On Saturday, September 1, Doane directed Scott to take twenty men and scout down to Baronett's bridge, which crossed the Yellowstone just above its confluence with the East Fork, to determine if the Nez Perces had forded there and to fire the grass on his return to frustrate their passage along the valley. [90] Scott moved out approximating a pony trail that led from Blacktail Deer Creek to the bridge. He refused his Crow scouts' advice to stay on the trail for fear of an ambush by the Nez Perces. He described his procedure of advancing:

We did not go over a ridge until we were assured all was safe beyond. With great difficulty in getting the horses down and up, we crossed the deep, narrow box cañon of Blacktail Deer Creek where there was no trail. The edge of the cañon was held by ten men to hold back any Indians who, though unseen by us, were doubtless watching us all the time, to keep them from coming up on the edge and killing us all like rats. The other ten went down with me, and we climbed out on the other side. Then we held the cañon edge for the others. I felt very uneasy at putting the cañon between me and the command, but had to carry out my orders. [91]

Reaching Baronett's bridge without sign of the Nez Perces, Scott's men set the grass on fire, but rain shortly extinguished it. Then the troops turned back. On the way, they came upon two scouts sent from Colonel Sturgis's command east of the park who were to try to find Howard. John J. Groff and J. S. Leonard had been fired on by warriors as they traveled Blacktail Deer Creek Trail. The warriors had wounded a fifteen-year-old Warm Springs Indian boy who had accompanied them, and Groff had been shot through the neck. The boy disappeared into the woods and was not seen again. [92] The two men went ahead to Henderson's, where Groff received treatment for his wound and rode in a wagon down to Fort Ellis. (Later, on his way back to Sturgis with dispatches from Fort Ellis, Leonard was overtaken and killed by the Nez Perces on Clark's Fork.) That night, Doane assumed a defensive position in some dry irrigation ditches and established a number of sentry posts around the bivouac.

Doane, a conscientious veteran officer revered by Scott as "a thorough plainsman," decided to proceed up Gardner River on the morrow on the advice of the Crows. He would leave the citizens with sufficient supplies at Henderson's. But Doane's movement was preempted by the appearance of a courier from Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert with instructions for him to await his arrival. [93] Gilbert's message, written at Fort Ellis on August 31, read as follows:

General Sherman and [Brevet Major] General Gibbon had a conference in my presence day before yesterday, the issue of which amounts to this, that I am to overtake you, assume Command of you and your party, and then communicate with General Howard whose presence General Sherman much needs in the Department of the Columbia, and should Howard go at once I am to take the Command of his column. I expect to camp about 10 miles out from this Post this afternoon of Sept. 2d, that is to say the third day out. [94]

Doane took it upon himself to notify General Howard, then passing through the park, with the following message:

The enclosed letter received by me last evening will need no explanation. I am here with one Co 7th Cavalry, about 30 citizens, and 42 Crow scouts. Camped at a burning ranch, fired by the Nez-Perces yesterday. Will await Col. Gilbert here but to-day am sending you this to anticipate him. Please return a courier with the bearer of this (who may be able to find you to-night). I will look for an answer tomorrow night. Gen. Sturgis on Aug. 29th was at Crow Agency. His command of 450 men, and Crow scouts besides, should be on Clarks Fork about Heart Mt. but I fear he is not there. [95]

Bearing Sherman's message to Howard regarding the transfer of his command, Gilbert and Company L, Second Cavalry, under Lieutenant Schofield, reached Doane's force on September 3 and refused to allow the lieutenant to proceed on his mission. Doane, with years of Indian experience, firmly believed that the Nez Perces intended to move down an age-old trail that paralleled the Yellowstone to where Livingston, Montana, stands today and then cross to the Musselshell and through Judith Gap to the hunting grounds. So anguished was Doane by Gilbert's directive that, according to Scott, he wept. Taking command, Gilbert marched the combined force back down the Yellowstone and away from the Nez Perces to Miner's Creek; he then followed an old trail to and up the West Gallatin River to the Madison long after Howard had left Henry's Lake. Hardly a "young energetic officer," as specified by Sherman, Gilbert (1822-1903), at fifty-five, was eight years older than Howard. A West Point graduate (1846), Gilbert served in the Mexican and Civil wars and had been wounded at Wilson's Creek in 1861. Appointed acting major general and brigadier general of volunteers in 1862, his star fell quickly after perceived command deficiencies at the Battle of Perryville, Kentucky, and he ended the war a major at a desk job. In 1877, according to Scott, Gilbert mismanaged Doane's cavalry so badly that the horses were starving. "We piled up twenty-five saddles on the West Gallatin and left them there, unable to transport them, and we sent twenty-five horses down the Madison by easy stages to Fort Ellis to recuperate." [96] Several dismounted cavalrymen escorted the animals to Ellis. "We went down the Yellowstone a badly broken up command," said Scott. Gilbert never found Howard, never delivered Sherman's missive, and never took over Howard's command. The troops traveled slowly through the park on his trail, at one point camping at a spot formerly occupied by the Nez Perces, where scout Jirah Allen found several baby moccasins. "I could not repress a wish that the fleeing, hunted creatures would get through all right." [97] Gilbert's men passed up and over Mount Washburn, then on down the Yellowstone to its junction with the East Fork. Here Doane and his fatigued men and animals departed for Fort Ellis via Mammoth Hot Springs. Gilbert, with about twenty men, continued on Howard's trail over to Clark's Fork before abandoning his mission "on account of the worn-out condition of the animals" and returning through the Crow Agency to Fort Ellis. Had Gilbert foregone his convoluted pursuit of Howard and marched instead to Baronett's bridge, he would have intercepted the general on his way down the Yellowstone on September 5. [98]

On August 29, Howard's army pushed slowly up the Madison and camped in the canyon within the park boundary. The general sent a dispatch to McDowell, explaining that the Nez Perces might diverge southeast to avoid the troops from Fort Ellis. [99] He sent a courier to Fort Ellis requesting that Sturgis be informed "that the Indians will [probably] go by Clarke's [sic] Fork, or make a wider detour, if bothered by troops, in order to reach the Yellowstone. . . . I [now] do not think they will go to Wind River country unless forced in that direction." He directed that Captain Cushing move out and join Sturgis, if possible, and sent word to General Crook to watch for signs of the tribesmen moving southeast. [100] Howard also took the opportunity to prepare a field order lauding his men for their sacrifices and attempting to put a bright face on a campaign of, at best, mixed success, with hollow assurances that their "disciplined spirit" would be rewarded "in the conscientious performance of duty." [101] "The chief incident of the day," penned Major Mason, "was finding by the roadside the poor fellow who was shot through the face by the Indians and afterwards escaped—he was almost dead from hunger and cold." [102] Albert Oldham was "all covered with blood and withal . . . a sad looking spectacle." [103] Advancing farther into the park on the thirtieth, Howard found many impediments to his advance. "The country in which I was now operating was a river-gorge, or cañon, walled in by precipices and choked by marsh and undergrowth, the river so winding that in one day it had to be crossed five times." [104] That day they crossed the mouth of Gibbon River and started up the Firehole, camping on "a fine level piece of land partly covered with pines and partly meadow," about one mile above the mouth of the East Fork of the Firehole. [105] Later that day, the wounded George Cowan, who had been found the previous day by Howard's white scouts, was brought in for treatment by the surgeons. As the column settled in camp, many of its members took the opportunity to visit the geysers, marveling at the "puffing steam, squirting boiling water, lakes of clear blue hot water, holes full of boiling mud, chalk vats that made bubbles as large as your hat, bountiful formations of soda and magnesia, [and] needles of pure sulphur." On Friday, the column with its eleven wagons pushed up the East Fork of the Firehole on the trail, encountering one of the Radersburg party's wagons off to the right and slowly clearing a path for the army supply wagons as they went. [106] At the base of Mary Mountain, the troops stopped for the night. [107] Next morning, September 1, Captain Spurgin of the Twenty-first Infantry brought his engineering talent to the fore, ably directing his civilian "skillets" in preparing the route up and over Mary Mountain. [108] As Henry Buck explained:

A route was laid out, not continuing on the old Indian trail, but following up ridges and gullies, also along some very steep side hills to pass from one ridge to another, where it would be necessary to use guy ropes fastened to the top of the wagon box, and men walk[ing] along side of the wagon, holding fast, thus preventing its capsizing. The last stretch of about one-half mile of heavy grade followed a sort of canyon or washout that was wide enough for the passage of our wagons. The bottom was filled with huge rocks, many of which it was necessary to roll aside before we could proceed. Our camp was on a nice little prairie at the foot of Mary Mountain, thence it was a dense forest to the summit, an estimated distance of three miles. There had been a fire that had swept through the pines, and trees lay criss-cross over each other on the way; much chopping had to be done and also some pick and shovel work. It took until the middle of the afternoon of the second [September 2], before we could make a start with the train. [109]

Thus, from the Firehole River, Howard's route paralleled the north side of the East Fork of the Firehole, gravitating northeast as it ascended Mary Mountain and skirted the west side of Mary's Lake. About one mile north of the lake, the road turned east, then south, cutting along the east side of Highland Hot Springs and continuing southeast for two miles before leveling east for ten miles across the south edge of Hayden Valley to the Mud Volcano and the Yellowstone River. [110]

On the morning of September 1, Howard moved his troops ahead of the workmen to Mary Lake, where they went into camp. During the day, more of the Bannocks began deserting the command and tried to make off with about forty horses belonging to the laborers. Eight of the scouts were arrested, and Howard made their release contingent on the return of the stolen animals, which by the next day had been accomplished. The remaining Bannocks (not counting those with Fisher) were released and then left the command. "The brave Bannock Indians have all deserted us," noted a correspondent, "and when we come to weigh their usefulness against their perfidy the latter largely predominates." [111] On the second, with the road completed, the wagons began their ascent of Mary Mountain. "My wagon was in the lead," recalled Henry Buck. "We hooked eight horses to it and made the start. Other teams were doubled up in like manner and our train was on the move." By noon on the third, all the wagons had reached Mary Lake; they then proceeded across Sulphur Mountain down to Alum Creek and toward the Falls of the Yellowstone. [112] Crossing a gentle plateau, they shortly approached a wooded ridge extending toward the river. Henry Buck remembered the details of the descent at what became known as "Spurgin's Beaver Slide":

We . . . came to the conclusion that the only way to get down was to take a jump of some five hundred feet. Someone suggested to prepare a slide and go down hill like a beaver. The pines were not thick and the ground was smooth, although about as steep as the roof of an ordinary house. We picked a place that looked most suitable for our descent and commenced clearing a roadway. . . . We had with us a very large rope—one hundred feet long—for emergency cases and were now all ready to "go". . . . One end of the rope was fastened to the hind axle of my wagon, then two turns were made around a substantial tree, with several men holding onto the end of the rope so that the wagon could not get away, they payed it out as fast as the descent was made. Nothing daunting, I climbed up into my spring seat and gathered up the lines—not even taking off my leaders. I made the start downward and nearly stood up straight on the foot rest of the wagon, it was so steep. Slowly and carefully we went the length of the rope, when a halt was called and, with the aid of a short rope made fast to the hind axle and securely tied to another tree, we then loosened the long rope and came down and made another two turns around a nearby tree and was then ready for a second drive; thence a third and so on until the bottom was reached in safety. The rope was then carried up the hill and another teamster took courage to try his luck and his wagon, too, was landed at the bottom of the hill. This routine was continued until all the wagons in our train were safely landed on the little flat together. [113]

The wagons then proceeded to the Yellowstone River, to a point about two miles above the upper falls, where they stopped for the night. Passing through cold and rainy weather, on Tuesday, September 4, the wagons stalled at Cascade Creek. "From here we could see our soldiers camp on the high plateau across the canyon, about on the same ground where the Canyon Hotel now stands [in 1922]," remembered Buck. [114] Again, the "skillets" stepped forward and cleared a roadway through the trees and erected a pole bridge across the stream. "The rope-act was here repeated to get our wagons down and teams again doubled up for the long climb to camp on the flat where the command lay waiting for us." [115]

Howard's troops, meanwhile, had camped at the ford, about six miles below Yellowstone Lake and near Mud Volcano, on the first, where they found "plenty of wormy fish." Next day, the command awaited the arrival of wagons from Fort Ellis bearing rations and badly needed clothing; many had been wearing the same outfits over the past several weeks. That afternoon, Captain Robert Pollock ordered Company D of the Twenty-first to strip and bathe in a medium-temperature hot spring. "Red flannels got a washing as did some choicer hides which had not seen water since leaving Wallula." [116] And on the evening of the second, the discharged soldier James Irwin had appeared, having escaped the tribesmen and encountered Fisher and his scouts up Pelican Creek. As previously indicated, he provided Howard with important news of the composition, organization, condition, and general location of the Nez Perces. Reported Howard: "The fact that they had a white man detained as prisoner and compelled to act as guide was encouraging as showing their ignorance of the country." [117] The general's Bannock scouts supplemented Irwin's information that the Nez Perces were headed in the direction of Clark's Fork, and Howard sent this word back by courier to Fort Ellis, attempting to coordinate with Captain Cushing's and Colonel Sturgis's columns. Howard also took Irwin's advice to follow down the Yellowstone River by a more accessible route than that of the Nez Perces. Therefore, on the afternoon of the third, the provisions having arrived, the troops marched down the left bank of the river and camped "on a little flat just above and nearly abreast of the lower falls." [118] On Tuesday, the general, distressed over Irwin's news that the Nez Perces had sent envoys to the Crows, dispatched a notice urging "that steps be taken to capture this delegation and prevent the Crows from forming an alliance with them." [119]

Because of the difficulty and delay in moving the wagons forward, Howard decided to cut loose from them, directing Spurgin to take them out of the park to Fort Ellis. Spurgin then continued down the Yellowstone, through Dunraven Pass and into Carnelian Creek valley, then slowly moved toward Tower Creek and down that stream to its junction with the Yellowstone. On the way, his men sighted Indians on a distant mountain, and Spurgin broke out the ammunition and, assuming a defensive position, braced for an attack. But they proved to be some of Doane's Crow scouts, and the excitement waned. The wagoners and civilians then detoured around Tower Fall, journeyed down the Yellowstone to strike Gardner River about one and one-half miles above its mouth, and erected a bridge to cross it. Then they went on down the Yellowstone and out of the park. [120]

Forging ahead with his supplies now carried by the pack animals, Howard's force on September 5 reached the confluence of the Yellowstone with the East Fork to find that Baronett's bridge had just been burned. (The act was probably accomplished by a Nez Perce party that included the "Snake chief"probably the Shoshone, Little Bear—who, Shively told an interviewer, had burned the bridge. This party had traveled down the East Fork about August 31 from the body or bodies moving in the vicinity of Cache or Calfee creeks. [121]) Howard quickly made repairs utilizing logs found in an abandoned house and crossed his army, continuing up the East Fork of the Yellowstone after having learned from miners about the Nez Perces' attack on Henderson's ranch and Mammoth Hot Springs. (A group of Howard's scouts under "Captain" Robbins also rode to Mammoth and Henderson's to survey the destruction there.) He also heard that Colonel Gilbert had undertaken a "stern chase" in the wrong direction to find Howard. On the sixth, the soldiers started up Soda Butte Canyon, and on the seventh, couriers from Sturgis appeared, bringing Howard his first concrete knowledge of that officer's position near Clark's Fork, east of the park. The general sent three couriers to Sturgis (none of whom reached him) and dispatched orders to Cushing at Fort Ellis to hurry supplies forward to Clark's Fork. "Indians are between me and Sturgis," he told Cushing, "and I hope we shall entrap them this time. By marching toward Clarke's [sic] Fork you will be ready to re-enforce either Colonel Sturgis or myself." [122] Continuing northeast up Soda Butte Canyon (which Howard renamed "Jocelyn Canyon" for that Twenty-first Infantry officer), the troops arrived at the New Galena Smelting Works, there veering off east-southeast to intersect Clark's Fork, which they traversed on September 8, descending to the mouth of Crandall Creek where reports had indicated the Nez Perces were headed. Meanwhile, his scouts followed the tribesmen's trail from the mouth of Soda Butte Canyon that probably led up Cache Creek and its tributaries to Hoodoo Basin. Observed one member of that party:

The Indians camped here and it looks as though they had got brushed, or rather, lost; for the trail is new and they have had a most difficult matter to get out, but out they have got of course, and over a trail that beats anything we have yet found. . . . A great curiosity consists of a washed-out basin, where the constant action of the elements has left pinnacles, towers and battlements of titanic structure. . . . [The Indians] now number, nearly 200 lodges; their strength has been largely increased as is evident by the more numerous lodge fires we found at their camping places. [123]

As the Indians passed through and exited the park, the troops of several commands had begun converging on them, hoping to close their way to the north and east and to compel their surrender. In fact, the time spent by the Nez Perces in getting out of the national park actually facilitated that troop deployment. But the experience of the soldiers and the Nez Perces in the national park was also important from several other standpoints. For one, it compounded the difficulty the tribesmen faced in their efforts to reach the buffalo country and their anticipated union with the Crows, and it may consequently have affected decisions about their final destination. Furthermore, the delay of the people in getting through the park made it additionally unlikely that the Crows—ever more firmly fixed in their service capacity to the army command—would provide the relief and support they sought. While in the park, the Nez Perces' dramatic encounters with the tourist parties pointed up not only the fragmentation of control authority that existed among them, but revealed the mix of searing hatred toward whites still evident among some warriors in the wake of the Big Hole, with that of the compassion evinced by elements of their leadership. But as it affected the Nez Perces, the trek through the park wilderness also further tried the endurance of Howard's weary men. For their commander, while the objective of the Nez Perces' defeat and surrender was not realized, a residual benefit came in the nature of the knowledge gained from scouts and informants about their strength, composition, and condition that could contribute to produce their final subjugation. Having finally pushed through the park, and thus encouraged by the notices that the tribesmen were at hand, a reinvigorated General Howard remained confident that, between his own force and Sturgis's strategically poised command, the long and trying odyssey of the nontreaty Nez Perces was at its end. [124]