The five visitor centers featured in this study are exceptional, both
because they were designed by notable architectural firms and because
they make up less than five percent of the facilities constructed for
visitors during the Mission 66 program. From 1956 to 1966, the Park
Service commissioned over one hundred new visitor centers and additions
to existing museum buildings. Local contract architects were responsible
for some of the designs, but the bulk of the work went to Park Service
architects. Foremost among these in productivity was Cecil Doty, an
architect from Oklahoma trained in the traditional Park Service Rustic
style of design. [1] Along with a handful of
his colleagues, Doty made the transition from the rusticadobe
or alpine depending on the natural and historical settingto a
modernist style stripped of such obvious associations with regional
context. According to Doty, this shift from the old to the new architecture
was entirely natural; he was simply doing his job under new parameters
and within a changing social and political climate. While most of the
selected contract architects were trained in an elite tradition of architecture
as art, Doty was educated in architectural engineering at a manual arts
school and spent almost his entire career working in the parks. When
Doty designed modernist buildings, he did so within the Park Service
tradition from which Mission 66 evolved. His buildings were not icons
of modern architecture, nor were they typically among the buildings
that are known for their Mission 66 character. Doty's designs were modest
and utilitarian. As if in response to Director Wirth's greatest aspiration
for his construction programthe creation of structures subordinate
to the park landscapeDoty designed many unremarkable buildings.
And yet, while much of the contract architects' work appears dated,
Doty's buildings often achieve a kind of timelessness. Perhaps most
important to the Park Service, his designs are sensitive to the site
and historical context without being cheap rustic imitations or modernistic
spectacles. The significance of the Mission 66 visitor center can only
be evaluated after a closer look at the work of Cecil Doty.
In 1954 the Park Service reorganized the design and construction component
of its four regional offices into two centralized facilities: the Eastern
Office of Design and Construction (EODC) in Philadelphia overseen by
Edward S. Zimmer and the Western Office (WODC) in San Francisco supervised
by Sanford J. Hill. Although Director Wirth had yet to launch the Mission
66 program, this concentration of forces assumed the need for massive
physical improvements and the organization necessary to execute a far-reaching
construction program. The responsibilities of the respective offices
included supervising the preparation of master plans and construction
projects, conducting surveys and research, and preparing building plans
and specifications. [2] These duties would
not change with Mission 66, the planning of which began in earnest during
the spring of 1956, but they would be magnified many times over. Such
an influx of design work demanded that the Park Service hire contract
architects from the private sector. This policy of hiring outsiders
was not new. During both World Wars, the federal government called upon
modern architects, many of whom were recent European immigrants, to
help design wartime housing. The New Deal programs that had done so
much for the parks during the 1930s and 1940s relied heavily on the
expertise of private architects, designers, and craftsmen. As supervisor
of the Civilian Conservation Corps state parks program, Conrad Wirth
had firsthand experience with such successful partnerships. The CCC
programs not only established the Park Service's reputation for well-built
rustic style buildings, but also set a precedent for collaboration on
such projects. A chief architect might sketch a design, and then pass
it on to his staff to refine and embellish. For Wirth and many of his
most trusted employees, the Mission 66 approach recalled the CCC effort.
[3]
The new program's contract policies were outlined in a memorandum to
the Park Service field offices in March 1956, explaining that superintendents
were responsible for determining which projects would be completed by
contractors and which by day labor. In general, it was "the policy of
the Department and the Service to accomplish as much construction work
by contract as is possible. It expedites the obligation of funds and
assures completion of projects within the amounts available. Day labor
is to be used only in exceptional cases where contracting is not practical."
[4] Members of the design and construction
offices had been forewarned of such changes in procedure. During their
conference at Great Smoky Mountains (April 1955), they had discussed
the Mission 66 program and immediately issued several statements and
recommendations based on general consensus. The Park Service design
offices voiced their "wholehearted support" for the program, which would
obviously expand their role in park architecture and planning. In anticipation
of Mission 66, they suggested that Wirth prepare a construction schedule
by region to guide them in gathering data and developing surveys necessary
for such extensive design work. The offices of design and construction
also deemed themselves best equipped to create plans and specifications
for construction projects and to prepare the preliminary drawings for
all buildings. Professional private offices could then produce construction
drawings on a contract by contract basis. It was recommended that the
two regional offices be granted "contract authority to negotiate with
professional firms in private practice, of recognized ability." [5] According to this arrangement, Park Service architects
were entirely responsible for design concepts, while contractors merely
performed the routine work of drafting working drawings. In practice,
the relationship with contract architects would vary according to project,
but it would usually involve some collaboration with Park Service colleagues.
That construction projects were underway by mid-summer is indicated
by a communication from Director Wirth admonishing superintendents and
regional directors for expanding their projects beyond the established
limits. Evidently, some supervisors were using up emergency funds in
the first contract, leaving little margin for over-runs or contingencies.
Even more potentially devastating was the fact that unauthorized adjustments
in contracts were affecting the planning schedule, which was established
two years in advance. A single misjudgment could start "a chain reaction,"
and necessitate the revision of the entire schedule. [6]
Field offices were to required to submit change orders and other cost
overruns to the regional director for approval.
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