Lake Roosevelt Administrative History

Prolonged Negotiations: 1980s

After the initial flurry of activity, the tribes and agencies settled down to work within the tenuous balance developed at Lake Roosevelt. There was no suggestion of restarting negotiations for a new agreement until the Park Service drafted its General Management Plan (GMP) in 1979 and sent it out for review. After receiving comments from the CCT, Superintendent William Dunmire met with the tribal Fish & Game Committee where the discussion centered on the need for greater cooperation, especially in law enforcement. Several committee members recommended beginning negotiations for a new agreement, and Dunmire promised to pass on their interest to Reclamation, the lead agency. Within a few weeks, an attorney for the CCT called Dunmire to discuss the GMP and to notify him that the CCT was preparing to ask the Secretary of the Interior to restart negotiations on the Tri-Party Agreement, with the tribes to be a formal signatory party. He also planned to request that the GMP not be implemented until the agreement was finalized, but it is not known if he asked for this delay. [112]

Despite the CCT's renewed interest in negotiations, the Tri-Party Agreement remained unchanged and the GMP went into effect as planned. The CCT did not put out feelers again until late in 1984 when tribal attorney Alan C. Stay asked LARO Superintendent Gary Kuiper what the Park Service would like to see in an agreement between the agency and the tribes. Kuiper expressed interest in having some functions returned to the Park Service, such as administration of campgrounds and all special use permits in the Indian Zones, as well as safety patrols for the entire reservoir. In addition, he wanted consistent administration of recreation and shoreline development around the entire lake, with extensive areas remaining undeveloped; he supported public boating and camping in the Indian Zones while still maintaining recognized Indian rights; and he was concerned with protection of archaeological and historical sites. While the tribes were not willing to cede any control over the Indian Zones, they did express interest in working with the Park Service to develop standards for selection of recreational sites; consulting with the agency over special use permits; instituting joint law enforcement efforts; and finding ways to use Park Service personnel and expertise to help the tribes manage their parks. Attorney Stay suggested that the tribes should negotiate with the Park Service while also starting negotiations with Reclamation over the return of all freeboard lands, hoping to put pressure on the agencies to reach an acceptable agreement. [113]

Meanwhile, the Park Service was exploring a variety of options to resolve the long-standing uncertainty at LARO. At a high-level meeting in January 1985, National Park Service Deputy Director Mary Lou Grier met with Reclamation officials to discuss management options for the recreation areas operated jointly by the two agencies. Grier asked Reclamation for help in determining the feasibility of having either state or local recreation agencies take over the management functions currently handled by the Park Service at three areas: LARO, Curecanti NRA, and Lake Meredith on the Canadian River Project. Superintendent Kuiper had other ideas, with his preference being legislation authorizing Park Service operations at Lake Roosevelt. This seemed unlikely, however, given the current political climate, so he recommended instead negotiation of a five-party agreement to include the tribes. Failing this, the Park Service could always negotiate a separate agreement with Reclamation to manage all the freeboard lands outside the Indian Zones. [114]

Actual negotiations for a multi-party agreement began October 30, 1985, following an invitation from Reclamation. Both tribes sent delegations, as did the BIA, Reclamation and the Park Service; the LARO team included Superintendent Kuiper and Assistant Superintendent Kelly Cash. At the first meeting, representatives agreed on procedural matters and briefly probed into potential issues including Park Service funding for tribal campgrounds, tribal management of the entire recreation area, and lake-level fluctuations. The mood soured by the second meeting when both tribal and BIA representatives expressed displeasure with the Park Service, claiming that the agency did nothing in the Indian Zones and allowed Indians no input in its operations. Cash reminded participants that, following the 1974 Opinion, the tribes had asked LARO to cease all activities on the Indian side of the lake and the Park Service had respected this request. Unmollified, one tribal member suggested working on a four-party agreement "because we don't need the National Park Service." On a more positive note, both agencies expressed interest in the issue of Indian preference for jobs at LARO. [115]

Following the meeting, George M. Davis, Superintendent of the Colville Agency, elaborated on the expressed tribal concerns. He reminded both Reclamation and the Park Service that they shared trust responsibilities with the BIA for the trust assets of tribal lands and resources, and he accused them of overlooking these. Jobs were an important issue, and with unemployment running as high as 70 percent on the Colville Reservation, Indian preference was vital to the tribes. They also were concerned about the damaging effect of the annual drawdown on archaeological resources and were upset that the agencies gave visitors no information about Indians living next to the NRA. [116]

The CCT provided a focus for the negotiations when it set out a list of seven principles in January 1986 and asked Reclamation and the Park Service to respond. These included 1) adoption of Indian preference in hiring policies; 2) acceptance of the tribes' exclusive rights to manage and control development in the Indian Zones, with the right to be included in operations and maintenance funding from the federal government; 3) recognition that development in the non-Indian areas of Lake Roosevelt affects the reservations and thus must be subject to tribal concurrence and/or input; 4) restrictions on development outside the Indian Zones that would limit the ability of tribes to develop recreation on the reservations; 5) agreement from Reclamation to consider alternatives to having the Park Service manage recreation at Lake Roosevelt; 6) agreement from both Reclamation and the Park Service that tribes would have equal voice in any new agreement; and 7) agreement to work together on concessions management and shoreline management plans that would identify particular Indian lands suitable for recreational development. [117]

Little progress was made on any of these issues at the January 1986 negotiations, and following the March session the tribes called a halt to any future meetings. While they wanted to keep doors open at the local and regional levels, they believed they needed to take their case to Washington, D.C. Despite this withdrawal, all three federal agencies followed up on the issue of Indian preference. Research by the Park Service's regional office found that the agency's system of hiring and promotion, with the need for career status, formed a barrier for minorities, especially since seasonal positions did not carry career status. The BIA, under the authority of the 1934 Indian Reorganization Act, was the only agency allowed to exercise Indian Preference Hiring Authority, so the Park Service came up with a plan of its own to increase Indian employment at LARO. The agency committed itself to developing a new Affirmative Action Plan that would include seasonal employees and meaningful goals based on the local population of Indians. The staff would work with local Indian organizations to help those interested in applying for work, and the Superintendent or his designee would review and approve all seasonal hiring to ensure that goals were met. In addition, the regional office looked into other non-competitive hiring authorities, such as Vietnam Era Veteran, Contiguous Area, and Summer Aid, that might be used to hire Indians. The Park Service also agreed to work with the BIA to provide training programs to help Indians qualify for Park Service jobs, and it promised to consider using non-competitive hiring authorities to find qualified American Indians for permanent positions before filling them with normal merit promotion. [118]

The agencies also considered using Excepted Service Appointing Authority to provide Indian preference. The BIA was convinced that this could be used by Reclamation and the Park Service for any position "directly and primarily related to the providing of service to Indians." [119] The Park Service asked permission to use this authority and worked out a formula, based on estimated number of Indian visits to LARO, to justify three seasonals for six pay periods each, hired under this special authority. "This request is particularly critical to the situation here in the Grand Coulee Dam area where the nearby Indian tribes suffer from acute unemployment," wrote Acting Regional Director, William J. Briggle in 1986. [120] The BIA encouraged the Park Service on the hiring issue, adding that tribal members would be a valuable asset to the agency in dealing with the public at the NRA. Reclamation, however, did not see how it could use the Excepted Service Appointing Authority since there were no positions at Grand Coulee that pertained strictly to service to Indians. Its workforce at the dam was already 6.6 percent Indian, and the agency aggressively advertised any openings with the BIA and the tribes. [121]

While there was virtually no progress toward a new agreement, the Park Service and the tribes did begin work on a Concession Management Plan (CMP) in 1986. Park Service officials saw negotiations for the CMP as helping to pave the way for the final approval of the new agreement governing overall management of Lake Roosevelt. The agency delayed the start of the CMP process to allow inclusion of the tribes as co-producers of the document, beyond the normal consultation role under the National Environmental Policy Act. By early 1987, two LARO concessions were tribally owned and operated, and the tribes were working jointly with the agency on the lakewide CMP that they hoped would be "a model for cooperation on the reservoir." [122]

Negotiations for a new management agreement remained on hold at the local level as the tribes took their case to the Secretary of the Interior. In mid-1987, Regional Director Charles Odegaard noted that the tribes were trying to negotiate unilaterally to reach an agreement that would be binding on both Reclamation and the Park Service, and he asked that the agency be allowed to participate in anything that might affect Park Service operations at Lake Roosevelt. Odegaard and others had good reason for concern since the agreement proposed by the tribes greatly reduced Park Service influence. They recommended that five parties manage the lake, with Reclamation having jurisdiction over the Reclamation Zone, the Park Service over the Recreation Zone, and the tribes over the Reservation Zone. All five parties would participate on a coordinating committee to manage the area, but only Reclamation and the tribes would be allowed to vote. The tribes would receive 100 percent of all fees collected in the Reservation Zone, supplemented by one-third of the fees from the other zones. The Park Service would work with the tribes to manage recreation; Indian preference would be required; and archaeological resources would receive special protection. [123]

The Park Service, needless to say, took a dim view of the proposed 1987 agreement that allowed the tribes to dictate future management at Lake Roosevelt since they would have a two-to-one voting majority. The agency believed that the funding proposal had no basis "in law or logic." More importantly, one Park Service official objected to the power given the coordinating committee, which could even vote to "reduce the authority of the NPS to administer any and all phases of its recreation responsibilities on the lake. This is preposterous!" The Park Service believed that such a committee should have no power of its own and should only advise signatory parties of interpretations of the basic agreement. Instead, "the 'power' should be vested in the agreement itself which should clearly outline the role and function of each entity." [124] The Solicitor's Office also found fault with the tribal proposal, noting that exclusive tribal rights did not include matters of policy and management that legally remained the responsibility of the Secretary. Committees could advise but not implement policy. In addition, user fees by law had to go into the Land and Water Conservation Fund while concession fees went to the government; thus none could go directly to the tribes. Besides these legal problems, the Park Service believed that non-Indians opposed what they perceived as an Indian "takeover" of parts of Lake Roosevelt. [125]

The tribes remained encouraged by the process, which included a working committee of three Assistant Secretaries to help resolve certain policy concerns. Among these were the acceptance of the tribes as co-managers at Lake Roosevelt, with funding to carry out all management responsibilities; implementation of Indian preference with Reclamation and the Park Service; return of archaeological and historical resources to the tribes, who would participate substantially in any future cultural resources management; return of all lands taken for the project but no longer needed; and mitigation of fish and wildlife losses. [126]

The agencies were asked to respond to these issues when negotiations reopened in November 1987. The Park Service took a hard line against the tribal demands and argued against designating the tribes as co-managers. It wanted tribal rights limited to those specifically outlined in the 1940 Act and applied to only 25 percent of the reservoir water and freeboard lands instead of the more than 40 percent claimed by the tribes. The Park Service believed that all management responsibilities rested with the Secretary, not the tribes, but if they were able to conclude a successful management agreement, Congress might provide funding to the tribes through the normal budgetary process. Neither the Park Service nor Reclamation believed that they were required to give Indian preference in hiring, although the Park Service continued "to aggressively seek equal opportunities in the job market." [127]

The BIA, on the other hand, supported tribal claims. In a strong statement, one official urged the DOI to negotiate a new management agreement that included the tribes "as resource co-managers . . . consistent with the Tribes' governmental and proprietary interests in Lake Roosevelt resources." She warned that failure to do this would essentially revoke the 1974 mandate to negotiate a new management agreement that included the tribes. She offered to have the BIA work with the other agencies to revise and implement affirmative action plans in relation to local tribes, in addition to providing technical job placement help to the tribes. Such actions could, she suggested, satisfy the tribes' Indian preference objectives in addition to helping the agencies meet their federal minority hiring obligations. [128] Locally, the Colville Agency Superintendent urged the Park Service to share funding with the tribes and encouraged the agency to contract with the tribes in FY1988 for services in the Indian Zones. [129]

The tribes began gaining ground in the negotiation process. Park Service officials hoped to keep Reclamation in charge of the working committee and worried that the BIA was trying to take over leadership. Their concerns were well founded because early in 1988, Patricia Keyes, from the BIA, was appointed to facilitate negotiations as a representative of the Secretary and all three Assistant Secretaries. She met with the tribes briefly in March and then spent five days in May for intensive government-to-government meetings with them. During this period, she held two breakfast meetings with LARO representatives but did not discuss Park Service concerns about the new agreement. At the end of her May visit, Keyes was pleased with the results and suggested that a new agreement would be finalized in July. Shortly after this, Keyes dropped out of the complex negotiating process. [130]

When negotiations did not proceed as rapidly as Keyes had predicted, the tribes asked Congress to step into the fray by including a requirement in the House Appropriations Bill that the Secretary of the Interior provide a progress report explaining the lack of agreement after nearly fifteen years of negotiations. The Park Service was concerned that the language in the bill used the 1974 Solicitor's Opinion as the basis for agreement, despite subsequent case law that invalidated many key conclusions of the opinion. This would provide credibility for Indian claims to 45 percent of the NRA lands and waters, all of which lay within the original reservation boundaries. The bill was modified, at the request of the Park Service, so that it merely require a new agreement along with a progress report. [131]