Epilogue:
National Parks for the Future: Encirclement and Uncertainty
The results of this study indicate that no parks of
the System are immune to external and internal threats, and that these
threats are causing significant and demonstrable damage.
State of the Parks Report, 1980
I will err on the side of public use versus
preservation.
James Watt, 1981
True to precedent, the jubilation of preservationists
following their achievements in Alaska proved to be short lived. On
January 20, 1981, Ronald Reagan assumed the presidency won a platform of
government austerity and conservative retrenchment. In keeping with his
conservative principles, his appointee as secretary of the interior,
James Watt, soon made it clear that expansion of the national park
system itself had come to an abrupt end. More alarming to
preservationists, Watt showed little respect for their conviction that
national parks, above all, ought to be managed as sanctuaries for
wilderness and wildlife. To Watt, the greatest problem facing the parks
was the deterioration of their physical plant, especially roads, parking
lots, overnight accommodations, and sewage systems. What funds might be
added to the existing park budget obviously would be spent on the
access, comfort, and safety of park visitors rather than on the sanctity
of park resources. To be sure, that wilderness should be protected for
its own sake was the last thing on either the president's or the
secretary's agenda. [1]
By itself, Watt's shift in emphasis from the
protection of the national parks to recreational development reminiscent
of Mission 66 would have been enough to arouse preservationists across
the country. Coupled with his outspoken disdain for the environmental
movement, however, his obvious indifference to the fate of endangered
lands and wildlife assured him a place in history as the most
controversial secretary of the interior since Albert B. Fall. In 1922,
Fall secretly and improperly leased the nation's petroleum reserve at
Teapot Dome, Wyoming, to the Sinclair Oil Company. [2] Among preservationists of the 1980s, it
seemed as if James Watt had attempted far worse. Most disconcerting was
his steadfast refusal to spend appropriations allocated by Congress for
national park acquisitions. No act more openly defied preservationists'
assessment that the underlying problem of the national parks since their
inception had been the government's failure to provide them with enough
land for sustained protection in the first place. [3]
As a critic of national park expansion, Watt
epitomized the continuing threat to preservation from within the federal
bureaucracy itself. Although Congress and the president alone had the
power to establish national parks and wilderness areas, by and large
their administration fell to government officials. How those officials
interpreted their responsibility in the field often determined whether
or not the apparent wishes of Congress would in fact be honored. In the
person of James Watt, preservationists relearned bitter lessons from
national park history, namely, that what the federal government gave it
could always take away. Even with Congress firmly behind the national
park idea, Watt's broad discretionary powers as secretary of the
interior left him with enough authority to promote the maintenance and
development of the nation's "crown jewels," as opposed to acquiring new
lands for so-called nontraditional park areas.
Watt, in other words, sensed that he might support
the national parks without actually supporting preservation. The key to
his subterfuge was in the nature of the parks he endorsed. Protection of
the original park system required that Watt respect only park
tradition; no new lands and few natural resources of great economic
value would be affected by his approval of past policies designating the
natural "wonders" of the nation as its "crown jewels." By the same
token, the policy kept preservationists constantly on the defensive.
Once again they were forced to convince the public that the protection
of monumental scenery alone no longer met the needs of environmental
preservation. As Watt realized, tradition was on the side of
monumentalism, Because he did not directly attack the legitimacy of
Yosemite, Yellowstone, the Grand Canyon, and their counterparts, the
public was not as likely to oppose his conviction that urban parks
especially were frivolous and wasteful. [4]
If preservationists had one argument to discredit
James Watt, it was that external threats to the national parks,
especially mining, air and water pollution, and land development,
jeopardized even the most remote and pristine of the nation's "crown
jewels." Maintaining the status quo in land acquisitions, among other
policies of retrenchment, merely insured that outside threats to the
national parks would continue to escalate. Early publicity describing
the scope of the problem understandably concentrated won compromises to
the parks' scenic integrity. Particularly in the Southwest,
meteorologists and other pollution experts noted the deterioration of
visibility over the Grand Canyon, Bryce, Zion, Canyonlands, and
neighboring national monuments. At stake was the sensation of
spaciousness those areas long had evoked. On a clear day, visitors at
the most popular scenic overlooks might see mesas and mountain ranges
more than one hundred miles distant. Nowhere were the sensations of
boundless horizons and personal freedom more pronounced and,
accordingly, more in danger of being lost to atmospheric degradation.
Indeed, by 1980, due to the spread of coal-fired power plants, smelters,
and urbanization throughout the Southwest, scientists had concluded that
none of its national parks any longer had "pristine" air quality more
than one day out of every three. [5]
The conclusions seemed inescapable. In its own report
to the Congress, State of the Parks1980, the National Park
Service agreed that external threats to the national parks posed the
gravest danger to their resources throughout the 1980s and beyond. "The
63 National Park natural areas greater than 30,000 acres in size
reported an average number of threats nearly double that of the
Service-wide norm," the document began on an ominous note. The category,
of course, included "Yellowstone, Yosemite, Great Smoky Mountains,
Everglades, and Glacier. Most of these great parks were at one time
pristine areas surrounded and protected by vast wilderness regions," the
report continued, underscoring the extent of the changes that had taken
place in recent decades. "Today, with their surrounding buffer zones
gradually disappearing, many of these parks are experiencing significant
and widespread adverse effects associated with external encroachment."
[6]
Preservationists themselves were particularly alarmed
by a proposal to lease portions of the Targhee National Forest,
bordering the southwestern corner of Yellowstone National Park, for a
large geothermal power project. In a direct line, the core of the
project would be only fifteen miles west of the Upper Geyser Basin and
Old Faithful Geyser. Immediately at issue was whether or not the
drilling would be harmful to the intricate geothermal systems underlying
both the park and its adjacent forest lands. In 1980 an environmental
impact statement released by the U.S. Forest Service admitted the
possibility of losing Yellowstone's geysers if the project were built.
"The exact boundaries of the Yellowstone geothermal reservoir(s) are
uncertain," the Forest Service concluded, "Thus, it is difficult to say
how much of a connectionif anythere is between the possible
geothermal resource . . . and thermal areas inside the park, or if any
adverse effects might result." [7]
Individually, the project stood a good chance of
being defeated. Collectively, however, both existing and proposed
projects of a similar nature bordering other parks, including
Yellowstone, underscored the futility of fighting the national lifestyle
indefinitely. In essence, the enemy of preservation was growth. As long
as the demands of the economy and a growing population strained the
supply of natural resources, the best preservationists could still hope
for was not to win environmental battles, but merely to trim their
losses.
Toward that end, preservationists and Park Service
rangers asked the public to visualize parks in the 1980s in conjunction
with their total surroundings. Parks at the center of threatened
ecosystems were no more secure than the security of their outlying
parts. Yellowstone National Park, for example, depended for its survival
won "greater Yellowstone," the territory comprising not only the park
proper but the millions of acres of national forest lands, wilderness
areas, and private property surrounding it, As a concept, "greater
Yellowstone" was especially relevant to wildlife protection. Of all park
management goals, wildlife preservation still had the least to do with
the placement of national park boundaries. If the grizzly bear in
particular were to survive in the continental United States, both
Yellowstone and Glacier national parkseither through expansion or
strict regulations controlling land use outside their
perimeterswould have to accommodate the bears' need to wander
freely beyond the national parks themselves. [8]
Symbolically, the administration of James Watt
suggested that Americans as a whole still refused to accept the
legitimacy of such lines of argument. Respect for grizzly bears and
other potentially dangerous animals called for levels of understanding
and tolerance usually discernible only among preservationists
themselves. To be sure, when Watt himself was forced to resign in 1983,
a prejudicial joke reflecting on disabled Americans and minorities, not
his disdain for the environment, was the actual basis for his fall from
grace. His successor, William Clark, generally followed Watt's direction
more quietly and diplomatically. At least with respect to national park
policy, little at Interior had changed. [9]
In the final analysis, it seemed as if only a
dramatic change in the nation's lifestyle itself could save the national
parks from continuing deterioration, During the nineteenth century, the
relative isolation of parklands in the West had allowed Americans the
luxury of simply stating that their commitment to protection wasas
vowed in the Yosemite Park Act of 1864"inalienable for all time."
The promise in 1864 was uncomplicated by immediate threats to the
integrity of Yosemite and its successors. Perhaps the nation was
sincere, but Americans had not yet been challenged to prove that
sincerity by sacrificing any substantive economic goals.
In the absence of national sacrifice, threats to the
national parks observable in the 1980s loomed as a potential fact of
life well into the twenty-first century. Past the midpoint of the
decade, air and water pollution, energy development, and urban
encroachment outside the national parks still underscored the
significance of economic motives in shaping American values. Writing for
an earlier generation, Aldo Leopold, the distinguished wildlife
biologist, saw materialism as the basic threat to the integrity of
anything wild. Before wilderness could be saved in perpetuity, Americans
as a whole would have to reject their destructive perceptions of the
natural world as simply a commodity of exchange. "Obligations have no
meaning without conscience," he wrote, "and the problem we face is the
extension of the social conscience from people to land." More than
anything else, the United States needed a responsible, sustainable, and
sincere land ethic, "A thing is right when it tends to preserve the
integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community," he concluded.
"It is wrong when it tends otherwise." [10]
It followed that the national parks themselves no
longer could accommodate every public whim. If their biological
resources were in fact important, then the protection of park
environments must take precedence over all forms of consumptive
recreation. The Reagan administration's own emphasis on park maintenance
aside, such development could only postpone but not suppress further
questioning regarding the legitimacy of roads, hotels, campgrounds, and
automobiles in the midst of fragile environments. Eventually, the
American people would have to choose preservation over development, or
accept development and fewer parks. As monuments to American culture,
the largest national parks were perhaps nominally secure. But if
monumentalism in fact no longer met the nation's environmental needs,
then the time for acting decisively was indeed running out.
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