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Chancellorsville Driving Tour, #10, Fairview
Transcript
Today at Fairview there are a number of gun pits that mark where US artillery positions defended Chancellorsville against the Confederate assault that began at dawn on May 3. US General Alpheus Williams described the Confederate assault that converged on his soldiers at Fairview: “This desperate struggle in front and flank by artillery and infantry continued almost without cessation until about 8:30 am. My regiments had literally exhausted their ammunition. Some of them had been twenty-four hours without food, and most of them several nights with but little sleep, while engaged in intrenching. My regiments had several times crossed the breastworks to attack the enemy’s repulsed columns, but the nature of the ground, the thickness of the underbrush, the heavy columns of the enemy always at hand, as well as their position on either flank of my line, admonished me to act on the defensive until a more favorable moment for the offensive should present itself.” That moment would not come for Williams or his troops. At about 9:15am, a Confederate projectile struck the porch of the Chancellor house where Hooker had been observing the battle. The impact knocked Hooker unconscious for a moment. After regaining some of his senses Hooker was taken back to the Bullock House, where he slowly recovered and ordered the rest of his forces to withdraw from the Chancellorsville intersection. Hooker’s forces retreated to a secondary line that extended from the Bullock House in a v-formation up to the river. As the US army retreated from Chancellorsville, Lee received word that the Federals, under command of General John Sedgwick, had broken through Confederate General Jubal Early’s forces holding Fredericksburg. In response, Lee left a thin veil of troops at Chancellorsville while the rest of his forces turned east to confront Sedgwick. For the remainder of May 3 through May 4, the heavy fighting shifted to the east. The Confederates dispatched towards Fredericksburg collided with Sedgwick’s approaching Federal column at Salem Church. As Sedgwick’s men halted against a threat to his front, Early’s troops in Fredericksburg reformed and approached from behind. Lee hoped his forces at Salem Church would destroy a sizeable chunk of the Army of the Potomac, but these hopes were disappointed when Sedgwick managed an escape across the river at Banks’ Ford. On the night between May 4 and May 5, with knowledge of Sedgwick’s retreat, Hooker called his available corps commanders together to discuss whether to stay south of the Rappahannock and fight, or to retreat. 3 of the 5 generals present wanted to stay and continue the campaign. Third Corps commander Dan Sickles summarized the considerations in favor of leaving, highlighting, “our deficiency in supplies; our imperiled communications, the hazards of a general engagement with an enemy, whose forces we could not estimate, and who could choose his own time and place to accept battle; the instructions which required the commanding general to protect Washington; and the consequences to the North which would follow disaster to this army.” Hooker chose to retreat. In the meantime, Lee once again refocused his forces on Chancellorsville. Lee determined to launch an overwhelming assault against the entrenched US soldiers in their new line. Heavy rain postponed Lee’s assault until the morning of May 6. On the night between May 5 and May 6, the Army of the Potomac completed their retreat across the river. At dawn on May 6, the Confederates prepared to launch their assault, only to find Hooker’s entrenchments abandoned, and the US army gone. The battle was over. In the aftermath of the battle, Confederate soldier G.W. Poindexter wrote of the battle, “What has either side gained? How much more does it look like peace than before – both sides back in their old camps, and their picket posts in the same place. Just say we have not gained anything nor the Yankees…” Throughout the Battle of Chancellorsville Lee displayed his tactical savvy and command skills. He seized the initiative, and he took risks. But, what end did those risks serve? Lee desired to deal a crippling blow to the Army of the Potomac. Instead, he racked up casualties. In total, the Battle of Chancellorsville claimed 31,000 men, killed, wounded, and missing: 17,000 US soldiers and 14,000 Confederate. Because Confederates captured more US soldiers in the fighting on May 2 and 3, the numbers of killed and wounded were roughly equivalent between the two sides. The losses in the Army of Northern Virginia totaled 23% of its fighting force, in the Army of the Potomac just 13%. Casualties in the Army of Northern Virginia piled up from the lowest rank to Lee’s second in command. The loss of men like Jackson and other Confederate officers created a vacuum of experienced leaders that would only get worse with each coming battle. Lee recognized the severity of his losses and just how precariously positioned his army was in the aftermath of the Battle of Chancellorsville. On May 7 Lee wrote to Jefferson Davis requesting cavalry and infantry reinforcements from other parts of the Confederacy. Lee feared another Federal campaign into Virginia, was vehemently opposed to retreating into the Richmond defenses, and was concerned about staying put in an area that was becoming too familiar to the enemy. So, Lee adopted a plan to go north, into Pennsylvania. Lee intended to draw the Army of the Potomac away from Virginia and raid for much needed supplies. Lee envisioned a fight on Northern soil that would demoralize the U.S. war effort and give support to the Northern Peace Party. In undertaking this plan, Lee was confident in the superiority of his army and believed he would continue to meet with success in the upcoming campaign. Lee’s confidence in his army was a viewpoint shared by many Confederates. As one Richmond paper put it, the Army of Northern Virginia’s success could be entirely attributed to “the matchless skills of our great Chief, the efficiency and morale of our army, and the righteousness of our cause.” By not sufficiently acknowledging Hooker’s blunders and the role of chance on the battlefield, Confederates exaggerated the superiority of Lee and his army. As a matter of course, Lee’s victory at the Battle of Chancellorsville was a welcome distraction for Confederates: the Southern home front was increasingly unstable and the larger Union war effort had begun to more effectively undercut the social and economic foundation of Southern society: slavery. One of the last acts of Confederate congress before adjourning on May 1, 1863, was to pass a series of resolutions in retaliation for the Emancipation Proclamation. The Confederate government declared that the United States’ enlistment of black troops was the equivalent of promoting a slave rebellion. Black troops captured by Confederate forces were to be delivered to state governments, not kept with other prisoners of war . White officers of black troops could be executed. Nearly 40% of the Southern population was enslaved, and the prospect of this population standing against slavery and aligning its interests with those of the United States Army was the Confederacy’s worst nightmare. As the war dragged on, more and more opportunities arose for enslaved people to leverage the chaos of war: to resist and undermine the Confederacy from within. To succeed, Confederates needed to win the war and preserve slavery, which meant winning the war as fast as possible. Robert E. Lee’s dash north offered up that possibility. Abraham Lincoln’s initial reaction to Chancellorsville displayed his concern about how the Northern public would respond to another loss. “My God!” the president cried out, “What will the country say?” Many Northern papers criticized Hooker and made scapegoats of the German soldiers in the 11th Corps. However, the same papers also took some satisfaction that the Army of the Potomac inflicted heavy casualties on the Confederates. Meanwhile, Hooker’s foray across the Rappahannock was only one of many fronts being covered in the wider war effort. By the end of May the Northern papers’ focus was shifting to Grant’s campaign in Mississippi, actions in Tennessee and Kentucky, and movements along the coast. Strategic victories in these places further helped destabilize the Confederacy and limit the possibility of its survival. Northern papers also covered the formation of the black regiments. On May 22, 1863, the US War Department established the Bureau of Colored Troops which officially incorporated black regiments, called United States Colored Troops, into the United States Army. These troops faced discrimination and pay disparities. But what the USCTs proved was that the United States was willing to evolve, even if only gradually, to realize the country’s founding belief that all men are created equal. Over time, USCTs’ efforts on the battlefield increasingly proved to white Americans that black men should be equal citizens. Hooker had spent the months before the Battle of Chancellorsville building morale in the Army of the Potomac. In the face of the loss at Chancellorsville, the soldiers in the Army of the Potomac largely maintained their morale even if they had lost faith in their commander. They were ready to fight the Army of Northern Virginia again, and would get the chance on the fields of Gettysburg, in Pennsylvania.
Description
The last part of the Chancellorsville Driving Tour discusses the last actions of the battle and the circumstances that led to US General Joseph Hooker's decision to retreat. Once the battle was over, what were the consequences? How does the story of the Battle of Chancellorsville fit into the larger story of the Civil War?
Credit
NPS
Date Created
04/29/2022
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