Library of Congress GENERAL: I have the honor to submit the following outline of the recent operations of this army, for the information of the Department: The position occupied by the enemy opposite Fredericksburg being one in which he could not be attacked to advantage, it was determined to draw him from it. The execution of this purpose embraced the relief of the Shenandoah Valley from the troops that had occupied the lower part of it during the winter and spring, and, if practicable, the transfer of the scene of hostilities north of the Potomac. It was thought that the corresponding movements on the part of the enemy to which those contemplated by us would probably give rise, might offer a fair opportunity to strike a blow at the army then commanded by General Hooker, and that in any event that army would be compelled to leave Virginia, and, possibly, to draw to its support troops designed to operate against other parts of the country. In this way it was supposed that the enemy's plan of campaign for the summer would be broken up, and part of the season of active operations be consumed in the formation of new combinations, and the preparations that they would require. In addition to these advantages, it was hoped that other valuable results might be attained by military success. Actuated by these and other important considerations that may hereafter be presented, the movement began on June 3. McLaws' division, of Longstreet's corps, left Fredericksburg for Culpeper Court-House, and Hood's division, which was encamped on the Rapidan, marched to the same place. They were followed on the 4th and 5th by Ewell's corps, leaving that of A. P. Hill to occupy our lines at Fredericksburg. The march of these troops having been discovered by the enemy on the afternoon of the 5th, on the following day he crossed a force amounting to about one army corps to the south of the Rappahannock, on a pontoon bridge laid down near the mouth of Deep Run. General Hill disposed his command to resist their advance, but as they seemed intended for the purpose of observation rather attack, the movements in progress were not arrested. The forces of Longstreet and Ewell reached Culpeper Court-House by the 8th, at which point the cavalry, under General Stuart, was also concentrated. On the 9th, a large force of Federal cavalry, strongly supported by infantry, crossed the Rappahannock at Beverly and Keley's Fords, and attacked General Stuart. A severe engagement ensued, continuing from early in the morning until late the afternoon, when the enemy was forced to recross the river with heavy loss, leaving 400 prisoners, 3 pieces of artillery, and several colors in our hands. General Jenkins, with his cavalry brigade, had been ordered to advance to Winchester, to co-operate with the infantry in the proposed expedition into the lower Valley, and at the same time General Imboden was directed with his command to make a demonstration in the direction of Romney, in order to cover the movement against Winchester, and prevent the enemy at that place from being re-enforced by the troops on the line of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. Both of these officers were in position when General Ewell left Culpeper Court-House on the 10th. Crossing the Shenandoah near Front Royal, he detached Rodes' division to Berryville, with instructions, after dislodging the force stationed there, to cut off the communication between Winchester and the Potomac . With the divisions of Early and [Edward] Johnson, General Ewell advanced directly upon Winchester, driving the enemy into his works around the town on the 13th. On the same day the troops at Berryville fell back before General Rodes, retreating to Winchester. On the 14th, general Early stormed the works at the latter place, and the whole army of General Milroy was captured or dispersed. Most of those who attempted to escape were intercepted and made prisoners by General Johnson. Their leader fled to Harper's Ferry with a small party of fugitives. General Rodes marched from Berryville to Martinsburg, entering the latter place on the 14th, where he took 700 prisoners, 5 pieces of artillery, and a considerable quantity of stores . These operations cleared the Valley of the enemy, those at Harper's Ferry withdrawing to Maryland Heights. More than 4,000 prisoners, 29 pieces of artillery, 270 wagons and ambulances, with 400 horses, were captured besides a large amount of military stores. Our loss was small . On the night that Ewell appeared at Winchester, the Federal troops in front of A. P. Hill at Fredericksburg recrossed the Rappahannock, and the next day disappeared behind the hills of Stafford. The whole army of General Hooker withdrew from the line of the Rappahannock, pursuing the roads near the Potomac, and no favorable opportunity was offered for attack. It seemed to be the purpose of General Hooker to take a position which would enable him to cover the approaches to Washington City. With a view to draw him farther from his base, and at the same time to cover the march of A. P. Hill, who, in accordance with instructions, left Fredericksburg for the Valley as soon as the enemy withdrew from his front, Longstreet moved from Culpeper Court-House on the 15th, and, advancing along the east side of the Blue Ridge, occupied Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps. His force had been augmented, while at Culpeper, by General Pickett, with three brigades of his division. The cavalry under General Stuart was thrown out in front of Longstreet, to watch the enemy, now reported to be moving into Loudoun. On the 17th, his cavalry encountered two brigades of ours under General Stuart, near Aldie, and was driven back with loss. The next day the engagement was renewed, the Federal cavalry being strongly supported by infantry, and General Stuart was in turn, compelled to retire. The enemy advanced as far as Upperville, and then fell back. In these engagements, General Stuart took about 400 prisoners and considerable number of horses and arms. In the meantime, a part of Ewell's corps had entered Maryland, and the rest was about to follow. General Jenkins, with his cavalry, who accompanied General Ewell, penetrated Pennsylvania as far as Chambersburg. As these demonstrations did not have the effect of causing the Federal Army to leave Virginia, and as it did not seem disposed to advance upon the position held by Longstreet, the latter was withdrawn to the west side of the Shenandoah, General Hill having already reached the Valley. General Stuart was left to guard the passed of the mountains and observe the movements of the enemy, whom he was instructed to harass and impede as much as possible, should he attempt to cross the Potomac. In that event, General Stuart was directed to move into Maryland, crossing the Potomac east or west of the Blue Ridge, as, in his judgment, should be best, and take position on the right of our column as it advanced. By the 24th, the progress of Ewell rendered it necessary that the rest of the army should be within supporting distance, and Longstreet and Hill marched to the Potomac. The former crossed at Williamsport and the latter at Shepherdstown. The column reunited at Hagerstown, and advanced thence into Pennsylvania, encamping near Chambersburg on the 27th. No report had been received that the Federal Army had crossed the Potomac, and the absence of the cavalry rendered it impossible to obtain accurate information. In order, however, to retain it on the east side of the mountains, after it should enter Maryland, and thus leave open our communication with the Potomac through Hagerstown and Williamsport, General Ewell had been instructed to send a division eastward from Chambersburg to cross the South Mountain. Early's division was detached for this purpose, and proceeded as far east as York, while the remainder of the corps proceeded to Carlisle. General Imboden, in pursuance of the instructions previously referred to, had been actively engaged on the left of general Ewell during the progress of the latter into Maryland. He had driven off the forces guarding the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, destroying all the important bridges on that route from Cumberland to Martinsburg, and seriously damaged the Chesapeake and Ohio Canal. He subsequently took position at Hancock, and after the arrival of Longstreet and Hill at Chambersburg, was directed to march by way of McConnellsburg to that place. Preparations were now made to advance upon Harrisburg; but, on the night of the 28th, information was received from a scout that the Federal Army, having crossed the Potomac, was advancing northward, and that the head of the column had reached the South Mountain. As our communicate with the Potomac were thus menaced, it was resolved to prevent his farther progress in that direction by concentrating our army on the east of the mountains. Accordingly, Longstreet and Hill were directed to proceed from Chambersburg to Gettysburg, to which point General Ewell was also instructed to march from Carlisle. General Stuart continued to follow the movements of the Federal Army south of the Potomac, after our own had entered Maryland, and. in his efforts to impede its progress, advanced as far eastward as Fairfax Court-House. Finding himself unable to delay the enemy materially, he crossed the river at Seneca, and marched through Westminster to Carlisle, where we arrived after General Ewell had left for Gettysburg. By the route he pursued, the Federal Army was interposed between his command and our main body, preventing any communication with him until his arrival at Carlisle. The march toward Gettysburg was conducted more slowly than it would have been had the movements of the Federal Army been known. The leading division of Hill met the enemy in advance of Gettysburg on the morning of July 1. Driving back these troops to within a short distance of the town, he there encountered a larger force, with which two of his divisions became engaged . Ewell, coming up with two of his divisions by the Heidlersburg road, joined in the engagement. The enemy was driven through Gettysburg with heavy loss, including about 5,000 prisoners and several pieces of artillery. He retired to a high range of hills south and east of the town. The attack was not pressed that afternoon, the enemy's force being unknown, and it being considered advisable to await the arrival of the rest of our troops . Orders were sent back to hasten their march, and, in the meantime, every efforts was made to ascertain the numbers and position of the enemy, and find the most favorable point of attack. It had not been intended to fight a general battle at such a distance from our base, unless attacked by the enemy, but, finding ourselves unexpectedly confronted by the Federal Army, it became a matter of difficulty to withdraw through the mountains with our with our large trains. At the same time, the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies while in the presence of the enemy's main body, as he was enabled to restrain our foraging parties by occupying the passes of the mountains with regular and local troops. A battle thus became, in a measure, unavoidable . Encouraged by the successful issue of the engagement off the first day, and in view of the valuable results that would ensue from the defeat of the army of General Meade, it was thought advisable to renew the attack. The remainder of Ewell's and Hill's corps having arrived, and two divisions of Longstreet's, our preparations were made accordingly. During the afternoon, intelligence was received of the arrival of general Stuart at Carlisle, and he was ordered to march to Gettysburg and take position on our left. A full account of these engagements cannot be given until the reports of the several commanding officers shall have been received, and I shall only offer a general description. The preparations for attack were not completed until the afternoon of the 2d. The enemy held a high and commanding ridge, along which he had massed a large amount of artillery. General Ewell occupied the left of our line, General Hill the center, and General Longstreet the right. In front of General Longstreet the enemy held a position from which, if he could be driven, it was thought our artillery could be used to advantage in assailing the more elevated ground beyond, and thus enable us to reach the crest of the ridge. That officer was directed to endeavor to carry this position, while General Ewell attacked directly the high ground on the enemy's right, which had already been partially fortified. General Hill was instructed to threaten the center of the Federal line, in order to prevent re-enforcement being sent to either wing, and to avail himself of any opportunity that might present itself to attack. After a severe struggle, Longstreet succeeded in getting possession of and holding the desired ground. Ewell also carried some of the strong positions which he assailed, and the result was such as to lead the belief that he would ultimately be able to dislodge the enemy. The battle ceased at dark. These partial successes determined me to continue the assault next day. Pickett, with of his brigades, joined Longstreet the following morning, and our batteries were moved forward to the positions gained by him the day before. The general plan of attack was unchanged, excepting that one division and two brigades of Hill's corps were ordered to support Longstreet. The enemy, in the meantime, had strengthened his lines with earthworks. The morning was occupied in necessary preparations, and the battle recommenced in the afternoon of the 3rd, and raged with great violence until sunset. Our troops succeeded in entering the advanced works of the enemy, and getting possession of some of his batteries, but our artillery having nearly expended its ammunition, the attacking columns became exposed to the heavy fire of the numerous batteries near the summit of the ridge, and, after a most determined and gallant struggle, were compelled to relinquish their advantage, and fall back to their original position with severe loss. The conduct of the troops was all that I could desire or expect, and they deserve success so far it can be deserved by heroic valor and fortitude . More may have been required of them than they were able to perform, but my admiration of their noble qualities and confidence in their ability to cope successfully with the enemy has suffered no abatement from the issue of this protracted and sanguinary conflict. Owing to the strength of the enemy's position, and the reduction of our ammunition, a renewal of the engagement could not be hazarded and the difficulty of procuring supplies rendered it impossible to continue longer where we were. Such of the wounded as were in condition to be removed, and part of the arms collected on the field, were ordered to Williamsport. The army remained at Gettysburg during the 4th, and at night began to retire by the road to Fairfield, carrying with it about 4,000 prisoners . Nearly 2,000 had previously been paroled, but the enemy's numerous wounded that had fallen into into our hands after the first and second day's engagement were left behind. Little progress was made that night, owing to a severe storm, which greatly embarrasses our movements. The rear of the column did not leave its position near Gettysburg until after daylight on the 5th . The march was continued during that day without interruption from the enemy, excepting an unimportant demonstration upon rear in the afternoon when near Fairfield, which was easily checked. Part of our train moved by the road through Fairfield, and the rest by way of Cashtown, guarded by General Imboden. In passing through the mountain in advance of the column, the great length of the trains exposed them to attack by the enemy's cavalry, which captured a number of wagons and ambulances, but they succeeded in reaching Williamsport without serious loss. They were attacked at that place on the 6th by the enemy's cavalry, which was gallantly repulsed by General Imboden. The attacking force was subsequently encountered and driven off by General Stuart, and pursued for several miles in the direction of Boonsborough. The army, after an arduous march, rendered more difficult by the rains, reached Hagerstown of the afternoon of July 6 and morning of the 7th. The Potomac was found to be so much swollen by the rains that had fallen almost incessantly since our entrance into Maryland as to be unfordable. Our communication with the south side were thus interrupted, and it was difficult to procure either ammunition or subsistence, the latter difficulty being enhanced by the high waters impending the working off the neighboring mills. The trains with the wounded and prisoners were compelled to await at Williamsport the subsiding of the river and the construction of boats, as the pontoon bridge left at Falling Waters had been partially destroyed. The enemy had not yet made his appearance, but as he was in condition to obtain large re-enforcement, and our situation, for the reasons above mentioned, was becoming daily more embarrassing, it was deemed advisable to recross the river. Part of the pontoon bridge was recovered and new boats built, so that by the 13th a good bridge was thrown over the river at Falling Waters. The enemy in force reached our front on the 12th . A position had been previously selected to cover the Potomac from Williamsport to Falling Waters, and an attack awaited during that the succeeding day. This did not take place, though the two armies were in close proximity, the enemy being occupied in fortifying his own lines. Our preparations being completed, and the river, though still deep, being pronounced fordable, the army commenced to withdraw to the south side on the night of the 13th. Ewell's corps forded the river at Williamsport. Those of Longstreet and Hill crossed upon the bridge. Owing to the condition of the roads, the troops did not reach the bridge until after daylight on the 14th, and the crossing was not completed until 1 p. m., when the bridge was removed. The enemy offered no serious interruption, and the movement was attended with no loss of material excepting a few disabled wagons and two pieces of artillery, which the horses were unable to move through the deep mud. Before fresh horses could be sent back for them, the rear of the column had passed. During the slow sand tedious march to the bridge, in the midst of a violent storm of rain, some of the men lay down by the way to rest . Officers sent back for them failed to find many in the obscurity of the night, and these, with some stragglers, fell into the hands of the enemy. Brigadier-General Pettigrew was mortally wounded in an attack made by a small body of cavalry, which was unfortunately mistaken for our own, and permitted to enter our lines. He was brought to Bunker Hill, where he expired a few days afterward. He was a brave and accomplished officers and gentleman, and his loss will be deeply left by the country and the army. The following day the army marched to Bunker Hill, in the vicinity it encamped for several days. The day after its arrival, a large force of the enemy's cavalry, which had crossed the Potomac at Harper's Ferry, advanced toward Martinsburg. It was attacked by General Fitz. Lee, near Kearneysville, and defeated with heavy loss, leaving its dead and many of its wounded on the field. Owing to the swollen condition of the Shenandoah, the plan of operations which had been contemplated when we recrossed the Potomac could not be put into execution, and before the waters had subsided, the movements of the enemy induced me to cross the Blue Ridge and take position south of the Rappahannock, which was accordingly done. As soon as the reports of the commanding officers shall be received, a more detailed account of these operations will be given, and occasion will them be taken to speak more particularly of the conspicuous gallantry and good conduct of both officers and men. It is not yet in my power to give a correct statement of our casualties, which were severe, including many brave men, and unusual proportion of distinguished and valuable officers. Among them I regret to mention the following general officers: Major-Generals Hood, Pender, and Trimble severely, and Major-General Heth slightly wounded. General Pender has since died. This lamented officer had borne a distinguished part in every engagement of this army, and was wounded on several occasions while leading his command with conspicuous gallantry and ability. The confidence and admiration inspired by his courage and capacity as an officer were only equaled by the esteem and respect entertained by all with whom he was associated for the noble qualities of his modest and unassuming character. Brigadier-Generals Barksdale and [R. B.] Garnett were killed, and Brigadier-General Semmens mortally wounded, while leading their troops with the courage that always distinguished them. These brave officers and patriotic gentlemen fell in the faithful discharge of duty, leaving the army to mourn their loss and emulate their noble examples. Brigadier-Generals Kemper, Admistead, Scales, G. T. Anderson, Hampton, J. M. Jones, and Jenkins were also wounded. Brigadier-General Archer was taken prisoner. General Pettigrew, though wounded at Gettysburg, continued in command until he was mortally wounded, near Falling Waters. The loss of the enemy is unknown, but from observation on the field, and his subsequent movements, it is supposed that he suffered severely. Respectfully submitted. R. E. LEE, General. General S. COOPER, Adjutant and inspector General, Richmond, Va. 
Library of Congress ... The advance against Harrisburg was arrested by intelligence received from a scout on the night of the 28th, to the effect that the army of General Hooker had crossed the Potomac, and was approaching South Mountain. In the absence of the cavalry, it was impossible to ascertain his intentions; but to deter him from advancing father west, and intercepting our communications with Virginia, it was determined to concentrate the army east of the mountains. BATTLE OF GETTYSBURGHill's corps was accordingly ordered to move toward Cashtown on the 29th, and Longstreet to follow the next day, leaving Pickett's division at Chambersburg to guard the rear until relieved by Imboden. General Ewell was recalled from Carlise, and directed to join the army at Cashtown or Gettysburg, as circumstances might require. The adavane of the enemy to the latter place was unknown, and the weather being inclement, the march was conducted with a view to the comfort of the troops. Heth's division reached Cashtown on the 29th, and the following morning Pettigrew's brigade, sent by General Heth to procure supplies at Gettysburg, found it occupied by the enemy. Being ignorant of the extent of his force, General Pattigrew was unwilling to hazard an attack with his single brigade, and returned to Cashtown. General Hill arrived with Pender's division in the evening, and the following morning (July 1) advanced with these two divisions accompanied by Pegram's and McIntosh's battalions of artillery to ascertain the strength of the enemy, whose force was supposed to consist chiefly of cavalry. The leading division under General Heth, found the enemy's vedettes about 3 miles west of Gettysburg, and continued to advance until within a mile of the town, when two brigades were sent forward to reconnoiter. They drove in the advance of the enemy very gallantly, but subsequently encountered largely superior numbers, and were compelled to retire with loss, Brigadier-General Archer, commanding of the brigades, being take prisoner. General Heth then prepared for action, and as soon as Pender arrived to support him, was ordered by General Hill to advance. The artillery was placed in position, and the engagement opened with vigor. General Heth pressed the enemy steadily back, breaking his first and second lines, and attacking his third with great resolution. About 2. 30p. m. the advance of Ewell's corps; consisting of Rodes division, with Carter's battalion of artillery, arrived by the Middletown road, and, forming on Heth's left, nearly at right angles with his line, became warmly engaged with fresh numbers of the enemy. Heth's troop shaving suffered heavily in their protracted contest with a superior force, were relieved by Pender's, and Early, coming up by the Heidlersburg road soon afterward, took position on the left of Rodes when a general advance was made. The enemy gave way on all sides, and was driven trough Gettysburg with great loss. Major-General Reynolds, who was in command, was killed. More than 5,000 prisoners, exclusive of a large number of wounded, three pieces artillery, and several colors were captured. Among the prisoners were two brigadier-generals, one of whom was badly wounded. Our own loss was heavy including a number of officers, among whom were Major-General Heth, slightly, and Brigadier-General Scales, of Pender's division, severely, wounded. The enemy retired to a range of Hills south of Gettysburg, where he displayed a strong force of infantry and artillery. It was ascertained from the prisoners that we been engaged with two corps of the army formerly commanded by General Hooker, and that the remainder of that army, under General Meade, was approaching Gettysburg. Without information as to its proximity, the strong position which the enemy had assumed could not be attacked without danger of exposing the four divisions present, already weakened and by a long and bloody struggle, to overwhelming numbers of fresh troops. General Ewell was, therefore, instructed to carry the hill by the enemy, if he found it practicable, but to avoid a general engagement until the arrival of the other divisions of the army, which were ordered to hasten forward. He decided to await Johnson's division, which had marched from Carlisle by the road west of the mountains to guard the trains of his corps, and consequently did not reach Gettysburg until a late hour. In the meantime the enemy occupied the point which General Ewell designate to seize, but in what force could not be ascertained, owing to the darkness. An intercepted dispatch showed that another corps had halted that afternoon 4 miles from Gettysburg. Under these circumstances, it was decided not to attack until the arrival of Longstreet, two of whose divisions(those of Hood and McLaws)encamped about 4 miles in the rear during the night. Anderson's division of Hill's corps came up after the engagement. It hat not been intended to deliver a general battle so far from our base unless attacked, but coming unexpectedly upon the whole Federal Army, to withdraw through the mountains with our extensive trains would have been difficult and dangerous. At the same time we were unable to await an attack, as the coutry was unfavorable for collecting supplies in the presence of the enemy, who could restrain our foraging parties by holding the mountain passes with local and other troops. A battle had, therefore, become in a measure unavoidable, and success already gained gave hope of a favorable issue. The enemy occupied a strong position, with his right upon two commanding elevations adjacent to each other, one southeast and the other, known as Cemetery Hill, immediately south of the town, which lay at its base. His line extended thence upon the high ground along the Emmitsburg road, with a steep ridge in rear, which was also occupied. This ridge was difficult of ascent, particularly the two hills above mentioned as forming is northern extremity, an a third at the other end, on which the enemy's left rested. Numerous stone and rail fences along the slope served to afford protection to this troops and impede our advance. In his front, the ground was undulating and generally open for about three-quarters of a mile. General Ewell's corps constituted our left, Johnson's division being opposite the height adjoining Cemetery Hill, Early's in the center, in front of the north face of the latter, and Rodes upon his right. Hill's corps faced the west side of Cemetery Hill, and extended nearly parallel to the Emmitsburg road, making an angle with Ewell's. Pender's division formed his left, Anderson's his right, Heth's, under Brigadier-General Pettigrew, being in reserve. His artillery, under Colonel [R. L.] Walker, was posted in eligible positions along his line. It was determined to make the principal attack upon the enemy's left, and endeavor to again a position from which it was thought that our artillery could be brought to bear with effect. Longstreet was directed to place the divisions of McLaws and Hood on the right of hill, partially enveloping the enemy's left, which he was to drive in. General Hill was ordered to threaten the enemy's center, to prevent re-enforrcements being drawn to either wing, and co-operate with is right division in Longstreet's attack. General Ewell was instructed to make a simultaneous demonstration upon the enemy's right, to be converted into a real attack should opportunity offer. About 4. p. m. Longstreet's batteries opened, a soon afterward Hood's division, on the extreme right, moved to the attack. McLaws followed somewhat later, four of Anderson's brigades, those of Wilcox, Perry [A. R.] Wright, and Posey supporting him on the left, in the order named. The enemy was soon driven from his position of the Emmitsburg road to the cover of a ravine and a line of stone fences at the foot of the ridge in his rear. He was dislodged from these after a severe struggle, and retired up the ridge, leaving a number of his batteries in our possession. Wilcox's and Wright's brigades advanced with great gallantry, breaking successive lines of the enemy's infantry, and compelling him to abandon much of his artillery. Wilcox reached the foot and Wright gained to crest of the ridge itself, driving the enemy down the opposite side; but having become separated from McLaws and gone beyond the other two brigades of the division, they were attacked in front and on both flanks, and compelled to retire, being unable to bring off any of the captured artillery. McLaws' left also fell back, and, it being now nearly dark, General Longstreet determined to await the arrival of General Pickett. He disposed his command to hold the ground gained on the right, withdrawing his left to the first position from which the enemy had been driven. Four pieces of artillery, several hundred prisoners, and two regimental flags were taken. As soon as the engagement began on our right, General Johnson opened with is artillery, and about two hours later advanced up the hill next to Cemetery Hill with three brigades, the fourth being detained by a demonstration on his left. Soon afterward, General Early attacked Cemetery Hill with two brigades, supported by a third, the fort having been previously detached. The enemy had greatly increased by earthworks the strength of position assailed by Johnson and Early. The troops of the former moved steadily up the steep and rugged ascent, under a heavy fire, driving the enemy into his intrechments, part of which was carried by Steuart's brigade, and, a number of prisoners taken. The contest was continued to a late hour, but without further advantage. On Cemetery Hill, the attack by Early's leading brigade-those of Hays and Hoke, under Colonel [I. E.] Avery-was made with vigor. Two lines of the enemy's infantry were dislodged from the cover of some stone and board fences on the side of the ascent, and driven back into the works on the crest, into which our troops forced their way, and seized several pieces of artillery. A heavy force advanced against their right, which was without support, and they were compelled to retire, bringing with them about 100 prisoners and four stand of colors. General Ewell had directed General Rodes to attack in concert with Early, covering his right, and had requested Brigadier-General Lane, then commanding Pender's division, to co-operate on the right of Rodes. When the time to attack arrived, General Rodes, not having his troops in position was unprepared to co-operate with General Early, and before he could get in readiness the latter had been obliged to retire for want of the expected support of his right. General Lane was prepared to give the assistance required of him, and so informed General Rodes, but the latter deemed in useless to advance after the failure of Early's attack. In this engagement our loss in men and officers was large. Major-Generals Hood and Pender, Brigadier-General [J. M.] Jones, Semmes, G. T. Anderson, and Barksdale, and Colonel Avery, commanding Hoke's brigade, were wounded the last two mortally. Generals Penders and Semmes died after their removal to Virginia. The result of this day operations induced the belief that, with proper concert of action, and with the increased support that the positions gained on the right would enable the artillery to render the assaulting columns, we should ultimately succeed, and it was accordingly determined to continue the attack. The general plan was unchanged. Longstreet, re-enforced by Pickett's three brigades, which arrived near the battle field during the afternoon of the 2d, was ordered to attack the next morning, and General Ewell was directed to assail enemy's right at the same time. The latter, during the night, re-enforced General Johnson with two brigades from Rode's and one from Early's division. General Longstreet's dispositions were not completed as early as was expected, but before notice could be sent to General Ewell, General Johnson had already become engaged, and it was too late to recall him. The enemy attempted to recover the works taken the preceding evening, but was repulsed, and General Johnson attacked in turn. After a gallant and prolonged struggle, in which the enemy was forced to abandon part of his intrechments, General Johnson found himself unable to carry the strongly fortified crest of the hill. The projected attack on the enemy's left not having been made, he was enabled to hold his right with a force larger superior to that of General Johnson, and finally to threaten his flank and rear, rendering it necessary for him to retire to his original position about 1 p. m. General Longstreet was delayed by a force occupying the high, rocky hills of the enemy's extreme left, from which is troops could be attacked in reverse as they advanced. His opertions had been embarrassed the day previous by the same cause, and he now demanded necessary to defend his flank and rear with the divisions of Hood and McLaws. He was, therefore, re-enforced by Heth's division and two brigades of Pender's, to the command of which Major-General Trimble was assigned. General Hill was directed to hold his line with the rest of his command, aford General Longstreet further assistance, if required, and avail himself of any success that might be gained. A careful examination was made of the ground secured by Longstreet, and his batteries placed in positions, which, it was believed, would enable them to silence those of the enemy. Hill's artillery and part of Ewell's was ordered to open simultaneously, and the assaulting column to advance under cover of the combined fire of the three. The batteries there directed to be pushed forward as the infantry progressed, protect their flanks, and support their attacks closely. About 1. p. m., at a given signal, a heavy cannonade was opened, and continued for about two hours with marked effect upon the enemy. His batteries replied vigorously at first, but toward the close their fire slackened perceptibly, and General Longstreet ordered forward the column of attack, consisting of Pickett's and Heth's division, in two lines, Pickett on the right. Wilcox's brigade marched in rear of Pickett's right, to guard that flank, and Heth's was supported by Lane's and Scale's brigades, under General Trimble. The troops moved steadily on, under a heavy fire of musketry and artillery, the main attack being directed against the enemy's left center. His batteries reopened as soon as they appeared. Our own having nearly exhausted their ammunition in the protracted cannonade that preceded the advance of the infantry, were unable to reply, or render the necessary support to the attacking party. Owing to this fact, which was unknown to me when the assault too place, the enemy was enabled, to throw a strong force of infantry against our left, already wavering under a concentrated fire of artillery from the ridge in front, and from Cemetery Hill, on the left. It finally gave way, and the right, after penetrating the enemy's lines, entering his advance works, and capturing some of his artillery, was attacked simultaneously in front and on both flanks, and driven back by heavy loss. The troops were rallied and reformed, but the enemy did not pursue. A large number of brave officers and men fell or were capture on this occasion. Of Pickett's three brigade commanders, Generals Armisted and [R. B.] Garnett were killed, and General Kemper dangerously wounded. Major-General Trimble, and Brigadier-General Pettigrew were also wounded, the former severely. The movements of the army preceding the battle of Gettysburg had been much embarrassed by the absence of the cavalry. As soon at is was known hat the enemy had crossed into Maryland, orders were sent to the brigades of [B. H.] Robertson and [William E.] Jones, which had been left to guard the passes of the Blue Ridge, to rejoin the army without delay, and it was expected that General Stuart, with the remainder of his command, would soon arrive. In the exercise of the discretion given him when Longstreet and Hill marched into Maryland, General Stuart determined to pass around the rear of the Federal Army with three brigades and cross the Potomac between it the Washington, believing that he would the able, by that route, to place himself on our right flank in time to keep us properly advised of the enemy's movements. He marched from Salem on the night of June 24, intending to pass west of Centervile, but found the enemy's forces so distributed as to render that route impracticable. Adhering to his original plan, he was forced to make a wide detour through Buckland and Brentsville, and crossed the Occoquan at Wolf Run Shoals the morning of the 27th. Continuing his march trough Fairfax Court-House and Dranesville, he arrived at the Potomac, below the mouth of Seneca Creek, in the evening. He found the river much swollen by the recent rains, but, after great exertion, gained the Maryland shore before midnight with his whole command. He now ascertained that the Federal Army, which he had discovered to be drawing toward the Potomac, had crossed the day before, and was moving toward Frederick, thus interposing it self between him and our forces. He accordingly marched northward, through Rockville and Westminster, to Hanover, Pa., where he arrived on the 30th., but the enemy advanced with equal rapidity on his left, and continued to obstruct communication with our main body. Supposing, from such information as he could obtain, that part of the army was at Carlisle, he left Hanover that night, and proceeded thither by way of Dover. He reached Carlisle on July 1, where he received orders to proceed to Gettysburg. He arrived in the afternoon of the following day, and took position on General Ewell's left. His leading brigade under General Hampton, encountered and repulsed a body of the enemy's a cavalry at Hunterstown, endeavoring to reach our rear. General Stuart had several skirmishes during his march, and at Hanovar quite a severe engagement took place with a strong force of cavalry, which was finally compelled to withdraw from the town. The prisoners taken by the cavalry and paroled at various places amounted to about 800, and at Rockville a large train of wagons coming to Washington was intercepted and captured. Many of the were destroyed, but 125, with all the animals of the train, were secured. The ranks of the cavalry were much reduced by its long and arduous march, repeated conflicts, and insufficiant supplies of food and forage, but the day after its arrival at Gettysburg it engaged the enemy's cavalry with unabated spirit, and effectually protected of left. In this action, Brigadier-General Hampton was seriously wounded, while acting with his accustomed gallantry. Robertson's and Joones' brigades arrived on July 3, and were stationed upon our right flank. The severe loss sustained by the army and the reduction of its ammunition, rendered another attempt to dislodge the enemy inadvisable, and it was, therefore, determined to withdraw. The trains, with such of the wounded as could bear removal, were ordered to Williamsport on July 4, part moving through Cashtown and Greencastle, escorted by General Imboden, and the remainder by the Fairfield road. The army retained int position until dark, when it was put in motion for the Potomac by the last named route. ... The highest praise is due to both officers and men for their conduct during the campaign. The privations and hardship of the march and camp were cheerfully encountered, and borne with a fortitude unsurpassed by our ancestors in their struggle for independence, while their courage in battle entitles them to rank with the soldiers of any army and of any time. Their forbearance and discipline, under strong provocation to retaliate for the cruelty of the enemy to our own citizens, is not their least claim to the respect and admiration of their countrymen and of the world. I forward returns of our loss in killed, wounded, and missing. Many of the latter were killed or wounded in the several assaults at Gettysburg, and necessarily left in the hands of the enemy. I cannot speak of these brave men as their merits and exploits deserve. Some of them are appropriately mentioned in the accompanying reports, and the memory of all will be gratefully and affectionately cherished by the people in whose defense they fell. The loss of Major-General Pender is severely left by the army and the country. He served with this army from the beginning of the war, and took a distinguished part in all its engagements. Wounded on several on occasions, he never left his command in action until he received the injury that resulted in his death. His promise and usefulness as an officer were only by the purity and excellence of his private life. Brigadier-Generals Armistead, Barksdale, Garnett, and Semmes died as they had lived, discharging the highest duty of patriots with devotion that never faltered and courage that shrank from no danger. I earnestly commend to the attention of the Government those gallant officers and men whose conduct merited the special commendation of their superiors, but whose names I am unable to mention in this report. The officers of the general staff of the army were unremittingly engaged in the duties of their respective departments. Much depended on their management and exertion. The labors of the quartermaster's, commissary, and medical departments were more than usually severe. The inspectors-general were also laboriously occupied in their attention to the troops, both on the march and in camp, and the officers of engineers showed skill and judgment in expediting the passage of rivers and streams, the swollen condition of which, by almost continuous rains called for extraordinary exertion. The chief of ordnance and his assistants are entitled to praise for the care and watchfulness given to the ordnance trains and ammunition of the army, which, in a long march and in many conflicts, were always at hand and accessible to the troops. My thanks are due to my personal staff for their constant aid afforded me at all times, on the march and in the field, and their willing discharge of every duty. There were captured at Gettysburg nearly 7,000 prisoners, of whom about 1,500 were paroled, and the remainder brought to Virginia. Seven pieces of artillery were also secured. I forward herewith the reports of the corps, division, and other commanders mentioned in the accompanying schedule, together with maps of the scene of operations, and one showing the routes pursued by the army. Respectfully submitted. R. E. LEE, General. General S. COOPER, Adjutant and Inspector General. |
Last updated: December 22, 2025