In the spring of 1864 the US Army of the Potomac and Confederate Army of Northern Virginia found themselves in the same position they had been a year earlier, with one major difference. Lincoln had appointed General Ulysses S. Grant commander of all US armies. In the spring of 1864, Grant planned to increase the pressure on the Confederacy with a series of coordinated assaults across the South. In Virginia, this plan led to a series of engagements where the US Army slowly pushed the Confederates towards Richmond, known as the Overland Campaign. The Battle of the Wilderness was the first clash of the Overland Campaign and the beginning of the end of Lee's Confederate Army.
The battlefield includes shared public roads that may move at high speeds. Drive carefully. This route and audio tour is also available via the National Park Service app (available at the Apple Store and on Google Play).
This small clearing in the woods off modern-day Constitution Highway (Route 20) was the location of US General Ulysses S. Grant's headquarters during the Battle of the Wilderness.
Difficult to see today, hidden in the woods off the Orange Turnpike, modern-day Constitution Highway, was once a small clearing on a small hill. It was here that Ulysses S. Grant would spend much of the Battle of the Wilderness, doing his best to coral and coordinate his large force. A small tent city would have sprung up here to house all the various command and control elements of the Grant’s and Meade’s respective headquarters.
Grant brought more than just the Army of the Potomac, commanded by George Gordon Meade with him, he also brought the US 9th Corps commanded by Ambrose Burnside. Because Burnside technically outranked Meade, rather than folding the 9th Corps into the Army of the Potomac Grant planned on coordinating the two forces together himself. These attempts at coordination would take up much of his time while the moment-to-moment details were largely left up to Meade.
Wilderness Driving Tour, #1, Grant's Headquarters
Welcome to the Wilderness Battlefield Driving Tour! This 8-part tour guides you though the events that shaped the Battle of the Wilderness in May of 1864. The Battle of the Wilderness was a turning point in the war that would shape events to come. The first engagement of US General Ulysses S. Grant's Overland Campaign, the Battle of the Wilderness marked the beginning of the end of Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia.
In 1864, for the fourth time in three years, the US Army of the Potomac crossed the Rappahannock and Rapidan Rivers on the offensive. In 1862 and 1863, bad luck and lackluster leadership prevented the Army from decisively defeating the Confederates in their territory. But by the end of 1863, the war seemed like it had taken a turn thanks to three major US victories. Ulysses S. Grant cemented Union control of the Mississippi River with the capture of Vicksburg, Mississippi. The Army of the Potomac, led by George Gordon Meade, defeated the supposedly invincible Army of Northern Virginia at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. Another Federal victory at Chattanooga, Tennessee, opened the heartland of the deep south to invasion . But by the spring of 1864, the war was still far from over. On March 2nd, 1864, Grant was promoted to Lieutenant General and made General in Chief of the US Army. Grant no longer commanded an individual field army but instead was tasked with directing the entire US war effort, and he was running out of time. The upcoming 1864 election loomed over the US war effort, and Lincoln worried that the war had strained the Northern public’s will to continue. With victory still uncertain and hundreds of thousands of men dead, the Democrats running on a peace platform seemed poised to sweep the polls . That could mean an end to the war with a reunited nation and slavery still intact; or, a peace deal with the Confederacy resulting in two separate nations. With this hanging over him, Grant needed to move fast; he either needed to win the war before the election or at least convince the American public that military victory was at hand by the time they headed for the polls. Grant designed a grand campaign for the spring of 1864. The goal was to launch simultaneous attacks throughout the country; each US field army was assigned a specific goal that, if successful, could end the war quickly and decisively. General George Meade’s Army of the Potomac's assignment was a familiar one, defeat and destroy Robert E Lee's Confederate Army of Northern Virginia. So vital was this mission that rather than stay in Washington DC as his predecessor had, Grant made his headquarters in the field alongside Meade. This made for an awkward command situation. Meade had offered Grant his resignation, assuming the new army commander would want one of his own people in command of the Army of the Potomac. Grant kept him in charge, but Meade worried Grant’s presence would overshadow his own, both militarily, and publicly. After the enormous losses the Army of the Potomac suffered after Gettysburg, the army was reorganized. From eight corps in the summer of 1863 the army was consolidated into just four. The US 2nd Corps under General Winfield Scott Hancock, the 5th Corps commanded by General Gouverneur K Warren, and General John Sedgwick’s US 6th Corps, and finally the Cavalry Corps lead by General Philip Sheridan. Offsetting the simplified Army of the Potomac, however, was the presence of General Ambrose Burnside’s US 9th Corps. Burnside technically outranked Meade, so rather than attach the 9th Corps to the Army of the Potomac, Grant intended to coordinate the Army of the Potomac and the 9th Corps as separate forces himself. Partially for this reason, Burnside’s command would play a limited role in the coming battle, and the arrangement ultimately proved unwieldy and unworkable. Here on the morning of May 5th, 1864, you would have seen thousands of US soldiers preparing to march south. One more good day's march, and they would be out of the woods into open terrain where Grant and Meade could best use the 120,000 men of the Army of the Potomac. But Robert E Lee had other plans. Lee wanted to intercept the US forces before they left the Wilderness, planning to use the thick woods to his advantage. When Union troops reported Confederates approaching from the west along the Orange Turnpike (the modern-day route 20), Grant came here. In 1864 this land was cleared and open, and while it's hard to tell now, is a slight hill. Grant's battlefield headquarters became a small tent city from which Grant tried his best to direct the battle in concert with Meade. As General in Chief and not directly in command of the Army of the Potomac, Grant left much of the fluid decision-making on Meade's shoulders. Grant occupied much of his time between decisions, whittling, and chain-smoking cigars, anxiously waiting to see how the Army of the Potomac would perform. It had beat Lee at Gettysburg, but it would need more than a single victory to win the war. This eight-stop tour will take you through the landscape and story of the 1864 Battle of the Wilderness and will take about an hour and a half to complete. The Wilderness of Spotsylvania County can be a confusing place to be, just as much so today as in 1864. To help keep yourself oriented, modern-day Route 20, the historical Orange Turnpike, will take you west through the northern part of the battlefield, and Hill-Ewell Drive will be taking you south to the Orange Plank Road, where you will finish the tour moving east towards the Brock Road which runs north – south.
Driving Directions to Wilderness Battlefield Exhibit Shelter, Stop #2 (optional stop at Ellwood Manor)
To head directly to the Wilderness Exhibit Shelter: Drive south on Constitution Hwy (Route 20) for 1.3 miles and look for the sign for the Wilderness Battlefield Exhibit Shelter, Tour Stop #2, on the right.
To stop at Ellwood Manor: Drive south for 0.2 miles and take a left turn into the Ellwood Manor driveway. The gate is only open when the house is open, but the grounds are always open sunrise to sunset.
The Wilderness Battlefield Exhibit Shelter sits in Saunders Field, where the first shots of the Battle of the Wilderness were fired.
The initial clash between the US Army of the Potomac and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia at the Battle of the Wilderness took place here, in Saunders Field. One of the few monuments on the Wilderness Battlefield, this one for the 140th New York Volunteer Infantry, is located here and memorializes the actions of May 5, 1864.
Here at Tour Stop 2 you will find the Wilderness Battlefield Exhibit Shelter. Many people start their tour of the Wilderness Battlefield here. If you are doing so and would like to reach the parking area for Grant's Headquarters, Tour Stop 1, you can leave the parking lot here, turn left, and drive back. Or, you can simply listen to the audio here. In the shelter is a series of signs and exhibits that provide a general overview of the Battle of the Wilderness. If you have the time, take a moment to look through the information here, and in particular examine the battle painting, which provides a bird's eye view of what the battle may have looked like. Also available here is a 2-mile walking trail that runs north into the forest and traces the Confederate battle line as well as the action of Confederate General John Gordan’s flank attack on May 6th. This attack was the last major action of the Battle of the Wilderness.
Wilderness Driving Tour, #2, Saunders Field Part 1
Part 2 of the Wilderness Battlefield Driving Tour explores the area of Saunders Field near the US lines around the present day Wilderness Battlefield Exhibit Shelter. The US Army initially planned to march through the densely wooded area known as the Wilderness of Spotsylvania, but Confederate General Robert E. Lee had other plans. On the morning of May 5, 1864, the battle began as the two armies clashed in this field.
The Wilderness of Spotsylvania County is aptly named. As a result of clear-cutting for farming and iron mining, the woods here consisted of dense second and third growth forest. In addition, most of the land here had been abandoned decades before the war, culminating in a land that was truly wild.
General Winfield Scott Hancock, commanding the US 2nd Corps describing the wilderness said “The immediate region of the wilderness was known to our army and its leadership as one of the most difficult and perplexing in which soldiers were ever called to operate. A region though portions of which troops could not be forced without completely breaking up their formation, over all of which there were few opportunities for the use of artillery. It was a region in which the power of discipline almost disappeared, and in which tactics were practically impossible.”
On the morning of May 5th soldiers of the US 5th Corps prepared to continue their march south. Indeed, a large portion of the corps, the 3rd division under General Samuel Crawford, was already moving. Other soldiers of the corps arrived here, at Saunders’ Field, one of the few clearings in the suffocating Wilderness. As the morning progressed, however, troubling signs appeared on the horizon. Sentries reported dust clouds rising from the Orange Turnpike to the west; it was not long before Confederate soldiers emerged from the dust clouds. Lee's Army was also split into three infantry corps : the 1st Corps under James Longstreet, the 2nd Corps under Richard Ewell, and the 3rd Corps under AP Hill. On May 5, Longstreet's Corps was a day's march away, so Lee only had two-thirds of his Army available. Lee wanted to keep the US from moving further south but did not want to bring on a full battle until Longstreet arrived. Lee took the two Corps he had and started moving them east along two parallel roads, the Orange Plank Road to the south and the Orange Turnpike (modern day route 20) to the north. Both were advancing on intersections the US army would need to pass through; capturing either would stop the Army of the Potomac dead in its tracks. Even just getting close would likely halt the Federal advance, buying time for Longstreet to arrive with the rest of the Army. Here on the Orange Turnpike, General Ewell found the US 5th Corps already in control of the targeted intersection. Heeding his orders from Lee to not bring on a major battle before Longstreet had arrived, Ewell stopped short and had his men start digging into a defensive line. As word filtered up to Grant and Meade, they decided to attack the Confederates. At 730 a.m., the order came down to General G.K. Warren, commanding the 5th Corps, to attack Lee's Army, but this was easier said than done. Before he could attack, Warren needed to form his command into a proper battle line. The process took time in the best of cases, and the Wilderness was not a best case. His command had started marching south first thing in the morning and was spread out over miles. To make matters worse, the dense forest and scarce roads of the Wilderness made any movement slow and communication difficult. Here at Saunders’ Field, Gen. Charles Griffin's division of the 5th Corps, which had been first to see Confederates and raise the alarm, prepared for the now inevitable collision. US soldiers dug trenches and cut down trees to reinforce them, creating a solid series of earthworks. Should they be attacked first, or if their attack failed, they would have a strong position to rally on and fight. To their west, the Confederates were preparing in much the same way, but despite the two armies' closeness to each other, neither could see what the other was doing through the thick foliage. As Captain Amos Judson of the 83rd Pennsylvania described it, "Here were two armies forming line of battle for a desperate struggle, within half a mile of each other, scarcely a movement of either of which could be observed by the other." As Warren struggled to get his command into line, Meade received word of Confederates marching down the Orange Plank Road as well. What Meade initially believed was a diversion on the turnpike that could be quickly snapped up for an easy victory now revealed itself for what it was:, a full-blown Confederate offensive, and Lee was dangerously close to outmaneuvering the Army of the Potomac. For now, that was Meade's problem, as Warren had plenty of his own. While he got his men ready for battle, he hoped for reinforcement from General John Sedgwick's 6th Corps, which had started marching to his aid that morning. However, Sedgwick's advance was slowed by bad roads and hounded by Confederates. By noon Meade had lost his patience and ordered Warren to make the attack with whatever he had on hand. From the east to west, through the field you now stand in, 8500 US soldiers, like a wave off the ocean, swept forth to clash against the Confederate battle line. All would remember the violence of the collision for the rest of their lives.
Driving Directions to Saunders Field, Stop #3
Continue southwest along Constitution Hwy (Route 20) for 0.2 miles and turn left on Hill-Ewell Drive. Look out for the Tour Stop #3, Saunders Field sign in 0.1 miles and park in the pull out on your right.
From here, Confederates found cover in the woods of the Wilderness and were able to repel Union attacks, but, like their US counterparts, could not cross the open space to dislodge their opponents.
Saunders’ Field was an agricultural clearing. The Wilderness has a long, if inconsistent, history of agriculture. When Europeans first began to settle the area much of the old growth forest was cleared to make way for farms, tobacco in particular. Over farming left much of the land unable to support agriculture. Some parts of the Wilderness transitioned to more industrial activities. Iron and gold mining cleared even more land before most of it was effectively abandoned.
Over time the land recovered, and the snarl of brush and trees that today is called the Wilderness began to grow in. Not all the land was left to itself. Some people stayed and others left, creating a patchwork of farms and slave plantations of every size and type, big and small, wealthy and poor. Saunders’ Field fell neatly into the mix. Owned by a New Yorker, it was farmed by its namesake the Saunders’ family. At the time of the battle, it would have been populated by the leftover stubs of corn stalks.
Wilderness Driving Tour, #3, Saunders Field Part 2
The fighting in Saunders Field seesawed back and forth during the Battle of the Wilderness. Confederates held this end of the field and constructed defenses at the edge of the tree line. Part 3 of the Wilderness Driving Tour explores the chaos and confusion at Saunders Field that defined the fighting here.
You now stand on the southwestern part of Saunders field, on the Confederate battle line. Here General John Jones's brigade of Virginians laid in wait for the US attack, watching as a wave of blue-clad soldiers marched out of the wood line and into the field in front of you. The US battle line stretched the entire 2000 foot width of Saunders’ Field, which today is about half as wide as it was in 1864, and a mile and a half south of it. As US troops moved forward, they ran into problems after the first step. Moving faster in the open field than their comrades in the woods to the south, the US battleline broke into disconnected chunks immediately. Griffin’s Federal troops were left exposed to the Confederate defenders, who met them with a rain of lead and iron. At first, the attack here went relatively well for the US troops. Even though some regiments became disconnected from the units to their south, the US battle lines stayed largely intact. On both sides of the Orange Turnpike, Confederate troops gave way. General Jones’s death early in the attack left the Confederate defenders south of the turnpike without a leader in a crucial moment. Troops from Gen. Charles Griffin's Union division penetrated the defenses held by Jones's and General George Steuart's Confederate brigades. However, as the Union troops gained ground, they found themselves lost and disoriented in the woods. The black powder smoke produced by soldiers' muskets was trapped by the thick woods, making it impossible to see what was happening. As US Regular Sergeant Burgess Ingersoll recalled, it became "a weird, uncanny contest – a battle of invisibles with invisibles. Men's faces were sweaty black from biting cartridges, and a sort of grim ferocity seemed to creep into the actions and appearance of everyone within the limited range of vision." To make matters worse, the Confederate battleline was longer than the Federals’. When the attack landed, the Confederates simply swung the longer northern part of their line down onto the US troops, outflanking and outnumbering them. As some Union soldiers fell back, others were left behind and surrounded. North of the turnpike, the 140th New York, which had been in the first wave and broken through the Confederate lines, was now trapped inside the Confederate Army and forced to fight their way back out. Here on the south of the turnpike, Alabamians counter attacked the confused and disoriented US soldiers. Some Union troops accidentally ran towards the Confederate soldiers as they tried to retreat. As they fled, many soldiers, the wounded in particular, collected in the swale, the depression that runs diagonally across Saunders’ Field in front of you. While the fighting devolved into small independent struggles for survival, the woods caught fire. As the fires spread, many wounded soldiers from both sides were consumed by them. As the US forces retreated across Saunders’ Field, some Confederates followed them and counterattacked. But Warren had advanced a reserve force in the trenches the US soldiers had already built, and the reserves stopped the uncoordinated Confederate counterattack cold. But the Confederates were not going to go back empty-handed if they could help it. During the assaults, two cannon from Battery D, 1st New York Artillery, advanced to support the infantry. But the guns were mostly useless. Ordered to set up in the field just south of the turnpike, the gun crews found themselves unable to aim high enough to fire directly on any Confederate positions. Instead, they fired diagonally across the field, putting the Union soldiers in just as much danger as the Confederates. When the US attack collapsed and the Confederates counter-attacked, these guns were left behind. First captured by the 1st and 3rd North Carolinian Infantry regiments, who were forced off by other Federals, the guns were captured again by the 6th Alabama. For a moment, the two Confederate units faced off, both convinced the capture of the guns were rightly theirs. They were so focused on their internal argument that the battle raging around them was forgotten, and a regiment of Federals tried to retake the guns, but the field was a no-man's land of fire and lead, and while the Confederates were driven away, the Federals were forced back themselves, leaving the guns abandoned in the field. This constant back and forth, attack and counterattack like a bloody pendulum would come to define not only the fighting at Saunders field, but the Battle of the Wilderness as a whole.
Driving Directions to Higgerson Farm, Stop #4
Continue southeast on Hill-Ewell Drive for 0.7 miles until you see the sign for Tour Stop #4, Higgerson Farm, and park in the pull out on the right.
Currently all that is left of Higgerson Farm is this mound where a structure once stood.
The Higgerson family farm rested here, just south of the Orange Turnpike. Known also as Spring Hill or Oak Hill, the farm was modestly successful, no small feat in the Wilderness, especially without enslaved labor. The 1860 census recorded Benjamin Higgerson’s land as valued at $500 and his other property at $1370. Living on the property at the time were Benjamin himself, his wife Permelia, and their children John, Jacqueline, William, and Walter, aged between 8 and 2 years old. Like many of the homes here the farmhouse was a wood frame building one and a half stories tall. Unlike most of their neighbors, at least some of the Higgerson family stayed put during the battle. Permelia went so far as to admonish the US soldiers advancing though her yard and mocked them during their retreat. Although active fighting took place on their land, the Higgersons’ home survived the war.
Wilderness Driving Tour, #4, Higgerson Farm
The Higgerson Farm was one of a few scattered homesites in located on the Wilderness Battlefield. During the battle, US troops in the Iron Brigade clashed with Confederates here who ultimately repulsed the Federal troops back the the US line at Ellwood. Part 4 of the Wilderness Driving Tour covers the experiences of the Iron Brigade at the Higgerson Farm.
The tangled Wilderness contained a few scattered farms. One was Saunders’ Field, which you have already seen, another was the Higgerson Farm, which you stand on now. While Griffin's Federal division fought the Confederates to your north, here was the division of General James Wadsworth. To your north (your right if your back is to the tour road) was the Iron Brigade, made up of Wisconsin, Michigan, Indiana, and New York men. Here at the Higgerson Farm itself was Col. Roy Stone's brigade of Pennsylvanians, and to the south Gen. James Rice's Brigade. In the trees to their front were the Confederate brigades of Gen. John Gordan's Georgians and Gen. Junius Daniel’s North Carolinians. The dense woods of the Wilderness, however, prevented either side from seeing each other until they were almost right on top of one another. Unlike Griffin's division, which advanced over the mostly open ground around Saunders’ Field, Wadsworth's men plunged into the woods. Before their advance began, soldiers in Stone's brigade were less than confident about their odds. One man told his comrades, "boys, label yourselves, if we must go down there, as you will never come back." So dense were the trees of the Wilderness that officers found it impossible to control their soldiers— regimental lines disappeared into the woods and immediately became entangled with or wholly disconnected from units to their left and right. Keeping a moving battleline straight was hard enough on the parade ground, profoundly challenging in dense woods, and pointless to even attempt in the Wilderness. Hidden by the trees were innumerable small creeks and gullies, and with every step the US soldiers were redirected in almost random directions by these hidden obstacles. Unable to see where they were going or hear the commands of their officers through the dense foliage, it was impossible to maintain anything but a random assortment of men heading in vaguely the same direction. North of the Higgerson Farm, the Iron Brigade ran into the southern end of the Confederate line at Saunders’ Field. However, the US soldiers became isolated from the rest of the division. At first breaking through the Confederate battleline, the Iron Brigade soon found itself outflanked by Confederate reinforcements. First was Gen. George Doles’s Confederate brigade, which began firing into the Federals from their right, followed by Gordan's Georgians, who smashed into their front and overlapped their left. Isolated from the rest of their support, disorganized by the terrain, and hit on three sides by Confederate forces, the Iron Brigade broke for the first time in its history. Famed for their fighting prowess, the Iron Brigade had suffered severe casualties on the first day at Gettysburg in July 1863. Almost a year later the Iron Brigade was a shadow of its former self and had only partially recovered. Diminished by years of hard service and isolated from help, the Confederate pressure was irresistible. The Iron Brigade’s retreat opened the rest of Wadsworth’s division to enemy fire on their unprotected sides. Here at the Higgerson Farm, the Pennsylvanians under Stone were having just as rough a go of it. Almost as soon as they hit the tree line on the other end of the field, they descended into a swamp described by one soldier as the "champion mud hole of all mud holes" just in time to run face-first into the counter charging Confederates of Gordon's brigade. Mired in mud and disorganized, the brigade devolved into a complete rout, men struggling to pull themselves out of the swamp fast enough to avoid capture or death. Many did not. The story played out much the same for Rice's brigade south of the Higgerson Farm. They, like Stone, ran headlong into counter charging North Carolinians under General Junius Daniel hidden by the woods, and approached suicidally close before firing and pitching-in with clubbed muskets. As isolated and outflanked as everyone else, they broke like the rest of the Federal line. As Wadsworth's shattered division retreated through the Wilderness, they tumbled into the clearings around the Ellwood Plantation, a little less than a mile to the east of the Higgerson farm . Here, Wadsworth succeeded in rallying his command and held a defensive line for the rest of the day. But the repulse was stunning, and some officers looked to cast blame. General Stone was one of them, blaming the 143rd Pennsylvania for the failure. Corporal Avery Harris of the 143rd disagreed. "I would have liked to have seen a rebel shell come and took the drunken head clean from his shoulders after he got through with his abuse. Could I photograph this hell hole that we were put in, I would then ask, what in the name of justice and cause and effect, had we to do with the outflanking and envelopment of the famous old Iron Brigade."
Driving Directions to Chewning Farm, Stop #5
Continue southeast along Hill-Ewell Drive for 1 mile until you see the sign for Tour Stop #5, Chewning Farm, and park in the pull out on your right.
The road here leads to the location of the Chewning Farm and was an important tactical location for Union and Confederate forces in the Wilderness.
More prosperous than most places in the Wilderness, Mount View was the home of the Chewning family and the center of their slave plantation. Family head William Chewning’s holdings were valued at a total of $14,400 in 1860, roughly equal to $500,000. Much of that wealth was in the form of human property. William Chewning held 13 enslaved people in 1860. The rest of his wealth was in his land, his house and outbuildings, livestock, and the wheat, rye, corn, oats, tobacco, wool, potatoes, butter, hay, and honey the farm produced in various amounts. No Civil War era accounts mention the presence of the Chewnings or their enslaved laborers during the battle. They presumably fled. The home was damaged during the war but survived to be repaired and reoccupied but was destroyed by fire in 1947.
Wilderness Driving Tour, #5, Chewning Farm
Part 5 of the Wilderness Driving Tour covers the Chewning Farm, located between the two main battle lines in the Wilderness. Holding this spot could have giving the US Army a great advantage in the battle, but this realization came too late.
The Chewning Farm represents the southernmost advance of the US 5th Corps on May 5th before the Battle of the Wilderness broke out. Around 8:00 am, the officer at the head of the advance, General Samuel Crawford, received orders to halt as a result of the Confederates spotted to the west and sent back a response of his own, stating that he had taken up a good position on the open fields and slight high ground of the Chewning Farm, and reported fighting between advancing Confederates and US cavalry on the Orange Plank Road about a mile to their south. Received by Meade around 9:00 am, this was the first evidence of a full Confederate offensive. More news arrived from Crawford at 10: 15am, confirming that the advancing Confederates were not just scouts but a large mass of infantry. Crawford's immediate superior, General Warren, ordered Crawford to fall back from the Chewning Farm and connect with the rest of the 5th Corps to be part of the offensive he was planning down the Orange Turnpike. Warren sent his aide, Major Washington Roebling, to deliver the order to Crawford . Upon his arrival at the Chewning Farm, Roebling recognized an opportunity. The Battle of the Wilderness was developing along two primary lines. One fight along the Orange Turnpike to the north, and the other fight along the Orange Plank Road to the south. Roebling immediately recognized that control of the Chewning Farm could be a decisive factor. Ultimately, the goal of the US forces was to move south. From there the only path the US Army could realistically use was the Brock Road, which both the Orange Turnpike and Plank Road intersected. Should the Confederates gain control of either intersection, the Army of the Potomac’s route south would be closed, and the campaign would be over before it had really begun. Even worse, if the Confederates took the Brock Road / Plank Road intersection, they would cut off the US 2nd Corps from the rest of the army. That would potentially allow the Army of Northern Virginia to outnumber, surround, and destroy them. Whoever controlled the intersections controlled the flow of the battle and its outcome. Recognizing it at the time, Roebling later wrote. "This field was a commanding plateau overlooking the ground to the north and west and connecting with the Plank Road by two good roads, one leading to Parker's Store, and the other to a point a mile east of the store,” "It became evident at once that it would be of the utmost importance to hold that field, as it's possession would divide Lee's Army into two parts if he attempted operations from the Plank Road and the Pike at the same time; and if he attempted to pass us and attack the 2nd corps further down the Plank Road we could fall upon his rear; again it was the best fighting ground in the whole neighborhood." Fortunately, the US 5th Corps already had the Turnpike / Brock Road intersection well in hand, but the only thing between the Confederate 3rd Corps and the Plank Road intersection was the 5th New York Cavalry Regiment. Roebling believed that Crawford’s division, in control of the farm, was ideally suited to both help protect the intersections and keep Lee’s army split in two. From the Chewning Farm, Crawford was barely more than a mile and half from the Plank Road. He was in the perfect position to make Confederate movements along the road towards the intersection difficult, if not impossible. Even if Crawford did nothing and simply kept his troops stationary, they could keep the two halves of Lee’s army separated, something Lee knew was possible and feared. Unfortunately, it wasn’t Roebling’s call to make. Warren wanted every possible soldier before he attacked down the Plank road, so he sent Roebling to order Crawford to pull out of the Chewning farm and hook up with the rest of the Corps. Both Crawford and Roebling recognized how important the Chewning Farm was, but Crawford proved indecisive. Unable to convince Warren he should stay; he took a half measure. Instead of attacking the advancing Confederates to his south and trying to secure the vital intersection or turning around joining the attack against the Confederates to his north, he sent a small portion of his command to join the 5th Corps attack, too few men and too late to do anything other than get caught up in the chaos of the failing offensive, only to abandon the Chewning Farm later that evening anyway. On May 6th, Confederates occupied the Chewning Farm and closed the gap Lee feared the US might use to split his army.
Driving Directions to Tapp Field, Stop #6
Continue east along Hill-Ewell Drive for 1.2 miles until you see the sign for Tour Stop #6, Tapp Field, and park in the pull out on the right.
The open clearing of Tapp Field was devastated after the Battle of the Wilderness.
The Widow Tapp Farm is that last of the clearings in the Wilderness that played a major role in the battle. Catharine Tapp, the widow from which the farm draws its modern name, lived here with three of her children, Bettie, Margaret, and Harriet Tapp, and her granddaughter Eliza “Phenie” Tapp when the battle began. Both her sons, William and James, had joined the Confederate army.
In the years leading up to the war the Tapp family scratched out a hardscrabble life on land they rented from the J. Horace Lacy, owner of the nearby Ellwood Plantation and Chatham Manor in Fredericksburg. Poor and insolvent at the time of the death of Catharine’s husband, Vincent, the family isn’t known to have owned any enslaved people, instead working the land themselves to earn their living. When Lee’s army arrived on May 5, The Tapps were warned that their home was going to become a battlefield and they fled to the west. Despite the heavy fighting that would take place around their farm, their home survived, and they returned here after the battle.
Wilderness Driving Tour, #6, Tapp Field
Learn about the Confederate occupation of Tapp Field on May 5-6, 1864 in Part 6 of the Wilderness Driving Tour. After being on the brink of complete antihalation, Confederate reinforcements saved Lee's army with little time to spare. From here the Confederates launched attacks on May 6 trying to dislodge the Federals from the critical Brock Road-Plank Road intersection.
Like the other clearings in the Wilderness, the fields around the farm of Widow Catherine Tapp were important ground for an army. While combat broke out at Saunders’ Field and the Higgerson Farm, and Union troops occupied the Chewning farm, Lee set up his headquarters for the coming fight here in Tapp’s fields. Situated along the Orange Plank Road, it was as good a place as any for Lee to lead his Army. Lee’s first objective for the area was the Brock Road intersection with the Orange Plank Road just a mile to the east of Widow Tapp’s. He was unaware of Crawford’s presence thanks to his inaction. Unfortunately for Lee, Meade realized the same thing as he gained a more complete picture of the battlefield into the late morning. While Hancock turned his Corps around and marched north to hook up with the rest of the Army, Meade also rushed George Washington Getty’s division of the US 6th Corps south to hold the intersection while Hancock reoriented. Shockingly stiff resistance from the 5th New York cavalry slowed the Confederate advance long enough for Getty to arrive, and Lee's golden opportunity started melting away. Lee pushed the lead division of AP Hill’s Confederate 3rd Corps to take the intersection, but Getty held firm. As reinforcements poured in, the Federals counter attacked. However, the fighting here devolved into the same bloody back and forth as at Saunder’s Field, neither army able to gain ground on the other before the setting sun put an end to the fighting on May 5th. Most importantly though, the Army of the Potomac was now reunited, and in control of both vital intersections. The Confederates were spread thin and disorganized. Overnight they choose not to reinforce their positions or reorganize their units. Assuming that Longstreet's Corps would arrive before the fighting renewed that morning, there seemed no need to worry. But when the sun rose on May 6th, Longstreet was nowhere to be seen. Instead, at 5:00 am, 20,000 Federal soldiers burst from the woods along the Brock Road and slammed like a hammer into the poorly prepared Confederates. Even worse for the Confederates, overnight, Meade had repositioned Wadsworth's division of the 5th Corps on the Confederate 3rd Corps' unprotected left flank. In concert with Hancock, the two groups were closing on the Confederates like a vice. Lee was forced to stand at his headquarters here on Tapp Field and watch as a third of his army disintegrated in front of him. Desperately trying to rally a defense before his entire army was lost, Lee lost his composure, yelling to one Confederate general as his men fled in disarray, "My God, General McGowan, is this splendid brigade of yours running like a flock of geese?" Before long, Federal troops began to appear on the edge of the Tapp Field clearing. The Confederate 3rd Corps was still in a general retreat; AP Hill became so desperate that he ordered Confederate artillery in the clearing to begin firing on the US troops, with Confederates still in the way. Twelve cannon forced to fire through their own men were now all that stood between the Confederate army and complete disaster. Lee had chosen to engage the US forces in the Wilderness, betting he could stop the Federal campaign much as he had done the year before on similar ground at the battle of Chancellorsville. Now it looked like he had led his Army to its doom. Just as all seemed lost Lee noticed a column of troops confidently marching up the Plank Road. An infusion of fresh infantry was exactly what he needed, so Lee rode up to them and asked who they were. “The Texas Brigade” came the answer from their commanding officer, General Gregg. Lee immediately ordered the Texans to charge, waving his hat in the air yelling “Texans always move them!” Caught up in the moment, Lee followed them as they advanced and prepared to charge into the Union onslaught. Noticing the army commander in their midst, the Texans stopped and called out “Go back General Lee go back!” The Confederacy lost one of its most famous generals, Stonewall Jackson, in these same woods a year ago, and the thought of losing another, worst of all Lee himself, was unacceptable. The Texans slowed their advance, and several tried to grab the reins of Lee’s horse and take him to the rear. But it was only when General Gregg requested Lee to retire that he left the front. As Lee turned to the rear he met with Longstreet, who was informed of Lee’s attempt to join the counterattack personally. Longstreet assured Lee that if left alone and given a free hand he would blunt the US assault and restore the Confederate lines. Finally convinced his presence was no longer needed, Lee moved further to the rear, leaving the details to his subordinates. Those details, it turned out, were simple but effective. Lining up his command on either side of the Orange Plank Road, Longstreet launched them against the US attackers in unrelenting waves. The first brigades to charge took horrific losses. Gregg’s Texas Brigade, whom Lee almost followed into the fight, went in with 800 men and came out with less than 250.
Driving Directions to Longstreet's Wounding, Stop #7
Continue east on Hill-Ewell Drive for 0.3 miles, then turn left onto Orange Plank Road. Drive for 0.4 miles until you see the sign for Tour Stop #7, Longstreet's Wounding, and park in the lot to your right.
Intense fighting in these woods in 1864 created fire, smoke, and ultimately, the confusion that would resulf in the accidental wounding of Confederate General James Longstreet.
One of the two roads that the Battle of the Wilderness formed along, the Orange Plank Road was a modern marvel of its time. Completed in 1853 the Orange Plank Road partially replaced the Orange Turnpike as the main route west out of Fredericksburg. The Plank Road was so called because rather than the crushed stone of the Turnpike, the Plank Road had a wood plank road surface for one lane. In some places the Plank Road used the same route as the Turnpike, but in others is diverged to make use of better ground. Just to the east of the battlefield is one of the places where the older Turnpike and newer Plank Road diverged from each other, creating the parallel roads the battle formed along.
By 1864 the road was in disrepair. Lower than expected revenue and higher-than-expected costs hurt the road company. The war hadn’t been kind either. Confederate soldiers who camped in the area over the winters pulled up the wood planks to use as firewood. Local civilians would scavenge much of what was left in the in an effort to rebuild after the war ended.
Arriving on the battlefield just in time, Confederate General Longstreet's led his corps in a flank attack against the Federal position at the Brock Road-Plank Road intersection. Initially successful, the attack could not dislodge the US position. In the confusion, Longstreet was wounded by his own men. Part 7 of the Wilderness Driving Tour explores Longstreet's attack and the consequences of his wounding.
While the Texans did little to regain lost ground, they stalled Hancock's attack. Fortunately for the Confederates, by this point, the US forces were almost as disorganized in success as the Confederates had been in retreat. Much like during the attacks at Saunder’s Field, maintaining control of large formations of men in the Wilderness was a tricky business. As the Confederates crumpled before them, US forces rushed forward, degrading unit cohesion and organization. That was not too much of a problem, as the US had forward momentum. But now that they were running into fresh Confederate units it made it more difficult to coordinate. Although the US forces were able to resist the initial Confederate counterattacks, they were not organized enough to retake the initiative. Longstreet's constant assaults ensured that the Federal forces did not have the breathing room to get reorganized. But in much the same way that the Federal assault became disordered by the terrain over time, so too did Longstreet's. First hitting the US troops just after 6 am, the Confederate counterattack began to stall out by 8 o’clock. The two forces settled into a desperate close-in fight, as the woods filled with black powder smoke. "The atmosphere of the woods was now thick and heavy with sulphureous smoke. There seemed not wind enough to raise the dense shroud which clung to our line. Of the struggle along the front of other divisions we really knew nothing. The continuous rack of musketry – the excitement – the cheers of our own brigade – the sometimes sharp and sullen yells of the enemy – all deadened our senses to the fact that we were not alone engaged, but that the entire Army of the Potomac was in the throes of combat with its hereditary antagonist." Charles Cowtan National Zouaves 10th New York Volunteer Infantry. The situation was about to get worse for the US troops, however. Just south of their battle line, and just south of where you now are, rested a clear-cut path intended for a railroad that had never been built. Unknown to the Federals, the chief engineer of the Army of Northern Virginia had scouted the trail and found it perfect for moving a large force unseen around the US lines. Four brigades totaling 6000 men were quietly advanced along the railroad grade until they were around the US left. Around 11 am the brigades unleashed themselves on the US troops, bursting out of the trees in front of you, in much the same way US troops had attacked the Confederates just a few hours before. Caught by surprise from the side, the US line caved in with frightening speed. The flank attack accomplished exactly what Longstreet had hoped it would, breaking the stalemate in the woods and making the Federal positions untenable. As Hancock himself said after the war, Longstreet "rolled me up like a wet blanket." Eager to follow up the success, Longstreet was quick to assemble another force to attack the retreating Federal soldiers, grabbing and advancing a brigade of South Carolina troops led by General Micah Jenkins. Longstreet placed himself near the head of the column along with Jenkins. This, it would turn out, was a mistake. Much of Longstreet's command, Jenkins included, had been recently issued new uniforms made from imported British fabric. Rather than the stereotypical gray or tan, these uniforms were a dark blue-gray color, described by some as being almost black. As the South Carolinians advanced, they found themselves in a sudden and deadly crossfire between the 12th and 41st Virginia Infantry, who in the maze of the wilderness had ended up facing each other on opposite sides of the Orange Plank Road. The Virginians began to fire on each other and their confusingly clothed advancing allies. General Jenkins was mortally wounded in the head and Longstreet took a bullet to the neck before the mistake was realized. Now Longstreet had met nearly the same fate as Stonewall Jackson a year earlier. At first staying on his horse Longstreet continued to ride forward, waving to the horrified troops that had shot him, but it did not take long for him to realize the severity of his wound, saying later “[T]he flow of blood admonished me that my work for the day was done.” Shot through his right shoulder and neck, the bullet took with it a piece of Longstreet’s spine. Although Longstreet would survive, he would never regain the use of his right arm, and his voice would never fully recover. He would not return to the Army until October. In 1863 Lee lost Jackson in the in these same woods just 3 miles away, now in 1864 he would temporarily lose Longstreet when he needed him most. Longstreet's wounding proved to be a lucky break for the US 2nd Corps. Without him to lead it, Longstreet’s attack was as paralyzed as their commander's right arm. It took hours to sort out the mess and reorganize Longstreet’s Corps, hours the Federals were all too happy to put to use.
Driving Directions to the Brock Road-Plank Road Intersection, Stop #8
Continue east along Orange Plank Road for 0.3 miles until you see the sign for Tour Stop 8, Brock Road-Plank Road Intersection, and park in the lot to your right.
Today, this intersection can be busy with vehicle traffic, but during the Battle of the Wilderness, this intersection meant everything to the Army of the Potomac.
Like so many battles of the Civil War before it, and those that followed, roads and intersections dictated much of the fighting at the Wilderness. The roads leading south to Richmond had brought the US Army to the area in 1862 for the Battle of Fredericksburg. Roads and intersections at Chancellorsville made Jackson’s famous flank attack possible, while their absence from Hooker’s maps left him ignorant to their possibility. Without the many road junctions at Gettysburg there may never have been a battle there at all.
The Wilderness too had its intersections, none more important than where the Orange Plank Road and Brock Road met. On the first day of the Battle of the Wilderness, capture of the Orange Plank Road by Confederates would have spelled doom for the US Army’s efforts. The fact that the Confederates failed to capture the intersection ensured that the campaign would not end here.
Part 8, the final part of the Wilderness Driving Tour, explores the critical juncture that Federal forces defended throughout the Battle of the Wilderness. With access to the route south, Federal Commander Ulysses S. Grant decided to do what other leaders had previously avoided: push south. This decision would prove to be one of the most consequential moments in the war.
While Longstreet's wounding may have been a lucky break for the Federals, it would not have done them very much good if they had not made the proper preparations the evening before. Unlike the Confederate 3rd Corps, the US 2nd Corps had spent the night entrenching. Here at the intersection and stretching to the north and south, US troops dug several lines of trenches and earthworks along the Brock Road. As they retreated towards the road, these defenses made natural rallying points. South of the Orange Plank Road, the US troops, were shattered, but to the north, protected from the worst of the flank attack, many of the regiments came back largely intact. Taking up positions behind their trenches, these regiments were ready to defend the vital Brock Road in relatively short order. Shattered as they were, many of the Union soldiers on the south side of the Orange Plank Road began working on reorganizing and solidifying their lines for another fight behind the protection of trenches. "It was our one hope – shattered, fatigued, and out of ammunition as we were by this time – to get across the parapet and, after a short rest in the hollow ground in the rear, to re-form and be ready again for action." Thomas Galwey 8th Ohio. Winfield S. Hancock, commanding the 2nd Corps, threw his energies into reorganizing and preparing his command for the inevitable Confederate attack. Around 4:15, Confederate troops beat back the US picket lines and began to slam into the Federal trenches. Lee hoped to simply smash through the Federal battle line with pure brute force. For half an hour, the Confederates blasted away at the US positions, however, the Union soldiers were well protected as they poured lethal rifle fire into the stubborn and exposed Confederates . A chance to break the US line came when a portion of the trenches here caught fire, forcing the defenders to abandon them. Confederates seized the opportunity and broke through right in front of a US artillery battery, which loaded their guns with canister—cans of iron balls—turning them into giant shotguns. US infantry surged into the breach and beat the Confederates back in hand-to-hand fighting. By 6 pm, the Confederate attack had failed, leaving Lee little more than a long causality list to show for it. On the north side of the battlefield, back at Saunders’ Field, the Confederates tried one more attack and struck the Federal flank there, but it came too late in the day, and the setting of the sun all but ended the battle of the Wilderness on the evening of May 6. On May 7th, Grant and Meade had a hard decision to make. More than 29,000 men were dead, missing, or wounded, 17,666 Federals and approximately 11,400 Confederates. It became clear to them that any more fighting where they were was useless. They had tried everything they could, and none of it had worked. At any other point in the war, the two armies would have separated. They would have spent the next few weeks or even months recovering from their fight before either made a move. But this was not any other point in the war, and Lincoln was about to find out. On May 6th Henry Wing, a correspondent from the New York Tribune, left the battlefield for Washington with reports of the first day of the battle. As it would turn out he would be the first person to bring any news of the fighting to the national capital. Haggling for time on a US government telegraph line in Union Mills 20 miles from DC, his report came to the attention of Lincoln himself. Wing was transported to the White House to report on the situation directly to the President. Wing revealed that before leaving the wilderness Grant have given him a message for the president. Grant’s message was simple “Well, if you see the President, tell him from me that, whatever happens, there will be no turning back.” Lincoln was so overjoyed by this news that he lifted Wing off the ground in a bear hug and planted a kiss on the messenger's forehead. For more than three years, Lincoln had been looking for a General that would stand his ground and finally fight the war to a finish. Now he knew he had finally found one. As soon as the sun set on May 7, the Army of the Potomac marched for Spotsylvania Courthouse. There, Grant hoped to return to the original plan of getting in between Lee and Richmond. For the first time, the Army of the Potomac had fought the enemy and made the decision to keep the initiative; to force Lee to react to them, rather than the other way around. For the next 11 months, the Army of the Potomac would only do two things. They were either fighting the Confederates, or marching to the next fight. The Battle of the Wilderness was the beginning of the end for the Army of Northern Virginia. But first, the two armies would come to blows once again, just 10 miles down the Brock Road around the Spotsylvania County Courthouse.
