Public Domain. "We think that it is the most effectual battle that has been fought..."The fields and woods south of Logan's Crossroads were now a scarred battlefield. Fencing that once kept out the roaming animals from cultivated crops was shattered by bullets and strewn on the ground. Weapons, jackets, shoes, belts, knapsacks denoted where soldiers had stood and died. The dead and wounded now covered the cold, hard ground. This place of peaceful subsistance and truly become a harvest of death. With the hostilities concluded, Federal General Thomas moved his headquarters to Somerset. After settling in, he wired Major General Buell about their victory. Buell sent word to the War Department and President Lincoln. Relaying President Lincoln's congratulatory message, Secretary of War Edwin Stanton wrote:
"The President, Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, has received information of a brilliant victory by the United States forces over a, large body of armed traitors and rebels at Mill Springs, in the State of Kentucky. He returns thanks to the gallant officers and soldiers who won that victory, and when the official reports shall be received, the military and personal valor displayed in battle will be acknowledged and rewarded in a fitting manner."81
Although a significant portion of the fighting had happened at Logan's Crossroads (today Nancy) near Fishing Creek, the United States War Department used the name Mill Springs despite typical naming conventions. News of the brilliant victory at Mill Springs would soon spread, further solidifying the name. While the news began circulating, General Thomas and the Federal Army remained in Somerset due to exhaustion and supplies. Somerset, after the battle, was filled with Federal troops, Confederate supplies, and the sick and wounded from both sides. The bodies of General Zollicoffer and Baily Payton were also brought there for embalmment. Eventually, they were both sent to Nashville for burial.
Thomas also had a fair amount of his forces still at Logan's Crossroads and Beech Grove, facing the horrors of the battle and the terrible task of burying the dead. Lieutenant Fred Keil, 35th Ohio Infantry, wrote a vivid description of the dreadful experience:
"The bodies of many of the dead were still lying on the field, and had swollen, in many instances, to enormous proportions; some had turned black, which caused debate whether or not the body was that of a negro…A battalion of Michigan pioneers was at work collecting and burying the dead. We came upon a party of this class near a log shanty where twenty bodies of Confederate soldiers had been gathered. A trench, six feet wide, about two feet deep, and long enough to accommodate the bodies collected at that point, had been dug in the garden. Own after the other was placed within the grave; such as happened to have a blanket about the person when found, were wrapped within the same. The bodies were laid as closely to each other as the rigidness of the dead would admit. There they lay, faces upturned, hands placed upon the breast – a ghastly looking sight; over these the soil was thrown, and the graves filled. This kind of work was going on all over the field."82
Not only were the dead left on the field, but the wounded as well, Lieutenant Keil continued:
"The few scattered shanties and other buildings found on the field where the battle was fought, were taken for hospitals where the wounded were gathered in, until the ambulances could bear them to more suitable places. Surgeons had tents, near these places, where the fierce work of amputating limbs was going on…the sight was more than most nerves could endure. When a contest was going on, men would look on bodies horribly torn by shot and shell; but when the sound of battle had died out, then there were few that could muster courage to look at sights like those to be seen at a surgeon's tent near a field hospital."83 The Confederate's circumstances were also dismal. Confederate General William Carroll reported: "Being entirely without commissary supplies, and there being none, or but little, in the surrounding country, my men became more apprehensive of destruction by famine than at the hands of the enemy. Under the influence of this panic, created by a fear of starvation, many deserted the army and fled through the mountains into East Tennessee."84 Starved and camped only one mile south of Monticello, a decision had to be made before their enemy picked up the pursuit again. Unfortunately, their commanding officer, Crittenden, was reportedly indisposed. Colonel William Wood wrote of this discovery: "We found the general lying across a bed, very drunk. One of his staff tried to arouse him but could not. We consulted together... Just before leaving, I went to the general and shaking him, succeeded in arousing him so that he asked what I wanted. I told him we wanted to know where we were going, and when he expected to get supplies. He told us to go where we ----- pleased, and let him alone [sic]. We left.... I issued an order for the army to move at daylight, Colonel Statham in advance, and move in the direction of Livingston."85 The next morning, January 21st, Crittenden and the Confederates were ready to move. Despite extreme hunger, they marched southwest toward Newberry. Forced again by their haste and lack of horses, many wounded and ill were left behind. Confederate forces stopped for the night around Elliot's Crossroads, having traveled 17 miles. Due to their plight, many more soldiers deserted the ranks and headed home. Several days after the battle, Confederate General Sydney Johnston learned of his subordinates' failure. However, he didn't receive this information from Crittenden or Carroll but rather from an article in the Louisville Democrat newspaper. Realizing the impact this defeat had on Confederate control of Eastern Kentucky, Johnston wrote to Adjutant and Inspector General Samuel Cooper in Richmond:
"If my right is thus broken as stated, East Tennessee is open to invasion. Or if the plan of the enemy be a combined movement upon Nashville, it is in jeopardy, unless a force can be placed to oppose a movement from Burkesville toward Nashville. Movements on my left, threatening Forts Henry, Donelson, and Clarksville, have, I do not doubt, for their ultimate object the occupation of Nashville…A successful movement of the enemy on my right would carry with it all the consequences which could be expected by the enemy here if they could break through my defenses…No matter what the sacrifice may be, it must be made, and without loss of time. Our people do not comprehend the magnitude of the danger that threatens. Let it be impressed upon them…All the resources of the Confederacy are now needed for the defense of Tennessee."86
As Johnston feared, Federal General Buell, understanding President Lincoln's desire to liberate East Tennessee, wanted Thomas to continue into Tennessee.87 On January 23, General Thomas replied to General Buell's orders:
"I have positive information that it is almost impossible to subsist a large force at Monticello... I would therefore again respectfully suggest that I may be permitted to move down the river with my troops, taking our subsistence and forage in flat-boats, and co-operate with the main army against Bowling Green." 88
Thomas sent a second correspondent a day later, adding:
"My scouts have returned and report the roads from this place to Monticello in an almost impassable condition. The enemy have entirely dispersed and gone to their homes. At Monticello they destroyed the carriages of four guns. General Schoepf starts to-day with his brigade for Monticello. I have left Colonel Manson, with his brigade, at enemy's entrenched camp, collecting the public property, which will require four or five days to accomplish." 89
Knowing the future intentions, Thomas sent Captain Gilliam to verbally describe the difficulties of advancing into Tennessee. General Buell, who had not fully supported Lincoln's desires, did not need much convincing. A few days later, on January 26th, Buell, using Thomas' reasons, informed the War Department:
"Under these circumstances any advance beyond Somerset is as present impossible, through I had instructed General Thomas on going there to be prepared to move into East Tennessee or in any other direction that circumstanced might require. I am making every effort to remedy this condition of things, but it is not to be concealed that the difficulties are very great." 90 As the Federals conversed on the difficulties the Confederates were experiencing, undersupplied and slogging through terrible roads and weather, they marched for over a week until reaching Livingston, Tennessee. There, they could finally get some much-needed rest and food. On the ordeal, Crittenden wrote:
"My march was through a poor country, over very bad roads. It was hard to obtain the necessaries of life along the route, and from scant subsistence and difficult marching my command suffered greatly…From the fatigues of the march and the want of proper food many were taken sick." 91
In Livingston, the Confederate army received much-needed rest and food. The Confederates had sorely missed the supplies they had left behind.
On January 26, Crittenden began to move his greatly depleted army west and arrived in Gainsboro, Tennessee, a few days later. From there, he sent the Confederate War Department the most detailed account he had written to date on the Battle of Mill Springs. General Johnston would send Crittenden well-needed supplies to aid his deteriorated army.
While the Confederates marched, so did the Federals. Acting Brigadier General Samuel Carter and his Brigade moved to enforce the Cumberland Gap, and General Schoepf's Brigade moved to Monticello. Unsatisfied, Washington continued to pressure General Buell, who sent probing messages to General Thomas. Confederate General Crittenden was also now under fire as word of Mill Springs spread. Words like ignorant, incompetent, and even traitor began to appear in southern newspapers, as well as accusations of Crittenden being a useless drunk. The Macon Telegraph published:
"It seems but too improbable that a culpable mismanagement lies at the bottom of this defeat. The mistake as to the force of the enemy, the failure to support the two attacking regiments, which, if they had been backed efficiently, would have carried the day in spite of the odds—the hasty abandonment of their position by the reserve, and the evident confusion, disorder and incoherency of the whole affair seems to indicate too clearly that the catastrophe was the result of incapacity in the command. Common rumor charges it to John Barleycorn—in plain words, that while Zollicoffer, in command of two regiments, was struggling successfully against the tremendous odds, Crittenden was too much intoxicated to direct the movements of the reserve. We are reluctant to credit any statement so much to the disparagement of a Confederate officer, and shall be quick to correct it, if unfounded; but it has already found such universal currency among the people that it is mere squeamishness to attempt concealment."92
Efforts were made to calm the storm of accusations; however, the media and public had turned against Crittenden. On January 30, Secretary of War Judah P. Benjamin wrote to General Johnston:
"Some painful rumors have reached the Department attributing the disaster to our arms at Somerset to the intemperance of General Crittenden, the commander of the army. The President can scarcely believe these rumors to be well founded; but we are at too great a distance to inquire into facts. Many letters are also received here, by members of Congress and others, representing that the army under General Crittenden and the people of East Tennessee have lost confidence in him, and that the morale of the army will be utterly destroyed by his remaining in command.”93
The final decision on whether to remove Crittenden from service was left up to General Johnston. The loss at Mill Springs had come as a shock to the Confederate states, and General Crittenden was the easiest to blame. While Johnston decided his fate, Crittenden prepared to move his command to Chestnut Mound. February 13, Crittenden, nearly a month after the battle, sent his official report to General Johnston. Crittenden now needed to clear his name and called for a court of inquiry. Secretary of War Judah Benjamin was under heavy public pressure and wrote to Johnston:
"The President thinks it best to break up the army of General Crittenden, demoralized by its defeat, and that you should distribute the forces composing it among other troops. You can form a new command for General Crittenden, connected with your own corps, in such manner as you may deem best. General Crittenden had demanded a court of inquiry, and it has been ordered; but from all the accounts which now reach us we have no reason to doubt his skill or conduct in his recent movements, and feel convinced that it is not to any fault of his that the disaster at Somerset is to be attributed."94
Crittenden would not get his chance, for the War quickly turned against the Confederates. As General Johnston feared, the Federals under General Ulysses Grant took Fort Henry on February 6th. In response, Johnston sent reinforcements to stop Grant. General Hallek then requested General Buell to threaten Bowling Green. Buell readily accepted it as it would mean the invasion into East Tennessee had to be postponed. Contacting the General-in-Chief, George McClellan, he got the approval to send General Thomas in support. In an order to Thomas, he wrote:
"Move your division with all possible dispatch back to Lebanon. Further orders will meet you there. Leave one regiment to collect and guard the public property until relieved…"95
With Thomas' departure, the campaign and Battle of Mill Springs had come to an end. The Federals had accomplished their immediate goal of removing Crittenden's and Zollicoffers forces. With their retreat, the Confederate's control of the region was waning. The Confederates no longer had the strategic position at the Cumberland Gap, and their supply line into Central Kentucky, the Cumberland River, was severely compromised. The last anchor points of the Confederate defensive line, Bowling Green and Fort Donelson, would soon follow. On February 16th, General Grant earned his nickname "Unconditional Surrender" for his famous response before forcing Fort Donelson's surrender. With Mill Springs and Fort Donelson in Federal control, Bowling Green became untenable and, after a brief siege, was abandoned.
Kentucky was now firmly under Federal control. It was now time for the Federals to press into Tennessee and beyond. To stop the Federal advance, the Confederates eventually took major action at the Battle of Shiloh on April 6-7, 1862. The battle for the Confederates ended in the worst way possible; despite being boxed in, the Federals had won, and Confederate General Albert Sidney Johnston was killed.
Most of the significant players from the lead-up and the Battle of Mill Springs had been involved at Shiloh in one way or another. On the federal side, there were Generals Ulysses Grant, William Sherman, Don Carlos Buell, William "Bull" Nelson, and George Thomas, who arrived just after the battle, and all those under their command, as for the Confederates Generals Albert Sidney Johnston and Leonidas Polk. Many of the Confederate regiments from Mill Springs were held in reserve as a part of John C. Breckinridge's, one of President Lincoln's opponents in the 1860s election, 3rd brigade.
Shiloh would be the last time many of these Generals and their command would face each other. A few months later, the completion of the Vicksburg (July 4, 1863) and Chattanooga (November 25, 1863) Campaigns changed the Civil War entirely. The Federals had firm control of the Western Theater and Tennessee. Due to this success, President Lincoln found a general who could contend with Robert E. Lee in Ulysses S. Grant. After Grant received command, the Civil War would end approximately one year later, on April 9, 1865, at Appomattox Courthouse. |
Last updated: May 6, 2024