Hopewell Culture Administrative History

CHAPTER TEN
The Long Road to Hopeton (continued)

Park Expansion and Local Reaction

The ambitious park expansion effort launched by Superintendent William C. Birdsell in the early 1970s had Hopeton Earthworks as the only tract nominated for acquisition not already federally owned. While Birdsell worked to secure state and local support for Hopeton's addition, he also used his political savvy to court congressional representatives and expressed optimism about having the national historic landmark included in the final legislative package. Gone were the days when the agency could merely administratively determine adjustments in park boundaries. During the 1960s and 1970s, Congress had clearly asserted its authority over the executive branch in such matters. [18]

Bill Birdsell failed to see progress made on Hopeton Earthworks during his tenure other than the preparation of a formal National Register nomination, the primary purpose of which was to establish a firm boundary. Upon passage of the National Historic Preservation Act on October 15, 1966 and creation of the National Register of Historic Places, cultural units of the national park system like Mound City Group and all NHLs, including Hopeton Earthworks, were automatically added to the national inventory of significant properties. Because Hopeton Earthworks NHL preceded the 1966 act, it lacked the required nomination form and an official boundary determination. When Fran Weiss, Washington Office archeologist, accompanied by Martha Otto of the Ohio Historical Society, arrived in August 1974 to walk the NHL and decide on a boundary, they stood on the Barnhart tract and peered over the fence at the Vaughn tract. The latter landowner flatly denied permission to access his property. Nonetheless, the National Register nomination form went forward on November 8, 1974. [19]

Archeological testing at Hopeton Earthworks to determine its significance and integrity took place in the summer of 1976 by David S. Brose, curator of archeology at the Cleveland Museum of Natural History and instructor at Case Western Reserve University in Cleveland. Brose's September 1976 report represented the first phase of a suitability/feasibility study undertaken by the Midwest Regional Office. Brose determined the site's national significance and integrity made it a worthy addition to the national park system. [20]

The second phase to determine feasibility began in January 1977 with formation of the planning team. Primary members were team captain Allen Hagood and Park Planner Donald Clark, both of the Denver Service Center, and Superintendent Fred Fagergren. Technical experts were F. A. Calabrese, manager of Midwest Archeological Center, and Finis Rayburn, land appraiser at Indiana Dunes National Lakeshore, Indiana. Delays in Denver postponed team information-gathering and public meetings until late July 1977, and other service center projects intervened to push progress on Hopeton until later the following year. [21]

The delay proved costly. In October 1977, the Chillicothe Planning Commission approved a development plan for a one hundred-fifty-unit apartment complex south of Barnhart Road, adjacent to Ohio Highway 159 or North Bridge Street. Named "North River Place," the apartment complex, financed in part through the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), was set for construction in spring 1978. Fagergren immediately informed both city and county planning commissions of the potential park development conflict, and found no zoning in effect to halt adverse developments, the city commission had merely ruled there were no housing code violations. Because planning was still underway and the agency's position remained "speculative and uncertain" without congressional action, Omaha regional experts determined NPS had no grounds to halt the development. [22]

Figure 78: Map of the Hopeton study area from the 1978 feasibility report in relation to other Chillicothe sites. (NPS/1978)

Bordering on "apologetic," this unfortunate attitude permeated the agency's regional and Washington-level decision-making, which resulted in reactive, not proactive, resource preservation. On matters archeological, NPS lacked political will or astuteness. Indeed, the Park Service failed to include its own Midwest Archeological Center as a full partner in the discussion concerning Hopeton and other Hopewellian sites. Testifying before Congress, NPS officials could not answer basic questions concerning the endangered resources, reflecting its ingrained bias and second-class treatment of all things archeological. At the regional level, communication became funneled through the Midwest Regional Office's public affairs officer, Bill Dean, who strangely enough also served as liaison to Washington Office legislative specialists. Dean placed tight restrictions on information exchanges, and at one point forbade professional interaction with the Archaeological Conservancy, a group he perceived as unwelcome interlopers, and not valued preservation partners. To his credit, Regional Archeologist Mark J. Lynott ignored Dean's order. Lynott later recalled,

The Park Service's whole involvement in Hopeton was one of an apology. All the problems that we have out there today we have only ourselves to blame because we have never taken an assertive stance on preservation of that resource. It's a chronic problem that this organization has. I mean, in my opinion, we like to wave the flag that we're this great preservation agency; but the fact of the matter is, there is absolutely no courage on the part of any of our leadership to preserve something that's worthwhile.... It's been a view from management at the top: Washington and some of the former upper level managers at the Midwest Region. The commitment just has not been there to take the stance to preserve the resources in Ross County that should be preserved. [23]

In the interim as planning efforts plodded ahead, the first academic conference ever held in Chillicothe concerning the Hopewell culture took place for four days in March 1978. Co-sponsored by Mound City Group National Monument, the Cleveland Museum of Natural History, and the Mid-Continental Journal of Archeology, the gathering represented the first such conference since 1961 and produced a valuable synthesis on Hopewell archeology. More than forty professional papers were presented at the well-attended "Conference on Hopewellian Archeology." The NPS arranged an afternoon tour of area Hopewell sites, with much discussion concerning Hopeton Earthworks and the need to preserve such sites. [24]

By late May 1978, Regional Director Beal approved final changes to "An Evaluation of the Feasibility of Adding Hopeton Earthworks to Mound City Group National Monument." It boldly stated that "Hopeton Earthworks and Mound City Group should be protected as a combined resource, administrated [sic] as a single unit of the National Park System. Should the combination of alternatives we recommend be approved and enacted, approximately 1,020 acres would be added to the System--477 acres in fee and 543 acres with a combined scenic and archeological easement." [25] Fagergren seized the opportunity to press for consideration of a name change for the expanded park, but offered no suggestion. He also heralded the idea of establishing an archeological center similar to the Chaco Archeological Center to study the Eastern Woodland Indians. Finally, he urged expedited drafting of legislation for Interior department approval so that citizens could hear the federal government's position as soon as possible. [26]

Fagergren's concern over public reaction proved well-founded as rumors about federal land acquisition plans swept Ross County. Even before official study results were known, special interest groups such as the Ross County Taxpayers Association, Ross County Farm Bureau, and East Side Civic Improvement Association passed resolutions opposing park expansion to include Hopeton and other prime industrial, commercial land. An informal group representing these opponents from the business community appeared before the Ross County Planning Commission in late June 1978 to urge that body to pass a similar resolution. Group leader, Larry Hardin, president of Hardin Real Estate and an investor in the stalled North River Place development, warned that the buffer surrounding the forty-acre Hopeton circle and square would be a thousand acres, putting a total of seven percent of Ross County in federal ownership. Hardin subsequently launched a petition drive objecting to the land being removed from tax rolls. [27]

Rushing to stave-off an avalanche of public opposition, Fagergren released the sixty-six-page suitability-feasibility study for public review on July 7. Stressing that the government had taken no position and the final approval was up to Congress, the alternatives ranged from the status quo to full federal purchase of 1,020.39 acres. Briefing the Ross County Planning Commission on July 18, Fagergren noted Maston Samson, owner of forty-five acres, as the lone favorable landowner, and acknowledged the selfish interests of the growing opposition. He downplayed economic impacts to the county's tax base, citing 1977 figures crediting more than seven million dollars annually pumped into the county by heritage tourism. Adding Hopeton, Fagergren argued, would only increase tourism profits. [28]

Congress had already acted on adverse impacts to local tax districts affected by federal land acquisition by passing Public Law 94-565, providing payments in lieu of taxes. In an effort to influence Congressman William H. Harsha, thought to be sympathetic with his anti-Hopeton constituents, NPS calculated 1976 valuations of the 1,020 acres at $4,080. Thanks to Congress, Ross County would get the same amount for the first five years following federal acquisition plus an additional $765 annually. After five years, the annual payment would remain at $765. With increased tourism revenues, Ross County would experience no adverse economic impact by this tax base reduction. [29]

Harsha's supportive nature as cultivated by Bill Birdsell in the early 1970s all but turned to hostility, thanks to miscommunication between the Washington and Midwest Regional Offices. Irked when his June request for a copy of the suitability-feasibility report was denied in Washington because of that office's understanding that it would not be available until fall, Harsha was rebuffed again even as the report freely circulated in Chillicothe. In an indignant letter to Secretary Cecil B. Andrus, Harsha claimed "I believe the National Park Service deliberately misled me. This apparent effort on the part of the bureaucracy to deceive a member of Congress is outrageous." Explaining the blunder, Andrus said the study could not be considered complete until Interior's position had been determined sometime in the fall, and apologized for the inadvertent error. [30]

With Carter administration approval, Interior's nod to include Hopeton Earthworks in the national park system finally came in February 1979. Previous suggestions to accomplish it by executive proclamation under authority of the 1906 Antiquities Act granting the president power to declare a national monument were laid to rest in favor of congressional action. Although approved for submission under section 8 of the General Authorities Act for 1978 and 1979, Interior's delay had spawned additional slowness in drafting legislation and pushing it through laborious reviews throughout 1979 [31].

News of firm federal plans for Hopeton prompted the Ross County Planning Commission to request Congress not to permit land or easement purchases until planning and funding were available for park development. It requested further that the minimum land area be acquired and current tax values be used for compensation. [32]

Commissioners made their statement based upon the knowledge that land values continued to climb. In December 1978, the commission gave final approval to developers HRH Properties, Ltd., for the 120-unit, $3.7 million North River Place apartment complex. Word of grant approval confounded NPS officials. The Washington Office informed Ohio HUD officials that funding for North River Place constituted a "direct conflict with adding Hopeton Earthworks to the National Park System." Receiving no response from HUD, Fagergren later learned that HUD claimed to have received none of the previous NPS protest letters on the subject, and lacking any written objections, HUD decided to proceed with the loan application. [33]

HUD did delay the project during 1978, requiring HRH to secure an archeological survey and then to supply the negative results to the state historic preservation office (SHPO) and the Keeper of the National Register, both of whom concurred that the tract lacked cultural resources. Intentionally deciding not to consult with NPS officials over the project, HUD proceeded through the section 106 consultation process, in accordance with the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, receiving both SHPO and the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation's concurrence with a "no adverse effect" determination. Once the section 106 process concluded, HUD was free to proceed. Fagergren first learned in June 1979 of these developments as well as HUD's resolve not to change its mind, but to continue granting HRH time extensions to secure bonding for the HUD grant. A furious Fagergren found HUD officials had not bothered to read the NPS Hopeton study, believing that land lacking in cultural resources should not be of interest to NPS. When Fagergren pointed out the tract was ideal for his agency's own development facilities for Hopeton, the explanation fell on deaf ears. [34]

In a desperate effort to get the HUD grant terminated, Fred Fagergren attempted to reopen the section 106 process by contending NPS was omitted from the consultation and that adverse visual and audible effects to the adjacent Hopeton Earthworks NHL were not considered. His request for Omaha officials to reopen the case with the Advisory Council did precipitate news that the Council had determined that the low-rise nature of the buildings would have a minimal impact on the NHL. There was no precedent for reopening a completed section 106 case, but the Council said it would consult its solicitor should NPS decide to press the issue. To Fagergren's dismay, Regional Director Jimmie L. Dunning decided against it. [35]

On August 30, 1979, North River Place developers closed with HUD on its loan and were set to begin construction. The letter that Fagergren coaxed the Washington Office to prepare two months before for the interior secretary's signature was too late. Signed by Acting Secretary Robert L. Herbst to Acting HUD Secretary Jay Janis on September 9, the letter sought to prevent the two departments from working at "cross-purposes." It warned North River Place would "occupy the only available entrance for 100,000 visitors to Hopeton" and exappropriate the site for an NPS administrative facility. It warned that Interior faced the "unpleasant possibility" of condemning the HUD project. [36]

Reporting on the North River Place groundbreaking ceremony in late September, a dejected Fred Fagergren refused to give up. Pressing Omaha officials do more, including pressing for condemnation, Fagergren asserted: "I am appalled that we were unable to deal with the bureaucracy and have some effect upon this project. I remain convinced that some effort should be made to work with the Advisory Council to have them at least place requirements upon the apartment developers to provide the screening, which will be necessary, on their acreage. The responsibility is with the Council to minimize impact on historic resources. The NPS should not bear the responsibility of screening for off-site projects which are Federally backed. To plant vegetation north of Barnhart Road as screening will be very difficult and extremely expensive." [37]

Determined to put the matter back into perspective, Dunning stated no legislation had yet been introduced, and condemnation was "both premature and presumptive." With no acquired interests, screening requirements had no basis. Two events, however, soon changed Dunning's negative position. First, fall 1979 draft legislation to add Hopeton was introduced, then got incorporated into an omnibus parks bill. Second, Fagergren reported in mid-November 1979 that land east of Hopeton was under consideration for an industrial park development by Ross County Community Improvement Corporation. Encouraged by progress made on North River Place, developers were salivating to improve agricultural land to the east. [38]

In a December 20, 1979, meeting at the HUD office in Columbus, Jimmie Dunning spoke bluntly. Concerned by HUD's failure to communicate honestly, he threatened the political reality of one government department condemning the project of another, an embarrassing prospect in an approaching presidential election year. Dunning presented three ways to reach common ground and avoid condemnation: realigning the apartment complex entrance from Highway 23, not Barnhart Road as designed; installing extensive vegetative screening; and to fence along the south edge of Barnhart Road to separate apartment dwellers from tourists. Should these modifications be made, NPS would then request that the development site be removed from the Hopeton acquisition. Dunning called for another meeting in early 1980 to discuss mitigation measures. Failure to satisfy NPS concerns, he warned, would bring certain litigation. [39]

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