

## What would you do?

Lesson Duration: 2 Periods or 1 Block

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Georgia Standards of Excellence:

**SSUSH9** The student will identify key events, issues, and individuals relating to the causes, course, and consequences of the Civil War

- a. Explain the importance of the growing economic disparity between the North and the South through an examination of population, functioning railroads, and industrial output.

**L9-10RHSS1**: Cite specific textual evidence to support analysis of primary and secondary sources, attending to such features as the date and origin of the information.

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Essential Question: Was there a way that the south could have won the American Civil War?  
(Do not give the essential question until after the activity)

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Procedure

Introduction:

This is a simulation that can provide a solid reference point to build upon while teaching the American Civil War. Used as an introductory lesson, Gagoola vs. Tangmania allows the students to explore the options available to civil war leaders.

Procedure: Students will be using the Gagoola and Tangmania information to conduct a simulation.

Divide the class into two separate groups.

Assign either group the role of Tangmania or Gagoola. It is important that each group have the opposing groups information as well.

Each group will cooperatively read the packet and answer the guiding questions.

After answering the guiding questions each group will develop a battle plan and conditions for winning.

Each respective group will elect two Generals to present their battle plan to the class as a whole. It is useful to project the map onto a smartboard, dry erase board or overhead.

Conclusion: Students will complete the assessment worksheet.

Extension: Have students research and answer the following question: How was Sherman's 1864 Atlanta Campaign and subsequent March to the Sea an extension and fulfillment of the Anaconda Plan?

Assessment - Use the following information to answer the following question:

Did the North or South have the better plan at the outset of the Civil War? Support your answer with relevant evidence from the sources,

### Union Strategy

HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY,  
Washington, May 3, 1861.

Maj. Gen. GEORGE B. MCCLELLAN,  
Commanding Ohio Volunteers, Cincinnati, Ohio:

SIR: I have read and carefully considered your plan for a campaign, and now send you confidentially my own views, supported by certain facts of which you should be advised.

First. It is the design of the Government to raise 25,000 additional regular troops, and 60,000 volunteers for three years. It will be inexpedient either to rely on the three-months' volunteers for extensive operations or to put in their hands the best class of arms we have in store. The term of service would expire by the commencement of a regular campaign, and the arms not lost be returned mostly in a damaged condition. Hence I must strongly urge upon you to confine yourself strictly to the quota of three-months' men called for by the War Department.

Second. We rely greatly on the sure operation of a complete blockade of the Atlantic and Gulf ports soon to commence. In connection with such blockade we propose a powerful movement down the Mississippi to the ocean, with a cordon of posts at proper points, and the capture of Forts Jackson and Saint Philip; the object being to clear out and keep open this great line of communication in connection with the strict blockade of the seaboard, so as to envelop the insurgent States and bring them to terms with less bloodshed than by any other plan. I suppose there will be needed from twelve to twenty steam gun-boats, and a sufficient number of steam transports (say forty) to carry all the personnel (say 60,000 men) and material of the expedition; most of the gunboats to be in advance to open the way, and the remainder to follow and protect the rear of the expedition, &c. This army, in which it is not improbable you may be invited to take an important part, should be composed of our best regulars for the advance and of three-years' volunteers, all well officered, and with four months and a half of instruction in camps prior to (say) November 10. In the progress down the river all the enemy's batteries on its banks we of course would turn and capture, leaving a sufficient number of posts with complete garrisons to keep the river open behind the expedition. Finally, it will be necessary that New Orleans should be strongly occupied and securely held until the present difficulties are composed.

Third. A word now as to the greatest obstacle in the way of this plan--the great danger now pressing upon us--the impatience of our patriotic and loyal Union friends. They will urge instant and vigorous action, regardless, I fear, of consequences--that is, unwilling to wait for the slow

instruction of (say) twelve or fifteen camps, for the rise of rivers, and the return of frosts to kill the virus of malignant fevers below Memphis. I fear this; but impress right views, on every proper occasion, upon the brave men who are hastening to the support of their Government. Lose no time, while necessary preparations for the great expedition are in progress, in organizing, drilling, and disciplining your three-months' men, many of whom, it is hoped, will be ultimately found enrolled under the call for three-years' volunteers. Should an urgent and immediate occasion arise meantime for their services, they will be the more effective. I commend these views to your consideration, and shall be happy to hear the result.

With great respect, yours, truly,  
WINFIELD SCOTT

Union Correspondence, Orders, And Returns Relating To Operations In Maryland, Eastern North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Virginia (Except Southwestern), And West Virginia, From January 1, 1861, To June 30, 1865.--#3 O.R.--SERIES I--VOLUME LI/1 [S# 107]

### **Confederate Strategy In The Civil War**

The southern commander at Manassas was Pierre G. T. Beauregard, the dapper, voluble hero of Fort Sumter, Napoleonic in manner and aspiration. Heading the rebel forces in the Shenandoah Valley was Joseph E. Johnston, a small, impeccably attired, ambitious but cautious man with a piercing gaze and an outsized sense of dignity. In their contrasting offensive-and defensive-mindedness, Beauregard and Johnston represented the polarities of southern strategic thinking. The basic war aim of the Confederacy, like that of the United States in the Revolution, was to defend a new nation from conquest. Confederates looked for inspiration to the heroes of 1776, who had triumphed over greater odds than southerners faced in 1861. The South could "win" the war by not losing; the North could win only by winning. The large territory of the Confederacy--750,000 square miles, as large as Russia west of Moscow, twice the size of the thirteen original United States--would make Lincoln's task as difficult as Napoleon's in 1812 or George III's in 1776. The military analyst of the *Times* of London offered the following comments early in the war:

". . . It is one thing to drive the rebels from the south bank of the Potomac, or even to occupy Richmond, but another to reduce and hold in permanent subjection a tract of country nearly as large as Russia in Europe. . . No war of independence ever terminated unsuccessfully except where the disparity of force was far greater than it is in this case. . . Just as England during the revolution had to give up conquering the colonies so the North will have to give up conquering the South. . . ."

Jefferson Davis agreed; early in the war he seems to have envisaged a strategy like that of George Washington in the Revolution. Washington traded space for time; he retreated when necessary in the face of a stronger enemy; he counterattacked against isolated British outposts or detachments when such an attack promised success; above all, he tried to avoid full-scale battles that would have risked annihilation of his army and defeat of his cause. This has been called a

strategy of attrition--a strategy of winning by not losing, of wearing out a better equipped foe and compelling him to give up by prolonging the war and making it too costly.

But two main factors prevented Davis from carrying out such a strategy except in a limited, sporadic fashion. Both factors stemmed from political as well as military realities. The first was a demand by governors, congressmen, and the public for troops to defend every portion of the Confederacy from penetration by "Lincoln's abolition hordes." Thus in 1861, small armies were dispersed around the Confederate perimeter along the Arkansas-Missouri border, at several points on the Gulf and Atlantic coasts, along the Tennessee-Kentucky border, and in the Shenandoah Valley and western Virginia as well as at Manassas. Historians have criticized this "cordon defense" for dispersing manpower so thinly that Union forces were certain to break through somewhere, as they did at several points in 1862.

The second factor inhibiting a Washingtonian strategy of attrition was the temperament of the southern people. Believing that they could whip any number of Yankees, many southerners scorned the notion of "sitting down and waiting" for the Federals to attack. "The idea of waiting for blows, instead of inflicting them, is altogether unsuited to the genius of our people," declared the *Richmond Examiner*. "The aggressive policy is the truly defensive one. A column pushed forward into Ohio or Pennsylvania is worth more to us, as a defensive measure, than a whole tier of seacoast batteries from Norfolk to the Rio Grande. The southern press clamored for an advance against Washington in the same tone that northern newspapers cried On to Richmond. Beauregard devised bold plans for an offensive against McDowell. But the question became moot when Beauregard learned of McDowell's offensive against him.

The Confederates eventually synthesized these various stands of strategic theory and political reality into what Davis called an "offensive-defensive" strategy. This consisted of defending the Confederate homeland by using interior lines of communication (a Jominian but also common-sense concept) to concentrate dispersed forces against an invading army and, if opportunity offered, to go over to the offensive, even to the extent of invading the North. No one ever defined this strategy in a systematic, comprehensive fashion. Rather, it emerged from a series of major campaigns in the Virginia-Maryland and Tennessee-Kentucky theaters during 1862, and culminated at Gettysburg in 1863. It almost emerged, in embryonic form, from the first battle of Manassas (Bull Run) in July 1861, a small battle by later Civil War standards but one that would have important psychological consequences in both the North and the South.

**Source: "Battle Cry of Freedom" by James M. McPherson**

# Gagoola

You have just declared independence from the nation of Tangmania. They refuse to listen to your point of view on several issues of concern to farmers. Things became intolerable, a federation of groups in your area revolted against Tangmanian government. You have organized a new decentralized government that respects the rights of each of the states.

Tangmania threatened one of your cities with military force so you fired shots at their navy. This was the start of a war. Now you must plan your response strategy.

You are a rather backward nation. You have no cars, planes, or nuclear weapons. Your chief sources of transportation are horses, trains, and ships.

Before you broke away from Tangmania, you traded your silk products to two foreign countries. These countries in turn provided you with vital resources such as food, steel, and iron products. As your country is now at war, you do not have an abundance of food or war materials.

Finally, you have fewer railroads and cities. Also, you depend heavily on the Quagmire River for transportation of goods between the northern and southern regions of Gagoola.

Fortunately, you have superior generals and an army more accustomed to fighting than does the nation of Tangmania. Your newly organized army consists of experienced hunters and marksmen.

Using this information, plan your strategy for the war. How can you convince Tangmania to recognize you as a legitimate nation? As you write your strategy, use the following questions as guidelines.

1. Are you going to fight an offensive or a defensive war?
2. How will you use your ground forces?
3. How will you use your naval forces?
4. How will your resources or lack of them affect your strategy?
5. Do you want to work out any treaties or agreements with other countries?  
What might these agreements be?

# Tangmania


Half of your country has just declared its independence. The people there feel that Tangmanian national government is not listening to their concerns. You disagree. The people in the region in revolt have formed a separate nation and formed new government. You refuse to recognize them and want them to come back in to the country. They refuse.

The people in this region started armed conflict that now involves people on both sides. They fired on one of your forts which is located in the area they now claim as part of their territory.

You are a rather backward nation, and have no cars, planes or nuclear weapons. Your chief sources of transportation are horses, trains, and ships. Gagoola, the name the region in revolt calls itself, has always traded silk with two foreign countries. These two nations have traded vital resources; food, steel, and iron products, to Gagoola. All the trading is done by ship. You, on the other hand, are self-sufficient. You produce enough food and other materials for your country.

Using this information, plan your strategy for the war. How can you convince Gagoola to rejoin the country? As you write your strategy, use the following questions as guidelines.

1. Are you going to fight an offensive or a defensive war?
2. How will you use your ground forces?
3. How will you use your naval forces?
4. How will your resources or lack of them affect your strategy?
5. Do you want to work out any treaties or agreements with other countries?  
What might these agreements be?



	Tangmania	Gagoola
Population	22 Million People	11 Million People
Industry	850 Factories 9000 Tons of Steel and Iron	150 Factories 1000 Tons of Steel and Iron
Agriculture	1.2 Million Acres of Farmland	800,000 Acres of Farmland
GNP	75 Billion	25 Billion
Exports	\$60,000,000	\$40,000,000
Military	227 Ship Navy	21 Ship Navy, Experienced Leaders and Soldiers
Railroads	6500 Miles of Track	3500 Miles of Track
Generalizations	Urban, Industrial, Dominates the Seas	Rural/Agricultural Focus

# Vital Statistics