Chapter 6
Science and the Struggle for Bureaucratic
Power: The Leopold Era, 19631981 (continued)
Forests
Concurrent with its new emphasis on the natural regulation of
wildlife, the Park Service moved toward a policy of restoring natural
conditions in plant communities. Previously, plant ecology had received
little attention from the Service. Management of national park flora had
been mainly either the domain of foresters or adjunct to the management
of ungulates, with primary focus on ensuring adequate range for grazing.
Despite the concerns of the wildlife biologists, control of insects,
disease, and fires had continued unabated. But the new policies signaled
an eventual end to total fire suppression and to extensive
disease and insect control in park forests. [133]
Addressing the problems of traditional forest management, the
Leopold Report had raised "serious question" about the wisdom of "mass
application of insecticides in the control of forest insects," where
"unanticipated effects on the biotic community . . . might defeat the
overall management objective." Spraying, the report emphasized, should
be discontinued until "research and small-scale testing have been
conducted." [134]
The report also advocated a change in fire policies, viewing the
"controlled use of fire" as the most "natural" means of managing
vegetation. Controlled burning could help restore the prefire
suppression density of forested areas, after which "periodic burning"
could be "conducted safely and at low expense." Of specific concern was
the situation in Sequoia and Yosemite, where areas long protected from
fire had developed dense understory vegetation. In what would become a
much-quoted phrase, the report stated that such overgrown areas were
like a "dog-hair thicket." They were a "direct function of
overprotection from natural ground fires." This accumulated fuel was
"dangerous to the giant sequoias and other mature trees" because of the
potential to cause abnormally hot and more damaging fires. The Leopold
Committee believed this situation should be of "immense concern" to the
Park Service. [135]
The Service, however, initially resisted changes in forest policies.
Bolstered by continued funding from the 1947 Forest Pest Control Act,
control of forest insects and disease had remained a vigorous program.
In accordance with the act, a federal review board annually examined
park budget requests for pest control; and in an August 1963 response to
the Leopold Report, the Park Service stated that to date no park
projects had been disapproved by the board. It also noted the support of
the Fish and Wildlife Service and the Forest Service in planning and
implementing the insecticide programs. Clearly identifying the program's
goals with public enjoyment, the Service maintained that spraying
insecticides in national parks was "restricted to areas of heavy public
use where high value trees and the forest scene must be maintained." [136]
Especially following the 1962 publication of Rachel Carson's
Silent Spring, pesticide use became a national concern.
Nevertheless, extensive spraying continued in the national parks,
covering much greater areas than were indicated in the Service's August
1963 statement on restricted use. For instance, in the mid-1960s (and in
conjunction with similar efforts by the U.S. Forest Service on adjacent
national forests), Grand Teton National Park began a three-year,
million-dollar pesticide program to eradicate a native park insect, the
bark beetle, from much of the park's backcountry. Voicing objections he
had long held, the recently retired Service biologist Adolph Murie
denounced spraying in the Tetons. In a 1966 National Parks
Magazine article Murie wrote that, in the interest of "saving park
scenery," spraying would "disrupt natural relationships between beetles
and lodgepole pine," the host plant for the bark beetles. He placed this
"destructive operation," in which Park Service crews systematically
killed off native species, "in the same category" as coyote control,
believing it destroyed "natural conditions and fundamental ideals" of
the Service.
Murie blamed the current practices on his longtime adversaries the
foresters, who were, he claimed, "frustrated" because they could not
"practice their professions." He asserted that there was "little, if
anything, for a forester to do" with national parks because there was no
logging or other "commercial operations dealing with trees." Murie
judged that many Service employees, influenced by Rachel Carson, opposed
insect control programs, but that "top administrators" had been
"conditioned to accept bug control as sacrosanct, normal park dogma" and
were hesitant to terminate a long-standing program. Illustrating a
glaring Park Service double standard, he quoted one "high ranking"
official as saying that the Service would " 'wring some poor woman
visitor's neck for picking a flower and at the same time permit bug
people to spray trees, kill large areas of vegetation and pollute the
soil.' " [137]
Replying sympathetically to these concerns, Assistant Secretary of
the Interior Stanley Cain asserted that the Park Service was already
"changing its attitudes and programs in the direction Murie wants it to
go." Yet only gradually did the changes take place. Even after the
Forest Service encouraged early termination of the Grand Teton spraying,
having decided it would do no good in the long run, park management
stalled. The Park Service was hesitant to end the program because it
benefited the local economy through the creation of jobs. But by 1968,
the Service's official policies placed tight restrictions on control of
native insects and forest diseases, which were recognized as "natural
elements of the ecosystem." In the 1970s and 1980s, widespread use of
chemical biocides was replaced by the restrictive Integrated Pest
Management program. Intended to avoid use of chemicals except when
absolutely necessary, this program would emphasize natural controls with
minimal environmental effects, including use of naturally occurring
predators and disease agents. [138]
The Park Service was equally reluctant to change its fire policies.
In response to the Leopold Report, Director Conrad Wirth (surely
influenced by the bureau's tradition-bound foresters) had stated that
although "less intensive" fire control deserved serious consideration,
"no change" in policy was "contemplated at this time." Through much of
the 1960s, the goal of total suppression of forest fires in the parks
remained in effect. In the opinion of Park Service fire management
expert Bruce Kilgore, the public seemed "quite ready" to accept a
"reasonable explanation" of new fire policies, but the Service did not.
The "biggest problem was within our own agency," he observed. Certainly
the Service's top forester, Lawrence Cook, resisted change, withholding
for months the release of a mid-1960s study of fire ecology in Sequoia
and Kings Canyon national parks that threatened the total fire
suppression policy to which he adhered. [139]
Despite such reaction, fire-related research accelerated, and fire
was an important catalyst for the study of plant ecology. The Service's
initial research into fire, conducted by biologist William Robertson in
Everglades in the 1950s, had indicated the decline of native sawgrass
and pines in areas of the park where fire suppression had been
vigorously conducted. This prompted the park to set fires to simulate
fire's natural role. Robertson's objectives in his study suggested the
necessarily close connection between understanding fire and
understanding plant ecology. Setting goals that future fire researchers
would also pursue, he hoped to determine the effect of fire on soils;
the "effect of burning on the vegetation, including plants killed and
injury to those that survive the fire"; the "recovery of the vegetation
after fire"; and the "probable course of development of the vegetation
in the absence of fire." [140]
Fire concerns contributed to a greater integration of plant and
animal research, and thus to a broader ecological understanding of the
parks. For instance, research in the 1960s on fire in the giant sequoia
forests focused on a broad ecological picture with a variety of
interrelated topics. Biologists studied the effects of fire on native
trees and on birds and mammals, as well as on sequoia seed and cone
production: they studied the chickaree squirrel's role in breaking apart
sequoia cones and releasing seeds, the relationship of invertebrates to
the sequoia's reproduction and life cycle, the buildup of flammable
debris under sequoias and other native trees, and forest succession when
fire is suppressed. Similarly, the study of fire ecology led to a deeper
awareness of the ecological influences of American Indian activity than
had ever before existed in the Park Service. Robertson's Everglades
study had mentioned the probability of extensive impacts from
prehistoric fire practices in the area. In the 1970s researchers in
Sequoia determined that fires set by many generations of Indians
constituted a significant part of the fire history of that part of the
Sierra Nevada. Within the Service this research opened the way toward an
understanding that, particularly because of fire practices, areas
largely untouched by European Americans but long used by Native
Americans were probably not in a truly pristine condition. [141]
Fire ecologist Bruce Kilgore believed that outside pressure helped
bring a change in Park Service fire management. The Service was, he
wrote, "pushed considerably by certain conservation organizations,"
which were especially concerned that the giant trees of Sequoia National
Park might be threatened by extraordinarily hot fires resulting from
accumulated, unburned forest understory. Most of all, Kilgore credited
the Leopold Report with being the true catalyst for changeit was
the "document of greatest significance to National Park Service [fire]
policy." In response to the report and its emphasis on fire's threat to
the giant trees, Sequoia National Park took the lead in changing fire
management policy. By 1968 the park had launched an aggressive program
to reduce the "dog-hair thickets" threatening the big trees. [142]
Fundamental aspects of the change in policy were the recognition of
fire's ecological role and the acceptance of fire as a valid means of
management. In contrast to the Service's long-established suppression
efforts, the 1970 management policies acknowledged fire as "one of the
ecological factors" affecting the preservation of native plants and
animals. Under closely controlled circumstances, certain fires could be
allowed to "run their course" in parks. [143] Such "prescribed burning" came to include
allowing selected naturally caused fires to burn, and purposely setting
fires in designated areas to simulate natural firesespecially
where suppression efforts in the past had seriously altered plant
ecology. All other fires, however, were to be suppressed. Accordingly,
the parks began preparing "prescription" fire plans that designated
which areas needed burning and under what conditions (based on factors
such as forest types, moisture content of the forest, humidity, wind,
topography, and weather forecasts, as well as human safety and proximity
to buildings and privately owned property). Over time, prescribed
burning would undergo some refinement; although criticized at times, not
well understood by the public, and perennially short of staffing and
funding, the program would remain. [144]
The Park Service's official policy shift toward prescribed burning
came several years in advance of the Forest Service's policy change.
Concerned about flammable forest debris accumulated during the decades
of total suppression, Sequoia's managers moved rapidly to begin
prescribed burning. In addition, the forest understory was thinned by
hand to reduce heat intensity and ensure that prescription burning could
indeed be contained. The prescribed burning program spread from
Everglades, Sequoia, and Kings Canyon to other parks. By the mid-1970s
the Service had begun implementation in a dozen parks, including
Yosemite, Yellowstone, Grand Teton, Carlsbad Caverns, Wind Cave, and
Rocky Mountain. Already parks had intentionally allowed more than six
hundred fires to burn, covering nearly ninety thousand acres. [145]
In a 1974 press release the Park Service defended its new fire
policies, identifying the dense understory in Sequoia as a "severe
threat" to the big trees because it would "provide the fuel for
devastating crown fires [in the tops of trees] that would kill these
ancient monarchs." The release also stated that scientists believed that
"not all fires are bad" and that some fires were "absolutely necessary"
to maintain the "ecosystem of a park in its proper natural balance." In
1976 the Park Service announced an agreement with the Forest Service to
allow "some naturally caused fires" (those that fit the fire
prescription) to cross the boundary between Yellowstone and the adjacent
Teton Wilderness, in the Bridger-Teton National Forest, thus extending
the program beyond park boundaries into national forests, where similar
policies were beginning to take effect. This agreement foreshadowed
cooperative arrangements between the Park Service and other
land-managing agencies. The Service affirmed its new fire policy for
parks in its 1978 Management Policies, which stated that most
fires are "natural phenomena which must be permitted to continue to
influence the ecosystem if truly natural systems are to be perpetuated."
[146]
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