Hopewell Culture Administrative History

CHAPTER TEN
The Long Road to Hopeton (continued)

Threats Escalate, but Congress is Slow to Act

The promised mitigation meeting had ominous results. The developer failed to attend, contending instead with a construction site strike, and HUD reneged on earlier assurances it could leverage the developer to make changes. Fred Fagergren's suspicions that the earlier meeting had merely allowed HUD to claim it listened to NPS concerns proved accurate. He later learned that an Advisory Council on Historic Preservation stipulation to HUD was for that agency to consult with NPS on the project. Until it did, and reported back to the Council, section 106 compliance had not been completed, and HUD illegally proceeded with project approval. Surprisingly, a meeting with developers did take place a week later and representatives were amenable to making design changes. [40]

A mid-February conference in Washington, D.C., on the apartment complex brought consensus that NPS could not afford to pursue condemnation with a tract price of $1.8 million and improvements at $3.5 million. NPS would instead work for maximum mitigation measures, and if those failed to materialize, language would then be inserted in the Hopeton legislation to provide funding for NPS to install mitigative features. The following day, Fagergren and Dunning met with Advisory Council officials to confirm that HUD failed to complete section 106 compliance and would be notified of their illegal action and urged to work closely with NPS on mitigation. Council staff members acknowledged that intense political pressure had been imposed on them to pass the apartment complex project through the section 106 process. [41]

Although no names were used, NPS knew the political pressure originated from Congressman William Harsha's office. Harsha staff members wanted NPS to compromise further so that the retiring congressman could support the Hopeton bill and tell constituents he helped reduce the total acreage. NPS officials asserted the agency had already compromised by its willingness to delete the apartment complex and pursue easements in lieu of fee purchases. NPS would compromise no further because a minimum boundary for preservation purposes had already been defined. [42]

Reducing the amount of farmland taken for Hopeton was precisely what Congressman Harsha intended to do. By May 1980, the House subcommittee added two new potential boundary packages for discussion, one consisting of 150 acres encompassing little beyond the earthworks themselves, the other a slightly larger tract at 320 acres. Fagergren opposed both, stating, "We would be taking the traditional Ohio approach and concentrating on the mounds and earthworks alone, ignoring the village, camp, and other type sites." [43] He favored no less than 450 acres. Harsha's persistent lobbying of the House subcommittee paid off and the 150-acre proposal prevailed with the strong backing of Congressman John Seiberling (Democrat-Ohio). The House of Representatives passed H.R. 3 304-102 on May 20. [44]

Ohio Senator Howard Metzenbaum pledged to shepherd the measure through the Senate and he proved true to his word. By fall 1980, all NPS-related legislation got lumped together into an omnibus national parks bill that became known as the National Park and Recreation Act of 1980. President Jimmy Carter signed Public Law 96-607 on December 28, 1980. Section 701 pertained to expansion of Mound City Group National Monument. For Hopeton Earthworks, a map called "Parcel X," drawn by Harsha's staff, served as the official boundary map. The 1980 law specified that no more than 150 acres could be bought in fee, and "Access to lands in the vicinity of the mounds by existing roadways shall in no way be encumbered by Federal acquisition or administration of the Monument." It also included a one million dollar ceiling for land acquisition and development, archeological studies not to exceed $100,000, and two years to investigate adjacent land to determine their significance to the expanded national monument. [45]

Progress in 1981 and 1982 on acquiring Hopeton Earthworks stalled with the ushering in of President Ronald Reagan's administration. Secretary of the Interior James G. Watt, hostile to further national park system expansion, invoked a land acquisition moratorium and froze further allocations from the Land and Water Conservation Fund. Mound City Group management changed in April as Ken Apschnikat entered on duty as superintendent. Park Service energy expended on Hopeton during these years involved identifying road corridor alternatives to eliminate vehicular routes that bisected Hopeton Earthworks and producing an official 150-acre boundary map. Property owners threatened to stall negotiations for purchase, and take the fight to court, if need be. Conservation organizations like the National Parks and Conservation Association began criticizing James Watt for not proceeding with Hopeton's acquisition. [46]

Lack of progress characterized 1983, too, as the Reagan-Watt land acquisition moratorium continued. In the face of growing criticism, Interior officials mandated that each NPS unit possessing non-federal land within congressionally-authorized boundaries must prepare "land protection plans" (LPP) to replace all existing land acquisition plans. LPPs were to consider the most fiscally-responsible methods for land protection compatible with the purposes for which Congress authorized each park. LPPs would provide landowners and other citizens with the reasoning behind federal intentions for fee simple or other land protection methods.

The massive paperwork exercise began for Mound City Group in March 1983, with a draft LPP produced late in the year. NPS inaction on assessing Hopewellian-related sites and reporting to Congress within two years evoked a critical letter from Ohio State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) W. Ray Luce. An inquiry from John Seiberling, House chairman of the Public Lands and National Parks subcommittee, brought the agency's reply that Congress had not authorized nor appropriated funds for such a new area study, and no funding requests would be made until the LPP was approved. By late 1983, however, the Midwest Regional Office determined it would proceed with the "Hopewell Sites Study." [47]

Phase one of the Hopewell Sites Study, an archeological evaluation with recommendations, was awarded under contract to John Blank of Cleveland State University. Blank's findings would serve as the basis of phase two, a feasibility evaluation for adding significant sites. NPS also authorized Blank to include evaluative work at Hopeton, using an emergency grant from the Ohio SHPO. As this effort commenced, news came that American Aggregates Corporation of Greenville, Ohio, commenced negotiations with Hopeton area landowners about sand and gravel mining operations. In June 1984, Ken Apschnikat learned that John Barnhart planned to join with Carmel G. (Bud) Tackett to form the Chief Cornstalk Sand and Gravel Company. Commencing in a gravel pit first used during the Depression, large areas of topsoil were peeled away and a bulldozer began excavating gravel as Barnhart pledged not to mine near the earthworks. By July, the company applied for a mining permit from the Ohio Department of Natural Resources. Apschnikat began working closely with the SHPO to get the permit denied. He found that no legal avenue existed to halt mining operations from impacting an NHL. Apschnikat nonetheless reported the activity for the 1984 "Threats to the Parks" report for Congress as well as having Hopeton included as a threatened NHL. [48]

Ohio law provided that two hundred tons could be removed without a state permit. SHPO approval no longer was required for such permits, although SHPO staff could be involved in the process to protect the NHL. Estimates on gravel content were as high as a 188-year supply at 150 truckloads per day. By mid-July Apschnikat received the news he dreaded most: with no federal regulation or action in the area to prevent it, Ohio had no other choice but to grant the mining permit. While projected excavations were within the southern boundaries of the NHL, it did not infringe on the parsimonious 150-acres dictated by William Harsha. In the fall, Congressman Bob McEwen, Harsha's successor, inserted one million dollars for Hopeton acquisition in the House's Interior bill, but it failed to clear the Senate. [49]

Dr. John E. Blank completed the first phase of the Hopewell Sites Study in July 1985, identifying more than one hundred sites in Ross County alone. Keeping citizens informed, Blank's study underwent public review. Well-known sites were determined to be significant over other lesser-known sites like villages. To obviate this bias, NPS circulated the report to the professional community and in late 1985, convened a special group hosted by the SHPO to make final site selections to be included in an environmental assessment. The professionals expressed concern that the limited area identified for purchase did not include all of its related archeological resources. Habitation sites on the terraces surrounding the earthworks needed to be preserved and were endangered by gravel quarrying. One expert reported seeing human skeletal remains and post holes in an area exposed by quarrying. [50]

Efforts to secure the one-million-dollar Hopeton acquisition appropriation nearly succeeded in 1985. While McEwen again attached it to the House version, the Senate failed to adopt it. NPS Director William Penn Mott, Jr., lobbied heavily for the funding, and succeeded in getting a half-million-dollars introduced during the conference committee. The funding failed to be included in the bill's final passage at the Christmas recess. Thanks to Mott's personal interest, however, the director pledged to redouble his efforts for fiscal year 1987. [51]

Mott enlisted Howard Metzenbaum and the National Parks and Conservation Association in 1986 to champion Hopeton's acquisition appropriation in the Senate, and by fall, the five-year effort finally succeeded, the result of an exchange of favors between Metzenbaum and Senator James McClure (Republican-Idaho). Much of the year was spent conducting a boundary survey, but the Vaughn family's steadfast refusal to permit entry forced NPS to file a condemnation for right of entry lawsuit. By the end of the year, a draft environmental assessment included six sites for acquisition: Hopeton Earthworks (including additional land beyond 150 acres as well as the quarrying operation), High Banks Works, Hopewell Mound Group, Spruce Hill Works, Seip Earthworks, and Harness Group. For the fifth consecutive year, Hopeton NHL made the endangered landmark list, threatened both by agriculture and gravel quarrying. John Blank added a sense of increased urgency by declaring what remained at Hopeton might be gone in as little as five years. Blank, using aerial photography, satellite imaging, and computer projections, asserted that cultivation had rapidly decimated the earthworks and scant time remained before Hopeton disappeared. The year also proved significant with John Barnhart declaring bankruptcy, then filing an inverse condemnation lawsuit against the federal government, claiming it had restricted his full use and enjoyment of the disputed Hopeton tract. [52]

Even with funding approved for acquisition, prospects for purchasing the 150-acres at Hopeton Earthworks were dim. In January 1987, the U.S. District Court in Columbus ordered the Vaughn family to permit NPS access for a boundary study. Work began on this the following month, and an official appraisal offer went to the Vaughns and Barnhart at summer's end. Both rejected it. As legal troubles already complicated the Barnhart acquisition, the Vaughn negotiation became more problematic upon the death of Gladys Vaughn and uncertain probate issues. In August 1987, phase two of the Hopewell Sites Study, the environmental assessment, went on public review, the results of which urged purchase of more Hopewellian sites.

At this time, the Archaeological Conservancy joined in full partnership with NPS as a key player in preserving significant sites. The Conservancy, led by president Mark Michel, owned ninety acres at Hopewell Mound Group, an interest in High Banks Works, and negotiations were underway to buy Spruce Hill Works. The Archaeological Conservancy and National Parks and Conservation Association stood in the wings, ready to push Congress to add the sites to an enlarged Mound City Group National Monument. Assessing the progress at year's end, Apschnikat recommended that any proposed legislation include a stipulation to rename the NPS unit Hopewell Culture National Historical Park. [53]

Acquisition negotiations continued through 1988 without positive results. In May 1988, Regional Director Don H. Castleberry transmitted the Hopewell Sites Study, mandated by the 1980 Public Law 96-607, to Director Mott. Castleberry recommended four sites be authorized for immediate inclusion with Mound City Group: 224 more acres at Hopeton, High Banks Works, Hopewell Mound Group, and Seip Earthworks. Castleberry deferred inclusion of Spruce Hill Works because of questions raised concerning its Hopewellian origins, and Harness Group was not recommended because of loss of integrity. He called for acquisition, donation, or exchange authority as well as cooperative management flexibility. The Omaha director urged further boundary studies of the four sites to determine that all significant resources were included as well as authority to make minor boundary adjustments up to ten percent of the park unit's total acreage. Castleberry also endorsed the monument's name change and sufficient appropriations, including deleting the parsimonious $100,000 development and research ceiling for Hopeton imposed by Public Law 96-607. Director William Penn Mott, Jr., endorsed the Midwest Regional Office's recommendation in July 1988. [54]

Settlement on the Barnhart tract of 57.87 acres came in late 1988 with a sheriff's sale of the bankrupt property. NPS purchased the Hopeton-related parcel under authority of the 1980 legislation, and was dismayed when another sand and gravel operation acquired the remaining Barnhart interests, including portions within the NHL boundaries. The Hopeton Unit of Mound City Group National Monument became official with the deed filing on January 8, 1990. Under NPS ownership were the southeast corner of the square earthwork wall, and the southwest ends of the parallel walls. Negotiations with the Vaughns continued even as NPS helped draft legislation incorporating the Hopewell Sites Study recommendations. The Archaeological Conservancy pressed NPS to include Cedar Banks and Spruce Hill, once testing proved the latter's authenticity, in the legislative package. Superintendent William Gibson took the recommendation under advisement, seeking input from the Hopewell Sites Study's seventeen original advisors. [55]

Figure 79: View of Hopeton Earthworks looking west. (NPS/ February 1980)

After a decade of hard work and enduring public skepticism and muted opposition concerning its efforts, the National Park Service's vision of an expanded park became more clear in the public mindset. With the passage of Ronald Reagan's administration to that of George Bush, less dominant and arbitrary policymakers held reign within Interior and expansion of the national park system, while not resuming its earlier frenetic pace, continued with better coordination and far less acrimony. Political support in Congress, bolstered by growing unanimity within the Ohio delegation, flowered as NPS presented convincing data to support its position. While those involved in the Mound City Group National Monument expansion effort experienced considerable frustration during the contentious 1980s, the decade served as a necessary catalyst, permitting Congress to perform an amazing metamorphosis in Ross County, Ohio.

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