Nez Perce Summer, 1877

Cover

Contents

Foreword

Introduction

Reasons

Eruption and White Bird Canyon

Looking Glass's Camp and Cottonwood

Clearwater

Kamiah, Weippe, and Fort Fizzle

Bitterroot and the Big Hole

Camas Meadows

The National Park

Canyon Creek

Cow Island and Cow Creek Canyon

Yellowstone Command

Bear's Paw: Attack and Defense

Bear's Paw: Siege and Surrender

Consequences

Epilogue

Appendix A

Appendix B

Bibliography

Nez Perce Summer, 1877 Chapter 7: Camas Meadows

Chapter 7:
Camas Meadows (continued)

During the hours before nightfall, August 19, a few tribesmen appeared in the distance, but such sightings were routine and thus given little consideration. In camp, some of the men crawled under the wagons to sleep, while others pitched shelter tents. Feeling secure for the first time in several weeks, many troops undressed before going to bed. The night was occasionally rainy, and clouds partly obscured the moon. [34] Apparently some Nez Perce warriors had stolen among the pack animals, either cutting the hobbles or the bell-straps on the bell-mares, and at around 3:30 a.m., [35] after the moon had set and in the predawn darkness of August 20, a column of horsemen (according to Howard's report) approached the picket line from the north, above the area of the Montanans' camp and from the general direction that Lieutenant Bacon was expected on his return from Henry's Lake. When the pickets' challenge went unanswered, the soldiers fired at the column"three or four shots fired in rapid succession," said one man—and suddenly an attack by Nez Perce warriors opened on the command, with the immediate fire directed against the citizens' camp. It sounded, said one participant, "like the discharge of several Gatling guns." [36] Captain Norwood reported that "the camp was startled and hurriedly aroused by a volley or heavy discharge of fire arms and loud yelling and whooping from [the] hostile Indians." [37] The warriors rushed into the area between the streams, startling and stampeding most of the volunteers' horses, as well as all the neighboring pack mules, and attempting to drive off the cavalry mounts. Recounted a volunteer:

Fortunately for the citizens, the camp was pitched on low ground, and the Indians overshot them, and although the bullets flew like hail around them, no damage was done by the fire beyond the killing of a horse and slight abrasions inflicted upon two of the party by spent balls. The Indians gathered up stock from all parts of both camps, and posted a line of about twenty-five men in front of the citizens' camp, within fifty yards of the wagons, and kept up their terrific fire at that distance, while the remainder of the raiders . . . were driving the animals across the creek and into the open country beyond. [38]

In the initial tumult, some volunteers took to the icy creeks for protection, while others scrambled to reach the regulars across Spring Creek. A reminiscent account stated that two of the citizens "made a bee line for Gen. Howard's tent, crying at the top of their voices every time they hit the ground: 'White men [!] Don't shoot [!]'" [39] Amid the gunfire and confusion, the soldiers raced from the shelter tents on hands and knees, quickly dressed, and rushed to meet the warriors. [40] "Everyone was out in a minute," recalled an enlisted man, "and all we could see was a magnified imitation of a swarm of fireflies flitting in the alders, as the rifles spoke; while the trampling of hundreds of hoofs added to the din." [41] Most of the soldiers dashed for the willow thickets bordering Spring Creek, "and in less than two minutes from the commencement of the firing, not half a dozen men were left upon the camp-ground." [42] Because of the darkness, and because the citizens' camp lay directly across the stream from the regulars, the soldiers withheld their fire, although their presence along the line of Spring Creek prevented the warriors from driving off the cavalry horses and the wagon mules. Yet they made off with 150 pack mules and most of the volunteers' horses in the strike. "Sweeping around our camp," penned correspondent Sutherland, "could be distinguished a herd of stampeded horses and mules, galloping at their highest possible speed, with a considerable band of Indians behind them goading them on with loud cries, and discharge of rifles." [43] "Except [for] the noise we were making ourselves, nothing could be heard but receding hoofbeats and faint yells." [44] Then they were gone, apparently heading northeast from the camp, leaving the command bewildered and in suspense in the half hour of darkness left before dawn. Despite all the shooting, only the two citizens and one soldier were slightly wounded. [45]

Nee-Me-Poo accounts of the raid on Howard's camp at Kamisnim Takin (Camas Meadows) all agree that Looking Glass played the primary role in orchestrating and overseeing the event. Some informants suggested that the notion for the attack stemmed from a vision experienced by Grizzly Bear Youth or Black Hair, or perhaps both men. [46] Scouts had anticipated Howard's selection of the bivouac (where the people had camped the previous night) and had reported such to the Nez Perce leadership. Looking Glass arranged for a group of warriors to join him in the attempt to capture the animals. [47] Some Nez Perce recollections indicate that the party numbered 28 warriors, while others place the figure at 120 or even 225. [48] In the darkness of morning on August 20, however, the raiders were unaware of the presence of the volunteers' camp and targeted their efforts on what they thought was the horse herd—in reality the pack mules congregated north of the citizens' bivouac. "We know American horses are afraid of Indians," Looking Glass reportedly said. "Make all the noise you possibly can, as by so doing we may be able to stampede the whole herd at once." And that was exactly what was done, although the warriors were surprised to discover later that they had captured mules instead of horses. (Whereas the obvious objective of the Nee-Me-Poo men was to get horses and complicate Howard's pursuit, the presence of the hated Bannocks among the troops probably provided yet another incentive. [49]) The Nez Perce Yellow Wolf was one who went among the animals and cut some loose. He and others discounted the notion that the warriors approached in column formation as reported by Howard. They said that they advanced on the soldier camp in two or three parties, and that an individual named Otskai (Going Out) prematurely fired his weapon to start the action. [50] While some of the Nee-Me-Poo desired to uncharacteristically attack the camp on foot, Wottolen stated that the idea was to go among the soldiers, find General Howard, and kill him and his officers, but that plan lost out because the warriors wanted to attack the camp on horseback and, perhaps more importantly, Looking Glass would not allow it. Besides Looking Glass, other leaders and principal warriors present included Ollokot, Toohoolhoolzote, Teeweeyownah (Over the Point), Two Moon, and Espowyes (Light in the Mountain). Despite some Nez Perce accounts that maintain that Joseph was present at Camas Meadows, others—and at least one explicitly—deny his participation. [51]

Informed of the loss of the animals, Howard directed Major Sanford's cavalry to pursue as soon as daylight came and try to retrieve the mules and horses taken in the raid. Two of Sanford's companies rode out shortly, consisting of Companies B (Captain Jackson and Lieutenants Adams and George S. Hoyle) and I (Captain Carr and Lieutenant Cresson), First Cavalry. They were joined by Company L, Second Cavalry (Captain Norwood and Lieutenant Benson), whose horses had pulled up a picket pin in the melee and had milled "'round and 'round and twisted themselves into a grotesque puzzle." [52] Companies C and K of the cavalry battalion remained with Howard and the infantry and volunteers in the Camas Meadows camp and prepared for another possible attack.

At the time that Sanford's cavalry left the bivouac at Camas Meadows, the warriors and the captured animals could be seen four or five miles in the distance, doubtless from the cloud of dust that they raised. According to the account of Sergeant Davis, who was with Norwood, "one company of the 1st Cav. was to make a detour to the right and the other to the left, and our company was to follow the trail." [53] In their pursuit, the cavalrymen managed to close on the warriors, and about three miles from the bivouac, Norwood's company succeeded in retaking about seventy-five mules and horses, but in the tumult most of the animals again broke away toward the warriors and only twenty-five were reclaimed. [54] Eight miles from the camp, the warriors halted beyond a timbered lava ridge, "the first roll of the foothills," remembered Davis, and when Captain Carr's company appeared ahead of the other units, the warriors opened fire on them from behind rocks, causing them to dismount. Carr and Norwood formed in line to meet the seeming ambush, and Captain Jackson assumed the right next to Norwood, with all number fours going to the rear with the horses. Sergeant Davis said that Norwood's men, crawling up to the brow of the ridge, could see the line of warriors about one thousand yards in the distance. As the shooting became general, the Nez Perces directed a heavy fire against the left of the soldiers' line and began to turn it at that location, causing Sanford to direct his men to fall back after an hour in that position, possibly after Sanford communicated with Howard. [55] Almost simultaneously, the pressure from the warriors increased on the right. Jackson found himself embroiled in a desperate contest with warriors starting to outflank his right. Amid the skirmishing, Jackson's trumpeter, Private Bernard A. Brooks, fell dead, a bullet through his heart, and Jackson, aided by one or two of his men, dismounted from his horse and dashed out and recovered the body. [56]

Trumpeter Bernard A. Brooks, Company H, First Cavalry, wearing his dress uniform, ca. 1876. Brooks was killed during the skirmish at Camas Meadows, August 20, 1877. Courtesy Eileen Bennett

Soon both Carr and Jackson withdrew their companies, and after twenty minutes Norwood's thirty-five men, too, started in the direction of the horse holders. When Sanford sent his adjutant, Lieutenant Cresson, directing Norwood to retreat, the captain told him that "we had better hold the position." Regardless, Norwood soon found that he could not safely withdraw, so he took up a temporary position on ground slightly higher than the surrounding terrain, planning to take appropriate measures to cover his rear before pulling back. [57] Up to this point, few casualties had occurred on either side, largely because, as Davis explained, "the range was long for our Springfields and longer for their Winchesters." [58] Lieutenant Benson, however, was hit, a bullet penetrating his buttocks. Norwood later declared that had he retired after "the 1st Cavalry . . . company uncovered my [left] flank, . . . my company would have been annihilated." [59]

In his official report, Norwood described his movement as follows:

I fortunately dismounted my men under cover of a small ridge of lava and deployed them for action. It was a position of great peril or danger; my flanks were exposed by the hurried withdrawal of Captain Carr's company. He having received an order to withdraw, and so did I, but I declined to obey it. If I had obeyed, my company would have been slaughtered. [60]

The exposed location quickly decided Norwood to move farther back in the general direction of Howard's camp to a stand of aspen where the horse holders had gone. At first, the troopers could not see the horses, and they momentarily panicked until a trumpeter blowing "recall" alerted them to their presence. Sergeant Davis explained that

the race to that thicket was something never to be forgotten, for a cavalryman is not trained for a five hundred yard sprint; luck was with us, however, and no man was hit in that mad race for safety. I had a horse's nose-bag slung over my shoulder containing extra cartridges, and a bullet cut the strap and let it fall to the ground. A hero would have stopped, gone back and recovered that bag, but not I. [61]

Norwood reported that the troops withdrew "to the left and rear about 1200 yards." [62] The captain continued:

I got my men in position very rapid[ly] and informed them to fortify, as I proposed to hold it, which I did . . . [for] four hours. After the two companies of the 1st Cavalry under [Brevet] Col. Sanford withdrew, the . . . whole fighting force of Indians concentrated on my position. [63]

The area occupied by Norwood's command—called the "frying pan" in some accounts—was located seven miles diagonally northeast from Howard's camp and approximated ten acres on a slightly elevated series of lava ridges overlooking the surrounding desert and bisected by a gully or wash extending north-to-south. Sergeant Davis described it as "a sort of basin . . . with a rim high enough to protect our horses, and filled with young cottonwoods in full leaf." [64] Probably the trees that grew in the gully were aspen, and the company horses were sheltered there while the soldiers fortified the ridges. There they hastily raised breastworks of loose pieces of basalt and built them facing in all directions to ward off the Nez Perce attackers. At least twenty-five such fortifications of varying size, generally sufficient to contain from one to two (sometimes three) men each, were thrown up along an irregular perimeter adjoining both sides of the gulch. Some of the breastworks took advantage of natural declivities in the terrain, with openings shored up with rocks to protect their occupants. Some were crescent-, oval-, and horseshoe-shaped and open at the rear for entrance and exit, while a few were completely enclosed. Some structures measured about four by five feet; others ran ten feet in length. While most of the Nez Perce marksmen seemingly remained behind rock-strewn ridges several hundred yards away, some warriors were able to approach behind a lava crest perhaps fifty yards south of the defense site.

It was this ability of the Nez Perces to draw near the soldiers that likely produced the greatest number of casualties. Besides Lieutenant Benson, who had been wounded before Norwood pulled his men back, these included Private Harry Trevor, hit in the right breast, and Samuel Glass, who received a bullet in the bladder; both subsequently died of their wounds. Another bullet struck Corporal Harry Garland in the hip, driving two cartridges from his belt into his body. Three other soldiers and a civilian received wounds in the fighting before the warriors withdrew. Davis reported that Sergeant Hugh McCafferty climbed a tree and, hidden by the foliage, kept the troops informed of the warriors' movements. According to a contemporary report, the Bannock, Buffalo Horn, "stood by Norwood all the time, and by all accounts, kept up his old reputation of being the bravest of scouts." [65]

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