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A Study of the Park and Recreation Problem of the United States
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Cover
Contents
Foreword
Supplemental Foreword
Introduction
Recreational Habits and Needs
Aspects of Recreational Planning
Present Public Outdoor Recreational Facilities
Administration
Financing
Legislation
A Park and Recreational Land Plan
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A Study of the Park and Recreation Problem of the United States
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Chapter VI: Legislation
BACKGROUND
According to the Totalitarian theory of government,
people are created for the service of the State. The theory of Democracy
is that Government is created for the service of the people. Our
Government was founded upon the ideology expressed in the Declaration of
Independence as follows:
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. . . all men are created equal . . . are endowed by
their Creator with certain Inalienable Rights . . . among these are
Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness . . . to secure these rights,
Governments are instituted among Men. . . .
This concept of Government was affirmed in the
Preamble of the Constitution:
We the People of the United States, in Order to form
a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility,
provide for the common defence promote the general Welfare, and
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our posterity, do
ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of
America.
In Article I, Section 8, Congress was empowered to
finance efforts in the interests of general welfare as follows:
The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect
Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the
common Defence and general welfare of the United States (Italics
supplied.)
James Madison said:
Good government implies two things: first, fidelity
to the object of government, which is the happiness of the people,
secondly, knowledge of the means by which that object can be attained.
Some governments are deficient in both these qualities; most governments
are deficient in the first. I scruple to assert, that in American
governments too little attention has been paid to the last.
It was more than 100 years after Madison made that
statement that American governments seriously addressed themselves to
the problem of ascertaining the means by which the happiness of
the people might be attained. Social legislation in the main was not
given serious and consecutive attention until after 1900. From that
date until 1917 advances were made in many public welfare fields. The
World War interrupted this trend and only slight gains were made until
1932, when the rending of our economic fabric disclosed the terrific gap
between preachment and practice and gave point again to James Madison's
words. At that time of uncertainty the appalling awareness of our
extreme interdependence upon one another, the feeling of our
helplessness as individuals led to a great resurgence of social
consciousness and an insistent urge that government muster the resources
of the Nation for the happiness and security of the people. This led to
a great expansion in the responsibilities and activities of government
and a rather frantic seeking of means by which human happiness could be
attained. Among other phases of human welfare, public recreation was
recognized as one of the effective means.
For the first time the Federal Government entered
into a working partnership with the States in a Nation-wide program in
this field. This has resulted in an extension of the Federal system of
recreational areas to serve a greater number of the citizens of the
country, and the authorization of large sums of Federal emergency funds
for recreational development and the conduct of recreational programs in
all parts of the country. These funds are being spent not only on
Federally administered areas but also upon areas under the jurisdiction
of State and county, metropolitan and municipal governments.
The State governments, in framing their fundamental
laws, likewise placed stress upon their responsibility to provide for a
happy day-by-day life for their citizens; in fact the purposes of the
pronouncements setting forth the raison d'etre of these
governments are identical in meaning and closely follow the phraseology
of the Federal Constitution. For instance, the Constitution of the
Commonwealth of Virginia states:
That government is, or ought to be, instituted for
the common benefit, protection and security of the people, nation or
community; of all the various modes and forms of government, that is
best which is capable of producing the greatest degree of happiness and
safety and is most effective against the danger of
maladministration.
Declarations similar in meaning and strikingly
familiar in language are found in other State constitutions.
Moreover, a number of State constitutions expressly
provide for parks and recreation. For example, the Virginia constitution
states
. . . nor shall this State become a party to or
become interested in any work of internal improvement, except public
roads and public parks . . .
Another example is found in the Wisconsin
constitution, which provides:
The State or any of its cities may acquire by gift,
purchase, or condemnation, lands for establishing, laying out, widening,
enlarging, and maintaining memorial grounds, streets, squares, parkways,
boulevards, parks, playgrounds, sites for public buildings, and
reservations in and about and along and leading to any or all of the
same . . . and after the establishment, lay-out, and completion of such
improvements, may convey any such real estate thus acquired and not
necessary for such improvements, with reservations concerning the
future use and occupation of such real estate, so as to protect such
public works and improvements, and their environs, and to preserve the
view, appearance, light, air, and usefulness of such public works.
Parks and Recreation: Essential Governmental
Functions. The provision of recreational areas and service by
agencies of all levels of government has been recognized in legislation
and by the courts as a necessary function of the various governmental
units under the obligations assumed in the above pronouncements.
In a case in Kansas in 1927 involving the exercise of
the power of eminent domain in acquiring the lands and buildings which
comprise the Shawnee Mission as an historic park, and in which the owner
of the property contested the action, the Court upheld the action of the
State and in the course of the opinion made the following
statement:
When life was simple, the power of eminent domain was
expended in providing for simple necessitiespublic buildings,
public ways, and other physically indispensable things. With the
advancement of civilization new needs multiply. First comes that which
is natural, and afterward, that which is spiritual, and cultural needs
become just as cogent as the material needs of pioneer days were. The
framers of the Constitution of Kansas understood this. The Constitution
makes it mandatory upon the legislature to encourage the promotion of
intellectual and moral improvement (Art. 6, par. 2). A specific method
of encouragement is prescribedestablishment of a uniform system of
common schools and schools of higher grade, embracing college and
university departments. This method is not exclusive. The legislature
must do that much, but it may resort to other methods perfected in the
course of social progress. The end to be sub-served by state promotion
of intellectual and moral improvement is better citizenship.
(State v. Kemp, 124 Kansas, 716.)
In United States v. Gettysburg Elec. R.
Co. (160 U. S. 668) the Supreme Court had before it the question of
the appropriation of private property for use by the United States in
restoring, preserving, and marking the Gettysburg battlefield. In the
opinion of the Court, sustaining the appropriation, it was said:
Can it be that the Government is without power to
preserve the land, and properly mark out the various sites upon which
this struggle took place? Can it not erect the monuments provided for by
the acts of Congress, or even take possession of the field of battle in
the name and for the benefit of all the citizens of the country for the
present and the future? Such a use seems necessarily not only a public
use, but one so closely connected with the welfare of the republic
itself as to be within the powers granted Congress by the Constitution
for the purpose of protecting and preserving the whole country . . .
A ruling was made in Connecticut that "the control of
public parks belongs primarily to the State, and municipalities in
operating and managing them act as governmental agencies exercising an
authority delegated to them by the State." (Epstein v. City of
New Haven, 104 Conn. 283, 132 Atl. 467.) This is in keeping with the
accepted principle that municipal corporations in their public and
political aspect are not only creatures of the State, but are parts of
the machinery by which the State conducts its governmental affairs. The
following court decisions are in point:
In Indiana it has been held that a city, in establishing
a playground within the city limits, and in determining the
character of the equipment therefor, was exercising a duty purely
governmental. (Indianapolis v. Baker, 72 Ind. App. 323,
125 N. E. 52.)
In Higginson v. Treasurer &c of
Boston, Chief Justice Rugg (212, Mass. 589, 590, 1912) said:
Passing from a consideration of the authorities to
the underlying principles, which in reason must govern, a park of the
nature here in question appears to be for the general public rather than
for the municipality in its proprietary capacity. The use of the park is
in kind analogous to those confessedly public. It closely resembles
roads and bridges. These are open to general public travel without
reference to the residence of the traveler. The enjoyment of public
parks hardly can be restricted to residents of a particular city or
town. They can not be made a source of revenue as may a system of water-works
or sewerage or gas, electric light, or markets. Their use by those
most needing them might be prevented by any pecuniary charge. . . .
Parks in the proper Sense to which the public are regularly admitted
have been inseparably connected with a public agency. . . . Although
the establishment of this park was permissive and not compulsory, this
distinction is not decisive. It is the character of the use which stamps
a given municipal venture as public or proprietary. (Tindley v.
Salem, 137 Mass. 171, 176.) Adopting this as the test, the
dominant aim in the establishment of public parks appears to be the
common good of mankind rather than the special gain or private benefit
of a particular city or town. The healthful and civilizing influence of
parks in and near congested areas of population is of more than local
interest and becomes a concern of the State under modern conditions. It
relates not only to public health in its narrow sense, but to broader
considerations of exercise, refreshment, and enjoyment. We should
hesitate to say that the State would be powerless to exert compulsion if
a city or town should be found so unmindful of the demands of humanity
as to fail to provide itself with adequate public grounds. The municipal
spirit which dictates an extensive park system is the same in kind as
that which provides fine streets and avenues, beautiful bridges, and
ample public schools of a high standard of efficiency, all distinctly
public in their nature. The end subserved by these instrumentalities
is essentially the same general public good.
In California it has been held that the maintenance
of a park by a city for the sole benefit of the public, and not for any
profit or benefit to the municipal corporation, is a governmental or public
function. (Kellar v. Los Angeles, 179 Cal. 605, 178 P.
505.) The court further held that children's playgrounds and
recreational centers established and maintained by a city for the
general use of the children of the city do not substantially differ from
a public park, stating:
It seems to us that the function in which the city
was thus engaged (the conduct of a summer camp) was purely in the
exercise of the governmental power and the discharge of the governmental
duty of maintaining the health of the children of the city, and was
therefore essentially governmental in nature. It will not be questioned
that a city is charged with such a duty of sovereignty as that of
maintaining the public health, and that in any measures it may adopt
solely for that purpose, which are reasonably adopted to that end, it is
acting strictly in a governmental capacity.
In Kentucky it has been said:
It may therefore be regarded as settled in this
jurisdiction that public parks, maintained and managed without
corporate or individual gain or profit, are not only exempt from taxation,
but may be created and maintained by taxation. Hence they are
essentially public places established for purely public purposes. The
right of the city to support public parks by taxation is rested upon
the ground that the municipal authorities are charged with the duty of
maintaining the public health, and that parks where exercises and
recreation can be indulged in, and pure and clean air breathed,
contribute largely to the health of the community. Viewing the matter
from this standpoint, the parks of the city occupy towards it and its
inhabitants the same relation as do hospitals and other public
institutions useful and necessary in the preservation of the health,
safety and morals of the people. (Board of Park Com'rs v.
Prniz, 127, Ky. 460, 105, S. W. 948.)
In Maryland the view is taken that to hold the
operation of parks as a proprietary function would be against public
policy, "because it would retard the expansion and development of park
systems in and around our growing cities, and stifle a gratuitous
activity vitally necessary to the health, contentment, and happiness of
their inhabitants;" and that "in these days of advanced civilization,
in a period when the unfortunate tendency is to abandon the
countrysidethe haunts of their own youthand thereby add to
the already over-congested metropolitan area, public city parks are
almost as necessary for the preservation of the public health as is pure
water." (Baltimore v. State, 168 Md. 619, 179 Atl.
169.)
In an opinion rendered by the Supreme Court of
Michigan, public parks and recreation are clearly recognized as
governmental functions at all levels of government.
Michigan, through its legislature, has recognized the
acquisition, improvement and maintenance of free public parks as a
governmental function by itself acquiring, improving, and maintaining
at State expense, under its appointed board, the Mackinac Island State
Park, and independent of the legislature, the people of the State, by
adopting the present Constitution, have authorized any city or village
to acquire and maintain parks, even without their corporate limits,
grouping them with works which involve public health and safety. The
Federal Government is also in "the park business" as a governmental
function, and whether they be Federal, State, or municipal parks, the
beneficial public purpose intended and served by such free recreation
grounds for the people and the resultant benefits which justify their
free maintenance at public expense as a governmental activity are the
same except it be in degree; and in that particular a comparison of the
beneficial results to the greatest number of people at large throughout
this commonwealth from the free use and enjoyment of Belle Isle City
Park and Mackinac Island State Park might indicate the degree is not
necessarily in favor of the larger governmental unit.
While, like public schools for education, public
parks are primarily provided for the recreation, pleasure, and betterment
of the people within the limits of the governmental organizations
which maintain them, they are not by legal restraint or custom or in
fact solely for the benefits gratuitously offered. Along the lines of
facilities which parks afford, playgrounds for healthy exercise,
swimming pools, baths, appliances for manual training, and other
equipment for balanced physical and mental development, with instructors
as to proper use and methods, are now recognized and
frequently adopted in the curriculum of our public schools as essentials
of education and sanitation, both acknowledged subjects of state
concern and governmental activity . . . The constitutionally authorized
function this municipality was exercising was without private gain to
the corporation or to individuals, for purposes essentially public and
of a beneficial character in furtherance of the common welfare in
harmony with the general policy of the state, and was in its nature a
governmental activity, whether it be put upon the ground of health,
education, charity, social betterment by furnishing the people at large
free advantages for wholesome recreation and entertainment, or all of
them. (Heino v. City of Grand Rapids, 202 Mich. 263, 168
N. W. 512.)
In Rhode Island it has been held that the
maintenance of a public park is a discharge of a governmental
function
engaged in the performance of a public service in
which it has no particular interest, and from which it derives no
special benefit or advantage in its corporate capacity, but which it is
bound to see performed in pursuance of a duty imposed by law, for the
general welfare of the inhabitants of the community. (Blair v.
Granger, 24 R. I. 17, 51 Atl. 1042.)
In Utah it has been held that the maintenance of a
public park and the presentation therein of a pageant
are clearly matters of public service for the general
and common good, designed exclusively for the social advantages,
entertainment, and pleasure of the general public. (Alder v.
Salt Lake City, 64 Utah 568, 321 P. 1102.)
In 1936 there was presented to the Supreme Court of
North Carolina the question whether, without submitting the question to
the voters, a city could issue its bonds for public park purposes
without impinging the constitutional provision that
no county, city, or town or other municipal
corporation shall contract any debt, pledge its faith, or loan its
credit, nor shall any tax be levied or collected by any officers of the
same except for necessary expenses thereof, unless by a vote of the
majority of the qualified voters therein.
The court held that an ordinance authorizing a bond
issue for development and equipment of parks and playgrounds was a valid
exercise of the police power, and that the bonds were for "necessary
expenses" within the constitution, thus obviating the necessity for the
voters' approval. The court said:
It has been said that "Health is wealth." These parks
and playgrounds at all times, and especially in the heat of summer, are
a benediction . . . to all the inhabitants of the city. Nothing is more
conducive to health and good morals than these recreational places in a
thickly settled city. (Atkins et al. v. City of Durham,
210 N. C. 295, 186 S. E. 330.)
Many other decisions could be cited which support
the same premise of these decisions, namely, that the provision of
recreational service is an essential governmental function, but their
effect would be merely cumulative. Decisions holding parks to be
proprietary functions have been rendered in Delaware, Missouri, New
York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Texas, West Virginia,
and Wyoming. Despite these decisions to the contrary, it is evident that
there is general recognition of recreation as a public function of
government.
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