Chapter 6:
The CCC: Accomplishments and Demise
About a quarter to three a couple of dozen CCC boys
and a couple of trucks showed up, and then the mayor arrived with
seventy-five or one hundred local citizens to witness the beginning of
the road. Among those present were two elderly ladies who carried small
Confederate flags. I saw them talking to a member of the mayor's staff
and then to the mayor. They made several trips back and forth. Finally,
the mayor's assistant came to me and asked, "Mr. Wirth, where are you
from?" I said, "I'm from Washington, D.C." He said, "I realize that, but
in what part of the nation did you live before you went to Washington?"
I said, "Well, I was born in Hartford, Connecticut, raised in
Minneapolis, and went to school in Massachusetts." That settled it. He
explained, "These two ladies always take part in our celebrations and
dedications. There is a problem concerning whom they are to be
photographed with. Would you mind if they were photographed with the
mayor during the ground breaking, and then we'll have a picture of you
and the mayor after they have been photographed?" It seems they were
unwilling to have a Yankee in the picture with them. I understood, and I
told the aide to assure them there was no harm done and I just hoped
they were pleased with the location of the road. He assured me that they
were. I never really had a chance to talk to them. The mayor expressed
his concern over the attitude of the ladies but was very appreciative of
getting the work under way. I told him there wasn't any reason to be
concerned, that the project was started, which made me happy, and that
my feelings were not hurt nor was I embarrassed.
In the last week of 1939 while out west I got the
news that Fechner had died. He had been sick for some time, but
apparently death was quite sudden. James McEntee, Bob Fechner's
assistant director, was, of course, the logical person to take over, and
though his attitudes were opposite from Fechner's in several ways, he
had made a good second man for him. Jim had seen that the office was
always in order and that business was handled on time. He believed in
centralizing many of the activities of the agencies, and he began at
once to transfer things around.
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King George VI and Queen Elizabeth
visited Fort Hunt, near Washington, D.C., in 1939 to view an exhibition
of pictures of CCC work. Walking with the king are the company commander
and CCC Director Robert Fechner.
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McEntee established a system of central repair shops
for automotive equipment and operated it out of his office. Some of
these shops were three, four, or five hundred miles away from the camps
they served. Any major repair jobs would require towing broken-down
trucks to the central repair shop. No matter how much we discussed this
matter with him and pointed out irrefutable factshow much it was
going to cost and how it would tie up our personnel and equipment for a
much longer timenone of our arguments seemed to have any effect
on him. The effect of the central repair shop activities on the morale
of the technical agencies can be judged when one considers a specific
instance: under the new system a truck from a camp near Yakima,
Washington, in need of ordinary repairs had to be sent through a
mountain pass in the Cascades to the central shop in Olympia, a distance
of 220 miles. The technical agency's shop at Yakima could have
accomplished all but major repairs, and good commercial shops were
available locally for the more difficult jobs.
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CCC Director James McEntee,
right, inspecting a CCC training and repair shop.
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One of the policies of the CCC under Fechner had been
to contract with the local firms for help with problems we could not
take care of ourselves. We also purchased as much of our materials and
supplies locally as we could. This practice was a great help to the
local communities, disseminating money in the grassroots where it was
needed and fostering good public relations as well. McEntee proceeded to
do away with many such arrangements. As a result we began to lose the
local community spirit that had been so much a part of the CCC. It had
been common for the boys to go into town to the movies in the evenings
or on weekends when invited by the local people. They would also attend
church services in the neighboring communities. Some CCC men went to
local night schools, and a few schools arranged courses especially for
them. Many of these activities were sacrificed to comply with the new
policy.
Certain people like Bob Fechner can instill an
indefinable sentiment or spirit that really makes an organization go.
Others, proceeding in accordance with a restricted organization chart
and rigid policies, instill a harsh, cold approach that kills the spirit
and morale of an organization. It is entirely possible that Fechner,
without the braking effect of McEntee's control, might have been too
lenient, for the interaction of these two personalities was very
productive. I just don't know how much influence Jim McEntee actually
exerted on Bob Fechner, but as far as I know he was loyal to the
director and carried out Fechner's wishes apparently to the director's
full satisfaction. I am certain, however, that the CCC would not have
been as highly regarded by the technical agencies, the boys, and the
public as a whole if McEntee's policies had been in effect from the
beginning or if the program had continued much longer than the few
years he was director. It seems to be human nature that when there is a
change made in the head administrative office of an organization the new
man feels he has to make changesand these changes often go far
beyond improvement of existing operations. The question of central
control versus dispersed operations had received long and intense
discussion in the CCC Advisory Council, and, as I recall, we were all in
accord with the policies and practices originally established by
Director Fechner.
What McEntee was trying to do finally became so
evident that it was necessary to report to the secretary of the interior
the state of the Civilian Conservation Corps as the technical agencies
saw it. On November 22 the secretary was informed by memorandum that the
morale of the corps had deteriorated and that this condition was
definitely the result of an increased number of functions being taken
over by the office of the director of the CCC. He was told of
complications and duplications resulting from this change. It was
explained that the mutual understandings essential to the coordination
of such an enterprise were being destroyed because the functions of the
CCC Advisory Council had been abandoned. We stated that our
understanding of the original intent of the president was that
cooperation among the several departments should be the fundamental
basis of the CCC undertaking and that, contrary to this, the director's
office had extended its activities far beyond its original functions of
policy making and coordination: that it was making field inspection of
work programs, operating an expanding and excessively costly system of
central equipment repair shops, insisting on giving prior approval to
all automotive and construction equipment purchases and to all purchases
of items in excess of $2,500 even when justified and approved in the
budget and controlled by law and regular department procedures, and
requiring the submission of regulations governing purely departmental
CCC functions for review and approval by the director. The report to the
secretary further stated that the expanded activities of the office of
the CCC director had necessitated an increase of personnel in that
office from some seventy-six employees during the fiscal year 1938 to a
total of 1,876 positions requested of the Bureau of the Budget for the
fiscal year 1942. That increase in staff had produced no noticeable
improvement in the situation of the three cooperating departments, nor
had it improved central administration of the corps in any way
whatsoever; rather, it had slowed down the efficient operation of the
corps to a considerable degree. Besides this increase in personnel there
had been additional expenses incurred in connection with the
construction of buildings for central repair shops, rental of office
space for division offices, travel, and other incidental expenses. The
secretary was told that these expenditures had not necessarily
increased the budget of the corps but represented unsound and
uneconomic uses of funds badly needed for the purchase of equipment and
supplies to carry out CCC projects.
The secretary was further advised that there had been
a gradual movement by the office of CCC director toward complete
operation of the corps. There had been only eight CCC Advisory Council
meetings in the calendar year October 1, 1939, to September 30, 1940. In
the earlier stages of the CCC, under the guidance of Director Fechner
and before his illness, meetings had been held frequently, and all
matters affecting the departments were discussed before any policy was
adopted. In contrast, under the new director practically the only time
the council was called together was when McEntee desired to issue
instructions to its members. The council had virtually ceased to
function as an advisory body.
In a letter to Harold D. Smith, director of the
Bureau of the Budget, Secretary Ickes restated our case, consolidating
some of the points made in the memorandum of November 22, and proposed a
solution:
The proper solution seems to be to revert to the
early idea of the President of placing in the old line Departments the
full responsibility of carrying out the functions of the CCC. I
recommend the following reorganization:
That the office of the Director, CCC, be
abolished.
That the War Department be relieved of its duties in
connection with the CCC.
That the duties of the Army Finance Office be
transferred to the United States Treasury.
That there be established a CCC Coordinating
Committee consisting of one of the Executive Assistants to the
President, a Representative of the Department of the Interior, and a
Representative of the Department of Agriculture, with the power to
determine major policies and to provide uniformity of operation.
That the Departments of Interior and Agriculture be
given full authority to carry out the activities of the CCC, including
housing and welfare, as well as the work program under the general
policies established by the CCC Coordinating Committee.
This recommended reorganization would provide savings
sufficient to permit the operation of 1,350 camps instead of 1,227 now
planned with the fiscal 1941 estimate of 230 million dollars.
I would not suggest this reorganization if Mr.
Fechner were still alive because of his contribution to the CCC. His
death is a distinct loss and his illness of the last year and a half has
been felt in the functioning of the Corps. If consideration is to be
given to the reorganization of the CCC on a more economical and
permanent basis, the proper time to do it is now.
The CCC Coordinating Committee should be set up
immediately and given the duty to reorganize the CCC on the basis
outlined above so as to become fully effective by July 1, 1940.
On the same date, January 4, 1940, Secretary Henry A.
Wallace of the Department of Agriculture wrote to Smith at the Bureau of
the Budget expressing his "complete concurrence" with Secretary Ickes's
recommendations. Smith brought these two letters to the president's
attention. There followed two years of memorandums, proposed plans for
reorganization, and what not. In the meantime McEntee's office and the
CCC were placed under the Federal Security Agency. Because the CCC
military officers were being withdrawn for active war duty, careful
study was given to the possibility of training the CCC for various
war-connected activities and for management of the camps.
On January 9, First Assistant Secretary Burlew wrote
a letter to the president on behalf of Secretary Ickes outlining the
same suggestions for reorganizing the CCC that the secretary had
submitted to the Bureau of the Budget. The president's reply of January
25 directed to the secretary was at least diplomatic.
My dear Mr. Secretary:
I have received First Assistant Secretary Burlew's
letter of January 9, 1940, concerning the proposed reorganization of
the Civilian Conservation Corps.
While I recognize that the proposal has for its
purpose economy in operations and perhaps more efficient administration,
it is my belief that the Corps should not lose its identity and that it
should be continued as a policy making body with a Director responsible
for its general functions.
I am particularly interested in many of the economies
mentioned. It seems to me, however, that it would be possible to
accomplish a number of these under the present organization. I am
therefore asking the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to undertake a
study of the Corps' activities in the near future in order to determine
what savings can be made and if any practical advantages would result
from the changes suggested in Mr. Burlew's letter.
Sincerely yours,
Franklin D. Roosevelt
Nothing really was done, and the corps faded out of
the picture as the war came on. The staffs of the many organizations
involved in the CCC program seemed to disappear almost overnight. The
following list shows the directors of the Civilian Conservation Corps
and the members of the CCC Advisory Council from the establishment of
the corps until its dissolution:
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DIRECTORS |
| Fiscal years |
Robert Fechner | 1933-39 |
James J. McEntee | 1940-43 |
ADVISORY COUNCIL |
War Department |
Colonel Duncan K. Major, Jr. | 1933-36 |
Brigadier General George P. Tyner | 1936-39 |
Major General James A. Ulio | 1940-43 |
Department of the Interior |
Horace M. Albright | 1933 |
Arno B. Cammerer | 1933-37 |
Conrad L. Wirth | 1937-43 |
Department of Agriculture |
R. Y. Stuart | 1933-34 |
Frank A. Silcox | 1934-38 |
Fred Morrell | 1938-43 |
Department of Labor |
W. Frank Persons | 1933-38 |
Veterans' Administration |
C. W. Bailey | 1937-43 |
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