Bandelier Administrative History

The plans of other Federal agencies often posed threats to Bandelier National Monument. The Park Service shared the Pajarito Plateau with the U.S. Department of Energy and the USDA Forest Service. The plans of these agencies created issues that threatened the park. The Department of Energy (DOE) was the most powerful of the three. While generally a model neighbor, the DOE sometimes acted as if it was the only entity on the Pajarito Plateau. As the agency responsible for the Los Alamos National Laboratory, the DOE wielded tremendous power in the region.

In the late 1970s, one of its many projects, a joint venture with Public Service Company of New Mexico [PNM] and Union Geothermal Company of New Mexico, presented a complicated matrix of problems for the Park Service. The three entities agreed to develop a 50-megawatt demonstration geothermal plant in order to illustrate "the reliability, economic feasibility, and environmental acceptability of generating electricity from a hot water source." Union Oil of California, the parent company of Union Geothermal, already held a lease for the geothermal rights to the Baca Location, and the companies decided to locate the project near Redondo Creek in the southwestern corner of the Baca, about twenty miles from Los Alamos and sixty from Albuquerque. [16]

The administration at Bandelier responded to the threat. The construction of the plant presented traditional problems: the Park Service recognized that noise, increased traffic, and other similar effects were likely results. The three sponsoring entities wielded significant power in New Mexico, and NPS officials wondered how sensitive they would be to the concerns of the agency. On private land, the companies faced fewer strictures than they did on Government land, and the DOE had a track record that dated from the 1940s of paying only lip service to NPS complaints. The Park Service could only request that the planners respect park values; it had little power to compel either James P. (Pat) Dunigan, the owner of the Baca Location, or the DOE, PNM, and Union Geothermal. A third major concern, the possibility of emissions of sulfur dioxide and the resultant potential for acid rain, also concerned the NPS. The transmission of power from the plant posed another kind of threat to Bandelier. The power from the proposed plant was to be transported to Technical Area-3 [TA-3] in Los Alamos, about two miles north of the Ponderosa campground. PNM and the DOE surveyed a number of possible routes from Redondo Creek to TA-3, but with strictures imposed by Pat Dunigan, they focused on routes that approached Los Alamos from the southwest.

The alternative they preferred crossed Bandelier National Monument, leaving the Park Service in a difficult position. Dunigan favored a route that went south from Redondo Creek across the Santa Fe National Forest and the monument and approached TA-3 from the southwest. He wanted to protect both the aesthetic value of his land and its grazing capabilities. From the perspective of PNM, the southern route had additional advantages. Much of the geothermal capability of the Jemez region centered around the Redondo Creek area. PNM officials believed that when new sources of power generation materialized, the route through Bandelier would prove safest and most economical. The cost of power line averaged $100,000 per mile, and the eighteen-mile route through Bandelier offered the shortest alternative. Beginning in November 1978, PNM explored the possibility of a right-of-way through Bandelier. [17]

From the point of view of the Park Service, the reasoning of PNM was specious. Although PNM claimed to have tried to "avoid as much environmental and visual impact as possible" when they considered routing alternatives, NPS officials felt that PNM ignored their concerns. The Park Service termed the proposed route the most environmentally damaging of the options. PNM's idea of significant values differed from that of the Park Service; among the advantages of the Bandelier route that PNM cited was that "the sensitive Pajarito Mountain Ski Area and the City of Los Alamos" could not see the transmission lines. [18] Park Service people sensed that PNM sought the path of least resistance, recommending routes based on a principle of inverted opposition. The most desirable routes to PNM were those that imposed on the least powerful constituencies. From PNM's point of view, the NPS and the USDA Forest Service were the least powerful entities on the Pajarito Plateau.

Park Service officials sought to counter this direct threat to the monument. Domestic energy sources were a primary national concern in the mid 1970s, and geothermal power offered a "clean," non-polluting alternative. Most environmental groups supported the principle of power sources that did not pollute the environment and could not protest too vociferously without risking a label of extremism. This limited the effectiveness of the usual cadre of NPS supporters. Park Service officials also worried about resisting; they feared that Congress and others would perceive the NPS position as obstructionist. Yet the agency needed a clearly defined position as soon as possible. Regional officials feared that if they delayed, the DOE and PNM would go over their heads to the Department of the Interior, and the Park Service would have little say in the final citing of the transmission line. [19]

If it chose to oppose the corridor, the Park Service had sixty-five years of congressionally established mandate to support its decision. Denying permission was "consistent with the mission of the Service as it relates to the protection of park lands and associated resources," an NPS briefing document on the question noted. Park Service policy also supported a decision to deny permission, as did its stated rationale for acquiring the headwaters section in 1976. The suggestion of multiple power lines across the monument in the future posed an even greater long-term threat to protection of the monument. In 1915, the president reserved the land within Bandelier National Monument for specific purposes, and conveying electrical power was not one of them. Even more importantly, capitulation on the Pajarito Plateau might weaken the resistance of the Park Service in similar cases at other park areas.

In the view of the Southwest Regional Office, PNM seemed "reluctant to fully explore" other possibilities. The Park Service viewed the Environmental Impact Statement for the project as an incomplete document that did not accurately reflect the impact of the transmission lines or the range of alternatives available to PNM. The Jemez Valley offered a solid option, but PNM expressed little interest. When PNM announced that the visual impact of the transmission line in the valley offered one reason for the recommendation of the other route, Park Service officials suspected that opposition by owners of summer homes in the area and the fact that the Jemez route crossed land belonging to Native Americans accounted for the sudden sensitivity of PNM. [20]

The Park Service held its ground against the proposed transmission line. After the agency reviewed the preliminary environmental analysis of the project, Wayne B. Cone, the Acting Regional Director of the Southwest Region, informed Ray Brechbill of the Department of Energy that "the proposed transmission line fails to meet any of the required conditions that would allow [the NPS] to grant a right-of-way for a corridor in an area of the National Park Service." [21] The highest echelons of the National Park Service supported the decision of the regional office.

The Park Service also recommended against building the power transmission line across the Valles Caldera, the central valley area of the Baca Location. The area had become a national natural landmark in 1962, and the Park Service hoped to purchase the entire location and convert Bandelier National Monument and the additional area into a national park. Ira J. Hutchison, Deputy Director and the Acting Director of the National Park Service, informed Union Oil of the objections of the Park Service. Hutchison recommended to the Department of the Interior that it suggest that the Department of Energy not support development of geothermal energy on the Baca Location. [22]

The project died for reasons other than the resistance of the NPS. The geothermal reserves of Redondo Creek simply did not generate enough power to make the project economically feasible. In the face of NPS resistance and marginal production potential, PNM and the DOE relented. They capped the well at Redondo Creek and terminated the project.

But at Fenton Hill, about twenty miles west of Los Alamos in the Jemez Mountains, the DOE initiated another test site. Instead of trying to harness naturally produced steam, the DOE drilled deep holes to hot dry rock formations deep below the surface. Under pressure, cold water was pumped into the holes, creating steam as it came in contact with the rock. A pressure system forced the steam up another hole, where it drove a turbine. In 1986, the plant produced a portion of the power the communities of the Jemez required, and Fenton Hill remained the extent of DOE involvement in geothermal excavation in the vicinity of Bandelier. [23]

But the Redondo Creek plant had a long-term ramification. The final Environmental Impact Statement for the Geothermal Demonstration program in the Baca included provisions for the construction of a new 345-kilovolt powerline to Los Alamos. When the program died, PNM looked at other alternatives for power transmission corridors. In 1985, the Ojo Line Extension program became another in a seemingly endless series of threats to Bandelier National Monument.

PNM had other reasons for interest in the line extension. Early in the 1970s, PNM and Plains Electric Generation and Transmission Cooperative (PG&T) determined that they needed to expand the 345-kilovolt transmission system to meet the increasing demand of northern New Mexico. Originally, the two companies planned a line from the Ojo Caliente Station to Norton Station, between Santa Fe and Los Alamos, and on to the Bernalillo-Algodones Station outside of Albuquerque. The prospect of a geothermal plant whetted the appetite of the two power companies. By the early 1980s, they believed that they could wait no longer to begin the new transmission line and installed a 345-kilovolt line between the Bernaliilo-Algodones and Norton locations. To serve the needs of northern New Mexico including Los Alamos County, the companies believed they needed an additional line. [24]

Two possible routes for the extension of the Ojo line existed. One followed the path of the earlier line through the Española Valley to the Norton Station and bent back north toward Los Alamos at a forty-five degree angle. The other bypassed the Ojo Station, departing from Coyote directly across the Jemez Mountains toward Los Alamos. From there it would continue to the Norton Station in a direct line that grazed the southern tip of White Rock.

Each proposal had advocates and detractors, and a power struggle ensued. Initially the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), the Park Service, the Forest Service, the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service, the New Mexico Department of Game and Fish, the Sierra Club, and a local environmental group, Save the Jemez, all favored the valley route. The DOE, LANL, and Los Alamos County favored the mountain route. The two sides quickly became polarized. [25]

Concerns about the mountain route focused on the environmental impact of the transmission line. The project included power transmission structures that were the equivalent of thirteen stories high, a serious threat to the aesthetic values of the Jemez Mountains. The line would also affect archeological sites and the "ecological coherence" of the mountains and would perhaps infringe upon the rights of Native Americans to visit religious shrines in the Jemez. The valley already had one high voltage power line argued activists such as Tom Ribe, a local freelance writer who also volunteered at the monument. Combining the lines would spare thousands of acres of mountain wildland. The Park Service concurred, suggesting that the Coyote-Los Alamos route would require the clearing of too much vegetation and would present a threat to the extensive concentrations of archeological sites along the corridor. [26]

In contrast, the DOE, LANL, and Los Alamos County presented economic and technical reasons for favoring the mountain route. The shorter distance between Coyote and Los Alamos made that route a desirable option for Los Alamos. Although their reasons for the mountain route were less compelling than those of their opponents, the DOE and LANL wielded considerable power. Some thought that they would prevail no matter what kind of resistance arose.

The Draft Environmental Impact Statement (DEIS) for the project aroused the opponents of the mountain route. The Park and Forest Services took the lead, with James Overbay, the acting regional forester, informing BIA that the studies of PNM lacked objectivity. The Park Service echoed many of the concerns of the USDA Forest Service, while environmental groups wondered if the project was really necessary. Some contended that the DEIS rejected viable alternatives for no reason. Others believed that the entire proposal was the result of faulty strategy on the part of PNM. Everyone expected that the final EIS would offer a more balanced perspective. [27]

When the final EIS appeared in August 1986, critics of the mountain route were outraged. The final copy barely addressed the concerns of the opponents. Superintendent John Hunter labeled it "an absolute disaster," and other opponents of the project loudly expressed their disapproval. After an interlude, the State of New Mexico filed a suit against the mountain route. Early in 1987, opponents were optimistic about their chances to defeat the proposal. "I think it's going to be beat," one remarked in February of that year. [28]