Chapter Eight:
Controlling Development: How Much Is Too Much? (1947-1972)
(continued)
By the middle of the 1950s, everyone in the Park
Service and an increasing number of outside observers knew that the
system was in trouble. Congress had chosen to neglect the nation's
parklands; facilities and structures were seriously declining, yet
visitors continued to pour in at alarming rates. Hamstrung by budget
constraints, the administration of a single park, or for that matter of
an entire region, was powerless to reverse the decay. Any recovery would
have to come from Washington, D.C. [7]
New Park Service Director Conrad Wirth and his
associates had been focusing on these problems. But anger and
frustration continued to mount as senior officials repeatedly met with
polite but aloof response from a Congress consumed with other issues. In
1955 in an article published in The Reader's Digest a worried
Director Wirth complained:
It is not possible to provide essential services.
Visitor concentration points can't be kept in sanitary condition.
Comfort stations can't be kept clean and serviced. Water, sewer and
electrical systems are taxed to the utmost. Protective services to
safeguard the public and preserve park values are far short of
requirements. Physical facilities are deteriorating or are inadequate to
meet public needs. Some of the camps are approaching rural slums.
The article went on to warn prospective visitors
that, "your trip is likely to be fraught with discomfort,
disappointment, and even danger." [8]
The problem, as Wirth saw it, lay in the budgeting
procedure. The Park Service had a series of discrete short-term projects
in individual parks which could be, and often were, trimmed at budget
time. Wirth hit upon an idea, based on the funding successes of agencies
like the Bureau of Reclamation, of presenting Congress with a grand,
multiyear project aimed at capturing more funds to halt the degeneration
of facilities. The resulting planMission 66was a masterpiece
of emotional appeal, hard sell, and clever maneuvering worthy of the
Service's founding director Stephen Mather. [9]
A full year's preparation went into the proposal. To
the annoyance of the Sierra Club and other preservationists, the Park
Service publicized the process but kept details secret. At last, in the
winter of 1956, the Park Service presented its overall plans to the
president and Congress. Mission 66 contained a series of basic points
which upheld traditional Park Service preservation goals. However, two
specific statements embodied the project: (1) "Substantial and
appropriate use of the National Park System is the best means by which
its basic purpose is realized and is the best guarantee of perpetuating
the system;" and (2) "Adequate and appropriate developments are required
for public use and appreciation of an area, and for prevention of
overuse." Mission 66 was to be first and foremost a program aimed at
redressing the decline of Park Service structures used by visitors and
employees. Although other points in the guidelines addressed issues such
as wilderness areas and resource preservation, these were philosophical
and cautionary advisements, not the guts of the proposed plan. Mission
66 would last ten years and carry a whopping price tag of nearly $800
million. It would conclude in 1966, on the fiftieth anniversary of the
founding of the Park Service, and would reverse the physical and
spiritual decline that had beset the parks for more than fifteen years.
[10]
The Mission 66 plan had vision, scope, emotional
appeal, grand design, and historical precedent. It combined the charisma
and political charm that Stephen Mather's programs had so successfully
displayed. After a hasty endorsement by President Eisenhower, Congress
got its chance to study the proposal. Here the scope of the project had
its real impact. With 168 units scattered across the country, there was
something for everyone in Mission 66. Likewise the publicized planning
process had already had a profound effect. As planning had proceeded, an
intrigued Congress boosted funding for 1956 by 50 percent. When they
finally received the proposal, lawmakers quickly approved it and
attached another 39 percent appropriations hike to inaugurate the
program. Ultimately Congress appropriated more than one billion dollars
for Mission 66 projects and quadrupled the Park Service's annual budget
to $128 million by 1966. [11]
The staff of Sequoia and Kings Canyon greeted the
Mission 66 concept with enthusiasm and optimism. Superintendent Scoyen's
men scrambled to assimilate data, inventory and field check facilities,
and provide their ten-year plan for renewal of the parks' physical
resources. The resulting proposal embodied the plans and ideas of the
previous two decades of park management. Included were provisions for
developing Cedar Grove, rerouting Generals Highway, acquiring inholdings
and eliminating grazing permits, redesigning structures at all the
parks' developed areas, and at least studying ways to remove the
concessioner from Giant Forest. The proposals were broken into three
priority lists and totaled nearly nineteen million dollars for the
decade-long program. [12]
One benefit of a multiyear, established program soon
became apparent at Sequoia and Kings Canyon. A few weeks before Mission
66 received congressional approval, Eivind Scoyen departed to become NPS
associate director. The appointment of George A. Walker as acting
superintendent commenced a sequence of relatively frequent top-level
changes at the parks. Walker was followed by Thomas J. Allen, John M.
Davis, and Frank F. Kowski as superintendents during the Mission 66
decade. Yet, despite the potential confusion such personnel changes
could have brought, the project proceeded toward specified goals at a
measured and largely successful pace.
The program designed by Scoyen's team and
incorporated into Mission 66 legislation proposed an ambitious
construction agenda. Major projects included four new visitor centers at
Giant Forest, Lodgepole, Grant Grove and Cedar Grove; a new
administration complex at Ash Mountain; replacement or erection of new
water, sewage and trash facilities; electrification of Giant Forest and
Cedar Grove; construction of additional employee housing; and partial
relocation of Generals Highway, especially around Giant Forest. Lesser
projects included expansion and redesign of some campgrounds;
construction of additional comfort stations, amphitheaters, and entrance
stations; and repair of assorted roads, fences, and overlooks. [13]
For a time though it appeared that Sequoia and Kings
Canyon would be among the failures of Mission 66. Superintendent Allen
wrote in his 1959 annual report that the vaunted program had gotten off
to a slow start, accomplished little, and had not impressed the public.
[14] However, the sixties brought a rapid
acceleration culminating in the completion of nearly all of the parks'
Mission 66 goals. Employee housing was added along with a big, new
administration complex at Ash Mountain. Giant Forest and Cedar Grove
received new water and sewage systems as well as new garbage
incinerators. Electric power lines reached Giant Forest in 1956. New
comfort stations, entrance stations, interpretive displays, trails, and
parking areas served visitors. Perhaps most significant for the public,
the Park Service completed new visitor centers at Ash Mountain in 1963,
Grant Grove in 1965, and Lodgepole in 1966. George Mauger's concession
company also contributed to the revamped visitor infrastructure with a
large new coffee shop and store complex at Grant Grove, bringing that
neglected area up to standard for the first time, along with
construction of new cabins to replace some of the miserable, substandard
shacks in both Giant Forest and Grant Grove. [15]
Despite all the gains of Mission 66 in Sequoia and
Kings Canyon, three major Park Service goals were not fulfilled:
development of Cedar Grove, construction of a visitor center at Giant
Forest, and relocation of Generals Highway. In each case, lack of funds
was not the problem. At Cedar Grove, the stubborn unwillingness of the
concessioner to participate threatened to sabotage all development in
the spectacular canyon. Meanwhile, the Giant Forest projects were among
the earliest casualties in a dramatic, pervasive, and hitherto unchecked
rise of ecological science and preservationist philosophy.
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