In hopes of surprising the sleeping Federals, the Confederates trudged through a dark, rain-soaked night but were spotted by Federal pickets. Exchanging fire, the Confederates slowly advanced, forcing the Federals back until confusion stopped them. Believing friendly fire was occurring, Confederate General Felix Zollicoffer rode forward to stop it. However, what he had thought to be Confederate soldiers were, in fact, Federals. His mistake cost him his life. The Confederate attack faltered, and with the outcome in the balance, General Crittenden was forced to assume command.
Marching through the night, the Confederates hoped to catch the Federals by surprise. However, after six hours of slogging through the muddy roads and freezing rain, the Confederates stubbled across Federal pickets of the 1st Kentucky Cavalry. On the event, cavalryman Eastham Tarrant wrote:
"On the night of the 18th of January, 1862, a strong advanced picket of Cavalry... was placed on the Mill Springs road. Danger was brewing, and it required select men for the post. Saturday night passed, and Sunday morning ushered in, gloomy and dark and rainy... the enemy appeared before the Cavalry pickets, and being challenged, neglected to halt, and were fired upon."1
The Confederates advance turned back to rejoin the column of soldiers behind, closing their ranks; the Confederates pressed forward. As dawn illuminated the danger, the Federal pickets discovered this was not a typical scouting party. Immediately, they sent a courier to alert their sleeping comrades and commander.2 In a report, General Thomas later wrote:
"About 6.30 o'clock on the morning of the 19th the pickets from Wolford's cavalry encountered the enemy advancing on our camp, retired slowly, and reported their advance to Colonel M. D. Manson, commanding the Second Brigade. He immediately formed his regiment (the Tenth Indiana) and took a position on the road to await the attack, ordering the Fourth Kentucky (Colonel S. S. Fry) to support him, and then informed me in person that the enemy were advancing in force and what disposition he had made to resist them. I directed him to join his brigade immediately and hold the enemy in check until I could order up the other troops."3
As General Thomas prepared, the 1st Kentucky Cavalry contended with a large force of advancing Confederates. In a fighting retreat, they eventually fell back to the pickets of the 10th Indiana Infantry. As more of the 1st Kentucky and 10th Indiana joined the engagement, the Confederate advance slowed.
Just like the Federals, the Confederates misjudged the numbers they faced. General Zollicoffer, believing it to be the main Federal line, deployed his men into battle lines. The decision held up the Confederates for almost an hour, for their column had stretched over a mile during their muddy march. With each soldier completing the march, their battle lines bolstered further.4
The Confederates severely outmanned the Federals at the front. On their actions, Colonel Wolford of the 1st Kentucky Cavalry later wrote:
"Overwhelmed by superior force and almost surrounded commenced falling back to meet re-enforcements. I ordered my men to follow. When we reached our horses we found them surrounded by the enemy. I cut them loose and let them run down the road, when my men caught them and remounted, the enemy getting two or three of our horses."5
The Confederates, believing they had taken the field, pressed forward aggressively after the 1st Kentucky and 10th Indiana. However, reality sounded with a Federal volley from the 4th Kentucky Infantry. On the state of the field, their commander, Colonel Speed Fry, later wrote:
"Upon arriving at a point where I could see their position I immediately determined to take mine on an elevated point in the field (Cornfield) on the left of the road, filed my regiment to the left through the fence, and formed my line of battle parallel with and near to it, under a heavy and galling fire from the enemy (15th Mississippi Infantry and 20th Tennessee Infantry), who were concealed in a deep ravine at the foot of the hill and posted on the opposite hill, distant about 250 yards. Their line extended around the ridge at the head of the ravine and onto the hill occupied by me, and within 50 yards of my right (19th Tennessee Infantry)"6
Icy rain continued to fall over the battlefield as the Confederates 20th Tennessee and 15th Mississippi pressed toward the cornfield's edge. The action compromised the Federal 4th Kentucky position, forcing them back into the woods on the other side of the fence they had crossed. The fence along the western edge of the cornfield became the main Federal line. 7
With the federal repositioning, the intensity of the battle increased. As the fire continued, the rain began to take its toll on the Confederate's weapons. Most were carrying outdated flintlock muskets. Ralph J. Neal, Co. E, 20th T.N., later expressed his thought:
"...had we been armed with percussion guns, the result of that battle would have been far different. It rained nearly all the time and our "Flint Locks" would not fire. Our men lost much time in drawing loads from their guns, the powder having gotten wet in the rain. Many of them never fired a dozen shots."8
The inconsistency of their weapons caused not only their movements to be slowed but also immense frustration. Private William Worsham of the 19th Tennessee wrote:
"The rain continued falling, sometimes in heavy showers. Many of the men had the old flintlock guns which were, in this rain, utterly useless... saw two or three of the boys break their guns over the fence, after several attempts to fire them."9
The 20th Tennessee fell behind a hill to the rear. Their muskets, soaked through, were no better than clubs. The Federals, seeing them back away, ceased fire. As the 20th dried their muskets, the battlefield fell almost silent. The 15th Mississippi, thinking the Federals had again retreated, advanced towards the ravine at their front. The 15th received federal fire almost immediately after crossing the fence and fled into the cover of the ravine. 10
Confusion spread through the Confederate left. The 19th and 25th Tennessee Infantries had moved through the haze-covered, thickly wooded area along Mill Springs Road. Unsure as to where Federals were, they began to fear the enemy they had been firing upon was, in fact, their friend.
Based on the information he received, Confederate General Felix Zollicoffer also began to think that friendly fire was occurring. Needing more information, he personally rode to speak to the 19th and 25th Tennessee regiments. His speculation solidified with each conversation, leading him to order the 25th to fall back and the 19th to hold their position and fire.11
Ever to the fault of his character, Zollicoffer decided to ride forward to investigate. Wearing a raincoat that concealed his blue uniform, he crossed the path of Colonel Fry and the 4th K.Y. On the encounter, Fry later wrote in a letter to his wife:
"I had a personal interview with General Zollicoffer on the field of battle. We stood side by side a short time I thinking all the time he was one of our officers and from his language to me, he must have thought I was a rebel officer or else he was trying to play a ruse upon me. The conversation took place right in the road..."
In the same letter. According to Fry, his conversation with the Confederate General went as follows:
"He said to me when he rode up to me; "We must not kill our own men," to which I replied, "I did not intend to kill my own men intentionally." He then said pointing to some men standing out in the woods, "Those are our men and let us not kill them."
Fry continued:
"...when I left him I rode off ten or fifteen paces and looking around to see what was going on behind me and the first thing that attractred my attention was a man, one of his aides, rode out of the woods and deliberately aimed his pistol at me but fortunately missed me. I then discovered that I had been talking to a rebel officer. I at once drew my pistol and the man who had shot at me having made good his escape I aimed my pistol at Zollicoffer and shot him through the heart."12
Lieutenant Henry Fogg was the aide who had attempted to save Zollicoffer. Panicked, he had shouted a warning to Zollicoffer before firing at Fry. With Fogg's arrival, Zollicoffer tried to turn and ride away but did not make it far before getting struck by Fry and the 4th Kentucky Infantry. Zollicoffer, hit by three bullets, died nearly instantly.13
After Zollicoffer's death, Crittenden, forced to take direct command, ordered a general advance. In a report later, he wrote:
"Soon the battle raged from right to left. When I sent my aide to order the Fifteenth Mississippi to charge, I sent by him an order to General Carroll to advance a regiment to sustain it. He ordered up for that purpose Colonel Murray's [Twenty-eighth Tennessee] regiment..."14
The 15th Mississippi charged out of the ravine, attacking the main federal line, and encountered stiff resistance from the 4th Kentucky, 1st Kentucky, and part of the 10th Indiana.
As the Confederates slammed against the fence again, the Federal line faltered. Most of the federal troops at the fence had been in the fight for several hours. They were running low on ammunition, making sustained the fight difficult.15
They turned to their commander, the just-arrived General George Thomas, for answers. Eastham Tarrant of the 1st Kentucky Cavalry later wrote of the exchange:
"General Thomas and Captain Joseph Breckenridge sat on their horses twenty steps only to the rear, with the limbs, cut from the trees overhead, falling down upon them, when I stepped to their side and shouted above the roar, 'General, the men in your front are nearly out of ammunition.' 'Tell them to hold their line, that McCook is coming up on their right.'"16
As Thomas had said, Acting Brigadier General Robert McCooks and two regiments from his brigade arrived shortly after. Thomas deployed the 9th Ohio Infantry to the right and the 2nd Minnesota Infantry to support the main line. Colonel Van Cleve of the 2nd Minnesota wrote:
"…we continued the march, and after proceeding about half a mile came upon the enemy, who were posted behind a fence along the road, beyond which was an open field broken by ravines. The enemy, opening upon us a galling fire, fought desperately..."17
The 2nd Minnesota responded with fury, forcing the Confederates from the fence line. The duressed Confederates fell back a short distance behind the crest of the hill.
The Federals Take the Field
Taking command, Confederate General Crittenden ordered a general advance at the Federals. Behind a split rail fence, the Federal left held their line against the fierce assault. At times, brutal close-quarters fighting ensued, with soldiers resorting to bayonets and fists. While the Battle at the Fence raged, more Federals joined on the right, pushing their enemy back and turning their flank. Rather than be captured, the Confederates at the fence withdrew, ending Crittenden's advance and the Confederate advantage. The Federals moved forward in a series of surges, one a bayonet charge, spurring the Confederate into a full-scale retreat.
General Crittenden ordered the 20th Tennessee forward to support the 15th Mississippi. Once in position alongside the 15th, both regiments prepared to charge the fence.
While the Confederates prepared, the Federals approached the fence. Captain Judson Bishop of the 2nd Minnesota later wrote of his regiment's experience:
"The rain had now ceased, but the air was loaded with mist and smoke, and the underbrush in our part of the field was so thick that a man was hardly visible a musket's length away. Suddenly the Second's lines came against a rail fence with an open field in front, and a line of the enemy's troops was dimly seen through the mist some twenty or thirty rods distant in the field. The firing commenced immediately, and in a few minutes the enemy's line just mentioned had disappeared. It was, in fact, his second line, the first being literally under the guns and noses of the Second Regiment, only the fence intervening."18
The 15th Mississippi pressed their muskets through the cracks of the fence and fired. Many of the 2nd Minnesota closest to the Confederates would fall wounded or killed. As more of the regiment joined the fight, the 2nd unleashed their full might. Robert McCook later:
"On the right wing of the Minnesota regiment, the contest at first was almost hand to hand; the enemy and the Second Minnesota were poking their guns through the same fence."19
Fighting for survival, Federal and Confederate soldiers ripped weapons from each other and used bayonets, knives, and even fists. In support of the 15th Mississippi, the 20th Tennessee charged forward. Ralph J. Neal, 20th Tennessee, wrote of his experience:
"some of our men reached the fence and the slaughter was simply terrible."20
As the Battle at the Fence raged, a second battle ensued on the west side of the road. General Thomas directed the 9th Ohio Infantry to support the 10th Indiana. To the Federal's front in the woods was the 19th Tennessee Infantry, who, a short time before, had seen their commander, General Zollicoffer, killed in front of them. After witnessing the events, the 19th fell back a short distance to a depression within the wooded area.
With the 9th Ohio joining the fray, the 10th Indiana could advance at the wooded Confederate's position. To prevent being driven back, Colonel Sidney Stanton moved his 25th Tennessee regiments to support the 19th Tennessee. However, when Stanton rode forward to survey, he was severely wounded by fire from the 10th Indiana. Disorientated, he ordered his troops back. 21
Seeing the 19th and 25th Tennessee regiments fall back, Lieutenant Colonel William Kise pressed his advantage. Of the 10th Indiana's actions, he later reported:
"The whole regiment, from right to left, was now warmly engaged, and slowly but surely driving the enemy before them, when I ordered a "charge bayonet," which was promptly executed along the whole line. We soon drove the enemy from his place of concealment in the woods into an open field 200 yards from where I ordered the charge."22
Forced back, the Confederates took shelter behind a fence but could not slow the advancing Federals. With their soaked flintlocks offering them little protection, many began to leave the field. Brigadier William Carroll later wrote:
"saw numbers of the men walking deliberately away from the field of action for no other reason than that their guns were wholly useless."23
With the Confederate left collapsing, Brigadier William Carroll moved his brigade forward. The 28th Tennessee Infantry moved alongside the 25th, and the 17th Tennessee Infantry moved up behind the 19th. The purely defensive maneuver marked the end and failure of General Crittenden's general advance. 24
While the 10th Indiana, 9th Ohio, and 1st Kentucky Cavalry turned the Confederate left flank, the Confederates on the right were at risk of being captured. James Binford, 15th Mississippi, wrote:
"Just at this time Lieutenant Colonel Walthall came coolly and calmly walking toward me and said, 'Let them go Jim'. I was perfectly astonished for such a thing as Mississippians being defeated had never entered my brain, so walking up to him I said, 'My God Colonel, we are not whipped are we?' Smiling at my remark he pointed to the rear and said, 'look there.' I for the first time saw directly in our rear and occupying the position we had first held and where our horses were hitched, a large Regiment of what seem to be the largest men and with the bluest clothes I ever saw. I asked him what were we to do. He replied, 'Get away if you can.' I said, 'Every man take care of himself?' He replied, 'Yes.'"25
Colonel Joel Battle, commander of the 20th Tennessee, also saw the peril and ordered his regiment to withdraw. However, as Battle issued these orders, 1st Lieutenant Bailey Peyton of Company A issued his own orders. Unknown to him, this was the 20th's final charge at the federal line. He charged forward, his men behind obscured by the haze, and getting within 30 feet of the fence, he fired, wounding Lieutenant Tenbroeck Stout 2nd Minnesota. In response, he received a hail of bullets, one striking him in the head. Later, after the battle, the 2nd Minnesota honored Peyton's bravery by embalming his body and sending it to his father, a United States Congressman.26
With the charge ending, so too did the Confederate attack. The Federals had stoutly resisted their surprise assault for over four hours. They were now entirely in control of the field.
As the Confederates struggled with their reality, Acting Brigadier General Samuel Carter's brigade removed all doubt. The 12th Kentucky Infantry and 1st and 2nd East Tennessee forced the decimated Confederate right into a disorganized retreat. Colonel Horatio Van Cleve 2nd Minnesota later reported:
"The enemy having met with so warm a reception in front, and afterwards being flanked... on their right by a portion of our left, who by their well-directed fire drove them from behind their hiding places, gave way, leaving a large number of their dead and wounded on the field."27
The Federals advance advanced on all sides. However, the right slowed to a halt. The 17th and 19th Tennessee had taken a strong position behind a fence. Robert McCook later wrote:
"The enemy obstinately maintaining its postion... a desperate fire was continued for about thirty minutes, with seemingly doubtful results."28
Unable to move the Confederates, McCook sent a request to General Thomas for artillery. It was promptly answered by Thomas, who had Acting Brigadier General Mahlon Manson send some. On this, Manson wrote:
"Captain Standart, with two sections of artillery, moved forward and with great difficulty succeeded in getting upon a hill, when a heavy fire from his guns was opened on the enemy."29
The artillery swept the field but did not have the desired effect McCook had hoped for. The 17th and 19th Tennessee held firm on the west. This stability allowed the scattered Confederates on the east side of the battlefield to reform loosely. Rather than letting the Confederate lines reform, McCook ordered his men to charge the enemy position at the fence. In a report, he later wrote:
"The order was given the regiment to empty their guns and fix bayonets; this done, it was ordered to charge. Every man sprang to it with alacrity and vociferous cheering, the enemy seemingly prepared to resist it, but before the regiment reached him the lines commenced to give way. But few of them stood, possibly 10 or 12. This broke the enemy's flank, and the whole line gave way in great confusion, and the whole turned into a perfect rout."30
The scattered Confederates were now in a full-scale retreat. In a final desperate attempt to reform, The 16th Alabama pressed forward but were forced from the field by the overwhelming Federal numbers.31 As the 16th fell back, the Confederate Calvary collected as many of their wounded comrades as possible. Seeing the Confederates on the road beyond their field hospital, the Federals promptly unlimbered a cannon. They fired, dispersing the Confederates, bringing the battle to a thunderous end.32
Ensnaring the Encampment
Reorganized the Federal's pursued the remnants of the Confederate army. Cautious of potential ambushes, the advance was slow and methodical. Reaching Moulden's Hill, they faced light resistance and secured the position, then used artillery to bombard the Confederate camp at Beech Grove. Despite calls for an immediate attack, General Thomas opted to wait for daylight.
Believing they were out of options, Confederate General Crittenden decided on a nighttime retreat across the Cumberland River. When the artillery fell silent, the Confederates hastily crossed. At dawn, the Federal assaulted Beech Grove but found their foe had escaped. Having left almost everything behind, the Confederates began a starved, exhausted retreat back into Tennessee.
After resupplying, the Federals began to pursue the disintegrated army. Unsure if the Confederates would reform and ambush them, the Federals proceeded with caution in battlelines sweeping the woods along Mill Springs Road. Judson Bishop 2nd Minnesota later wrote:
"Colonel Van Cleve sent a messenger to relieve and bring up our men left on the picket line, as the advance was resumed, gave us the lead. The pursuit was, however, tedious and uneventful. Occasionally a few shots were exchanged with the enemy's rear guard, and some exhausted or wounded stragglers captured were all we had to enliven the chase until we approached Moulden's Hill, a high ridge within a mile of and commanding the entrenched camp at Beech Grove."33
Confederate General Crittenden had sent the 37th Tennessee Infantry and a portion of the 3rd Tennessee Cavalry to defend Moulden's Hill. Seeing the Federal approach, the Confederates fired their muskets. In a display of power, General Thomas brought forward the artillery and returned their fire. 34 Judson Bishop Continued:
"Here a show of resistance was made, and General Thomas halted and developed his forces in order to attack. The advance up the easy slope of the hill was an inspiring spetacle to us, but the enemy did not remain to enjoy it. When our skirmish line reached the crest of the ridge, their rear guard was seen in full retreat again and soon disappeared within their camp."35
After taking the hill, General Thomas set up his artillery. Describing their placement, he later wrote:
"From this point I directed their entrenchments to be cannonaded, which was done until dark by Standart's and Wetmore's batteries. Kenny's battery was placed in position on the extreme left at Russell's house, from which point he was directed to fire on their ferry, to deter them from attempting to cross."36
Confederate artillery attempted to return fire, but their smoothbore cannons were ineffective, many of their rounds falling short of their desired target.
As darkness fell, General Thomas had to decide whether to attack then or wait till morning. A number in his command pressed him to take the advantage and capture the entire Confederate force. However, Thomas decided to wait; his men were exhausted, and asking them to attack an unknown fortification could end in disaster.37
As the Federals fell silent, Confederate General George Crittenden met with his staff to determine their course of action. Crittenden explained:
"On the evening of the 19th I called in consultation General Carroll, Colonel Cummings, engineers, artillery, and other officers, and it was considered best by all to retire from Beech Grove. I directed at once that the crossing should be effected during the night, with every effort and artifice to insure perfect concealment from the enemy and the success of the movement..."38
One of the first regiments to receive the order was the 19th Tennessee. William Worsham later wrote of the experience:
"We were hungry, and were just preparing to satisfy our appetites, when orders came ringing down the line of cabins, 'Fall in line quickly and quietly as possible, leave everything but guns and accoutrements, clothing, knapsacks, haversacks, canteens, blankets, leave all in camps.' We came pouring out of our huts, those who had eaten feeling well, but many had not... After we had left camp and had gotten to the river, the realization of our misfortune came crashing upon the heart like an avalanche. We were retreating."39
Crittenden, in an attempt at an orderly retreat, had instructed his officers to refrain from telling their men the true intention of gathering. As more Confederates arrived at the landing, it quickly became apparent that they were retreating across the river. Time was not on their side. Knowing the Federals would resume their attack at dawn, panic began to spread. William Worsham continued:
"We are on the river bank in one compact mass of excited and confused humanity. Thousands were crowded there waiting, each his turn to get on the Noble Ellis as she crossed and recrossed the river... The cavalrymen were whooping and hallowing to drive their horses into the river to swim them over. But very few of the horses ever crossed, many of them, perhaps, were drowned, but the greater part of them remained and were captured. Here were artillerymen without artillery, teamsters without their teams and cavalrymen afoot. What a racket and confusion reigned here, and right in the face of the enemy. A hundred men could have captured General Crittenden's whole army. If one gun had been fired just behind us hundreds doubtless would have been pushed into the river."40
At dawn, the Federal artillery commenced firing. Seeing the Noble Ellis running from bank to bank, the Federals concentrated their fire on the steamboat. Private Joseph Durfee, in a letter, described the event:
"At six o'clock in the morning, our Battery was ordered to move half a mile south to the banks of the Cumberland River, and down the stream near the enemy's camp. We saw a steamer just crossing the river. We fired at her with the Parrott guns, and after firing ten shots, set her on fire, and a grist mill close by... When we shelled her, she was loaded with horses and baggage. The horses jumped overboard; some were saved and some drowned. The rest of the loading was destroyed."41
The Noble Ellis had been struck through one of the smokestacks. Disabled, the steamboat floated back to the south bank. Captain Spiller, who had piloted the steamboat through the night, was forced to abandon the vessel. Spiller set fire to the Noble Ellis, scuttling the boat. On the crossing, Crittenden reported:
"I ordered the men to be crossed over—first, by commands, in designated order; then the artillery to be crossed over; then what could be crossed of baggage and mules, horses, wagons, &c. I directed the cavalry to swim their horses over. Time only permitted to cross the infantry under arms, the sick and wounded, one company of cavalry mounted, the rest of the cavalry dismounted, the artillery-men, and some horses. Many cavalry horses, artillery horses, mules, wagons, and eleven pieces of artillery, with baggage and camp and garrison equipage were left behind. Much is due to the energy, skill, and courage of Captain Spiller, of the cavalry, who commanded the boat, and continued crossing over with it until fired upon by the enemy in the morning, when he burned it, by my directions."42
Having disabled the Confederate means of escape, the Federal artillery ceased fire. Federal General Thomas then sent forward the 10th Kentucky and 14th Ohio Infantry to determine their enemy's strength. Lieutenant John Chase, 14th Ohio, later described:
"We were sent to the front to learn, if possible whether the enemy was in the trenches behind these works or not, and that information must be gained in some way, be the consequences what they may. The movements were made as quiet as possible; the timber and brush for several rods outside the fortification had been carefully cleared away, and in fact everything that would obstruct the view or range of an approaching enemy had been carefully removed... The moment the signal was given, the men dashed forward on double quick and soon gained the top of the fortification. Meeting with no opposition, we tarried there for a moment or two and waived our hats, as a signal for the main force of troops to advance as rapidly as possible."43
The Confederates had escaped, but they had to leave almost everything behind to do so. In a report, General Thomas wrote of the spoils:
"On reaching the entrenchments we found the enemy had abandoned everything and retired during the night. Twelve pieces of artillery with their caissons packed with ammunition; one battery wagon and two forges; a large amount of ammunition; a large number of small arms, mostly the old flintlock muskets; 150 or 160 wagons, and upwards of 1,000 horses and mules; a large amount of commissary stores, entrenching tools, and camp and garrison equipage, fell into our hands."44
With no means readily available to cross, the fighting was over. The Federals had achieved their first major victory in the Western theater.At its conclusion, the two-day affair had claimed 814 casualties; 202 men lost their lives (55 Federal and 148 Confederate), and a further 613 were wounded (207 Federal and 404 Confederate).
- Tarrant, Eastham. The Wild Riders of the First Kentucky Cavalry, 57
- Tarrant, Eastham. The Wild Riders of the First Kentucky Cavalry, 58
- U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 95
- Hafendorfer, Mill Springs, 187-188
- U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 100
- U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 87
- U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 88
- McMurray, William Josiah., Roberts, Deering J.., Neal, Ralph J.. History of the Twentieth Tennessee Regiment Volunteer Infantry, C.S.A.. United States: Publication Committee, consisting of W.J. McMurray, D.J. Roberts, and R.J. Neal, 1904. Pg 124
- Worsham, William Johnson. Old Nineteenth Tennessee Regiment, C. S. A. Paragon Printing Company, 1902, p. 22.
- Hafendorfer, Mill Springs, 274
- Hafendorfer, Mill Springs, 281-287
- Fry, Speed Smith. "Autograph Letter Signed: [Mill Springs, Ky.], to [his Wife], [Danville, Ky.] 1862." Fry, Speed Smith, and Butler-Gunsaulus Collection. University of Chicago Library.
- Hafendorfer, Mill Springs, 288-292
- U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 107
- Hafendorfer, Mill Springs, 303
- Tarrant, Eastham. The Wild Riders of the First Kentucky Cavalry, 63
- U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 95
- Minnesota. Board of Commissioners on Publication of History of Minnesota in Civil and Indian Wars. "Narrative of the Second Regiment by General J. W. Bishop." Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars, 1861-1865. 1890, 83-84.
- U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 93-94
- McMurray, Roberts, and Neal, History of the Twentieth Tennessee Regiment Volunteer Infantry, C.S.A., 123
- Hafendorfer, Mill Springs, 320-322
- U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 91
- U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 114
- Hafendorfer, Mill Springs, 342-348
- Binford, James R. Recollections of the Fifteenth Regiment of Mississippi Infantry, C.S.A. Patrick Henry Papers, Z/0215.000, Mississippi Department of Archives and History.
- Hafendorfer, Mill Springs, 351-352
- U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 95
- U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 93
- U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 84
- U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 94
- Saunders, James Edmonds., Stubbs, Elizabeth Saunders Blair. Early Settlers of Alabama. United States: Southern Historical Press, 1899. p188
- Tarrant, Eastham. The Wild Riders of the First Kentucky Cavalry, 60
- Minnesota. Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars, 1861-1865. 85
- Hafendorfer, Mill Springs, 439
- Minnesota. Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars, 1861-1865. 85
- U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 80
- Hafendorfer, Mill Springs, 446
- U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 109
- Worsham, William Johnson. Old Nineteenth Tennessee Regiment, C.S.A., 27
- Worsham, William Johnson. Old Nineteenth Tennessee Regiment, C.S.A., 27
- "The Battle of Somerset as described by a Geauga Volunteer." The Jeffersonian Democrat (Chardon, Ohio) (February 7, 1862). Ohio History Connection, Columbus, OH.
- U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 110
- History of the Fourteenth Ohio Regiment, O.V.V.I.: From the Beginning of the War in 1861 to Its Close in 1865. United States: St. John Printing House, 1881. Pp 21-22
- U.S. War Department, Official Records, Vol 7, 81
Binford, James R. Recollections of the Fifteenth Regiment of Mississippi Infantry, C.S.A. Patrick Henry Papers, Z/0215.000, Mississippi Department of Archives and History.
Chase, J.A., History of the Fourteenth Ohio Regiment, O.V.V.I.: From the Beginning of the War in 1861 to Its Close in 1865. United States: St. John Printing House, 1881.
Fry, Speed Smith. "Autograph Letter Signed: [Mill Springs, Ky.], to [his Wife], [Danville, Ky.] 1862." Fry, Speed Smith, and Butler-Gunsaulus Collection. University of Chicago Library.
Hafendorfer, Kenneth A., “Mill Springs: Campaign and Battle of Mill Springs, Kentucky”, (KH Press: Louisville, KY, 2001)
McMurray, William Josiah., Roberts, Deering J.., Neal, Ralph J.. History of the Twentieth Tennessee Regiment Volunteer Infantry, C.S.A.. United States: Publication Committee, consisting of W.J. McMurray, D.J. Roberts, and R.J. Neal, 1904.
Minnesota. Board of Commissioners on Publication of History of Minnesota in Civil and Indian Wars. "Narrative of the Second Regiment by General J. W. Bishop." Minnesota in the Civil and Indian Wars, 1861-1865. 1890
Saunders, James Edmonds., Stubbs, Elizabeth Saunders Blair. Early Settlers of Alabama. United States: Southern Historical Press, 1899. Pp. 188
Tarrant, Eastham. The Wild Riders of the First Kentucky Cavalry: A History of the Regiment, in the Great War of the Rebellion 1861-1865. Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and company, 1888.
U.S. War Department. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series I, Volume 4. Government Printing Office, 1880
U.S. War Department. The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies. Series I, Volume 7. Government Printing Office, 1880
Worsham, William Johnson. Old Nineteenth Tennessee Regiment, C.S.A. Knoxville, Tenn.: Paragon Printing Company, 1902.
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