Capitol Reef
Administrative History
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CHAPTER 12:
GRAZING AND CAPITOL REEF NATIONAL PARK: A HISTORIC STUDY (continued)



Extended Phaseout and Partial Buyout: Grazing During the 1980s

The Sagebrush Rebellion, climaxing in the early 1980s, revived the fight between ranchers and environmentalists over grazing practices on the public domain. Throughout this period, "rebels" across the West attempted to transfer federal grazing lands to more sympathetic state or even private control. While these efforts eventually failed, the election of Ronald Reagan and the policies of Interior Secretary James Watt brought administrative support to the ranchers' position.

In this new climate of support for multiple use, the ranchers of south-central Utah urged their congressional delegation to postpone the grazing phaseout at Capitol Reef National Park. In the congressional debate that followed, it was clear that the National Park Service, under Watt's leadership, was prepared to reverse its policy and endorse a grazing extension. It was also clear that there were no thorough, independent studies to show the actual effects of grazing on the varied resources of Capitol Reef. In the end, a compromise postponed the beginning of the phaseout for 10 years until such studies were completed.

Since there was no extra money to fund independent studies as originally proposed, these studies began under National Park Service impetus. Meanwhile, the climate for a final compromise developed toward the end of the 1980s. When a Department of the Interior Solicitor's ruling made it possible to buy out the AUMs within the park, a complicated compromise was worked out among all the parties involved. The result has been a dramatic reduction of grazing throughout most of the park, a little security for those ranchers who are left, and the beginning of positive relationships between the National Park Service and the local communities. What follows is the story of how grazing at Capitol Reef moved from conflict to compromise.


1981: The Livestock Supporters Go On The Offensive

In the spring of 1981, Capitol Reef National Park was undergoing the process of writing a new general management plan. Since the first grazing permits were scheduled to be eliminated the next year, it was proposed that some slight boundary changes be made to conform to natural boundaries, thus eliminating the need for some expensive fencing. The park's managers invited the Bureau of Land Management and representatives from Utah's congressional delegation and Garfield and Wayne Counties to a meeting in late April to discuss the options. This meeting opened a veritable can of worms. [230]

Within the next couple of days, the Wayne and Garfield County Boards of Commissioners proposed their own (previously considered) alternative that would guarantee the continuation of a majority of winter grazing in the Waterpocket Fold area. Their proposal called for eliminating national park lands in the northern district and changing the entire southern half of Capitol Reef from a national park to a national recreation area. This move would reduce Capitol Reef National Park by over 70,000 acres or 30 percent. [231]

The BLM also proposed dramatic alterations to the park boundaries. Its proposal called for returning over 38,000 acres from the northeast, southeast, and Circle Cliff areas to BLM control, and transferring 8,300 acres from the BLM to the northwest corner of Capitol Reef. The BLM's purpose was the same as that of the counties: to remove as much grazing land from Capitol Reef as possible. Superintendent Derek Hambly was not enthusiastic about the proposals. In a magazine article about the BLM proposal, Hambly is quoted as saying, "They went a little wild when we asked for the changes. We have never advocated this exchange at all." [232] While the BLM maintained that these alternatives were merely suggestions that would obviously need congressional approval, Capitol Reef managers and their supporters saw them as an ominous threat to the park's integrity. [233]

These boundary changes were never made. The lack of communication and cooperation between the agencies during 1981 would leave Capitol Reef in a decidedly weakened position to fight off the next, more substantial efforts to extend grazing within the park.

By October 1981, the Utah Farm Bureau was lobbying Utah's congressional delegation and Governor Matheson to support legislation extending grazing privileges to the heirs of current permittees. This proposal, based on the Grand Teton model, was similar to the bill proposed by Sen. Moss back in 1971. The Farm Bureau also advocated continued grazing indefinitely within the park, or at the very least, prohibiting the use of government funds to carry out the scheduled phaseout. The stated reasons for altering P.L. 92-207, which established Capitol Reef National Park and the 10-year grazing phaseout, included:

  1. the adverse economic impact on ranchers and the local communities;

  2. the historical value of grazing;

  3. the present, viable condition of the range;

  4. the lack of visitor conflict with winter grazing in the park;

  5. the impracticality and cost of fencing; and

  6. the rushed manner in which the 10-year phaseout was pushed through Congress.

These six reasons for change would dominate the legislative history of S. 1872. [234]


1982: Legislation To Extend Grazing In Capitol Reef

The Utah Farm Bureau lobbying effort was quite effective. First, the Utah delegation attached a rider to the 1982 Interior Appropriations Bill, placing a one-year moratorium on the grazing phaseout while other alternatives were explored. [235] Then, on November 19, 1981, Sen. Jake Garn introduced Senate Bill 1872, which would change the 10-year phaseout schedule to the more liberal lifetime or "grandfather" phaseout. Most of Sen. Garn's points appear to have come from the Utah Farm Bureau grazing issue brief. Since the bill was introduced so late in the congressional session, it would not be given serious consideration until 1982. [236]

The problems facing Capitol Reef were discussed among Don Gillespie (Utah State Coordinator for the National Park Service), former Senator Moss, and powerful park supporters Gene and George Hatch in January 1982. The Hatches took quite seriously the threats to reduce the size of the park. According to Gillespie, the two men "remain convinced that support of Garn's grazing 'Bill' is necessary to avoid a serious effort to reduce the size of Capitol Reef." Gillespie tried to persuade George Hatch, who owned KUTV in Salt Lake City, that the boundary alterations would be less of a threat than setting the precedent of extending grazing privileges in the park.

After Rep. James Hansen echoed Garn's arguments when he introduced his similar bill in the House on March 18, [237] Superintendent Hambly wrote Rocky Mountain Regional Director Lorraine Mintzmyer. He assured her that the end of grazing in the park would not cause a significant harm to the area's economy. [238] Mintzmyer supported Hambly's conclusions, and in early April she urged National Park Service Director Russell Dickenson to reconsider a National Park Service draft proposal in support of S. 1872. Mintzmyer's objections included the following:

  1. All previous proclamations and legislation made it clear the National Park Service was to determine management policy for the park.

  2. There was "existing and continued permanent resource damage" due to grazing.

  3. The cost of maintaining the grazing would be more than eliminating it.

  4. Conflicts existed due to the incompatibility of cattle and the backcountry users of the park.

In short, the regional director proposed that the National Park Service oppose S.1872 "based on the National Park 1916 Act establishing the National Park Service and the effects of grazing on this fragile desert area within Capitol Reef National Park." [239]

By the April 14 Senate hearings on S. 1872, it was obvious that the National Park Service Washington office was going to reject the advice of Hambly and Mintzmyer, and support the bill to extend grazing within Capitol Reef National Park. From this point on, the National Park Service testified in favor of the bill, so long as some minor amendments were added. These small alterations sought by the National Park Service would clearly limit the extension only to grazing, as opposed to mining or other extractive uses. They would also limit the extension to apply only to the permittees' immediate family and one heir, thus ensuring an eventual phaseout. [240]

With the support of the National Park Service, the passage of S. 1872 seemed all but assured. During the course of the testimony before the Senate and the House committees, however, the lack of comprehensive, impartial studies was noted repeatedly. The Utah ranchers testifying in favor of the bills and the opposing environmental lobbyists used different figures and emphasized different priorities. Director Dickenson and Superintendent Hambly, without data, could not address the differences. They were left to make guesses about or not answer questions pertaining to specific impacts from grazing and its potential phaseout. [241]


Analysis of Testimony For and Against Grazing Extension

The prepared statements, testimony, newspaper articles, and correspondence from 1981 and 1982 reveal a common problem in land use disputes: each side can evaluate the same piece of land and draw entirely different conclusions about it.

Grazing advocates endorsed the points made by the Utah Farm Bureau. They also consistently observed how little range improvement had occurred since the National Park Service assumed stewardship of the land. Those opposed to any future grazing, on the other hand, argued that Capitol Reef National Park was already alarmingly overgrazed. According to the environmentalists, this overgrazing was responsible for numerous resource depredations and a negative visitor experience.

Throughout their testimony, ranchers and County Commissioners Guy Pace and Dell LeFevre emphasized the hardships that the removal of grazing would impose on the local economy. They even cited a Colorado State University study suggesting that removal of grazing privileges in Capitol Reef would cost the local economy over $500,000. [242] Russell Butcher, Southwest regional representative for the National Parks and Conservation Association, disputed these figures. He argued that the $35,000 estimated value of the actual AUMs would constitute the only economic loss. [243] The reality probably lies somewhere in the middle.

The ranchers believed that revoking their winter grazing permits would force them out of business, because adjacent BLM lands could not accommodate those extra AUMs. Cattlemen also pointed out that their AUM grazing permits were used in assessing the value of their ranch operations and establishing loan collateral. Therefore, they needed permits for the maximum number of allowable AUMs, even if they were grazing fewer cattle. [244] However, many local ranchers were running fewer than 10 cows on Capitol Reef at any given time: it is hard to believe that the loss of 10 cattle would force a ranch to fold. [245]

The environmentalists, on the other hand, argued that protecting national park lands was more important than feeding a few cattle. They focused entirely on the AUMs in the park, failing to recognize the impact a rapid phaseout would have on the ranchers who depended on the winter range within the park. Nor did the conservationists recognize the intangible impact these changes could have on rural people struggling to maintain their traditions.

Another related issue was the declining economy of south-central Utah. Over the previous decade, the region had been denied two coal-burning power plants (one on the Kaiparowitz Plateau and the other just east of Capitol Reef's boundary) and a large coal strip mine just east of the Burr Trail switchbacks. The loss of these projects caused many locals to emphasize the traditional economic security of livestock grazing on the public domain. [246]

Perhaps the most subtle, yet divisive, issue that separated the ranchers from the conservationists was the manner in which each side looked at the range in question. The environmentalist saw dirtied water supplies, miles of trampled soil and close-cropped vegetation, invasive exotic species, and heaps of cow dung in prime camping spots. [247] The cattleman looked at the same range and, knowing its condition in earlier years of uncontrolled grazing, saw that the range was steadily improving. As to the water issues, livestock supporters argued that piping more water into the allotments would allow cattle to spread out more, and would actually contribute to an increase of wildlife in the park. The ranchers and the range conservationists did not recognize that multiple use and range developments were incompatible with the single use, preservationist mandate of the National Park Service and its supporters. [248] Rep. Hansen observed, "I have a hard time believing that a few white-faced cattle in any way take away from the aesthetics of this beautiful area." [249]

Environmentalists, on the other hand, saw the devastating results of overgrazing that had occurred in previous decades, and blamed the current ranchers for the problem. Both sides talked in terms of values and aesthetics. Yet, the values came from such different perspectives and were so deeply, emotionally entrenched that compromise would be virtually impossible.

In such cases, non-biased, extensive studies are needed to allow an arbitrator, in this case Congress, to weigh the arguments. During the hearings in 1982, however, the only studies completed were sponsored by the respective sides. The ranchers pointed to their economic study and the positive range analysis of range ecologist James Bowns. [250] The environmentalists hailed a study done by Stanley Welsh, who strongly reprimanded the livestock industry for turning Capitol Reef into a virtual wasteland. [251] (This report was actually requested by Superintendent Hambly to bolster the National Park Service position at the House hearings. For reasons unknown, though, it was not endorsed at the hearings and was withheld from public review. [252]) It also did not help that the National Park Service was endorsing the legislation to extend grazing while also suggesting that grazing was incompatible with current park management and visitor appreciation. [253]

In the end, each side made valid points during House and Senate testimony, but left no clear understanding of the underlying economic and resource impacts of grazing at Capitol Reef. House Subcommittee Chairman John Seiberling concluded, "Testimony presented at the hearings convinced the subcommittee that there was insufficient information regarding the problems of grazing within Capitol Reef National Park to overturn the existing law." [254]

Therefore, the subcommittee proposed amending S. 1872 to delay the start of the grazing phaseout for five years, until 1987. [255] In the interim, the National Park Service, in cooperation with the Bureau of Land Management, would contract with the National Academy of Sciences to study the unresolved issues. These studies would document resource impacts of grazing and evaluate alternatives to a grazing phaseout. The five-year delay was later expanded to 10 years, and this amended bill became P.L. 97-341 on October 15, 1982. [256]

In the 1981-82 struggle to end grazing at Capitol Reef, ranchers won a major victory by postponing the grazing phaseout for 10 years. Even so, the future of grazing privileges within Capitol Reef was still far from certain, as the delay gave park managers and grazing opponents time to regroup. Had S. 1872 passed as originally worded, nearly all areas of the park might have been grazed well into the next century. Instead, the National Park Service now had 10 years to produce studies showing that grazing was incompatible with its preservation mission and should be quickly phased out.


What Happened To All Those Studies?

Although the end of 1982 brought a temporary cease-fire in the legislative battle over grazing phaseout, new encroachments threatened Capitol Reef National Park. Coal strip mining operations were proposed for the western mesas of the Henry Mountains within view of the park's South District, and an ambitious oil exploration project was planned for the southwest corner of Capitol Reef. [257] These urgent issues pushed grazing to the side for the next year. Another reason for the delay in implementing P.L. 97-341 was that Congress had made no authorizations to fund its mandated studies by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS). The National Park Service therefore assumed that the funds had to be diverted from existing operating funds. [258]

P.L. 97-341 specified that the studies were to be contracted to the NAS, which would supervise the subcontracting, design, and methodology of the research. As the congressional testimony implied, this requirement was meant to ensure objective research and non-biased results. [259] However, because the work proposed by the NAS was extremely expensive, the project was split into two parts in order to secure funding. Phase I was conducted by the Board of Agriculture of the National Research Council at a cost of $53,000, using funds provided by the Washington office. [260] This first contract called for

a committee of experts to evaluate the grazing problem at Capitol Reef National Park by on-site visits, by meeting with interested parties in the region, and by researching the background of the problem through published documents (private, state and federal). From these efforts, the second phase, a long term program, will ultimately provide information to the Congress regarding the phaseout of grazing in the park. [261]

On September 27-29, 1983, that committee of experts met at Capitol Reef to gather information from park managers, Bureau of Land Management officials, local ranchers, politicians, and scientists. [262] The following summer, the Phase I final report -- an excellent summary and analysis of many of the pertinent grazing issues -- was completed. Significantly, the report recommended that 10 interrelated field studies, costing $930,000, be undertaken to address those issues. According to the Phase I Final Report, such an enormous undertaking was necessary to comply with the congressional mandate in P.L. 97-341. It was also needed to "generate new information for use by national park personnel in managing all resources on CRNP, provide more substance for decisions on grazing phaseout on CRNP, and perhaps provide a study protocol for the NPS to use in resolving conflicts at other national parks." [263]

Unfortunately, the $930,000 price tag was daunting. Because Congress failed to provide funding and the National Park Service determined it could not afford the cost, other options were sought. [264] After a good deal of deliberation, the National Park Service decided to administrate the contracting itself, hiring local universities and small consulting firms to undertake fieldwork and analysis. The National Academy of Sciences, through its National Research Council, kept up with the studies and assisted with the yearly reports to Congress. Thus, at least part of the requirement of P.L. 341 was met. [265] However, while this procedure was a good deal less costly than the original plan, it introduced the appearance of political bias and undermined the unimpeachable objectivity sought by P.L. 97-341. The fact that the studies were coordinated and funded by the National Park Service convinced some grazing proponents that the results could only be biased against them. As a result, the research was largely unacceptable to many local ranchers and livestock supporters, including the Utah congressional delegation. [266]

Thirteen grazing-related resource studies were completed as of 1994. Norman Henderson, former Chief of Resources Management & Science at Capitol Reef, views this accomplishment as one of the most comprehensive natural resource baselines on the Colorado Plateau. These studies provide Capitol Reef managers with an excellent basis on which to make resource management decisions, and they have contributed significantly to an understanding of the ecological systems of the Waterpocket Fold. Thus, while the objectivity of the research has been questioned by some, the studies have nevertheless proven valuable to Capitol Reef National Park. [267]

While the National Park Service was determining how to proceed with the mandated studies, a new conflict emerged between grazing utilization and the proposed wilderness with the national park. In 1984, Guy Pace and the Bureau of Land Management sought park approval to bring bulldozers into the Hartnet Allotment to dredge two stock ponds (constructed in 1971) and improve one spring. Use of motorized equipment and the proposed alterations, though, could not be permitted in the Hartnet, which was proposed and administered by the park as a wilderness area. Both outgoing Superintendent Hambly and incoming Superintendent Robert Reynolds opposed the project for that reason and because of the precedent it would set for other ranchers seeking range improvements within the park. After a great deal of correspondence, a detailed environmental assessment was completed on the stock pond proposal. Former Superintendent Reynolds recalls that Sen. Garn's office applied significant pressure on the National Park Service to allow the bulldozer into the park. Over the objections of park managers and the National Parks and Conservation Association, the National Park Service finally decided to permit the range improvements under strict limitations and with on-site monitoring. [268]

Guy Pace's success persuaded Superintendent Reynolds that a grazing phaseout, of any length of time, had too many political and social variables to make long-range planning possible. It was time once again to re-evaluate the grazing policy of Capitol Reef National Park.


The Buyout: 1987 - 1991

The idea of purchasing the permittees' AUMs at Capitol Reef first emerged in 1969. Only seven months after the monument was expanded to over 250,000 acres, Superintendent William F. Wallace proposed that the National Park Service purchase all of Capitol Reef's permitted AUMs. Wallace argued:

The expenditures of a relatively small amount of money for the existing AUM permits could advance the development of the area by approximately 10 years. It would also eliminate to a great extent the adverse feeling of the local residents as it now exists toward the National Park Service. If the AUMs are not purchased the financial loss to some smaller operators would be disastrous to their livelihood. [269]

While the plan seemed feasible at the time, there were several factors working against it. First, it was believed that the courts would not allow the federal government to purchase grazing privileges. Second, Regional Director Frank Kowski, with counsel from a departmental solicitor, believed that it was not a good idea to suggest such a plan while the controversy over the monument expansion was at its height. Kowski felt that there was already a gentlemen's agreement with the local ranchers and the Bureau of Land Management to phase out the grazing within 10 years. According to the regional director, to "take any other approach at this time would be a breach of faith with both the citizens concerned and the Bureau of Land Management." [270]

In 1969, the legal aspects of a buyout of existing AUMs had not been determined. Yet, the idea that ranchers and the BLM would prefer a 10-year phaseout to actual reimbursement for permits is hard to accept. There was the possibility that, due to the furor over the expansion, the local livestock interests would have opposed any immediate attempt to remove the cattle from the monument. Most likely, the National Park Service, which was on the defensive over the expansion controversy, did not want even to think about any new kind of grazing policy until park status was assured. [271]

After this brief correspondence in 1969, there is no evidence that a buyout of existing permits was again considered until 1984. Then, in the National Academy of Science's Phase I report, the possibility of purchasing the AUMs was again proposed:

One option is the immediate (1984) buyout of the grazing permits by the National Park Service (NPS), which would conserve the natural and historical features of the park and compensate the ranchers for their lost animal unit months (AUMs). The costs for compensation of lost grazing would have to be negotiated by the NPS. Although the committee did not study this option in detail, it would seem to be more cost effective than option one [which was the 10 studies for $930,000]. [272]

This option was rejected in favor of the 10-study plan mentioned earlier. Then, after the episode in 1985 in which a bulldozer was allowed into a potential wilderness area to fix stock ponds, Superintendent Reynolds began to investigate the possibility of buying out the remaining permittees. Ironically, it was during an inspection of the South Desert stock pond work with Reynolds that Guy Pace himself brought up the idea of at least a partial buyout. Regional Director Mintzmyer agreed that this proposal was worth pursuing. In a briefing statement from Mintzmyer to Director William Penn Mott in November 1985, three alternatives were discussed. These were: maintain the status quo, with the National Park Service coordinating the recommended the studies; work with the BLM to find alternative grazing allotments; or have the National Park Service directly purchase in-park grazing privileges on a willing seller basis. [273] The cost of buying all the AUMs was estimated at $150,000 to $200,000, approximately one-fifth the expense of the NAS studies. Yet even if the financial incentive was obvious, the legal authority to purchase the permits was still uncertain. [274]

Superintendent Reynolds recalls that he faced significant opposition on this matter from within the National Park Service. This opposition was based on three arguments:

  1. Permits were regarded as a privilege, not a right, and therefore could not be purchased.

  2. There was no legal authority for the federal government to make such purchases.

  3. Even if authority had existed, purchases would set an inappropriate precedent that could be used to force the purchase of AUMs in other parks.

Despite this internal opposition, Reynolds decided to explore the possibility of purchasing the park's AUMs rather than waiting to see what would happen in 1994. In order to proceed with this course of action, however, the superintendent needed a departmental solicitor's "specific opinion as to the legality of the NPS, under current law, acquiring the grazing permits within Capitol Reef National Park through fee simple purchase." [275]

After a great deal of correspondence and investigation by Reynolds and park Chief of Resource Management Norman Henderson, a favorable solicitor's opinion was issued in July 1987 allowing the proposed buyout to proceed. The opinion argued that grazing permits could be purchased specifically at Capitol Reef due to the wording of P.L. 97-341. It seems that the compromise legislation calling for a 10-year delay actually converted noncompensable grazing privileges, held under a standard BLM permit, to a compensable right. [276]

This opinion was submitted just as Capitol Reef National Park was welcoming a new superintendent. Martin C. Ott was an expedient appointment: a career park service man with a Southern Utah ranching heritage. Since he was comfortable and respected both within the National Park Service bureaucracy and among the rural, Mormon ranching communities of south-central Utah, Ott was ideal to lead the final push toward compromise. When the new superintendent arrived at the end of August 1987, the time was finally ripe for proceeding toward resolution of the grazing conflicts that had tormented Capitol Reef for nearly half a century.

Superintendent Ott, with the assistance of the Bureau of Land Management and input from local ranchers, proposed a three-part plan in October 1987. This plan called for:

1) purchase of 783 AUMs in three sensitive allotments (Waterpocket, Muley Twist and Chimney Canyon) where resource damage and visitor use conflicts are well documented; 2) purchase of additional AUMs in other allotments on a 'willing seller' basis; and 3) after purchase of all AUMs in sensitive allotments, support legislation that would gradually phaseout remaining grazing interests. [277]

In a 1994 interview, Ott discussed his motivation for proposing this buyout plan. According to Ott, many in the National Park Service had a "strong feeling" that there would be a revived effort in 1994 to extend grazing throughout the park. On the other hand, many of the local ranchers feared that grazing would be phased out immediately without any kind of compensation. Thus, apprehension on both sides made some kind of compromise all the more likely. [278] Furthermore, Ott wanted to avoid the kind of conflict that historically had driven grazing policy at Capitol Reef. He wrote:

With no new legislation the scheduled termination of grazing in 1994 [P.L. 97-341] will again signal a polarization of interests and the rekindling of emotions that will result in the park and park programs being alienated from the local communities. Based on the fact that the park's research studies will likely be subject to criticism, and supposing little or no change in the political scene, it is probable that legislation that demonstrates understanding of and empathy with the local culture will pay huge dividends in public relations and in gaining support for other park activities. [279]

Key to this plan were the needs to buy the most sensitive allotments in the southern part of the park and to provide some kind of long-range guarantee to those ranchers who did not wish to sell. The specified allotments in the South District and just north of the visitor center were those most heavily utilized by the park's backcountry visitors. As such, they were the sources of greatest conflict with approved management plans emphasizing resource preservation and visitor appreciation. Ott determined that these allotments must be sold in their entirety or the whole deal was off. [280]

It took Ott almost a year to get local ranchers to agree to this point of the plan. Stan Adams, the Henry Mountain Resource Area Manger out of Hanksville, Utah, was particularly instrumental in persuading the ranchers to agree to selling these allotments and most of the others in the park. [281]

The other crucial plank of the plan was to assure those ranchers declining to sell that they would not immediately be phased out. In making preliminary inquiries with local ranchers and politicians, Superintendent Ott discovered that many stockmen were willing to sell their park AUMs so long as those who did not sell were granted a more gradual phaseout. This phaseout would be similar to the one sought by the ranchers back in 1971 and 1982. [282]

One of the key reasons for this provision was the fact that some stockmen, including spokesman Guy Pace, were almost solely dependent on park lands for their winter grazing needs. In the tight-knit, interdependent communities of Wayne and Garfield Counties, Ott observed:

There is a strong indication that there are many permittees willing to sell at this time if there is some assurance that the interests of their neighbors will not be compromised. In this same light, the Utah Congressional Delegation and the directors of the Utah Farm Bureau have clearly stated that they will support the park's initiative as long as the gradual phaseout for ranchers who choose not to sell is part of the package. Failure to support this part of the plan could, of course, result in direction from Congress to cease purchasing AUMs and continue on the course directed in P.L. 97-341. [283]

Before the local ranchers, lobbyists, and Utah congressional delegation would support the buyout, ranchers (such as Guy Pace) who were not willing to sell had to be assured of the long-term grazing phaseout. At the same time, several environmental organizations resisted what they viewed as a compromise of the national park's resources, and advocated gambling on a stricter phaseout in 1994. Apparently, some who opposed the compromise were also found on the staff of Regional Director Mintzmyer. Despite persistent advice to reject the proposal, Mintzmyer nevertheless stuck to her original promise to Ott, supporting the entire package through to the end. [284]

According to Superintendent Ott, the entire proposal was "a crap shoot," though "not as big a gamble as one might think." First, Ott obtained commitments from the ranchers to sell in those three problematic allotments. Next, he ascertained from talking with various advisory boards and local people that many of the other ranchers were willing to sell, as well. Knowing that most of the ranchers would go along with the plan, Ott could then agree to an extended phaseout for the few who chose to retain their grazing rights. Armed with this information, Ott would approach the regional director and Utah congressmen and senators for funding to proceed with the buyouts. [285]

Once the Utah delegation approved spending National Park Service money on the buyout, Sen. Garn and Rep. Hansen successfully attached a rider on the Fiscal 1988 Interior Appropriations Bill. Their rider would give the non-selling ranchers and their immediate families the right to continue grazing in the park (see Appendix B). [286] Those few ranchers would thus have a chance to phase out their winter cattle operations much more gradually, giving them time to explore alternatives to their park allotments. Those choosing to sell, on the other hand, could use their buyout money to purchase AUMs in neighboring allotments, or invest it in some other manner.

By the end of 1989, the buyout program had successfully relieved the park of more than 3,000 AUMs, or 69 percent of the total permits, at a cost of approximately $220,000. The 37 AUMs in Fishlake National Forest were transferred administratively by an allotment realignment. The only remaining livestock grazing in the park as of January 1, 1991 consisted of 78 AUMs in the extreme northern Cathedral Allotment, 972 AUMs in the Hartnet, 482 AUMs in the Sandy 1 and 3 Allotments, and seven AUMs in the Torrey Town Allotment. [287]

The plan also called for a continuing role for the Bureau of Land Management in actively monitoring grazing on the remaining park lands. Superintendent Ott had three reasons for advocating this arrangement. First, he wished to continue the cooperative agreement between the sister agencies because he believed that such successful relationships were too rare and should be maintained wherever possible. Second, he believed that no one in the National Park Service had the grazing expertise of the BLM's professionals. Finally, he felt that the dramatic grazing reductions eliminated the need for a full-time, year-round range conservationist in the park. [288]

The entire plan, however, would have been unsuccessful had money not become available to fence cattle out of most of the park: permitted or not, cattle on nearby allotments would simply wander across the boundaries. Fencing would also prevent other cattle from trespassing on park lands, and would thereby further reduce the livestock impacts that previously occurred. [289] Throughout the entire grazing history of Capitol Reef, the lack of fencing was probably the underlying cause for much of the conflicts and hard feelings among ranchers, Bureau of Land Management personnel, and park staff.

While one could look narrowly at and find fault with any one part of the final buyout policy, in total this was the first grazing policy at Capitol Reef that successfully relieved pressure on the range and actually improved community relations. The buyout was initiated by a determined Robert Reynolds and successfully implemented by Martin Ott. Through all the unenforceable, conflicting grazing policies established at various times by National Park Service managers, and despite all the resistance by local people, there finally had come a plan that was agreeable to both sides.


Current Status and Conclusions

Capitol Reef Grazing: 1994

The Bureau of Land Management continues to monitor the grazing permits inside the park boundaries. This is done in consultation with the park's superintendent and the chiefs of the divisions of interpretation, visitor protection, and resource management and science. In 1994, a long-time local rancher and Capitol Reef employee, Keith Durfey, was hired by the park as a range technician to work with the BLM in monitoring grazing inside the park boundaries. With his local connections, Durfey has arranged the buyouts of additional AUMs. In 1993, there were still six grazing allotments in the park: Harnet (972 AUMs); Sandy 3 (410 AUMs); Cathedral (78 AUMs) Sandy 1 (72 AUMs); Sleeping Rainbow (48 AUMs); and Torrey Town (9 AUMs). Since that time, the National Park Service has acquire the AUMs in the Sandy 1, Sleeping Rainbow, and Torrey Town allotments. Park managers hope that National Park Service personnel will soon be able to assume all grazing monitoring and regulation of the remaining permits within Capitol Reef National Park. [290]

Relations between the park and the local communities appear to be improving. A formal educational outreach program, designed and operated by a permanent education specialist, was initiated in 1992. Other outreach programs include Harvest Homecoming (where local craftsmen are invited to demonstrate their skills and knowledge in historic Fruita), and interpretive activities at the refurbished Gifford House. These programs are doing a great deal to foster positive, constructive relationships with the local communities.

Yet, as long as grazing remains within the national park, there will be conflicts. For example, in early 1990 prominent rancher Karl Don Taylor asked to trail his cattle down the park's Halls Creek drainage to an allotment in the bordering Glen Canyon National Recreation Area. His request was denied by Superintendent Ott because of the stipulations of Taylor's sale of AUMs in the lower Waterpocket Allotment, and because Halls Creek was not a recognized stock driveway. [291] Angry over this decision and related grievances with the National Park Service, the Bureau of Land Management, and the U.S. Forest Service, Taylor wrote a bitter letter of protest to Sen. Jake Garn. According to Taylor, the federal land managers' policies demonstrated "an insidious program advocating the removal of federally controlled lands out of the multiple use concept." [292]

While Garn's response is undocumented, Taylor's actions suggest a continuing potential for conflict between the residents of south-central Utah and the federal agencies that control much of the land around them.

On the other hand, many within the environmental movement and even some National Park Service personnel refuse even to hear the ranchers' concerns (and vice versa). This all demonstrates that, while the issue of grazing at Capitol Reef has come a long way, it more rough road lies ahead.


Lessons Learned

Livestock grazing has had a profound effect on the desert landscapes now within Capitol Reef National Park. Clearly, the present ranchers and park and BLM managers are not responsible for those effects. Improper grazing management combined with the often incompatible policies of the National Park Service took years to create the environment that now exists. The process was gradual and continual. It was not unavoidable.

It now appears that most of the documented resource damage -- including overgrazing, erosion, and the introduction of exotic plant species -- occurred between 1900 and 1950. Despite the teachings and beliefs of the Mormon Church, its settlers began to alter the landscape almost upon their arrival, with their agricultural and development activities. Most of the environmental damage occurred when huge herds of cattle and sheep were allowed to roam the ranges of the Waterpocket Fold in unrestricted and unmonitored competition. Market value and climatic conditions determined the carrying capacity of the range; ranchers, especially the sheep herders, turned a blind eye toward the resource damage around them.

Even after the beginnings of federal range regulations, first with the U.S. Forest Service and then with the Taylor Grazing Act, the lack of understanding about range conservation techniques and dependence on rancher endorsements limited any real improvement for several decades. When slow change finally did begin, with the Bureau of Land Management implementing range reductions and rest/rotation systems, it was often too late for the range to recover.

On the other hand, the National Park Service arrived late on the scene, after all the land had already been allocated. With little understanding of local conditions or attitudes, the National Park Service officials attempted to manage grazing by unilateral policies that were neither enforceable nor acceptable to the livestock interests. Insulated by political boundaries, National Park Service officials attempted to protect the monument or park lands with little understanding of what was happening on the outside.

The conflicting attitudes of the livestock and national park interests came to a head with the unexpected expansion of Capitol Reef National Monument in 1969. By incorporating an additional 190,000 acres of grazing lands, the National Park Service inherited an enormous administrative headache. Perhaps if the investigative process had not been as secretive or rushed as it was, the boundaries of Capitol Reef might have been laid out to exclude a great deal of the grazing land and its related problems. On the other hand, the question needs to be asked: Would the starkly beautiful northern and eastern flanks of Capitol Reef soon be free of adverse grazing impacts had the monument's size been smaller? In any case, the monument was soon made by Congress into a national park, and grazing was to be phased out within 10 years.

Arches and Canyonlands National Parks, created at about the same time and working under the same 10-year phaseout, had few problems with former grazing lands. Capitol Reef, however, had too many AUMs operated by too many ranchers with disparate permits to allow the issue to quietly fade away. The 10-year phaseout was appealed to Congress. At this point, the National Park Service hierarchy determined that, with little concrete or non-controversial information to oppose a grazing extension, it may be more politically expedient to accept the inevitable. Many in Congress, however, wanted that unbiased information. Thus, the grazing phaseout was delayed and studies were begun. When the studies proved too costly, the National Park Service compromised the objectivity of those studies by directly assuming their coordination and funding. At the same time, the bitterness over past park policies eased and the local economic conditions began to change. Livestock grazing in Capitol Reef was simply not as important as it had been in the past. Ironically, it was the compromise of 1982, delaying the grazing phaseout, which actually sped up the entire process. The compromise turned previous "privileges" into rights, which ultimately allowed the National Park Service to begin the systematic purchase of AUMs on a willing-seller basis.

By the late 1980s, conditions were finally ripe for a compromise. With Superintendents Robert Reynolds and Martin Ott at the helm, a complicated plan was steered through a sea of objections, eliminating much of the park's grazing, particularly where it most conflicted with park visitation. Ranchers choosing not to sell were given assurances that grazing would not be phased out in their lifetimes or those of their immediate families. Almost everyone was, if not happy, at least relieved.

While living and working at Capitol Reef in the early 1990s, this author perceived a slowly changing attitude between the park and the local communities. The deep scars of resentment and animosity on both sides were beginning to heal. In order to encourage that healing process to continue, both sides must recognized that they made mistakes in grazing management. The traditional practice of loosing large, competing herds on a desert range forever altered the landscape. Yet, in attempting to correct the problems, the policies of the National Park Service often did more to stimulate conflict than to resolve it.

On the other hand, the positive steps toward change must also be acknowledged. In the last few decades, improvements have been made that are revolutionizing the livestock industry. The technical information and extensive training that the federal range managers and the ranchers, themselves, have acquired have gone a long way to changing those old, destructive grazing habits. These new techniques, including rest/rotation systems and more intensive monitoring and moving of livestock, must be encouraged to continue.

On its end of the issue, the National Park Service and its sister agencies finally realized that compromises could ensure long-range integrity while also appeasing the local communities.

Yet, even today one constantly reads about the conflicts between ranchers and environmentalists throughout the West. Our evolving philosophy, from an emphasis on land utilization to one of land stewardship, is still taking shape.


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Last Updated: 10-Dec-2002