Prelude

An Attempt for Neutrality

Shortly after the Battle of Fort Sumter, Kentucky declared neutral on May 16, 1861. Newly elected President Abraham Lincoln, recognizing Kentucky's critical importance, reluctantly accepted this stance. However, as time passed, Kentuckian's support for neutrality faded. After Confederate General Polk occupied Columbus, Kentucky, a pro-Union majority in the legislature swayed the state to remain in the Union in September 1861.

 

Kentucky's Neutrality

On April 12, 1861, the Battle of Fort Sumter occurred, signaling the start of the American Civil War. Three days later, in a proclamation, United States President Abraham Lincoln requested aid from all states:

"to all loyal citizens to favor, facilitate, and aid this effort to maintain the honor, the integrity, and the existence of our National Union.”¹

Kentucky's Governor, Beriah Magoffin, refused the request. Although a supporter of the Confederacy, he viewed it as too risky to choose a side. Kentucky, due to its location, was a social and economic crossroads and could easily become a battleground. On May 16, 1861, the Kentucky legislature supported Magoffin's decision:

"Resolved, by the House of Representatives, that this State and the citizens thereof should take no part in the civil war now being waged, except as mediators and friends to the belligerent parties; and that Kentucky should, during the contest, occupy the position of strict neutrality.”²

President Lincoln reluctantly accepted Kentucky's neutrality rather than lose it entirely. In a letter to O.H. Browning, Lincoln later expressed his thoughts about his birth state. 

"I think to lose Kentucky is nearly the same as to lose the whole game. Kentucky gone, we can not hold Missouri, nor, as I think, Maryland. These all against us, and the job on our hands is too large for us. We would as well consent to separation at once, including the surrender of this capitol."3 

East Tennessee

With Kentucky proclaiming neutrally, Lincoln's attention shifted to Tennessee. On June 8, 1861, Tennesseans had narrowly voted to secede; however, pro-Union East Tennessee disputed the results. In a resolution to the state, they wrote:  

"...we do earnestly desire the restoration of peace to our whole country, and most especially that our own section of the State of Tennessee shall not be involved in civil war... That the action of the state legislature in passing the so-called 'Declaration of Independence,' and in forming the 'Military League' with the Confederate States, and in adopting other acts looking to a separation of Tennessee from the Government of the United States, is unconstitutional and illegal, and therefore not binding upon us as loyal citizens."4

In aid, Lincoln sent two Navy Lieutenants in early July of 1861, Samuel Carter to East Tennessee and William "Bull" Nelson, to Southeast Kentucky. Their assignment was to muster troops as a part of the Kentucky Home Guard, a military group designed to protect Kentucky's neutrality and its pro-Union interests; it was the counterpart to the pro-Confederate State Guard. When the time was right, Lincoln planned to use these soldiers to liberate East Tennessee.  

Fearing the volatile situation in East Tennessee, Confederate President Jefferson Davis and the Confederate War Department appointed Felix Kirk Zollicoffer, a local, to command the newly created District of East Tennessee on July 26, 1861: 

"The President directs that you repair to East Tennessee and assume command of that district. Preserve peace, protect the railroads, and repel invasion."⁵ 

Many Tennesseans and Kentuckians saw this as an occupation by the Confederates. Despite open hostility, Zollicoffer became aware of Nelson and Carter's actions and wrote to the War Department: 

"A Kentuckian named Nelson, late a lieutenant in the U.S. Navy... is the most prominent man in getting up the threatening invasion of East Tennessee. My information goes to show that they contemplate a movement very soon, but I am not sufficiently advised of their state of preparation. It is becoming difficult to command reliable information, on account of the apprehension felt by spies in that region."⁶   

Before being barred from the region, Carter, with the support of locals, initiated a plan to burn critical railroad bridges. This final action did little harm to the Confederate rail network but spoke volumes about East Tennessee's support of the Union.⁷

Broken Neutrality

Lincoln's Plan to liberate East Tennessee was no longer secret. Pro-Southerners and Conservative Unionists in Kentucky voiced their concerns; however, due to the Confederate's actions, support for neutrality and the Confederacy had faded. As a result, a pro-Union majority had been elected into the Kentucky Legislature. 

On August 30, 1861, all progress made by the Union in Kentucky was almost undone. Without President Lincoln's consent, Major General John C. Frémont issued a proclamation placing Missouri under martial law and declaring that all property of those in rebellion would be confiscated. This property included enslaved peoples, who would subsequently be declared free.⁸  

Turmoil spread through the slave state of Kentucky; however, on September 4, 1861, Confederate Major General Leonidas Polk, despite orders to withdraw, ordered Brigadier General Gideon Pillow to take Columbus, Kentucky.⁹ Polk wrote to Jefferson Davis, defending his actions:

"The enemy having descended the Mississippi River... seated himself with cannon and intrenched lines opposite the town of Columbus, Ky., making such demonstrations as left no doubt upon the minds of any of their intentions to seize and forcibly possess said town... It is my intention now to continue to occupy and keep this position."¹⁰

The enemy force was a brigade under Brigadier General Ulysses S. Grant. Two days later, in response to Polk's actions, Grant took possession of Paducah, Kentucky. In a proclamation to its citizens, Grant wrote:

"I have come among you, not as an enemy, but as your friend and fellow citizen, not to injure or annoy you, but to respect the rights, and to defend and enforce the rights of all loyal citizens. An enemy, in rebellion against our common Government, has taken possession of, and planted its guns upon the soil of Kentucky and fired upon our flag. Hickman and Columbus are in his hands. He is moving upon your city. I am here to defend you against this enemy and to assert and maintain the authority and sovereignty of your Government and mine."¹¹ 

With the occupation of these cities, Kentucky's neutrality officially had been broken, and more Confederate and Federal troops were entering the state by the day. Kentucky had to make a decision.

While Governor Magoffin and the Kentucky Legislature met, President Lincoln addressed the repercussions of the Frémont Emancipation. Although an abolitionist, Lincoln understood the delicate balance the nation was in. In a publicized letter, Lincoln wrote:   

"The particular clause, however, in relation to the confiscation of property and the liberation of slaves, appeared to me to be objectionable, in it's non-conformity to the Act of Congress passed the 6th of last August upon the same subjects; and hence I wrote you expressing my wish that that clause should be modified accordingly -Your answer, just received, expresses the preference on your part, that I should make an open order for the modification, which I very cheerfully do."¹²

Word from the letter spread, calming many and alleviating the situation. Lincoln learned a lot from the crisis that he would later apply to his Emancipation Proclamation.  

On September 18, Kentucky declared the South had broken its neutrality act and that General Grant had responded to the invasion. Kentucky would enter the war on the side of the Union. Despite Pro-southern opposition and a veto by Governor McGoffin, a majority decision still passed the resolution.¹³

 

War Comes to Kentucky

With Kentucky's decision made, Federal and Confederate forces took defensive positions and routes in the state. After several battles, skirmishes, and raids around the Cumberland Gap, Confederate General Zollicoffer looked west, hoping to form a base of operations for expeditions north. Zollicoffer selected the furthest navigable point on the Cumberland River from Nashville and built the Beech Grove Fortified encampment.

 

A Western Route

After Grant's occupation, in late September, Confederate General Zollicoffer set out to further deter invasions of East Tennessee by reinforcing the Cumberland Gap. This natural feature, used throughout history by pioneers and indigenous peoples, was still a significant route north and south. Once fortified, the Gap could not just repel invasion but also be used to stage campaigns into Kentucky.  

The day after Kentucky's Neutrality ended, Zollicoffer sent troops north through the gap.¹⁴ In a report, he wrote: 

"An advanced force sent last night (September 18), about 800 strong, entered Barbourville, 18 miles from here, about daylight, where they found about 300 of the enemy, and a fight ensued, in which we killed 12 and took 2 prisoners. We lost 1 killed... The enemy fled precipetiently. The number of his wounded unkown."¹⁵

The Battle of Barbourville and subsequent raids sent the Federals and Kentucky a message that war was on their doorstep. In response, Federal Brigadier General George Henry Thomas sent Acting Brigadier General Samuel P. Carter to find a defendable location along the Wilderness Road. After Carter selected a location, a fortified camp named Camp Wildcat was established by Colonel Frank Wolford. As Confederate activity increased, it would be reinforced by Brigadier General Albin Francisco Schoepf.¹⁶ 

Realizing the strategic importance of Camp Wildcat, General Zollicoffer attempted to dislodge the federals on October 21. However, the terrain surrounding Camp Wildcat was not suitable for a large-scale battle. Zollicoffer later wrote:

"On the 21st I reached the enemy's entrenched camp, on Rockcastle Hills, a natural fortification, almost inaccessible. Having reconnoitered in force under heavy fire for several hours from heights on the right, left, and in front, I became satisfied that it could not be carried otherwise than by immense exposure if at all."¹⁷

On the Battle, General Thomas reported to Major General William Tecumseh Sherman: 

"I have just received a dispatch from General Schoepf, at the Rockcastle Hill. He writes that the enemy attacked the camp with 6,000 infantry and 1,500 cavalry, and were repulsed and driven back... General Schoepf regards the position as secure."¹⁸ 

With the Cumberland Gap secured and advancing up the Wilderness Road no longer an option, General Zollicoffer, under the approval of General Albert Sidney Johnston, began identifying and securing key routes and locations. In doing so, the Confederates could further bolster a defensive line that stretched from the Cumberland Gap to the Mississippi River. Zollicoffer quickly identified locations and expressed his thoughts: 

"There are three main roads by which, if an invasion of East Tennessee is contemplated, an enemy might approach. On this, by Cumberland Gap, we have heretofore concentrated nearly our whole force, and we now have seven guns in position at Cumberland Gap. The most westerly road is by Monticello, in Kentucky, and Jamestown, in Tennessee... they may select the middle route, by Williamsburg and Jacksboro."¹⁹ 

Change of Plans

On November 9, Federal Brigadier General Don Carlos Buell was appointed command of operations in Kentucky. His predecessors, Brigadier General Robert Anderson and Brigadier William Tecumseh Sherman, had stepped down for health and personal reasons before they could accomplish President Lincoln's goal of liberating East Tennessee. A goal that, by the day, was fading as the Confederates further secured their defensive line.    

As General Zollicoffer prepared to move west, he received word that Confederate President Jefferson Davis' was establishing a Cumberland Gap District. The new district comprised of the Eastern parts of Kentucky and Tennessee would be under the command of Major General George Bibb Crittenden, a Kentuckian.²⁰

Ever proactive, Zollicoffer pressed forward with his plans rather than wait for his new commander to arrive. On November 20, he wrote General Johnston:

"I am moving as expeditiously as possible...to unite with Stanton's command beyond Jamestown, with a view of taking a strong position on the Cumberland River beyond Monticello. The country is sterile from near Clinton to beyond Jamestown, Tenn. The counties of Wayne and Clinton and the western half of Pulaski, in Kentucky, are, I learn, comparatively good counties for subsistence and forage. If I can find a good position on the Cumberland for hunting in winter I hope, by scouring the country on the north bank down to Burkesville occasionally, to command the river, and draw supplies from Nashville..."²¹

General Zollicoffer progressed forward in a report on November 28; he informed headquarters of what he had learned:

"I occupy a position midway between Mill Springs and Burksville for a day or two, to perfect my knowledge of the topography resource... Mill Springs, 22 miles east, is a fertile region, with grist and sawmill, wood, water, and capable of easy defense, commanding the ferry."²²

On November 29, as General Zollicoffer arrived at Mill Springs, Federal General Buell set plans to counter the Confederate's actions. In an order to General Thomas, he expressed what he believed Zollicoffer's intentions to be:

"I don't expect Zollicoffer to cross the Cumberland in force, but he will try by demonstration to drive us from Somerset, or even attack there if we are not watchful, and he will prepare the means of crossing, so to threaten our flanks if we advance. We will be organized to-day; in the mean time consider yourself in command of everything east of New Haven, but make no important move without referring to me, except to avert immediate danger."²³ 

Buell instructed Thomas to concentrate command in Lebanon, Ky. A centralized location with railroad access enabled Thomas to respond to threats in London, Somerset, and Columbia. These larger towns going from east to west formed anchor points of a federal defensive line. Since Zollicoffer was near the center point of Somerset, Buell also told Thomas to reinforce the area. ²⁴

Crossing the River

As General Thomas moved to Lebanon, Confederate General Zollicoffer made moves doing what Federal General Buell had expected. Zollicoffer was securing ways of crossings, but unexpectedly, he was crossing in force. In a report on December 9 to General Johnston, he wrote:

"I have had to have boats built, and have been much delayed in crossing the Cumberland River. Five regiments, seven cavalry companies, and four pieces of artillery are now across. The position on both sides of the ferry is naturally strong, and I am rapidly strengthening the defenses on the right bank."²⁴ 

A few days later, the Federal Army under General Schoepf at Somerset discovered what had happened. Since Zollicoffer's arrival, Schoepf had inhibited the Confederate General. However, inexperienced soldiers had twice neglected their duties, allowing Zollicoffer to cross. In a report to General Thomas, he explained:  

"...when I arrived at Fishing Creek, I found the Seventeenth Ohio retreating and on this side of the creek; this was owing to disobedience of orders by Captain Dillion, of the First [Ky.] Cavalry, whom I ordered on Monday to proceed to Mill Springs (bank opposite), there encamp, and, if any attempt was made by the enemy to cross the river, to dispatch that fact to me. Instead of obeying, he encamped only 2 miles from Fishing Creek, without even the precaution of throwing out pickets, and the enemy, it is reported, crossed in force to this side last night."²⁵

Over the next week, more Confederates crossed the river, causing an ever-increasing alarm at General Buell's Federal Division Headquarters in Louisville, Ky. To aid with Zollicoffer, Buell approved General Thomas' request to send most of the Twelfth Brigade from London to Somerset.  

After crossing, Zollicoffer forces began fortifying the area, locally called Beech Grove. Although concerns spread about having the camps back to the river, Zollicoffer continued.²⁶ In correspondence with General Johnston, Zollicoffer explained his decision:        

"This camp is immediately opposite to Mill Springs. 1 1/4 mile, distant. The river protects our rear and flanks. We have about 1,200 yards fighting front to defend, which we are intrenching as rapidly as our few tools will allow... The position I occupy north of the river is a fine basis for operations in front. It is a much stronger natural position for defense than that on the south bank. I think it should be held at all hazards, but I ought to have a stronger force."²⁷

The stronger force Zollicoffer desired was being prepared by his superior, General Crittenden. Since getting his assignment, Crittenden had been in limited contact with Johnston and Zollicoffer. With a clear directive and some of the troops he had requested, he made for Mill Springs.   
 

On December 20th, Zollicoffer ordered winter huts. The cold weather was pressing, and he needed to protect and supply his soldiers.²⁸ Fortunately, two well-supplied steamboats were being sent from Nashville, TN, to within 35 miles of Beech Grove at Burkesville, KY. Along with the supplies, Zollicoffer would eventually bring up the smaller of the two boats to Beech Grove, naming it the Noble Ellis.²⁹ 

 

To Battle

The Federals quickly identified Zollicoffer’s Camp as a threat and sent General George Thomas to dislodge the Confederate position. As Thomas moved into position, Confederate General George Crittenden arrived at Beech Grove. Knowing the Federals were coming and uncertain of his defenses, Crittenden decided to go on the offensive, the stage was set for the battle for Kentucky.

 

A Mired March

Federal General Buell's patience had drawn thin. He could no longer tolerate Zollicoffer's presence and aggression on the north bank. On December 29, he sent orders to General Thomas: 

"It is for you to move against his left and endeavor to cut him off from his bridge, while Schoepf, with whom of course you must communicate, attacks in front... The result should be at least a severe blow to him or a hasty flight across the river. But to effect the former the movement should be made rapidly and secretly, and the blow should be vigorous and decided."³⁰  

Upon receiving Buell's orders, Thomas began the difficult process of moving his command towards Zollicoffer. What should have been a relatively easy march turned into a muddy logistical nightmare, as the constant rain and snow destroyed the roads and slowed Thomas' army. On January 13th, 1862, Thomas wrote to Buell:  

"The road, which has been represented as good, is the worst I ever saw, and the recent rains have made it one continuous quagmire from Columbia to this place. We are still 17 miles from the position of the enemy by the shortest road... This road is represented by my scouts as much worse than the roads the command has already passed over. It is next to impossible to procure either forage or subsistence in the country, and entirely impracticable to haul either over the road at this season of the year."³¹ 

On January 17th, most of Thomas' command reached Logans Crossroads, present-day Nancy, KY. In a report, he later wrote:  

"I reached Logan's Cross-Roads, about 10 miles north of the intrenched camp of the enemy on the Cumberland River, on the 17th instant, with a portion of the Second and Third Brigades... being still in rear, detained by the almost impassable condition of the roads, I determined to halt at this point, to await their arrival and to communicate with General Schoepf."³² 

As Thomas prepared to camp that night, Samuel Carter's Twelfth Brigade left Somerset. The weather that had hampered Thomas' march had also swollen the rivers. With great effort, Carter's Brigade forded Fishing Creek to join their commander at Logan's Crossroads. In the next day or so, with more preparation, Schoepf made plans to do the same.³³

Crittenden's Decision

Confederate General Crittenden had arrived at Beech Grove in early January. He had brought soldiers with him, and a few days later, additional men under Brigadier General William Carroll also arrived. Although unsatisfied with some of Zollicoffer's decisions, he accepted his reasoning in making them.³⁴ However, as more Federal soldiers moved into the area, he became ever more concerned with Beech Grove's position and defenses:  

"This river with high muddy banks was a troublesome barrier in the rear of Beech Grove. Transportation over it was, at best, was very difficult... Beech Grove was protected in front by earthworks; but these incomplete and insufficient, and necessarily of such an extent that I had not force to defend them. The range of our artillery was bad, and there were commanding positions for the batteries of the enemy."³⁵ 

After receiving information that the Federals were also having difficulties crossing, on January 18th, 1862, General Crittenden ordered Zollicoffer and Carroll to lead their brigades north to attack General Thomas. Of the decision, he later wrote: 

"I was out of reach of support or reinforcement. Under the circumstances I determined not without a battle. I decided that it was to attack the enemy, if possible, before the Somerset force could cross Fishing Creek. I could reasonably expect much from a bold attack and the spirit of my command."³⁶  

 

References

 

Notes

1. Lincoln, Abraham. (1861, April 15). Proclamation on State Militia. Senate.gov: https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/civil_war/LincolnExtraordinarySession_Transcript.htm. Para. 3.
2. Quisenberry, A. C. 1917. "Kentucky's "Neutrality" in 1861." Register of Kentucky State Historical Society (Kentucky State Historical Society) 15: 9-21.
3. Lincoln, Abraham. "To Orville H. Browning, Sunday, September 22, 1861 (Fremont's Proclamation)." Abraham Lincoln Papers: Series 1. General Correspondence. 1833-1916. Library of Congress
4. Temple, Oliver Perry, 1820-1907. East Tennessee and the Civil War. The R. Clarke company, 1899, pp. 568.
5. U.S. War Department. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series I, Volume 4. Government Printing Office, 1880, pp. 374.
6. U.S. War Department. Official Records, Vol 4., pp. 374.
7. Temple, Oliver Perry, East Tennessee and the Civil War, pp. 366-411.
8. "The Beginning of the End." Harper's Weekly: A Journal of Civilization, Vol. V, No. 246, September 14, 1861, p. 578. https://archive.org/details/harpersweeklyv5bonn/mode/2up?view=theater:.
9. Hafendorfer, Kenneth A., “Mill Springs: Campaign and Battle of Mill Springs, Kentucky”, (KH Press: Louisville, KY, 2001), pp. 28
10. U.S. War Department. Official Records, Vol 4., pp. 181.
11. Simon, John Y., ed. "The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, Volume 02: April-September 1861." Southern Illinois University Press, 1969, pp. 194-195., The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, Volume 02: April-September 1861 (msstate.edu)
12. Lincoln, Abraham. "To John C. Fremont, Wednesday, September 11, 1861." Abraham Lincoln Papers: Series 1. General Correspondence. 1833-1916. Library of Congress, https://www.loc.gov/item/mal1862600/.
13. Shaler, Nathaniel Southgate. Kentucky, a Pioneer Commonwealth. Boston, Houghton, Mifflin and company, 1888. Pdf. https://www.loc.gov/item/37010365/.
14. Hafendorfer, Mill Springs, 34-35
15. U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 4, 199
16. Tarrant, Eastham. The Wild Riders of the First Kentucky Cavalry: A History of the Regiment, in the Great War of the Rebellion 1861-1865. Henry Clay Press, 37.
17. U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 4, 217
18. U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 4, 205
19. U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 4, 487
20. Hafendorfer, Mill Springs, 38, 54-56
21. U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 686-687
22. U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 715
23. U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 458
24. U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 10-11
25. U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 474-475
26. Hafendorfer, Mill Springs, 100-111
27. U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 753
28. U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 797
29. Hafendorfer, Mill Springs, 119
30. U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 522
31. U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 550
32. U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 79
33. Hafendorfer, Mill Springs, 158-160
34. Hafendorfer, Mill Springs, 168-170
35. U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 105-110
36. U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 105-110

Bibliography

Hafendorfer, Kenneth A., “Mill Springs: Campaign and Battle of Mill Springs, Kentucky”, (KH Press: Louisville, KY, 2001)

Lincoln, Abraham. "Proclamation Calling Out the Militia," April 15, 1861. The American Presidency Project,

Lincoln, Abraham. "To John C. Fremont, Wednesday, September 11, 1861." Abraham Lincoln Papers: Series 1. General Correspondence. 1833-1916. Library of Congress.

Lincoln, Abraham. "To Orville H. Browning, Sunday, September 22, 1861 (Fremont's Proclamation)." Abraham Lincoln Papers: Series 1. General Correspondence. 1833-1916. Library of Congress,

Quisenberry, A. C. "Kentucky's 'Neutrality' in 1861." Register of Kentucky State Historical Society, 15(43), JANUARY, 1917, pp. 7, 9-21.

Shaler, Nathaniel Southgate. Kentucky, a Pioneer Commonwealth. Boston, Houghton, Mifflin and company, 1888

Simon, John Y., ed. "The Papers of Ulysses S. Grant, Volume 02: April-September 1861." Southern Illinois University Press, 1969, pp. 194-195.

Temple, Oliver Perry, 1820-1907. East Tennessee and the Civil War.** The R. Clarke company, 1899, pg. 1.

"The Beginning of the End." Harper's Weekly: A Journal of Civilization, Vol. V, No. 246. New York, September 14, 1861, p. 578.

U.S. War Department. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series I, Volume 4. Government Printing Office, 1880

U.S. War Department. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series I, Volume 7. Government Printing Office, 1880