Big Bend Administrative History

By 1975, the NPS had prepared a revised master plan that incorporated much of the debate and thinking about Big Bend since the early 1970s. Planners noted the decline in visitation by mid-decade (191,200 visitors, or a loss of 22 percent), even as "a large corporate land subdivision and sale is in progress . . . along the northern boundary of the park." These lands "are being sold primarily as recreation sites," wrote NPS planners, "and hunting is expected to be an important activity." Future guests to such facilities might use railroad service from Alpine to the park area, while "increased use of private aircraft suggests the wisdom of an airstrip near the park." The 1975 plan did recognize criticisms about the Muzquiz-Boquillas road, suggesting instead the La Linda bridge alternative. "Such a route would also provide much better access into the Sierra del Carmen-Fronteriza Range," said the planners, and could become "a principal feature of Mexico's proposed companion park." The planners preferred to leave border crossings at Santa Elena and Boquillas as they were, as "the residents of the Mexican agricultural villages along the park boundary use both park roads and concession services in the Rio Grande Village and Castolon areas." [17]

One feature of park planning that had not changed in the 1970s was the call for reduced dependency on the Chisos Basin for visitor and park use. The planners wanted no more automobile traffic in the basin than the existing 1975 levels, but agreed that the "Dallas huts will be replaced with modern units on a unit-for-unit basis," with "all new units . . . located within the existing impacted areas." Panther Junction would become the preferred site for visitor contact. "The location presents excellent opportunities for horseback rides into the surrounding foothills of the Chisos Mountains," wrote the planners, and "trails could be developed to connect with the existing trail network at the higher elevations." Rio Grande Village, in the estimation of the 1975 plan, would "become a major park visitor-use development." This site had sufficient water and land to form a "green-oasis" for visitors. Castolon would become a "secondary park use area," with "many of the amenities found at Rio Grande Village." History would be Castolon's primary emphasis, and "extreme care must be taken to integrate new structures with the old, while designing all facilities to fit within the regional scale." The planners included a call for "a river management plan . . . to establish the river's carrying capacity for float-trips, define appropriate types and extents of use, determine an appropriate number of commercial operators, and outline other necessary management practices and controls." [18]

By addressing these facility issues, the planners believed that Big Bend could solve its most serious problems of resource management. While conceding "the impossibility of turning back the ecological clock," future resource programs should attempt "re-establishing, where feasible, the dynamic natural scene as viewed by the first European visitor." The planners praised "the reintroduction of pronghorn in 1947 and 1948 and the apparently successful reintroduction of Montezuma quail in 1972." The next step for Big Bend's natural resource efforts, said the NPS planners, was that "the turkey and the desert big horn sheep should re-established in their former habitats." Park officials also should maintain vigilance about the grasslands, and "the historical role of fire in the ecology of the grassland and upper Chisos forests should be investigated." Once "the role of this natural agent is defined," said the planners, "and public property is not endangered, naturally occurring wildfires should be allowed to run their course." [19]

Should the NPS be permitted to implement these ideas, concluded the 1975 planning document, the NPS could make great strides to preserving the wilderness conditions that had prevailed centuries ago. Echoing the words of Walter Prescott Webb four decades earlier, the planners wrote that "Big Bend National Park provides an opportunity for a desert experience unequalled in quality or quantity in its region and the Nation." As had previous generations of NPS planners and scientists, the 1975 document called for "sound land-use practices, effective water utilization, and establishment of a companion park in Mexico" as the "major priorities for the continued qualitative use of the park." Then the planners reminded the NPS that "every encouragement should be given to the development of the park in Mexico by that government." They believed, as had commentators as diverse as Roger Toll, Everett Townsend, and Daniel Galicia in the 1930s, that "physically, the outstanding resources in the Big Bend National Park landscape are matched, and in some cases excelled, by the outstanding resources in Mexico south of the Rio Grande." The "facilities, developments, and wild areas for the two parks," wrote the NPS team, "would be planned to complement one another, to heighten the visitor's understanding of the region's plant and animal life and wildlife, and to better interpret the relationships between the Rio Grande watershed and all the people who inhabit it." [20]

Adoption of the draft master plan for Big Bend did not come easily in the 1970s, even after several revisions and inclusion of criticisms from both the preservation and development perspectives. Then in August 1975, Roland H. Wauer, chief scientist for the Southwest Region of the NPS (and previously the chief naturalist at Big Bend), delivered a paper to the Southwest Region superintendents' conference in Santa Fe. Wauer, like David Jones in 1967, placed the NPS in the context of a land-user in Big Bend as he narrated "a chronology of the environmental evolution of the Chisos Mountains and vicinity." When the CCC closed its camp in 1942 in Big Bend State Park, there remained about 4,500 square feet of building space; a number that had grown by 1975 to 115,126 square feet. In addition, said Wauer, NPCI had added 22,624 square feet for its operations. Visitation to the park had compounded what the NPS's chief scientist called "man's demands upon this unique environment." From 3,205 people in 1945, said Wauer, the numbers had grown in five years to 70,325, to 80,990 in 1955, and 163,550 by 1966 (the year, said Wauer, "when new facilities were completed that were intended to offer adequate visitor facilities for several decades into the future"). When the new master planning process began in 1973, visitation had leaped to 281,320. Wauer argued that "the National Park Service was not the first landlord within the Big Bend, but we are likely to be the last." The NPS "did not inherit a virgin area, but one that had been badly abused over the years." The chief scientist noted that "we started out to restore the natural environment and for the most part succeeded," as "nature has a way of healing itself if we let well enough alone." But Wauer confessed that "we made gross errors." In his mind, "I will always be ashamed that the Park Service developed Cattail Falls Canyon, placed a radio repeater station on top of Emory Peak, constructed two sewage lagoons in the Lower Basin, and are now building a sewage treatment plant nearby." [21]

Wauer then took issue with the conclusions of the March 1975 master plan, especially its call for new construction at Castolon, Rio Grande Village, and Panther Junction. "These are redundant areas," claimed the regional chief scientist, "where some development will not appreciably add to the total impacts within the environments of floodplain, desert and grassland." He praised the plan's call for removal of facilities in the Chisos Basin, as "these actions are huge pluses for resources protection." Wauer saw as an intractable dilemma "the continuation of natural processes, while seemingly insurmountable pressures for more development continue;" a circumstance that the chief scientist said "we must live with in this case for many years to come." Speaking rhetorically, Wauer asked "in retrospect, how wonderful it would have been if the Park Service could have inherited virgin wilderness and then had the foresight to learn about the resources and their relationships prior to committing ourselves to development." He then emphatically declared: "But it was too late! It is now a battle between the protectionists and the developers." Quoting the famed naturalist Aldo Leopold, Wauer closed by reminding the region's superintendents of the lessons of Big Bend. "It was Leopold who said, 'The first rule of intelligent tinkering is to save all of the pieces.'" For Wauer, "today's extremes are tomorrow's lifestyle." Thus the NPS "must use the tools at hand if we are going to really win the battle of preservation of our resources." Big Bend, if it taught anything in its three decades of existence, reminded its former chief naturalist that "we must do more than just insulate the natural processes from the impact of modern man." [22]

Having the regional chief scientist weigh in on the 1975 master plan did not augur well for Big Bend's planning process. At the same time, operations deteriorated within the park under superintendent Joe Carithers. By the summer of 1976 (five years after Carithers's appointment), the Southwest Region had to send a review team to document charges of mismanagement and racism. This process echoed the problems of a generation earlier, when Ross Maxwell's actions came under increasing scrutiny, leading to his removal and departure from the park service. Four regional officials (Robert Bendt, Jose Cisneros, Emil Matic, and Charles Budge), joined with Dennis Hill of the NPS's Mather Training Center to conduct a series of interviews and site inspections in August 1976. From that would come a scathing indictment of Carithers's management, removal of nearly all of his top assistants, and the need for new directions in a park already under siege in the battle between preservation and development. [23]

The Southwest region had received complaints about the management of Big Bend for several years. Making the review of Carithers's operations more difficult was his connection to the upper echelons of NPS management, and his presumed relationship with important Democratic party officials like Arizona senator Morris Udall and his brother, former Interior secretary Stewart Udall. A preliminary review of Big Bend's activities in July 1976 led SWR officials to suspect problems not only with the superintendent, but his assistant superintendent, chief ranger, chief of maintenance, and administrative officer. Regional director Joseph Rumburg (himself a young park ranger at Big Bend in the early 1950s) went to the park in early August, and agreed that a complete review was in order. He then asked the review team to address concerns with park maintenance, resource management, employee development, and external programs and activities. [24]

Upon arrival at Big Bend, the team began with assessment of external affairs. They found that Carithers and his staff did little with the surrounding communities. "It is, therefore, little wonder," wrote the team in August 1976, "that 49% of the articles and 47% of the space given to Big Bend in the 'Alpine Avalanche' were concerned with park development and planning, mostly negative in nature." The team then remarked about the lack of standards for employees' appearances, including adherence to NPS regulations for uniforms. In matters of law enforcement, "a great deal of thought is to be given," said the review team, "to de-emphasizing of the wearing and displaying of weapons and other defensive equipment by the RM [resource management] and VP [visitor protection] personnel." The team disliked the lack of planning by park staff in matters of "search and rescue, backcountry management, river management, and resource management." There was no documented safety program at Big Bend, as "safety appeared to be of concern to employees but not of too great a concern with park management." Rules of the federal Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) were not applied, and the team discovered that "safety meetings, tailgate sessions, safety films, etc., are not being held or shown as they should be." Training in first aid had been requested by staff, but not provided. This laxity had spread to all areas of maintenance, leading the team to report that "the general appearance of the park is one of wide-spread neglect in maintenance of all facilities." From planning to inventory of supplies and equipment to "personal performance standards," the team found that "maintenance is managed by crisis," and that employees were frustrated and unmotivated. [25]

The language used by the review team consistently emphasized the shabby state of affairs at Big Bend. At the Panther Junction visitors center and park headquarters, paint had faded, restrooms were unclean, and even the American flag needed replacement. In the Chisos Basin (the object of much discussion in the master planning process), the team declared that "the overall appearance of those facilities that we are responsible for maintaining are a disgrace to the Service." Restrooms and campground facilities showed that "there has been no scheduled preventative maintenance for several years." The same applied to the hiking trails in the basin, while the road into the Chisos Basin was the worst in the park. Erosion, poor drainage, overgrown vegetation, and obstructed signage plagued all park roads, and the review team surmised that employees put up whatever color of sign that they had at their disposal. [26]

Employee moral contributed to the sad state of resource management at Big Bend; a condition that the review team agreed "was a chronic problem." Staff would be kept in remote locations for too long, leading to jobs that the reviewers considered "dull and repetitive." In addition, employees faced "supervisory neglect" in the field. "Supervisory contact is limited to radio conversations," leading to "a two-sided problem: management is not aware of the problems and employees are made to feel alienated from the organization." Maintenance supervision suffered from a heavy reliance upon seasonal employees with little experience, and the "increasing chronological age" of the permanent staff. This created what the team called "a drain on available manpower as a result of required annual leave, furloughs, and in some cases, extended sick leave." The average maintenance worker was 50 years of age, with 18 percent eligible for immediate retirement and 40 percent facing the same situation within five years. "As a result," wrote the review team, "the work force is rapidly losing the stamina to do the maintenance work necessary to maintain operations at standard." The review team especially disliked the lack of minority employees throughout the park, with the maintenance crew "predominantly minority," and only one permanent ranger being Latino. [27]

Given these concerns at Big Bend, the NPS had to make changes in management that underscored what Jose Cisneros would recall as the 1970s' political nature of park management. Gene Balaz would be named as assistant superintendent, charged with improvement of operations and maintenance. When superintendent Carithers refused the offer of a position in the regional office in Santa Fe, SWR director John Cook then had to remove him and his supervisory personnel. Issues of maintenance improved with the appointment of Robert Haraden in 1978 as superintendent, as Haraden had come to the NPS in the 1950s with a degree in engineering from the University of Maine. Gene Balaz would recall in a 1996 interview his efforts to advance the cause of employee morale at Big Bend, and the improvement of facilities such as the 250,000-gallon water-storage system in the Chisos Basin for the concessions. Bob Haraden also worked to reestablish good community relations in west Texas (not unlike the efforts in the early 1950s of superintendent Lon Garrison when he replaced Ross Maxwell). [28]

With the dawn of the 1980s, the planning process at Big Bend had nearly reached a halt. Russell Berry, acting superintendent, and Wayne Cone, acting SWR director, admitted in January 1980 that the NPS could not complete the park's master plan begun ten years before. Caught between new environmental standards and local opposition to changes in park operations and boundaries, the master planning team decided instead to release in August 1979 one of the new documents connected to the planning agenda: a final environmental statement (FES). Visitation had rebounded at Big Bend by the close of the decade (a reported 300,000 in 1978), and the NPS claimed that "park use patterns are fairly well established." They had hoped "to develop the park for the visitor in a way that interprets park values and, at the same time, preserves the natural and historical environment." One feature of the master plan that had not existed when the process began inn 1970 was congressional designation of the Rio Grande as a "wild and scenic river." Because of the separation of management, the WSR would not be included in the 1980 master plan for Big Bend. [29]

While the 1980 plan could not initiate action, the team did attempt suggestions for new park operations that once again blended the preservation and development concepts debated throughout the 1970s. Panther Junction would continue to be the focus of visitor orientation and interpretation. To alleviate crowding in the Chisos Basin and avoid such overuse in other areas of the park, the plan called for the NPS "to encourage development of privately owned campgrounds, trailer villages, motel units, and other visitor facilities on lands adjacent to the park." At the same time, the park should "provide park accommodations and camping facilities, along with supportive facilities" in the Basin. This meant that "visitor accommodations and other facilities in the Basin will be upgraded and made safer, and human use of the area -particularly horse use and employee quarters — will be redirected to reduce environmental impacts." For the Rio Grande Village, the planners described its future as a "major use area, such as the Chisos Basin is now." No details were given of the expansions for the village, but the plan hoped that this would "spread park visitation more evenly through the year, as well as more evenly throughout the park." Castolon required that the NPS "move very slowly . . . in such a way as to avoid intrusion into the historic scene." [30]

In a reference to the ongoing debate over wilderness status, the plan called upon the park service to preserve the natural resources of Big Bend through "management of 533,900 acres of the park as though it were wilderness." A stretch of the Persimmon Gap-Panther Junction road was to be rebuilt according to current NPS standards for drainage and surfacing. The plan then called for "relocation underground of all or most of the present 110 miles of electric and telephone lines which are aboveground." The park also should remove "18.75 miles of unnecessary roads to conform to the wilderness designation," restore "where feasible" an "historic vegetational system," and offer "alternative transportation planning when visitor pressures increase." Fire management also needed attention, as "natural caused fires, in specific delineated locations, will again be allowed to influence the natural ecosystem as long as they do not damage private property or Federal structures, or threaten protected species." This would be accomplished through "prescribed burning," with "test plots in the grasslands and research from other Park Service areas with similar ecosystems" used as models. Restoration of the Montezuma quail and desert big horn sheep should proceed, said the planners, and archaeological resources required inventorying. Finally, the plan called upon the NPS to monitor "environmental factors to evaluate consequences of development and to determine carrying capacities." [31]

The 1980 plan paid careful attention to the contentious issue of Chisos Basin facilities, even though earlier discussions had generated much controversy. The fifteen "Dallas huts" would be removed, and replaced with "an equivalent number of motel units" to maintain the capacity of 68 overnight guests. The park service should move the bulk of concessionaire housing into the lower Basin, reducing by half the number of employees residing in the upper Basin from the maximum of 65 to 35 on average. The NPCI store in the upper Basin should become a ranger station, allowing the NPS to remove the modest facility dedicated to that purpose. NPCI's grocery store also should be moved to the lower Basin, and the Chisos Remuda taken out of the Basin altogether. The campground also would need attention, with one group campsite closed to reduce occupancy by about 1,000 visitors per year. The park service had not given up on the idea of complete restoration of the Basin to pre-1935 conditions, however, as the 1980 plan called for "long-range plans (perhaps 40 years hence) for converting the Basin to day-use, including consideration of the removal of automobiles and replacement with a bus-type or other public transportation system from a parking are outside the Basin." [32]

The planners acknowledged that Panther Junction needed much more development to accommodate future park use. "The overall effect," said the 1980 plan, "will be to approximately triple the present developed acreage of about 30," including the search for a more stable water supply. The NPCI compound would hold some 30 employees, while the park service would need to house an additional 40 of its staff members. An "NPS operations center" would include "office space for the U.S. Magistrate, U.S. Post Office, medical clinic, detention cell, and communications-dispatch facilities." In addition, the plan envisioned an "NPS employees recreation building." This structure would consist of a general recreation room and gymnasium, as well as an outside swimming pool, a wading pool, and bathhouse. Water supplies would be stored in a new 500,000-gallon structure to augment the existing 150,000-gallon facility. Visitors could expect development at Panther Junction of a 50-unit motel, lodge, three campgrounds, a trailer court, and a remuda and horse trails. All of this would require more water piping, surfacing of roads, and hiking trails. [33]

Without implementing the 1980 master plan, Big Bend had to make do with the limited resources available to all national parks in the budget-conscious decade of the 1980s. In 1984, an unsigned report on "Natural Resource Protection" outlined the problems that cost cutting had wrought upon the infrastructure and operations of Big Bend. The park had grown to 741,118 acres of land with the addition of the Harte-Hanks ranch on its northern boundary. "Today, 40 years after the establishment of Big Bend National Park," wrote the SWR employee, "a critical look at this question of 'impairment' shows some disturbing trends." The reviewer attributed Big Bend's problems in part to its sheer size: 324 miles of gravel and paved roads, and 276 miles of trails. Big Bend shared its northern and western boundaries with 45 private landowners, and 118 miles of the southern and eastern boundary were shared with Mexico. The reviewer contended that "there is a clear and unmistakable indication that the park's natural and historical resources are being impaired at what appears to be a slowly increasing rate." One such feature was removal of cactus "as the demand for desert vegetation for home landscaping throughout the Southwest increases." H.A. Harrington visited Big Bend in 1984 to write an article for The Cactus and Succulent Journal. Outside of Study Butte on the park's west side, Harrington discovered "the most disgusting sight to that point: in a flat area behind a small grocery store/gas station lay enormous loads of collected plants, all freshly dug and in flower." He estimated the number to be "12 stacks, measuring 20 to 30 feet long each, by 5 to 10 feet wide, by 3 to 4 feet high." Harrington concluded that "there is strong evidence to suggest that many of these specimens are being taken from the park; nearby and adjacent ranches are virtually denuded of certain cactus specimens." [34]

The NPS reviewer then turned to an age-old problem at Big Bend: the trapping and poaching of wildlife. "There is a large and continuing demand for animal furs and live reptiles," said the report. While the reviewer did not know the extent of these operations, the NPS official did note that "in two recent cases (1983 and 1984), furs valued at over $60,000 were seized by State and Federal authorities immediately adjacent to the park." In 1979, "17,000 assorted pelts valued at over $1,000,000 were confiscated by Federal authorities at a ranch which is adjacent to the park's northeast boundary." The reviewer had "strong evidence" to prove that "many of these pelts were taken from the park." Equally problematic was the seizure of snakes and lizards. "The demand for certain species is high," said the reviewer, "and some specimens are sold for prices up to $1000." Unfortunately for the park service, "the Chihuahuan Desert of the Big Bend is an especially attractive source for reptile collectors, since specimens are much more numerous than near large population centers where collecting has been taking place for a number of years." Big Bend in particular had rare species, such as the Trans-Pecos Rat Snake and the Gray-banded King snake that poachers found highly valuable. [35]

Trapping and poaching shared space in Big Bend with yet another historic resource problem: trespass livestock from Mexico. The 1984 review lamented the fact that NPS programs to restore the denuded grasslands and eroded stream banks now confronted an increase of illegal grazing. "Some of the trespass is deliberate," the report stated, while "some is accidental, but with no real efforts made by the Mexican people to prevent the activity." This the reviewer attributed to "a definite lack of an adequate feed source on the Mexican side of the river caused by severe overgrazing and a prolonged drought." The reviewer had observed that "many animals are literally starving to death." The report did note that "the problem along the park boundary which borders ranches in the United States is similar but not nearly as significant as along the river." This condition occurred because of "livestock crossing into the park through downed or damaged fences." [36]

While not as extensive as natural resource damage, limited funding for law enforcement put the park's historic resources in jeopardy as well. "Recent surveys indicate that many of the best and most significant of these sites," said the 1984 report, "have suffered serious damage from vandals, collectors, and 'pot hunters.'" A major factor was their proximity to travel corridors. "Most sites are within a reasonable distance of roads or the river," said the reviewer, "and thus are accessible to most visitors." The reviewer could only comment that "as damage or pilfering of these irreplaceable resources occur, remedial action most often cannot be taken." [37]