Chapter 9: Canyon Creek
On August 26, General Sherman wired Sheridan in
Chicago: "I don't think Howard's troops will catch Joseph, but they will
follow trusting to your troops heading them off when they come out on
the east of the mountains." [1] Among the
commands assigned by Sheridan to head off the Nez Perces as they emerged
from the national park was that of Brigadier General George Crook,
commander of the Department of the Platte. Both the Indians and General
Howard's soldiers were presently operating in his administrative
jurisdiction. Uncertain as to the exact direction the tribesmen were
traveling, but nonetheless responding to the reports of scouts and other
observers that they perhaps intended to reach the buffalo country via
Wind River, Crookon orders from Sheridanprepared to confront them
accordingly in the area south and east of the park. Crook planned an
offensive from Camp Brown, Wyoming, to include six companies of the
Fifth Cavalry and one of the Third, most of them permanently stationed
at Fort D. A. Russell near Cheyenne. [2]
These troops would cooperate with a battalion of five companies of the
Fifth under Major Verling K. Hart. This battalion was already afield
from Cantonment Reno on Powder River and was searching the area of
north-central Wyoming for vestiges of the Lakota-Cheyenne alliance left
from the Great Sioux War. At Sheridan's direction, a contingent of
Oglala Sioux scouts started from Red Cloud Agency, Nebraska, for Hart's
command, which on September 6 got underway for the Bighorn River and the
site of Fort C. F. Smith, abandoned since 1868. Originally, Crook was to
personally lead the expedition, but problems arising at Camp Robinson,
Nebraska, and environs after the death of the Lakota leader, Crazy
Horse, took precedence, and Colonel Wesley Merritt, regimental commander
of the Fifth Cavalry, assumed the command. [3]
Sheridan's design called for Major Hart and his four
companies (7 officers and 239 enlisted men) to converge on the Stinking
Water River (present Shoshone River) if the Nez Perces came down that
stream. [4] If they exited the park and
traveled down Wind River, Hart and/or Merritt would proceed there to
stop them. On September 10, Crook reported to Sheridan that his scouts
had found no sign of the Nez Perces on the Stinking Water, but that the
Nez Perces had told the Bannocks with Howard that they were en route to
join the Crows. "The fact of their loitering around the mountains in the
Yellow Stone country would indicate that they were holding communication
with other Indians so as to determine what their future movements should
be," said Crook. [5]
Despite Crook's belief that the Nez Perces would not
come south, Merritt moved out of Camp Brown (north of present Lander,
Wyoming) with his seven companies (approximately five hundred officers,
men, scouts, and teamsters) on September 9, hoping to cooperate with
Hart and keeping fifty of the eighty-four Shoshone scouts under Chief
Washakie posted well in front to intercept any news of the Nez Perces'
approach. [6] With wagons instead of pack
mules to carry its rations, the column on September 12 had difficulty
surmounting the summit of the Owl Creek Mountains in a rainstorm and
only slowly proceeded northwest toward the Stinking Water. Two days
later, Merritt cut loose from his wagons, and on the fifteenth, the
troops passed through a snow squall en route to crossing the Greybull
River and trailing up Meteetse Creek to reach the Stinking Water on
September 17, where a recent cavalry trail was discovered. Camping
between the forks of that stream (above present Cody, Wyoming), Merritt
sent out scouts who identified the trail as having probably been made by
Sturgis's command operating from the vicinity of Heart Mountain, just
twelve miles away. Later, the scouts established contact with Hart's
battalion, which had ridden west from Fort Smith and then south through
Pryor Gap in the Pryor range to reach the Stinking Water. The scouts led
them back to join Merritt at the forks of that stream. The combined
force then marched for Clark's Fork, but arrived far too late to join
Sturgis and Howard, now well across the Yellowstone, and found only a
few abandoned cavalry mounts. The aptly named Wind River Expedition
concluded with the return of the eleven companies to Camp Brown on
September 28, having been too late and too far removed to help find and
subjugate the Nez Perces. [7]
Thus, for the moment, as the Nez Perces passed
through and out of the national park, it remained for Colonel Samuel
Sturgis to assume the principal role of confronting them. Sturgis's
involvement in the campaign would constitute an important change in the
direction and conduct of the army's pursuit of the tribesmen, for with
the introduction of the aggressive Colonel Nelson A. Miles and his
Yellowstone Command onto the scene (of which Sturgis's Seventh Cavalry
was a major component), it now became a matter only of time and
opportunity for the war with the Nez Perces to conclude. Anticipating
the Indians' goal of gaining the buffalo grounds north of the
Yellowstone, and perhaps uniting with the Sioux under Sitting Bull near
the British line, Miles, on August 12, as mentioned, had sent Sturgis
and part of the Seventh Cavalry west from their camp opposite the Tongue
River Cantonment (on the Yellowstone River at the mouth of the Tongue)
to strategically poise themselves in the Judith Gap, a stretch of
prairie land lying north of the Yellowstone and between the Little Belt
and Big Snowy mountain ranges through which the Nez Perces might
logically attempt to pass. Miles's orders to Sturgis were as follows:
With six companies of your regiment and the Artillery
Detachment [a bronze twelve-pounder Napoleon gun] with your command you
will proceed by rapid marches, via the valley of the Yellowstone and
Musselshell Rivers to the vicinity of Judith Gap, sending forward
rapidly to Fort Ellis, M.T., to obtain all possible information
regarding the movements of the hostile band of Nez Perces. . . . It is
the object of your movement to intercept or pursue, and capture or
destroy them. . . . The Crows and Nez Perces have hitherto had friendly
relations, but it is deemed probable that the former will act with your
force against the Nez Perces, as they are hostile to the Government. You
will please use your discretion as to the extent to which you can rely
upon them (the Crows) for the object you have in view, being careful to
avoid exciting hostility on the part of the Crows. . . . Your command
will be provided with thirty six-mule teams, two ambulances and the pack
train now at your camp. . . . In addition, . . . you will have driven
with your command Beef Cattle for 25 days supply. [8]
Miles next day followed up with the comment: "I think
it desirable that as much force as possible be brought to bear against
the Nez Perces, with a view to striking a decisive blow and bringing
them into complete subjection to the Government." [9]
Fifty-five-year-old Samuel D. Sturgis (1822-1889)
graduated from West Point in 1846. He had gone immediately as a
lieutenant of dragoons into the war with Mexico, where he was captured
before the Battle of Buena Vista and not released until its conclusion.
Until the Civil War, he served primarily in the West, where he garnered
experience in numerous campaigns against Apaches, Kiowas, and Comanches.
During the war, Sturgis fought in many engagements in the eastern and
western theaters, rising to the rank of brigadier general of volunteers
after his performance at Wilson's Creek, Missouri. He fought at Antietam
and Fredericksburg in 1862. But his reputation as a commander faded
after his rout by the Confederate cavalry leader Nathan Bedford Forrest
at the Battle of Brice's Cross Roads, Mississippi, and after an
investigation, Sturgis spent the rest of the war "awaiting orders."
Appointed to command the new Seventh Cavalry in 1869, Sturgis endured
Custer as a subordinate (unless assigned detached service elsewhere)
until after the Battle of the Little Bighorn in 1876, which saw half his
regiment annihilated and his beloved son, Second Lieutenant James G.
Sturgis, a recent graduate of the military academy, among the killed.
Following that tragedy, Sturgis assumed personal command of the
regiment, leading it west from Fort Abraham Lincoln, Dakota, the
following spring to participate in Miles's closing operations against
the Sioux and Northern Cheyennes, thus availing his troops to counter
the Nez Perces. [10]
Sturgis's command consisted of Companies F (Captain
James M. Bell, Second Lieutenant Herbert J. Slocum), G (First Lieutenant
George D. Wallace, Second Lieutenant William J. Nicholson), H (Second
Lieutenant Ezra B. Fuller, Second Lieutenant Albert J. Russell), I
(Captain Henry J. Nowlan, Second Lieutenant Edwin P. Brewer), L (First
Lieutenant John W. Wilkinson), and M (Captain Thomas H. French, Second
Lieutenant John G. Gresham) and numbered about 360 officers and men. The
troops were divided into two battalions of three companies each, with F,
I, and L commanded by Major Lewis Merrill, and G, H, and M under Captain
Frederick W. Benteen. [11] Sturgis's
adjutant was First Lieutenant Ernest A. Garlington. The march along the
north side of the Yellowstone to the landmark of Pompey's Pillar was
hampered by a dearth of rations occasioned when a supply steamer sank
above the cantonment; the shortage was relieved only by sending a
detachment to obtain provisions at the Bighorn Post (later Fort Custer)
then under construction at the confluence of the Bighorn and Little
Bighorn rivers. [12] (Although supplies
arrived on the twentieth, the loss of proper rations haunted the troops
for the duration of Sturgis's campaign.) Also, alarming rumors reached
Sturgis from Miles that Sitting Bull with his Lakotas had recrossed from
Canada into the United States, headed toward the mouth of the
Musselshell on the Missouri River. Therefore, wrote Miles, "it is
important that the hostile Nez Perces should be captured or neutralized
to prevent their joining the band of hostile Sioux." And later he urged
Sturgis: "Keep your force between the Nez Perces and Sitting Bull, if
possible, and [I] should be very glad if the former could be struck
first." [13] Sturgis reached the Musselshell
on August 19, having marched cross-country from Pompey's Pillar. "At
this time," wrote engineer officer First Lieutenant Luther R. Hare, "the
valley was covered with immense herds of buffalo." [14] On the twenty-first, the troops continued
upstream toward Judith Gap, where Lieutenant Doane was already
maneuvering with his Crow scouts. A courier from Second Lieutenant Ezra
B. Fuller, who with five men had previously ridden up the Yellowstone
from the cantonment to Fort Ellis, brought word that the Nez Perces were
still in the vicinity of Camas Meadows and, moreover, were likely en
route to Wind River. [15] This news decided
Sturgis to turn back toward the Yellowstone, to near the mouth of the
Stillwater, and, as he notified Governor Potts, to keep watch for the
Nez Perces' possible emergence into or along the Yellowstone Valley or
to be ready to move his command toward the Stinking Water or Wind River.
As Doane departed for Fort Ellis in accordance with instructions from
Gibbon (and much against Sturgis's preference), Sturgis had hired John
J. Groff and J. S. Leonard, with the Warms Springs boy, to scout the
Clark's Fork and Stinking Water region and "to penetrate the park until
they could bring me definite information in regard to the hostile
Indians." [16] (It was these two men that
Lieutenant Scott encountered in the park on September 1.) On the
twenty-fifth, Sturgis forded the Yellowstone and then moved up the
Stillwater to the Crow Agency, where he hired six Crows and a French
guide named Rogue. These he sent forward into the Clark's Fork and
Stinking Water region after receiving a telegram from Howard citing the
latter stream as the likely objective of the Nez Perces.
Miles also directed Sturgis to proceed farther south
"to near Stinking Water." "You may yet capture or destroy the Nez
Perces," he wrote on August 26. He advised that Sturgis might initiate
their surrender by "sending a small party of Crows, or any white man
that knows them . . . demanding their surrender on the same terms as
other Indians who have surrendered to this command, assuring them that
they will receive fair and just treatment from the Government." [17] Next day, Miles changed his mind, writing
Sturgis, "I would prefer that you strike the Nez Perces a severe blow if
possible before sending any word to them to surrender." [18] Meanwhile, angered by the meddling of
Gibbon in directing Doane up the Yellowstone ("cruel interference with
my orders and plans"), Sturgis waited at the agency for his scouts to
return until August 31; then, hearing nothing and fearful that the Nez
Perces were passing east through the park, he moved his force toward
Clark's Fork. [19] His plan, as he notified
Colonel Miles, was as follows:
In case I should learn that the hostiles had moved up
the East Fork of the Yellowstone [Lamar River], then I would move up the
cañon of Clark's Fork, going on if necessary until we should
encounter them in the Soda Butte Pass; otherwise I would establish my
camp near Heart Mountain, and from that central point observe the
outlets both on the Stinking Water and Clark's Fork, all depending on
the information I might receive in the mean time. [20]
But Sturgis's difficulties were just beginning.
Reaching the mouth of Clark's Fork Canyon on September 5, he continued
to a tributary two miles away and went into bivouac, where his hungry
men used grasshoppers to hook many fine trout. [21] The colonel had discovered, in fact, that
no trail led through the canyon, and he therefore determined to march
next day northwest up a stream that would lead, ultimately, to Soda
Butte Pass. Word from his Crow scouts and the Frenchman, Rogue, however,
that the country to his right was impenetrable, and that, moreover, the
Nez Perces could not descend via that route, turned his attention toward
the Stinking Water. On the sixth, Sturgis sent his wagons with
twenty-five men back to the Crow Agency for provisions expected to
arrive from Fort Ellis. His Crows also departed for the agency, and the
colonel dispatched Rogue and a prospector named Seibert with a notice to
miners in the Clark's Fork area regarding the proximity of the Nez
Perces ("As they are hostile and murdering all the unarmed people who
come in their way, I send this to put you on your guard."). [22] These men on the eighth met Howard's
command and alerted that officer to Sturgis's location, but somehow
failed to return and alert Sturgis to Howard's presence. On September 7,
Sturgis marched his men again for Clark's Fork Canyon, fully intending
to start for Heart Mountain, a lofty pinnacle shooting up from the
plains some fourteen miles southeast from his position. Next morning,
scouting parties struck out in divergent directions for the Stinking
Water and the upper reaches of Clark's Fork, led, respectively, by
Lieutenants Hare and Fuller. At 3:00 that afternoon, Hare returned to
report having found Rogue and Seibert sixteen miles away, one dead and
the other badly wounded, apparently having been attacked by Nez Perce
warriors coming from the Stinking Water. The injured man was
subsequently treated and sent in company with several prospectors back
to the agency. [23] Fuller, too, brought
word that from a mountaintop he had sighted the tribesmen moving toward
that same stream before they disappeared beyond some mountains. "The
guide who accompanied him," Sturgis later reported, ". . . assured me
that from the point where the Indians had disappeared behind the
mountain range, it was altogether impossible for them to cross over to
Clark's Fork, and that they must necessarily debouch on the Stinking
Water." [24]
Sturgis's next decision was inadvertently horrendous
as it affected army plans to close on the Nez Perces as they emerged
from the park. Apparently against the advice of some of his senior
officers, he resolved to drive his force cross-country to the presumed
outlet of their route and head the people before they gained the
Stinking Water, then follow up on that route until he met them or turned
them back onto Howard's army, "wherever it might be." Perturbed that
Doane's command was unavailable to help monitor both potential routes of
the tribesmen, on the evening of September 8, after sending the balance
of his train and the Napoleon gun back to the agency, Sturgis set out
with pack animals for the Stinking Water, moving up Pat O'Hara Creek, a
tributary of Clark's Fork, and camping after fifteen miles, probably on
Skull Creek, near the base of Heart Mountain. [25] Next day, his command negotiated the rough
terrain west and south of Heart Mountain and forded the Stinking Water
about noon east of its canyon. "The sulphur fumes are distinctly
noticeable a mile from the stream," wrote Lieutenant Hare, "all coming
from the sulphur-beds in the cañon." [26]
On the morning of the tenth, in a "tedious march"
owing to the "continuing rarity of the atmosphere," his men recrossed
the Stinking Water (both forks) [27] and
turned up a tributary (probably Rattlesnake Creek) leading northwest
from the North Fork of the Stinking Water. They crossed the divide to
Dead Indian Creek, an affluent of Clark's Fork, where they found the
trail of the Nez Perces and camped at high altitude, probably in the
vicinity of Dead Indian Pass. The tribesmen's path suggested that they
had turned back and descended into Clark's Fork, effectively
circumventing Sturgis's troops while leading, and thus evading, those of
Howard yet on the back trail coming from the park. Sturgis, wrote Hare,
had been misinformed by "the ignorance of the guides and their
confusion." On Tuesday, September 11, Sturgis roughly paralleled Clark's
Fork Canyon to reach the river below the mouth of the canyon directly on
the Nez Perces' trail. Late in the day, the troops came on an abandoned
government horse bearing a First Cavalry brand, evidence that Howard's
army probably lay somewhere ahead on the trail. [28]
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