After-Action Reports from Your Gettysburg Field TripOn this program, your students learned about history and memory and the difference between history and memory. This follow-up activity furthers this idea. Grades 4-61. The day after your field trip to Gettysburg, ask your students to create an "After-Action Report" about their trip to Gettysburg, like the ones written by Colonel Oates and Colonel Chamberlain following the Battle of Gettysburg that can be found in the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion (excerpted transcriptions below). 4. Once everyone’s Official Reports are drafted, ask students to swap reports with a partner to compare their timelines and descriptions, then review as a class. Identify specific differences and similarities. Ask:What can this exercise teach them about history and how we remember it? How did some students remember the trip differently from others?
Grades 7-121. As soon after your field trip to Gettysburg as possible, you, as the teacher, write an After-Action Report of the trip, including as much detail as you would like. Then, at least one week after your trip, have your students draft their own After-Action Reports of their trip to Gettysburg, like the ones written by Colonel Oates and Colonel Chamberlain following the Battle of Gettysburg that can be found in the Official Records of the War of the Rebellion (excerpted transcriptions below). 3. In addition, print and distribute the map below and ask your students to trace or draw the route they took while on the Round Tops ranger program. 4. Once everyone’s Official Reports are drafted, ask students to swap reports with a partner to compare their timelines and descriptions, then review as a class. Identify specific differences and similarities.
Library of Congress Excerpts from the Official Report of Joshua Chamberlain, 20th Maine Infantry
Headquarters 20th Maine Vols Lieut, In compliance with orders from Brigade Hd. Qrs. I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by the 20th Regt. Maine Vols in the action of July 2d and 3d near Gettysburg, Pa. On reaching the field about 4 p.m. July 2d, col Vincent commanding the Brigade, placing me on the left of the Brigade and consequently on the extreme left of our entire line of battle, instructed me that the enemy were expected shortly to make a desperate attempt to turn our left flank, and the position assigned to me must be held at every hazard. I established my line on the crest of a small spur of a rocky and wooded hill, and set out at once a company of skirmishers on my left to guard against surprise on that unprotected flank. These dispositions were scarcely made when the attack commenced, and the right of the Regt. found itself at once hotly engaged. Almost from the same moment, from a high rock which gave me a full view of the enemy, I perceived a heavy force in rear of their principal line, moving rapidly but stealthily toward our left, with the intention, as I judged, of gaining our rear unperceived. Without betraying our peril to any but one of two officers, I had the right wing move by the left flank, taking intervals of a pace or two, according to the shelter afforded by rocks or trees, extending so as to over the whole front then engaged; and at the same time moved the left wing to the left and rear, making a large angle at the color, which was now brought up to the front where our left had first rested. This hazardous maneuver was so admirably executed by my men that our fire was not materially slackened in front, and the enemy gained no advantage there, while the left wing in the mean time had formed a solid and steady line in a direction to meet the expected assault. We were not a moment too soon; for the enemy having gained their desired point of attack came to a front, and rushed forward with an impetuosity which showed their sanguine expectations. Their astonishment however was evident, when emerging from their cover, they met instead of an unsuspecting flank, a firm and steady front. A strong fire opened at once from both sides, and with great effect – the enemy still advancing until they came within ten paces of our line, when our steady and telling volleys brought them to a stand. From that moment began a struggle fierce and bloody beyond any that I witnessed, and which lasted in all its fury, a full hour. The two lines met, and broke and mingled in the chock. At times I saw around me more of the enemy than of my own men. The edge of conflict swayed to and fro – now one now the other party holding the contested ground. Three times our line was forced back, but only to rally and repulse the enemy. As often as the enemy’s line was broken and routed, a new line was unmasked, which advanced with fresh vigor. Our “sixty rounds” were rapidly reduced; I sent several messengers to the rear for ammunition, and also for reinforcements. In the mean time we seized the opportunity of a momentary lull to gather ammunition and more serviceable arms, from the dead and dying on the field. With these we met the enemy’s last and fiercest assault. Their own rifles and their own bullets were turned against them. In the midst of this struggle, our ammunition utterly failed. The enemy were close upon us with a fresh line, pouring on us a terrible fire. Half the left wing already lay on the field. Although I had brought two companies from the right for its support, it was now scarcely more than a skirmish line. The heroic energy of my officers could avail no more. Our gallant line withered and shrunk before the fire it could not repel. It was too evident – we could maintain the defensive no longer. As a last desperate resort, I ordered a charge. The word “fix bayonets” flew from man to man. The click of the steel seemed to give new zeal to all. The men dashed forward with a shout. The two wings came into one line again, and extending to the left, and at the same time wheeling to the right, the whole regiment nearly described a half circle, the left passing over the space of half a mile, while the right kept within the support if the 83rd Penna. Thus leaving no chance of escape to the enemy except to climb the steep side of the mountain or to pass by the whole front of the 83rd Penna. The enemy’s first line scarcely tried to run – they stood amazed, threw down their loaded arms and surrendered in whole companies. Those in the rear had more time and gave us more trouble. My skirmishing company threw itself upon the enemy’s flank behind a stone wall, and their effective fire added to the enemy’s confusion. In this charge we captured three hundred and sixty eight prisoners, many of them officers, and took three hundred stand of arms. The prisoners were from four different regiments, and admitted they had attacked with a brigade. At this time Col. Rice commanding the Brigade (Col. Vincent having been mortally wounded) brought up strong support from General Crawford’s command, and 3,000 rounds of ammunition. The wounded and the prisoners were now sent to the rear, and our dead gathered and laid side by side. As for the conduct of my officers and men, I will let the result speak for them. If I were to mention any I might do injustice by omitting some equally deserving. Our role of honor is the three hundred eighty officers and men who fought at Gettysburg. My thanks are due the 83 Penna, Capt. Woodman, Comdg. for their steady and gallant support, and I would particularly acknowledge the service of Adjt. Gifford of that Regt. who exposed himself to the severest fire to render me aid. Very respectfully
Oates, William C. The War Between the Union and the Confederacy, 1905 Excerpts from the Official Report of Col. William C. Oates, 15th Alabama Infantry
SIR: I have the honor to report, in obedience to orders from brigade headquarters, the participation of my regiment in the battle near Gettysburg on the 2d ultimo. My regiment occupied the center of the brigade when the line of battle was formed. During the advance, the two regiments on my right were moved by the left flank across my rear, which threw me on the extreme right of the whole line. I encountered the enemy’s sharpshooters posted behind a stone fence, and sustained some loss thereby. It was here that Lieut. Col. Isaac B. Feagin, a most excellent and gallant officer, received a severe wound in the right knee, which caused him to lose his leg. Privates [A.] Kennedy, of Company B, and [William] Trimner, of Company G, were killed at this point, and Private [G.E.] Spencer, Company D, severely wounded. After crossing the fence, I received an order from Brigadier-General Law to left-wheel my regiment and move in the direction of the heights upon my left, which order I failed to obey, for the reason that when I received it I was rapidly advancing up the mountain, and in my front I discovered a heavy force of the enemy. Besides this, there was great difficulty in accomplishing the maneuver at that moment, as the regiment on my left (Forty-seventh Alabama) was crowding me on my left, and running into my regiment, which had already created considerable confusion. In the event that I had obeyed the order, I should have come in contact with the regiment on my left, also have exposed my right flank to an enfilading fire from the enemy. I therefore continued to press forward, my right passing over the top of the mountain, on the right of the line. On reaching the foot of the mountain below, I found the enemy in heavy force, posted in rear of large rocks upon a slight elevation beyond a depression of some 300 yards in width between the base of the mountain and the open plain beyond. I engaged them, my right meeting the left of their line exactly. Here I lost several gallant officers and men. After firing two or three rounds, I discovered that the enemy were giving way in my front. I ordered a charge, and the enemy in my front fled, but that portion of his line confronting the two companies on my left held their ground, and continued a most galling fire upon my left. Just at this moment, I discovered the regiment on my left (Forty-seventh Alabama) retiring. I halted my regiment as its left reached a very large rock, and ordered a left-wheel of the regiment, which was executed in good order under fire, thus taking advantage of a ledge of rocks running off in a line perpendicular to the one I had just abandoned, and affording very good protection to my men. This position enabled me to keep up a constant flank and cross fire upon the enemy, which in less than five minutes caused him to change front. Receiving re-enforcements, he charged me five times, and was as often repulsed with heavy loss. Finally, I discovered that the enemy had flanked me on the right, and two regiments were moving rapidly upon my rear and not 200 yards distant, when, to save my regiment from capture or destruction, I ordered a retreat. Having become exhausted from fatigue and the excessive heat of the day, I turned the command of the regiment over to Capt. B.A. Hill, and instructed him to take the men off the field, and reform the regiment and report to the brigade. My loss was, as near as can now be ascertained, as follows, to wit: 17 killed upon the field, 54 wounded and brought off the field, and 90 missing, most of whom are either killed or wounded. Among the killed and wounded are 8 officers, most of whom were very gallant and efficient men. Recapitulation. – Killed, 17; wounded, 54; missing, 90; total, 161. I am, lieutenant, most respectfully, your obedient servant, W.C. OATES, The Warren Map of GettysburgPrint this map and using markers or crayons have your students do their best to trace the route we walked on the Round Tops student program. It may help to point out the Round Tops first. 
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Last updated: December 11, 2025