MANZANAR Historic Resource Study/Special History Study

VOLUNTARY EVACUATION

In late February and early March, both the War Department and General DeWitt hoped that the mere announcement of prohibited and restricted zones would induce a voluntary migration out of these zones, as had been the case in the California prohibited zones previously announced by the Department of Justice in the aftermath of the Pearl Harbor attack. Bendetsen, for example, noted that many aliens ordered to move after Pearl Harbor had found new residences for themselves; thus, he felt the Army should not advertise that it would provide food and housing for those it displaced because numerous aliens might take advantage of a free "living." He also supported voluntary migration because he thought the Army should not be responsible for resettlement, since such action would divert the military from its primary task of winning the war. DeWitt estimated that 15,000 persons moved out of the Justice Department's prohibited zones by midnight, February 24 Most of them had moved into adjacent restricted zones in urban areas. Thus, in his press release of March 2, DeWitt urged the continuation of this voluntary migration of Japanese from Military Area No. 1 along the coast to the interior. [24]

It soon became apparent to many observers, however, that the voluntary program could not work. As early as February 21, the Tolan Committee received complaints from interior areas to which the evacuees were moving, indicating that fears of sabotage and destruction were spreading inland. [25] The Japanese who were willing to migrate also struggled with problems of insecurity as evidenced by a statement to the Tolan Committee by the Emergency Defense Council of the Seattle Chapter, Japanese American Citizens League:

A large number of people have remarked that they will go where the Government orders them to go, willingly, if it will help the national defense effort. But the biggest problem in their minds is where to go. The first unofficial evacuation announcement pointed out that the Government did not concern itself with where evacuees went, just so they left prohibited areas. Obviously this was no solution to the question, for immediately, from Yakima, Idaho, Montana, Colorado and elsewhere authoritative voices shouted: 'No Japs wanted Here!'

The Japanese feared with reason that, forced to vacate their homes, unable to find a place to stay, they would be kicked from town to town in the interior like the 'Okies' of John Steinbeck's novel. Others went further, and envisioned the day when inhabitants of inland States, aroused by the steady influx of Japanese, would refuse to sell gasoline and food to them. They saw, too, the possibility of mob action against them as exhausted, impoverished and unable to travel further, they stopped in some town or village where they were not wanted. [26]

As a result of such developments, political officials, including Earl Warren and Richard Neustadt, the regional director of the Federal Security Agency, realized that only a mandatory evacuation and relocation program operated by the government could work. [27]

The reaction from the interior states was direct and forceful. On February 21, for instance, Governor Carville of Nevada informed General DeWitt that permitting unsupervised enemy aliens to go to all parts of the country, particularly his state, would be conducive to the spread of sabotage and subversive activities:

I have made the statement here that enemy aliens would be accepted in the State of Nevada under proper supervision. This would apply to concentration camps as well as to those who might be allowed to farm or do such other things as they could do in helping out. This is the attitude that I am going to maintain in this State and I do not desire that Nevada be made a dumping ground for enemy aliens to be going anywhere they might see fit for travel. [28]

Although Governor Ralph L. Carr of Colorado was characterized by many contemporaries as the one mountain state chief executive receptive to relocation of the Issei and Nisei, his radio address of February 28, 1942, offered a vivid impression of the emotions associated with the relocation of the Japanese in the interior:

If those who command the armed forces of our Nation say that it is necessary to remove any persons from the Pacific coast and call upon Colorado to do her part in this war by furnishing temporary quarters for those individuals, we stand ready to carry out that order. If any enemy aliens must be transferred as a war measure, then we of Colorado are big enough and patriotic enough to do our duty. We announce to the world that 1,118,000 red-blooded citizens of this State are able to take care of 3,500 or any number of enemies, if that be the task which is allotted to us. . . .

The people of Colorado are giving their sons, are offering their possessions, are surrendering their rights and privileges to the end that this war may be fought to victory and permanent peace. If it is our duty to receive disloyal persons, we shall welcome the performance of that task.

This statement must not be construed as an invitation, however. Only because the needs of our Nation dictate it, do we even consider such an arrangement. In making the transfers, we can feel assured that governmental agencies will take every precaution to protect our people, our defense projects, and our property from the same menace which demands their removal from those sections. [29]

Federal officials were also beginning to realize the hardship which the "voluntary" program was posing for evacuees. Secretary Knox, for instance, forwarded to the attorney general a report that the situation of the Japanese in southern California was becoming critical because they were being forced to move with no provision for housing or means of livelihood. McCloy, who although continuing to favor the voluntary program, wrote to Harry Hopkins, one President Roosevelt's leading advisers at the White House, that one "of the drawbacks they have is the loss of their property. A number of forced sales are taking place, and, until the last minute, they hate to leave their land or their shop." [30]

Inevitably, the voluntary evacuation failed. On March 21, Colonel Bendetsen recommended the termination of voluntary migration, and four days later DeWitt determined that it should end. The Army recognized this failure in Public Proclamation No. 4 issued on March 27, the same day that Public Proclamation No. 3 went into effect. The proclamation prohibited all persons of Japanese ancestry in Military Area No. 1, where most of them still lived, from changing their residence without permission or approval from the Army, effective midnight, March 29. [31] The Western Defense Command explained that the proclamation was designed "to ensure an orderly, supervised, and thoroughly controlled evacuation with adequate provision for the protection . . . of the evacuees as well as their property." Thus, the evacuees, according to the military, would be shielded from intense public hostility by this approach. [32]

Government statistics, although not entirely consistent, show the failure of the voluntary evacuation program. The change-of-address cards required by Public Proclamation No. 1 show the number of people who voluntarily relocated before March 29. In the three weeks following March 2, only 2,005 of the approximately 107,500 persons of Japanese descent who lived in Military Area No. 1 moved out. These statistics alone demonstrated that voluntary migration would not achieve evacuation. Public Proclamation No. 4 was issued on March 27 and became effective at midnight March 29. In the interval, approximately 2,500 cards show moves out of Military Areas Nos. 1 and 2. The statistics in the War Department's Final Report show discrepancies concerning the number of voluntary evacuees. They show that from March 12 to June 30, 1942, 10,312 persons reported their "voluntary" intention to move out of Military Area No, 1. But a net total of less than half that number — 4,889 — left the areas as part of the voluntary program. Of these voluntary migrants, 1,963 went to Colorado, 1,519 to Utah, 305 to Idaho, 208 to eastern Washington, 115 to eastern Oregon, and the remainder to other states. The Final Report concludes that this net total "probably accounts for 90 percent of the total number of Japanese ... who voluntarily left the West Coast area for inland points." [33]