Chapter 9
The Fight for Permanence
Scarcely had the CCC been established when
individuals and groups began to discuss the possibility of its becoming
a permanent federal agency. The secretary of the American Forestry
Association, Ovid Butler, called as early as September, 1933, for a
permanent organization, [1] and in November
of that year the acting chief forester, C. M. Granger, asked regional
foresters for their suggestions. [2] The
President himself soon began to talk about a possible permanent
organization, though on a smaller scale, [3]
and by 1935 he was stating specifically that "these camps, in my
judgment, are going to be a permanent part of the policy of the United
States Government." [4] Indeed, by late 1935
the Forest Service even had a draft bill ready. [5]
It was in 1936, however, that plans for permanence
began to take definite shape, and there are several reasons which
explain this. First, the camps had obviously succeeded in their work and
were firmly entrenched in popular favor. The climate of public opinion,
therefore, was right for such a move. [6]
Second, in accordance with the existing law, the CCC's activity would
automatically terminate on March 31, 1937, unless congressional action
assured its continuance. This seemed a fine opportunity, therefore, to
propose legislation for permanence. [7]
Third, investigation had indicated that there was enough conservation
work to justify a permanent agency. Official surveys showed "that the
annual work load ahead for a permanent CCC would increase rather than
diminish during the next few years." [8]
Finally, 1936 was an election year, and while the permanence of the CCC
was never a major issue, it is possible, in view of the Corps'
popularity, that Roosevelt's advocacy of it during the campaign
redounded to his political benefit. [9]
In this expectant atmosphere the various co-operating
bodies began to produce their own proposals for permanence, each one
tending to reflect the particular interests of the agency concerned. The
Forest Service, for example, wanted the existing organization of the
Corps to be continued virtually intact, but with far greater emphasis
laid on its conservation aspect. [10] The
Office of Education, on the other hand, not altogether satisfied with
what it had so far received, pressed for a radical and impractical
restructuring of the whole CCC framework. Under its plan the Corps was
to have two co-directors, one for work and one for recreation, the whole
enterprise to be supervised by a federal board of educators. The role of
the Army was to be severely limited, and enrollees were to be selected
by state and local guidance councils. They would then go to one of two
proposed camp types, depending on whether they were between seventeen
and twenty years old or between twenty-one and twenty-four. The work
program was to be an amalgam of physical labor, prescribed recreation,
and education, with the emphasis laid on the third component. Enrollees,
after identifying their educational needs, were to be dispatched to a
camp of their choice. [11] The War
Department had no detailed plans for permanence: it wanted out of the
whole CCC arrangement. When it became clear that Roosevelt was opposed
to this, the Army supported the Forest Service in advocating that the
present organization be unchanged. [12]
As well as receiving detailed plans, Fechner, in
accordance with the President's wishes, held informal discussions with
the Advisory Council seeking further views on the best ways of
approaching permanence. He was unpleasantly surprised to find that some
took a cautious attitude. W. Frank Persons, in particular, while
realizing that the imminent expiration of the original statute made some
action inevitable, counseled against pressing for immediate permanence.
Rather, he thought that the Corps should be continued on a temporary
basis for another eighteen months, during which time the whole matter
could be investigated thoroughly, alternatives could be considered,
policy defined, and a well-rounded bill eventually presented to
Congress. Hasty legislation, he believed, would surely be regretted. [13] Fechner, for his part, could see no reason
for delay. He foresaw no congressional controversy whatsoever over the
passage of the bill, as he considered that all political groups were
"favorable to a permanent CCC organization. So far as I know, the
Democrats certainly are, the Republicans certainly are, the
Farmer-Laborites certainly are, and the Progressivesat least as
exemplified by their present representatives in Congress. I do not know
of a Congressman or Senator who is definitely opposed to the continuance
of the CCC." [14] Fechner thought that
Congress would back anything the Advisory Council recommended, and he
strongly disapproved of any further holdup, yet he agreed to make known
the views of Persons and his supporters to Roosevelt.
The President, however, paid little attention to the
Advisory Council's opinions when Fechner brought them to his attention.
He agreed with the Forest Service and War Department and decided to
proceed immediately with a bill which would make the Corps permanent,
but which would effect no change in administration. The Army, despite
its protests, was to remain in charge of the camps, and the role of the
technical services was to be unchanged. Camps were, however, to be
reduced in number, the permanent CCC to employ no more than 300,000
youths in 1,456 camps. [15]
It was no surprise, therefore, when, in his annual
budget message on January 7, 1937, President Roosevelt spoke on the
future of the CCC. "The Civilian Conservation Corps has demonstrated its
usefulness," he declared, "and has met with general public approval. It
should be continued. I intend shortly to submit a supplemental estimate
of appropriation to carry the Corps from March 31, 1937, to the end of
the current fiscal year; and I strongly recommend that Congress enact
during its present session the necessary legislation to establish the
Corps as a permanent agency of the Government." [16] There was little comment in the leading
newspapers on the proposal, and what there was predicted an easy passage
for the measure. [17] Permanence for the CCC
seemed destined to be a routine affair.
It was not until April 5, however, that the
Administration moved further. In a message to Congress on that day, the
President called for legislation creating a permanent CCC of 300,000
youths and veterans, together with 10,000 Indians and 5,000 enrollees in
the territories and insular possessions. He justified his report by
pointing to the "physical improvement" of forest land as a result of the
Corps' activities, by warning of the need for much more of the same type
of work, and by stressing "the improvement . . . in the moral and
physical well-being of our citizens who have been enrolled in the Corps,
and of their families." [18]
Apart from making the CCC an independent agency and
transferring all Emergency Conservation Work records and property to it,
the proposed bill did nothing more than perpetuate the organizational
and administrative traditions that had been used and developed during
the past four years. The offices and functions of the director and the
Advisory Council were to be preserved, and the President was "authorized
to utilize the services . . . of such departments or agencies of the
Government as he may deem necessary for carrying out the purposes of
this Act." He was also given the responsibility of deciding on rates of
pay and allotments. Among the few significant changes in policy was the
ruling that all Corps employees would henceforth come under Civil
Service provisions. Those presently holding positions had to take a
Civil Service Commission non-competitive examination within twelve
months or lose their jobs. Moreover, the maximum number of enrollees was
fixed at 300,000, including no more than 30,000 veterans. Enrollees were
now to be between seventeen and twenty-three years of age and should "at
the time of enrollment be unemployed and in needy circumstances." No
relief provision was specifically mentioned. Despite these few
alterations, the intention was clearly to depart as little as possible
from the basic practices and traditions of the CCC as they had evolved
in the past four years. [19]
The Senate Committee on Education and Labor held
hearings on the measure on April 9 and 13, 1937. [20] The bulk of the time was spent questioning
Fechner on the specifics of administration, work, and opportunity in the
Corps. Little of significance was discussed and no controversial issues
were raised. The only Republican committee member who attended, Senator
James J. Davis of Pennsylvania, confined his questions to particular
details concerning his home state and seemed in no way to dispute the
need for a permanent CCC at this time. [21]
Only Senator Elbert D. Thomas of Utah attempted to draw attention to any
of the broader issues involved in the transfer to permanent status. He
thought that the whole work relief concept of the Corps should be
discarded, and that it should become a place of rehabilitation for
socially deprived young men, whatever their financial status.
Millionaires' sons probably needed training in social responsibility
more than anyone else, he surmised. [22] For
the most part, however, the hearing was a formality. Passage of the
measure was probably fully expected.
Of more substance were the House hearings, held
before the Committee on Labor on April 14 and 15, 1937. Several
congressmen took exception to Fechner's apparent lack of emphasis on the
educational aspects of the CCC life and to his refusal to permit the
shortening of the work day to allow more classes. Representative Albert
Thomas, Democrat of Texas, opposed the lack of compulsory education in
the camps and said that on-the-job training was insufficient. He claimed
that the Corps merely took boys off relief and eventually discharged
them without having given them much of long-term value. [23] A permanent CCC, he asserted, should have a
wider educative function. Representative Glen Griswold, Democrat of
Indiana, also advocated compulsory education, disagreeing with Fechner's
insistence that the two principal objectives of the Corps were relief of
unemployment and the accomplishment of useful work. [24] Congressman James J. Scrugham, Democrat of
Nevada, took issue with the clause limiting enrolment to 300,000 youths.
He considered 350,000 to be an absolute minimum figure in view of the
unemployment rate and the amount of conservation work yet to be done.
[25] He was supported by Representative
Walter M. Pierce, Democrat of Oregon, who contended that "the WPA money
has not been nearly as successful or profitably spent" as the CCC
appropriation. To cut the best of all the Administration's relief
projects was indefensible. [26] There was,
however, no serious opposition to the intent of the measure, with
Republican committee members limiting their collective contribution to a
few specific questions. The bill was reported favorably on April 21. Any
serious criticism would now have to take place on the floor of the
House; and though a group of House Democrats had indicated their
dissatisfaction at the reduction of enrolment to 300,000, the prospects
for passage were still excellent. [27] When
the measure received an early clearance from the Rules Committee on May
3, a permanent CCC seemed only a matter of time. [28]
The House, acting as the Committee of the Whole,
debated the measure on May 11, 1937. It was soon apparent that virtually
no one wanted to end the CCC. What was surprising, however, and alarming
to Administration leaders, was the strength of bipartisan support for a
proposal that the Corps be extended for two years only. Announcing that
he intended to offer an amendment to this effect, the House Minority
leader, Representative Bertrand H. Snell of New York, while praising the
good work of the Corps, declared he was "not ready to say that the U.S.
will never again be able to take care of its boys from 17 to 25 years of
age without putting them in the CCC camps." [29] Democrats who spoke early supported this
point of view: they warned against hasty legislation and advocated a
two-year extension period while the whole question of the role of a
permanent CCC in American life was more thoroughly explored. [30] The Democratic leaders in the House soon
realized, to their surprise, that all their skill would be required to
keep the measure out of trouble.
The Administration's view was presented by
Representative William P. Connery, who had introduced the bill, and
Representative Jennings Randolph, Democrat of West Virginia. They rested
their case on twin arguments of the Corps' popularity and proven worth,
emphasizing that the President clearly desired that the measure should
pass. [31] Randolph cited a recent public
opinion poll which indicated that 87 per cent of all Americans,
including a majority of registered Republicans, favored the Corps, and
he dwelt on its success in building "not only better land, but better
men." [32] These arguments were beside the
point since few congressmen, Republican or Democrat, denied that the
Corps had been anything but a success, and most of them wanted it to be
continued. [33] Rather, the relevant issue
was whether hasty legislation was warranted or whether an extension
period of two years, during which time a thorough investigation of all
aspects of the Corps could be made, would be a better way of insuring
continuance. Moreover, the argument that the President wanted the bill
passed intact was not calculated to overly impress congressmen, who were
already sorely troubled and divided by his strong backing of the
controversial Supreme Court reform plan. [34] They had had enough of presidential
pressure for one session.
There were several other specific objections to the
Administration's measure, some of which had been explored previously at
the hearings. Representative Arthur B. Jenks, Republican of New
Hampshire, favored the bill but wanted provision made for ten hours of
vocational training, to be taken out of the working hours. He was
supported by Representative Arthur H. Greenwood, Democrat of Indiana.
[35] Representative Randolph felt that the
enrolment limit of 300,000 was too low and personally preferred a
minimum of 350,000. [36] Representative Jack
Nichols, Democrat of Oklahoma, pointed out that the Civil Service
provision would mean the end of a good source of patronage for Democrats
and accordingly he proposed that it be removed. [37] The bill as it stood was seriously in
trouble, though the success of the CCC was never the point at issue.
Connery, probably sensing failure, made a strong plea
for passage of the Administration's measure. Pointing out that Congress
could abolish the CCC at any time, permanent or not, he stressed that
"this is the pet project of the President of the United States; it is
his baby if you please . . . he has asked it be made permanent." Snell
immediately ridiculed him for insisting that the measure be passed
"because it is the pet project of the President." It was, he asserted, a
poor excuse for doing a foolish thing: the wisest policy was to extend
the CCC for two years, then see if the need for permanence still
existed. [38] Possibly to forestall a
Republican move to this effect, Representative Fritz G. Lanham, Democrat
of Texas, offered an amendment continuing the provision of the existing
act for two more years, "till we can better know under what conditions
it should be made permanent. It is an emergency measure," he said, and
to make it permanent now would be to take a pessimistic view and admit
that the emergency would never end. [39]
Democrats supported the Lanham Amendment strongly.
Representative Samuel Hobbs of Alabama believed the CCC was one of the
"most splendid accomplishments of the New Deal" but that the proposed
permanency bill was "hopelessly unconstitutional" in its unauthorized
delegation of power to the director and to the President. Others spoke
on similar lines and the Lanham Amendment passed the Committee of the
Whole by 224 to 34. [40] The committee then
further amended the Administration's bill. Educational and vocational
training was made compulsory. [41] The Civil
Service provision was removed, thus safeguarding congressional
patronage; [42] and, unexpectedly, the
committee voted to cut Fechner's salary from $12,000 to $10,000. [43] The relief provision, as it affected
enrolment, was reinserted. [44]
On the following day, May 12, the House confirmed the
amendments of the Committee of the Whole and then voted on the passage
of the bill, which now extended the Corps for two years only. The
measure was passed by the huge margin of 389 to 7, only two Democrats
and five Republicans voting against it. [45]
Nevertheless, the Administration's measure had been altered in its
essentials. The CCC, though now independent, was not yet permanent.
Many newspapers interpreted the passage of the Lanham
Amendment not as an expression of lack of confidence in the CCC but as a
blow struck for congressional independence. The New York Times
described it as "the largest Democratic defection in years," and
thoroughly approved of the House's action. [46] The Chicago Tribune called the
defeat the "most drastic since Roosevelt took office," but pointed out
that "the merits of the CCC were not at issue" and that its success was
beyond question. Nevertheless, the Tribune thought that, given
the present trend to concentration of power in the presidency, a
permanent CCC could have become "An American Black Shirt or Brown Shirt
Army, a political agency dangerous to the Republic," and for this reason
the paper supported temporary extension only. [47] Both the Boston Evening Transcript
and the Baltimore Sun interpreted the action as a serious setback
for the President. [48] The St. Louis
Post-Dispatch regretted the defeat while asserting that, though
not yet permanent, "the CCC would remain a useful agency for giving
young men healthful and morale-building work." [49]
Fechner had assumed that the debate would have been a
formality only, and he was dismayed by the House's action. Bewildered
and enraged, he threatened to resign. "I am ready to go back to the
Machinists tomorrow," he stormed, "and when I come back from Alaska I
may do that. I cannot understand how Congress ran away with this thing
yesterday afternoon. There has been no opposition [to permanence] in the
hearings." [50] The President, on the other
hand, outwardly shrugged off the revolt. The refusal of the House to
vote permanence was a minor point," he considered, "so long as the CCC
was extended." Moreover, the Senate Committee on Education and Labor had
reported favorably on the plan for permanence. There was little point in
talking about defeat until after the senators had considered the amended
House measure. [51] The fight was not yet
over.
The Senate debated the House measure on May 19, after
Senator Hugo L. Black of Alabama had explained the importance of the
House amendments. [52] Much of the time was
devoted to the question of Fechner's salary. Senators Tom Connally,
Democrat of Texas, and Champ Clark, Democrat of Missouri, led a
determined drive to sustain the House cut from $12,000 to $10,000.
Connally claimed that $12,000 was more than a senator, or even Harry
Hopkins, was paid; moreover, Fechner, he contended, was trying to
influence the CCC enrollees politically, especially on the matter of
Supreme Court reform. [53] He was successful
in bringing the matter to an early vote, which went against the director
by 44 to 29. [54]
On the larger issue of permanence for the Corps, the
senators were much more inclined than the House to support the
Administration. Though few went as far as Senator "Cotton Ed" Smith of
South Carolina, who declared that the CCC was "the most marvellous piece
of legislation that has been enacted during the present Administration,
or any preceding one," [55] most were
inclined to favor a permanent agency. Indeed, Senator Carl Hayden,
Democrat of New Mexico, declared that he "would like to see a million
young men a year going through the camps." [56]
Senator William E. Borah led the forces against
permanence. He yielded to no one in his appreciation of the benefits the
CCC had brought to boys, local communities, and the nation, but to make
it permanent was, he insisted, to admit that America would always have
an unemployment problem, and this he was not prepared to do. [57] Yet, his was distinctly the minority view:
an amendment to extend the camps for only two years was soundly
defeated. [58] The vote on the Black
Amendment to substitute the original bill for the House measure was a
one-sided affair. The amendment was carried by a huge majority of 67 to
2, with Borah the only Republican voting against it. Thus, the
Republican senators voted with the Administration and against the action
taken by the House. [59] An impasse had been
reached.
The inevitable conference was held between the labor
committees of the two chambers. When the results of their deliberations
were reported on June 7, they showed that on the major issue the Senate
conferees had capitulated to House intransigence. The Corps was not to
be permanent, but would be extended for three, not two, years. Fechner's
salary was to be cut. Enrolment would not be limited to youths from
families receiving relief, but to all young men between seventeen and
twenty-three years of age who were unemployed and in need of employment.
It was anticipated that those to whom the relief provision actually
applied would be given first preference. The peak enrolment was to be
300,000, including veterans and Indians. The Senate gained two major
points when the conference agreed to remove the House's clause
authorizing ten hours of vocational training per week, substituting the
wording "training for citizenship," and to reinsert the Civil Service
provision that those presently employed would be given time to study for
the mandatory examination. [60]
These amendments were still too much for the House to
accept. Congressmen demanded that the vocational training clause be
reinserted and the Civil Service provision be once more removed, thus
safeguarding their source of patronage. [61]
To these further changes the senators agreed, so that when the President
signed the bill on June 28, 1937, it represented a victory for the House
over both Administration and Senate. [62]
Roosevelt's bid to make the Corps permanent had failed.
The failure of the CCC to become permanent in 1937 is
all the more significant because it was so unexpected. At the beginning
of the year it had stood at the zenith of its great popularity, drawing
support from all sections of the community. Most officials were certain
that congressional approval for the President's plan would have been
little more than a formal action. What then were the reasons for the
President's defeat, a reversal perpetrated by the large-scale defection
of members of his own party?
The first argument against permanence brought forward
in the debates was that a permanent CCC would be a gesture of pessimism,
a recognition of defeat in the war against unemployment. No doubt this
point has a certain validity, though Congress could always have
abolished the CCC, permanent or not, once the unemployment situation had
improved. Moreover, the argument ignored the urgent need for more
conservation work, independent of the employment situation. Similarly,
to stress the need for further study of the Corps was to ignore the fact
that the CCC had been under observation for four years, and if any
defects had subsequently been discovered in the legislation for
permanence, they could easily be removed by congressional action. The
fact that a permanent CCC with Civil Service provisions attached would
have meant the end of a useful source of congressional patronage was no
doubt important and must have loomed large in many a congressman's mind.
Likewise, the clause limiting enrolment to 300,000 would inevitably have
meant the widespread closing of camps with the attendant local
discontent. Nevertheless, it would have been possible to compromise on
both these points and still make the CCC permanent. Of more substance,
perhaps, was the feeling that the proposed legislation was somewhat
hastily conceived, and that there had not been enough real consideration
given to the future role of the CCC. The bill before Congress
perpetuated almost intact the existing organization of the Corps, as
well as its heavy emphasis on relief, and some congressmen were
convinced that no proposal for permanence should be enacted until there
had been much more discussion and reflection on just what broader
functions a permanent agency could be expected to perform.
Probably just as important in explaining the defeat
of the measure were the deep feelings of concern and uncertainty
engendered in Congress and country by the President's Supreme Court
reform plan. It is significant that the Corps itself was never under
criticism. Democratic congressmen, however, may have sensed a need to
affirm their independence after the trying early weeks of the session,
when the court plan was bitterly debated and conscientiously opposed.
There could hardly be a better way of protesting against what was
considered to be the dangerous accretion of power by the Executive than
to refuse to go along with the President on this issue, especially since
the House Democratic leadership was making so much of the fact that the
CCC was Roosevelt's "pet" and that he wanted the measure passed. To
refuse this favor, while still extending the most popular New Deal
agency, could well have been the House's way of reaffirming to President
and people that it was not to be considered a rubber stamp.
The problem of Fechner's salary cut adds some
substance to this hypothesis. Fechner had received since 1933 an annual
salary of $12,000 without any criticism ever being uttered. Nothing at
the hearings on the bill in April indicated that this amount was
considered excessive; yet in May both Houses agreed that he should
receive only $10,000 a year. Perhaps this reduction was due to an
economy drive and a desire to bring his salary into line with those of
congressmen and other federal officials, but it was probably reinforced
by the fact that in the latter half of April, Fechner made a series of
radio speeches in which he strongly advocated the adoption of the
President's court reform plan. [63] For
these he was publicly criticized by Senator Clark, who later injected
the matter into the Senate debate on the director's salary. [64] Surely Fechner's pay cut can be explained
in part by his support of court reform. Moreover the editorial support
given the House's motion, while disavowing any intention of criticizing
the CCC, nevertheless indicated that the time was not ripe for the
creation of further permanent federal bodies. In adopting this view,
even normally friendly editors were possibly reflecting the fear of
further Executive encroachment which the court reform furor had created.
[65] It seems reasonable, therefore, to
conclude that the plan for a permanent CCC failed not only for the
reasons adduced in the House but also because of the vague uneasiness
against increasing federal power which had been engendered by the
court-packing issue. Indeed, it may well have met a better fate had it
been dealt with before the court plan was made known. In any event, 1937
was a bad year for President Roosevelt. The court reform bill was only
one in a series of measures defeated in the House because of increased
congressional independence. [66] Failure to
make the CCC permanent must be considered within this context.
The fight for permanence was not over, though never
again did it attain such significant proportions. The President still
aimed at a permanent Corps, [67] and the
American Conservation Association, a group of former enrollees and other
interested parties, was formed specifically to agitate to this end. [68] In January 1939, bills were introduced into
the House and Senate. Their main provisions, apart from permanence, were
once more to include Corps employees within Civil Service provisions and
to increase Fechner's salary to $12,000. There were no other changes
from the 1937 legislation. [69] Work would
continue, as previously, under the auspices of the director, but it
would be directly carried out by the co-operating federal
departments.
The House Committee on Labor held hearings in
February. While support for the CCC was as strong as ever, and while no
one wanted the camps discontinued, members expressed the usual
reservations about making the Corps permanent. For example,
Representative Richard J. Welsh, Republican of California, said he had
always felt that the establishment of the CCC "is one of the most
outstanding, if not the most outstanding, Administrative and
Congressional accomplishment since the depression," but he was
nevertheless "not sold" on the wisdom of making it permanent at this
time. [70] Moreover, there was enough
discussion concerning the need for military training in the camps to
indicate that a new CCC Act could be held up while congressmen debated
this contentious issue. [71] Both Fechner
and Brigadier General George P. Tyner, who attended the hearing, spoke
strongly against making formal military training part of the Corps'
curriculum, Tyner insisting that the War Department considered it to be
quite unnecessary and, if CCC boys alone were to receive such
instruction, quite unfair. He thought that the present situation was of
positive value, even without formal instruction, in that the enrollees
were learning to accept Army discipline and camp life, while the Reserve
officers in charge of the camps were gaining valuable experience in
command techniques. In his view, formal military training would be
superfluous. [72] In spite of the War
Department's explicit disavowal of the need for military training,
however, many congressmen remained committed to it as a prerequisite for
the passage of a permanent CCC bill. [73] It
was considered as well that the President's pending administrative
reorganization plan might affect the CCC to such an extent that it would
surely be better to study its provisions before discussing permanence.
[74]
The report from the Committee on Labor to the House,
therefore, did not advocate permanence for the CCC at this time. While
pointing out that testimony before the committee had clearly shown that
the Corps "operated effectively and efficiently," that its "social
benefits" had been great, and that there remained much conservation work
to be accomplished, the committee nevertheless recommended extension for
five years only, from July, 1940. [75] It
was considered too difficult at the time to study the unemployment
situation and gauge its long-term implications, and until this was done
it was deemed unwise to make the CCC permanent. This being the case, the
committee decided it was better not to include the Civil Service
provision nor to raise Fechner's salary. No mention was made of military
training. [76]
Thus, the House Labor Committee, apart from
increasing its time span, made no significant change in the act which
had governed the Corps since 1937. Though the Senate Committee on
Education and Labor favorably reported its bill to make the Corps
permanent, [77] it was once more the House's
decision which was followed. The House on July 31, 1939, by voice vote
and without debate, extended the life of the Corps till July 1, 1943,
but made no other changes in the bill of 1937. [78] The Senate followed suit the next day, [79] again without debate, and the President
signed the measure on August 8, 1939. [80]
This was the final attempt to secure permanence for
the CCC. It was but a pale echo of the 1937 campaign, arousing no press
controversy or presidential statement, and provoking no congressional
debate. The real fight for permanence had taken place two years
previously, and the Administration had lost it. The significance of the
CCC's failure to attain permanence should not, however, be overrated.
Possibly large-scale planning was hindered, but this in itself was
dependent on long-term budgeting, and nothing in the legislation
indicated that Roosevelt intended to place CCC appropriations on such a
footing. Since no change in structure was ever seriously planned, the
failure of passage of these two bills meant very little. Indeed, it is
hard to see how the CCC's future course could have been substantially
different, even with permanence, so long as its organization, thrown
together as it was in the Corps' first few frantic weeks and having
slowly evolved a working equilibrium, remained unchanged.
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