Congressional Involvement

In mid-January 1988 Mike Andrews (D-Tex.) gladly accepted the opportunity to tour the Second Manassas battlefield with his friend, noted Civil War historian Dr. Frank Vandiver. They tramped around the Brawner Farm and discussed the pivotal actions taken by the South to win a second resounding victory at Manassas. A few days later, while flying home to Houston, Andrews read in the Washington Post that the Hazel/Peterson Companies planned to build a shopping mall on Stuart's Hill. Astounded by the incongruity of having a regional mall where Lee had had his headquarters, Andrews called his colleague Bob Mrazek (D-N.Y) and enlisted his support in stopping the mall. [27]

For Andrews, the mall threatened to change forever the nature of the Manassas National Battlefield Park. With this "monstrous behemoth development next door," Andrews believed that the park's integrity would be lost. Mall traffic on the fragile park roads would be "devastating, insurmountable," and a critical part of the battlefield—Stuart's Hill—would be destroyed. The fact that the battlefield was in a congressional district other than that of Texan Andrews or New Yorker Mrazek did not stop Andrews. In his opinion, everyone in the federal government had a responsibility to ensure the protection of national parks. And Andrews did not agree with Interior Secretary Hodel that the compromise plan of closing the roads and allowing construction of the mall would preserve the historic Manassas landscape. [28]

Andrews and Mrazek first tried to talk with Til Hazel to resolve the controversy. Hazel's determined response, "no one is going to stop me from building this mall," convinced them to look elsewhere for support. They established contacts with the Save the Battlefield Coalition and exercised their legislative authority within the House of Representatives. In April they inserted language into a supplemental appropriations bill for the Department of Transportation that prohibited federal funds from being used to plan, design, or construct an interchange on I-66 at the William Center. Without the vital interchange, Andrews and Mrazek reasoned, the mall would not be able to survive and thus would not be built. Then, in May, they introduced H.R. 4526, which would have authorized the federal government to purchase the entire William Center tract and incorporate it into the Manassas battlefield park. [29]

But H.R. 4526 did not offer much hope of meeting the immediate threat of Hazel/Peterson's twenty-four-hour construction crews at the William Center. Before the House Subcommittee on National Parks and Public Lands would hold a hearing on the bill and thus begin the review and approval process, its chairman, Bruce Vento (D-Minn.), required that Andrews and Mrazek obtain 200 cosponsors for the bill. The two junior congressmen walked the House floor every time there was a vote and convinced members to sign on, even as Virginia's congressional representatives kept silent. The media attention generated by the SBC and the resulting flood of letters from concerned citizens across the country to their representatives helped Andrews and Mrazek in their task. In short order, they had well over the needed 200 cosponsors. [30]

Despite this initial success, H.R. 4526 faced an uphill battle. Congress was scheduled to recess in August and adjourn in October for election-year campaigning, leaving little time for discussion and passage of the bill. If, miraculously, the bill was passed and signed by the president, Hazel/Peterson would retain the right to develop the tract until Congress appropriated money for its acquisition and the Park Service completed a land protection plan justifying the purchase. Previous experience suggested that ultimate federal government acquisition of the William Center tract could be five years distant. This would give Hazel/Peterson time to construct the mall, irretrievably scar the landscape, and increase the land's value, making it prohibitively expensive. [31]

Frank Wolf (R-Va.) broke the Virginia congressional delegation's silence and offered a solution. For Wolf, "if this land [was] so important," as demonstrated by the national outcry and the professional opinions of historians, then "the government should have it." On 25 May, Wolf introduced H.R. 4691, which utilized a rarely used procedure called a "legislative taking" to allow the federal government to take immediate control of the property and to compensate the landowners at a later date. Legislative takings had been used in 1968 and 1978 for the Redwood National Park in California and in 1974 for the Piscataway Park in Maryland. H.R. 4691 also included $30 million for studying the feasibility of rerouting Lee Highway and Sudley Road out of the battlefield park, thereby addressing some of the concerns of the Interior Department. Hearings in Vento's subcommittee proceeded in rapid fashion on both H.R. 4526 and H.R. 4691 on 21 June. [32]

Congress's response to these bills depended on its reaction to the continuing war being played out in the national media over the William Center. By the end of May, Interior Secretary Hodel had joined the fray, publishing blistering attacks against Andrews, Mrazek, and other Democrats who had indicated support for H.R. 4526. In a letter to the Houston Chronicle, Hodel accused Andrews of using the Manassas battlefield issue to gain media attention at the expense of the U.S. taxpayers, who would have to foot the estimated $70 million bill for the William Center tract. Hodel accused Andrews of playing politics, although observers noted that none of the Republican sponsors of H.R. 4526 saw similar letters published in their districts. [33]

Aside from attempting to make the controversy a partisan issue, Hodel did raise two important points for Congress to consider before passing the proposed legislation. First, the cost of the William Center tract continued to escalate as Hazel/Peterson Companies proceeded with nonstop construction work. When discussions with the Interior Department and the National Park Service on the compromise plan had deteriorated, Til Hazel followed his maxim, "never give up," and pushed ahead. He decided that if Congress passed the legislative taking, he would make it an "expensive take." Congress thus had to justify the expected high price for the land. [34]

Second, Hodel wondered how far national park boundaries should extend to provide adequate protection of their natural and cultural resources. Hodel felt there had to be a reasonable limit that took cost into account. This issue had been debated during the previous boundary expansion attempts at the Manassas National Battlefield Park. Historical significance had been a primary factor, along with the desire to have the park shield itself by acquiring tracts between historic areas. With the William Center land, both its historical significance with regard to Second Manassas and the effect of large-scale development on the battlefield park warranted, in the eyes of SBC supporters, federal acquisition. Mott's call for partnerships between the federal government and local interests had shown its strengths and weaknesses during the William Center controversy. When Superintendent Swain had entered into negotiations with Hazel/Peterson Companies in 1986, the resulting office park complex addressed the Park Service's most serious concerns. But these negotiations proved insufficient once the developer announced the mall. Congress had to decide if it should rely on such partnerships in the future. [35]

As Hodel tried to undercut the efforts of the Democratic members of Congress with his articles in local newspapers, the Save the Battlefield Coalition organized a huge rally at the battlefield park on a steamy Saturday in mid-July. This kept the mall issue in the media as Congress recessed for the Fourth of July holiday. The coalition ensured television coverage by using a special "TV blue" backdrop for the stage, which is most compatible with television cameras, and having as many celebrities as possible participate. These efforts paid off. As one of Jody Powell's associates at Ogilvy & Mather stated, the rally was "critical because we got such incredible media." An estimated 5,000 people joined Snyder, Powell, Representative Mrazek and other members of Congress, and radio and newspaper personalities for a day of speeches and commemoration. Willard Scott, an NBC-TV weather man, spoke on the meaning of the Manassas National Battlefield Park to him, a resident of Virginia and a Civil War enthusiast. Scott had long been interested in the outcome of the William Center controversy, aiding publicity by televising one of his weather broadcasts from the park during the controversy's early stages. [36]

Fig. 15. Youths dressed in Civil War-era costumes, reminders of the youngsters who had served and died during the 1861-62 battles, dotted the estimated 5,000-strong crowd of supporters at Manassas battlefield park who gathered one steamy Saturday in mid-July 1988 to demonstrate their opposition to the William Center mall. These boys, Thomas and Stephen Edgar, pictured with their father Tomas, were members of the United Youth Army of the North and South. (Photo by Andres Alonso. © 1988, The Washington Post. Reprinted with permission)

Celebrities helped draw media attention, but the incongruity of having a shopping mall—that bastion of twentieth-century materialism—next to the battlefield park drew ordinary people. They traveled from as far away as Ohio, California, and even Puerto Rico to sport buttons reading "Stonewall the Mall, Save Manassas" and participate in the protest. Civil War reenactors, braving the 104-degree heat in their heavy woolen uniforms, gave demonstrations for the crowd. Participants joined the SBC in a rendition of the organization's theme song, "Manassas There's No Need for You to Die, performed by the artists who had recorded it, Dusty Rose and Tom Lofgren. Written by David Lowe and released to area radio stations in May, this song created an emotional appeal that drew people together. Its last stanza, sung against the backdrop of a Civil War fife and drum, encapsulated the issue for many:

So I drove out to Manassas, stood alone and watched the sunset
I imagined I would see grandfather fall
Behind the place where he was standing
Just before the bullet took him
Is where they're going to build a SHOPPING MALL.

The bluntness of the image of a shopping mall standing where a Civil War soldier had fallen personalized the struggle and contributed to the rally's success. [37]

This overwhelming support for saving the battlefield, along with the potential for political exploitation, drew an immediate response from one of Virginia's silent congressional leaders. Sen. John Warner had first declined an invitation to participate in the rally, but as the date neared and the publicity increased, he realized the political value of attending. He still did not intend to address the audience, but a lengthy conversation with Willard Scott changed Warner's mind. Responding to the crowd's enthusiasm, Warner promised to introduce legislation to preserve a portion of the William Center tract from development. When Congress reconvened in September, he laid out his plan: federal purchase of 136 acres, or one-quarter of the land, using a legislative taking; mall construction banned on the rest of the tract; $11.9 million to build an interchange on Interstate 66 for the Route 234 bypass; and a study of new roads needed to replace Lee Highway and Sudley Road, should they be closed to through traffic in the battlefield park. Warner later scaled back the amount of land to 80 acres by eliminating some of the buffer along Lee Highway and thereby reducing the estimated cost of his proposal. In the Senate subcommittee hearing Warner argued that his plan protected the most historic areas of the tract, allowed the developer to build the office park as originally proposed, addressed the Park Service's concerns about traffic through the battlefield park, and saved the taxpayers the high cost of buying the entire tract. [38]

Some preservationists see Warner's announcement at the July rally as turning the tide toward acquisition. Having the senior member of the Virginia congressional delegation—and a Republican—admit that Stuart's Hill should be federal land strengthened the cause against the mall. In remarkably speedy fashion, in August before its recess, the House voted overwhelmingly for Andrews's and Mrazek's H.R. 4526, which had been amended to include Wolf's language of a legislative taking and the $30 million road study. The highly publicized rally and Warner's presence in the debate certainly influenced the outcome of this vote. [39]

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