Main Branches of OSS
Most of the glory was won by the operational branches, especially the bold and daring agents of the Secret Intelligence and Special Operations Branches and the commando-style military units of the Operational Groups. Most mysterious were the “cloak and dagger” operatives of the Secret Intelligence Branch (SI).22 These were the men and some women who ran intelligence operations and rings of indigenous spies primarily in enemy or enemy-occupied countries. Intelligence gathering an analysis was a major function of OSS.
“The information came in from agents. We never called them spies,” recalled Dorothy Hayes Stout, who typed up incoming coded messages.23 The military was particularly interested in obtaining intelligence about the enemy, and the main supplier of military-related intelligence in the OSS was the Secret Intelligence Branch. SI played its first important role in helping ensure the success of the American invasion of Vichy French North Africa in November 1942. As early as June when planning for the operation had begun, a female SI agent, Amy E. Thorpe (code-named “Cynthia”), a 32- year-old socialite, seduced a Vichy official and copied valuable naval codes from the French Embassy in Washington.24 In North Africa itself, OSS agents like diplomat Robert Murphy, World War I war hero and American professor at Cairo University William Eddy and Harvard Arabist and anthropologist Carleton Coon worked successfully to minimize resistance to an Allied landing by the colonial forces of Vichy France which was collaborating with the Nazis. The OSS may have had some complicity in the assassination of Vichy French commander Admiral Jean Darlan.25 SI continued its work throughout the Mediterranean and in Western and Central Europe. On the other side of the world, in China, SI networks behind Japanese lines provided information on bombing targets for U.S. Army Air Forces and on Japanese shipping for the U.S. Navy.
The majority of SI personnel worked in Allied or neutral countries, from which they made contacts with informants or, more frequently, sent foreign speaking Americans or indigenous agents, into enemy areas by night parachute drops or submarine landings to carry out their missions of obtaining information directly or through paid or unpaid informants about military, economic, political, and morale conditions. Among SI station chiefs, none was more successful than Allen Dulles, whose headquarters was in Bern in neutral Switzerland. This scion of a family of international lawyers and diplomats, Dulles had served as an intelligence agent in Switzerland in the First World War, returning in 1942, he built a ring of more than one hundred agents in Germany, including lawyers, businessmen, labor leaders and socialists, and learned about the development sites for V- 1 and V-2 weapons, the organization of opposition to Hitler within the German officer corps prior to their attempt to assassinate him in July 1944, and other valuable information. Dulles also became the contact for the most valuable single human intelligence source of the war, Fritz Kolbe, an anti-Nazi bureaucrat in the German Foreign Office with liaison to the German General Staff. British intelligence rejected him, but Dulles trusted him, and from 1943 to 1945, Kolbe smuggled to the OSS station chief in Switzerland some 1,600 valuable military and foreign policy documents providing important insights into military, economic, and political conditions in wartime Germany. Donovan included summaries of that information in the intelligence reports he gave regularly to President Roosevelt.26 Dulles later became Director of the Central Intelligence (DCI) under President Dwight Eisenhower. The SI chief in London in the later part of the war, William J.Casey, became DCI under President Ronald Reagan. In World War II, Casey, then a young New York lawyer who joined the OSS, underwent close combat and demolitions training at OSS Training Area B in Catoctin Mountain Park, became the last chief of SI in London. In the final five months of the war in Europe, Casey, using parachuted German agents, achieved a penetration of Hitler’s Third Reich by infiltrated spies, something British intelligence said could not be done.27
Although the Secret Intelligence Branch produced some valuable information during the war, OSS was excluded by both the U.S. and British military from the most important signals intelligence source of the war—the intercepted and decoded Axis radio communications (code named Ultra and Magic). However, beginning in 1943, Donovan was able to persuade the British intelligence services to share some of the Ultra intercepts for the purpose of counter-espionage, the identification of German spies and their elimination or conversion to “doubled” agents, who would report deceptive information to Berlin for the Allies. Headed by James Murphy in London and with station chiefs like the brilliant but ultimately controversial James Jesus Angleton in Rome (Angleton had taken his OSS basic training course at Area B at Catoctin before his more specialized training at SI and X-2 schools in Maryland and Virginia), the Counter-Intelligence Branch (X-2) was the most secretive of the OSS branches because of its access to some of the Ultra intercepts; it was also one of the most powerful, as its access enabled it to cancel SI or SO operations without explanation.28
Like the majority of women who enlisted in the OSS, Aline Griffith, from Pearl River, New York and a tall, statuesque Hattie Carnegie model, was assigned to the office in Washington. But in December 1943, after a month’s secret intelligence training at Area RTU-11, “the Farm,” the adventurous, 21-year-old woman, codenamed “Tiger,” was sent overseas to Madrid to work in the capital of neutral, if pro-Axis Spain. In addition to coding and decoding, he mission was to counter-espionage, initially to learn the identity of a top German agent there. The bright and beautiful young woman proved a great success, gaining access to information while dining and dancing in an international social circle that included diplomats, attachés, businessmen, undercover agents and the like. On weekend visits to country mansions, she was not above rummaging through drawers and cracking safes and photographing documents. She became a top counterespionage agent. After the war, she remained there and married a Spanish nobleman, becoming the Countess of Romanones.29
Only a relative handful of OSS women were trained for Secret Intelligence or Special Operations behind enemy lines. Most of them attended one of the OSS parachute classes taught at Fort Benning, Georgia or in North Africa or China by Colonel Lucius O. Rucker, U.S. Army paratrooper and a veteran of 119 jumps himself. The 38 women he instructed as parachutists represented only 1 percent of the 3,800 people he trained to jump out of airplanes, including Americans, British, French, Italian, Chinese and Thais. Rucker supervised more than twenty thousand jumps in his career, and he reported that only 50 trainees had refused at the last minute to jump out of the plane. None of those who refused was a woman. The women jumped, but they complained that their breasts were badly bruised by the severe snap back of the harness when the parachute opened.30
A number of American women in SI worked just behind the Allied lines, among them Betty Lussier, who set up an extensive double-agent network in southern France after the Americans had liberated Nice, and Wanda Di Giacomo, who had started in the Personnel Division of the OSS in Washington but ultimately served in SI in Italy. She received her overseas espionage training at a converted warehouse in Roslyn, Virginia. “After my work in Personnel, this was the pits,” she recalled, contrasting the quiet, comfortable facilities in OSS headquarters with the hurly-burly of a temporary OSS training site. “Bathroom facilities were terrible. I had to share them with men. And what a collection! The place was always full of agents: Chinese, Arabs, French, even Germans, coming and going.”31 She was taught clandestine entry, safe-cracking, steaming letters open. However, neither Lussier nor De Giacomo was allowed to operate behind enemy lines. The only American OSS women who were sent behind enemy lines were apparently those who had already been in German-occupied countries before they joined the OSS. 32
The women who served behind enemy lines were the heroines of the OSS. Often they were indigenous agents, such as Hélène Deschamps (code named “Anick”), who joined the French Resistance as a teenager and who reported to the OSS on German mines and camouflaged weapons, and helped downed fliers and persecuted Jews to escape. She was interrogated and beaten and suffered hearing loss from a bomb explosion, but she survived the war, married an American officer, and moved with him to the United States. Her advice for spies: “You have to think. If you look scared, you’re dead. So smile.”33
The most famous woman spy for the OSS was Virginia Hall, an American socialite from Baltimore, known to the Gestapo in France as the limping lady, because of her wooden leg. Fluent in French and living in Paris when the Nazis invaded in 1940, Hall served first as a volunteer ambulance driver until the French surrendered. Then she fled to London where she was recruited by the British Special Operations Executive (SOE). They sent her to Lyons, where she launched an operational resistance unit. Her unit was betrayed to Klaus Barbie, the “Butcher of Lyons,” but she escaped across the Pyrenees Mountains. When SOE declined to send her back to France as too dangerous, Hall joined the OSS, which smuggled her into northern France, disguised as an elderly peasant. Becoming a major Resistance leader, Hall (now code named “Diane”) directed espionage and guerrilla operations that established “safe houses” for intelligence agents and downed airmen, located drop zones for supplies for the Resistance. After the Allied invasion of France, her teams helped impede German reinforcements by blowing up bridges and supply trains, and ambushed truck convoys. They killed more than 150 German soldiers and captured nearly a thousand. After the war, Virginia Hall was awarded the French croix de guerre, the Order of the British Empire title, and in September 1945, the U.S. Army’s Distinguished Service Cross ”for extraordinary heroism in connection with military operations against the enemy.” She was the first women and civilian awarded that medal, the highest after the Medal of Honor. She married a French-born, former OSS agent, Paul Goillot in 1950, joined the CIA the next year, and served in the agency until her retirement in 1966.34
Special Operations and Operational Groups
If OSS SI aimed at intelligence information, OSS Special Operations Branch (SO) aimed at destruction. Its members were trained to blow up bridges and railroad lines and to lead guerrilla attacks on enemy outposts and lines of communication and supply. Initially, the Army did not view Special Operations as useful, in contrast to the Secret Intelligence Branch, which proved its effectiveness in the North African invasion of November 1942. “Our endless trouble child,” one top OSS executive, labeled SO in his diary in June 1943.35 The Army was not yet convinced of the usefulness of SO’s planned guerrilla and sabotage campaigns. Later, between 1943 and 1945, Special Operations Branch would prove its value in Europe and in Asia, but it took time.36
and a gutsy, cocky, devil-may-care attitude among many OSS special operations agents. They were serious about their business and the risk of fighting behind enemy lines, but there was also a swagger to men who saw themselves as part of an elite unit, physically and mentally at top form, ready to jump out of airplanes into the dark behind enemy lines, risking capture and death in daring, hazardous secret missions that as far as they knew the public would never hear about, but which, they believed, might help win the war. Some of the people in Secret Intelligence derided the SO operatives, with their emphasis on explosives and automatic weapons, as the “Bang-Bang Boys.”37 Unlike SI’s spies, who were usually civilians, male or female, and often worked alone, Special Operations combat operatives were uniformed, military personnel, men who worked in teams.
Those American Special Operations teams generally consisted of an SO officer and an enlisted radio man trained by the Communications Branch (CB). But beginning in May 1943, OSS augmented SO by establishing an Operational Group Branch (OG).38 The Operational Groups differed from commandos in that they were recruited by language. They also usually operated far behind enemy lines on a sustained basis working with indigenous resistance groups. Donovan’s idea was to recruit among various nationality groups in America’s multi-ethnic society, individuals who knew the culture and language of their forbearers’ country, and were willing to fight against its occupiers. Such ethnic soldiers in American military uniforms parachuted behind enemy lines, would be welcomed, Donovan believed, by indigenous resistance groups. By 1944 the OGs included ethnic Norwegians, Frenchmen, Italians, Greeks and other ethnic groups. Each consisted of about half a dozen officers and about 30 enlisted men.
Like the two- to three-man Special Operations teams, but in larger units, the Operational Group units were trained to work with local resistance forces and to engage in sabotage, hit-and-run raids, and other guerrilla operations to disrupt enemy lines of communication and supply in conjunction with directives from the Allied theater commander to assistant the invasion or other offensives of the main Allied forces.39 In the Mediterranean and European theaters of operations, OSS Special Operations and Operational Groups were infiltrated by submarine, small craft, or parachute drop into North Africa, Italy, Yugoslavia, Albania, Greece, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Norway far in advance of the main Allied forces. In 1944, as a prelude to the Allied invasion of Normandy and subsequently the South of France, dozens of SO and OG teams were dropped behind German lines there with instructions to link up with indigenous guerrillas and impede German resistance through sabotage and hit-and-run raids. Among them were nearly one hundred multi-national SO teams, usually American, British, and French, code named Jedburghs.40 The “Jeds” were a handpicked, colorful, capable, and adventurous lot, who received considerable publicity after the war. Most of the Americans picked to be “Jedburghs” had initially trained at Catoctin Mountain Park before undergoing Jed training in Britain. By August 1944, in addition to the “Jeds” and the other SO teams, approximately 1,100 Americans were operating in OG units throughout Europe.41
In all, there may have been up to 2,000 members of OSS Operational Groups.42 This was in addition to the 1,600 operatives that Special Operations sent behind enemy lines.43 During the war, almost all the American Special Operations teams received most of their training at the OSS Training Area B at Catoctin Mountain Park in Maryland or Training Area A at Prince William Forest Park in Virginia. The radio operators who accompanied the SO officers and the Operational Groups received their training area Area C at Prince William Forest Park. The Operational Groups themselves generally received their initial OSS training at Area F, the former Congressional Country Club in Bethesda, Maryland, but they usually then were sent on to Area B, or sometimes Area A, for further training, before being shipped overseas.
The first Special Operations unit sent into the field was Detachment 101, which was sent to northeastern India in the middle of 1942 to begin guerrilla operations against the Japanese in Burma. The group of some two dozen Americans had received their training for the mission in the spring of 1942. Their commander, Colonel Carl F. Eifler, and half of the initial contingent was trained at Camp X founded by British SOE on the edge of Lake Ontario outside of Toronto, Canada. The other half of the contingent, under Lieutenant William R. (“Ray”) Peers, trained at Area B in Catoctin Mountain Park. Detachment 101, a group that never exceeded 120 Americans in the field, recruited and directed nearly 11,000 native Kachin and other Burmese tribesmen. Operating as guerrillas deep behind Japanese lines in the jungles of Burma from 1942 to 1945, they harassed and weakened the Imperial Japanese Army and Air Force.44 Later in the war, other OSS units operated in Thailand and eventually in Japanese-occupied French Indochina.45 Beginning in 1943, OSS special operations forces in conjunction with SI agents also operated in China, providing target information for U.S. General Claire L. Chennault’s “Flying Tigers” pursuit planes and ultimately his bombers. SO and OG officers working with Chinese troops, the first Chinese OGs, as well as Chinese guerrillas sought to impede Japanese advances by blowing up supply depots, railroads and bridges After Tokyo surrendered in 1945, flying SO rescue teams into POW camps to prevent Allied prisoners from being harmed by fanatical Japanese militarists.46
Because OSS teams became involved in a number of seaborne projects in which operatives would be infiltrated by boat or which would involve the demolition of ships, harbor facilities, or landing obstacles, the OSS in June 1943 established a Maritime Unit (MU). Earlier, some seaborne infiltration training took place on a lake at Prince William Forest Park, but most of such training occurred at a Maritime training camp (Training Area D) established in late April 1942 at Smith Point on the eastern bank of the Potomac River in southern Charles County, Maryland. Members of SO and SI continued to receive seaborne landing instruction there, but the OSS Maritime Unit emphasized for its own personnel training not just in small craft handling and underwater explosives, but also sustained underwater combat swimming. Since the Potomac proved unsatisfactory for various reasons (lack of surf to simulate sea landings, iced over in winter, too murky and polluted for underwater swimming), MU moved its facilities to the Caribbean and California (Area D continued to be used by for advanced SO training until it was closed in April 1944). In the meantime, the Maritime Unit produced underwater explosive devices such as the Magnetic Limpet that saboteurs could use to blow a hole in a ship’s steel hull. It also developed specialized boats, such as collapsible kayaks that could be launched from submarines, and it was a pioneer in the invention of underwater, selfcontained breathing devices, like the Lambertsen Unit, which did not leave any tell-tale trail of bubbles on the surface. The Maritime Unit also developed the flexible swim fins used by the combat swimmers or “frogmen” of the OSS and the U.S. Navy. The Maritime Unit deployed and supplied Special Operations teams and Operational Groups by small craft across the Adriatic Sea to Yugoslavia, over the Aegean Sea to Greece, and across the Bay of Bengal to the coasts of Burma, Thailand and Malaya. In the Pacific, OSS frogmen assisted the Navy in scouting the shores and defenses of Japanese held islands prior to invasion by the Marines.47
Other Operational Branches
In regard to psychological warfare, having lost the Foreign Information Service to the Office of War Information in spring 1942, Donovan used the distinction between regular information, so-called “white” propaganda, and disinformation, “black propaganda,” and created a Morale Operations Branch (MO) in January 1943. Its mission was to use “black” propaganda to spread confusion, dissension, and disorder among enemy troops and civilians. It was most effective if such rumors at least appeared to originate in the enemy territory; consequently, MO units operated in the war zones, albeit behind Allied lines, as well as in regional headquarters. Some of the men in MO were trained at Area A in Prince William Forest Park, Virginia; the women and some other men of MO received their training at Areas F or E in Maryland. Defeatism among enemy troops and encouragement among captive populations were encouraged through material stressing the deteriorating position of the occupiers, inciting internal dissension and suspicion of leaders. Leaflets and radio programs, mingling lies, rumors, and deceptions with truth, were the most common media for such disinformation cued to recent developments and often to regional conditions. In Italy, Barbara Lauwers, a private in the Women’s Army Corps, stationed with the MO unit in Rome, helped develop “Operation Sauerkraut,” an innovative psychological program that temporarily dispatched disaffected German POWs back behind enemy lines to persuade their fellow soldiers to surrender. Initiated following the July 1944, German officers’ attempt to assassinate Hitler, the project’s propaganda declared that Germans were in revolt against the Nazis. Hundreds of German soldiers did surrender as a result. Later, the Czech-born Lauwers created a program that induced 500 Czech soldiers conscripted into the Germany Army to give up to the Western Allies. She was awarded the Bronze Star Medal for her achievements.48
In China, when civilian MO operative Elizabeth McDonald (later Elizabeth McIntosh} arrived in Kunming in early 1945, she reported that the crude printing presses using hand-carved characters that MO field units were using to wage psychological warfare were being effectively replaced by new lightweight aluminum offset presses developed in OSS in Washington. She was assigned to a project providing leaflets for Chinese and Korean agents with instructions on how surreptitiously to place OSS incendiary devices shaped like a piece of coal into railroad coal bunkers so that they would be shoveled into a locomotive’s firebox and explode at the proper time, thus disrupting the transportation of Japanese troops.49 The primary MO role in China, however, was directed by socialite and media man Gordon Auchincloss, who arrived from the European Theater in August 1944. MO set up a powerful radio transmitter and beamed programs in various dialects to different regions of China encouraging guerrilla action by Chinese against Japanese occupiers and providing discouraging news to Japanese soldiers.50
One of the most respected and successful units of OSS was the Research and Analysis Branch (R&A).51 Headed for most of the war by noted Harvard historian William L. Langer and supported by a large staff, it consisted of more than 900 scholars who used materials in the Library of Congress—and other facilities abroad—to collect and analyze economic, political, social, and military information about Axis or Axisoccupied nations or countries or regions for which the military needed information, such as North Africa prior to the Allied invasion.52 Its Enemy Objectives Unit in London analyzed the German economy and war production, recommended particular targets and ultimately helped convince Allied air commanders that the key objectives of the bombing campaign should be first, German aircraft factories and second, German oil and synthetic oil production facilities.53 R&A reports from World War II on crucial targets as well as other aspects of the industrial and transportation systems of particular countries in Europe, the Mediterranean, the Middle East, and the Far East, continued to prove useful to the American military even during the Korean War and the Cold War.54 OSS R&A was later described by McGeorge Bundy, head of the Ford Foundation, as the first great center of area studies “not located in any university.” For the government, it proved that scholarly research and analysis could produce important even vital information unavailable by espionage.55
“The importance of communications to secret activities cannot be over-stated,” declared the OSS official report at the end of the war.56 It was essential that OSS operatives in the field be able to send and receive secure, coded, radio messages. Thus, the Communications Branch (CB or “Commo”) included cryptography as well as communications operations. Indeed without secure and effective communications, the entire process of planning, coordinating, and implementing OSS operations, whether involving espionage, counter-espionage, covert operations, or psychological warfare, would have been jeopardized. As OSS Communications Branch veteran Arthur (“Art”) Reinhardt expressed it: “Commo underpinned everything OSS did.”57
To deal efficiently and securely with a global network serving initially primarily the SI, SO, and R&A branches, Donovan created a unified OSS Communications Branch on 22 September 1942.58 Lawrence (“Larry”) Wise Lowman, vice President in charge of operations at the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS), with fifteen years experience in handling the technical aspects of that radio network, was named Chief of the Communications Branch.59 The “Commo” Branch had an engineering section that built and operated the main message center and the regional relay base stations, purchasing and development sections that supplied specialized equipment, and a training section that developed a supply of operators for field and relay base work as well as code clerks for cryptography.60 OSS communications agents in the field required both linguistic skills, particularly in foreign languages, as well as, as Donovan expressed it, “a higher degree of self reliance than those assigned to a normal military operation, due to the autonomous nature of each mission.”61
The Communications Branch developed a system capable of rapid and secret communication among OSS locations around the globe. OSS headquarters was able to maintain wireless and cable communication with fixed and mobile relay base stations located in secure areas behind Allied lines in almost every major theater of operations. Those base stations communicated with agents in the field, whose transmissions were restricted in range by the limitations of their small, portable equipment. The relay stations, therefore, were necessary to interact between those field agents and OSS headquarters, forwarding coded instructions from headquarters and receiving and decoding information and requests from the agents. The primary coding system used in the field was the “one-time pads,” a double-transposition system, based on random key text printed on the back and a memorized Vigenere Square.62
Given its highly specialized needs, the Communications Branch recruited and trained technical personnel in the skills required for its communications and its cryptography. The “Commo” branch radio operators, all of whom were ultimately military servicemen, underwent training at the Communications Branch’s Training Area C at Prince William Forest Park, Virginia. (CB cryptographers, men and women, were trained in Washington, D.C., but men going into the war zone were sent to Area C for close combat and weapons instruction.) Living in tents and cabins there in the woods, the radio trainees became familiar with OSS communications equipment, its operation and maintenance, codes and ciphers, direction finding, and they learned or improved their telegraphy using International Morse code. Between 1942 and 1945, perhaps as many as 1,500 Communications Branch personnel (plus numerous other OSS personnel taking shorter radio and code courses) trained for generally three-month periods at Area C in Prince William Forest Park.63
The OSS’s global communications network included base stations in Washington and around the world that operated twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. The “Commo” men and women at those stations had to code and decode quickly and accurately messages and ensure their duplication and distribution. Indicative of the enormous volume of radio and cable traffic handled by OSS, the Communications Branch, which in addition to Washington, D.C., maintained message centers in some 25 major locations in 15 countries, handled 60,500 messages comprising 5,868,000 code groups in the single month of April 1945.64 Despite the enormous number of OSS messages during the war, there was no known compromise of OSS’s secure coding system or its cable traffic.65
Although the Communications Branch purchased most of its equipment from the civilian market or the Army Signal Corps, it had its own Research and Development Division. It developed wiretap devices, “Eureka” electronic beacons to identify drop sites, direction finding set, early “squirt” technology, and highly effective portable radios. Most widely used was what would be known as one of the most outstanding long-range, clandestine field radio sets of era, the SSTR-1 (for Strategic Services Transmitter/Receiver Number One). It was a transmitter, receiver, spare parts kit and a power supply compact enough to fit into a small and innocuous looking suitcase. OSS purchased 8,000 of these wireless telegraphy (WT) sets. Even more innovative was the so-called “Joan-Eleanor” communications system that OSS got into the field in the Netherlands and Germany by late 1944. The new equipment employed for the first time the Very High Frequency (VHF) band operating at 200 to 300 MHz, a frequency much more difficult for the enemy to monitor (most radio equipment worked under 100 MHz). With a small hand-held radio (an SSTC 502/ nicknamed “Joan”), an agent on the ground could talk with a radio operator in a plane circling in the dark six miles above and equipped with a substantial transmitter/receiver (an SSTR-6, nicknamed “Eleanor”), expediting the transmittal of information because the voice communication replaced telegraphy and the VHF obviated the need for coding and decoding.66 The Joint Chiefs of Staff credited the OSS’ Joan-Eleanor communication system one of the “most successful wireless intelligence gathering operations” of the war.67
OSS Research and Development Branch
For their war of insurgency, sabotage, and espionage, OSS operatives needed a number of highly specialized weapons, explosives and other deadly devices. The OSS had its own workshops and laboratories in its Research and Development Branch headed by Stanley P. Lovell, a chemist and former business executive from Boston.68 Among the specialized weaponry were silenced, flashless pistols and submachine guns, dart guns, even hand-cranked crossbows, as well as various styles of knives and clubs. The OSS also adapted the “Liberator” pistol or $2 “Woolworth” gun, a cheaply made, one-shot.45 caliber pistol, that was distributed to indigenous guerrillas, especially in China and the Philippines (the single shot was to be used to kill an enemy soldier and obtain his rifle or pistol). For demolition work, OSS adopted some existing explosives such as Torpex, and a plastic explosive, Composition C, paradoxically a moldable, gelatin-like substance that was also much more stable than TNT and which exploded so effectively that it could blow a hole through one-inch steel. It also developed “Aunt Jemima,” an explosive powder disguised as flour that could be baked as biscuits without exploding (although poisonous if eaten), but when ignited by a timed or contact fuse was powerful enough to blow up a bridge. For espionage, OSS R&D developed a variety of devices from 16mm cameras hidden in matchboxes or even jacket buttons to maps concealed in playing cards, plus a variety of invisible inks as well as faked identification cards, passes, and counterfeit currency.69
1 Roosevelt’s quotation is from “Notes from WJD—April 5, ’49,” Donovan’s notes on a postwar interview [presumably with William vanden Heuvel], cited in Thomas F. Troy, Donovan and the CIA: A History of the Establishment of the Central Intelligence Agency (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1981), 116. For the Polo Grounds episode, see the New York Times, 8 Dec. 1941, 32.
2 The Organization of Strategic Services (OSS) was created on 13 June 1942. By Executive Order, Roosevelt first moved the Foreign Information Service to the newly created Office of War Information (OWI). Then by military order, he transformed the reduced COI into the new Office of Strategic Services and placed it under the jurisdiction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He appointed Donovan as Director of the OSS. The Military Order of 13 June 1942, establishing the OSS is reprinted in Franklin D. Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, comp. Samuel I. Rosenman, 13 vols. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1950), 11: 283.
3 OSS, War Report of the O.S.S.., with new introduction by Kermit Roosevelt (New York: Walker and Co., 1976, orig.., 1947), 18-27, 188-90. On the deleterious effects on counterespionage of the FBI rivalry with the COI/OSS/CIA, see Timothy Naftali, Blind Spot: The Secret History of American Counterterrorism (New York: Basic Books, 2005). Troy, Donovan and the CIA , 120-50; on the transfer of Robert Sherwood and the FIS to the OWI, see Harriet Hyman Alonso, Robert E. Sherwood: The Playwright in Peace and War (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 2007), 245-50.
4 As the President told Sherwood in making the change, “I strongly felt that your work is essentially information and not espionage or subversive activity among individuals or groups in enemy nations. I know Bill Donovan does not agree with this, but the rest of the C.O.I., including himself, belongs under the Joint Chiefs of Staff.” FDR to Dear Bob [Robert E. Sherwood], 13 June 1942, Official File 4485, OSS, Box 2, Folder OSS 1942-1945, Franklin D. Roosevelt Library, Hyde Park, N.Y., hereinafter, Franklin D. Roosevelt Papers, Hyde Park, N.Y.
5 On the creation of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and strategic planning with the British Joint Chiefs of Staff, see Mark A. Stoler, Allies and Adversaries: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Grand Alliance, and U.S. Strategy in World War II (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 64-67. For most of the war, the JCS included General George C. Marshall, U.S. Army; Admiral Ernest J. King, U.S. Navy; and General H.H. (“Hap”) Arnold; U.S. Army Air Forces; together with Admiral William D. Leahy as the President’s personal representative.
6 For interest by the Army’s War Plans Division as early as February 1942 in active liaison with COI in regard to the Army’s new mission of “subversive activities,” see, “W.P.S., Draft Memorandum for General Gerow, Subject: Subversive Activities—Planning,” n.d. [February ? 1942], and W.P.S. [of the War Plans Division], Memorandum to General Lee [probably Brig. Gen. Raymond E. Lee, chief of Army G-2, Intelligence], n.d. [February? 1942], Wash-OSS-Op-21 (COI Subversive Activities), photocopies in CIA Records (RG 263), Thomas F. Troy Files, Box 2, Folder 19, National Archives II.
7 Dwight D. Eisenhower, The Papers of Dwight D. Eisenhower: The War Years, ed. Alfred D. Chandler (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), 253-54.
8 On the key negotiations were between Donovan and JCS secretary Brig. Gen. Walter Bedell (“Beatle”) Smith, see Troy, Donovan and the CIA, 129-37, 143-50.
9 Troy, Donovan and the CIA, 173-91, 431-34..
10 JCS Directive 67 of 21 June 1942, approved 22 June 1942, recognized Donovan as having the military rank of colonel. For the dates of Donovan's promotions, 24 March 1943 and 10 November 1944, see Troy, Donovan and the CIA, 514n. See also Diary entry of 14 November 1942 in James Grafton Rogers, Wartime Washington: The Secret OSS Journal of James Grafton Rogers, 1942-1943, ed. Thomas F. Troy (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1987), 21.
11 William J. Donovan to Gen. Archibald Wavell, 6 July 1942, job 66-595, Box 1, Folder 48, Donovan Papers, U.S. Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pa. The JCS’s Joint Psychological Warfare Committee reported sabotage and guerrilla as the OSS’s military functions to be placed under theater commanders. See Joint Psychological Warfare Committee, memorandum to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, subject: Functions of the Office of Strategic Services in Relation to Secret Operations, 21 July 1942, and subsequent drafts of 24 and 28 July 1942, copies in OSS Schools and Training Branch; Schools, Functions of OSS in Relationship to Special Operations; Records of the Director’s Office of OSS (RG 226), microfilm number 1642, roll 64, frames 952-968, National Archives II, College Park, Md.
12 OSS, War Report of the O.S.S., 87.
13 Reported in James Grafton Rogers, diary entry of 6 September 1943, Wartime Washington: The Secret OSS Journal of James Grafton Rogers, 141.
14 A figure of 12,718 OSS personnel is provided in Lawrence H. McDonald, “The OSS and Its Records,” in The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II, ed. George C. Chalou (Washington, DC: National Archives and Records Administration 1992), 81. See also Michael Warner, The Office of Strategic Services: America’s First Intelligence Agency (Washington, D.C.: Central Intelligence Agency, 2000), 9. That apparently was the number of personnel at its peak. The total number of 21,600 people who had worked for COI or OSS at one time or another in civilian or military capacity is provided in Elizabeth P. McIntosh, Sisterhood of Spies: The Women of the OSS (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1998), xi, 11. In August 2008, CIA released OSS personnel files suggesting 24,000 persons. Brett J. Blackledge and Randy Herschaft, Associated Press, “Newly Release Files Detail Early US Spy Network,” 14 August 2008, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/08/14/August; Spy Files Include a Justice, a Baker, and a Filmmaker,” Newark (N.J.) Star-Ledger, 15 August 2008, A4.
15 Figures provided in Maj. Gen. William J. Donovan to Adjutant General of the Army, 15 May 1945, subject: Recommendation for Promotion [of Col. Millard P. Goodfellow], p. 3, located in Millard Preston Goodfellow Papers, Box 2, Folder: Biographical Material, in the Millard Preston Goodfellow Papers, Hoover Institution, Stanford, Calif.
16 Elizabeth P. McIntosh, Sisterhood of Spies: The Women of the OSS (Annapolis, Md.,: Naval Institute Press, 1998), xi, 11; Katherine Breaks, “The Ladies of the OSS: The Apron Strings of Intelligence in World War II,” Senior Thesis in History, Yale University, 1991), cited by Robin W. Winks, “Getting the Right Stuff: FDR, Donovan, and the Quest for Professional Intelligence,” in The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II, ed. George C. Chalou (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Administration 1992), 24. But as Elizabeth McIntosh wrote in the late 1990s: “Discrimination against women in government service during the war was obvious. The women in X-2 [counter-espionage], for example, were as well educated as the men, they spoke the same number of foreign languages, on average were the same age (early thirties), and most had traveled abroad. But in X-2 they were generally secretaries, filing clerks, or translators. There was one decoder; two were listed as associate head and administrative assistant. None achieved executive positions in X-2.” McIntosh, Sisterhood of Spies, 97-98.
17 Barbara Hans Waller, telephone interview with the author, 19 March 2005.
18 Barbara Hans Waller, telephone interview with the author, 19 March 2005. They were trained at the OSS Administration Building in Washington, D.C. She had no knowledge of the Communications Branch radio operation school at Area C.
19 Barbara Hans Waller quoted in McIntosh, Sisterhood of Spies, 215-16.
20 “OSS Personnel: By Branch,” Table in McDonald, “The OSS and Its Records,” The Secrets War, 96.
21 “OSS Personnel: By Theater” Table in McDonald, “The OSS and Its Records,” The Secrets War, 92.
22 For a brief summary of the organization and operation of the Secret Intelligence Branch, see OSS, OSS, War Report of the O.S.S., 179-87; and Warner, Office of Strategic Services, 21-24. David K.E. Bruce headed SI until 1942 when he was appointed OSS chief in London and was succeeded by Whitney H. Shepardson, international lawyer and business executive, who headed SI until the end of the war. See David K. E. Bruce, OSS against the Reich: The Wartime Diaries of Colonel David K.E. Bruce, ed. Nelson Douglas Lankford (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1991).
23 Lou Mumford, “Her Secret Life was Working with Spies. It Wasn’t Like James Bond Movies, but World War II Era Job Was Intriguing,” South Bend [Indiana] Tribune, 27 May 2005, reprinted in OSS Society Digest No. 1044, 28 May 2005, firstname.lastname@example.org, accessed 28 May 2005.
24 McIntosh, Sisterhood of Spies, 21-31.
25 Stephen Ambrose, Ikes’ Spies: Eisenhower and the Espionage Establishment (Garden City, N.Y.; Doubleday, 1981), 39-56.
26 Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1994); Christof Mauch, The Shadow War against Hitler: The Covert Operations of America’s Wartime Secret Intelligence Service (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003). In January 2008, the CIA released in digitalized form nearly 8,000 formerly classified documents in the Allen W. Dulles Papers, 1939-1977, some of it heavily redacted. See, for example, information on Double Agent Lummy, in Switzerland and France, August 1943 through October 1944, in image 194308L70000029249; and reports from contacts about political and military developments in Germany’s ally, Bulgaria, February 1943 through April 1944, image 19430210_0000029247; Sub-Series D, Correspondence General, English, 1942-1947, Allen W. Dulles Digital File Series, 1939-1977, Seeley Mudd Manuscript Library, Princeton University, Princeton, N.J.
27 William J. Casey, The Secret War against Hitler (Washington, DC: Regnery Gateway, 1988); Joseph E. Persico, Casey: From the OSS to the CIA (N.Y.: Viking, 1990).
28 OSS, War Report of the O.S.S., 188-98; Warner, Office of Strategic Services, 8, 29. Caricatures of Angleton have appeared in numerous spy-thriller books and films, most recently, Robert DeNiro’s film, The Good Shepherd (2007), starring Matt Damon as the Angleton character. On Angleton, see David C. Martin, Wilderness of Mirrors (New York: Harper & Row, 1980), 12, for his basic training at Area B; Timothy J. Naftali, “ARTIFICE: James Angleton and X-2 Operations in Italy,” The Secrets War: The Office of Strategic Services in World War II, ed. George C. Chalou (Washington, D.C.: National Archives and Records Service, 1992), 218-45; for contrasting views of Angleton and the Cold War, see the favorable view of Robin W. Winks, Cloak and Gown: Scholars in the Secret War, 1939-1961 2 nd ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996), 322-437, 539 (p. 340 on Angleton’s recruitment and training); and the more hostile view of Angleton as an ideologue in Tom Mangold, Cold Warrior: James Angleton: The CIA’s Master Spy Hunter (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1991), passim (p. 42 for the Angleton’s Legion of Merit Award from the U.S. Army in 1945 citing the capture of a thousand enemy agents).
29 Aline, Countess of Romanones, The Spy Wore Red: My Adventures as an Undercover Agent in World War II (New York: Random House, 1987), 18-44,56-57, 148-49, and passim; and The Spy Went Dancing: My Further Adventures as an Undercover Agent (New York: Putnam, 1990), 13-14.
30 McIntosh, Sisterhood of Spies, 13.
31 Wanda Di Giacomo quoted in McIntosh, Sisterhood of Spies, 17.
32 Elizabeth P. (“Betty”) McIntosh, telephone interview with the author, 12 March 2005; on Di Giacomo and Lussier, see also McIntosh, Sisterhood of Spies, 16-17, 145-152.
33 Hélène Deschamps, Spyglass: An Autobiography (New York: Henry Holt, 1995); OSS Society Digest, Number 2078, 16 June 2008, email@example.com, accessed 16 June 2008; see also Margaret L. Rossiter, Women in the Resistance (New York: Praeger, 1986).
34 Judith L. Pearson, Wolves at the Door: The True Story of America’s First Female Spy (Guilford, Conn.: Lyons Press, 2005); McIntosh, Sisterhood of Spies, 113-128. Despite the title of Pearson’s book, Virginia Hall was hardly the first American female spy since their use dates back to at least the American Revolutionary War.
35 James Grafton Rogers, diary entry of 8 June 1943, Wartime Washington: The Secret OSS Journal of James Grafton Rogers, 107-8. See also entry of 20 February 1943, p. 57, for similar.
36 The SO branch went through several chiefs. See OSS-USA Organizational Chart November 1944, attached to H.C. Parton, Jr., Chief, Presentation Branch, to Lt. E.R. Kellogg, subject: Attachment, 2 Nov. 1944 in OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 133, Box 163, Folder 1384, National Archives II.
37 Bang-Bang Boys, phrase from “History of Schools and Training, OSS,” p. 25, a 55-page-typescript, copy accompanied by a 7 January 1949 memorandum by Col. E.B. Whisner stating “Received this date from W[illiam]. J. Morgan the following report: History of Schools and Training, OSS, Part I thru Part VI,” OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 176, Box 2, Folder 13, National Archives II.
38 One of Donovan’s ideas had been to create American commando military units of foreign-speaking immigrants or second-generation Americans. This went so far as a proposal to the JCS for a Strategic Service Command and the formation of significant units in an independent corps. Although the JCS rejected the plan, something of it survived, via the broad authorization in JCS 155/4/D of 23 December 1942, in the full-fledged guerrilla companies of ethnic or foreign-speaking American troops, which became the OSS’s different nationality Operational Groups. Wallace R. Deuel, “The History of the OSS,” typescript, 1944, II:52, summarized in CIA Records (RG 263), Thomas Troy Files, Box 2, Folder, 19, National Archives II. Wallace R. Deuel, Chicago Daily News correspondent for Rome and Berlin in the 1930s, joined COI in 1941 as a special assistant to Donovan. He remained with OSS throughout the war and later worked for the CIA until his retirement in 1972. His typescript history of the OSS, written in 1944, has remained with the CIA. The present author requested its declassification in 2008.
39 The OSS Operational Groups (OGs) were created as 13 May 1943 as a separate tactical combat units under JCS Directive 155/7/D, 4 April 1943, Article 7, relating to Operational Nuclei for Guerrilla Warfare. The initial authorization was for 120 officers and 384 enlisted men. William J. Donovan, Special Order No. 21, issued 13 May 1943, effective, 4 May 1943; and Col. Ellery C. Huntington, Jr., C.O. Operational Groups, to Lt. Cmdr. R. Davis Halliwell, Chief of S.O., 22 June 1943, subject: Operational Groups, OSS— Organization and Functions, both in OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 136, Box 140, Folder 1460, National Archives II. Unlike SI, R&A, and even the Jedburgh teams of SO, there is, as of this writing, no overall history of the Operational Groups. A start has been made with a special OG section in OSS Society Newsletter, Winter 2007, 5-8; and the website www.ossog.org.
40 After the war, the legend emerged that the term “Jedburgh” came from a Scottish town where the teams trained. Although there is a town of Jedburgh in Scotland it is 250 miles north of Milton Hall in Peterborough, England, the main training site. A recent student of the subject has concluded that the name Jedburgh was given operation by being randomly selected from a list of town names in the U.K. Will Irwin, The Jedburghs: The Secret History of the Allied Special Forces, France 1944 (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 37-38.
41 OSS, War Report of the OSS, 225; Warner, Office of Strategic Services, 16-17.
42 “The Story of OSS OGs Worldwide,” OSS Society Newsletter, Winter 2007, 5. Albert Materazzi, an OG veteran, believes there may have been 2,000 OGs. Albert Materazzi, “OGs get to tell their story,” OSS Society Digest Number 1313, 26 March 2006, firstname.lastname@example.org, accessed 26 March 2006.
43 Harry Howe Ransom, The Intelligence Establishment (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), 70.
44 Warner, Office of Strategic Services, 37-39. Richard Dunlop, Behind Japanese Lines: With the OSS in Burma (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1979); Roger Hilsman, American Guerilla: My War Behind Japanese Lines (Washington, DC: Brassey’s, 1990).
45 E. Bruce Reynolds, Thailand’s Secret War: OSS, SOE, and the Free Thai Underground (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Dixee R. Bathrolomew-Feis, The OSS and Ho Chi Minh: Unexpected Allies in the War against Japan (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2006).
46 Maochun Yu, OSS in China: Prelude to Cold War (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1996); Ronald H. Spector, In the Ruins of Empire: The Japanese Surrender and the Battle for Postwar Asia (New York: Random House, 2007), 9-21, 32-33, 44-47, 106-33.
47 OSS, War Report of the OSS, 225-28; John W. Brunner, OSS Weapons, 2nd ed. (Williamstown, NJ: Phillips Publications, 2005), 161-63; Francis Douglas Fane and Don Moore, The Naked Warriors (New York: Appleton-Century Crofts, 1956), 133; see also John B. Dwyer, Seaborne Deception: The History of U.S. Beach Jumpers (New York: Greenwood, 1992).
48 Barbara Lauwers Podaski, “Infiltrating Nazi Front Line with Morale Op’s Disinformation” OSS Society Newsletter, Winter 2006, 3; and McIntosh, Sisterhood of Spies, 59-70.
49 McIntosh, Sisterhood of Spies, 233-234; and see her memoir, Elizabeth McDonald, Undercover Girl (New York: Macmillan, 1947).
50 Soley, Radio Warfare, 172-89.
51 Wink, Cloak and Gown, 114.
52 Bary M. Katz, Foreign Intelligence: Research and Analysis in the Office of Strategic Services, 1942- 1945 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1989).
53 OSS, War Report of the OSS, 48-69; Warner, Office of Strategic Services, 12. Examples of OSS R&A Reports include Report No. 1756, 27 January 1944: Development of German Pattern of Occupation; Report No. 232, 22 September 1944: South Germany: An Analysis of the Political and Social Organization, the Communications, Economic Controls, Agricultural and Food Supply, Mineral Resources, Manufacturing and Transportation Facilities of South Germany; Report No. 1844, 3 October 1944: Concentration Camps in Germany; Report No. 1999, 19 August 1944: The Belgian Underground; Report No. 2229, 15 June 1944: Burma: Enemy Shipping, October 1943-April 1944; Report No. 2993, 31 March, 1945: The Contributions of the Italian Partisans to the Allied War Effort; Current Intelligence Study No. 31, 20 July 1945: Japan’s “ Secret” Weapon: “Suicide.”
54 R&A reports and estimates were used by Army intelligence in the Korean War and in Europe in the Cold War; they were “good and still valuable,” according to Lt. Col. Elbert B. O’Keefe (U.S. Army-Ret.), former G-2 officer, conversation with the author at Catoctin Mountain Park annual dinner for park volunteers, 17 November 2007.
55 Edward Hymoff, The OSS in World War II (New York: Ballantine, 1972), 342,
56 OSS, War Report of the O.S.S., 135.
57 Arthur Reinhardt, “Deciphering the Commo Branch,” OSS Society Newsletter, Fall 2006, 6-7.
58 OSS, War Report of the O.S.S., 90-91, 135-43. The new Communications Branch consolidated all the previous COI and OSS signal and traffic communications operations into one branch. There had been a difference of opinion over the desirability of lines of communication for SO and SI, but Donovan insisted that the organization be done through the headquarters unit. William J. Donovan to Colonel Buxton, Colonel Goodfellow and Major Bruce, Memorandum, 3 July 1942, OSS Records (RG 226), Director’s Office Files, microfilm M1642, Roll 42, Frame 1122, National Archives II.
59 Lt. Cmdr. William H. Vanderbilt to Lawrence W. Lowman, 18 May 1942; Lt. Col. M. Preston Goodfellow to the Surgeon, Army Dispensary, 21 May 1942, subject: Physical Examination [of Lawrence Wise Lowman]; Lowman to Vanderbilt, 3 June 1942; “Check Slip,” Security clearance 16 June 1942; all in OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 92A, Box 45, Folder 736, National Archives II.
60 On the detailed plans for such a Communications Branch, see Robert Cresswell to Major Bruce, 20 July 1942, subject: Communications Problem: Survey and Recommendation, attachment to David K.E. Bruce to William J. Donovan, 20 July 1942, in OSS Records (RG 226), Director’s Office Files, microfilm M1642, Roll 42, Frames 1125-1131, National Archives II.
61 William J. Donovan to Assistant Chief of Staff, G-1 [Personnel], 10 June 1943, subject: Request for Priority to Procure Communications Personnel from the Signal Corps, OSS Records (RG 226), Director’s Office Files, microfilm M1642, Roll 42, Frames 1319-1321, National Archives II.
62 The one-time pad had on the cardboard backing numerous alphabets, arranged in what seemed to be nonsensical order, especially when, as the agent would, use them in conjunction with the randomly generated key text printed on the pages of the one-time pad. The key was to know how to position the text (the clear text to be encoded or the enciphered text to be decoded) to the pad’s key text using the Vigenere Square, referred to as “triads.” Operators needed to memorize the 676 combinations possible in the square and then apply them. See, for example, W. Scudder Georgia, Jr., “It’s All Greek to Me: And Other Stories,” in James F. Ranney and Arthur L. Ranney, eds, The OSS CommVets Papers, 2nd ed. (Covington, Ky.: James F. Ranney, 2002), 158.
63 The figure is from Arthur Reinhardt, “Deciphering the Commo Branch,” OSS Society Newsletter, Fall 2006, 6. Because of the temporary expansion of training in 1943, the Communications Branch also established an additional if smaller training facility in 1943 at a former Signal Corps Radar Training School at Camp McDowell, near Napierville, Illinois, which was designated Area M. OSS, War Report of the O.S.S., 137.
64 OSS, War Report of the O.S.S., 141.
65 Arthur Reinhardt, “Deciphering the Commo Branch,” OSS Society Newsletter, Fall 2006, 6.
66 Warner, Office of Strategic Services, 32-33; for a detailed description, see John W. Brunner, OSS Weapons, 2nd ed. (Williamstown, NJ: Phillips Publications, 2005. While the transmitter used by the agent on the ground spread to about a 60 mile circle at 40,000 feet, the cone narrowed to only a few feet at ground level with little chance that the Germans would detect it. Marvin R. Edwards, “Joan and Eleanor: Radio Transmissions Aboard the Mossie [Mosquito bomber],” OSS Society Newsletter, Fall 2006, 8.
67 Reinhardt Krause, “Inventor of Portable Radio Developed Joan-Eleanor Project,” OSS Society Newsletter, Fall 2006, 7.
68 Stanley P. Lovell, Of Spies and Strategems (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1963), a memoir filled with details as extraordinary and often as harrowing as the lethal products of Lovell’s laboratory.
69 John W. Brunner, OSS Weapons, 2nd ed. (Williamstown, NJ: Phillips Publications, 2005); H. Keith Melton, The Ultimate Spy Book (New York: DK Publishing, 1996), 28-41, 149, and passim. Many of these devices are on display at the International Spy Museum in Washington, D.C. and the Airborne and Special Operations Museum, Fayetteville, N.C., the latter which houses Brunner’s extensive collection.
70 Harry J. Anslinger with J. Dennis Gregory, The Protectors: Narcotics Agents, Citizens and Officials Against Organized Crime in America (New York: Farrar, Straus, 1964), 76-80, one quarter of the FBN agents went into this wartime unit; Charles Siragusa, The Trail of the Poppy: Behind the Mask of the Mafia (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966), vii, 58-59; John C. McWilliams, “Covert Connections: The FBN, the OSS, and the CIA,” The Historian, 53/4 (Summer 1991): 660-72.
71 History and Mission of the Counter Intelligence Corps in World War II (n.p., n.d.), 1-5.
72 “Military Record of Garland H. Williams, Major, Infantry,” attached to William J. Donovan to Secretary of War, 2 March 1942, [subject: promotion of Williams to lieutenant colonel], OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 92, Box 32, Folder 33, National Archives II.
73 William J. Donovan to Secretary of War, 31 December 1941 and 2 March 1942, the latter with threepage attachment, “Military Record of Garland H. Williams, Major, Infantry,” OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 92, Box 32, Folder 33. Williams was promoted to lieutenant colonel in March 1942.
74 Maj. Garland H. Williams to Lt. Col. M.P. Goodfellow, 14 February 1942; William J. Donovan to Secretary of War, 14 February 1942; Donovan to Secretary of War, 17 February 1942; all in OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 136, Box 158, Folder 1721, National Archives II. On the difficulties in securing the allotment of 2,000 non-commissioned officers from the War Department, see OSS, War Report of the O.S.S., 82, 100.
75 Tommy Davis, Report for the Special Operations Executive on visit to the United States, 15 Oct. 1941, Special Operations Executive Archives, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London; quoted in David Stafford, Camp X (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1987), 31. The decision for the SOE camp in Canada had been made at a meeting in William Stephenson’s apartment in New York City on 6 September 1941, ibid. 17-20.
76 Lynn Philip Hodgson, Inside Camp-X, (Oakville, Ontario: L.P. Hodson, 1999); and Hodgson and Alan Paul Longfield, Inside Camp-X, Part II, forthcoming 2008). See also the Camp X Historical Society’s website: www.campxhistoricalsociety.ca. The official name was Special Training School #103 (STS 103).
77 OSS, Strategic Services Training Unit, “[British] Commando Tactics” July 1942, typescript binder, p. 2, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 136, Box 165, Folder 1804, National Archives II..
78 Stafford, Camp X, 81-82; George White’s Diary, 1942, cited in McWilliams, “Covert Connections,” 665 [the diary itself has subsequently been lost]; Anthony Moore, British Liaison, “Notes on Co-Operations between SOE and OSS,” January 1945, pp. 1-2; OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 136, Box 158, Folder 1722, National Archives II.
79 The quotation is from one of Brooker’s SOE colleagues, Bickham Sweet-Escott, Baker Street Irregular [SOE headquarters in London was on Baker Street] (London: Methuen, 1965), 143. On Brooker and the rest of the staff, see Stafford, Camp X, 10-12, 55-56.
80 Stafford, Camp X, 87.
81 Most of the training of Americans at Camp X occurred in 1942 and early 1943; thereafter, it trained mainly European guerrillas, until it closed as a secret agent training school in March 1944. www.campxhistoricalsociety.ca.
82 Anthony Moore, British Liaison, “Notes on Co-Operations between SOE and OSS,” January 1945, pp. 1- 6; OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 136, Box 158, Folder 1722, National Archives II. There was, of course, self-interest involved. In accepting more than a dozen OSS instructors for a month-long visit to SOE schools in Britain in the summer of 1942, SOE commended the idea of having even more OSS officers involved as “extremely desirable” because “this will not only serve as a means of training for the individuals concerned but will be a most powerful factor in insuring unity of doctrine and effort in the future operations of the two national S.O. organisations.” “Record of Discussion regarding Collaboration between British and American S.O.E. [sic],” 23 June 1942, copy in papers of M. Preston Goodfellow, Box 4, Folder 3, Hoover Institution, Stanford, Calif.
83 History of the Schools and Training Branch, Office of Strategic Services, William L. Cassidy, ed. (San Francisco, Calif.: Kingfisher Press, 1983), 28-29, which is primarily a reproduction, without the extensive appendices, of the original 1945 typescript, “History of the Schools and Training Branch, OSS,” completed in August 1945, probably by Maj. Kenneth P. Miller and most of the text of which was declassified by the CIA in 1981 as a result of a Freedom of Information Act request from William Cassidy (and fully declassified in 1985). Hereinafter cited as History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS. A copy of the original typescript is the OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 99, Box 78, among other locations in the OSS Records in the National Archives II. But for readers’ convenience, citation in the present work will be to pages in the version published in 1983.
84 Maj. Garland H. Williams, “Training,” eight-page, typed memorandum, undated [but January or February 1942 before Williams was promoted to lieutenant colonel in March] with attachments on details of proposed courses (the quotation is from page 2), located in OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 136, Box 161, Folder 1754, National Archives II.
85 Training films as well as films documenting OSS operations in the field were produced by the Field Photograph Branch, which included Hollywood director John Ford. Training films, included those on close combat techniques, clandestine communications, foreign weapons, uniforms, and insignia. OSS, War Report of the O.S.S., 161-62. Many of these OSS films are located in the Visual Branch of National Archives II; copies of shooting scripts and narration are in the records of various OSS branches, for example, “Gutter Fighting,” OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 133, Box 151, Folder 1258; “Short Range Intelligence,” Entry 146, Box 220, Folder 3054, National Archives II.
86 Williams, “Training,” 7.
87 Williams, “Training,” 4. The draft of a memorandum in August 1942, indicates that Goodfellow’s office was thinking of nearly a dozen different foreign guerrilla groups, each comprised of about sixty men and four officers who could be from the U.S. Army or foreign armies. The list of groups included “Norwegians, French, Italians, Austrians, German, Dutch, Hungarians, Spaniards, Poles, Czechs-Slovaks, Yugoslavs, Greeks, Chinese, Korean, Thai.” Handwritten draft of a memorandum [written by M. Preston Goodfellow?], Joint Psychological Warfare Committee to Joint Chiefs of Staff, 31 August 1942, subject: Organization, Strategic Service Command [reference JCS 83/1 of 19 August 1942, further study as to training, type of men and organization of the Strategic Service Command,” in M. Preston Goodfellow Papers, Box 4, Folder 4, Hoover Institute, Stanford, Calif.
88 Williams, “Training,” 5-6.
90 For student capacity at the training areas, see Lt. Col. H. L. Robinson to Major Teilhet, 27 Nov. 1943, subject: Report on Training Areas, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 146, Box 162, Folder 1757; for the station complement, see L.B. Shallcross, deputy Staff Training Branch/TRD, [Central Intelligence Agency], to John O’Gara, chief, Staff Training Branch, 1 February 1951, subject: Information on OSS Schools and Training Sites, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 161, Box 7, Folder 76, both in National Archives II.
91 OSS, War Report of the O.S.S., 81.
92 “History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS,” pp. 7-8, attached to W[illiam] J. Morgan to Col. E.B. Whisner, 7 January 1949, pp. 10-11, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 176, Box 2, Folder, 13, both in National Archives II.
93 Ibid., 10.
95 OSS, War Report of the O.S.S., 81.
96 “History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS,” p. 10, attached to W[illiam] J. Morgan to Col. E.B. Whisner, 7 January 1949, pp. 7-8, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 176, Box 2, Folder, 13, both in National Archives II.
97 OSS, War Report of the O.S.S., 81.
98 H. Preston Goodfellow, interviewed for the OSS official history in 1945, and quoted in History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS, 29.
99 Lt. Col. Garland H. Williams quoted in History of the Schools and Training Branch, OSS, 28; see also 31-32, 47. For similar, see Maj. Garland H. Williams, COI, to Joseph Green, supervising customs agent, Seattle, Washington, 12 January 1942, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 92, Box 32, Folder 33, National Archives II.
100 Anonymous OSS recruiter, quoted in Russell Miller, Behind the Lines: The Oral History of Special Operations [SOE and SO] in World War II (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2002), 57.
101 OSS, War Report of the O.S.S., 223-24.
102 OSS Security Office, “History of the Security Office,” , 4-5, 12, typescript, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 99, Box 77, Folder 4, National Archives II.
103 OSS, War Report of the O.S.S., 76-77, 241; History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS, 42-43, 47.
104 For location and the station complement, see L.B. Shallcross, deputy, Staff Training Branch/TRD, [Central Intelligence Agency], to John O’Gara, chief, Staff Training Branch, 1 February 1951, subject: Information on OSS Schools and Training Sites, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 161, Box 7, Folder 76, National Archives II. “The Farm” of the OSS training was not the same site as “The Farm” later used by its successor, the CIA, which is located in southeastern Virginia.
105 History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS, 47-49.
106 Although it is clear that OSS Training Area D was on the east bank of the Potomac River, the precise location is still disputed, in part because there is are no remains of the facility and the OSS records regarding it are so sparse. Some veterans believe that it was at Indian Head, some contend Smallwood State Park, and other put it farther south. A contemporary reference by the Schools and Training chief in 1945, places it about 40 miles south of Washington, D.C., which would correspond to the identification of Smith’s Point made in a 1951 CIA document which precisely and accurately identifies the sites of all the other OSS training schools. L.B. Shallcross, deputy Staff Training Branch/TRD, [Central Intelligence Agency], to John O’Gara, chief, Staff Training Branch, 1 February 1951, subject: Information [designation, location, type of training, and station complement] on OSS Schools and Training Sites, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 161, Box 7, Folder 76, National Archives II.
107 John P. Spence, considered by the UDT-SEAL Association as the “First Frogman,” to be one of the initial sailors assigned to Area D beginning in 1942 and who eventually served in OSS Maritime Unit L, telephone interview with the author, 28 January 2005.
108 Commander H. Woolley [Royal Navy] to Col. M.P. Goodfellow, 9 October 1942, subject: Guerrilla Notes—rough notes and suggestions [regarding use of Area D], M. Preston Goodfellow Papers, Box 4, Folder 4, Hoover Institution, Stanford, Calif.; History of Schools and Training, OSS, 135, which says portable buildings obtained from the Army; John P. Spence affidavit included in Tom Hawkins, “OSS Maritime,” The Blast, ( 3rd Quarter 2000), 10-11, magazine of the UDT-SEAL Association; and layout of buildings in Area D, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 85, Box 13, Folder 249, National Archives II.
109 OSS, War Report of O.S.S., 225-227. The West Coast MU/SO training area at Tonyon Cove, 2 1/2 miles from Avalon on Catalina Island, reached its peak in 1944-1945 training teams for landings in the Pacific and the Far East.
110 “History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS,” p. 10, attached to W[illiam] J. Morgan to Col. E.B. Whisner, 7 January 1949, pp. 7-8, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 176, Box 2, Folder, 13, both in National Archives II.
111 The Area E facilities included E-1, the Inverness estate owned by Leslie Kieffer near Towson, which could handle 24 trainees; E-2, Oldfields School, Inc., owned by Maj. Watts Hill, near Towson, with a capacity of 77 trainees; and E-3, the Nolting estate, owned by Harry C. Gilbert, one miles east of Glencoe, Maryland, which had room for 64 trainees. For location and the station complement, see L.B. Shallcross, deputy Staff Training Branch/TRD, [Central Intelligence Agency], to John O’Gara, chief, Staff Training Branch, 1 February 1951, subject: Information [designation, location, type of training, and station complement] on OSS Schools and Training Sites, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 161, Box 7, Folder 76; for trainee capacity, see layout of buildings, Areas E-2, E-2, E-3, in OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 85, Box 13, Folder 249, both in National Archives II.
112 Col. H.L. Robinson, Schools and Training Branch Order No. 1, issued 21 July 1944, effective 17 July 1944, OSS Basic Course, OSS Records (RG 226), Directors Office Files, Microfilm No. 1642, Roll 102, Frames 1120-1121, National Archives II.
113 Congressional Country Club, The Congressional Country Club, 1924-1984 (n.p., n.d.; [Bethesda, Md., c. 1985] ), 12, 26. I am grateful to Maxime D. Harvey, director of the club’s membership services for supplying me with a copy of this volume.
114 “History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS,” p. 10, attached to W[illiam] J. Morgan to Col. E.B. Whisner, 7 January 1949, pp. 12-13, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 176, Box 2, Folder, 13, in National Archives II; the report explained also that additional factors leading to the decision to lease the club was its housing facilities, kitchen and dining room equipment, and grounds for tents or huts and the fact that a search had failed to obtain any other comparable facility available.
115 Ibid., 26, 33; see also A. William Asmuth, Jr., OSS Legal Division, to Col. Ainsworth Blogg, Schools and Training Branch, 26 April 1944, subject: Provisions of Lease with Congressional Country Club, Inc., OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 137, Box 3, Folder 24, National Archives II.
116 Joseph Kelley, an OSS veteran and member of the Congressional Country Club since 1949 quoted in “Society’s Annual Meeting Held at Country Club Where OSS Trainees Once Blew Up the Greens,” OSS Society Newsletter, Summer 2005,
117 Congressional Country Club, The Congressional Country Club, 27-31; Roger Hall, You’re Stepping on My Cloak and Dagger (New York: Norton, 1957), 23-33; on the fatality on the bridge training exercise in July 1943, Albert Materazzi, veteran of the OSS Italian OG, telephone interview with the author, 26 January 2005.
118 Building and tent layout for Area F as of 5 Oct. 1943, in OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 85, Box 13, Folder 249, National Archives II.
119 Elizabeth P. (“Betty”) McIntosh, oral history interview, 2 May 1997, pp. 5-6, conducted by Maochun Yu, OSS Oral History Transcripts, CIA Records (RG 263), Box 2, National Archives II.
120 Elizabeth P. (“Betty” ) McIntosh, telephone interview with the author, 12 March 2005. None of the male OSS veterans from Areas A, B, and C, in the two National Parks, whom the author interviewed, remembered ever seeing any OSS women, or any women at all, at those forested training areas, except for one dance held at Area C in 1945.
121 History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS, 29-31; see the dissatisfaction expressed in Lt. Col. Garland H. Williams to R.W. Billinghurst, 28 April 1942, Goodfellow Papers, Box 3, Folder OSS Correspondence, January to May 1942, Hoover Institution, Stanford, Calif.
122 After JCS was given supervision of the OSS in June 1942, a subcommittee of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee of the JCS studied the issue of training saboteurs and commandos. It questioned SO training officers, observed the operation of one of the SO camps (presumably Area B), and compared OSS training with accounts of British SOE training and with a report on saboteur training in Germany based on interrogations of several captured Nazi saboteurs who had been landed by U-boat on the East Coast and quickly captured. The subcommittee reported that OSS training seemed suitable for saboteurs and their organizers, but given the type of training and missions involved, Army and Navy instructors should be used in the military and technical fields. Enclosure, “Functions of the Office of Strategic Services,” JPWC 21/2, pp. 2-4, enclosed with Lt. Col. A.H. Onthank, secretary, to the subcommittee of the Joint Psychological Warfare Committee of the JCS, 28 July 1942, OSS Records (RG 226), Directors Office Files, Microfilm No. 1642, Role 64, Frames 952-958, National Archives II.
123 See History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS, 34-35, 48-49; Anthony Moore, British Liaison, “Notes on Co-Operations between SOE and OSS,” January 1945, p. 2; OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 136, Box 158, Folder 1722; and a highly critical report by the newly named acting chief training officer, Capt. George E. Brewer, Jr., to Lt. Col. E. C. Huntington, Jr., 31 August 1942, subject: Problems Confronting the Training Unit, six typed pages, copy in OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 136, Box 161, Folder 1754, National Archives II.
124 On the reorganization, see memoranda from Colonel Donovan to All Branch Heads, 10 Aug. 1942; for Colonels Buxton, Goodfellow, Huntington, and Captain Doering, 17 Aug. 1942; and for Colonel Buxton, 23 Aug. 1942, all in OSS Records, Washington Directors Office-Op. 266, No. 519 (.S.O.); and on Goodfellow’s naiveté in sometimes misjudging character, see William J. Donovan to “Dear Preston,” 28 April 1942, Washington Director’s Office Op-266, file No. 656; copies in CIA Records (RG 263), Thomas Troy Files, Box 2, Folder 19, National Archives II
125 Wallace R. Deuel, “History of the OSS,” typescript, 1944, Vol. 2, chapt. 30, p. 52ff. Deuel stated that the OSS guerrilla operations, particularly the OGs, outgrew the limitations set forth in JCS 155/4/D, 23 Dec. 1942 because theater commanders began in mid-1943 to ask SO chief Ellery Huntington to provide not merely organizers, fomenters and operational nuclei, which the JCS directive had authorized, but also full-fledged guerrilla companies. Plus a Norwegian general wanted Norwegian-speaking American solders for his forces. Deuel worked as one of Donovan’s special assistants. This section of his typescript history was summarized by CIA historian Thomas Troy in the CIA Records (RG 263), Thomas Troy Files, Box 2, Folder19, National Archives II. Deuel’s typescript history remained classified by the CIA at the time the present study was completed. The present author utilized the Deuel Papers at the Library of Congress and filed a request in 2008 for its declassification.
126 History of Schools and Training, OSS, 51. One of them, James Grafton Rogers, a former Assistant Secretary of State then chief of the OSS’s Planning Group for covert action, belittled Goodfellow in his diary, as “a sort of promoter character, who …is as irresponsible as a blue-bottle fly.” James Grafton Rogers, diary entry of 3 August 1942, Wartime Washington: The Secret OSS Journal of James Grafton Rogers, 1942-1943, ed. Thomas F. Troy (Frederick, Md.: University Publications of America, 1987), 9.
127 John C. McWilliams, The Protectors: Harry J. Anslinger and the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 1930- 1962 (Newark: University of Delaware Press, 1990), 161, 214n.
128 History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS, 35. Lt. Col. Garland H. Williams left OSS and was assigned to the U.S. Army’s Airborne Command on 11 August 1942.
129 History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS, 51.
130 Robert E. Mattingly, Herringbone Cloak—GI Dagger: Marines of the OSS, Washington, D.C.: U.S. Marine Corps Headquarters, History and Museum Division, 1989, 109-ll. Mattingly ignores Williams.
131 On Huntington’s background, see McIntosh, Sisterhood of Spies, 21; Rogers, Wartime Washington, 14n.
132 Edwin Putzell, Oral History Interview, 11 April 1997, p. 13, CIA Records (RG 263), OSS Oral History Transcripts, Box 3, National Archives II.
133 Mattingly, Herringbone Cloak—GI Dagger: Marines of the OSS, 112-13.
134 The Training Directorate thus included Baker from SI, Huntington from SO, Lawrence W. Lowman from Communications Branch, and Brooker from SOE. History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS, 55- 56. Baker had immense faith in Brooker’s approach to training. Sweet-Escott, Baker Street Irregular, 143.
135 History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS , 53.
136 Lt. John A Bross, “Notes of Meeting with Geographic Desks, dated September 3, 1942,” two page memorandum, 7 September 1942, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 136, Box 161, Folder 1754, National Archives II.
137 Lt. Louis D. Cohen to Kenneth Baker, 18 December 1942, in response to “Student” to Baker, 8 December 1942, both in Appendix III, “Part Two of the History,” OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 136, Box 158, Folder 1722, National Archives II.
138 The OGs were to be combat units behind enemy lines. Obtained from the Army, the men already had basic training. They were to be assembled primarily according to foreign language groups, then they would spend four to six weeks being trained as a unit by SO/OG instructors and by the officers who would lead them. OSS, Operational Groups Field Manual—Strategic Services (Provisional), Strategic Services Field Manual No. 6, issued 25 April 1944, pp. 7-13, in OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 136, Box 140, Folder 1465, National Archives II.
139 History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS, 66-68.
140 OSS General Order No. 9, establishing the Schools and Training Branch, was issued on 3 January 1943; History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS, 62.
141 Ibid., 62-63; see also Minutes of the OSS Executive Committee, June 23, 1945, p. 5, in black bound volume, “Minutes of Executive Committee, OSS, 19th meeting, May 11, 1943 through 43rd meeting, Oct. 19, 1943,” in OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 139, Box 221, Folder 3097, National Archives II. Taking an indefinite leave from OSS, Baker was reassigned to the Army’s Command and General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He subsequently returned to OSS duty and wound up in southern France in late 1944, heading Special Forces Unit 4, the advance unit of Special Project Operations Center (SPOC), Algiers, and representing SPOC with the U.S. Seventh Army and the 6th Army Group. Erasmus H. Kloman, Assignment Algiers: With the OSS in the Mediterranean Theater (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 2005), 34-35.
142 Possibly due in part to that stress, Knox Chandler, a former journalist and college professor and the chief instructor at RTU-11, “The Farm,” the SI finishing school, committed suicide in July. Chandler had sustained a head injury, and it may have contributed to his action. History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS, 63.
143 On the investigations of the OSS training schools see, for example, Minutes of the OSS Executive Committee, June 21, 1945, p. 2, and July 1, 1943, p. 4, in bound volume, “Minutes of Executive Committee, OSS, 19th meeting, May 11, 1943 through 43rd meeting, Oct. 19, 1943,” in OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 139, Box 221, Folder 3097, National Archives II.
144 Table of organization for OSS Schools and Training Branch and OSS, in Lt. E.R. Kellogg to Chief, Presentation Branch, 2 November 1944, subject: Attachment, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 133, Box 163, Folder 1384, National Archives II. See also History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS, 62-63, 85.
145 History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS, 85.
146 Blogg had also attended SOE schools in Britain in the late summer and early fall of 1942. On his background, see Ainsworth Blogg, Personnel File, CIA Records (RG 263), Accession #92-745, Box 10, National Archives II; Col. H.L. Robinson to Director, Strategic Services Unit (successor to OSS), 20 February 1946, subject: Recommendation for Citation [for Ainsworth Blogg], OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 133, Folder 814; Maj. John J. Sullivan to Col. William J. Donovan, 24 April 1942 [recommendation for Ainsworth Blogg], in OSS Records (RG 226), Director’s Office Files, microfilm roll 36, frames 325-27, National Archives II; and Mrs. Dorothea (“Dodie”) Dow, widow of Capt. Arden Dow, one of the instructors at Areas B and A, letter to the author, 6 August 2005.
147 Col. H.L. Robinson to Director, Strategic Services Unit, 20 Feb. 1946, subject: recommendation for citation [for Lt. Col. Philip K. (sic) Allen], OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 133, Box 105, Folder 814; and “History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS,” pp. 7-8, attached to W. J. Morgan to Col. E.B. Whisner, 7 January 1949, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 176, Box 2, Folder, 13, both in National Archives II.
148 History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS, 4, 77-78, 100, including the criticism from Joseph Anthony Kloman, former chief instructor at Area E, who had been moved to Area A-3. .
149 In October 1943, OSS had 5,000 members and asked for 6,000 more. James Grafton Rogers, diary entry of 6 September 1943, Wartime Washington, 141.
150 History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS, 83; see also Kenneth H. Baker to Col. Edward Buxton, 13 March 1943, subject: Curriculum of Basic Training Course, reprinted as Exhibit A in ibid., 169-71. For an example, see Operational Groups Field Manual—Strategic Services (Provisional), Strategic Services Field Manual No. 6, April 1944, Section IV, Training, pp. 10-13, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 136, Box 140, Folder 1465, National Archives II.
151 John Waller, Oral History Interview, 27 January 1997, pp. 4, 6, CIA Records (RG 263), OSS Oral History Transcripts, Box 4, National Archives. Waller retired from the CIA as inspector general.
152 Maj. Gen. John K. Singlaub, US Army (Ret.), with Malcolm McConnell, Hazardous Duty: An American Soldier in the Twentieth Century (New York: Summit/Simon & Schuster, 1991), 32-33; also John K. Singlaub, telephone interview with the author, 11 December 2004.
153 Albert Materazzi, telephone interview with the author, 26 January 2005.
154 Frank Mills, Oral History Interview, 19 November 1996, p. 2, CIA Records (RG 263), OSS Oral History Transcripts, Box 3, National Archives II; on his background and deployment, see Francis B. Mills with John W. Brunner, OSS Special Operations in China (Williamstown, NJ: Phillips Publications, 2002)
155 Raymond Brittenham, Oral History Interview, 27 February 1997, pp. 13-14, 16, CIA Records (RG 263), Oral History Transcripts, Box 1, National Archives II.
156 Elizabeth McIntosh quoted in Miller, Behind the Lines, 59-60; see also Elizabeth McIntos telephone interview with the author, 12 March 2005.
157 “History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS,” p. 35, attached to W[illiam] J. Morgan to Col. E.B. Whisner, 7 January 1949, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 176, Box 2, Folder, 13, National Archives II.
158 A 1943 memorandum, for example, cited reports from China that “we have had at least eight men, who for various quirks in their make-up, have to be pulled from the field…should never have been sent to the field….Others simply won’t fit anywhere. One was definitely a psychiatric case.” OSS Assessment Staff, Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for the Office of Strategic Services (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1948), 4, 12-13.
159 W[illiam] J. Morgan, The O.S.S. and I (New York: Norton, 1957), 20-23, asserts that in developing these Selection Assessment Boards at the beginning of the war, the British combined the best features of German psychology, especially the techniques of a Wehrmacht psychologist named Simoneit, with the scientific, psychometric approach of American psychology. The Americans then developed this assessment system even further. A Yale trained psychologist, Morgan was sent by OSS in the summer of 1943 to observe the British SOE apply it to its agents, which he did for a year before parachuting into France in an SO mission in August 1944. See also OSS, War Report of the O.S.S., 238-39.
160 “A Good Man is Hard to Find: The O.S.S. Learned How, with New Selection Methods that May Well Serve Industry,” Fortune, 1946, 92-95, 218-19, 223. Station S was run first by Dr. Henry A. Murray of the Harvard Psychological Clinic, and subsequently by Dr. Donald W. MacKinnon, a Harvard trained psychologist from Bryn Mawr College. On the faculty at Station S in 1944 was a 31-year-old psychologist with a Ph.D. from Berkeley, John W. Gardner, later President of the Carnegie Corporation, Secretary of Heath, Education, and Welfare, and head of the consumer advocacy organization, Common Cause.
161 “OSS Assessment Program,” pp. 15-16, Appendix IX, Part Three, Section F, of the “History [of the OSS],” typescript in OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 136, Box 158, Folder 1727, National Archives II.
162 Raymond Brittenham, Oral History Interview, 27 February 1997, pp. 14-15, CIA Records (RG 263), OSS Oral History Transcripts, Box 1, National Archives II.
163 “History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS,”pp. 39-41, attached to W[illiam] J. Morgan to Col. E.B. Whisner, 7 January 1949, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 176, Box 2, Folder, 13; and John Waller, Oral History Interview, 27 January 1997, p. 4, CIA Records (RG 263), OSS Oral History Transcripts, Box 4, both in National Archives II.
164 “A Good Man is Hard to Find,” Fortune, 1946, 94-95. As an OSS recruit, Sidney Harrow spent ten weeks at Area A in 1943 before being assigned to Station S. Mrs. May K. Harrow, Sidney Harrow’s widow, telephone interviews with the author, October 17 and 27, 2005.
165 “History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS,”p. 39, 41-42, attached to W. J. Morgan to Col. E.B. Whisner, 7 January 1949, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 176, Box 2, Folder, 13, National Archives II. The report indicated that at these three day assessments, “a surprising number of psycho-neurotics was found.”
166 “History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS,”p. 42, attached to W[illiam] J. Morgan to Col. E.B. Whisner, 7 January 1949, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 176, Box 2, Folder, 13, National Archives II.
167 OSS Assessment Staff, Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for the Office of Strategic Services (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1948), 58-202.
168 War Report of the OSS, 240-41; “The Test at Station S,” Time, 21 Jan. 1946; “History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS,” p. 42, attached to W[illiam] J. Morgan to Col. E.B. Whisner, 7 January 1949, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 176, Box 2, Folder, 13; and OSS Assessment Program,” pp. 18-68, Appendix IX, Part Three, Section F, of the History [of the OSS], typescript in OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 136, Box 158, Folder 1727, National Archives II.
169 Edward Hymoff, The OSS in World War II (New York: Ballantine Books, 1972), 83. Hymoff, a Corps of Engineers’ private from Boston, served briefly with the OSS in Italy and Yugoslavia, ibid., 10-13, and later became a newspaper reporter and author of several books on military history.
170 “A Good Man is Hard to Find,” Fortune, 1946, 220-23.
171 OSS Assessment Staff, Assessment of Men: Selection of Personnel for the Office of Strategic Services (New York: Rinehart & Co., 1948); reprinted in paperback as Donald W. Fiske, Eugenia Hanfmann, Donald W. MacKinnon, James G. Miller, Henry A. Murray [OSS assessment professionals], Selection of Personnel for Clandestine Operations: Assessment of Men (Walnut Creek, Calif.: Aegean Park Press, 1996). For its continued impact, see Alfred H. Paddock, Jr., U.S. Army Special Warfare, Its Origins: Psychological and Unconventional Warfare, 1941-1952 (Washington, D.C./Fort McNair: National Defense University Press, 1982), and Mattingly, Herringbone Cloak—GI Dagger: Marines of the OSS, 107.
172 History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS, 84; Col. H.L. Robinson, chief, Schools and Training Branch Order No. 1, issued 21 July 1944, effective 17 July 1944, subject: OSS Basic Course, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 133, Box 163, Folder 1401, National Archives II.
173 Minutes, 3rd Meeting of [SI Advisory] Training Committee, 11 May 1944, p. 1; Minutes, 6th Meeting of the Training Committee, 29 May 1944, p. 2; see also Maj. Louis D. Cohen, Chief, SI Training, to Mr. Whitney H. Shephardson, S.I., 24 July 1944, subject: Training Program Washington; all in OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 146, Box 229, Folder 3239, National Archives II. In its defense, Schools and Training Branch complained that the operating branches retained their own ideas and programs for training their agents, resisted common training, and often failed to inform Schools and Training of their precise needs or how its training programs related to changing conditions and performance in the field overseas. History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS, 81-86.
174 Minutes of the [Eighth Meeting] of the [SI Advisory] Training Committee, 14 June 1944, p. 2, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 146, Misc. Washington Files, Box 229, Folder 3239, “Advisory Training Committee,” National Archives II.
175 Draft of Memorandum from SI, [June 1944], OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 146, Box 229, Folder 3239, National Archives II. Only three pages from the middle of this unsigned and undated draft memorandum remain in this folder; they are located between documents dated 24 May 1944 and 20 July 1944. The memo itself refers to the 14 June committee meeting. It is not clear that this memorandum was ever sent; nevertheless, it is certainly indicative of the existence of bitter condemnation of Schools and Training Branch at least in SI. Given the report from the conference on SI, SO, and X-2 representatives referred to in the Minutes of the Eighth Meeting of the SI Training Advisory Committee, 14 June , it reflected similar sentiments in SO and X-2 as well. For additional evidence of the friction between the branches and Schools and Training, but also the ability of the branches to achieve at least a compromise from S&T, see Minutes of the 11th Meeting of the [SI Advisory] Training Committee, 6 July 1944, “a joint meeting of representatives of S.I., S.O., M.O., X-2 and personnel of S & T to discuss the [operating branches’] proposed changes in training,” in ibid.
176 James L. McConaughy to Col. [G. Edward] Buxton, 20 July 1944, subject: Report of Mr. O’Gara, 15 July [a 10-page critical analysis of Schools and Training’s program, by J.E. O’Gara of OSS Secret Intelligence Branch]. Both are in OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 146, Box 229, Folder 3239, National Archives II. John E. O’Gara was deputy director of OSS in charge of personnel. In civilian life, O’Gara had been general manager of Macy’s Department Stores.
177 R. Boulton, vice chairman, S.I. Training Advisory Committee, to chief, S.I., 17 July 1944, subject: OSS Basic Two Weeks Course, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 146, Box 229, Folder 3239, National Archives II.
178 R. Boulton, S.I., for the Training Representatives of SI, X-2, SO and MO Branches, to Col. H. L. Robinson [Schools and Training], 7 July 1944, subject: Meeting with Schools and Training Personnel, 6 July 1944; Training Board Meeting, 7 July 1944, “Notes on Discussion Regarding Area `E’ S.I., X-2, Basic Course Changes,” OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 146, Box 229, Folder 3239, National Archives II.
179 History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS, 157-58. The Washington headquarters of Schools and Training Branch had initially occupied part of Q Building in late 1943, but in early 1944, it moved to the North Building and finally to the first floor and basement of the Toner Building, a former public school in the District of Columbia, which it shared with the OSS Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment.
180 A number of OSS units were excluded from S&T’s jurisdiction over training at least until late 1944. These included highly specialized technical units like the Communications Branch, the Maritime Unit, Counter-Espionage Branch (X-2), and the OSS Services Branch (reproduction, budget and procedures, procurement and supply), although some of them drew on S&T for supplies and school administration. By 1944 a number of them, such as Research and Analysis Branch, also sent their personnel for the OSS Basic Course, particularly when they were sending personnel overseas. History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS, 68-69.
181 OSS, War Report of the O.S.S., 242-43; “History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS,” pp. 44-50, attached to W[illiam] J. Morgan to Col. E.B. Whisner, 7 January 1949, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 176, Box 2, Folder, 13, National Archives II.
182 On the West Coast, Area WP was set up at the Marine Base at Camp Pendleton near San Onofre north of San Diego. By the end of 1944, training Area WA on Santa Catalina Island off Los Angeles could handle 200 trainees (the sites on the island included Tonyon Cove for Maritime training, the largest facility; Howlands Landing for SO and MU; and 4th of July Cove for SO and MU training. An assessment station (WS) was opened at the Capistrano Beach Club in San Clemente on the mainland ; a West Coast Training Center (WN) responsible for maritime, Far Eastern Background, and assessment activities was set up in Newport Beach, connected through communications wire to the OSS West Coast headquarters in San Francisco. L.B. Shallcross, memorandum for John O’Gara, 1 Feburary 1951, subject: Information on OSS Schools and Training Sites, OSS Record (RG 226), Entry 161, Box 7, Folder 76, National Archives II.
183 “History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS,”pp. 31-32, attached to W[illiam] J. Morgan to Col. E.B. Whisner, 7 January 1949, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 176, Box 2, Folder, 13, National Archives II.
184 In the one year of operation of the West Coast schools, nearly 1,000 men were given the Basic OSS Course, approximately 250 given Advanced SO training, 200 Advanced SI, and 100 Advanced MO. “History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS,” pp. 31-32, 52, attached to W[illiam] J. Morgan to Col. E.B. Whisner, 7 January 1949, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 176, Box 2, Folder, 13, National Archives II.
185 History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS, 81-82,84.
186 At the peak activity, six training areas and two assessment stations in California were turning out 100 students a month, including special groups of Chinese, Indonesians, Koreans, and a class of Japanese Americans (code named “Irish”). History of Schools and Training Branch, OSS, 13-24; War Report of the OSS, 251-53. In the one year of operation, the West Coast schools trained and dispatched 985 persons to the Far East. Col. H.L. Robinson to Director Strategic Services Unit, 20 Feb. 1946, Recommendation for Citation [for Philip K. Allen], p. 3, OSS Records (RG 226), Box 105, Folder 814, National Archives II. The Training Report for 23 January 1945 showed 132 enrolled in schools in the Washington, D.C. area and 199 enrolled in the West Coast training center as of 17 January 1945, reported in Minutes of the OSS Training Board Meeting of 25 January 1945, OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 133, Box 164, Folder 1414, National Archives II
187 OSS Schools and Training Branch existed from January 1944 through the end of the war. During that period its Basic Espionage Schools graduated more than 1,800 trained men and women as operatives in gathering, analyzing and disseminating information. Its Paramilitary Schools, concerned with training saboteurs and guerrilla leaders, trained 1,027. “The Farm,” which specialized in advanced intelligence training, graduated more than 800 men and women between May 1942 and December 1944. These figures cover only those trained for European operations, and they do not include specialized groups over which the Schools and Training Branch had little or at most divided control, such as Communications, Operational Groups, and the Maritime Unit. During the operation of the West Coast training facilities in California, close to 1,000 personnel were given basic OSS training. Approximately 250 were given advanced SO training, some 200 had advanced SI training, and approximately 100 received Morale Operations training before being sent to the Far East. In addition to all of the above, countless other operatives, foreign or American, were given instruction in various OSS branch training programs in Europe, North Africa, or the Far East. OSS, War Report of the O.S.S., 242-43.
188 History of Schools and Training, OSS,” n.d. [1945-1947?], pp. 53-54, a 55-page-typescript, copy accompanied by a 7 January 1949 memorandum by Col. E.B. Whisner stating “Received this date from W[illiam]. J. Morgan [former OSS psychologist and SO team member] the following report: History of Schools and Training, OSS, Part I thru Part VI,” OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 176, Box 2, Folder 13, National Archives II.
189 Ibid., 54, 7-8; for other examples, see OSS, War Report of the O.S.S., 243.
190 History of Schools and Training, OSS,” n.d. [1945-1947?], pp. 54-55, typescript accompanied by a 7 January 1949 memorandum by Col. E.B. Whisner stating “Received this date from W[illiam]. J. Morgan [former OSS psychologist and SO team member] the following report: History of Schools and Training, OSS, Part I thru Part VI,” OSS Records (RG 226), Entry 176, Box 2, Folder 13, National Archives II.