The soldiers stationed in western Montana Territory had been there only a few weeks, having been sent into the area to build a post near Missoula City to police intertribal conflict over hunting grounds and to offset rising fears of an Indian war among Bitterroot Valley settlers as the government attempted to remove area tribesmen to a reservation farther north. Lieutenant Colonel Charles C. Gilbert, Seventh U.S. Infantry, selected the site of the new post four miles southwest of the community. On June 25, 1877, Captain Charles C. Rawn established the Post at Missoula (formally named Fort Missoula in November, 1877) with soldiers of Companies A and I, Seventh Infantry, out of Fort Shaw. [35] As building progressed, Captain Rawn, a Civil War veteran with sixteen years in the regiment, visited the different tribes in the region and gained statements of continued friendship from their leaders. In particular, Chief Charlo of the Flatheads, longtime allies of the Nez Perces, pledged neutrality in the escalating conflict, but promised to provide the army with intelligence of Nez Perce movements (and later more openly sided with the troops). As a precautionary measure, Rawn hastily fortified the new post, then sent an officer and four men "to watch the Loo-Loo [sic] trail from a point where it can be seen six or eight miles and report the approach of any large band of Indians from the west side." [36]

The detail under Second Lieutenant Francis Woodbridge was the one that had been reported to Looking Glass at Lolo Hot Springs. Woodbridge ascended the trail for several days. On June 21, Rawn, having heard nothing from them, dispatched First Lieutenant Charles A. Coolidge with one soldier and several civilian volunteers to learn Woodbridge's whereabouts. Coolidge's party encountered them a day later, as Woodbridge returned down the trail. That same day a mixed-blood Salish Indian named Jim Simonds (more commonly known as Delaware Jim), who lived with one of the Nez Perce women, brought word to the detachments of the arrival of the Indians at Grave Creek Meadows and Woodman's Prairie, [37] and the news, immediately forwarded to Rawn, spread quickly through the Bitterroot Valley creating consternation among the settlers. [38] Four days later, Rawn led four officers, thirty enlisted men, and about fifty volunteers six miles up the trail to a point "in what I considered the most defensible and least-easily flanked part of the cañon between the Indians and Bitter Root Valley." "My intentions were," reported Rawn, "to compel the Indians to surrender their arms and ammunition, and to dispute their passage, by force of arms, into Bitter Root Valley." [39] Rawn's command advanced into Lolo in skirmish formation. One soldier recalled that as they entered a narrow part of the canyon Nez Perce pickets fired on them, after which "the main column closed up and we went ahead into the defile." No further shooting occurred. [40]

Also on the twenty-fifth, Delaware Jim communicated with the Nez Perces, relaying the information to Rawn, who notified district headquarters of his status:

Am intrenching twenty-five regulars and about fifty volunteers in . . . Lou Lou cañon. Have promises of more volunteers but am not certain of these. Please send me along more troops. Will go up and see them to-morrow and inform them that unless they disarm and dismount will give them a fight. White Bird says he will go through peaceably, if he can, but will go through. This news is entirely reliable. [41]

On Thursday evening, July 26, Rawn, accompanied by a group of regulars and volunteers, and carrying a flag of truce "fashioned by tying a white handkerchief to a gun barrel," met with the tribesmen and demanded that they turn in their arms and horses. Both Looking Glass and White Bird attended the council, and Joseph appeared as the proceeding ended, apparently concurring in a decision to meet Rawn again the next day. [42] That same day, Montana Territory Governor Benjamin F. Potts, who had arrived in Missoula with an escort, issued a call for volunteers and then hurried to the front. He wanted no trouble with the Nez Perces. [43]

On the twenty-seventh, Captain Rawn, accompanied by Potts, Captain William Logan of Company A, Seventh Infantry, and three volunteers, along with Chief Charlo, and backed by about a hundred armed men, approached the meeting place. Rawn and Potts met Looking Glass and Joseph between the lines at the edge of Woodman's Prairie and beyond rifle range of the warriors "drawn up in line on a ridge to show themselves." [44] Volunteer John Buckhouse remembered that "they were all well armed, and appeared a decent lot of fellows." [45] Delaware Jim interpreted, and the meeting lasted less than an hour. In return for being allowed to peaceably pass by the troops and through the Bitterroot Valley, the Nez Perces offered to surrender ammunition but not their arms. Rawn refused. A volunteer remembered: "The situation was just a little bit tense and strained as we sat facing each other with guns ready for instant use and each side watching for the first sign of treachery." [46] Finally, Looking Glass told Rawn that he needed to consult his people and that he would inform the captain next morning of the decision. Rawn asked to be informed by midnight, and the council broke without agreement. [47] That evening Governor Potts returned to Missoula, while Rawn filed the following report:

Had a talk with Joseph and Looking-Glass this afternoon and told them they had to surrender arms and ammunition or fight. They are to consider to-night. I think that for want of ammunition or Charlo[']s threat they are wavering. Charlo has sent them word, that if they come into the Bitter Root he will fight them. [48]

By that time, Rawn's mixed command of 216 men lay prepared for the Nez Perces behind a hasty field fortification that stretched from the bench overlooking the creek and trail from the north. Each unit, regular and volunteer, had labored to raise its own barricade, consisting of log breastworks built of felled timber laid horizontally atop the dirt dug to create a trench in the rear. Corporal Charles N. Loynes described the construction: "A tree would be dropped, then another, called a head log, would be placed upon it, with a small limb in between giving the required space to get the rifles through." [49] A few rifle pits were apparently located farther up from, and to the rear of, the line of trench and log works. Although it appeared strong enough to face an opponent approaching directly from the west, the barricade's position on the floor of the canyon made it susceptible to enfilade fire from the heights on either side. [50] Volunteer Wilson B. Harlan recollected that "it was the belief of most of us, that in case of a fight, especially before our reinforcements arrived, it would have been another Custer massacre." [51] Following the meeting on the twenty-seventh, many of the approximately 150 volunteers, on learning of the people's intent to pass by their homes peacefully and unwilling by their presence to risk their hostility, peremptorily abandoned Rawn's entrenchment "in squads of from one to a dozen," leaving only about thirty to man the work. Helping to offset this loss were Charlo and twenty Flatheads, who tied white cloths about their heads and arms to distinguish themselves from the Nez Perces. [52] Thus, on Friday evening, Rawn's total force at the barricade stood at thirty regular soldiers, about thirty volunteers, and twenty-one Flathead Indians. [53]

The command passed a restless night in a drizzling rain. As the hours went by, three unarmed Nez Perces came into the works and were captured. [54] Early Saturday morning, the soldiers and volunteers behind the log breastwork braced themselves for an attack. But it never came. Instead, despite the confidence of Rawn and his men that the Nez Perces could not get by them, they did exactly that.

Some distance west of the entrenchments, the tribesmen, with all their families, horses, and baggage, skillfully climbed north up a ravine, then took to distant slopes and ridges out of view of Rawn's command. They then went back down to the Lolo Creek drainage three miles east of the works. In effect, their route was "making an arc of a circle in the movement." [55] Volunteer Harlan, acting as an advanced picket, watched the circumvention of Rawn's position from a mountainside:

About nine o'clock I sent word that the Indians were driving in their horses and breaking camp. Another man was sent in when it was seen that they had packed up and had started down the valley toward us. . . . I reported to Captain Rawn that the Indians were beginning to climb the ridge a fourth of a mile above our camp and were evidently going around us. . . . I saw squaws and children with camp stuff going up. [56]

While the passage was occurring, a party of thirty or forty volunteers, led by Lieutenant Coolidge, moved back along the base of the mountain on the north and climbed a short distance to guard against a surprise from the right rear of the barricade. A few random shots were fired, but no one on either side was injured. "The truth was," wrote one volunteer, "some of our citizens were pretty badly scared." [57] Late that afternoon, after the Nez Perces completed the passage, they went across the bottom and emerged into the Bitterroot Valley south of Lolo Creek. Rawn led troops after them, later reporting that "I abandoned the breastworks, formed a skirmish line across the cañon with my regulars and such of the volunteers as I could control, and advanced in the direction the Indians had gone." [58] At the mouth of the Lolo, the remaining Bitterroot volunteers left Rawn and moved up the valley, warily approaching the Nez Perces' camp. Looking Glass appeared, professing friendship, promising to pass through the valley peaceably, and offering the men safe conduct through the village, an offer that the volunteers accepted. [59]

Meanwhile, Rawn and his soldiers, along with the volunteers from Missoula and adjacent communities, returned to their stations amid unfolding criticism of the regulars' inaction. Editorialized one territorial paper: "The Nez Perces, fresh from the victorious slaughters of Idaho, were permitted to pass an entrenched camp . . . under command of a Regular army officer without a shot being fired." [60] "Everybody went home," recalled a volunteer, "the majority mortified and disgusted at the turn affairs had taken." [61] In the aftermath of what became known as "Fort Fizzle," Captain Rawn came under severe criticism from the volunteers for not attempting to prevent the passage of the Nez Perces. "So far as infantry goes," opined the Helena Daily Herald, "they are as useless as boys with pop-guns." [62] Argued one participant:

How Capt. Rawn can make it appear that it was not safe to oppose the passage out of the Lolo when he had 250 well armed men under his command and more arriving hourly, I fail to see. Before dark on Saturday, 28th of July, there would have been 400 men to the front, and by noon the following day one to two hundred more would have been added. [63]

Correspondent Thomas Sutherland, who was with Howard's force, complained that "the conduct of Captain Rawn and the volunteers . . . is very reprehensible and admits of no defense." Concerning the Nez Perces, he wrote, "there is no earthly excuse for their escape." [64] Yet many of Rawn's volunteers had deserted him before the tribesmen passed by, refusing to do anything to cause the warriors to strike back at the Bitterroot residents. The Nez Perces credited Rawn for withholding his men's fire, thereby preventing their disastrous defeat at the barricade. [65] There was also criticism of those volunteers from Missoula, Philipsburg, and Deer Lodge, who turned back at the same time as Rawn, thereby leaving the Bitterroot Valley settlers to meet the threat by themselves. [66] Later, cooler, more reflective assessments voiced approval of Rawn's prudence and judgment.

Of course, while the Fort Fizzle imbroglio was unfolding, General Howard's force was still making preparations to leave Kamiah, over a hundred miles to the west. By the time Howard's various dispositions had been made and the troops were underway, the Nez Perces were well advanced in their journey up the Bitterroot Valley. [67] Howard's march was not easy. After leaving on July 30, the command made sixteen miles to Weippe Prairie and there encamped. "A severe rain . . . kept us company for the entire day, making the marching, which was single file on account of the narrowness of the path, one of the most slippery, sticky, mucky and filthy of the trip." [68] Over the next several days, the soldiers wound their way across "fallen timber and miry bog-holes," ascending along a winding divide "where we find scarcely grass enough to keep our animals alive." [69] Dr. Jenkins A. FitzGerald wrote his wife on August 1: "Last night we had rather an unpleasant time. . . . We went to bed without our tents, and it began to rain about midnight. So I had to get up and make a shelter with a tent fly. . . . Today some beef cattle arrived to serve as food for us all, poor things." [70]

The command was large and unwieldy in its movements across the narrow trail. Far in advance ranged the Indian scouts, followed by a pioneer unit, initially of dismounted cavalrymen but eventually of civilian skilled laborers (later dubbed "skillets" by the soldiers) commanded by Captain William F. Spurgin of the Twenty-first Infantry. The pioneer unit led the way through "the most God-forsaken country troops ever went over." Often the infantry and cavalry alternated in working to clear the road of fallen trees to ease the passage of the column. In one instance, Major Sanford was cited for allowing his men to water his horses "one by one on the trail," a procedure that greatly impeded the soldiers following behind. Insufficient forage for the pack mules additionally slowed progress. [71] At one point, the soldiers came upon an Indian sign, which they interpreted as one of defiance. "It is in the shape of a bow, at least ten feet in length, cut out with a perfect line of beauty, on the bark of a huge black pine tree." [72]

The ponderous advance left some officers doubting whether Howard's force could ever catch and strike the Nez Perces. [73] But conditions improved after the command crested the summit and entered Montana. At Lolo Hot Springs, recalled an officer, "every one, down to the most stoical mule in the packtrain, felt cheered." [74] Dr. FitzGerald again reported to his wife:

Last night we had the most picturesque camp I have ever seena very remarkable spot where there are 4 hot springs. The steam from them this morning rose up as if from a number of steam mills. I bathed my feet in one of them last night and found it as hot as I could bear comfortably. There was good trout fishing in the Lolo nearby, and [Brevet] Colonel Sanford and I got quite a fine string and had them for breakfast. . . . The rumor is that Joseph has left White Bird and Looking Glass and is somewhere in the mountains by himself with his band. . . . Do you know . . . that for nearly every morning of this month [of August] we have found ice in our wash basins and buckets? [75]

By crossing into Montana Territory, General Howard left the Department of the Columbia, in McDowell's Division of the Pacific, and entered the Department of Dakota within Sheridan's Division of the Missouri. He acted on direct orders from Commanding General William T. Sherman, through McDowell, to forsake administrative boundaries in running down the Nez Perces. [76] On August 4, Howard learned from messengers that the Nez Perces "had been permitted to pass through the Lo Lo Cañon," and that Colonel Gibbon's force was approaching Missoula from Fort Shaw. This news at least quelled fears that the tribesmen would somehow double back past Howard to the Camas Prairie. [77] It inspired Howard to move forward next day with Sanford's cavalry and the artillery, leaving the infantry and most of the packs to follow behind, and join Gibbon as quickly as possible. His detached command consisted of "192 cavalrymen, 13 officers, 20 Indian scouts [plus] 2 Howitzers and a Coehorn, with 15 men, 1 officer." [78] He also sent couriers over the back trail to report by telegraph to division headquarters that he had learned that the tribesmen were then camped near the community of Corvallis, in Bitterroot Valley, and likely intended on moving "toward Big Hole Prairie on [the] Elk City trail." [79] On August 6, Howard grazed the animals at Summit Prairie (presently called Packer's Meadows), then pushed on to Lolo Hot Springs, where a courier from Gibbon notified him that the colonel had left Missoula and was pressing down the Bitterroot Valley after the Nez Perces. Gibbon requested cavalry, and Howard sent him word that he was hurrying en route with two hundred horsemen:

I shall join you in the shortest possible time. I would not advise you to wait for me before you get to the Indians, then if you can create delay by skirmishing, by parleying, or maneuvering in any way, so that they shall not get away from you, do so by all means if you think best till I can give you the necessary reinforcements. I think however that the Indians are very short of ammunition, and that you can smash them in pieces if you can get an engagement out of them. Your judgment on the spot will be better than mine. I will push forward with all my might. [80]

From the bivouac at the hot springs, Howard also sent an aide to Missoula requesting that supplies and forage be forwarded to the mouth of Lolo Creek on the Bitterroot. On the eighth, the troops reached Rawn's vacated barricade. A citizen pointed out the Nez Perces' route around the work on the heights on the north. "The position was a very strong one," noted Howard, "and it is to be regretted that the Indians could not have been met and driven back upon me. . . . In truth, I should have been in Missoula by the northern route . . . had I not been detained by reports of the return of the hostiles [to Kamiah] after they had started for Montana." [81] Later on the eighth, Howard reached the mouth of Lolo Creek. Because the Nez Perces had turned south after debouching into the Bitterroot Valley and were now targeted by both Howard's force and that of Colonel Gibbon, he sent a directive north to Colonel Wheaton of the left column to shorten his marches "till you hear from me, for you may not be obliged to come through to Montana." [82] Then, reprovisioning his cavalry and artillery detachment with supplies from Missoula, and the Lolo trail now behind him, Howard set out on Gibbon's trail up the Bitterroot Valley.