MANZANAR Historic Resource Study/Special History Study

SECURITY

The commanding generals of each sector of the Western Defense Command were responsible to DeWitt for the external security at each of the assembly centers. One or more military police companies were assigned to each assembly center "as required by the area and evacuee population involved.

The basic function of the military police at the assembly centers was to guard the camp perimeters and to "prevent ingress and egress of unauthorized persons [without passes issued by the WCCA]." According to the Operation Manual, the assembly centers were "generally located in grounds surrounded by fences clearly defining the limits for evacuees." In centers "having no fences, and boundaries marked only by signs, the military police" were to "control the roads leading into the Center and may have sentry towers placed to observe the evacuee barracks," The "balance of the area could "be covered by motor patrol." [16] If an evacuee attempted to leave camp without permission, he would be halted, arrested, and delivered to the center internal civilian police. A "firm but courteous" attitude toward the evacuees was required, but the military police were not permitted to fraternize with them. The military police were permitted within the areas occupied by the evacuees only when performing their prescribed duties. In the event of a fire, riot, or disorder which was beyond the control of center management or its internal police, assembly center officials were authorized to call for assistance from the military police. When they were called, the "commanding officer assumed full charge of the entire Center until the emergency was ended." The commanding officer of the military police was responsible for black-outs of the centers, and a switch was to "be so located to permit the prompt cut-off by the military police of all electric current in the center." The military police were also responsible for protection of merchandise at the post exchanges furnished for the use of the military personnel.

Original plans for internal security at each center contemplated a civilian law enforcement body consisting of an experienced Caucasian peace officer as chief of police and one other Caucasian assistant, with evacuees to serve as patrolmen. Early in the operation of the first centers, "disaffection among the evacuees" became "rampant," necessitating a change in plans. An Interior Security Branch was established in the central office of the WCCA, and an army officer with previous experience as a student of municipal affairs and as a metropolitan police chief was assigned as chief. Caucasian civilians with municipal police experience were employed as assistant chiefs of the branch, inspectors, and planning assistants. An experienced municipal police officer, directly responsible to the WCCA, was employed as chief of interior security police in each center. An assistant chief and two or more sergeants rounded out his Caucasian staff. A number of patrolmen were recruited from the evacuee population. The proportion of interior security police was four per one thousand evacuee population. Duties of the internal security police, as governed by an Interior Security Manual, included inspection of all incoming and outgoing parcels, except letter mail, for contraband; inspection of all vehicles passing through entrances and exits; supervision of visitors; patrol of mess halls; and escort of all evacuees who were authorized by the center manager to leave the center. The personnel of the Interior Security Branch reached its maximum in the month of July 1942 with a total of 334 employees — 319 in the assembly centers and 15 in the WCCA headquarters.

Charges for criminal offenses in the assembly centers totaled 534 between April 25 and October 25, 1942. The largest categories of offenses were larceny (theft), 123; "suspicion," 117; disorderly conduct, 72; gambling, 55; and assault, 36.

To assist in keeping the peace and regulating foot and motorized traffic during the early operations of the assembly centers, the chiefs of internal security recruited staffs of auxiliary police from among evacuees. This practice, according to DeWitt, "proved wholly unsuccessful." Their alleged "transgressions" included extending special privileges to influential evacuees, demanding extra compensation and privileges, protecting gambling rings, and participating in demonstrations and disturbances. Thus, after "more than a fair trial," the evacuee auxiliaries were disbanded.

Direct liaison was established between the internal security police at each center and local law enforcement agencies, county attorneys, and courts. All internal security police at each center received deputizations from local county sheriffs except in those cases where the center was entirely within a municipality. There special police commissions were issued by local police chiefs. Violations of local ordinances and state laws were tried in local courts before local prosecutors.

Subversive activities and violations of federal laws were investigated by the FBI and prosecuted in the federal courts. Internal security police conducted preliminary investigations, reported those that appeared to be federal violations to the FBI, and cooperated with FBI agents in further investigations and the apprehension of violators. [17]