MANZANAR Historic Resource Study/Special History Study

NATIONAL HISTORIC CONTEXT (continued)

Segregation Program

The idea of separating the evacuated people into two groups on the basis of their "fundamental loyalties" stemmed back to the earliest days of the government's evacuation program. During the spring of 1942 Lieutenant Commander K. D. Ringle, Military Attache for the WRA from Naval Intelligence, prepared recommendations for segregation of those evacuees determined to be "disloyal." He urged the agency to conduct a segregation program based on the assumption that the overwhelming majority of "disloyal" evacuees would be found among the Kibei and their alien parents. Under his proposal, all Kibei should be questioned by administrative boards in the relocation centers and "called upon to declare and demonstrate where their natural sympathies lay." This early recommendation for the military's desire to divide persons of Japanese ancestry based on "loyalty," and especially singling out the Kibei for such segregation, would continue to be a theme that military authorities emphasized throughout 1942. [34]

In mid-December 1942 DeWitt proposed a more draconian plan for segregation. His plan envisioned a surprise move by military authorities in which designated evacuees would be gathered, placed aboard trains, and moved to the Poston relocation center, where evacuees not to be segregated would then be removed. The people to be segregated would include those who wished repatriation or expatriation; parolees from detention or internment camps to relocation centers; those with "evaluated" police records during their confinement in assembly or relocation centers; others whom the intelligence services identified as "potentially dangerous;" and immediate families of segregants or wished to join them. The plan, if implemented, would have affected approximately 60,000 persons, or more than half of the evacuee population in the relocation centers. [35]

The WRA, although itself considering segregation, objected to DeWitt's drastic proposals, because they suggested segregating by category and called for secrecy, military control, cancellation of normal relocation center activities, and raised the probability of rioting and bloodshed. Three steps already under way would, the WRA hoped, eliminate the need for segregation: the indefinite leave program; Justice Department custody for aliens whom the WRA believed should be interned; and an isolation center at Leupp for relocation center "troublemakers."

During the spring of 1943, however, pressures from the aforementioned Congressional investigations, War Department officials, and the Japanese American Citizens League, coupled with the larger-than-expected negative reaction to the registration program, provided the backdrop for a WRA-administered segregation program. From the beginning, however, the WRA took the position "that such a separation would have to be made with the utmost care and only after painstaking consideration of each individual case." Thus, once the registration program had been completed and the results had been tabulated, the WRA was "in position for the first time to undertake a really sound and equitable program of segregation."

Several developments indicated "the desirability of such a program" by May 1943. First, the disturbances at Manzanar and Poston in late 1942, together with the turmoil at Tule Lake and other relocation centers during the registration program in early 1943, demonstrated "that serious social tensions at the centers would doubtless continue and perhaps intensify as long as people of sharply diverging loyalties remained quartered close together." Second, many of the evacuees "whose loyalties lay with Japan — those, for example, who had requested repatriation — wanted nothing so much as to remain secluded for the duration of the war." Third, the "admixture of a disloyal minority in the population at relocation Centers was undoubtedly confusing the public mind about the loyalties of the entire group." Once "the patently disloyal had been weeded out," the WRA felt that the "problem of gaining public acceptance for relocation of the remainder would likely be greatly simplified." [36]

At a meeting of the project directors at WRA headquarters in Washington in late May 1943, the major point of discussion was a segregation program. Considerable attention was given to the fact that both "loyal" and "disloyal" elements in the centers were pressing for segregation as a way of alleviating the mounting tensions resulting from the turmoil in the aftermath of the registration program. When a final vote was taken at the end of this meeting, the overwhelming consensus of opinion was for segregation. By a vote of ten to one the final obstacle in the way of another forced movement of Japanese Americans had been cleared. All that remained was the development of procedures for the implementation of the program. The targeted groups and individuals to be segregated included repatriates and expatriates; those with records indicating subversive activities; those who answered "No" to Question 28 or provided seriously qualified answers to the question; and passive resisters. [37]

One of the initial problems faced by WRA administrators in connection with segregation was to find a place where the segregants might be quartered. As early as November 1942, the WRA attempted to find a suitable site for housing repatriates apart from other evacuees, but the search had been unsuccessful. By June 1943, however, the population of the ten relocation centers had dropped to the point where it was possible to designate one of them as a segregation center and to transfer the non-segregant evacuees residing in that center to several of the others. After further consideration, Tule Lake in northern California was selected on July 15 as the segregation center for four principal reasons:

1. It was one of the largest of the relocation centers with a capacity of approximately 16,000.

2. It contained extensive acreage readily available for agriculture and thus could provide the segregants with numerous work opportunities.

3. Its resident population contained a greater proportion of potential segregants than any other center.

4. It was one of the two centers lying in the evacuated zone and special restrictions imposed by the Western Defense Command made it less desirable than other centers for use as a relocation center. [38]

Whereas the registration program in the relocation centers had been implemented hastily amid confusion and turmoil, planning for the segregation program "was complete and practical." A "Manual of Evacuee Transfer Operations" was prepared by the WRA Solicitor's Office which set forth "a uniform conception of objectives and procedures, outlining a flexible plan of organization of the work entailed at the projects and providing the means of uniformity in essential detail while allowing latitude in project organization to accommodate special circumstances." The procedures "recognized the need of a well-informed staff and a well-informed resident population."

Director Myer and key members of the WRA's Washington staff met with the project directors and their principal staff members at a segregation conference held in Denver, Colorado, on July 26-27, 1943. The purpose of the conference was "to clarify by discussion and unify interpretation of the segregation policy."

At the conference, WRA Solicitor Philip Glick discussed the manner in which those to be segregated would be screened. Three separate types of 'hearings" would be used at each relocation center: segregation, welfare, and leave clearance. The function of the segregation hearings was

to determine that the man really said 'No" to question 28 and knew what it meant and intended to say "No" and still wants to say "No". Or that he refused to register, that he really wants to be Japanese, that the refusal to register was an evidence of his wanting to be Japanese, or that his failure to answer question 28 represents a desire to be Japanese.

The welfare hearings would

be held with the whole family. They will follow the segregation hearing and be held only with families of the segregants. The purpose of the welfare meetings will be to help the evacuees make a choice between centers, answer their travel questions, help them with arranging routine baggage check outs, etc.

The leave clearance hearings were

designed to be as complete an investigation as we can make to enable the director to determine whether a definite leave should be given or whether the person should be interned for the duration. This is a serious problem. Washington will send a docket if available. . . . the Leave Clearance Board will then hold exhaustive hearings, getting a written statement from the evacuee. The ideal way to do this would be to segregate no one until leave clearance hearings had been given, but we can't wait. We have to accomplish the mass segregation of those we are reasonably sure need to be segregated now. We are assuming that the repatriates and expatriates can be segregated now and the 'No's' can be segregated after a hearing to determine what the persons meant. For all others, we don't feel sure enough of our judgment to segregate and to deny indefinite leave unless we do complete elaborate leave clearance hearings. Hearings on them will be completed after segregation and we can determine then whether we have made a mistake. We are recognizing that mistakes will be made however careful we may be. [39]

An official pamphlet entitled, Segregation of Persons of Japanese Ancestry in Relocation Centers, was published by the WRA in August 1943 for distribution to all evacuees and WRA personnel in the ten relocation centers. According to the pamphlet, segregation was for

Those persons of Japanese ancestry now in relocation centers [who] have had the opportunity to state their individual choices and to back their statements by their actions. . . . one of the important sources of information which will be considered will be the answer given by each individual to Question 28 in the registration conducted in each relocation center during February and March, 1943.

The segregation manual outlined the groups of evacuees that would have to attend the segregation, welfare, and leave clearance hearings. Four groups were designated:

Group I. Persons who will be designated for segregation without further hearing. This group includes those persons who made formal application for repatriation or expatriation before July 1, 1943, and did not retract their applications before that date.

Group II. Those persons who, on the strength of their answers to Question 28 or their refusal to answer the question, would appear to be loyal to Japan rather than to the United States. Each of these persons will be asked to appear before a Board of Review for Segregation which will ascertain whether the evidence of pro-Japanese loyalty correctly represents the attitude of the individual. This group includes those who answered "No" to Question 28 and who did not change their answers to "Yes" before July 15, 1943; those who refused to register; those who registered but did not answer Question 28.

The hearings before the Board of Review will be comparatively brief. Those persons found by the Board to continue to hold to their pro-Japanese views will be designated for segregation. Those who sign a statement of loyalty to or sympathy with the United States at the hearings will reclassified to Group III for further hearings on eligibility for leave clearance.

Group III. Those persons who may have stated their loyalty to or sympathy with the United States, but whose loyalty or sympathy is in doubt because of previous statements or because of other evidence. This group includes:

a. Those reclassified from Group II.

b. Those who answered "No" to Question 28 at the time of registration but who changed their answers to "Yes" before July 15, 1943.

c. Those who qualified their affirmative answers to Question 28.

d. Those who requested repatriation or expatriation but retracted their requests before July 1, 1943.

e. Those about whom there is other information indicating lack of allegiance to the United States.

f. Those who have been denied leave by the Director.

Persons in Group III as outlined above will be given hearings by the Leave Section at the relocation center with sufficient thoroughness to enable the Leave Section to determine the true loyalty of each individual, and to decide whether or not he should be declared eligible for leave.

Group IV. Those who are eligible for leave. (Not to be segregated). [40]

In August 1943 a special review board composed of WRA appointed personnel members was established at each relocation center to conduct individual hearings for those persons who had answered the loyalty question in the negative or had failed or refused to answer it. Only those persons who filed applications for repatriation or expatriation to Japan and, as of July 1, 1943, had not retracted them were consigned to the segregation center at Tule Lake without an individual hearing. Each person who had given a negative answer (or none at all) to the loyalty question was asked if he wished to change his answer. If he said that he did not wish to change, the conversation was terminated. On the other hand, if he said that he wanted to change to an affirmative answer, he was questioned extensively as to his motives for changing, and at the close of the hearing the board made a recommendation to the project director for disposal of the case.

Despite the consequences, most evacuees stuck by their original statements and the rehearing process during the summer of 1943 at the relocation centers registered mostly grief, disappointment, and anger. Numerous Issei professed "disloyalty" as a way of getting back to California or of avoiding release. Many Kibei chose Tule Lake out of frustration with official distrust of their group. Others had no choice; they were family members — elderly, children, or handicapped — who could not leave their relatives. A number of evacuees already at Tule Lake embraced "disloyalty" to avoid moving again. [41]

On August 19, 1943, a WRA field station was established at Fort Douglas, Utah, to serve as liaison between the Ninth Service Command of the Army, which was handling the transportation for the segregation program, and WRA officials both in Washington and at the relocation centers. Prior to the first entrainment, a two-day conference was conducted at Fort Douglas, during which all military personnel, train commanders, mess and medical officers, and other staff members received detailed instruction regarding transportation operations.

Between September 13 and October 11, 1943, 33 train trips transported 15,148 evacuees, 6,289 from Tule Lake to other centers and 8,559 to Tule Lake. Each train trip of segregants was accompanied by a military detachment of 50 persons and a WRA staff member whose duty it was to be alert to safety measures, take necessary health and sanitary precautions, answer questions, and delegate to evacuee train monitors and coach captains responsibilities for getting volunteers to work en route and for keeping the railway cars in a sanitary condition. Evacuee volunteers served the regular meals prepared by army cooks, operated the auxiliary diners which furnished meals for the ill and infirm in sleeping cares, and maintained a high standard of sanitation and neatness in the coaches, kitchens, lavatories, and diners. Car mothers looked after children, and formula girls assisted the Army nurses in the preparation of formulas and infant diets. Arrangements for meals en route were made by the Army, with the WRA supplying perishables, fuel for gasoline stoves, and ice for refrigeration. In the course of these train movements, 129,846 meals were served. The Army, at the urging of the WRA, attempted to provide for the comfort and well-being of the aged, sick, expectant mothers, and mothers with small babies. Sickness en route was kept to a minimum, and no deaths or births took place on the trains. Six persons were removed from trains for hospitalization. No case of unrest, violence, disorderly conduct, or intentional resistance was observed by military personnel or WRA train riders on the trains. In view of wartime travel conditions, the service of the railroads was reportedly "excellent in respect to both equipment and schedules." While some trains were delayed in departure beyond their scheduled times, only two reached their destinations later than scheduled.

With one exception the program was conducted according to plan. It was found that housing at Tule Lake could not accommodate the total number of segregants. Consequently, the transfer of approximately 1,900 people from Manzanar was postponed until additional housing units could be constructed. When it became apparent that the movement of the Manzanar people would be delayed until early 1944, one trip was scheduled in early October to move 297 of the Manzanar segregants whose health required that they make the trip before the onslaught of severe winter weather.

During February 21-26, 1944, the second transfer movement of evacuees — 1,876 persons on four trains — from Manzanar to Tule Lake was accomplished. A third transfer movement of evacuees from Jerome, Rohwer, Granada, Heart Mountain, Minidoka, and Gila River to Tule Lake took place on May 4-25, 1944, when 1,654 persons were transferred via four special trains and two special cars on regular trains. [42]

Additional individual segregation hearings continued at the relocation centers, thus ensuring that small contingents of segregants were sent to Tule Lake from time to time. Others would be sent as they failed to convince Director Myer, or his authorized representatives, that they were "loyal" and should be granted leave clearance. All told, the later transfers moved 249 more residents out of Tule Lake, while 3,614 additional segregants transferred in. Altogether, some 6,000 evacuees remained at Tule Lake. Meanwhile, Tule Lake was being physically transformed into a segregation center. A double eight-foot barbed wire fence was erected, the military guard was increased to a battalion, and six tanks were lined up conspicuously on the center's perimeter. [43]

The Solicitor's Office was instrumental in establishing an Appeals Board at Tule Lake for handling cases in which persons denied leave clearance and transferred to Tule Lake might feel that "justice had miscarried." A panel of members for the Appeals Board, consisting of prominent citizens not connected with the WRA, was established, and hearings before the board were set for 1944. The Appeals Board, however, served only in an advisory capacity; the authority to grant or deny leave clearance rested in the final analysis solely with the Director of the WRA. Twenty-four appeals were made prior to June 30, 1944, and were scheduled to be heard by the Appeals Board in July. [44]

While embarking on the segregation program, the federal government also undertook measures to exchange nationals with the Japanese government. On September 2, 1943, the ship Gripsholm sailed from New York for Japan under an exchange of nationals arranged by the State Department, carrying 314 passengers from relocation centers, 149 of whom were American citizens. [45]

During fiscal year 1944, there were 8,981 requests by persons of Japanese ancestry for repatriation and expatriation to Japan, raising the total number of effective requests to 15,366. The WRA reported that a "marked increase in the number of requests for repatriation and expatriation "has followed every major change in government policy affecting evacuees." About 10,000 of the requests

on file were made during or immediately following crises brought about by the Army and leave clearance registration which was conducted in the spring of 1943, the segregation activities of the summer and fall, and the Army announcement on January 20, 1944, that Nisei were to be inducted under Selective Service procedures.

A large percentage of the requests appear to be based more on emotion than reason. The evacuation, the loss of economic security that went with it, and evidences of antagonism outside the centers have filled the evacuees with fear for the future, and any change of policy adds to their alarm. Few of them are motivated to request repatriation or expatriation because they have any real interest in Japan or expectation of going there. They are tired of moving and Tule Lake seems to them the one place where they may be allowed to stay for the duration of the war. They seek segregation to escape pressure to relocate under wartime conditions, to hold their families together, or to protest against the evacuation. Others who do look to a future in Japan have built up fantasies of life there with hardly any actual knowledge of the country they are choosing. [46]

Thus, the registration and segregation programs pushed evacuees in the relocation centers in opposite directions. Some were released and were heading toward a more normal, productive life in American society. To those who expressed their anger and frustration, however, the programs brought a more repressive, violent, and frustrating period at Tule Lake. The programs are appropriately remembered as one of the most divisive events in the camps. It broke apart the community of evacuees by forcing each to a declared choice — a choice that could be made only by guesswork about a very uncertain future. It was a choice that was hard to hedge, and it divided families and friends philosophically, emotionally, and finally, physically, as some went east to start new lives and others were taken off to the grimmer confinement of Tule Lake. [47]