Chapter 14: Consequences
General Howard's soldiers steamed down the Missouri
River aboard the Benton and reached Omaha on November 3. Next
day, the four hundred officers and men boarded Union Pacific cars for
the West Coast. Citizens and military personnel from the Platte
department headquarters saw them off, noting that the men appeared
"dirty, ragged and footsore[and] presented a sorry appearance." [1] By estimate, the troops had marched more
than seventeen hundred miles since leaving Kamiah, Idaho Territory, on
July 30, and most of them, by the time they reached their home stations,
had gone approximately seven thousand miles. Howard's march was termed
in the media "the most remarkable on record." [2] The army, of course, tried to cast the most
favorable light possible on what had really been at best a haphazard
campaign and, at worst, a sloppy one. The most immediate encomiums went
to Miles for the quickness of his victory, which contrasted greatly with
the plodding nature of Howard's lengthy pursuit. Congratulations were
extended to Miles after Bear's Paw from Generals Sherman, Sheridan, and
Terry. Colonel Gibbon sent kudos from Fort Shaw, too, telling Miles that
"after coming so far this way to carry off 'our' Indians you might have
come a little farther & paid us a visit here." Later, Sherman issued
an order thanking Howard's command "that pursued them, as well as the
commands of Colonels Sturgis and Miles that headed them off and finally
captured them." [3] Regimental general
orders thanked officers and men of the units involved, [4] and Secretary of War McCrary proclaimed his
"grateful recognition to the zeal, energy, endurance, courage, and skill
displayed by General Howard, Colonel Gibbon, and Colonel Miles, and the
officers and men under their command, in the prosecution of this most
remarkable campaign." [5]
On the evening of November 13, a gala in Howard's
honor took place in Portland with many officers on hand who served under
him during the campaign. The reception was held at Turn Halle, and
Washington and Oregon militia units accompanied the general into the
festooned hall to an artillery salute. After welcoming speeches and
recitations about the campaign, Howard rose to a thunderous ovation and
told the throng: "There has been one campaign continuous, and, we claim,
systematic, extending from the time the savage murderers of Idaho forced
the unequal battle of White Bird Canyon to the last scene when Col.
Miles stood at my side to receive the surrendered rifle of the Indian
Chief." [6] On December 1, 1877, Howard
issued General Field Orders No. 8, congratulating the men of the
Department of the Columbia who participated in his campaign, including
"officers and soldiers of the Army, volunteers, scouts, and other
citizens, who rendered in various capacities willing and valuable aid as
occasion demanded."
From the 14th of June to the 5th of October the
pursuit was continuousnot a day passed that some part of the force
was not marching, crossing torrents, climbing mountains or threading
their rocky defiles. From the Snake and Salmon Rivers in Northeastern
Idaho, across the Continent, to within a day's march of the "British
Line," you pursued a foe, at first cruel, arrogant, and boastful; but
after the successful battle of the Clearwater, intent only on escaping
and eluding your attack. [7]
The tributes to and from Howard, while sincere, also
helped assuage the bitter and sometimes unjust criticism he had received
throughout most of the course of the campaign. Although Howard
rationalized his performance to the best advantage, it was perceived
generally in a negative light by the media, especially after Miles's
sudden victory at Bear's Paw. In his report of August 27, 1877, written
at Henry's Lake, Howardalready under scrutiny by the
presshad enumerated the positive results of his campaign thus far
as (1) the end of citizen murders by the Nez Perces after the Battle of
White Bird Canyon; (2) the ejection of the tribesmen from the
Salmon-Snake river country and the destruction of Looking Glass's
village; (3) the anticipation of the movements of the Nez Perces at
Cottonwood, leading to the victory at the Battle of the Clearwater; and
(4) the driving of the Nez Perces out of Kamiah, their pursuit out of
Idaho into the buffalo country, and "the Department of the Columbia
freed from their presence." [8] Before
Howard's departure from Idaho Territory, his campaign drew little
negative editorial comment in the regional press, even if the New
York Herald had mentioned the government's deliberation over
replacing him with Crook as early as July 16. His perceived ambulatory
progress began to draw sharp notice after the post-Clearwater failure to
check the tribesmen before they headed out over the Lolo Trail. After
the Fort Fizzle episode, Howard complained of the editorial criticism to
Governor Potts in a letter that was widely reproduced. Later, when
Sherman contemplated replacing Howard with Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert,
the news found its way into print. [9] The
Philadelphia Times called Howard a "feeble braggart" whose
"career, both military and civil, has been a lamentable failure." [10] After Camas Meadows, the New York
Herald averred that "Howard now finds himself reviled as a failure
by a public which supposed that he was pursuing the Indians when, in
fact, they were pursuing him." [11] (In
fact, the Nez Perces themselves grew contemptuous of the general,
applying to him the sobriquet, "Day After Tomorrow," because of his
propensity to fall so far behind them. [12]) Howard believed that the newspaper abuse
of him for a perceived lack of aggressiveness was patently unfair. He
was likely correct, for it is implausible that anybody could have done
more under the circumstances that existed regarding terrain and
logistics, factors augmented by the extreme determination and mobility
of the Nez Perces. Even McDowell failed to appreciate these realities,
and his own critique of Howard's campaign to his department commander
was devastating. [13] A major criticism of
Howard, however, has to be leveled at his role in the councils preceding
the Salmon River murders. At the least, his lack of diplomatic
sensitivity at Fort Lapwai contributed to creating an atmosphere that
promoted the outbreak of violence. Moreover, the presence of troops to
bolster the dictums of agents of the Indian Bureau only exacerbated
existing intratribal tensions and promoted the inevitability of open
conflict.
Conversely, in Howard's support it must be said that
he did what he could initially with the limited force at his disposal;
requests for reinforcements were in process when the fight at White Bird
Canyon commenced. And later, with a weary, footsore army, he kept moving
forward, although the realities of the march made whatever progress he
achieved nearly unbearable. Persistent criticism that he remained in
camp every Sunday to conduct church services for his men was unfounded.
"As to the story that he peddled out Bibles to the soldiers, . . . there
was not one in the force, the General himself only having a 'Daily Food'
selection of Bible texts, which he carried in his vest pocket." [14] The Army and Navy Journal went to
Howard's defense:
Howard followed his game untiringly through two
[sicthree] departments and over twelve hundred miles of territory,
and 'got in at the death,' in hunter's phrase. The fact is equally plain
and equally to his credit that after he had hunted his prey successively
into the grasp of Sturgis and Miles, General Howard refused to
appropriate any of the glory of the final exploit to himself, leaving
the command in the hands of Miles. [15]
In an attempt to defuse the censure, Howard issued a
highly defensive "Supplementary Report" of his campaign, most of which
was drafted by Lieutenant Wood, and which was published at the end of
the Report of the Secretary of War, 1877, as well as in a
separate edition. So averse was he to the criticism of his reputed
slothful pace throughout the expedition that he closed the paper with a
point-by-point rebuttal to specific charges regarding his rate of march
to White Bird Canyon and to the battlefield at Clearwater, his perceived
delay in starting over the Lolo trail, and his proximity to the Nez
Perces at various points of the march. In support of his contention, he
offered a statistical summary showing, for example, that "the march to
Captain Perry's battle-field, of 80 miles, averaged 2 5/8 miles per
hour, including all rests and halts." He also presented a computation of
"exceptional marches" made by his total force, which included the
mileage of treks of consecutive days, and a table showing that in
seventy-five days his force traveled 1,321 miles from Weippe in Idaho
Territory to the embarkation point on the Missouri River, making an
average daily distance of 17.61 miles. [16]
While the data must have contributed to clearing up the record in
Howard's mind, the public perception of his tardiness in the Nez Perce
War, created in large measure by the media, remained.
The combination of bad luck and bad press dogged
Howard beyond the end of the campaign. While he continued to draw heated
criticism, Miles, conversely, basked in the publicity for his work at
Bear's Paw and emerged as the leading Indian fighter in the army,
notably rivaling Crook and supplanting the dead Custer. [17] Unfortunately, the controversy that
swirled between Howard and Miles in the weeks and months following the
surrender at Bear's Paw only added to Howard's woes and tarnished what
had earlier been touted as an air of cooperation that had brought about
the final success of arms. Miles's initial messages from the battlefield
following the capitulation of the Nez Perces slighted (probably
purposefully) Howard's presence there. In his announcement of victory on
October 5, Miles stated that "We have had our usual success," but made
no mention of Howard or the role of his two Nez Perce interpreters in
undertaking the negotiations leading to the surrender. And in his more
lengthy report of the next day, the colonel acknowledged only that
Howard "arrived on the evening of the 4th, having come forward in
advance with a small escort," and only at the very end of his dispatch.
He was more gracious in his congratulatory message of October 7, in
which he cited the general's presence "to witness the completion of his
arduous and thankless undertaking." [18]
For his part, Howard seemed satisfied. "Permit me to congratulate you
with all my heart," he intoned in his letter of October 7 to Miles, "and
give you, your officers and men, my sincere thanks for your grand
success." [19]
But in the aftermath of the event, Howard's attitude
soured. He believed that Miles's initial dispatchpurportedly
mentioning that Howard was present and had assisted in the
surrenderhad been forwarded purposefully omitting any reference to
himself; in fact, the brief statement of October 5 announcing Joseph's
surrender (and subsequently published both in tabloids and in Report
of the Secretary of War, 1877) did not contain a reference to
Howard. The dispatch of the following day, while alluding to his
presence, was not published in its entirety, and the portion published
did not include the reference to Howard. Thus, the acknowledgment did
not appear in the newspapers, and editorially Miles was credited solely
with the victory. Howard, deprived of any of the initial reward, came to
believe that the original dispatch had mentioned him, but that
Miles had deviously expunged the reference before his courier departed
the battlefield.
Howard learned of the omission on arriving in
Bismarck. He was, recalled Lieutenant Wood, at once "heart-broken and
furious." On October 22, he telegraphed to Sheridan a report in which he
stressed his intentional slowing of his command to let Miles overtake
the tribesmen, as well as the role of his Nez Perce interpreters in
producing the surrender. Then he and Wood journeyed to Chicago,
ostensibly to discuss the arrangements he had made with Miles respecting
the Nez Perces. There Wood delivered an account of the surrender,
together with a copy of Howard's report to Sheridan"a flattering account
of his share in the hostilities" to the Chicago Tribune
(published the morning of October 25). Howard also granted a
disconsolate and paranoiac interview to the Chicago Times
(published October 26) and then sought an audience with a fuming
Sheridanwho believed the publication of the dispatch to be a
breach of military formalityto set the record straight. [20] In a letter to the division commander, a
contrite Howard wrote:
I wish to assume the entire responsibility for the
publication of the dispatch sent to you from the Missouri River. I
wished the publication made with a view of placing in succinct form
before the public the facts of the campaign as they appeared to me and I
did not dream of there being any objection from yourself in the
premises, and I am very sorry to have compromised you in any way. [21]
Miles initially stayed aloof from the brewing storm,
but eventually he could not resist getting involved, despite Sherman's
private admonition to him to "Keep quiet." [22] In December, Howard addressed a note to
Miles: "In my presence, in your tent, you inserted the fact of my being
with yougiving, I think, the arrival, the evening before. Were the
words of this struck out before the dispatch left you or after?" [23] More than a month later, Miles wrote back,
assuring Howard that the October 6 dispatch had gone forward in its
entirety; he also noted that the newspapers had omitted the last
paragraph of his general order of the seventh in which Howard's presence
was mentioned. Miles continued: "If this garbling of official documents
has been done by one officer to the prejudice of another, it has been
done without my knowledge and outside of my command, and in my opinion
is a dishonorable act." Then he took Howard to task:
Your statements in public, your official documents
and comments thereon, particularly your congratulatory order, have been
received with just indignation, as the representations contained therein
are not considered in accordance with well-known facts, or your letters
written to me at the time. I can appreciate your desire to compliment
your own troops, but I regret that you should have found it necessary to
claim that which you were not entitled to, as well as to ignore the
bloody engagements on this side of the mountains, for in so doing, you
do an injustice to those who were killed and wounded, days after you,
with your command, had abandoned the pursuit. [24]
For the next several months, Howard and Miles
exchanged a bitter correspondence over the affair, with Miles just as
adamantly critical of the general's slighting of his command's role in
his public accounts. In one letter to Miles in 1878, Howard claimed to
be "astonished" at Miles's allegations. Howard wrote that:
My own report has, I think, done you and your
officers no injustice. I claim nothing but simple truth, and would, as
you know, rather have honored you than myself. You fought the battle and
succeeded and if there is any language in which I can state it to the
credit of yourself, your officers and your men I was willing, and remain
willing to do so. [25]
Miles responded to Howard: "You virtually gave up the
pursuit." But the dispute always came back to the initial announcement
of the victory. Almost twenty years later, Howard still complained that
"the telegram . . . should not have been altered so as to leave out the
fact of my being there. Who changed the telegram I do not know. Gen.
Miles was my devoted friend till then." [26]
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