Chapter Seven:
Changing of the Guard
As the loss of the Hetch Hetchy Valley in 1913
further testified, the earlier reduction of Yosemite National Park had
done nothing to resolve the issue of park integrity. About the only
thing preservationists still had to cheer about was California's
agreement in 1905 to return Yosemite Valley and the Mariposa Grove to
the federal government. Congress formally accepted both tracts the
following year; the agency responsible for protection was also quickly
identified. For the first time since its arrival at Wawona in 1891, the
cavalry was put in charge of both the high country and Yosemite Valley.
With the transfer of army headquarters from Wawona to the valley in the
summer of 1906, preservationists looked forward to a new era for the
park, characterized, above all, by military efficiency and unified
management.
Yet as the cavalry soon discovered, the management of
Yosemite Valley called for more than patrols and the ejection of
trespassers. For fifteen years that distinct but limited role had meshed
ideally with the needs of the high country and with military tradition.
Suddenly the cavalry was ordered to fill the void left in Yosemite
Valley by the abolishment of the state park commission. As a result, the
army found itself dealing not only with shepherds and poachers but also
with valley residents, tourists, and park concessionaires. Clearly the
requirements and expectations of management had multiplied severalfold.
In the high country, cavalry authority had gone basically unchallenged.
In the valley, on the other hand, people conditioned by forty years of
management give-and-take expected more say in the overall operation of
the park.
Concessionaires, visitors, preservationists,
politiciansall required considerably more of the acting
superintendent's time and attention. Resource management alone called
for a greater variety of decisions. For example, sighting a bear or a
mountain lion in the high country was likely to raise excitement and
perhaps even a demand that the animal be killed. Still, generally there
was less concern in the backcountry about visitors' safety. In Yosemite
Valley the presence of wildlife in close proximity to residents and
visitors evoked not only excitement but also occasionally fear. Such
concerns were often baseless, but that was not the point. Simply, what
the cavalry decided seemed more immediate and visible. In the high
country, sightings of so-called dangerous animals might in fact be
ignored. In the valley, the luxury of decision making in isolation had
been largely stripped away.
It followed that the question would be asked yet
again: Was army management for the park any more appropriate or
desirable than the previous custodial arrangement with the state of
California? The answer came in 1914 when civilian rangers replaced the
troopers and the cavalry era drew abruptly to a close. The search for
management unity now turned to Congress and to the expected
authorization of the National Park Service. Another milestone in the
history of Yosemite National Park was about to be realized.
The retrocession of Yosemite Valley to the federal
government closed one period of management debate and opened yet
another. Advocates of the transfer, among them the Sierra Club and the
Southern Pacific Railroad, looked forward to the advantages of unified
control. [1] "The state commissioners have
done as well as could be expected," the Sierra Club's board of directors
remarked in a special letter to Congress. Diplomatically, the Sierra
Club dropped any direct reference to the commission's alleged corruption
and management ineptitude. Instead the board emphasized the
commissioners' struggles with the state. "They receive no salary," the
club stated, for example. "All the time they give to the affairs of
Yosemite Valley must be sacrificed from the time devoted to their
regular vocations." Moreover, the commission's budget was a "paltry ten
or fifteen thousand dollars annually." And it was "with difficulty" that
the commission had convinced the legislature to appropriate even that
amount. "The State commissioners are entitled to praise for what they
have accomplished in the face of such adverse conditions," the club
therefore admitted, seeming to ignore the earlier criticism of some of
its distinguished members. Nevertheless, the underlying problem remained
unresolved: "The State is unable to properly care for Yosemite Valley."
[2]
Shrewdly, the Sierra Club's definition of "proper"
care included projects intended to promote tourism. To be sure, federal
ownership of Yosemite Valley would allow the "construction of the best
roads, bridges, and trails," the club stated emphatically in its letter
to Congress. "Ample hotel accommodations of the best quality would be
provided. A telephone system for the entire park to guard against forest
fires would be inaugurated." Similarly, the system of toll roads
approaching the parkso despised by touristscould "be
abolished, and in all probability a splendid boulevard constructed up
the Merced Canyon, which would reduce the time and expense of travel
one-half and greatly increase the comfort." In fact, better roads and
hotels probably "would attract immense numbers of tourists from all
parts of the world," people presently discouraged only "by the arduous
nature of the trip and the lack of accommodation." [3]
Leading opponents of recession, among them
concessionaires and local developers, took precisely the opposite
stance, suggesting that the state was more amenable to all forms of
commercial enterprise. Another argument underscored the potential injury
to California's pride and reputation if Yosemite Valley reverted to
federal control on the strength of earlier charges against the state
park commissioners. [4] Given these
objections, the strategy of the Sierra Club was indeed most effective.
Of course, the club undoubtedly heeded suggestions from the Southern
Pacific Railroad, whose own interests in tourism and passenger traffic
would be far better served by federal appropriations for valley
improvements. Indeed, as early as January 5, 1905, John Muir appealed
directly to Edward H. Harriman, whose railroad empire included not only
the Southern Pacific but also the Union Pacific and Illinois Central
lines. Unquestionably, Harriman's influence with the California
legislature effected the approval in 1905 of the state's transfer bill.
Muir, greatly pleased, appealed to Harriman a second time in 1906,
requesting assistance in winning congressional acceptance of the state's
intended gift. "I will certainly do anything I can to help your Yosemite
Recession Bill," Harriman wrote Muir on April 16, 1906. [5] And once again the industrialist was as good
as his word. His request that a vote be taken was speedily honored,
thereby freeing the bill from the threat of a lengthy deadlock.
Accordingly, on June 11, 1906, President Theodore Roosevelt signed H.J.
118, a joint resolution of the House and Senate accepting California's
act to reconvey Yosemite Valley and the Mariposa Grove. [6]
As yet, little had been said about natural resources;
the Sierra Club, for one, seemed to retain its long-standing confidence
in military efficiency, promising that "perfect order would prevail, no
matter how great the number of visitors," just as soon as army
protection was extended to the valley. [7] On
an ominous note, however, an amendment to the resolution accepting
Yosemite Valley was the instrument for a second reduction of Yosemite
National Park. That second reduction, it will be recalled, cost the
national park another 10,480 acres, adding slightly over sixteen and a
third square miles to the 542 taken out the previous year. In short,
another important gain had been offset by another significant loss. The
monumental core of Yosemite National Park might have had greater
security, but resource issues affecting forests and wildlife were still
basically unresolved.
Not to be discouraged, Major H. C. Benson, acting
superintendent, continued to press for the recognition of wildlife
problems in the park. Indeed, wildlife conditions were uppermost on his
mind that summer of 1906 as he moved park headquarters from Wawona to
Yosemite Valley. As he had already observed, the boundary adjustments of
1905 had seriously disrupted the park's original wildlife range. More to
his amazement, conditions even in Yosemite Valley seemed entirely out of
hand. "The Yosemite Valley itself has, during recent years, been a death
trap to all game that was unfortunate enough to enter it," he reported.
"Practically every person living in the valley kept a rifle, shotgun,
and revolver, and any animal or bird... was immediately pursued by the
entire contingent, and either captured or killed." In fact, he
concluded, his words still tinged with amazement, "A bear pen
constructed about three years ago was found by me within 400 yards of
the Sentinel Hotel." [8]
An incident early in September dramatized Benson's
point. As he reported, "Two bears entered the valley, causing great
consternation among those people who had been living here for some
time." Everyone "seemed to think that these bears should at once be
pursued and driven out." His sympathies obviously lay with the bears.
"It is hoped that within a short time game will learn that the valley is
a safe retreat and not a death trap," he concluded. Toward that end he
recommended year-round protection of the park, further underscoring the
futility of seasonal patrols. "Immediately upon the withdrawal of the
troops from the park it is overrun with pot hunters, and these same men
often remain throughout the entire winter, killing and trapping all the
game in their vicinity." [9]
In retrospect, Benson was among the first to identify
the foundations of wildlife management in national parks. Contemporary
thinking focused on Yosemite's grand scenery. A good many people in awe
of the park's waterfalls and cliffs had practically no regard for its
wildlife populations, especially for animals believed to pose danger to
residents and visitors. In Benson's view, at least, national parks
should be sanctuaries for both people and wildlife. The problem was that
national parks had not been established on biological principles but
rather, far more basic, in celebration of the grandeur of the American
scene.
Another problem was psychological. Unlike scenery,
wildlife was capable of arousing the deepest fears and emotions. The
California grizzly was extinct in Yosemite; the species still causing so
much excitement was the black bear, Ursus americanus. This bear
not only was historically more common but also was considerably less
dangerous. Even so, most Americans visiting Yosemite at the turn of the
century would not have been swayed by the argument that their ignorance
of such distinctions was setting the stage for wildlife problems well
into the future.
Much as the extermination of the buffalo became a
symbol of America's vanishing frontier, so bears were to become symbolic
of national-park wildlife and its needs. At the turn of the century,
bears in Yellowstone delighted tourists; attracting the animals required
little more than scattering food and garbage around camps and hotels.
[10] In Yosemite the wildlife picture in
1900 was somewhat less dramatic. There, to reemphasize, the grizzly was
already extinct; decades of illegal poaching and grazing had taken their
toll of other wildlife species as well. "To see Bear or Deer, or any
other animal life at times required days of travel," Gabriel Sovulewski,
one of the earliest civilian rangers, recalled in 1936. Simply, the
animals "were killed on sight." Traps also "were plentiful" for both
large and small game. Further corroborating Major Benson's observations,
he reported, "I found Bear traps on the floor of Yosemite Valley as late
as 1906," even "after the Valley was ceded back to the United States and
became part of the national park." As a result, he concluded, "It was
several years before the wild animals became friendly and were not
afraid to face men, women, and children on the floor of the Valley." [11]
What Sovulewski failed to mention in 1936 was his
initial advocacy of the elimination of the bear population. "It is not
necessary for me to call your attention to the question of bears in the
valley," he wrote Benson's successor, Major William W. Forsyth, on
November 11, 1910. No doubt the major had already received "many
complaints." The "bear question" nonetheless was "very serious";
therefore, "if possible, some action should be taken to rid the valley
of their presence." In Sovulewski's opinion the matter had come down to
a choice "between campers and bears." More specific, "if the bears
remain here," he warned, "camping in Yosemite Valley will be a very
serious proposition." [12]
Typically, Sovulewski had not distinguished between
normal bear behavior and that induced by lack of human knowledge. Always
the problem was bears, not people. In that vein Mack A. Erwin of Selma,
California, an advertising representative for several park
concessionaires, also took "the liberty" to give Major Forsyth "the
facts," opening his letter of complaint by noting that he, his wife, and
four children had already suffered two encounters with Yosemite's
notorious "beasts." The first occurred the night of August 19. As the
Erwins slept, "three grown bears pillaged the camp and took everything
in the shape of edibles." Erwin awoke to find the bears walking around
his sleeping children, "all," he added for emphasis, "under the age of 5
years." The following evening he built a large campfire and lit a
kerosene lantern, hoping these "would bluff the bears." Only then did he
walk to the village, leaving his family behind in camp. The ruse was a
failure. Just minutes after he had left, "the five bears came marching
up and before Mrs. E. was aware they were within 20 feet of where she
was washing the dishes. Seeing her, the two large ones reared up and
gave a mad growlshowing defiance." Although his wife quickly
gathered up the children and immediately fled the area, "before she had
gotten 30 yards away," Erwin remarked, "the bears had climbed upon the
table and they remained until they cleaned the camp." [13]
At last he acknowledged that tourists who fed bears
"might in part be responsible for the presence of the beasts." Open
refuse in the garbage pits also seemed enough "to induce any bear to
make his nightly calls." Erwin confessed, "That alone would bring them
down into the valley." Still he did not admit his own complicity in the
problem; his observations of human carelessness ended where his campsite
began. "The last experience leads me to believe that the bears are a
menace to life and at all times they are a source of annoyance," he
wrote, again ignoring that food left in the open explained the bears'
raid on his camp. "I cannot get my family to go back to the Park to camp
and I have heard dozens of others say the same." Nor would the situation
improve. "Until the bears are either killed or caged there
will be a constant decrease in private camping." The rights and safety
of park visitors came first. "Sleeping in the open is the most
attractive health feature that this Valley affords," he explained, "and
the presence of the bears forbids this!" [14]
A less destructive prohibition that would allow bears
and people to coexistbanning food left out in the open around
buildings and camp sitesstill eluded Erwin and his contemporaries,
including Major Forsyth. In both his annual and monthly reports he too
left open the possibility that some of the bears might have to be
destroyed. For example, he wrote the secretary of the interior on
November 4, 1910, justifying that point of view, "It is, in my judgment,
a matter of time only, when some frightful disaster will occur on one of
the high trails due to some riding party meeting a bear." Forsyth could
just imagine the horror of horses and mules tumbling "over the cliff."
He therefore asked for authority "to hunt the bears out of the Valley
using shot guns loaded with very small shot." "In this connection," he
concluded, further revealing the power of public opinion, "a copy of a
letter from Mr. Mack A. Erwin, Selma, California, is enclosed." [15]
Although painful, the method outlined by Major
Forsyth at least avoided killing the bears outright. But again the
enormity of his request was swallowed by emotion. As long as people
considered bears a threat to life and limb, any sign of an animal's real
or imagined aggressiveness was bound to occasion a deadly response. Just
two years later, for example, Forsyth presented evidence suggesting that
his program failed to distinguish between bears acting aggressively and
those reacting in self-defense. Ranger Gaylar, assigned to pepper the
animals with buckshot, reported that he had killed "perhaps eight or ten
bears" in his own self-defense. Under the circumstances, of course, it
would have been impossible to determine whether the bears really meant
anyone any harm or had simply lashed out at Gaylar's own aggressiveness.
[16]
Undoubtedly Ranger Gaylar had overreacted; his
response was nonetheless in keeping with current perceptions. Opinions
about wildlife were still largely influenced by frontier myths and
emotions. Obviously lacking was scientific knowledge of animal behavior.
Certainly any conviction that bears also had a right to live unmolested
in the Yosemite environment had yet to win an effective minority of
converts. Extending the concept of sanctuary from scenery to wildlife
was just beginning in national parks. And even as that process gained
momentum not every species received equal consideration. The temptation
was much too strong to judge animals in human terms, to distinguish
between "good" and "bad" species as well as between individual animals
displaying "moral" or "immoral" behavior.
The result in Yosemite was the persecution of any
animal or species of wildlife believed to jeopardize visitor enjoyment
of the park. The list included black bears, mountain lions, coyotes, and
rattlesnakes. Fur-bearing animals were also trapped and hunted for their
skins. Understandably, biologists would look back on the period as one
of ignorance and tragedy. But of course park managers viewed the
situation through entirely different eyes. The long-term tragedy was the
compounding of emotions, the persistence of prejudice against wildlife
even in the face of emerging scientific awareness. Greater knowledge of
wildlife behavior did not immediately lead to greater human tolerance.
Especially in the case of confrontations between animals and people, the
burden of guilt almost always fell on the animals. More than any other
gulf between common sense and prejudice, this double standardthat
only the animals could do wrongwould have to be bridged if parks
were indeed to become refuges for both wildlife and people.
Wildlife aside, the priority of park management was
accommodating more visitors. Still at issue throughout the period was
the level of accommodation. A keen awareness of the process by
which temptations became "needs" had led in 1865 to Frederick Law
Olmsted's singular warning not to allow anything into Yosemite Valley
that might distract visitors from their natural surroundings.
Subsequently, the California commissioners learned by bitter trial and
error how easily preferences among visitors could evolve from luxuries
into needs. Simply, taste became necessity. In Olmsted's view,
succumbing to that argument would be management's worst failure, for the
park would be undermined by compromise after compromise, each an
imposition on the resource rather than a legitimate social need.
As a group, concessionaires obviously had the most to
win from labeling wants as needs and, it followed, more to lose from an
impairment of such labeling. All that visitors really needed, namely
nourishment and a place to sleep, was basic to the range of services
most concessionaires hoped to provide. Profit was in luxuries,
especially those easily transported and saleable at a premium, including
postcards, candy, and small souvenirs. Alcoholic beverages also met
sales criteria perfectly. Thus it was small wonder that the consumption
and sale of beer, wine, and liquor served as a telling symbol of the
ploys used to justify every park compromise as a pressing social
need.
Unlike food and shelter, liquor was something
everyone could certainly live without. Yet reporting to Secretary of the
Interior John W. Noble just after the establishment of Yosemite National
Park, Charles D. Robinson, the same local artist who had brought charges
of misconduct against the Yosemite Park Commission, defended alcohol as
both a legitimate sales item and a necessity. "I would state that there
has always been a bar of some description attached to the various
hotels," his letter began. Entering the valley, the visitor passed, in
succession, "a licensed bar at the store of A. Cavagnaro," another "at
the Barnard Hotel attached to the hotel building," and still another "at
the Stoneman House in a separate building distant from the main hotel
building between 400 and 500 feet." The detached structure "also kept a
general store and a billiard room." On trails leading out of the valley
the thirsty traveler could find refreshment "at Snow's Hotel or Casa
Nevada at the base of the Nevada fall," and "also a bar at McCauley's
Glacier Point hotel at the summit of Glacier Point." [17]
On the question of the need for these bars Robinson
was most emphatic. "Up to the present time," he maintained, "the bars
attached to the hotels have been found almost indispensible for the use
of guests." The need obviously was greatest "upon first ascending from
the Valley floor." At those "great altitudes," where visitors first
encountered "extremely dry and ratified air," many experienced
"sensations of faintness and sometimes of slight heart failure or great
difficulty in breathing." For these reasons, Robinson noted,
"stimulants" were "absolutely necessary at these summit hotels." The
need applied to "many women" as well as most men, who there discovered
"for the first time in their lives, perhaps, symptoms of heart disease."
Accordingly Robinson decided, "Remedies in the shape of stimulants must
be immediately at hand." Alcoholic beverages were no less welcome, "if
not equally necessary," on the visitor's return to the valley floor. The
problem again was the number of people "unused to such unwonted
exertion" as was required for these trips in the high country "of
intolerable severity." Robinson's conclusions thus seemed inescapable:
"In the confines of the New National Park, if it be ever opened to
public travel, I think that the presence of liquors will be absolutely
necessary and their absence attended with positive danger." [18]
Having concluded that liquor equaled safety,
Robinson's argument bridged the remaining gap between credibility and
absurdity. Liquor suddenly became a requirement for the
protection of the visitor. Of course the argument was ridiculous;
tourists were more likely to kill themselves by intoxication than by
gasping for breath in rarified air. The point is that simply repeating
the argument gave it a hint of plausibility. From there, the power of
precedent was on Robinson's side. The longer visitors enjoyed alcoholic
beverages in the park, the harder it would be to deny them the
privilege.
The pattern, once established, was most difficult to
break. Whatever the project, once qualified as essential it was likely
to win support. In that vein the commission concluded its own
forty-two-year administration with efforts to control flooding and
erosion by confining the Merced River to a single valley channel. Such a
feat, the commissioners confidently reported as early as 1892, was "by
no means beyond the resources of engineering science and practical
construction." In due course intelligent management would "curb the
stream in floodtime and preserve the groves and meadows from the damage
which it now inflicts at will." This, coupled with the clearance of
encroaching vegetation, would finally deliver Yosemite Valley "from the
two capital dangers of fire and water which have heretofore menaced it."
[19]
The transfer of management authority from the
commission to the cavalry did nothing to erode arguments that protecting
human lives and property justified the further manipulation of natural
resources. Once begun, the development of the park had become
self-fulfilling. Those advocating change need only twist their arguments
from obvious expressions of individual preference into all-embracing
statements of common social need. Protection, in contrast, called for
discipline and restraint, for resisting inevitable tendencies to define
everything as either useful or profitable. Those were the standards
Frederick Law Olmsted had espoused; they were not yet, however,
turn-of-the-century standards for the majority of Yosemite's managers,
visitors, and leading concessionaires.
With David A. Curry, the outspoken founder and
original proprietor of Yosemite Valley's Camp Curry, the promotion of
tastes as needs came sharply into focus. In 1899 Curry and his wife,
Jennie, both Indiana schoolteachers, placed several tents on the valley
floor just beneath Glacier Point. Such were the humble but breathtaking
beginnings of the Currys' summer camp. Through personal and professional
contacts, including an earlier transportation venture in Yellowstone
National Park, they attracted nearly three hundred guests in the first
season. Indeed, by the end of the summer their number of tents had
nearly quadrupled. [20] Little more evidence
was required to convince the Currys that their initiative, experience,
and eye for location had combined to provide them with a lucrative
opportunity.
The Currys, moreover, knew how and what to advertise.
Most notably, they quickly revived the firefall, the celebrated evening
cascade of glowing embers pushed over the cliff at Glacier Point. Ever
afterward associated with Camp Curry and its founders, the spectacle in
fact dated back to one Fourth of July in the early 1870s when James
McCauley, owner of the Four-Mile Trail from the valley to Glacier Point,
decided to entertain valley spectators. Others had approached him with a
plan to throw fireworks off the cliff; McCauley reciprocated with a
scheme of his own, announcing his intention to build a large fire and
push the flaming embers over the precipice. At least fifteen hundred
feet of sheer granite fell away from Glacier Point to the first ledges
down below; people in the valley would enjoy unobstructed views of the
entire cascade, accompanied by the booming reverberations of the
detonating fireworks. [21]
As the Currys soon recognized, the location of their
camp directly beneath Glacier Point invited periodic revivals of the
firefall as a drawing card for patronage. Occasionally guests were asked
for contributions and a worker was dispatched up the cliff to prepare
the pile of firewood and, on cue from Camp Curry, to send the burning
embers on their brief but spectacular journey into the abyss. In
addition to attracting guests, the firefall stymied the competition. How
indeed could other camps and hotels emulate the Currys' spellbinding
stunt? Ever mindful of their competition, the Currys assumed financial
responsibility for the firefall in order to sponsor it nightly
throughout the summer months. [22]
The Currys, it may be argued, now had everything they
could have wished forsuperior location, grateful guests, and the
promise of repeat business for years and years to come. Yet the outward
appearance of Camp Curry as just a small family enterprise was an
illusion they fostered as carefully as the firefall. In truth the Currys
were driven to success in every sense of the American Dream. Expansion
was the objective of any entrepreneur; to accept the status quo was in
effect to admit one's failure. The strategy of park concessions dictated
constantly importuning park management to allow operations to be
enlarged from season to season. Growth was the objective and the Currys
played the game masterfully. The stipulation that the government would
establish national parks but turn them over to private enterprise for
the development of visitor services was rarely defended with greater
conviction than by David Curry.
Outspoken, determined, and some would say ruthless,
he rapidly alienated every park superintendent with whom he had to deal.
Indeed, hardly had military supervision come to Yosemite Valley when
Curry and Major H. C. Benson were already at odds. On July 11, 1907, for
example, Benson reported to Secretary of the Interior James A. Garfield
that "J. B. Cook and David A. Curry, business lessees of Yosemite and
Curry camps respectively," had submitted letters "relative to the
increasing of facilities for the accommodation of guests." In Benson's
opinion Camp Curry had already exceeded its capacity; further expansion,
in other words, seemed totally unjustified. "It will be noted that Mr.
Curry claims his present capacity to be 318," Benson wrote. However, it
appeared he maintained that number only at great discomfort to his
guests. Sanitary facilities especially were "exceedingly bad."
Specifically, only ten toilets served the 318 people Curry claimed he
could accommodate. His cesspool also was "very small, not properly
constructed and very unsanitary." Simply, to raise the capacity of his
camp during periods of peak demand, Curry resorted to separating "men
and wives, putting all men in one tent and the women in another, where
they are packed in like sardines." In truth his capacity was closer to
"about 175." At least Benson was "of the opinion that the accommodations
should be of such a nature that people would be able to have separate
beds and separate tents if they desire it." [23]
But sanitary problems would only worsen if expansion
was approved. Secretary Garfield agreed, and on August 1 ordered M. O.
Leighton, the chief hydrographer of the U.S. Geological Survey, to make
a full investigation. Just three weeks later Leighton strongly advised
against further expansion unless Camp Curry was moved to a more suitable
location. "The present site has now been in use nine years," he
remarked. A projected increase from 250 to 500 guests per day would
intolerably strain the primitive methods of waste disposal currently in
use. "There are on the borders of the camp troublesome accumulations of
garbage and other organic matter," Leighton further noted, specifying
the exact nature of his and Major Benson's concerns. Certainly uncovered
garbage and untreated human wastes could not be considered anything but
"a menace to the health of the persons patronizing the camp." [24]
In Curry's defense, pollution problems were
widespread throughout Yosemite Valley. [25]
Nor did the push for expansion of visitor services come from park
concessionaires alone. Originally the California commissioners, and now
the Department of the Interior as well, were also eager to accommodate
more tourists in the valley. Curry was often singled out because he was
so visible and abrasive. Rather than admit his own part in the park's
evolving problems, he constantly shifted blame onto management
authorities. Here again, not until he faced losing Camp Curry's enviable
location did he finally agree to improvements in its waste disposal
systems. But, to reemphasize, Curry was not motivated by a deep sense of
responsibility to his guests. Even in the present location, he finally
conceded, Camp Curry would be prohibited from further expansion until it
was purified. The depth of his frustrationand his
prioritiesshowed through in his response. "I have told thousands
of tourists that it is the finest camp ground God ever made," he
complained in a letter to the secretary of the interior, bitterly
objecting to Leighton's recommendation that Camp Curry still be moved.
"Its present location affords the best show ground for avalanches of
fire from Glacier Point, and Curry's stentorian voice, both of which
have become advertising features in its present location." [26]
Even more to the point, he openly accused park
officials of trying to drive him out. The accusation was bound to win
the enmity of the superintendent and his staff, who in turn saw Curry's
insubordination as the product of his greed. In a report dated October
6, 1908, Major Benson went so far as to describe him as "a detriment to
the Valley, as he is constantly complaining of conditions that exist,
imagining that everybody is imbued with the single idea of annoying him
and preventing him from making money." In truth the only problem was
Curry himself. "He stirs up discontent in his camp against the existing
order of affairs," Benson wrote, noting Curry's habit of lambasting park
officials during evening displays of the firefall and at other public
gatherings. Similarly, Curry falsely accused his competitors of
disrupting his operation. Thus Benson felt obligated to be blunt in his
own right. "He has now been in the Valley for ten years and has reaped a
good harvest, and in my opinion, the Valley would be very much better
off without his presence in the future." [27]
Yet public opinion, Curry realized, was far
more important than Benson's. Accordingly, each time the Department of
the Interior suggested that Camp Curry be relocated, its proprietor took
his case directly to Congress and the press. In the end, his array of
printed circulars, newspaper advertisements, letters to the editor, and
personal correspondence to leading politicians proved highly effective,
not only for these current issues but also for several others that were
to follow. With the exception of a multiple-year lease, Curry ultimately
won practically everything that he had initially been refused, including
the right to expand both his camp and its visitor services. [28]
Thus Curry symbolized the growing influence that
concessionaires wielded over the development of the park. The key to
expansion, Curry demonstrated, was not to take "no" for an answer.
Whatever its drawbacks, persistence paid off. "I asked for studio
privileges at Camp Curry for the present year," he wrote on September
21, 1911, for example, "which were not granted. I now renew my request."
Shrewdly, he justified this pure convenience as a necessity for
visitors, as another pressing social need. "Camp Curry is distant more
than a mile from all the studios at present," he noted. "It requires too
much exertion for 3800 guests, staying an average of six or seven days
each, to walk more than two miles every time they wish some little thing
from a studio." For instance, requiring "tourists to walk over two miles
for a barber," he complained, "for soft drinks or ice cream, for cigars,
for newspapers, for fresh fruit, or for studio privileges, is to curtail
50 to 75 percent of their desires in all those lines." [29]
Curry's underlying motive had at last been revealed.
Rather than protect his guests from overexertion, he simply hoped to
steal more business from existing competitors. Nor did he seem in the
least concerned that those smaller concessionaires currently
specializing in selling the items that he had enumerated might, because
of his request, lose most of their business to Camp Curry. "The
establishment of a studio at Camp Curry would damage very little the
present studio concessions," he argued, offering no evidence whatsoever
in support of his claim. Instead he reemphasized his camp's isolation,
acknowledging only in passing that studio privileges "would increase my
own receipts." [30]
Thus did Curry's formulaask and ask
againlead incrementally and steadily toward expansion of his camp.
From every standpoint of business his formula was sound; for park
legislation, it masked a troubling inconsistency. For whom and for what
were national parks intended? If private entrepreneurs controlled all
visitor services, was not expansion for the sake of greater profit the
logical outcome? Why should David Curry be blamed for promoting his
interests? More fundamentally, the flaw was in park legislation. In
effect, Congress had authorized competitive management units. Even
though concessionaires were regulated by the government, the fact
remained that they would never relent. Any government weakness, it
followed, in turn would lead to concessionaires' greater strength. Curry
graphically depicted how to manipulate that arrangement. To use the
vernacular, the squeaky wheel got the grease.
In that regard, nothing more angered park officials
than Curry's constant willingness to go over their heads by appealing
directly to the secretary of the interior, the Congress, and the public
at large. On February 4, 1913, for example, he complained bitterly to
Representative John E. Raker of California that park management had
absolutely no understanding of why he should be "entitled to normal
business security." "We certainly appreciate your efforts in our behalf
lately," he began his letter, "though I fear we shall not get our
desires. We, as business men, would like to be treated like business
men. We are more like mendicants who ask and are refused without being
vouchsafed any reason." Similarly, a one-page printed circular dated
April 10, 1914, implored the reader, "as a friend of Camp Curry," to
write Secretary of the Interior Franklin K. Lane, "asking his favorable
consideration of questions now pending, concerning the concession of the
Curry Camping Company," and also to write the reader's congressman,
"asking him to cooperate with his fellow Congressman, Hon. J. E. Raker,
who represents the Yosemite district, in presenting to the favorable
consideration of Mr. Lane the claims of the Curry Camping Company." [31]
Above all, Curry vehemently objected to the
firefall's abolishment, for which, he claimed, "no reason had been
given." The Interior Department's edict, handed down on March 3,
suggested only that the firefall might be a hazard. "You realize the
pleasure and amusement caused by the fire fall to Camp Curry's guests
and other Yosemite tourists," Curry wrote in protest. "Camp Curry wants
the fire fall restored." The remainder of the circular enumerated his
long-standing grievance: He too should be allowed to sell postcards,
fruit, candy, guidebooks, magazines, maps, fishing tackle, and
photographs. Similarly, he still insisted that Camp Curry be awarded a
multiple-year lease. "I am starting for Washington at once and hope a
letter from you will go forward immediately," he concluded, "lending
your support to as many of these propositions as you believe are
worthy." [32]
Public opinion, Curry realized, was a powerful ally,
at times even stronger and more influential than park management itself.
It was said, for example, that the abolishment of the firefall in 1914
was intended solely to punish him for his ridicule of park authority.
[33] Even so, the decision did little to
dampen his militancy. He simply found all the more reason to mimic James
Mason Hutchings, portraying his camp as just another small family
business and himself as a businessman who was being unreasonably
harassed by government bureaucrats. Meanwhile, whatever the grievance,
the key to courting public opinion was to state that whatever the public
wanted was in fact a crying need. "Candies are as immediate necessities
for the ladies as cigars are for gentlemen," Curry therefore argued in
his printed circular. "Camp Curry wants the right to sell fruits and
candies as well as the other necessities which are allowed." [34]
The argument was not to end there. Rather, Curry and
other concessionaires solidified their positions in the park, time and
again resorting to "need" as justification for a widening range of
projects and services, from the sale of small items like candy and
cigars to the expenditures for larger capital investments like
auditoriums and swimming pools. Each "need", when introduced, invariably
took on a life of its own. The guest who found candy and swimming pools
one year expected similar luxuries on the next visit. The possibility
that one or more might undermine the purposes for which the park
supposedly had been established seemed to elude even government
officials. The issue of park control still begged for resolution, not
only to strike a working balance for accommodations and services but
also to ensure that increased development would not overwhelm the
natural scene.
The military, it was finally recognized, was not
appropriate to that task. For one thing, military regulation of
civilians in peacetime was probably illegal; in either case, protection
was no longer a simple matter of standing between poachers and
resources. David A. Curry was only one example of the growing number of
individuals seeking to exploit the park legally. As management duties
multiplied in political and social complexityand as park
visitation dramatically increasedit seemed less and less desirable
that the military should intervene in wholly civilian matters.
A final consideration was military prestige. The
army's original missionto protect the high country's forests and
meadowshad been simple and pure. Finally involved in the civilian
intrigue so common to Yosemite Valley, the army was frequently portrayed
as just another government bureaucracy. Inevitably, tensions between
civilians and military superintendents steadily multiplied. So too, the
motives and convictions of the common soldier were increasingly called
into question. [35] The outcome was
inevitable; in 1914 civilian rangers replaced the military throughout
Yosemite National Park, and the era of army administration came abruptly
to a close.
The arrival of the civilian rangers presaged the
establishment of the National Park Service, approved by Congress and the
president on August 25, 1916. Preservationists' hopes had at last been
realized; for the first time, national parks had an agency of their own
to oversee the protection and enhancement of their natural resources.
That ideal, at least, was winning acceptance as the sole priority of
park management. But in Yosemite, especially in the confines of the
valley, there was still good reason to doubt whether that ideal could
withstand unforgiving realities.
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