Big Bend Administrative History

The thoughts of senior NPS engineer E.F. Preece, however, were more pointed and critical of the overall work of the CCC, and of the park service's plans. Preece spoke harshly in his report of April 28, 1941, of the NPS's strategy of "spraying the walls with a paint or preservative coating of some sort." This, said Preece, "has been proven so definitely unsatisfactory that it is difficult to understand why we continue to try to do something which we know will not work." Preece complained that "for years now this Service has been using every kind of material to preserve adobe ruins," only to realize that "there is not a single record of even mediocre success and an attempt to paint the adobe bricks at Big Bend will meet with no better success." The senior engineer thus recommended that "this proposal be completely abandoned." [17]

Preece further criticized the CCC's efforts to locate the visitors center and administrative headquarters below the Chisos basin. "This location," wrote the senior NPS engineer, "must be considerably hotter than the higher elevations in which the vegetation is much more varied and certainly more profuse." As the NPS needed to consider "the comfort of those who must eventually use the headquarters," he argued that their needs "should outweigh whatever indiscernible consideration dictated its presently proposed location." Preece then addressed the master plan's call for a cog railway to the South Rim. "I understand the reasons back of this suggestion," said Preece, "and certainly agree fully with them." He remarked rather sarcastically that "it must be possible for the obese lady from Iowa to visit the rim and a road scar is far too great a price to pay for this accessibility." The senior engineer then suggested replacing the cog railway with a monorail, which he believed "is completely practicable [and] will not require even the removal of vegetation in any important degree." Preece also thought that "the monorail will be simpler to operate than a cable car and should be much less expensive to maintain." [18]

Preece's remarks provoked substantial discussion among NPS architects, with Harvey Cornell responding to the NPS director's call for an explanation of the problems at the CCC camp in the Chisos Basin. Cornell disagreed with Preece's claim that the headquarters site could not support adequate vegetation, noting that "there are no other sites that would be easily accessible and still afford adequate space on reasonably adaptable terrain." He then challenged Preece on the issue of the cog railway to the South Rim. Cornell and other park designers realized that if "the usual pressure for a park road should become acute, then our preference would be for the cog railroad, but only on the assumption that one or the other would have to be provided." He preferred horse paths to the rim, and suggested that "if the bridle trails are of sufficient width, small mule carts might be adequate for those park visitors who absolutely refuse to use bridle and foot trails in the normal fashion." Cornell added that "at least this method of conveyance would be novel and would seem entirely in keeping with local precedent." As to the adobe brick controversy, Cornell told the NPS director that Lyle Bennett had offered more elaboration of his thoughts. Bennett admitted: "'I cannot defend a job which is so far from the results intended as regards appearance.'" Yet the associate architect contended that "'it is questionable whether more supervision by this office would have greatly improved results unless someone with the experience to understand and execute the kind of work desired were available to devote full time supervision to the job.'" Cornell concluded that future construction work at Big Bend needed "the continuous direction of a supervising architect," with an example being the "arrangement followed at the Painted Desert Inn, Petrified Forest National Monument." He also reminded the NPS director that "the successful adaptation of the provincial Mexican style of architecture, with the colorful blending of native materials into a natural setting, should not be too difficult to accomplish." [19]

The merits of adobe construction at Big Bend paled in significance for NPS officials when the US Army announced plans to close CCC camps deemed non-essential to the anticipated war effort. John C. Diggs, inspector of CCC camps in Texas for the park service, asked that "Big Bend NP-1" (the Chisos facility) remain open, and that it remain connected to his office "where easy and frequent contacts will be maintained with the Texas State Parks Board and the group of people who are raising at least part of the funds to make the land purchase." The camp was spared from the Army's budget cuts, and by October 1941 the military had asked the park service to construct four adobe dwellings for the contingent of Army management personnel in the Chisos basin. Raymond Higgins, NPS field supervisor for Big Bend and other Texas CCC camps, noted that the Army's request placed the park service in a bind. "To be eligible for consideration," said Higgins, "the structure involved should be a camp building appearing on the approved standard camp plan." The Army could not order the CCC to build facilities for them in the Chisos Basin, said the field supervisor, nor did the CCC have the authority to construct dwellings outside of the camp perimeter. Higgins suggested as a solution the building of permanent structures for the Army the NPS could acquire after the war. His agency's lack of funding also compelled the Army to use its own monies, and Higgins noted that without emergency conditions, the Army would have to follow standard procedure for design, ordering materials, and acquiring the services of the CCC crew then in the basin. [20]

Late in the evening of December 26, 1941, the CCC camp experienced its most traumatic moment when the museum building, which contained the artifacts, specimens, and records of the scientific research conducted at the future NPS site, burned to the ground. Built in the spring of 1936 as a "temporary laboratory," the structure had been renovated in the summer of 1941, as Lloyd Wade had used the building from 1937 to 1941 as his living quarters while the CCC camp sat abandoned. The facility had been maintained since then by the Army, with periodic checks by camp employees to guard against fire. Then about 3:00AM on the 26th, the night watchman, Manuel Leon, noted flames leaping from the north end. "Prompt efforts to check the spread of the fire," wrote Higgins, "or to extinguish it were unsuccessful and the building and contents were completely destroyed in 10 or 15 minutes after the first was first noticed." Higgins dismissed the usual causes of combustion (faulty wiring, defective stoves or heaters, chemical storage, waste, lightning, etc.). Instead he speculated that "the fire resulted from the actions of pack rats which virtually infest the camp." The NPS field supervisor thought that "a pack rat might have brought ordinary, or 'non-safety,' matches to a storage place or nest under the building." Friction might have ignited the structure, as there had been no rain for three weeks in the Chisos Basin. All that Higgins could recommend was for the CCC to "construct all frame buildings sufficiently high from the ground to permit periodic inspections to detect and remove [pack rats'] nests and storage places from below the floor." [21]

For Ross Maxwell, the destruction of the CCC museum had grave implications for the future of interpretative programs at Big Bend. He reported to the Santa Fe regional office that he had devoted three years to the collection and identification of the specimens and artifacts consumed in the December 26 fire, and especially regretted the loss of the materials used in compiling his geologic map of the park area. Maxwell noted that he had spent his days collecting specimens, with his "off-duty" evenings devoted to curatorial work. He had employed four student technicians, thus managing to process some 2,225 geological specimens. "A few of the larger rock specimens," wrote Maxwell, "are only slightly damaged, but virtually all fossils, including dinosaur bones, crumble when picked up to remove from the ashes and charcoal." CCC workers tried to salvage what rocks they could, but Maxwell surmised that "it is doubtful if 2% now have value for exhibit purposes." For these reasons the NPS geologist lamented that "to place a value on the specimens is virtually impossible." Beyond the staff time and money invested in the museum, the park service now would have to conduct another series of surveys to replace the rocks and artifacts, if such could be located again. Maxwell also dismissed most potential causes of the fire, with the possible exception of arson. "There are," said the geologist, "a few people in Brewster County who are not in sympathy with the park project." He speculated that "someone might have taken this method to slap at either the Park Service or the writer." Maxwell also did not discount the possibility that "one of the [CCC] enrollees might have started the fire because of a dislike for one of the personnel." Yet a third consideration, reported Maxwell, was that "one of the enrollees is a 'fire bug.'" [22]

The implications of the Big Bend museum fire prompted NPS officials in Santa Fe to issue recommendations for all work projects within Region III. Natt N. Dodge, acting regional naturalist, suggested that all structures used "for the housing, storage, or display of museum exhibits and collections or scientific specimens shall be of fireproof construction." If this meant temporary storage off-site, Dodge preferred that to the threat of fire like that witnessed at Big Bend. He also wanted CCC supervisors to redesign their camps with fire protection as a high priority. Dodge did not want to frighten away researchers with the potential for damage to their findings, as he believed that "research is essential both to an accurate and complete knowledge of the primary values of Service areas, and to a clear and accurate interpretation of those values to the public." Dodge contended that "scientific specimens and study collections constitute as much a portion of the natural values of these areas as the scenery, the plants and animals, and the other resources" that the NPS mandate required. Thus the provision of "fireproof, weatherproof, and verminproof structures for the protection of these invaluable public collections . . . is a recognized duty of the National Park Service which must not be neglected." [23]

Two months after Dodge released his findings on fire protection, the issue became moot for Big Bend. On March 21, 1942, the NPS announced the closure once again of Camp NP-1, with "Company 3856 White Juniors" transferred out of the Chisos basin. The regional office discovered, however, that word of the abandonment did not reach Big Bend for several days, as the facility lacked telephone or radio service. This did not stop Paul V. Brown, chief of the region's division of recreation land planning, from conducting his own inquiries about facility development in the future national park. One issue that concerned Brown early in the process was reference in the region's files to "a possibility of a selection of one of the canyons within the proposed park boundary for water storage." Writing on April 15, 1942, to Earl O. Mills, planning counselor for the National Resources Planning Board (NRPB) in Austin, Brown noted that a publication of the University of Texas for the International Boundary Commission referred to "a Big Bend Dam Site in Boquillas Canyon." Brown also found mention in the minutes of the first meeting in January 1940 of the "Lower Rio Grande Basin Committee" of a "Rio Grande Water Reservoir possibility" in the same location. Further confusing Brown was any reference in NPS files to a decision by Mill's office "recommending that the National Resources Planning Board undertake a fact finding study of the Lower Rio Grande Drainage Basin. [24]

Brown's work on the Big Bend master plan led regional director Minor Tillotson to praise his findings to the NPS director in Washington. On April 28, 1942, Tillotson sent to park service headquarters Brown's report, along with his own recommendations for the Texas NPS unit. Tillotson's first consideration was "promotion of the International aspect of the area." This should begin, said the regional director, with "early establishment of a contiguous National Park south of the Rio Grande." From there the NPS and Mexico should consider "the park area on each side of the river as a single unit without too much regard for the political boundary and, as Mr. Brown states, in such a way that the two areas will serve to complement rather than to compete with each other." This would lead, in Tillotson's estimation, to "free interchange of travel between the two sections of the International Park just so far as Customs and Immigration regulations can be modified to permit." Along with this would be "maintenance of the 'border' atmosphere of old Mexico," and "retention of certain typical Rio Grande trading posts and eating places." Then the regional director encouraged Washington officials to preserve "the spirit and atmosphere of early-day Texas" at Big Bend, with "the park to be essentially a saddle and pack horse area, rather than one through which the automobile will be the principal means of transportation." For Tillotson this meant "emphasis on the development of trails and camping places rather than on high standard roads and hotels," with accommodations akin to "ranch house and frontier days type." Finally, Tillotson suggested that the NPS plan accommodations for two seasons of visitation, with summer visitors in the Chisos Basin and "the Rio Grande for the winter visitors." [25]

Brown's own narrative about planning for the new national park revealed the power of the border, the need for better relations with Mexico, and the imperatives of World War II on the park service's imagination. The regional recreation-planning chief noted that "Mexican music and the colorful characteristics of Mexico definitely have influenced the music, the dance and the art of this country." In addition, "the economic and political relationship of the two nations as well as the blending of cultural sympathies is becoming more and more of vital importance." As Brown considered Big Bend to be "in the very heart of this land of romance and frontier lure," he hoped that the NPS would make it "the particular park of the National Park System where the Mexican and Texan scene may be experienced in reality by the vacationist." He believed that this interpretation of a shared cultural frontier was inevitable, as "the area will always reflect the Mexican and Spanish influence and will serve to introduce the two people to one another." Brown speculated that "when international highways connect at the park, as should be anticipated in our planning, the gateway function of the area will be greatly enhanced." The lure of the exotic for visitors, said Brown, required the NPS to "contemplate and encourage" development of accommodations south of the Rio Grande. "The planning theme," Brown continued, "must be towards retaining that unique atmosphere which is conducive to appreciation and understanding of the wide open spaces." He also suggested that NPS planners think of "the simple primitive relationship of man to rugged lonely landscape," of the "inter-dependence and friendship between a rider and his horse," and of the "ever-welcome mountain landmarks that keep the explorer from being 'lost.'" [26]

Turning to the realities of park design, Brown noted that "our planning premise should preclude the possibility of elaborate structures and architectural intrusions." For the regional official, "only an absolute minimum of essential park roads should disturb this vastness of unperturbed nature." Brown considered it "not possible to sense the lonely magnitude of such a country from the security of an automobile on a smooth highway having known terminals." He hoped that "on the dim bridle trails between overnight camps or rest stations, it is to be expected that in some spacious grandeur of unhurried nature the park visitor will regain some of that mental poise and perspective with which to better evaluate life's purposes and social objectives." Brown conceded that Big Bend would not attract "the sensation hunters, those restless thrill seekers rushing across the country from one exploited phenomena to other spectacles and sports arenas." Big Bend "is a country that needs no exploitation, nor man's superimposed attractions." Brown surmised that "many will come out of curiosity and in response to the prestige of a national park name." Yet "only a relatively small percentage will remain to experience a true appreciation of the fascination of the park and what it provides in the way of the proper use of leisure and recreation." [27]

The NPS planner also contemplated the visitation patterns of such a place as Big Bend, noting that "we may be influenced by [wishful] thinking in predicting that from the populous eastern seaboard a heavy winter traffic by way of New Orleans, Houston, and San Antonio will eventually flow into the Big Bend." Brown also estimated that "the Great Lakes States, including the Chicago district, will route winter tourist travel through St. Louis, Dallas, and Fort Worth into the Big Bend country in response to the appeal of such a park as planned." He hoped that "much of the winter travel will have Big Bend as its terminal objective or a scheduled stay of several days in the park." Then the NPS could anticipate that "the great population of Texas alone practically assures ample use of the cool mountains of the park during the summer months." For these reasons, Brown compiled a "travel analysis" that calculated "approximately 1000 visitors coming into the park daily during the peak of the summer tourist season." These visitors would arrive in 300 automobiles, with one out of six seeking camping facilities. "This would leave 250 families daily seeking cabin or lodge accommodations in the park," wrote Brown, "since we feel that only a very small percentage will attempt to loop through the park from the distant highways in one day without an overnight stop." Campgrounds should be built for an average stay of three nights, said Brown, with Pine Canyon "admirably suited, provided it can be connected by park roads with the Green Gulch entrance road at or near Moss Well, via Smugglers Gap." [28]

Brown's study of campgrounds in Big Bend emanated from his belief that "the average tourist has become accustomed to the use of auto camps." By recognizing this phenomenon, said the recreation land planner, "the introduction of auto camp facilities in Pine Canyon would relieve the pressure for DeLuxe cabins in the Basin and, in that event, we would reverse our estimates for campground capacity to read 250 cars per day into Pine Canyon and 50 cars per day into the Basin during the summer peak." This pattern of visitation would require "bridle trails out of Pine Canyon connecting with the South Rim trail, perhaps at Boot Springs." Brown also speculated that "visitors will desire to take auto trips to Santa Elena and Boquillas Canyons." There the NPS would need "ranch accommodations," which Brown described as "bunk house, mess hall, and sales room for local handicraft, short-orders, and drinks." He then offered as potential visitation an average of 600 to 800 in June, 800 to 1,200 in July, and 1,000 to 1,500 in August. After Labor Day, Brown anticipated a natural shift of emphasis down to the Rio Grande, leading him to suggest "that consideration be given to the locating of the center of activity in the vicinity of San Vicente and Boquillas." He believed that "the principal activity will be absorbing sunshine and the engaging in ranch type activities; such as horseback riding, plus boating and fishing." Brown looked for "some auto tours to the mountains, to Santa Elena Canyon and to the proposed Longhorn Ranch." NPS planners thus should prepare for "a daily population of 600 to 1000 during the winter." When added to his estimate of 12,000 visitors monthly in the summertime, Brown concluded that Big Bend "would have an annual attendance of at least 200,000." [29]

Once the Big Bend master plan reached Washington headquarters, NPS officials began to round out the contours of the future park site. By early June, NPS director Newton B. Drury advised Minor Tillotson that the regional office should plan for a series of roads that included a main route from Persimmon Gap to the Chisos basin by way of Grapevine Hills. Drury disliked the proposal for a main road across Smuggler's Gap to Pine Canyon, and on to Hot Springs and Boquillas. He did agree, however, that "a route be sought that passes around the eastern side of the mountains to Boquillas Crossing." These also would be "the only roads in the park built to PRA [Public Roads Administration] highway standards." Drury then wanted the regional office to remove from the park "the road from Santa Elena Canyon generally paralleling the Rio Grande to connect with the Boquillas Crossing road." The NPS director also believed that "the desert type road paralleling the eastern boundary near the proposed Longhorn Ranch location is satisfactory." [30]

In matters of facility construction, Drury believed that "we should avoid any attempt to locate headquarters within the mountain area and that a study should be made as to the possibility of developing an oasis for headquarters along the main road system." The NPS director considered "the Grapevine Ranch site . . . to be the most obvious and feasible location." If regional officials "thought that this is not centrally located enough," wrote Drury, "and that headquarters should be nearer to the junction of the road leading into the mountains, or to the junction of the road leading to Boquillas, such a location would be given favorable consideration if adequate water can be obtained." For Drury this meant "a location 3 or 4 miles west of the junction of the road leading into the mountains," with water piped from Oak Springs some three to five miles away. The NPS director then turned his attention to visitor accommodations, stating that "the cabin area will be the only facilities provided in the mountains." Drury was emphatic in declaring that "in no circumstances should anything be planned for the present CCC campsite, and the camp itself should be removed and the roads to it obliterated, in order that the area might, at an early date, begin to restore itself." Drury then referred to the upcoming visit to Big Bend by his associate director, Arthur Demaray, who would "review the first year's estimates for administration, maintenance and protection." Demaray also would "give particular study to the tourist facilities which may be operated by the National Park Concessions Inc. " The associate director hoped to identify "what can be provided in the way of tourist accommodations in existing facilities for the first year's operation," and then offer "proposals for the development of more permanent facilities." [31]

Reference to the National Park Concessions, Incorporated (NPCI), indicated the NPS decision upon a concessionaire for Big Bend. Minor Tillotson approved of Drury's decision, writing in July of 1942 to the Texas state parks board of his friendship with W.W. Thompson, president and general manager of the Kentucky firm of NPCI. "Not only is Bill Thompson a swell fellow and an old personal friend of mine," Tillotson informed the state parks board's Frank Quinn, but he had "many years experience in the operation of the hotel properties in Mammoth Cave National Park." The park service had worked with NPCI in the 1920s and 1930s to open concession facilities in smaller and more isolated parks, especially those which would not attract bids from the major concessionaires more interested in the profits to be had from parks like Yosemite, Glacier, and Yellowstone. NPCI had entered into an agreement with the park service as a "not-for-profit" operation, with all revenues generated beyond actual expenses reinvested into the plant and equipment of NPCI's facilities. [32]

W.W. Thompson's visit in 1942 to Big Bend did not eventuate in plans for concession facilities, as another potential occupant of the area, the U.S. Army, studied placement of a training facility in the Chisos Mountains. Bob Hamilton of the Big Bend Land Department in Alpine informed Ross Maxwell that "the Army has been after me to give them correct information about the water supply, as they have plans of placing a cavalry detachment in the CCC barracks." Hamilton knew that "Messrs. Drury and Wirth are very much against any army group moving into the old camp," but the land department was "behind the '8-ball' for reasons that I cannot place in writing." As Hamilton needed to file a water-supply statement with the Army, he asked Maxwell: "If you can gracefully give me another report that would not be so favorable it would be better for all concerned." Milton McColm, associate regional director, likewise warned Lloyd Wade "to protect the Service and your interests [as CCC camp caretaker] against any unauthorized salvage or removal of the property still under our custody and accountability." McColm had learned that the Albuquerque District of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, tasked with acquisition of wartime materials and structures for use in training centers, had targeted Fort D.A. Russell for such training, with supplies transferred to Marfa for use by the Army. [33]