Chapter 5
The War and Postwar Years, 19401963 (continued)
The Road to Mission 66
Although Newton Drury was not enthusiastic about recreational
programs and the development associated with them, they remained viable
during his directorship, even growing in certain aspects. As in the
1930s, Conrad Wirth spearheaded the Service's recreational planning
efforts in the 1940s. After he became director in 1951, recreational
tourism, culminating in the Mission 66 emphasis on intensive public use,
would become more than ever the driving force within the National Park
Service. It was the antithesis of the scientific approach to park
management.
With reduction of Service personnel and termination of the Civilian
Conservation Corps, maintenance of roads, trails, and buildings in the
national parks had declined drastically during World War II. As
anticipated, the end of the war brought a sudden upswing in the number
of park visitors. Yellowstone superintendent Edmund Rogers reported that
in the first three months following victory over Germany in the spring
of 1945, visits to the park were up 56.4 percent. Immediately after the
Japanese surrender in August, the number of visits "practically doubled"
and continued to increase during the remaining weeks of the travel
season. Overall, the number of visitors to the national park system
jumped from 11.7 million in 1945 to 25.5 million in 1947. With poorly
maintained park facilities, the Service, as Sequoia superintendent John
White described it, felt more than ever like engineers "compelled to dam
a stream in flood without opportunity to divert the flood waters." [80]
Advance planning for development of the national parks to meet the
needs of tourism in the postwar era had begun shortly after Pearl
Harbor, with a "Plans on the Shelf " program overseen, not surprisingly,
by Conrad Wirth. Although Drury promised in his 1945 annual report that
after the war the Service would "do what we were doing before the war,
but do it better," in fact he did not effectively promote postwar
improvement of park facilities. [81]
Yet Drury did attempt to get development funds, for instance in 1947
citing such problems as "poorly equipped and crowded" campgrounds,
"pitifully inadequate" utilities, and hotel and tourist accommodations
"vastly in need of enlargement and modernization." That year he
estimated that annual appropriations of $45 million were needed over a
span of seven years (an overall total of more than $300 million) to take
care of physical facilities. Two years later he raised the multiyear
request to half a billion dollars. But his efforts brought few results.
Concerned about huge war debts, only in 1947 did Congress grant the
Service a substantial budget increasewhich was quickly followed by
a return to minimal funding. [82]
Conservative by temperament, Drury, in his postwar funding quests,
was probably inhibited by his longtime opposition to increased
development of the national parks. His timid leadership, along with the
restrained circumstances of the times, meant that he was not able to
obtain sufficient support from Congress to launch an overhaul of
national park facilities. [83] Even so, his
funding efforts triggered fears of too much park development. In the
spring of 1948 the Sierra Club advised the Service of its apprehension
about the proposed park development program. Drury promised the club
that the projects would not intrude on backcountry areas. In a revealing
statement, he added that "perhaps an even more important point" was that
the chances of the budget request being approved were "decidedly
slim"in effect, not to worry about it, the Park Service was not
going to get the money anyway. Similarly, Drury once assured a group of
eight Sierra Club leaders that the Service was unlikely to impair the
parks; perhaps exhibiting his innermost attitudes toward park
development, he told them, "We have no money; we can do no harm." [84]
Drury took a conservative stance with another program that had
arisen and that again revealed the Service's affinity for intensive
recreational development. Although funds for improvement of national
park facilities remained limited, funds became available for studies of
recreation potential at proposed reservoir sites in river basins of the
West. The Park Service, having undertaken such a study for Lake Mead in
the 1930s and accepted responsibility to manage the new Boulder Dam
National Recreation Area, soon expanded its involvement with river basin
development. It undertook recreational planning for the reservoir to be
created behind Grand Coulee Dam on the Columbia River, and in 1941
agreed to survey the recreational potential of reservoirs planned by the
Bureau of Reclamation for the Colorado River Basin.
The Service also cooperated with the bureau on plans for river basins
in Texas and California, and in 1943 it began surveying areas for
possible recreational use along that part of the Alaskan Highway within
United States territory. Another big opportunity came in 1944, when
Congress authorized flood control in the Missouri River Basin and the
Service agreed with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to conduct
recreational surveys of the prospective reservoirs in that basin. Beyond
recreation, the surveys included extensive archeological investigation
and salvage of artifacts from reservoir sites. Providing funds to help
keep Park Service staff on board, and overseen by Conrad Wirth's
recreation and land planning office, these programs grew substantially
during Drury's directorship. [85]
As had happened with Boulder Dam National Recreation Area, the Park
Service moved beyond the initial surveys and planning toward actual
management of reservoir recreation areas with marinas and campgrounds
and attendant facilities. Drury was uneasy with these responsibilities,
believing them inappropriate for the Park Service. They ran counter to
his belief that the Service's essential mission was to maintain large
natural areas in minimally altered condition while also accommodating
the public. Early in 1945 H. W. Bashore, commissioner of the Bureau of
Reclamation, requested from Secretary Ickes a clarification of
departmental policy on which bureau should assume recreation
responsibility at certain reservoirs. Bashore's request related most
immediately to Millerton and Shasta reservoirs in California, but it
also raised fundamental questions regarding the Park Service's true
purpose. [86] In an exchange of letters
that became known as the "Black MagicIvory Tower" correspondence,
Drury and the Interior Department laid out opposing views on the wisdom
of expanding Service commitment to reservoir recreation management.
Drury believed that a departmental policy on the emerging field of
reservoir recreation would have an "important bearing on the future
operations of the National Park Service," and he appealed to Secretary
Ickes. Seeking to limit involvement with reservoirs, Drury argued that
there was "no black magic" in the management of such areas, and that
they did not have to be the Service's responsibility. Noting also that
it was cumbersome for two bureaus to divide management of reservoirs (as
with flood control and public recreation), Drury then raised his chief
concern: the potentially negative effects on the Service and on the
national parks themselves. Additional involvement with reservoir
recreation would, he predicted, "dissipate our energies and divert them
from the performance of our primary functions." It would make the
national park system vulnerable by diluting the standards and policies
of park management that had evolved over time.
The director noted that Service policies against consumptive uses in
the national parks (such as grazing, mining, and timber harvesting) were
already disputed. These policies would become even more vulnerable if
Congress and the public could no longer distinguish "true national park
areas" from multiple-use areas. Thus the Service should "keep clear of
such equivocal arrangements" as reservoirs, and "local or mass
recreation" should not be a primary concern. Although recognizing the
Park Service's legal responsibility to assist with state and federal
recreational planning (stemming from the Park, Parkway, and Recreational
Area Study Act of 1936, which the Service itself had promoted), Drury
nevertheless wanted to avoid becoming the nation's recreation overlord.
[87]
But with Ickes' concurrence, his assistant secretary Michael W.
Straus (who would soon succeed Bashore as commissioner of the Bureau of
Reclamation) rejected Drury's recommendations as an "open abdication" of
a serious responsibility and an attempt to retreat to an "ivory tower,"
away from the conflicts of recreational management. He argued that both
"law and custom" (the Park Service's congressional mandates and its past
efforts in recreation) made it the "best equipped" bureau to assume the
duties in question. Straus noted the diversification of the national
park system (a result of Park Service expansion efforts in the 1930s).
He wrote that, beyond maintaining the "purity . . . of natural
phenomena," the Service already managed reservoirs such as Lake Mead,
and Jackson Lake (in Jackson Hole National Monument, soon to be
incorporated into Grand Teton National Park), and historic areas like
Independence Hall, the Statue of Liberty, and numerous sites in
Washington, D.C. Straus saw Drury's opposition as "narrow-visioned" and
urged an agreement with the Bureau of Reclamation for the Service to
operate the recreational facilities at Millerton and Shasta reservoirs.
[88]
Having once accused the Park Service of becoming a "Super Department
of Recreation," Drury seemed to have hoped that he was now in a position
to restrict the Service's recreational programs. (Indeed, he was
currently overseeing the removal of most of the New Dealcreated
recreational demonstration areas from Park Service custody, as had been
originally planned.) But Drury lost the policy debate with Straus. The
Service was assigned to manage recreational facilities at Shasta and
Millerton reservoirs in California, and at Lake Texoma on the Red River
between Texas and Oklahoma.
Although willing to manage large recreation areas such as Lake Mead
and Grand Coulee, which could be construed to be of significance to the
nation as a whole, Drury continued to oppose involvement with smaller
reservoirs. [89] Ultimately, the Park
Service was able to divest itself of recreational management at some
lesser sites, beginning with a 1948 agreement for the Forest Service to
assume the responsibilities at Shasta Reservoir. The following year,
faced with difficulties caused by "unsatisfactory division of authority"
between the Park Service and the Corps of Engineers (as Drury had
anticipated), the Service was permitted to transfer all of its
management responsibilities at Lake Texoma to the corps. [90]
The recreation programs promoted by Conrad Wirth beginning in the
1930s and expanded during Drury's administration had entrapped Drury in
a situation he could not fully reverse. The Park Service's ties to river
basin studies and reservoir management put it, as Drury stated it, in an
"equivocal" policy and philosophical position. Although committed to
protecting the parks' scenic landscapes from intrusions such as dams,
the Service, through its reservoir work, lent support to the inundation
of scenic canyons and valleys throughout the West. Moreover, Drury's
fears that reservoir recreation commitments would make the national park
system more vulnerable foreshadowed the troubles that arose when the
expansive dambuilding programs of the Bureau of Reclamation and the Army
Corps of Engineers began to threaten established units of the park
system.
Drury, in fact, contributed to these troubles. Park Service
involvement with the proposed Echo Park dam project, which was intended
to inundate a large portion of Dinosaur National Monument and would
become the most controversial of all postwar dam initiatives, had begun
in 1941, the year after Drury became director. At that time the Service
agreed with the Bureau of Reclamation to undertake the recreational
survey for prospective reservoirs on the upper Colorado River. Drury
hoped the Park Service might gain meaningful influence in the extensive
planning under way for the Colorado basin; moreover, the bureau provided
funds for the survey surely an enticement for the Service.
Included in the agreement was an understanding that, because the
proposed Echo Park reservoir would drown a large portion of Dinosaur,
consideration would be given to redesignating the flooded monument a
national recreation area. [91]
Drury's initial willingness to support this plan seems itself
equivocal and contradictory to his reluctance to manage reservoirs. The
vast Echo Park area had been added to the original (and very small)
Dinosaur National Monument only in 1938, and the Service lacked real
familiarity with the recently added park lands that were proposed for
inundation. Therefore, it had little appreciation of the area's scenic
qualitiesa key consideration for leaders like Druryand the
Park Service became a willing participant in the dam proposal.
The Service failed to take a position against the dam until the late
1940s, when the area's scenic beauty became more appreciated and it
appeared that the dam might indeed be built. This delay nearly led to
the flooding of a large part of the national monument. Furthermore, by
the time the vacillating Drury began to oppose the dam, other water
control proposals were threatening major national parks such as Grand
Canyon, Kings Canyon, Glacier, and Mammoth Cave. [92]
Having been a cooperative endeavor with the dam builders, the
Service's reservoir work had become, as Drury saw it, "a two-edge
sword," with the recreational potential of artificial lakes being used
as one pretext to gain approval for dams and reservoirs that would
intrude on existing national parks and monuments. The preeminent example
of the loss of a park's spectacular, natural landscape had come with the
creation of a reservoir in Yosemite's Hetch Hetchy Valley, and the
specter of Hetch Hetchy disturbed Drury. There, as he put it, "something
commonplace was substituted for something great and fine"a
situation he began to fear could be repeated. In June 1948 he instructed
his regional director in San Francisco to be "very cautious" and avoid
giving the dam builders "ammunition that will be used against the basic
cause in which we are primarily engaged." [93]
In hearings held early in April 1950, the Park Service objected to
the Echo Park dam proposala position contrary to that taken by
Secretary of the Interior Oscar Chapman, who favored the dam. Later that
year, in what turned out to be his last annual report, Drury stated that
in recent years the Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of
Reclamation had promoted projects that would "destroy or impair the
beauty and interest" of the national parks. He called for balanced,
long-range planning to address natural resource issues, including nature
preservation. Acknowledging that the Park Service had worked
"wholeheartedly and conscientiously" with the dam builders to promote
reservoir recreation, Director Drury nevertheless argued that an
"artificial body of water" in a park never makes a "satisfactory
substitute for a natural scene"a policy he had ignored in his
earlier agreement to allow a reservoir in Dinosaur National Monument.
[94]
Drury's lack of enthusiasm for reclamation projects and his
lateblooming opposition to the Echo Park dam helped precipitate his
sudden resignation early in 1951. Secretary Chapman, who still favored
the dam, was severely criticized for forcing a respected conservationist
out of office. Reflecting on his difficulty with the secretary, Drury
later recalled that, as a dedicated Republican who had survived a decade
of Democratic administrations, he had been like a "cat in a strange
garret." He noted also the hostility of the Bureau of Reclamation,
which, he claimed, was the "dominant bureau in the Department of
Interior," and which "more or less colored" Chapman's views. [95]
Arthur Demaray, longtime member of the Park Service directorate,
succeeded Drury. Having already indicated he would retire soon, Demaray
remained director for only eight months, until December 1951, when
Conrad Wirth assumed the office. [96] From
the time of Drury's resignation, the Park Service, under orders from
Chapman, accepted a diminished role in the Echo Park conflicta
role that surely did not enhance the Service's image within the growing
conservation movement. Director Wirth often supplied information to and
worked behind the scenes with opponents of the dam. Nevertheless, the
hard-fought battle against the damultimately successful in the
mid-1950swas waged mainly by conservation groups such as the
Sierra Club and the Wilderness Society, which used their increasing
strength to fight reclamation projects. [97]
Even though Wirth opposed the Echo Park dam, his support for other
national recreation areas contrasted markedly with Drury's ambivalence.
In a 1952 address to the American Planning and Civic Association, the
new director expressed pride in the Service's accomplishments in this
area, boasting that its many years of experience made it best equipped
to undertake planning for reservoir recreation: "We feel that these
activities are closely related to other responsibilities of ours, and
that it is just common sense that we should undertake them."
Wirth claimed that involvement with river basin development programs
put the Service in a better position to defend the national parks
against possible intrusions of dams and reservoirs. Like Drury, he
favored the most impressive reservoirs, especially those behind Boulder
and Grand Coulee dams. [98] His interest in
the larger reservoirs would help lead the Park Service in 1958 to agree
to take charge of recreation at another huge reservoir: Lake Powell,
expected to flood nearly two hundred miles of southern Utah canyon
country upstream from the massive Glen Canyon Dam, due to be completed
in the 1960s. Just over two years after the defeat of the Echo Park dam,
the Service signed on to help manage a reservoir that would drown some
of the most spectacular sandstone canyons in North America. The
sacrifice of this area to a new reservoir was part of the price of the
compromise that had prevented construction of the Echo Park dam. [99]
Much of the land to be covered by Lake Powell had once been proposed
for part of the national park system as a large, essentially natural
area. Thus, at different times, the Park Service had been willing to
manage Echo Park and the Glen Canyon area either as national parks or as
reservoir recreation areas. This readiness to administer certain public
lands under whichever management policy was arrived at by the political
system was revealed in Wirth's 1952 address to the American Civic and
Planning Association. The newly appointed director noted that many
people considered Hells Canyon, along the Snake River on the
Idaho-Oregon border, to be of "national park or monument calibre." But
with the Bureau of Reclamation already planning to dam the canyon, Wirth
suggested that it could therefore become a national recreation area
under Park Service management. [100]
Committed to recreation programs and to managing large natural areas,
the Service revealed its opportunistic tendencies when an attractive
prospect of either type arose.
As one of the chief proponents of the New Deal diversification of
Park Service programs, Wirth did not suffer the equivocation that Drury
experienced when contemplating the possible effects of reservoir
management on the attitudes and priorities of the Service. With an
emphasis on physical recreation much more than on the contemplative
enjoyment of natural scenery, recreation areas involved substantially
different management approaches, perhaps most notably the allowance of
public hunting. These areas also emphasized water sports, which
necessitated development of marinas and beaches, beyond the tourist
accommodations and administrative facilities typically found in national
parks. [101] They nurtured the Park
Service's already-ingrained affinity for recreational tourism. And in
this regard, Wirth soon focused his considerable bureaucratic skills on
a huge new program designed to improve the capability of the national
parks themselves to receive the hordes of tourists arriving in the
1950s.
|