MANZANAR Historic Resource Study/Special History Study

CAUSES

WRA Investigations

Following the violence at Manzanar on December 5 and 6, WRA administrators, shaken by the seething tensions in the camp, launched several investigations in an attempt to determine the principal causes of the unrest. In a document, entitled "The Manzanar 'Incident': December 5 to December 19, 1942," WRA investigators concluded:

From the preceding sketchy picture of what happened for two weeks at Manzanar it can be seen that an extremely complex situation developed. To list briefly some of the contributing factors to the general condition: self-government charter controversy, personal grudges, Japanese-American Citizen's League, camouflage, housing, dissatisfaction with certain administrators. The two most important factors were: first, the inherent conflict between those culturally Japanese and those culturally Americans, and secondly, the close confinement within the area. The latter is a strong force that tends to aggravate any preexisting conflicts.

The clean sweep that would eliminate a goodly portion of these problems naturally would be relocation. . . . [72]

Although many factors contributed to the tensions that led to violence at Manzanar, WRA authorities nevertheless concluded that the confinement within barbed wire fences of various divergent groupings of persons of Japanese descent was a major underlying cause of the unrest. These groupings ranged from traditional, and hence conservative, rural agricultural communities such as Florin near Sacramento, where members of the burakumin, a class of Japanese "untouchables," had settled, to "Japanesy" working class communities such as Terminal Island and San Pedro near Los Angeles Harbor, to middle class neighborhoods in West Los Angeles and Los Angeles suburban communities such as Pasadena and Glendale. Evacuees from agricultural areas, such as Bainbridge Island, Washington, Florin, French Camp near Stockton, Venice, and the San Fernando Valley, and college-educated professionals from Los Angeles had little in common. Furthermore, stresses and strains had developed between the younger largely-Americanized Nisei and the older, more Japanese-oriented Issei who had dominated prewar Japanese American communities. [73]

In the aforementioned WRA report on the events of December 5 and 6 submitted to Director Myer on December 22, 1942, a section entitled "Probable Causes" elaborated further on the underlying factors leading to the violence. The report noted in part:

Ueno was very popular at Manzanar. Tayama was despised as an informer and a stool pigeon. The spark that set off the incident was the arrest of Ueno on suspicion of participating in the assault on Tayama, and his removal to a local jail. Few of the evacuees believed that Ueno was guilty, most of them thought that he was arrested because of the personal animosity of Mr. Campbell; that, even if he were guilty, he ought not to be punished for assaulting an informer of Tayama's character; and that his guilt should be determined by a hearing at Manzanar rather than in the local courts.

It is the consensus of the administrative staff at Manzanar and many of the evacuees who were interviewed that, while the arrest of Ueno was only an immediate cause of the incident, the real causes lay in a long series of deep-seated grievances which culminated in the event on Sunday, December 6. Tom Ozamoto detailed most of these grievances when his committee met with Mr. Merritt on December 14. Dr. Goto listed many of the same grievances. Togo Tanaka and other representatives of the Manzanar Free Press confirmed this analysis. . . .

Thus, the WRA report listed 25 reasons as the underlying causes for the unrest that led to violence at Manzanar. The grievances were listed "without attempting to indicate the particular persons who assigned them as basic reasons for the unrest." The list included:

1. Discrimination against the Issei and their exclusion from positions of importance in project administration.

2. Reliance by the project administration upon JACL leaders who were not regarded as representative of the evacuees and upon other purported leaders who aided in the evacuation.

3. Pre-evacuation quarrels and differences between various factions of the Japanese.

4. The presence of informers within their relocation center.

5. Rumors of misappropriation of sugar.

6. Frequent changes in the Project Director.

7. Frequent changes in administrative policies.

8. Indecision and vacillation in the determination of administrative policies.

9. Delays in the payment of clothing allowances.

10. Delays in making wage payments.

11. The wage differential between chefs and cooks.

12. Variation in food between the kitchens in different blocks.

13. The pro-government policy of the Manzanar Free Press.

14. The inadequacy of literal translations of English into Japanese.

15. The presence of objectionable flag-waving groups within the center.

16. The assumption by the JACL of the right to speak for the evacuees without consulting them, on such subjects as the application of the selective service system to the Japanese Americans.

17. The separation of Japanese aliens held in internment camps from their families, many of whom reside in Manzanar.

18. The labor policy for the camouflage net project.

19. The arrest of evacuees and their trial outside the relocation area.

20. The administration's effort to organize an evacuee council without consulting representative Issei groups.

21. Dissatisfaction with some members of the administrative staff.

22. The attitude of some members of the administrative staff toward the evacuees; unnecessary familiarity, fraternalism.

23. Uncertainty about the future in this country.

24. Loss of income and property as a result of the evacuation.

25. The unfavorable national press. [74]