Chapter Seven:
Two Battles for Kings Canyon (1931-1947)
(continued)
Although grazing and timber interests had deflected
previous attempts to establish a park in the Kings watershed, the worth
of pasture and timber resources was recognized as relatively low.
However in 1902, the United States Geological Survey published an
evaluation of the water storage capacity of the Kings River. [4] It suggested four major damsites with
associated irrigation canals and power plants. Two sites were in the
spectacular canyons of Tehipite Valley and Kings Canyon. More than half
the financial support for this study had come from local irrigation
associations. Although ground water and surface sources within the San
Joaquin Valley had proven adequate to date, the future of the district's
agriculture appeared to depend upon the rugged watershed of the Kings
River. With this favorable report, local farmers and businessmen
commenced long-range planning in an atmosphere of comfortable
confidence.
Meanwhile, fresh from its water diversion victory in
the Owens Valley and mindful of San Francisco's water and power triumph
on the Tuolumne River, the city of Los Angeles cast an interested eye
toward the Kings River. In 1919, the Los Angeles Bureau of Power and
Light released a study showing the watershed's considerable potential
for power generation. [5] Contemporary rumors
suggested that Los Angeles had struck a deal with Southern California
Edison to sell its surplus power to the utility company for a healthy
revenue addition to the city's budget. [6]
In June 1920, the Federal Power Act touched off the
real action by creating a commission to be headed by the secretaries of
Agriculture, Interior, and War, which could license water and power
projects on government lands, including national forest lands. Several
months later Los Angeles seized the initiative by applying to the
commission to construct an elaborate water control and power generation
system on the Kings River. Principal dams were to be located at Cedar
Grove and Tehipite Valley with other units on tributaries above the
canyons and on the main channel below. The fledgling Federal Power
Commission took the plan under study, and Los Angeles dug in to fight
the expected opponents. [7]
They did not have long to wait. San Joaquin Valley
residents were angered by what they perceived to be a territorial
intrusion by money-hungry urban business interests. They also feared a
repeat of the Owens Valley debacle which had all but destroyed a
bustling agricultural industry in that distant valley. Before the
Federal Power Commission was entirely sure of its duties and limits, the
San Joaquin Light and Power Corporation filed a proposal to develop the
same sites Los Angeles desired, but for local consumption.
While the power contestants froze the commission,
both tourism and park proponents gained steam. Increasingly in the 1920s
businessmen from Fresno and other nearby towns looked favorably on the
potential tourism revenue of another Yosemite Valley. Although still
overshadowed by reclamation proponents, talk of a major resort complex
began to circulate at businessmen's socials and in the halls of local
government. The Forest Service, which had administered the area since
1905, seemed favorable to recreation as part of its portfolio of
activities for the Kings River watershed. [8]
Meanwhile, from 1881 through the 1920s, pressure for
a national park encompassing the Kings River country continued to mount.
A succession of Interior secretaries vocally supported park status.
Conservation groups, led by the Sierra Club, kept up a continuous
drumbeat through pamphlets, editorials and letters to congressmen. The
legislators responded with a dozen bills between 1911 and 1926 aimed at
creating a new park or enlarging nearby Sequoia National Park to protect
the Kings River drainage. Establishment of Sequoia and General Grant
national parks in 1890 and the vast expansion of Sequoia in 1926 both
represented compromises in drives that had set out to save the Kings
River country. Agitation by preservationists and other supporters
consistently kept the Kings River watershed in the public eye. [9]
The result of all these conflicting proposals by
water, power, tourism, and park proponents was an atmosphere of such
confusion and desperate antagonism that those politicians and government
officials not directly involved avoided the controversy. Politicians who
were involved moved slowly and cautiously, weighing each decision for
political as well as legal and economic consequences. Hence, the Federal
Power Commission took nearly three years to reject the 1920 power
application of Los Angeles. The city immediately refiled and the
controversy continued. Congress simply found the Kings River issue too
hot to handle. The campaign to enlarge Sequoia was extremely well
organized, lasted seven long years, and succeeded in adding Kern Canyon
and the Mt. Whitney country to the park in 1926. However, the original
proposal to include the Kings River watershed brought such diverse,
rapid, and boisterous opposition that the legislators opted to ignore
the entire region. [10]
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By 1930 a harried Federal Power Commission, stinging
from criticism of its apparent inactivity and indecisiveness, released
its own report on Kings River water resources. Challenges by opponents
to reclamation and power development had increasingly taken the form of
disputing the very feasibility of damming the Kings River in the
mountains. The commission's so-called Randell Report aimed to settle the
matter of water storage and power generation capacities once and for
all. Senior engineer Ralph Randell concluded that nineteen damsites were
feasible. One, at Pine Flat in the lower foothills, would be a huge
structure intercepting the main valley-bound flow of the combined Kings
River. Included among the other sites were both Cedar Grove (Kings
Canyon) and Tehipite Valley, as well as the rugged junction of the
Middle and South forks. Eastward and upward smaller dams could flood
more than a dozen alpine basins. San Joaquin Valley and Los Angeles
power enthusiasts gleefully noted Randell's healthy figures for
potential electricity from the network of structures. [11]
The report momentarily stunned park and tourism
proponents, as the potential benefits of such a reclamation project
appeared insurmountable. Soon, however, controversy again reared to
cloud the issue. Reclamation opponents discovered that Randell's
"extensive field survey" actually consisted of an eight-day horseback
circuit of part of the watershed and a one-day flyover of the larger
area he could not reach. Based on this circumscribed field work, Randell
not only recommended nineteen sites, but provided a construction cost
estimate of $130 million. When pressed for an explanation of this
figure, the engineer admitted that three small dams in the Mineral King
Valley formed the basis of his cost figures on the nineteen proposed
dams. Opponents quickly pointed out that the Mineral King dams lay three
miles from a road while some proposed for the Kings River watershed were
more than twenty-five miles from a road, and some were in remarkably
rugged terrain. The expense of packing workers, supplies, and
construction materials to such sites would far inflate the total project
figure. Several months of debate and defense ensued as an embarrassed
Federal Power Commission tried to salvage parts of the report. By the
end of 1931, however, the Randell Report was virtually discredited and
confusion again reigned in the battle for the Kings River country. [12]
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