Chapter 3
The Policies of Expansion, 1933-1937
After the hectic activity of May and June, 1933, it
is hardly surprising that the succeeding six-month period should be
primarily one of consolidation, of building on the framework constructed
in the first weeks of the CCC's life. Nevertheless, several policy
decisions were made in the latter half of 1933 which were of great
significance to the Corps' existence. One of the first of these
concerned the establishment of "side camps," small subcamps set apart
from the main site. Without such camps, much work, peripheral to the
main project but important nevertheless, could not have been undertaken
because of the distances involved. The responsibility for administering
such camps was a source of dissension between the Army and the work
services. The technical agencies wanted to have them placed under their
control and, though both the Army and Fechner bitterly opposed the
decision, the President acceded to this demand. On July 19 he approved
the establishment of side camps, provided that not more than 10 per cent
of the company strength was inducted into them, and he freed them from
military control. [1] Such small camps were
widely used, particularly in forests and state parks, and accomplished
much useful work.
Another important decision was taken on August 17,
1933, when Fechner authorized the use of CCC units to fight fires in
Craig, Montana, thus beginning a long chronicle of CCC assistance in
local and national emergencies. Public authorities and private citizens
came to look to the CCC for immediate assistance when disaster struck,
and it did not let them down. Other disasters at which the CCC rendered
valuable aid were the Winooski, Vermont, and Walkill, New York, floods
in 1937, the blizzards of 1936-1937 in Wyoming, Utah, and Nevada, the
Florida tornado of 1933, and the New England hurricane in 1938. Such
work, besides its immediate humanitarian value, was of tremendous
assistance in firmly establishing a favorable public impression of the
CCC. [2]
On August 15, 1933, the President made the first of
many tours of inspection when he visited five CCC camps in the Blue
Ridge MountainSkyline Drive area of Virginia. He received a
tremendous reception, and was entirely in his element, laughing and
joking with those accompanying him as he dined "on steak, mashed
potatoes, green beans and salad, iced tea, and a so-called apple pie."
[3] With typical political acumen, Roosevelt
had included in his touring party the erstwhile chief critic of the
Corps, the president of the AF of L, William Green. Already partially
mollified by Fechner's appointment, Green counted the excursion "one of
the most pleasing experiences" of his life and admitted that because of
the President's deep interest in the Corps he "could not help but view
the whole project in a most sympathetic way." [4] Though organized labor and the CCC
authorities occasionally had their differences, principally over wage
rates for contract work, the unions were never again unreservedly
hostile to the whole operation.
The visit to the camps confirmed for the President
that the CCC was a success. It came as no surprise, therefore, when on
August 18 he extended the Corps at full strength for another six months.
This announcement was followed a week later by the decision to permit
re-enrolment for a second six-month term, an act which caused great
jubilation in the camps. [5] The most
important policy decision taken in 1933, however, was to develop an
education program. On November 22 the President approved a plan for a
nationwide, Washington-directed, CCC education service, supplanting the
scheme then existing which left the introduction of educational work
entirely to the discretion of the camp commander. Thus began a new phase
of CCC expansion. [6]
The credit for first stimulating interest in the
possibilities of using the CCC for educational purposes probably
belonged to the director of selection, W. Frank Persons. As early as May
18, 1933, he had submitted an ambitious plan for a centralized education
scheme to Fechner, which broadly suggested the appointment of an
educational counselor to each camp and which presupposed close
co-operation with university extension services. [7] Persons' plan was circulated widely and was
well received by a cross-section of people and professions, including
university teachers and trade-union officials. [8] Fechner was not similarly impressed, however,
and Persons was forced to report rather ruefully on June 6 that his plan
stood "disapproved by the Director of Emergency Conservation Work." [9] Fechner was solidly supported by the Army,
whose fear of radical and leftist infiltration of the camps colored its
whole attitude to educational work. [10]
Still the pressure was kept up. Fechner was deluged
by requests from state selecting agencies for a comprehensive education
program, [11] and the new federal
commissioner of education, George F. Zook, who was enthusiastic about
the educational potential of the Corps, occasionally discussed the
question with the President. [12] Roosevelt
showed enough interest in the various schemes to keep Colonel Major in a
state of "suspended agitation." On August 11, reacting to a rumor that
the President had authorized the employment of 10,000 jobless teachers
in the camps, the Colonel thundered:
I have constantly fought the attempts of long-haired
men and short-haired women to get in our camps . . . we are going to be
hounded to death by all sorts of educators. Instead of teaching the boys
how to do an honest day's work we are going to be forced to accede to
the wishes of the long-haired men and short-haired women and spend most
of the time on some kind of an educational course. [13]
Major claimed that the youths could not possibly be
induced to attend classes after a hard day's work, leaving the teachers
with so little to do that he advocated their employment as clerks as
well. The Army, in short, stood completely opposed to a centralized
educational program for the Corps.
Nevertheless, the idea slowly gained support in
Washington, even Fechner himself beginning to recognize the need for a
more comprehensive plan, especially as pressure from the field
increased. On October 16, 1933, the Association of State Foresters at
its annual meeting passed a resolution urging that "this educational
opportunity should not be neglected" and supported the idea that planned
instruction be given in the camps. [14]
University teachers also contributed suggestions, [15] and the President even added a few ideas of
his own. He wrote on November 8 that he was "very anxious to try out in
one or two places the idea of giving the men in the CCC camps some kind
of formal instruction in forestry and the natural history of trees. I am
going to ask them to do this in the Virginia camps this winter." [16]
The first really positive move toward the
establishment of an educational program in the camps was made on October
25 when Howe sought from Persons "a definite and specific plan for
education in the CCC." [17] Zook, too, was
consulted, and between them they evolved a comprehensive program which
was presented to Fechner on November 2. The plan advocated a director of
CCC education working under Fechner, with an office staff and an
advisory committee, an education co-ordinator in each Corps Area, and a
camp education adviser and two enrollee assistants in each camp. [18] Education in the CCC was becoming a real
possibility.
The War Department, too, realizing the inevitability
of some type of program being adopted, changed its tactics. It now
merely aimed at insuring that whatever the outcome, the Army would
retain ultimate control over all camp activities. Accordingly, General
MacArthur presented a modification of Zook's program to the President on
November 22. Retaining enough of the original features to mollify the
Office of Education, it nevertheless firmly established the principle of
Army control of education. MacArthur proposed that the program be
administered by the Office of Education in the Department of the
Interior. It would be headed by a director, aided by an advisory
committee, who would communicate directly with the secretary of war on
all important matters and would "recommend to the Secretary the outlines
of instruction, teaching procedure, and the type of teaching materials
for use in the camps."
The responsibility for carrying out the program was
vested in the corps area commander, assisted by a corps area educational
adviser who was selected by the Officer of Education but was directly
responsible to the corps area commander. The procedure was duplicated in
each camp, where the camp commanders were to be in charge of all
instruction in their respective camps, assisted by one camp educational
adviser. It was expected, however, that both the military and technical
service people would co-operate with the adviser in giving instruction
and settling general camp policy. As there was to be no encroachment
upon working hours, education would have to be given at night, and
attendance was to be purely voluntary. [19]
This modified scheme was immediately approved by the President, and
centralized education in the CCC had officially begun. [20]
Though many found the dominant position accorded the
Army repugnant, and though, as will be discussed later, the program as
approved did contain many unsatisfactory features, it probably
represented the best possible compromise between the ambition of
education officials and the nervous apprehension of the War Department.
Because of the strategic importance of the Army to the CCC organization,
it was necessary to gain military acceptance of the program if it was to
have any success at all. Thus, the vesting of ultimate responsibility
with the Department of War was the best practical solution.
Much had to be organized before the program could
operate at full strength. A director, staff, and advisers were needed,
and curricula had to be prepared. Clarence S. Marsh, dean of the evening
session at the University of Buffalo, was appointed director on December
29, 1933, and he immediately proceeded "to marshall a working force and
prepare it for its duties," selecting his advisers mainly from the ranks
of the unemployed teachers and university graduates. [21] By June, 1934, the program was fully
staffed and had begun its operations. [22]
The problems with which education officials and
advisers had to contend were urgent and alarming. In the first place,
they had to provide instruction for 250,000 youths and men of widely
divergent skills and background, whose educational attainments ranged
from no formal schooling to university degrees. Within each camp,
therefore, a wide variety of courses had to be scheduled, both academic
and vocational, in order best to meet the needs of the enrollees. Thus,
advisers, even if they were able to secure technical service
co-operation or outside teaching assistance, were forced to become
instructors in many fields, often well outside their own level of
competence, with inevitable deterioration in both preparation and
teaching performance.
Second, the material available was often grossly
inadequate. The adviser seldom had an office of his own, let alone a
classroom, and most of the instruction was done in the mess halls or
barracks. Library facilities and classroom equipment were in variably
substandard and in insufficient supply. It is scarcely surprising that
the turnover of supervisors was always high and that after one year only
50 per cent of original appointees were still in the camps. [23]
Third, it is clear that the initial success of the
program in the individual camps depended on the attitude of the camp
commander. Some co-operated enthusiastically with the adviser, but
others were frankly skeptical and uninterested. As one commander bluntly
put it: "why pamper [the enrollees] with this hocus-pocus of education.
It's a lot of bunk, anyway." [24] Such open
contempt could effectively kill the camp program, making it, as one
disillusioned adviser complained, "futile and wasteful." [25] Many corps area commanders, too, were most
uncertain about the scheme's value. General Fox Connor, commander of the
First Corps Area, once issued instructions to abolish forthwith what he
termed "cultural courses." As disciplines like history, sociology,
foreign languages, and philosophy were deemed to fall within this
category, the scope of academic instruction available to the individual
adviser was somewhat reduced. [26]
Fourth, Army officers too often tried to discourage
discussion of social and political issues. One corps area officer for
example, refused to allow any books on sociology to be used in the camps
on the grounds that "all writers on sociology were somewhat radical."
Unrestrained discussion, he believed, could bring discontent and
agitation. The official instructions issued to all education advisers
contained detailed advice on "how to avoid dangerous issues" as an added
safeguard against controversial debate. Advisers resented this
high-handed infringement of the right of free speech and asserted that
it hindered their efforts to keep the enrollees well informed on the
basic issues of the day. [27]
Finally, most CCC education officials were sure that
Fechner did not co-operate fully with them in plans for the advancement
of their work, and in this allegation they were undoubtedly correct.
Fechner always considered that relief of unemployment and the promotion
of useful conservation work were the chief activities of the CCC;
education was secondary. His attitude was, in a sense, commensurate with
his responsibilities as director of an organization which he had to
justify each year on the basis of work performed, not lessons learned.
He was therefore reluctant to spend more money on education because this
would simply mean less for the work projects, and work was what the CCC
had been created to do. One can understand his reasoning, narrow in
vision though it seems, but to Marsh and his associates it smacked of
non-co-operation. In fact, Marsh resigned in 1935, frustrated by his
inability to develop a coherent program, believing that he was being
deprived of finance, time, and encouragement. He was replaced by a
former educational adviser to the Liberian government, Howard Oxley, who
held the post till the Corp's demise, though he too had a full share of
frustrations. [28]
Nevertheless, despite military antagonism,
directorial apathy, and confused aims and intentions the CCC education
program not only survived its first three years but achieved some
measure of success in the process. In remedial education, for example,
it performed a great function. By June, 1937, 35,000 illiterates had
been taught to read and write, more than a thousand youths had gained
high school diplomas, and thirty-nine had received college degrees. To
this end, forty universities gave courses to CCC camps by mail and
twenty-six had granted scholarships to former enrollees. [29] Here were at least some criteria by which
to judge the program's effectiveness.
Within each camp the courses offered were
extraordinarily varied and could range from wood chopping to empirical
philosophy. More than half were vocational in nature; the rest were
academic courses. Of the total number of academic offerings, 16 per cent
were on the elementary school level, 27 per cent on the high school
level, and 5 per cent were college courses. [30] Much of the best vocational training was
given "on the job." Boys who had never swung a pick nor used an ax now
learned to run jackhammers and drive trucks. Though the success of more
sophisticated vocational courses, such as boilermaking or metal work,
was often compromised due to lack of equipment, space, and time, the
basic instruction in the use of tools and machinery stood many an
enrollee in good stead when he left the Corps and sought employment. [31]
Thus, by 1937, CCC education had survived the
controversies of its origin and the vicissitudes of its development to
take its place as a legitimate aspect of the Corps' work. Though it was
to encounter more hostile criticism in later years, it had achieved
enough success to insure its continuance.
The Civilian Conservation Corps entered the new year,
1934, on the crest of a wave. On January 25 the President informed
Fechner that he wanted the work continued at least until April, 1935,
and that he had sought an appropriation of $275,000,000 to cover the
cost. Fechner was authorized to plan ahead on that basis, maintaining
enrolment at the present figure of slightly more than 300,000, including
veterans and Indians. Re-enrolment was again to be permitted, but no man
was to remain in camp for more than a year in an effort to distribute
the benefits of CCC life over as wide an area as possible. [32]
On April 7, 1934, the CCC celebrated officially its
first anniversary. This was, of course, a time to review the
accomplishments of the past year, and they made very impressive reading.
By March, 1934, the Corps had improved millions of acres of forest and
park land, thousands of miles of telephone lines had been erected, and
420,000 dams had been built to aid in erosion control. Losses from
forest fires in national forests had decreased spectacularly over the
year to less than 17 per cent of the average annual loss, a splendid
tribute to CCC endeavor. The health of enrollees had improved, and on an
average each had gained seven and one-quarter pounds. Moreover, about
$72,500,000 had been allotted to dependents during the year, lightening
local relief burdens and stimulating local business. The satisfaction
felt by officials as they celebrated the anniversary was indeed well
justified. [33]
There was still, however, much room for improvement.
One particular area of concern was the number of accidents in camp. In
October, 1933, Fechner had expressed his anxiety at the number of
accidental deaths in the Corps and had stressed the "need for greater
vigilance" on the part of the military and technical services. Such
appeals had little effect, however, and it seemed that a thoroughgoing
safety program was needed. [34]
Such a program was approved on April 9, 1934, in one
of the first major policy decisions of that year. Curiously enough,
Fechner had opposed the program as presented because of excessive cost,
but it was so strongly supported by the War Department and the technical
services that he capitulated. [35] Samuel M.
Lauderdale, a bluff, experienced Forest Service engineer, was
subsequently appointed director of the Civilian Conservation Corps'
Safety Division. Working with a council composed of one representative
from each of the co-operating agencies, his organization did much good
work throughout the CCC's existence. [36]
Safety Division representatives visited each camp, demonstrating
accident prevention techniques, checking camp equipment for safety
hazards, insuring that high sanitation standards prevailed, and giving
instruction in work safety measures. By June, 1936, in large part due to
their labors, the death rates from disease and injury had been reduced
to a point much lower than those of the Regular Army for the same
period, and lower also than those prevailing among men of similar age
groups throughout the United States. [37]
In mid-1934 came the first significant expansion of
CCC enrolment. In the spring and summer of that year drought devastated
much of the Midwest, blasting its way as far south as Texas and east to
the Alleghenies. Millions of acres of topsoil were lost, crops withered
and died, and cattle languished without water. [38] There was desperate need for immediate
government action, both to ameliorate somewhat the physical devastation
left by the drought, and to relieve the increased regional unemployment
situation which it had caused. Roosevelt decided to use the CCC as one
of the agencies to implement drought policy and asked Congress for an
additional $50,000,000 for Corps work in the drought areas. He planned
to enrol as many men in the drought-affected states as the increased
appropriation would allow, form them into regular CCC units, and put
them on work projects in the stricken areas, principally to check soil
erosion and to develop irrigation schemes. [39] Once Congress had voted the money, the
Department of Labor was instructed to select 50,000 additional men,
including 5,000 veterans, from cities of more than 2,500 population in
the drought-affected areas of twenty-two states, as it was in urban
areas where unemployment was most widespread. They began work on July 1,
the increased enrolment raising the strength of the Corps to 353,000
including Indians and veterans, and the number of camps to 1,625. [40]
The quality of the work in the drought areas added
more kudos to the already favorable public image of the CCC. The New
York Times commented on the success of the agency, stating that
the absence of criticism"even from Republican quarters"was a
phenomenon "watched with interest by the Administration," while the
Detroit News admitted that prospective critics of the Corps had
been "silenced by the prompt and unmistakable dividends" it had paid.
[41] The agency certainly rested firmly on a
broad base of support which transcended party and regional lines.
Delighted with its achievements, the President made
plans to extend the life of the CCC after the expiration of the existing
enabling legislation on April 1, 1935. He wrote to Fechner: "This kind
of work must go on. I believe that the Nation feels that the work of
these young men is so thoroughly justified, and, in addition the
benefits to the men themselves are so clear, that the actual annual cost
will be met without much opposition or much complaint." [42] Not only did he seek continuation of the
Corps, but he also planned a drastic extension of its size and compass
as part of the expanded relief organization which he outlined in his
message to Congress on January 4, 1935. Roosevelt proposed a bold new
approach to the problem of unemployment. "Continued dependence on
relief," he proclaimed, induced "spiritual and moral degradation";
consequently, he sought legislation aimed at puffing 3,500,000 people
back to work. To this end, he asked for the massive appropriation of
more than $4.8 billion in order to create a public works program which
would be self-liquidating, non-competitive with private business, and
which would pay a "security wage," higher than the dole, but not so high
as to become a lucrative alternative to private employment. The
President "envisaged the extension and enlargement of the successful
work of the CCC" as an integral part of this development. [43]
The decision to enlarge the CCC again caused further
paeans of praise to ring out in the nation's press, in contrast with the
mixed reception given the work relief scheme in toto. Even the violently
anti-New Deal Chicago Tribune thought that "The CCC is one of the
best projects of the Administration, and the great majority of its
recruits, we believe, appreciate its opportunities and are being
benefited." [44] Such words from the most
bitter of Republican newspapers indicated dramatically how high the
Corps stood in popular esteem.
Anticipating the passage of the legislation, the
Advisory Council drew up a blueprint providing for the mobilization of
the CCC to 600,000 men and their full employment in work camps as soon
as possible after the appropriation was authorized. This document the
President approved on January 17. [45] There
were other steps taken to meet the demands of expansion. On April 12
Roosevelt authorized the use of Navy and Marine Reserve officers to
augment the six thousand Army Reserve officers already employed in the
camps. [46] The expansion program could
quickly be implemented as soon as Congress approved the work relief
scheme. But this took some time. The plan's very magnitude and
philosophy caused much misgiving on Capitol Hill, and weeks passed
without action. Though Fechner was concerned at the effect of the delay,
mainly because the CCC was running out of funds, the future of the
agency was never in serious doubt. [47] The
debates on the work relief measure were often most acrimonious, but
there was virtually no criticism of the provision extending the CCC.
Indeed, the success of the agency was of positive value to the
Administration. Supporters of the President's plan were able to remind
their opponents that its failure to pass Congress would spell doom for
the CCC, a prospect few congressmen relished. [48] The work relief resolution was eventually
signed by the President on April 8, after passing the House by 317 votes
to 70 and the Senate by 66 to 13. [49] CCC
expansion could now begin.
On April 11, 1935, Fechner discussed with the
Advisory Council the burden of a recent interview with Roosevelt in
which the President had outlined his latest idea for the future
organization of the CCC, a plan intimately concerned with his hopes of
reducing government expenditure in the election year. The increase to
600,000 enrollees was to be only temporary. Starting on October 1, 1935,
Roosevelt wanted the numbers gradually tapered down until only 450,000
remained in camp on June 1, 1936. Fechner tried to point out that such a
scheme was fraught with dangerous possibilities, in that it meant that
work projects might have to be left incomplete and men discharged before
finishing their full term. Though Roosevelt did not choose to develop
the idea further at this stage it was an ominous augury of policies to
come, policies which for the first time were to incur a substantial
amount of congressional and public criticism for the Corps. [50]
Meanwhile, expansion continued briskly. There were
2,916 camps to be filled, 2,106 under the Department of Agriculture and
690 under the Department of the Interior, and to facilitate full
enrolment the upward age limit was increased from twenty-five to
twenty-eight years and the maximum time of service from one year to
eighteen months. There seemed no reason at this time why the figure of
600,000 could not be easily met. [51]
However, a new and controversial figure began to pose
problems for the CCC. This was Harry Hopkins, newly appointed director
of the Works Progress Administration and rising star in the hierarchy of
presidential advisers. The President had decided that all projects paid
for by the $4.8 billion appropriation had to be voted on by a specially
constituted Committee on Allotments. The CCC clearly came under this
category and Fechner was forced to submit his plans to this committee
for approval. The chairman of the committee was Frank Walker, former
executive secretary of the Executive Council and Democratic national
committeeman, but the dominant member was Hopkins. [52] It was at a meeting of this committee that
Roosevelt, influenced by Hopkins, announced a decision which was to have
the gravest consequences for the CCC's whole expansion program. In
future, he ruled, all enrollees and employees had to be taken from
public relief rolls, even skilled persons like stenographers and clerks.
[53]
Fechner protested that this decision would radically
alter the whole basis of selection. While the overwhelming majority of
enrollees had always come from the relief rolls, states had been
permitted to take other needy youths in order to fulfil their quotas.
Boys without dependents, for instance, were often inducted, and made
their allotment to some destitute family recommended by the local board,
but their selection would in future be impossible under the new ruling.
[54] Fechner also wanted to know about the
status of specially trained persons, stenographers, technicians, and
above all, educational advisers. Many of these people had not come from
relief rolls. Would their continued employment be barred?
The answers Hopkins and Roosevelt gave to these
concerned inquiries were quite definite. Hopkins insisted that if a
given state could not fill its quota from the relief rolls, the
remaining enrollees were to be selected from states with overflows of
qualified applicants. Thus, he effectively wrecked the quota system of
selection. Moreover, Hopkins asserted that he "had five million people
on his relief rolls, and among them were people capable of substituting
in any position." [55] All future CCC
employees were therefore to come from these rolls, a decision the
President spelled out in a letter to Fechner in which he confirmed that
education advisers certainly were included under such a provision. [56] Fechner's objections had been disregarded.
With these rulings the CCC entered a four-month period of drift and
indecision as officials attempted to implement the Hopkins-controlled
enrolment provisions. As early as June 6 it was apparent that, given
strict adherence to the relief clause, the 600,000 enrolment figure was
unlikely to be reached. The alternatives, therefore, were either to cut
the quota, which was inadvisable because of camp construction already
begun, or to expand the eligibility rules. [57] The problem was emphasized to both
Roosevelt and Hopkins on June 18 at a White House conference which,
however, produced nothing definite. Neither Hopkins nor the President
was willing to withdraw the relief provision, nor would they authorize a
specific reduction in the number to be enrolled, though the President
hinted that this might be considered at a later date. In the meantime
the 600,000 enrolment was still to be the goal. [58]
Faced with ever-increasing evidence from the states
that the quotas would not be filled under existing regulations, Fechner
implored the President once more a week later for some relaxation of the
provision, but again he was brusquely treated. [59] Roosevelt insisted that enrolment and
construction be continued on the existing basis, with the goal still to
be 600,000 men in 2,916 camps. All state quotas were to be completely
disregarded, and all qualified applicants were to be taken. [60] There was little to do but attempt to
comply with the ruling and watch as the situation deteriorated.
In a desperate attempt to end the prevailing climate
of drift, Fechner proposed a new solution to the President without
either of them first consulting Hopkins. On July 24 the director
reported to Persons that Roosevelt had verbally authorized the enrolment
of single men up to the age of thirty-five in the Corps and that camps
would henceforth be divided into two groups, one for ages eighteen
through twenty-four, and the other for men twenty-five and over. With
this extension, Fechner believed that the quota would be reached.
Accordingly he had advised the state directors of the decision but had
instructed them to await confirmation from Persons before beginning
selection. Persons, therefore, was now instructed to confirm Fechner's
prior announcement and order selection of the older men to begin. [61]
But Persons bitterly opposed the extension of the age
limit. Over the head of the director, he protested to Hopkins against
its implementation. [62] Hopkins apparently
knew nothing of Fechner's talk with the President and was similarly
opposed to extending the upper age limit. The selection of older men
would affect his own relief schemes, principally the WPA, and so he
instructed Persons, again without Fechner's knowledge, to delay ordering
the enrolment of the new group while he attempted to persuade Roosevelt
to reverse his decision. [63] He was
successful, and the President withdrew his verbal assent to the
extension, much to Persons' relief. In thanking Hopkins for his good
offices, he said that the proposed relaxation of the age limit would
have "affected the CCC and its morale." [64]
Fechner, out of town, was in due course apprised of
the decision. He accordingly informed Persons of the change. With some
heat he reported that Hopkins had once more interfered in selection
policy and had convinced Roosevelt that the extension of the age limit
would not be desirable. [65] There is no
evidence to indicate that he ever learned of the vital part his own
director of selection played in influencing the President's decision.
From the point of view of staff relations, his ignorance was no doubt
just as well.
It is likely that the raising of the age limit to
thirty-five would have created more problems than it could have solved.
It would have allowed a complete new age group into the Corps, men who
were by no stretch of the imagination the youths for whom projects,
education, and remuneration had been designed. State directors were
bitterly opposed to selection of older men, and a radical
reconsideration of policy would have been necessary. [66] The controversy provided a striking
indication of the importance of Harry Hopkins as a controlling factor of
CCC policy at this time and shows just how circumscribed was Fechner's
position. In an important matter of policy he was unable to claim the
loyalty of his own director of selection.
No further attempt was made to adjust policy to meet
the exigencies of the relief provision. The enrolment period ended in
September, 1935, with 502,000 men in 2,514 camps, well short of the
original goal. This was due partly to the creation of the National Youth
Administration which provided unemployed youths with an alternative to
the CCC, but there is no doubt that Hopkins' obstinacy was also a key
factor. Moreover, much discontent had been generated in the process.
Selection agents found real resentment in local areas at the rigid
adherence to the relief provision. Technical service representatives
grimly reported that in many communities which had prepared for camps
under the expanded plan, and where construction had started only to be
abandoned because of the failure to meet the goal, a reservoir of anger
had built up against the policies of the Corps. Such hostility was a new
experience for Fechner, one that particularly chafed him because he was
not responsible for it. The director was apprehensive that the issue
could be used against the President in his re-election campaign in 1936.
[67]
The September, 1935, figure of more than 500,000 was
to be the high point of CCC enrolment, for election apprehension
affected the President differently. While Fechner still advocated
relaxation of the relief provision as the way to salvage the situation,
the President, influenced by the desire of a budget reduction in
election year, decided on a policy of extensive camp closings. He
envisaged a progressive shutdown with no new enrolments, until by July
1, 1936, the total in camp would be but 300,000 men. He then hoped to
make the CCC a permanent federal agency on this diminished scale. [68]
In vain Fechner argued against the wisdom of such a
dubious scheme, pointing out the further reductions would serve only to
exacerbate the discontent already smouldering in the localities. The
President regretted the "embarrassment" which his plan would cause, but
nevertheless he insisted on its immediate application, starting with the
curtailment of additional expenditure on supplies and equipment. [69] As Roosevelt's reduction plans became more
widely known, public protest grew in volume. The announcement that 489
camps, existing or approved, were to be closed or canceled by January 1
produced such a vigorous reaction, particularly in the Midwest, that
Fechner wrote requesting a "special allotment of $25 million to
establish at least 12 camps in areas of tremendous political value." [70] The request was denied.
Congressmen added their substantial support to the
protests. Representative Braswell Dean, Democrat of Georgia, in pleading
for the re-establishment of a camp in his district, said the reduction
policy would have "tragic" consequences for the Administration.
Representative John W. McCormack, Democrat of Massachusetts, was
similarly pessimistic. Petitions of protest pouring in from all parts of
the country gave point to their argument. [71]
Alarmed at the intensity of feeling which had been
aroused, other Administration officials joined Fechner in criticizing
the reduction policy. Secretary of Agriculture Wallace discerned "grave
consequences to the Administration" in the move and protested that
"discontinuance of the number of camps necessary to bring Corps strength
down to 2,078 camps in January and 1,456 camps in April will make it
impossible to carry out agreements entered into in good faith by these
local co-operating agencies and will result in widespread charges that
the Administration had broken its promises." [72] He advocated continuing all camps till
their work projects were played out, then "knocking them off." He also
mentioned that he had been inundated with memoranda from state foresters
stressing the bad effect the decision had had in local communities.
However, Roosevelt stood adamant in face of the
rising tide of criticism both within and without the Administration. He
was sure that Fechner was exaggerating the seriousness of the reaction
and that the political benefits of budget reduction would far outweigh
the brief spell of tarnished popularity. [73] Accordingly, at a meeting on December 18
attended by the secretaries of labor, agriculture, and the interior, the
director of the Bureau of the Budget, the chief forester, Tugwell,
Walker, and Fechner, he insisted that the reduction plan was still fully
effective and would start on January 1, 1936. By June 30, he declared,
he wanted only 300,000 men enrolled in 1,456 camps. [74] Consequently, the Corps entered the new
year with considerable trepidation.
The CCC lost 489 camps as of January 1, 1936, an
occurrence which pleased few and which prompted a further batch of
protest mail. [75] Leading Democratic
congressmen made strong personal appeals to the President to stay his
hand, but to no avail. [76] Fechner reported
to the Advisory Council on February 5 that Roosevelt was pleased with
the way the first reduction had been carried out and wanted detailed
plans drafted for cutting the number of camps to 1,456 by June 1. [77] On February 13 Fechner himself made a
further plea for modification. He asked for funds to operate 1,807 camps
till June 30 but again his request was denied. The President was
determined to have only 1,703 camps in operation by April 1, which
therefore meant the immediate reduction of a further 455 camps. [78] In addition, Roosevelt announced that
because the CCC would no longer operate on funds taken from relief
appropriations, but would be provided for in the regular War Department
appropriations, a substantial reduction in funds was to be expected for
the financial year 1936-1937. It seemed as if his determined stand for
camp reduction would succeed. [79]
On March 14, 1936, however, a new element entered the
situation, one which within ten days had changed it entirely.
Congressmen, increasingly concerned as pressure from the grass roots
mounted, resolved to take positive action themselves to save what camps
they could. On that day, therefore, the speaker of the House,
Representative Joseph W. Byrns, and Representative Samuel D. McReynolds,
both Tennessee Democrats, called on the President with a petition signed
by 233 members of the House, including a substantial number of
Republicans, urging Roosevelt to discontinue the wholesale closing of
camps. [80] The President considered the
plea but rejected it. His intention was definitely to continue the
reduction policy. He wanted only 300,000 in the CCC by July 1, he said,
and "did not see how it could be maintained in greater strength after
July 1 without throwing the Budget further out of balance." [81] The reference to budget balancing is
important, for it indicates that this was not merely a convenient
catchphrase to the President. He genuinely sought fiscal stability and
was willing to sacrifice much of the CCC program to attain it.
Congress, however, was not of a similar mind.
Balanced budgets, desirable in principle, could not be allowed to
interfere with re-election prospects. On March 18, therefore, a letter
signed by Representative Jack Nichols, Democrat, of Oklahoma, was sent
to all Democratic congressmen, requesting their attendance at a meeting
on the morning of March 20 "to lay plans for a continuous fight to
prevent this order going into effect." Congressmen were reminded that
"whether you have a CCC camp in your district or not, you are affected,
for the threatened reduction in personnel will mean that an average of
300 families in each district would lose their breadwinner." [82] The President would henceforth have to
implement his reduction plan in the teeth of serious congressional
opposition from his own party.
At a meeting which was attended by more than two
hundred House Democrats, strategy was thoroughly deliberated. The plan
was to act as a bloc and force the continuation of the CCC at its
present strength of 2,158 camps and 400,000 enrollees. Furthermore, as a
supplementary appropriation, congressmen decided to fight for the
earmarking of part of the President's new $1.5 billion relief bill for
CCC purposes. To emphasize their determination, seventy-five
representatives signed a petition to force the whole Democratic caucus
to discuss the issue. Representative Nichols was delegated to appoint a
committee to call on the President and inform him of their intentions.
[83]
The revolt of such a substantial section of the House
Democratic strength caused Administration leaders to have doubts about
the fate of the President's whole legislative program. Pointing out that
the insurgents had threatened to block the passage of the relief
appropriation until their demands were met, they urged on Roosevelt the
necessity of compromise. [84] The President
could do little else but capitulate in the face of such strong
pressures. Accordingly, he advised Fechner that all existing camps were
to be maintained and camps were to be closed only as they completed
their work projects. Another $6,800,000 would be allotted to pay for the
change in plans. [85]
Thus the congressional revolt was ended. Roosevelt's
policy of cutting the CCC in the interest of economy, a plan in which he
genuinely believed and which he had advocated consistently for more than
six months, had been defeated by his own party, led mainly by rural
representatives who in other days and other contexts could usually be
counted among those supporting the curtailment of federal
expenditure.
The reasons for the revolt were not hard to identify
and the newspapers lost no time in exploring them. The New York
Times correctly concluded that the uprising originated in the
county, coming "from the hundreds of communities and hundreds of
Congressional districts which would have been affected by the proposed
reduction." Representatives and senators from all states had been
deluged with mail, telegrams, and calls attesting to the popularity of
the CCC camps and seeking immediate reversal of the reduction policy.
[86] Faced with such a dramatic
manifestation of the extraordinary popularity of the CCC, congressmen
saw compliance with the President's plan as political suicide. As one
representative said: "it would have been tough for me if [the camps] are
moved out of my district. I would have hated to face the people in that
community if that one had been slashed." [87] Discussing the revolt, Arthur Krock in the
New York Times made the point that few Republicans had supported
retrenchment and that they were just as interested as the Democrats in
having camps retained in their particular districts. [88] The attitude of Republican newspapers to
the revolt lends credence to this view. The New York Herald
Tribune called the CCC the "most popular" of all New Deal
legislation, and talked both of its success in conserving natural
resources and its effectiveness in stimulating local trade in "thousands
of small communities." [89] The Des Moines
Register, generally anti-New Deal in policy, was pleased at the
success of the revolt. While it considered retrenchment in federal
expenditures to be necessary, it believed that "the CCC should be one of
the last of the government agencies to face the axe." The Boston
Evening Transcript was similarly complimentary. [90] The reaction of the Republican news papers
again indicates the strong bipartisan flavor of CCC support.
Nowhere was this bipartisan trend more in evidence
than in the 1936 election. The Republican presidential and
vice-presidential candidates both specifically indorsed the CCC, thus
effectively removing it from the arena of campaign criticism. Governor
Alfred M. Landon had long admired the Corps. In 1934 in a letter to
Roosevelt he had termed it "one of the most constructive policies of the
Administration." [91] During the campaign he
even tried to associate himself specifically with its success. Speaking
at Los Angeles, Landon claimed credit for an amendment to the original
bill, namely the one permitting work on state lands. He proudly stated
that "subsequent experience has shown this has greatly enlarged the
value of the Conservation Corps" which had "great opportunities for
lasting good." Landon promised: "Once I am elected President, I will do
everything within my power, not only to continue the CCC, but to improve
the organization." [92] Such statements
could scarcely be termed partisan criticism. The Republican
vice-presidential candidate, Colonel Frank Knox, admitted that "the CCC
has been a valuable institution in time of great distress," though its
cost had been high. Only the Socialist party proposed its abolishment.
The party platform claimed that the CCC "threatened the wage and living
standards of organized labor"; the platform also expressed its dislike
of the Army's role. [93]
In the first weeks of the campaign the Republican
national chairman, John D. M. Hamilton, made sporadic attempts to prove
political influence in the CCC organization, an accusation which, as
Arthur Knock commented, should surprise no one, patronage "being one of
the means by which national political machines are maintained." [94] Few papers took much notice of Hamilton's
charges. The New York Herald Tribune said that "Farleyization"
would "introduce a note of demoralization into an organization that
above all New Deal innovations has received almost unanimous approval"
and that "the camps . . . deserve a better fate than to be made the
tools of cynical place-seekers," but the issue did not catch on. [95] Hamilton soon dropped it, and the Corps
survived the rest of the campaign unscathed.
For the Democrats, of course, it was a positive
source of gain and a regular ingredient of campaign speeches. The
President himself invoked its success from time to time, promising that
if re-elected he intended to make it permanent. [96] Moreover, he was able to use the Corps for
both practical and political effect in September, once more increasing
enrolment in drought areas. [97] Few of
Roosevelt's legislative actions during his first term caused him less
campaign embarrassment than the CCC. It came as no surprise, therefore,
that in his 1936 report to the President, Director Fechner requested
"that this program of conservation work, among men and natural
resources, be adapted as a part of our permanent national governmental
activities, the size and extent of the work to be governed by the dual
factors of employment conditions and the urgency of the conservation
work to be accomplished." [98] Within three
years the CCC had become probably the most highly regarded of all New
Deal agencies. Its continuation seemed inevitable.
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