Chapter Eight:
Controlling Development: How Much Is Too Much? (1947-1972)
(continued)
Reappraisal: Giant Forest
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In the years from 1930 through 1947, assaults on the
scenery and serenity of Sequoia and Kings Canyon had continued to mount
and with them concern about the future of the parks. These fears for
resource conservation and the park administration's ability to carry out
its founding charter were fueled principally by landscape architects.
Although scientists like Emilio Meinecke, George Wright and Lowell
Sumner contributed important and respected research that further
demonstrated ecological decline, theirs was a tiny voice in the
management chorus. Quite simply, ecological science was too immature and
undersupported in the parks to contribute strong factual data and thus
shape management opinion. Landscape architects tackled visible problems
with visible solutions aimed at creating visual pleasure. To a Park
Service concerned with object preservation and visitor entertainment,
the voice of landscape architecture remained the star player. [31]
During the 1950s, however, science began to assume a
stronger role. Not only had botany, zoology, conservation, and ecology
made tremendous strides in methodology and in the sophistication of
their conclusions, but more science-trained people were joining the Park
Service both in the Sierran parks and nationwide. The quarter century
from 1947 to 1972 would see a revolution in management priorities in the
national parks as the voice of science replaced that of landscape
architecture in management decisions. In Sequoia and Kings Canyon, this
role reversal both caused and resulted from a reappraisal of resource
management in the two parks. In Giant Forest, in the alpine backcountry,
and with animals and vegetation, the Park Service scrutinized past
policies, gauged their results, and began a profound shift toward
ecosystem preservation and an interpretation of the charter which tilted
ever more toward preservation and away from visitor use.
Nowhere in the two parks had resource threats and
concerns gone deeper than in Giant Forest. In 1947, when an embattled
and embittered Colonel White retired, the struggle to control human use
in the grove was already twenty years old. But the forced retirement of
the powerful superintendent signaled a change in the tone of contract
negotiations between the concessioner and those who would evict his
company from the forest. Superintendent Scoyen, who replaced White for
the second time, had long served with and respected his old boss, but he
had his own ideas and agenda for the parks. Scoyen was younger, more
flexible, and apparently less proprietary in his administration than the
Colonel had been. In addition, he held somewhat different ideas about
concession development and the proper balance between use and
preservation. He announced his new administrative philosophy with small
changes such as adding a second lane to the Generals Highway between the
Four Guardsmen, four spectacular sequoias which Colonel White had long
protected even though they were an obvious bottleneck. And within a
couple months of assuming the superintendency, Scoyen went on record in
favor of allowing all concession facilities except Giant Forest Village
to remain in the grove. Although the Washington office was actually
responsible for concession contract negotiations, they listened
carefully to the opinion of the superintendent on site. Following
Scoyen's advice and recalling Howard Hays' similar plan of a few years
earlier, the Park Service approached the concessioner with such a plan.
All too quickly the stringent efforts of Colonel White fell to a new
philosophy and an expedient solution. [32]
At the same time, however, Hays and Mauger had also
reconsidered their position. They replied that they would be happier if
the Park Service would simply forget about any notion of evacuating
Giant Forest. More than 75 percent of the revenue from their operations
through the two parks derived from Giant Forest. Neither believed that
Lodgepole, or any other site, could replace the experience of being
beneath the Big Trees or that many people would pay for a substitute.
Bolstered by an apparent governmental willingness to indefinitely grant
short extensions of the old contract, the two men commenced a series of
objections and stall tactics. First they balked at a provision which
would allow complete evacuation to be reconsidered after a ten-year
hiatus. Then there was the matter of how much the government should
reimburse them for moving the Village structures. The Korean conflict
provided another excuse, as everyone tried to measure the seriousness of
the conflict and whether it heralded another period of austerity and low
visitation. Finally, for nearly a year the company negotiated to sell
the business to a nonprofit organization formed by former Park Service
employees. With each new problem and each nine- or twelve-month contract
extension, Mauger and Hays backed further away from the notion of
leaving Giant Forest. [33]
Finally in 1952 the issue came to a head.
Negotiations with the potential buyer broke down and the concession
owners suggested that a new contract was now long overdue. They would
not budge from their stand to remain in the grove, with one exception.
That was a concession from Hays allowing reconsideration of removal of
Giant Forest Village in ten years. Interim Park Service Director Arthur
Demaray signaled the weariness and frustration of the government by
summarily ordering that the concessioner be allowed to remain in the
grove and that contract negotiations should conclude as soon as
possible. In August 1952, both parties inked a new contract specifying
the conditions Hays had recently suggested and consigning to the scrap
heap twenty years of effort by Colonel White and his allies. The former
superintendent's prediction of concessioner tactics and their eventual
results proved to be exactly accurate. [34]
The conclusion of contract negotiations between the
Park Service and Sequoia and Kings Canyon National Parks Company seemed
to settle the issue of evacuation from the grove once and for all. With
a twenty-year contract in hand and further written approval from the
director, Mauger and Hays resumed normal operations. The Park Service
too turned its attention to managing Giant Forest under existing
conditions and doing the best job possible to provide quality visitor
experiences while preserving the delicate sequoias. True, conditions
were distressing, but the battle was lost and there was no alternative
but to forge ahead. [35]
However, as the years passed and visitation nearly
doubled prewar annual totals, conditions in Giant Forest continued to
deteriorate. The concessioner had more than 400 structures in the area
including 303 cabins for guests, 47 cabins for employees, assorted
bathing and rest facilities, entertainment and office buildings, stores,
dining facilities, and storage sheds. A number of those buildings
cramped giant sequoias in the lodge area at the heart of the grove. [36] The Park Service itself owned several dozen
or so structures as well as four large and rapidly deteriorating
campgrounds, a picnic area at Hazelwood, and associated features like
sewage plants, cisterns and an amphitheater. Traffic along the Generals
Highway competed with cars leaving Camp Kaweah, Giant Forest Lodge,
Giant Forest Village, Moro Rock Road, four campgrounds, a picnic area,
and a variety of scenic turnouts. [37] In
addition, on crowded weekends and holidays, long lines of cars waiting
at Sequoia's only gas station in the Village spilled onto the road.
Driving to the peaceful and edifying serenity of Giant Forest often
became a chaotic and frustrating experience. Within the Village,
pedestrian traffic at the post office, village market, and gift shops
became equally disturbing. To any park administrator these alarming
conditions begged for solution. To park resource managers and visiting
scientists, such conditions boded poorly for the future of the grove
itself. [38]
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By the 1950s visitor congestion had
become chronic in the Giant Forest area of Sequoia National park.
(National Park Service photo)
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George Mauger offered a simple solutionenlarge
and expand operations in Giant Forest. Throughout the remainder of his
tenure in the parks, Mauger pressed for a higher pillow limit, newer and
larger guest cabins, expansion of the gas station, coffee shop, and gift
shops, and oiling of footpaths in the concession areas to control the
dust generated by thousands of tourist feet. [39] In a few cases, Mauger succeeded. The Park
Service oiled several miles of footpaths despite worries about the
effect on sequoia root systems. He also received permission to replace
many of the ramshackle rent-top cabins with more permanent and
comfortable units. Although park officials rejected most of his other
requests, Mauger remained, until the day he retired, unceasing in his
efforts to enlarge the Giant Forest operation. [40]
Even before the frustrating contract negotiations
ended and as summer traffic became increasingly congested, a disquieting
incident further focused attention on human activity amid the sequoias.
In the spring of 1950, park rangers observed a sequoia near Giant Forest
Lodge that appeared to be leaning toward a number of concession cabins.
The big tree, 18 feet in diameter and more than 240 feet high, had
always exhibited a lean. However, subsequent measurements showed that
lean to have increased slightly in the previous year to a point where
the top was 28 feet out of plumb. For sixty years the preservation of
giant sequoias had been the one incontrovertible policy of park
management, the one thing that all agreed upon. Here, however, a tree
leaned dangerously toward more than a dozen concession cabins. The
thought of the giant crashing to earth onto hapless visitors in the
cabins gave both Park Service officials and George Mauger many worried
nights. [41]
Through the summer, park officers, and various
forestry experts consulted over the fate of the big tree. Among the
scientists to study the tree on site were Emilio Meinecke, recently
retired, and Professor Emanuel Fritz of the University of California.
Forest Service officials, park foresters from other units, and Director
Drury himself traveled to Giant Forest to view the problem tree.
Throughout the process an anxious George Mauger pressed to have the tree
cut down. To suggestions that he move the dozen or so cabins in danger,
Mauger said he could not afford that. Yet Park officials found it
distressing to consider the destruction of one of the "objects" which
they had promised to protect, particularly since some sequoias had
persisted at a tilt for longer than anyone could remember. [42]
At last, the Park Service agreed to have the tree
felled. The concessioner could move his cabins, but at what cost and to
what new area? Superintendent Scoyen favored felling the tree because if
it later fell and killed or injured someone he would be, "on a very
lofty and exposed pinnacle of personal responsibility." A subsequent
flurry of correspondence between the Washington office and Sequoia
National Park confirmed the fate of the first giant sequoia to be
deliberately cut in the sixty-year history of the park.
The actual job of bringing down the giant went to two
brothers, Marshall and Leonard Brown. On November 8, they made a deep,
horizontal cut on the side facing a prearranged direction where the tree
could fall and do no appreciable damage. Through the day with axes and a
twelve-foot power saw, the brothers worked as a crowd of more than 100
employees and their families gathered. Telegrams from Scoyen to Regional
Director Tomlinson reported the progress every few hours. Finally, at
4:15 P.M., the huge tree toppled with a tremendous crash to earth,
spraying cabins up to 350 feet away with mud and clots of dirt. With the
aid of modern tools, including a block-and-tackle connected to a jeep
via another sequoia, the Brown brothers successfully laid the tree
exactly on target between permanent structures of Giant Forest Lodge.
Subsequent investigation showed the tree to be an estimated 2,222 years
of age. It lays today where it fell in the lodge area minus only a few
sections of the trunk which were taken as museum displays. [43]
The cabins were safe, no visitors had even been
inconvenienced, and the cutting had been an impressive feat;
nevertheless the entire episode badly disturbed park officials. Even
George Mauger reported the deep sense of sadness that swept the crowd of
onlookers when the task was done. It had been a blow to the deepest
loyalties of the park administrators, an action none had ever envisioned
taking. Even before the tree came down, Mauger pointed out another
leaning tree near Beetle Rock, which threatened cabins at Camp Kaweah.
However, Scoyen brusquely refused his request that it be cut at the same
time on the grounds that no shift in its lean had been observed. [44]
Failure to remove the concession company from Giant
Forest, renewed pressure from Mauger and Hays to expand operations in
the grove, the deeply disturbing incident with the leaning sequoia, and
distressingly crowded conditions motivated the Park Service to search
frantically for options to ameliorate the situation. In the minds of
Scoyen and his aides, neither of the parks' purposes were being
fulfilled. Visitors were so crowded, jostled, and stressed that they
could find little enjoyment or inspiration on busy days. And the scenery
and serenity of the grand trees was being despoiled by sheer numbers of
tourists.
Mission 66 gave park officials an opportunity to
address the situation. The landscape architects who designed the program
chose two options aimed at relieving traffic congestion and compressing
Park Service operations in the grove. First, they would reroute Generals
Highway around Giant Forest as Frederick Law Olmsted, Jr. had suggested
more than a decade earlier. Among several routes, Olmsted favored
looping the road below and to the west of the plateau, tunneling below
Sunset Rock, and rejoining the old highway somewhere near Lodgepole or
the Sherman Tree. Engineers with the Park Service and the Bureau of
Public Roads supported the project for traffic considerations, although
most considered the notion of a tunnel under Sunset Rock to be dubious
at best. Most park officials strongly supported the plan as a desperate
measure to control crowding. Under the scheme Giant Forest and all its
camping and lodging facilities would remain on a spur road leading
ultimately to Crescent Meadow. [45]
The second option incorporated into Mission 66 was
construction of a large new visitor center in Giant Forest Village
within which the functions of a half-dozen existing structures could be
concentrated. Not only would this plan replace a scattering of buildings
with one unit, but it would take some of those functions away from one
of the densest areas of Big Trees and put them in Giant Forest Village
where only a few trees could be affected. Suggestion of this plan marked
one of the first times that landscape architects recommended a single
large structure in place of several, smaller, rustically "appropriate"
ones. [46]
However, while businessmen, landscape architects, and
rangers versed in people management debated how to improve conditions in
Giant Forest, alarming scientific evidence continued to accumulate. That
evidence suggested that all ideas proposed to date, with one exception,
would fall short of preserving the Giant Forest ecosystem. That
exception was Colonel White's old notion of completely removing visitor
facilities, both those of the concession and of the Park Service, from
the grove.
One of the earliest research studies to influence
management of giant sequoias ironically came from Yosemite National
Park. In January 1954 a committee appointed by the superintendent there
released its "Report on the Effects of Human Impact Upon the Giant
Sequoias of the Mariposa and Tuolumne GrovesYosemite National
Park." The chief conclusion of the "Yosemite Report" was that roads,
buildings, sewage and power lines, and human compaction of soil all
harmed the delicate root systems of the big trees. The committee could
offer no solution to preserve the trees except to remove the offending
structures and paths. Although the report was widely read and respected
in Sequoia and Kings Canyon, it alone did not sway management opinion.
It did however lay the foundation by bringing ecological concerns to the
forefront and by calling for a large-scale, continuing program of
sequoia research. [47]
The name most associated with sequoia research, in
Sequoia and Kings Canyon and elsewhere in the species' range, was
Richard Hartesveldt. A doctoral candidate at the University of Michigan
when he began his studies, the Grand Rapids native continued his work
through the next two decades, later as a member of the faculty at San
Jose State University. Much of Hartesveldt's early research took place
in the Mariposa Grove of Yosemite National Park. There he found evidence
that not only corroborated the conclusions in the "Yosemite Report" and
those of Emilio Meinecke back in 1944, [48]
but suggested that the peril of the Big Trees was much more serious.
Steps would have to be taken if the species were to continue in the
grove and if the existing old giants were to survive. [49]
Hartesveldt's evidence, when added to that of the
"Yosemite Report" and Meinecke's research, presented the Park Service
with stark choices. The gravity of the problem appeared irrefutable.
Partial solutions and half-hearted attempts would doom the giant
sequoias. In response, in 1960 Superintendent John M. Davis called for a
high-level conference of park officials to consider the evidence, review
the options, and decide on the management future for Giant Forest. In
attendance at the "summit meeting" were Park Service Chief Ranger
Lawrence Cook, Chief Landscape Architect Merel Sager, and Chief
Naturalist Howard Stagner from the Washington office, their western
region counterparts, all the senior officials from Sequoia and Kings
Canyon, Regional Research Biologist Lowell Sumner, and several landscape
architects from the Washington Office Development Center. The ostensible
purpose of the meeting from May 31 to June 2 was to choose the exact
site for a visitor center in Giant Forest, but in reality it was to
decide the fate of developments, both existing and future, in the
sequoia grove. [50]
The committee released its report and recommendations
a few weeks later. The ominous evidence presented by Meinecke, the
Yosemite Committee, and Hartesveldt was cited to underline the urgency
and seriousness of the problem. In answer to the specific question of
locating a visitor center, the committee recommended that it be located
in or near Giant Forest Village if the Generals Highway remained where
it was. If, on the other hand, the road were to be rerouted around Giant
Forest, then the visitor center should be built at Lodgepole. Having
settled the nominal topic of the conference, the committee then
addressed the weightier issue of the grove's future development and made
several recommendations, specifically: (1) all commercial activities
(retail and food services) should ultimately be moved to Lodgepole or
some other nearby site (2) Giant Forest should be allowed to recover its
"natural aspects" (3) the gas station, ice house, and grocery store in
the Village should be given first and immediate priority in the move to
Lodgepole (4) a continuous program of research and observation of human
impact on giant sequoias should be established (5) walk ways, parking
areas and other blacktop features should be moved or eliminated near
sequoias and (6) "the questions of the relocation of all overnight
accommodations and campgrounds from Giant Forest to Lodgepole or
elsewhere, as a long-term objective, should be reopened." [51]
The final, albeit understated, recommendation threw
before park planners, after a decade of relative quiet, the most complex
and divisive issue in the history of Sequoia and Kings Canyon. However,
from such a blue ribbon panel, relying on hard scientific data from a
variety of sources, and with such stakes at risk, Colonel White's old
proposal packed a lot more potential punch this time around.
Superintendent Davis supported all the recommendations with virtually no
alterations. However, Director Wirth still remained unconvinced on the
matter of removing all facilities from Giant Forest. Instead, he
suggested restudying a bypass road, an option which had gotten bogged
down in the early days of Mission 66. [52]
Although the Bureau of Public Roads had conducted a
bypass study in 1957, Wirth now wanted a more in-depth analysis by the
same agency. In late October and early November of 1961, road engineers
conducted field reconnaissance and a few months later released a second
report. The bureau offered two routes around Giant Forest, both of which
veered from the existing road south and west of Beetle Rock, wound below
the plateau to a point near Sunset Rock, and then curved northeastward
to rejoin the highway near Lodgepole. There was no mention of a tunnel.
In subsequent studies, Park Service engineers modified the routes to
form a third option which combined elements of the first two. In all
three cases the price tag hovered at between five and five and one-half
million dollars, and in all three cases Giant Forest remained on a spur
road. [53]
Almost immediately problems with the routes and,
indeed, the very concept of a bypass road began to surface. The routes
proposed by the Bureau of Public Roads required removal of a few sequoia
trees. Superintendent Davis called this suggestion "a dead duck from the
beginning." Thereafter questions arose about the level of traffic
decrease that could be expected from such a move and how much protection
the giant sequoias would receive if the spur road remained. Eventually,
in 1969, the Park Service commissioned a traffic study for the parks as
part of a new master plan. In the resulting report, engineer D. Jackson
Faustman suggested that construction of a bypass for traffic reasons
alone was not justified. If facilities remained in Giant Forest,
especially at the Village, they would continue to create "congestion and
hazard," he wrote. Thus it seemed from both traffic and ecological
standpoints, a bypass road would be ineffectual. [54]
Even before these doubts torpedoed the bypass road
project, the Park Service turned its attention once again to the more
controversial measureevacuation of infrastructure from Giant
Forest. If the Park Service were to implement this "final solution" it
faced the same issues as before: the concessioner who owned some 400
buildings, and the government's own structures, four sizeable
campgrounds, and picnic area at Hazelwood. The public enjoyed all these
services despite the overcrowding, while the concessioner remained
adamant about staying in the forest.
Taking the easiest job first, the government
indefinitely deferred action on building a new visitor center in Giant
Forest, and accelerated construction of the one at Lodgepole. In
addition, in 1962 it closed the smallest of the four campgrounds,
Firwood. Park officers wanted to close the remaining three campgrounds,
Paradise, Sunset Rock, and Sugar Pine which totaled 152 sites, but felt
obliged first to replace the sites elsewhere. This they eventually
accomplished by doubling the size of Dorst Campground some twelve miles
north of Giant Forest. Finally, in 1971 over protestations from some
visitors who decried park policy as favoring the concession-housed
"rich," the Park Service closed the remaining campgrounds in Giant
Forest. It was not lost on campers that the concessioner needed space
for a new sewage treatment facility and that Sugar Pine provided a
remarkably perfect site for such an installation. [55]
At the Hazelwood Picnic Area, the Park Service also
faced an uneasy prospect in eliminating a popular feature. However, in
this case a tragic occurrence provided the excuse it needed. On August
9, 1969, a 240-foot sequoia tree, partially damaged by fire and by
carpenter ants, fell against another sequoia, toppling the upper 130
feet of the second tree onto a picnic table. An elderly woman was killed
instantly. In the days that followed, Superintendent John McLaughlin
proposed that the picnic area be closed for safety reasons. The regional
director approved and park workers hastily removed all the sites,
leaving only a hiking trail behind in what had once been a popular
campground and later a favorite lunchtime stop. [56]
Thus by 1971, public government presence in Giant
Forest consisted of only one cabin, a tiny information station in Giant
Forest Village and restrooms. But the other side of the Park Services
plan, removal of concession facilities, continued to be an entirely
different matter. Park Service planners themselves remained divided on
the issue despite the growing scientific evidence and an increased
acceptance by the public. Some officials favored complete evacuation,
some only the removal of Giant Forest Village, and a few still accepted
George Mauger's contentions that damage from his structures was minimal,
and that there were plenty of other sequoia groves for those aesthetes
who insisted on freedom from humans in their nature experience. However,
each passing year tipped the balance of administrative opinion further
toward complete removal. By 1970, the two features all park planners had
agreed to oust, the gas station and post office, were moved to
Lodgepole. They were the first significant non-Park Service facilities
ever to be removed to another site. [57] At
the same time, ironically, the concessioner gained permission to replace
a dozen tent cabins at Giant Forest Lodge with modern units, to rebuild
and enlarge the lodge dining room, and even to erect a new gift shop on
the site of the just-removed post office.
Discussion aimed at evicting the rest of Giant Forest
Village proceeded until 1968 when a complication arose. New Director
George Hartzog, at the urging of Park Service archaeologists, ordered
that no building older than fifty years be razed or even modified. Most
of the buildings in Giant Forest Village would soon meet that criterion
easily. Later official designation under the historic structures act
further complicated any ideas about simply tearing down Giant Forest
Village. [58]
While debate continued about the Village and its
retail and food structures, the matter of concession housing continued
to be the major source of contention and negotiations between the
government and the company. In a startling and unheralded move the Park
Service raised the pillow limit in 1964 from 1,000 to 1,240. There is no
record of what debate or agreement led to this action nor of how, after
forty-three years, George Mauger convinced the government to accede to
his long-held wishes. [59] It may have been
done to facilitate Mauger's negotiations for sale of the concession
company. Less than a year later Mauger sold to the Fred Harvey Company
who immediately took up the cudgels for further expansion of facilities
in the grove. In 1967, the leaning tree at Beetle Rock exhibited new
cracks at its base and threatened concession housing at Camp Kaweah.
Park foresters felled their second giant sequoia in the history of the
park on January 13, 1967. This series of eventsraising the pillow
limit, continued aggravating pressure for more development, and
destruction of a second sequoia treestrengthened the resolve of
those park employees committed to evacuation from the grove and
intensified negotiations toward that end. [60]
As noted, however, the period 1965 to 1972 was one of
confusion and inaction due to repeated corporate changes. In addition,
the approaching termination of the twenty-year concession contract
exacerbated the situation. Hence both sides were tentative in their
efforts to change the status quo. In January 1972, GSI assumed
operations and accelerated negotiations for a new long-term contract.
Owing to the confusion of the preceding decade, the Park Service made no
drastic demands, but satisfied itself with a contract stipulation that
the concessioner would build a large market, gift shop, and snack bar
facility at Lodgepole. Although this left both concession housing and
the Giant Forest Village in place, park officials fervently hoped that
the concessioner could later be convinced to move, once superior visitor
services were in place at Lodgepole. [61]
Thus, in 1971, as the government removed the last
campgrounds, hailed the new gas station at Lodgepole, and negotiated for
a new contract with a concessioner, it backed down again from a
commitment to remove concession structures from Giant Forest. The park's
1971 master plan allowed that concession housing in the grove was
appropriate, and merely called for further investigation of alternative
sites by the Park Service. [62] On August
22, 1972, the National Park Service signed a twenty-year contract with
the new concessioner. The new contract required no additional removals
from Giant Forest. In the closing decades of the park's first century,
the subject would continue to be the biggest in a portfolio of
ecological problems put under the spotlight by resurging ecological
research.
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