Chapter 10
Progress, Consolidation, and Dissension, 1937-1939
During the passage of the act of 1937, Congress had
inserted a clause specifically encouraging vocational education and had
criticized educational work in the CCC as it then stood. It was clear,
therefore, that a pressing task for the director was to investigate
thoroughly the whole training program. As a beginning, Fechner solicited
the commissioner of education, J. W. Studebaker, for suggestions.
Studebaker recommended that the work week be shortened, specifically
that the Wednesday afternoons and Saturdays be devoted to education;
instruction in the evenings would also be continued. [1] Studebaker was strongly supported by Ickes
in advocating the change, but both Fechner and the President stood firm
against it. "Of course I want the Office of Education to continue their
fine work among the CCC boys," said Roosevelt, "but this work must be
under the final control of the director, Mr. Fechner. In other words,
Mr. Fechner is the responsible head and he must have the final say." Mr.
Fechner said "no" most emphatically to any reduction in working hours
for teaching purposes. [2]
The director was more receptive to another proposal
from Studebaker. This was to remove the ultimate responsibility for
education from the War Department, placing it in the Office of
Education. The Office of Education would thus be on an equal footing
with the Army and the technical services, each with its own particular
sphere of responsibility. [3] Fechner
greeted this suggestion with enthusiasm, and the Advisory Council soon
evolved a new plan for the organization of educational work. The
director of CCC education was to be directly responsible to Fechner's
office, and the role of the War Department was correspondingly reduced.
The Army now merely had to insure that floor space would be available
for educational purposes in each camp and that all enrollees had the
opportunity to attend classes. [4]
Delighted, Studebaker exulted that the plan enabled him "not only to
place the full force of the U.S. Office of Education, but the whole
educational system in the country, behind you and your efforts to give
the enrollees the very best educational program possible." He eagerly
awaited its early implementation. [5]
Unfortunately, the program was never to develop past
the paper stage. As early as August 6, 1937, the Army officer in charge
of CCC disbursement intimated to Fechner that the proposed scheme might
run into constitutional difficulties. He doubted if the provisions of
the act of 1937 would enable Fechner to bring the director of CCC
education, Howard Oxley, into his office. [6] The blow fell on August 30. Assistant
Director Taylor, after conferring with the comptroller general, bluntly
informed Fechner that the new program would have to be dropped. There
was no authority to transfer the funds needed for its implementation to
the director's office, nor could the President do so by Executive Order.
[7] Accordingly, Fechner, after confirming
Taylor's message, advised all co-operating agencies that the old
educational organization was still to be followed. He stressed, however,
that because congressmen had shown so much interest in CCC education, it
was incumbent upon all Corps officials to make serious efforts to
improve the program wherever possible. [8]
Thus ended abortively the most serious attempt to increase even slightly
the emphasis on education in the CCC's activities and to bring to the
teaching program a modicum of cohesion.
The failure of the new education plan brought not
unification, but renewed criticism. Much of it was due to antagonism
between the technical services and the Office of Education, dissension
which had reached such a pitch by October, 1937, that McKinney, the CCC
publicity director, complained that it was even intruding into official
publications. [9] In December a long report
prepared by Frederick Morrell of the Forest Service and Conrad Wirth of
the National Parks Service sweepingly criticized the whole concept and
orientation of education in the CCC. Morrell and Wirth advocated
scrapping the existing program entirely and removing the educational
advisers, substituting on-the-job training, which they thought to be the
only type of education suitable in the camps. Men should be trained for
work, they believed, not for high school diplomas. [10] The Director's Office was dismayed at the
tone of the report, but recognized that it had some validity. Oxley,
according to Taylor, had often treated the technical services
cavalierly, and was now reaping the whirlwind. Still, such dissension,
if left unchecked, could wreck the educational work entirely, dependent
as it was on interservice co-operation. [11]
The Office of Education was equally dissatisfied with
the current state of affairs. Studebaker was bitterly critical of the
technical services. They were not pulling together, he claimed, and he
indicated that he was not inclined to favor anyone "telling our men in
the camps what they should do." Job training, while important, was, he
believed, only part of the totality of CCC education, and he had no
intention of increasing the emphasis on it. [12] Conditions were deteriorating
steadily.
Confusion and conflict at the center were reflected
in the camps. Educational advisers renewed their protests about
unsatisfactory programs and technical service hostility. One of the most
articulate of these was C. T. Clifton, of Camp SC-16, Yellow Springs,
Ohio. His trenchant criticism of the program, adumbrated in a long
letter to Fechner, was widely circulated among CCC officials [13] because it summed up forcefully the
accumulated grievances of Corps educational advisers. Clifton paid
tribute to the real accomplishments of CCC education, but he was more
concerned with what it had failed to do, particularly in the field of
vocational training which he categorized as "weak." He attacked Fechner
for not having stimulated more interest in this aspect of the Corps'
work. Clifton was also bitterly hostile to the Army, claiming that free
discussion was effectively muzzled in the camps and with it any chance
of embarking on "the ambitious program of social and economic education"
which the CCC was peculiarly fitted to supply. Education had become the
"Cinderella" of Corps life, he complained, and few could miss his
implication that the Director's Office and the War Department were the
two "ugly sisters." In concluding, Clifton called for a "new liberal CCC
program of work, study, and play," with more emphasis on training and
less on relief. [14]
The dissension between the technical services and the
Office of Education, the discontent in the camps, and the confusion
about the education program's aims and methods could not continue
unchecked. In June, 1938, therefore, Fechner appointed a special
committee to investigate education in the CCC in the hope that its
findings would provide guidelines for a revised program. [15] The six members included representatives
from the technical services, the Department of Labor, and the Office of
Education. [16] The committee reported to
the director in January, 1939, after having studied camp education in
four of the nine Corps areas. The report paid glowing tribute to certain
facets of the work accomplished in the camps and to the dedication of
most educational advisers, but it was sweepingly critical of the
organization and objectives of the program as a whole. It stated that
"the chief justification for a camp program was to make the boys more
employable," and this it was often failing to do. [17] To reverse this tendency, the report
advocated more emphasis on job training and urged that the foremen be
given teacher training courses in order to provide such instruction more
efficiently. [18] Other specific shafts
were aimed at the unsuitability of the hours allotted to instruction and
at the dual administrative organization of the camp program, which
rendered it difficult to define concise educational objectives. [19] The committee asserted that if the program
were to be made more effective, classes should not be held in the
evenings, as by then the enrollees, tired after their day's work, were
least willing to co-operate. [20] Committee
members found that educational advisers were all to often grossly
underpaid, overworked, and inadequately trained, while their freedom of
action was circumscribed by Army control. [21] The whole import of the committee's
findings was, first, to stress the need for a change of emphasis within
the program, specifically a shift to vocational and on-the-job training,
and second, to suggest that before educational work could be really
successful the whole organization of the camps would have to be
alteredthe Army would have to be removed, and educational endeavor
placed on an equal footing with the work program of the CCC. [22]
Similar shortcomings were described by the American
Youth Commission, an agency established with Rockefeller Foundation
money to study youth problems. It carried out a private investigation of
CCC education at the same time as the special committee and, in its
first report, also indicated the need for more vocational training, for
better-paid advisers, and for less Army control. [23] The Youth Commission was at pains to point
out, however, the "definite benefits" that the present system afforded
enrollees, and in particular it praised the work done with illiterates.
Furthermore, the commission believed that since 1937 greater emphasis
had, in fact, been laid on training for employment, though such trends
needed acceleration. [24]
The official response to these two reports was muted
and generally unfavorable. The Selection Division considered them
"misleading" and, while admitting that they contained some useful
suggestions, thought they "were not based on careful study" and included
too many generalizations "from a sample only." [25] Fechner made it clear that the special
committee's recommendation had not changed his resolute opposition to
shortening the hours of work. Likewise, he intended ultimate Army
responsibility for education to continue. [26] Many of the main conclusions of the
reports, proposals aimed at removing the basic grievances of educational
officials, were thus disregarded or disavowed.
Some of the specific recommendations, however, were
adopted. Serious attempts were made to improve the system of teacher
training in camps, [27] and Fechner
emphatically directed that more vocational education be included in camp
programs. [28] A policy of directing
enrollees to selected camps where they could best profit from the
training opportunities was also instituted. [29] It is likely that even more of the
recommendations would have been implemented had the CCC not been placed
on a non-combatant footing in 1940, a move which changed completely the
whole objective of CCC education and training. [30]
Many of the recommendations of both investigating
bodies were indeed balanced and reasonable. Others took an unrealistic
approach to the CCC situation. Suggested improvements within the
existing organization were subordinated to sweeping denunciations of the
whole structure of the Corps. The removal of the Army, or the shortening
of the work week in order to add more classes, no matter how desirable
in principle, would nevertheless have meant a radical reconstruction of
the Corps' framework as delineated by statute and tradition. Such
recommendations were thus beside the point, at least until the future of
the Corps had been settled. What was now needed was improvement within
the existing framework, not the abolition of the framework.
Furthermore, the reports of both the special
committee and the American Youth Commission, through concentrating on
the weakness of CCC education, tended to gloss over the very real areas
of accomplishment. The special committee made little mention of the
CCC's excellent work with illiterates, and neither body discussed the
achievement in giving youths a second chance to complete their high
school education or to continue with college work. In the fiscal year
1938-1939 alone, 8,445 enrollees were taught to read and write, and 763
were awarded college scholarships. [31]
Despite the fact that vocational training facilities were considered
inadequate, the CCC still managed to produce 45,000 truck drivers a
year, 7,500 bridge builders, 2,000 bakers, and 1,500 welders. [32] One cannot discount the real success of
the Corps in providing a measure of useful training for at least some of
its enrollees, and improving, even indirectly, the employment prospects
of almost all.
Nevertheless, education must be counted one of the
less successful fields of CCC endeavor. The program always suffered from
its initial handicap of being a late starter in a competitive field. The
Office of Education could never really convince the CCC authorities that
its work was anything more than an afterthought, an extra to be
accommodated if possible, but ignored if necessary. Neither the
President nor Fechner, when it came to the pinch, was prepared to
improve the position of the educational advisers in relation to the War
Department or the technical services, either by giving them more money
or by setting aside certain hours during the day for instruction.
Moreover, though many of the problems plaguing CCC education were
insoluble while the Corps retained its original form, it may fairly be
said that, even in the limited sphere where it could operate
effectively, the program often failed to meet fully the needs of the
enrollees. Academic courses, while doubtless interesting in themselves,
were of limited practical value to youths who would almost certainly
lead non-academic lives, while one can legitimately question whether
instruction in digging ditches and building dams was fitting the
enrollees for life in an increasingly urbanized society. Though
education in the CCC was emphatically not a total failure, its
deficiencies were undoubtedly grave, and the blame must be shared by the
President, the CCC organization, and the education officials
themselves.
The organization of educational work was not the only
policy matter called into question in 1937 because of the new
legislation. Now that the relief provision was no longer a condition of
enrolment, the President, in the interests of economy, wanted the base
monthly pay rate reduced from $30 if at all possible. [33] Fechner put the matter to the Advisory
Council, where once again there was substantial disagreement. The
technical agencies and the War Department supported a dual pay system,
advocating that veterans should still receive $30 monthly, and all
others should be cut down to $21. [34] The
Selection Division could not support the idea of reducing the pay of all
junior enrollees to $21 because of the opposition from state selecting
agencies. It would mean the end of the $25 allotment to families. Snyder
and Persons proposed instead that junior enrollees from families on
relief should be paid the full $30 as before, but that those from
families not on relief should receive only $15. [35] Both plans were sent to the President for
perusal, but despite the fact that the suggestion to revise pay scales
was his own, he changed his mind, discarded both, and decided to
continue with the old scheme. [36] The $30
monthly pay rate lasted until the Corps was dissolved.
It was in 1937, too, that the first significant
attempts were made to develop a workable re-employment service for
discharged enrollees. The initial moves were made on the state level,
the most important being the structure developed in Arkansas. Here the
state director of CCC selection, Edward Bethune, co-operated with the
Arkansas branch of the United States Employment Service in producing a
monthly bulletin on discharged CCC enrollees, giving full particulars of
height, weight, race, accomplishments, previous experience, interests,
and reaction to camp life. These brochures were then sent to business
firms and other prospective employers. [37]
The arrangement was an outstanding success. By 1939 the Arkansas
Employment Service was having little trouble in placing former
enrollees. [38]
Officials of the Selection Division of the CCC were
quick to see the merits of the Arkansas plan. They sent full details of
its operation to all state selection agents, [39] and by 1939 most of them had adopted it.
[40] They were not always as successful as
Arkansas, but where co-operation between selection director and
employment agency was wholehearted, the prospect of former enrollees
returning home to unemployment was greatly reduced.
Franklin Roosevelt had never sounded firmer in his
desire to curb the spending policies characteristic of the early years
of the New Deal than in the summer and fall of 1937. Even in the face of
rising unemployment, he still spoke in terms of a balanced budget, an
end to "pump priming," and a general reduction of federal expenditures.
[41] The CCC inevitably felt the force of
the economy drive. The director of the Bureau of the Budget advised
Fechner in November, 1937, that the CCC's estimates for the 1938-1939
fiscal year had been slashed by $125 million. [42] Fechner vainly protested that this cut
would mean the closing of 104 camps before December 30, and some 300
more by July 1, 1938, leaving only 1,200 in operation. [43] The President in his budget message of
January 3, 1938, recommended that the CCC be reduced. [44] A few Democratic congressmen, led by
Representative Jed Johnson of Oklahoma, attempted to bring about a
revolt and restore the full appropriation, but the drive for economy was
too strong and the House defeated their attempted amendment by voice
vote. [45] In February, Fechner announced
that more than one hundred camps had already been closed and that on
March 1 he would begin to close three hundred more, until by July the
reduced enrolment would stand at 250,000 men in 1,200 camps. [46]
The balanced budget, however, was sacrificed to the
exigencies of the steadily worsening economic situation. The recession
of late 1937 showed signs of developing into a full-scale depression.
Stock prices plummeted, and unemployment rose from under five million in
August, 1937, to more than nine million in May, 1938. [47] Faced with the starkness of a collapsing
economy, the President abandoned deflation for the well-tried policies
of increased federal spending. [48] On
April 14 he went before Congress seeking additional money for work
relief, for the WPA, the NYA, and the CCC. Specifically, he asked that
$50 million be voted for the Corps to keep the three hundred camps from
closing and to maintain the number of camps at 1,500. [49] A resolution to this effect, introduced by
the chairman of the House Appropriations Committee, Representative
Clifton A. Woodrum, Democrat of Virginia, on March 23, [50] had already passed the House by the
lopsided majority of 326 to 6. [51] It was
approved by the Senate on April 19. [52]
Thus, the recession, though it destroyed Roosevelt's
hope for a balanced budget, saved the CCC from further reduction. The
Corps remained steady at 1,500 camps and 300,000 enrollees for the rest
of 1938, and no cuts were planned for the 1939-1940 fiscal year. [53] Numerically at least, it was maintaining
its strength.
The same could not be said for the organization of
the CCC. Serious disagreements between the director and the technical
services threatened to disrupt the agency's high level of performance.
For the first four years of the Corps' existence, Fechner had made
little attempt to direct the policy of the co-operating agencies in any
way; he had allowed them to function very much according to their own
methods and traditions. Now, secure in his office and concerned with
what he regarded as a challenge to his authority by men like Ickes,
Tyner, Morrell, and Persons, he attempted to reverse this trend and
began a policy of gradually extending his authority over the technical
services and even the War Department. The first signs came in July,
1937, when Fechner announced to the Advisory Council that he had decided
to transfer to his office the CCC's liaison officers, presently hired
and paid by the technical agencies. [54]
The decision was bitterly fought by the Departments of Agriculture, the
Interior, and War, not so much because of its intrinsic significance,
but because the transfer would constitute a precedent for further
centralizing action. Fechner took little notice of their protests and
proceeded with the arrangement. Only when it was pointed out that its
cost would be excessive did he drop the matter, to the relief, though
not to the satisfaction, of the co-operating departments. [55]
The attempted transfer of liaison officers set the
stage for greatly increased tension between Fechner and the federal
agencies. The director's relationship with the acerbic Ickes had always
been uneven; now it became positively stormy. Ickes accused him of
discriminating against the Department of the Interior in allotting camps
and of attempting to "curtail" the secretary's authority. [56] Oscar L. Chapman, acting secretary of the
Department of the Interior, claimed that Fechner was attempting to "take
over responsibilities which are delegated to other departments and which
rightfully belong to them." [57]
The director's clash with Department of the Interior
officials was soon dwarfed, however, by a full-scale row which broke out
when he attempted to dictate terms to the Department of War. The
struggle, the only one of its kind during the whole of the Corps'
existence, was precipitated by a difference of opinion over the rotation
of Reserve officers in the camps. By 1937, high Army officers were
convinced that the CCC experience was of real value to those Reserve
officers who were used in the camps; therefore, in order to spread these
benefits over as broad an area as possible, they decided to replace all
those who had been on duty for more than eighteen months with a fresh
batch of younger men.
This was an extraordinarily unpopular decision.
Hundreds of those due to be replaced had learned to look on their CCC
jobs as permanent, and they were not about to give them up lightly. A
petition to Roosevelt praying for his intercession on their behalf spoke
of "the brutal and we believe thoroughly unwarranted, unwise, and
altogether unjust order issued by the War Department . . . this
callously brutal attempt to throw out of employment over 6,000 officers,
most of them with families. . . . in order that the Regular Army shall
not be marred by a permanent or semi-permanent force of 'we temporary
gentlemen.'" [58] Fechner strongly
supported the officers in their complaints because he feared that the
mass replacement of camp commanders would inevitably have a disastrous
effect on CCC morale. His arguments seem to have influenced the
President, who put pressure on the War Department to rescind the order.
The wrangle was eventually resolved by a compromise, the War Department
reluctantly agreeing to replace only 50 per cent of the officers
concerned. But Army feelings had been thoroughly ruffled by what was
considered to be Fechner's blatant influence in a strictly departmental
issue. Further conflict became almost inevitable. [59]
Smoldering Army resentment flared violently to life
early in 1938, following a series of complaints from Fechner on specific
points of administration. He was still not satisfied about the rotation
of officers. Further, he suspected that the Army officials were spending
CCC funds in an unauthorized way; he insisted, therefore, that he be
allowed to inquire into the details of their disbursement. [60] The War Department had had enough. In a
strongly worded memorandum, the acting secretary of war, Louis Johnson,
refuted Fechner's charges and angrily asked, "how far should the
Director, CCC inject himself into the details of the administration of
the War Department?" Denying that the co-operating agencies were in any
way subordinate to the director, Johnson asserted that since July 1,
1937, Fechner had ignored the advice of his Advisory Council, and had
arrogated as much power as he was able to his office. Johnson thought
that, if pursued further, this trend was bound to wreck the CCC as an
efficient agency. [61]
No one doubted that such overt hostility between War
Department and director could, in fact, paralyze the CCC. Accordingly, a
conference, attended by Fechner, the new chief of staff, General Malin
Craig, and members of the Advisory Council, was held on April 1 under
the chairmanship of James Roosevelt. Roosevelt came down heavily on the
side of the Army. He let it be known that the attorney general's opinion
was that the co-operating departments were in no way subordinate to the
director's office, and he strongly advised Fechner to concentrate on
making policy and to leave its implementation alone. [62]
Fechner, for his part, had no intention of letting
things end there. After being refused a copy of the opinion, he left the
whole matter to the President. In a letter to Roosevelt, after
emphasizing the need to maintain unity in the CCC, he asked for positive
reaffirmation that final authority for all CCC matters, including the
right to investigate and direct the policies of the technical services,
lay with the director. [63] His request
placed the President in a dilemma. Roosevelt balked at the idea of
offending the Army, but he sensed that Fechner attached such importance
to the issue that he would resign if his demands were not met. After a
fruitless attempt to satisfy both sides by approving Fechner's request
verbally only, he capitulated and in November put his signature to a
document specifically stating that "All matters of policy will be
initiated by, or approved by, the Director. The Director will satisfy
himself, through such methods as he may deem appropriate, that his
policies are being administered and executed as approved. If violations
are established, corrective action thereon shall be taken at the request
of the Director." [64] This authorization
was all Fechner wanted. He was now able to stress to a chastened
Advisory Council where power lay. Triumphantly, he asserted that "There
is no higher authority than the Director except the President. I want
that thoroughly understoodthere is no higher authority above the
Director other than the President in administering this Act." [65]
The outcome of the struggle between Fechner and the
Army is important because of the light it throws on the whole question
of the director's place within the CCC organization. It has been alleged
that Fechner had no real power, that he was a public relations man only,
and that the Army effectively controlled CCC policy. [66] While it is true that the Army ran the
camps and that Fechner often accepted Army advice, it is equally true
that in the last resort he, not the military, called the tune. That he
normally chose to accede to the Army's wishes in the interests of
harmony within the CCC organization did not mean that he was powerless
to oppose them should he deem it necessary.
Once he had received presidential confirmation of his
authority, Fechner embarked on the most ambitious centralization plan of
all, again in the teeth of the strongest opposition from the
co-operating services. The CCC used a vast amount of motorized equipment
in the course of its extensive operations, the responsibility for repair
and maintenance of which had always lain with the co-operating agencies.
In 1939 Fechner decided to alter this policy, proposing to set up a huge
chain of central machine repair shops directly under his control. All
repairs of CCC machinery would henceforth have to be carried out there,
and the director's office, not the technical services or Army, would
hire and pay the mechanics and other employees. [67] Immediately there was a storm of protest
from the technical agencies, directed at both the plan itself and at
Fechner's decision to implement it without consulting the Advisory
Council. The secretary of agriculture insisted that it be held in
abeyance, [68] Ickes demanded an
investigation by the Bureau of the Budget, [69] and Wirth, the Department of the
Interior's Advisory Council representative, declared that the plan was
"so decidedly adverse to departmental and CCC interests that every
effort should be made to have it reversed. Since it is believed useless
to request Director Fechner to reverse his decision, it is urgently
requested that this matter be taken up with the President." [70]
The protests did convince Roosevelt to appoint a
committee to investigate the efficiency and economy of Fechner's plan.
[71] It was but a brief respite for the
technical services, however, as the committee's report was highly
favorable to the scheme, recommending its early adoption. [72] The plan was implemented almost
immediately, a signal triumph for Fechner's centralization policies. It
was also his last official act. His health had been poor throughout
1939, and in December he suffered a severe heart attack. He died in
Walter Reed Hospital on New Year's Eve, after a three-week struggle for
life. [73]
There were several applicants for the vacant
position, with McEntee and Brigadier General Duncan Major, now retired,
the two strongest candidates. McEntee was strongly supported by the AF
of L, and was eventually selected for the post. It was probably the
logical choice, for he had been Fechner's right-hand man since the
Corps' earliest days, knowing both the details of the organization and
the people who made it work. His thoroughgoing approval of Fechner's
centralizing proclivities, however, were not calculated to endear him to
the co-operating agencies, and administrative dissension was to plague
the Corps for the rest of its existence. [74]
Fechner, in attempting his policy of centralization,
was clearly acting within the limits of his authority. Nevertheless, he
effectively damaged the easy relationship between director and federal
agencies which had been a significant feature of the CCC's initial
success. By exercising his authority to the full after four years in
which he had been content to play a passive role, he encroached on areas
which the technical services considered to be theirs by "right of
occupation." It is hard to decide why Fechner embarked on his policy of
centralization. One can only surmise that it was due to a clash of
personalities rather than a yen for administrative efficiency. Fechner,
growing old and ill, was becoming increasingly protective of the
prerogatives of his office, increasingly suspicious of the attitudes and
intentions of his technical service colleagues, and increasingly
determined to reassert himself as undisputed head of the CCC hierarchy.
Perhaps his short-lived resignation in 1939 in protest at the creation
of the Federal Security Agency adds credence to this assertion.
Fechner's centralization schemes may well have brought increased
efficiency, but they did so at the expense of morale. Extended by
McEntee, they contributed to the decline of the Corps after 1940.
Not even the controversy over the central repair
shops caused as much concern to CCC officials in 1939 as did the
establishment of the Federal Security Agency. For some years the
President had wanted to implement a plan of administrative reform, but
his schemes had invariably been frustrated by a recalcitrant Congress,
fearful of losing power over patronage. [75] Not until 1939 did the President achieve
some measure of success. In May, Congress passed by substantial
majorities a watered-down reorganization proposal, to take effect on
July 1, 1939. The bill consolidated the complex of federal agencies into
administrative groups according to function and authorized the
appointment of six administrative assistants to the President. [76] The most important agencies created were
the Federal Security Agency, the Federal Works Agency, and the Federal
Loans Agency, each presided over by an administrator. [77] Most federal agencies were to be placed
under the jurisdiction of one of these consolidating bodies. The CCC,
because of its achievements in the promotion of the welfare and
education of its enrollees, was to come under the "direction and
supervision" of the Federal Security Agency, which also regulated the
U.S. Employment Service, the Office of Education, the Public Health
Service, the NYA, and the Social Security Board. [78] The grouping itself is significant, for it
revealed that in Washington at least, it was now considered that the CCC
had more sophisticated functionstasks concerned with the welfare
and training of youththan simply work relief, and that these were
considered to be its most significant endeavors. If this were not so,
the Corps would surely have been assigned to the Federal Works Agency,
along with the PWA and the WPA.
Fechner protested both the change itself and the
placing of the CCC in the "welfare group." He pleaded with Roosevelt to
allow the Corps to continue as "an independent agency, responsible
directly to the President." If this continuation were not possible, it
should be placed in the work, not welfare, category. To Fechner, the
more complex definitions of function were immaterial, for the Corps, as
far as he was concerned, had always been, and still was, primarily a
"self contained work agency." [79] Nor did
he realize immediately that the Federal Security Agency administrator
would have authority over him. [80] When it
became clear that this would be the case and also that the President had
no intention of transferring the Corps to the Federal Works Agency,
Fechner angrily submitted his resignation, effective July 1. [81] In explaining his action to the Advisory
Council, he revealed clearly his bitter disappointment and frustration,
not only because his own authority was to be superseded, but also
because the Corps to which he had devoted six years, and which he had
grown to love, was to be changed so drastically. No matter who was
selected as administrator, Fechner claimed, he would be unable to run
the Corps "without messing the thing up." The whole situation was "in
such a fix" that Fechner had "lost interest in it and [did] not care to
go on with it. . . . I think the greatest reason or factor in the
success of the Corps is because the President let us run it. A new man
who will not only have the responsibility of a number of other agencies,
and also of the CCC will make a mess of it." He told the council that he
had made arrangements to go back to his old job, "which is still waiting
for me." [82]
Yet Fechner did not resign, though his failing health
meant that increasingly he was director in name only. No doubt he
acceded to the President's determination that he withdraw his
resignation, [83] and perhaps the selection
of Paul V. McNutt, a man whom he respected, to be Federal Security
Agency administrator helped him change his mind. [84] The handsome, articulate McNutt, formerly
governor of Indiana and regarded as a possible presidential nominee in
1940, [85] brought a wealth of ability and
experience to his new job. His very presence, however, was galling to
men who for a long time had been used to running their own organization
in their own way, responsible only to the President. With the bluff,
stubborn McEntee soon to take the helm of the CCC, the possibilities of
increased administrative tension were great.
One other policy change in 1939 exacerbated the
difficulties within the CCC ranks. Thoroughly alienated by Fechner's
centralization policy, the War Department had redoubled its demands to
be removed from the CCC organization. [86]
Fechner welcomed this. He "would have no hesitation in taking over the
functions in the Corps now exercised by the War Department," he
declared. [87] The President was less
confident of the director's ability to do so, but a development within
Congress had made some action necessary. On April 3, 1939, against
Roosevelt's expressed wish, Congress gave full disability benefits to
Reserve officers on duty with the CCC. [88]
The cost of this move to the government would be so great, and the risks
involved in CCC work so small when compared to service in the Regular
Army, that Roosevelt decided to replace all Reserve officers in the
camps with civilians. Accordingly, he directed the secretary of war to
implement a policy of gradually removing Reserve officers from duty, and
the transfer was completed by the end of the year. [89]
Actually, the change was more apparent than real. The
officers were replaced by civilians selected from Reserve officer lists
by the War Department under the supervision of the director. [90] The War Department likewise remained in
ultimate control of camp administration. Thus, it was merely a change in
status, rather than personnel, but Army authorities were so bitterly
hostile that another link in the chain of administrative dissension was
forged. [91] Congressmen also added their
protests, predicting dire consequences for the efficiency of the CCC.
[92]
The CCC ended 1939 with little enough reason for
self-congratulation. True, it was still very popular, but the death of
the director, the truculent personality of his replacement, the loss of
morale and enthusiasm among the co-operating agencies, the uncertainty
due to the outbreak of war, and the slashing of the CCC budget for
1940-1941 in accordance with good election year practice [93] all pointed to rocky days ahead.
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