MANZANAR
Historic Resource Study/Special History Study
|
|
CHAPTER FIVE:
RELOCATION CENTERS UNDER THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE WAR RELOCATION AUTHORITY (continued)
EVACUEES' EXPERIENCES DURING TRANSFER TO
RELOCATION CENTERS
Notwithstanding the Army's planning efforts for the transfer of
evacuees from the assembly to the relocation centers, the evacuees often
experienced less than ideal conditions. In its Second Quarterly
Report, the WRA reported that during the summer and early fall of
1942 "contingent after contingent of evacuees boarded trains at the
assembly centers and travelled hundreds of miles farther inland to the
partially completed relocation centers." In addition some 8,000 to 9,000
people of Japanese ancestry were moved from their homes in the eastern
half of California (Military Area No. 2 portion of the state) directly
into relocation centers beginning on July 9. The WRA observed that in
"planning the movement to relocation centers, every effort was made to
hold families intact and to bring together people who came originally
from a common locality." However, the agency noted:
Evacuees from the San Francisco Bay Area, for example, were first
moved to the Tanforan and Santa Anita Assembly Centers and later
reunited at the Central Utah Relocation Center. Colorado River
Relocation Center drew its population largely from the Imperial Valley,
from the Salinas and Pinedale Assembly Centers, and Military Area No. 2.
The two northern-most relocation centers Minidoka in Idaho and
Heart Mountain in Wyoming received their contingents mainly from
the assembly centers at Puyallup, Washington and at North Portland,
Oregon. Gila River absorbed the whole population of the assembly centers
at Tulare and Turlock, plus several contingents from Santa Anita and
others from Military No. 2.
"Despite this general pattern," however, the WRA reported that "some
mingling of heterogeneous populations was inevitable." Evacuees at the
Santa Anita Assembly Center, for example, "were widely dispersed in the
movement to relocation centers." "These people, most of whom were
originally from Los Angeles, were scattered among the Gila River,
Granada, Central Utah, and Rohwer Relocation Centers." Later, some Santa
Anita evacuees would also be sent to Manzanar and Jerome. At Granada,
"where the highly urban Santa Anita people were combined with
predominantly rural contingents from the Merced Assembly Center," the
WRA noted that "some minor tensions had already developed between the
two groups before" the end of September. "Sincere efforts were being
made on both sides, however, to create a better mutual understanding and
to develop greater community solidarity." [43]
The train trips, particularly the longer ones, were often
uncomfortable for the evacuees. Even on trips of several days, sleeping
berths were provided only for infants, invalids, and others who were
physically incapacitated. Most evacuees sat up during the entire trip,
and mothers with small children who were allowed berths were separated
from their husbands. Ventilation was poor because the military had
ordered that the shades be drawn for security purposes. The toilets
sometimes flooded, soaking suitcases and belongings on the floor. The
trips were slow because the trains were old, and sometimes they were
shunted to sidings while higher-priority trains passed. Delays could be
as long as ten hours. Arrangements for meals were sometimes less than
satisfactory, and medical care was frequently poor. Although the WCCA
had ordered that trains be stopped and ailing evacuees hospitalized
along the route, at least two infants died during the journeys. [44]
Some evacuees were harassed by the military guards. One evacuee later
recalled:
When we finally reached our destination, four of us men were ordered
by the military personnel carrying guns to follow them. We were directed
to unload the pile of evacuees' belongings from the boxcars to the
semi-trailer truck to be transported to the concentration camp. During
the interim, after filling one trailer truck and waiting for the next to
arrive, we were hot and sweaty and sitting, trying to conserve our
energy, when one of the military guards standing with his gun, suggested
that one of us should get a drink of water at the nearby water faucet
and try and make a run for it so he could get some target practice. [45]
Another evacuee remembered:
At Parker, Arizona, we were transferred to buses. With baggage and
carryalls hanging from my arm, I was contemplating what I could leave
behind, since my husband was not allowed to come to my aid. A soldier
said, "Let me help you, put your arm out." He proceeded to pile
everything on my arm. And to my horror, he placed my two-month-old baby
on top of the stack. He then pushed me with the butt of the gun and told
me to get off the train, knowing when I stepped off the train my baby
would fall to the ground. I refused. But he kept prodding and ordering
me to move. I will always be thankful [that] a lieutenant checking the
cars came upon us. He took the baby down, gave her to me, and then
ordered the soldier to carry all our belongings to the bus and see that
I was seated and then report back to him. [46]
At the end of the lengthy train trips were the new relocation
centers. To travel-weary refugees, the spectacle of guard towers and
armed sentries in the middle of vast, primitive expanses of nothingness
came as a rude shock, especially since they had been assured that the
relocation centers were to be residential communities without the most
repressive aspects of the hastily-constructed assembly centers. [47] Upon arrival at the relocation centers the
evacuees underwent an often grueling "intake" procedure, which usually
took about two hours. The process included five principal steps: (1) a
medical check; (2) issuance of registration and address forms to each
family group; (3) assignment to quarters; (4) emergency recruitment of
evacuees needed in the mess halls and other essential community
services; and (5) delivery of hand baggage to individual families. [48]
In his The Governing of Men, Alexander H. Leighton described
the "intake" process and its effect on the evacuees at the Poston
relocation center. He observed:
In May the physical shell of Poston began to fill with its human
occupants. First came the volunteers and then a swelling stream of
evacuees until the city of barracks had become alive. . . .
[The] first volunteers were soon followed by others until a total of
251 turned to work in the growing heat and cleaned up the barracks for
the 7,450 evacuees who arrived during the succeeding three weeks. The
volunteers worked at the receiving stations interviewing, registering,
housing and explaining to the travel-weary newcomers what they must do
and where they must go. . . .
The new arrivals, coming in a steady stream, were poured into empty
blocks one after another, as into a series of bottles. The reception
procedure became known as "intake" and it left a lasting impression on
all who witnessed or took part in it.When the bus stops, its forty
occupants quietly peer out to see what Poston is like. A friend is
recognized and hands wave. The bus is large and comfortable, but the
people look tired and wilted, with perspiration running off their noses.
They have been on the train for twenty-four hours and have been hot
since they crossed the Sierras, with long Waits at desert stations. . .
.
They begin to file out of the bus, clutching tightly to children and
bundles. Military Police escorts anxiously help and guides direct them
in English and Japanese. They are sent into the mess halls where girls
hand them ice water, salt tablets and wet towels. In the back are cots
where those who faint can be stretched out, and the cots are usually
occupied. At long tables sit interviewers suggesting enlistment in the
War Relocation Works Corps. . . . Men and women, still sweating, holding
on to children and bundles, try to think. A whirlwind comes and throws
clouds of dust into the mess hail, into the water and into the faces of
the people while papers fly in all directions. . . .
Interviewers ask some questions about former occupations so that
cooks and other types of workers much needed in the camp can be quickly
secured. Finally, fingerprints are made and the evacuees troop out
across an open space and into another hall for housing allotment,
registration and a cursory physical examination . . . In the end, the
evacuees are loaded onto trucks along with their hand baggage and driven
to their new quarters; there each group who will live together is left
to survey a room 20 by 25 feet with bare boards, knotholes through the
floor and into the next apartment, heaps of dust, and for each person an
army cot, a blanket and a sack which can be filled with straw to make a
mattress. There is nothing else. No shelves, closets, chairs, tables or
screens. In this space 5 to 7 people, and in a few cases 8, men, women
and their children, are to live indefinitely.
"Intake" was a focus of interest and solicitude on the part of the
administrative staff. The Project Director said it was one of the things
he would remember longest out of the whole experience at Poston, He
thought the people looked lost, not knowing what to do or what to think.
[49]
While the intake process was an inauspicious introduction to the WRA
for the evacuees, the physical condition of the relocation centers at
the time of arrival also contributed to their feelings of disaffection.
At the end of September the WRA reported on living conditions in the
centers:
Seriously hampered by wartime shortages of materials and wartime
transportation problems, construction of the relocation communities went
busily forward under supervision of the Army Corps of Engineers
throughout the summer months, At most centers, the building of evacuee
barracks was finished on or very close to schedule, Installation of
utilities, however, involved more critical materials and consequently
moved forward at a considerably slower rate. At some of the centers,
evacuees were forced temporarily to live in barracks without lights,
laundry facilities, or adequate toilets. Mess halls planned to
accommodate about 300 people had to handle twice and three times that
number for short periods as evacuees poured in from assembly centers on
schedule and shipment of stoves and kitchen facilities lagged behind. In
a few cases, where cots were not delivered on time, some newly arriving
evacuees spent their first night in relocation centers sleeping on
barracks floors. At nearly all centers, evacuee living standards
temporarily were forced, largely by inevitable wartime conditions, far
below the level originally contemplated by the War Relocation
Authority.
The WRA went on to report that "most of these difficulties were
either straightened out or well on the way to solution" by the end of
September. Still ahead, however, was "the sizable job of constructing
buildings which were not included in the agreement with the War
Department" such as schools and administrative housing. "With the fall
term already started at most public schools in the United States,
evacuee children were getting ready to resume their education in
barracks and other buildings which were never intended for classroom
use." [50]
Other developments also contributed to the confusion and disgust of
many evacuees as they entered the relocation centers, One of the most
disconcerting issues confronting both the WRA and its new charges was
the agency's unreadiness to undertake its mandate. Having selected the
sites for the relocation centers, the WRA quickly turned to its second
job development of policies and procedures that would control the
lives of the evacuees while the centers were being constructed.
In his letter to Eisenhower on April 6, Masaoka set forth a long list of
recommendations for regulating life in the camps and stressed, among
other things, the importance of respecting the citizenship of the Nisei,
protecting the health of elderly Issei, providing educational
opportunities, and recognizing that the evacuees were "American" in
their outlook and wanted to make a contribution to the war effort. [51]
Although the WRA agreed with many of these recommendations, it was
slow in developing policies for operating the relocation centers. The
WRA would later describe the difficulties it encountered as it grappled
with the issue of policy formulation:
Ideally the War Relocation Authority should have had a complete set
of operating policies drawn up and ready to go into effect when the
first contingent of 54 evacuees arrived at the gates of the Colorado
River Relocation Center on May 8, 1942. Actually it was 3 weeks after
this date before the agency produced a set of policies which were then
frankly labeled by the Director as 'tentative, still fairly crude, and
subject to immediate change.' And it was not until August, when more
than half of the evacuee population had been transferred to WRA
supervision, that the Authority was able to provide the centers with
carefully conceived and really dependable answers to some of the more
basic questions of community management.
The chief reason for the delay in producing a reliable set of basic
policies lies in the fact that WRA had to start virtually from scratch,
. . . no agency governmental or private had ever been
called upon before to care for the needs of a tenth of a million men,
women, and children who had been uprooted from their homes under a cloud
of widespread popular distrust in time of total war. The problem of
managing camps under these conditions were so unprecedented, so complex,
and so unpredictable that the process of policy formulation continued,
at varying levels of intensity, throughout the major part of the
agency's active life. Nevertheless, the principal outlines of center
management policy were laid down in 1942 in tentative form in a
statement issued at the Washington office on May 29 and then, somewhat
more thoughtfully and against a brief background of actual operating
experience, in an agency conference held at San Francisco in the middle
of August. [52]
Given the limited time available and the novelty of WRA's task as
both jailer and advocate for the evacuees, it is not surprising that the
agency was not fully prepared for the evacuees when they began arriving
at the relocation centers, Furthermore, the "Tentative Policy Statement"
issued in mimeographed form on May 29 must have left the evacuees
puzzled and confused. Committed to a policy of detention even before the
relocation centers were completed, the WRA announced that it had begun
making plans to assure evacuees "for the duration of the war and as
nearly as wartime exigencies permit, an equitable substitute for the
life, work, and homes given up, and to facilitate participation in the
productive life of America both during and after the war." [53] Nevertheless, the fact that WRA was unable
to provide dependable answers to basic questions, such as policies on
evacuee employment and compensation, self-government, internal security,
education, agricultural production, and consumer enterprises in the
relocation centers, until late August and early September contributed to
the disaffection and anxiety that increasingly characterized evacuee
reactions to the relocation centers. [54]
The confluence of diverse political interests had again conspired
against the evacuees. The condition of the relocation centers at which
the evacuees arrived in 1942 were barely an improvement over the hastily
constructed and makeshift assembly centers they had left. The increased
freedom and possible resettlement they had anticipated had been reversed
in favor of confinement, and the rules and policies that would govern
their uprooted lives for the indefinite future were uncertain,
tentative, or non-existent, The Manzanar War Relocation Center, located
in the arid expanse of Owens Valley in eastern California, will provide
a poignant case history of the WRA administered program to both detain
and relocate persons of Japanese ancestry during World War II.
manz/hrs/hrs5e.htm
Last Updated: 01-Jan-2002
|