MANZANAR Historic Resource Study/Special History Study

CAUSES (continued)

Togo Tanaka, January 25, 1943

Togo Tanaka, an active JACL leader during pre-evacuation days and one of the documentary historians employed at Manzanar, prepared a lengthy analytic report, entitled "An Analysis of the Manzanar Riot and Its Aftermath: Its Causes, Principal Participants, Occasion, Consequences," on January 15, 1943. This report, the last of the documentary reports to be prepared, was written during his stay at the Cow Creek Civilian Conservation Corps Camp in Death Valley. He prefaced the report with a statement that placed his work as a relocation center documentary historian in perspective:

The Documentary Historian, compelled by circumstances to be an unwilling Principal in the Manzanar disturbance of December 6, concludes his duties with this report. Because, like it or not, he was a Principal in the event, he runs the risk of submitting a paper lacking in the objectivity expected of such an assignment. This report has been purposefully delayed. A detached perspective has been better afforded by the lapse of time. Moreover, the time has been spent by the Documentary Historian in solid manual labor with congenial Park Service Rangers here in Death Valley. He cannot help but feel that this atmosphere, freeing him from fear of assault and violence and uncertainty, has cleared up mental processes clogged by seven months in bewildering situations of which he was more often than not, unprepared. . . . In a very real sense, the documentary work has been, to him, a continuing search for the truth. The cost in personal defamation of character and slander sustained partially as a result of the work has not been light. . . . If time sustains the truth, accuracy, and historical value of the work, he will feel that the cost will not have been too heavy.

Tanaka observed that the "Manzanar Riot" was the "logical outgrowth of pre-evacuation factional conflicts among evacuees, clashes of ideology intensified by war, and the unhealthy condition of accumulating resentments within the limited area of the Center." Pre-evacuation conflicts "centered chiefly around two fairly distinct and identifiable groups." The conflicts were "a curious mixture of pre-war personal feuds, political, business and social rivalries of long standing." Evacuees "from Southern California, particularly Los Angeles, carried these conflicts into Manzanar in March, April and May, 1942."

During the "early stages of Manzanar's development," Tanaka noted that there was "little doubt that individuals associated with the two groups expressed this rivalry in efforts to secure key administrative jobs:" Continuing, he observed:

. . . .In a very real sense, there was jockeying and maneuvering for what may be described here as political control or leadership of the population. It was generally felt by members of both groups in the beginning that 'we're all in the same boat now, so let's pull together.' But old incompatibilities and jealousies flared anew in short order, individuals within each group resorted to torpedoing one another. It is significant that these two factions represented the only articulate citizen element within the Center having a semblence [sic] of organization.

In the light of what has already happened, it is quite safe to record here that this situation of a feuding citizen element helped pave the way for the formation of a third group which came much closer to achieving the goal that the pre-evacuation groups failed to reach — the ostensible leadership of Manzanar's population.

Tanaka identified and described the three groups or factions at Manzanar. These were: Group I, the Japanese American Citizens League, an organization of which he was a member; Group II, the Anti-JACL group; and Group III, the Anti-Administration-Anti-JACL group.

Regarding Group I, Tanaka noted that there were over 350 clubs and organizations in the pre-war Japanese communities throughout southern California. Of the dozen that survived war and evacuation, the JACL was "undoubtedly the largest from the standpoint of membership, organization staff, finances, prestige, and enemies." For many years in Los Angeles, the "most persistent criticism of, and opposition to, the J.A.C.L. was furnished by a numerically small but articulate group" which he termed the Anti-JACL group.

Group II (the Anti-JACL group in pre-war days), according to Tanaka, had "held a reputation among the Japanese population generally as being 'Aka' (Red) meaning 'Communist.'" In the communities "where economic control or dominance was held largely by a Japanese-speaking non-citizen element, to be labelled 'Aka' was synonymous with ostracism." Tanaka observed that "individual political thinking among the Japanese was neither characteristic nor conspicuous." Among the "so-called Anti-J.A.C.L. group, however, it was." Some individuals, "who shied away from this group for personal economic or social reasons, considered it more as a 'left wing,' 'liberal,' or 'progressive' group rather than the 'Aka' label more generally recognized."

Tanaka noted that, unlike Groups I and II, the Group III faction was "primarily Japanese-speaking" and had "no pre-evacuation history as an organize, body." Unlike Groups I and II, its "war idealogy was openly and admittedly anti-American pro-Axis." According to Tanaka, "Group III's principal appeals for evacuee support and sympathy, however, were bolstered more by the general unpopularity of Groups I and II rather than by any wholesale adherence to the war ideology its more fanatic obvious leaders preached."

Tanaka observed that any "discussion where 'groups' are involved compel certain general statements," and that generalizations "at best, are only approximately true." In the "Manzanar riot, there were individuals who figured as Principal Participants who considered themselves as belonging to no 'group.'" Other principals had "deliberately" attempted "to dissociate themselves from previous labels under which they had been known." Within "the small circle of the groups themselves were frictions tending against any 'group' unity." Nevertheless, "both in the developments leading to the disturbance, and in the riot itself, Groups I, II, and III crystallized as definite associations or factions."

Tanaka listed some of the relationships among the three factions. Group I individuals were on the "Death List of Group III." Individuals in Group II were on the "Death List" of Group III. Groups I and II, numbering less than 40 principals, were evacuated for reasons of personal protection to Death Valley. Group III leaders were jailed for their efforts. "Differences of opinion, personal dislikes, harbored grudges of long standing, and old rivalries separated Groups I and II." In their "positions and attitudes on the war, however, they were united — ideologically." Their "community of interests and willingness to cooperate with each other, however, ended there."

During the pre-evacuation period, individuals associated with Group I "were, among the Japanese population, more affluent; in business they were undoubtedly the more financially successful; they were generally described as the entrepreneurs or employers; socially they carried greater prestige." Individuals in Group I "through positions of office in the Japanese Citizens League, regularly receipted for a heavy bill in accusations, rumors, public charges." There were numerous charges that "Group I members were grafters, or frauds cheating the J.A.C.L. treasury" or "they were disreputable would-be capitalists exploiting Japanese American labor or obstructing legitimate unionism." "That Group II members were parties to these public and private efforts to discredit Group I" was "acknowledged by the former."

Tanaka observed that Group II "came in for the same type of abuse and slander in pre-evacuation days." This "torpedoing was admittedly aided and abetted by Group I." More than the other factions. Group II "was characterized in its composition as intellectual intelligentsia among the Japanese." Rumors and "vicious backyard talk about Group II invariably centered around the alleged loose morals and unconventional behavior of its members."

Group III leaders "exploited this relationship of bad feeling and malicious personal slander between Groups I and II, to good advantage in winning evacuee support and in neutralizing potential sympathy for the obvious representatives of 'pro-Administration' and 'pro-American' thought." Tanaka noted that it was "now apparent" that Group III held "both Groups I and II in contempt for the latters' position on the war which was regarded by Group III more often than not as 'dreamy idealism" or "wishful thinking contrary to real facts." Group III held Groups 1 and II in "disgust for the latter's evident desire to cooperate with the Caucasian administration, a desire that was interpreted by Group III as 'licking the white man's boots.'" Group III also viewed Groups I and II "with fear, distrust, and suspicion because of the latter's alleged willingness to cooperate with the federal investigative agencies within the center." This "latter relationship played an important part" in the "outbreak of violence" on December 6.

On the "night of the riot," Tanaka noted that "it can be recorded" that no love was apparently lost between Groups 1 and II, despite the fact both were refugees from the same disturbance." "Mutual distrust, suspicion, and dislike" were "only temporarily stifled."

Tanaka recalled "that members of Group II arrived at Manzanar as evacuees before Group I," thus enabling Group II members to establish "themselves at the relocation center first." When Group I members "arrived a month or so later, they generally discovered that Group II "had laid the mines and torpedoes in advance of our coming." They "prepared the Administration — and volunteer evacuees for a hostile reception for us; they kept up the vicious rumors to perpetuate themselves in their petty little jobs, continuing jealousies and frictions of pre-war and pre-evacuation days." On the other hand. Group II "members felt justified in their attitude toward the latecomers," characterizing the JACL members as "troublemakers and would-be big shots" who were "used to grabbing selfish control of everything."

Tanaka reported that approximately 95 percent of the Manzanar evacuees "were neither active nor passive participants in the incident." Rather, "they were interested, curious, fearful, somewhat bewildered spectators." None of the three groups "commanded any substantial loyal following." Groups I and II "certainly did not," as individuals "associated with either have been completely vilified, hung in effigy." In Tanaka's opinion. Group II "represented a spontaneous outburst of pent-up emotion growing out of fears and uncertainties which continually made for a neurotic state of mind among a large section of the population." The "incentive to resist the kind of talk espoused by Group III (Harry Ueno-Joe Kurihara-Genji Yamaguchi) did not (and still does not) exist within the limiting confines of barbed wire fences and watchtowers."

Tanaka observed that the "impression given in most newspaper accounts of the Manzanar disturbance" was that the "instigators were all 'pro-Japan' or 'pro-Axis' (and the same was applied to their alleged followers) and that the intended victims of violence were 'pro-American.'" This, however, was not "necessarily an accurate picture." "If it implies that all the outstanding 'pro-American' individuals have been driven out of the Center and only 'pro-Axis' or 'pro-Japan' elements are left, it is entirely erroneous and misleading." Undoubtedly, "differences in ideology and position on the war played an important part," but these were "incidental to clashes of personality and organizational friction in leading to the riot itself."

One of the most difficult problems facing WRA administrators, according to Tanaka, was "that of securing or getting evacuees sympathetic, or at least cooperative, in their attitude toward the W.R.A. administration." "If even partial success is attained, the vicious circles of rumors which make for so much unrest and fear would be cut down considerably." The evacuees were "a disbelieving, distrustful, suspicious populace," because of "the long and unbroken series of 'broken promises,' about the true nature of which there is little understanding." Added to this unconscious "source of resentment and grievance," was the disillusionment and "bitterness of a frustrated citizen element which can be satisfied completely only by a return to the normalcy of outside life." This "underlying situation" provided "a setting for disturbance, an occasional outbreak of violence."

Thus, on December 6 Manzanar "was not unlike a powder barrel." "Groups I, II, and III constituted exceedingly short fuses." One single incident — the attack on Tayama and the subsequent arrest of Ueno — "ignited the whole barrel."

Elimination "of the apparent and most active members of these Groups has reduced the hazard of another blow-off of major proportions in any predictable immediate future." However, Tanaka warned that this did not "necessarily mean that the underlying situation has been corrected." [75]