Chapter Seven:
Two Battles for Kings Canyon (1931-1947)
(continued)
Harold Ickes and the Final Battle
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In 1933, as George Gibbs released his grand
development plan for Kings Canyon and as the Forest Service began the
road into Kings Canyon, another event occurred with profound
consequences for the future park. Newly elected President Franklin
Roosevelt appointed as Secretary of the Interior a Chicago lawyer named
Harold Ickes. In Ickes, Roosevelt had one of the most strong-willed,
heartily disliked, and powerfully effective appointees in Interior
history. [16] The secretary took particular
interest in the National Park Service, actively promoting, some say
interfering in, decisions on the creation, funding, and management of
parks. Among his accomplishments during his dozen years at the helm were
absorption of national battlefield sites from the Department of War and
of national monuments from the Department of Agriculture. In 1934, Ickes
came close to adding the entire Forest Service to Interior even as the
secretary of Agriculture campaigned to take over the National Park
Service. These political maneuvers created a healthy distrust and
dislike of Ickes by many both in and out of government, but particularly
within the Forest Service and the forestry and ranching communities.
Ickes also incurred the wrath of corporations for his
anti-trust stance, all segregationist groups for his incipient pro-civil
rights actions, and many politicians for his acerbic perhaps even brutal
verbal and written assaults. He was dictatorial, suspicious, petty, and
vindictive to employees and absolutely merciless with enemies. Forest
Service Regional Forester S.B. Show later described Ickes as
"overambitious, ignorant, egocentric, ruthless, unethical and highly
effective." [17] The last adjective conveys
part of the positive side of Harold Ickes. He was highly principled and
even righteous, and he was as tenacious a fighter as Washington has ever
seen.
Ickes had long cultivated strong ideas on
conservation, initially those espoused by Gifford Pinchot and later
those of Stephen Mather. [18] The secretary
had become interested in the Hetch Hetchy conflict two decades earlier,
and through his subsequent relationships with Mather and Albright had
taken an interest in wilderness preservation. [19] Indeed, by the time of his appointment as
secretary of Interior, Ickes had developed a preservationist philosophy
that went well beyond that espoused by most Park Service personnel. In
May 1933 he declared, "If I had my way about national parks, I would
create one without a road in it. I would have it impenetrable forever to
automobiles, a place where man would not try to improve upon God." [20]
In the Kings Canyon conflict Harold Ickes had a
chance to put those words into action. In 1935, he persuaded California
Senator Hiram Johnson to propose a bill to create a John Muir-Kings
Canyon National Park and, further, to make it a wilderness preserve. As
noted, this proposal came at the same time as the Forest Service plan
for a "primitive area." In any case, the confusion and counterproposals
of the previous fifty years had so long stalled development that the
concept of a roadless wilderness remained a viable one. In the Johnson
bill horse trails, footpaths, controlled use by commercial packers, and
simple camping facilities were to be encouraged. Roads, hotels, and
other large-scale developments would be bannedincluding within
Kings Canyon itself. [21]
If nothing else could unify the development
claimants, this bill and the presence of Harold Ickes in the conflict
did. A storm of protest from power, reclamation, tourism, grazing, and
timber interests drowned Johnson's bill in committee. Thereupon, with
the immediate threat of park status averted, the various claimants
retired to continue maneuvering for control of the watershed, its lands
and water. Los Angeles, its power needs temporarily satisfied by the
huge, new Boulder Dam (later renamed Hoover Dam) on the Colorado River,
dropped out, but the battle between irrigation and tourism factions
continued unabated.
In this atmosphere Ickes, NPS Regional Director Frank
Kittredge, and members of the Sierra Club decided on a plan of concerted
action. After lengthy discussions with park proponents around the state
and a careful survey of the opponents among the local residents and
businessmen, two things became clear. First, the Park Service had a poor
reputation. Despite the nearly universal respect for Colonel White and
his staff, locals perceived the Park Service as an agency opposed to
development, unconcerned about the economic fates of local farmers and
communities, dictatorial and restrictive in the management of their
lands and resources, largely under the control of wealthy urban
pleasure-seekers and, finally, extraordinarily land hungry. Almost to a
person, they preferred the Forest Service whose personnel espoused a
freer use of lands and resources, who seemed ready and anxious to
promote the economic welfare of San Joaquin Valley farmers, and who
allowed much easier access to hunting, fishing, and travel within their
mountain territories. Ickes and Kittredge discovered that much of this
damaging sentiment was fostered by local and regional Forest Service
officials. From Regional Forester Show on down, the Forest Service men
lost no opportunity to reinforce these perceptions and, indeed,
cultivate no small fear of the consequences of park expansion in the
southern Sierra Nevada. [22]
The second thing that became clear was the confusion
among park opponents as they bickered over different proposals for the
watershed's future. Some wanted extensive reclamation, some wanted roads
and tourism, some even wanted a wilderness preserve; all wanted it under
Forest Service control. The one other view all locals shared, whether
for or against a park, was a deep antagonism toward and fear of Los
Angeles. Neither San Francisco nor Los Angeles had shown any compunction
in recent history about stripping a watershed of its water and power
resources regardless of the consequences for those who might depend for
their very economic existence on those resources. Los Angeles had
destroyed the Owens Valley, bled water from the Colorado River, and
convinced the state of California to implement a vast plan aimed at
shifting water southward from Sacramento Valley rivers toward the huge
city. What chance did the Fresno Irrigation District have in blocking
this imperialistic juggernaut?
Here was the opening and the opportunity park backers
had needed. Ickes, Kittredge, and Sierra Club members like William Colby
conceived a plan to improve the Park Service's reputation and garner
some critical support for a Kings Canyon park by dividing their enemies
and playing on this fear of Los Angeles. [23] The campaign began in earnest during the
early months of 1938. Both Ickes and Kittredge commenced a series of
radio addresses and speaking engagements aimed at newspaper publishers,
outdoor recreation groups, influential women's and businessmen's groups,
state and local legislators, and nearly anyone else who would listen.
Most talks were in San Francisco or Los Angeles, although both men
appeared in Fresno and other San Joaquin Valley towns during the next
two years. Superintendent White also stumped about the state promoting
the idea that Sequoia National Park was everyone's park and that they
should support it and the Park Service.
The real job of diplomacy, however, fell to Assistant
Regional Director B.F. Manbey. Through the spring and summer of 1938,
Manbey met dozens of times with civic officials, sportsmen's groups,
publishers, businessmen's clubs, farmers, irrigation associations, and
even timber and grazing interests to sell both Kings Canyon National
Park and the Park Service. His seventeen reports back to Frank Kittredge
in fact went to Harold Ickes, from whom Manbey took direct orders. Those
reports show a vigorous, tiring schedule, a veritable whirlwind of
speeches and panel discussions, and as near a piece of diplomatic
negotiation as the Valley had ever seen.
Manbey's orders from Ickes were strict and, given the
source, surprising. He was not to challenge, insult, or in any way
conflict with the Forest Service. Rather he was to strive for an image
of calm, concerned reasonableness, exactly the opposite of how the
Forest Service had portrayed the Park Service. Manbey told farmers and
irrigation proponents that the Park Service understood and sympathized
with their needs. Certainly the very fate of the nation depended on
assuring the success of agriculture particularly in a breadbasket such
as the San Joaquin Valley. He reassured the locals that Harold Ickes
would see that their water needs were not ignored or usurped. And he was
in a position to make good on that promise, for in addition to the
National Park Service, Secretary Ickes had control of the U.S. Bureau of
Reclamation.
Concerning the proposed new national park, Manbey
promoted the health, educational, and spiritual benefits of saving the
wilderness. More and more people, tired, dispirited, and aching from the
chaos and pressures of urban life, would come to mend themselves along
the paths, lakes, and canyons of the mountain park. The approaches to
this fountain of salubrity would pass directly through Fresno and other
Valley towns where recreational staging areas, auto and camping supply
services, and other businesses would cater to increasing numbers of
tourists. As for hunting and other activities, there still existed
around the proposed park a huge forest area on all but the south side to
accommodate sportsmen. [24]
Many, of course, remained unconvinced by the combined
persuasive assaults of Ickes, Kittredge, White, and especially Manbey.
Unconvinced, at least, to back the park proposal. However, the National
Park Service as an organization fared rather better. Bitter enemies,
including local Forest Service officials, were nonplussed. At the
occasional meeting where both agencies were represented, Park Service
officials invariably complimented their Forest Service counterparts
graciously, even effusively. Thus the Forest Service's rancorous
criticism blunted for a time, and stories of an arrogant, aloof,
power-hungry Park Service faded. [25]
Slowly but surely through this media and personal
campaign a compromise developed between Ickes and local civic officials,
businessmen, and ultimately most farmer and irrigation groups. That
compromise became the basis for the final successful push for park
status, for the organization and operation of the future park, and for a
series of promises the Park Service made which came back to haunt it
later.
Three conditions were to be met by the Department of
Interior. First, immediate water and power needs were to be met with
construction of a large facility at Pine Flat. The Bureau of Reclamation
under Harold Ickes was to undertake construction with the brunt of the
cost being borne by the federal government and the bulk of the benefit
going to local water users. In addition, reclamation projects on the
North Fork of the Kings River, well outside any proposed park, were to
be sanctioned by Interior.
Second, Tehipite Valley and Kings Canyon were to be
excluded from the park proposal. Both sites had been the core of the
1902 Geological Survey Report, the 1920 Los Angeles proposal, and the
Randell Report. Although local farmers saw no immediate need for
construction of dams at these sites, they were loath to give them up for
park inclusion. One thing still clear after all the negotiations was
that once in the park, these canyons would be forever lost to
reclamation. Hence, both had to be withheld until future demand
determined their importance. Exclusion of these magnificent canyons, the
very heart of the proposed park, was a bitter pill for the Park Service
to swallow, but one absolutely necessary to placate local water
users.
Finally, the third condition set by locals was that
the Park Service would see that a major tourism development would be
constructed in the canyon of the South Fork. The preferred sites were at
Kanawyer's Camp adjacent to Copper Creek, near the entrance to the
wilderness park, and at Cedar Grove where the Forest Service had begun
development. This was a curious provision for both the Park Service and
the Fresno community because if the canyon was excluded from the new
park, the Forest Service, not the Park Service, would still control the
land and its development. Nevertheless, a verbal agreement was concluded
and the much-bolstered park lobby geared up again to tackle Congress
with the Kings Canyon issue. [26]
Despite depleting the ranks of the opposition with
diplomacy and promises, the road ahead for the Park Service remained a
difficult one. When Representative Bertrand "Bud" Gearhart proposed a
new bill to create a John Muir-Kings Canyon National Park opponents were
still many, strong, and loud. Several irrigation associations had not
been lured into the pro-park camp, chief among them the California
Mutual Water Companies Association which represented forty-eight
irrigation companies. Sportsmen's associations to a member opposed Park
Service administration of any more territory. Several influential state
newspapers, the California legislature, and the California Chamber of
Commerce also went on record against the park. [27]
Among the most vocal anti-park groups was the U.S.
Forest Service in California. This is noteworthy because Secretary of
Agriculture Henry Wallace, under strict orders from President Roosevelt,
had already firmly stated his own and his department's support for the
new park. Reasons for the local Forest Service revolt were many:
widespread enmity toward Harold Ickes, his recent attempt to take over
the Forest Service, the ardent belief among California members of the
Forest Service in the superiority of their philosophy, and the
deep-seated mistrust and dislike of their conservation competitor, the
Park Service. That orders from Secretary Wallace had come to support the
park proposal is clear. That Show, his assistants, and field men ignored
them is equally clear. As the spring of 1939 rolled by and the bill came
closer to House consideration, the verbal attacks on Ickes and the Park
Service by Show and others became strident and frenzied. [28]
Meanwhile, a new issue entered the fray. For many
years the largest and one of the most impressive giant sequoia groves at
Redwood Mountain had remained in private hands. Park officials often
worried about the future of this huge grove of magnificent trees.
Fortunately, the owners had seemed ill-disposed to cut the trees and,
hence, for decades the forest had remained intact. In 1939 the owners of
the grove found themselves in a precarious situation. With no income
from the land and with taxes mounting, they tried to sell the area to
the government for inclusion in a national park. Typically, the
government could not make up its mind how or even whether to buy the
forest. As the taxes mounted and the owners prepared to default on their
payment, it became clear that the land would have to be sold to someone
soon, and logging of the Redwood Mountain Grove was a virtual certainty
thereafter. The grove had been included in Representative Gearhart's
bill, yet time was running out. [29]
With this impetus the campaign for Kings Canyon
further intensified. In the process so did the antagonism between the
two agencies involved. Subsequently, Park Service officials accused
Forest Service representatives of poisoning local sentiment with
distortion and slander. To be sure Show and his assistants were now
working full time to marshal support for their position and to convince
fence-sitters of the Forest Service's superior moral and economic
position. In this he was ably assisted by Charles Dunwoody, a local
member of the California Chamber of Commerce, and several other local
officials whose interests would apparently be damaged by creation of the
park. [30]
Meanwhile, the Forest Service reacted with even
stronger charges. Among the actions of which the Park Service was
accused were wire-tapping, which is likely given Ickes' predilection for
that sort of thing, bullying of Forest Service personnel which seems
unlikely since their own boss could not control them, and burglary of
the Forest Service office in Porterville. The burglary charge was tricky
because Park officials had obtained Department of Agriculture permission
to enter the offices and seemed unconcerned when caught redhanded by
Forest Service personnel. Thereafter, Show claimed he hid all his
records so they could not be summoned by his boss, acting under orders
from the president. What is perhaps the greatest wonder throughout this
campaign is that Show and his assistants managed to keep their jobs. [31]
A curious rift had also developed in the
preservationist camp. Several organizations, notably the National Parks
Association and The Wilderness Society, opposed the Gearhart bill on the
grounds that a park without the two canyons was unworthy. They insisted
on holding out for a proposal that would include the canyons and perhaps
some additional territory along the road from Grant Park to Cedar Grove.
The Sierra Club and the Emergency Conservation Committee supported the
bill, taking the pragmatic approach that a park without the canyons was
better than no park at all. Besides, the threat to the canyons was not
imminent and they might be added later.
As the campaign developed, the National Parks
Association in particular became very active in opposition, publishing
pamphlets and frequently going on public record against the park. Two
years earlier, this same group had equally loudly opposed creation of
Olympic National Park. Roosevelt aide Irving Brant subsequently
suggested that a fairly dim William Whorton, who headed and formed the
financial backbone of the National Parks Association, had been duped by
his friend William Greeley, a lumberman and recognized advocate of
resource development. The Wilderness Society finally agreed to support
the bill freeing them from the insulting label "The Be-wildered
Society," which had been applied by other preservationist organizations.
[32]
The outcome of the park bill and this latest and most
organized Kings Canyon campaign was by no means clear when an unexpected
and startling event occurred to demoralize and destroy organized park
opposition. A busy Congress, preoccupied with continuing economic
recovery and ominous events overseas, looked to local representatives
for guidance on domestic issues such as the John Muir-Kings Canyon
National Park bill. The two local congressmen were Bud Gearhart, author
of the bill, and Alfred Elliot of Visalia. Elliott was deeply and
emotionally opposed to it. He was also well known and respected, and his
frequent antagonistic pronouncements about the bill, the National Park
Service, and Secretary Ickes had an effect. Despite the compromise, the
combination of Elliott's opposition and that of the state legislature
still made passage difficult.
Then, on March 4, 1939, an elderly Sierra Club member
and park supporter, Mrs. Gertrude Achilles of Morgan Hill, California,
wrote both congressmen urging passage of the park bill. In addition, she
wrote a check to Gearhart for $100 and instructed him to apply it to the
cause. However, she inadvertently enclosed the check to Gearhart in the
envelope to Elliott.
Upon receiving his letter and the check to Gearhart,
Elliott envisioned a bribery scandal and saw a way to defeat the pesky
conservation bill. He notified the FBI, made a copy of the check, typed
a new letter and envelope, and had an ally mail the check to Gearhart
from San Jose, near Morgan Hill. Gearhart received the check, but
returned it to the woman, thanked her for her endorsement, and suggested
she send the money to the Sierra Club.
The trap had not worked, yet Elliott plunged ahead
anyway showing the photostat of the check to prominent men in the San
Joaquin Valley and to several other congressmen. Gearhart first learned
of the plot when he received an anonymous phone call from a man who had
been at one of the meetings where Elliott showed the check and implied
corruption on the part of his Fresno colleague. in his tipoff, the
speaker concluded, "He is out to frame you, Buddy, and I would not be a
party to it. I had to tell you. Be on your guard." Over the next few
days three congressmen approached Gearhart with the same news.
Gearhart, a former district attorney, then set about
collecting the evidence to protect himself and show Elliott's
misconduct. He had an affidavit prepared from Mrs. Achilles, and
reassembled the pertinent steps in the plot with evidence of motive and
actions taken.
During April 1939, Elliott compounded the problem by
again suggesting to San Joaquin Valley men that Gearhart only wanted the
park created because he would personally profit from it. The two men
proceeded on a collision course.
Finally, on May 2 Representative Gearhart rose before
the House on a question of personal privilege. He was, he stated,
shocked and dismayed that a congressional colleague would stoop to
flagrantly false character assassination to get a bill defeated. He
reported the entire sequence to a packed House and gallery and then
refused to demand Elliott's expulsion. In his concluding remarks
Gearhart showed his oratorical skills stating:
I have searched the precedents of this body, searched
them down through the last 150 years of the history of this body, and I
fail to find one case referred to in those proceedings that even
approaches that which I have been compelled to lay before you.
I ask no action. There was a time when I thought of
expulsion. There was a time when I thought of disciplinary action. But
all that is past now. The record is made. I am content.
To thunderous applause Gearhart sat down and the
House turned an expectant eye toward Elliott. His futile defense
consisted chiefly of an attack on the park bill and on Secretary Ickes.
Frequently interrupted, peppered with questions on his actions and
laughed at, Elliott finally blurted in frustration, "...some of you
might think you are making a monkey out of me, but that cannot be done."
Roars of derisive laughter followed and Elliott sat down shortly
thereafter, an embarrassed and lonely figure. [33]
The representatives were aghast at the thought of
this sort of character assassination being leveled at each of them and
frustrated by Gearhart's unwillingness to demand ouster of Elliott. In
August, as the vote on the bill approached, Gearhart read into the
record a number of Valley newspaper accounts of the scandal to refresh
the minds of his colleagues. [34] When the
vote came up, opponents attempted one last sabotage by attaching a rider
allowing unlimited reclamation in the new park. In the ensuing arguments
the rider was excised but with it went the John Muir portion of the park
name. Once this last shot failed, the bill passed easily. After a
relatively easy passage in the Senate, on March 4, 1940, President
Franklin Roosevelt signed the bill creating Kings Canyon National Park.
[35]
Thus ended a sixty-year conservation struggle, one
nearly unrivaled for rancorous debate, emotional character
assassination, and political wheeling and dealing. Three factors were
important in the creation of Kings Canyon National Park over the
objections of numerous and vociferous groups. First, the opposition's
inability to unite allowed park proponents to divide and conquer them.
Second, this same disunity prevented development of other forms of land
and resource use which would have doomed the prospects of a park in the
region. Finally, an amazing and egregious political blunder eliminated
the last stumbling block by infuriating both Congress and the public to
righteous and convenient indignation.
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