

THE REGULAR BRIGADE OF THE ARMY OF THE CUMBERLAND.

BY LEWIS M. HOSEA,

Captain Sixteenth U. S. Infantry (resigned); Brevet Major U. S. A.

[After beginning the preparation of this paper, I requested the use of data collected by Brevet Major William R. Lowe, Nineteenth U. S. Infantry. This he cordially gave, in the form of a narrative of which free use has been made. As our labors in this regard covered largely the same ground, it is but just to him to regard this paper as in a sense a joint production.]

INTRODUCTORY.

Among the first acts of legislation passed by Congress at the breaking out of the War of the Rebellion, in 1861, was one adding to the Regular Army nine or ten new regiments of infantry, having three battalions of eight companies each. The Colonels, Lieutenant Colonels and some of the Majors were taken from the old army; but the line officers were appointed from civil life.

These regiments were enlisted from the same material and were infused with the same spirit as the State regiments, and were, in fact, "volunteers," like all the rest. The Fifteenth Infantry was organized at Newport Barracks, opposite Cincinnati; the Sixteenth at Chicago; the Eighteenth chiefly at Columbus, Ohio, and the Nineteenth at Indianapolis.

They received no attention, however, from the States or other local authorities; and, according to the traditional custom of the "regulars" of that day, the official reports of the

commanding officers, as the war progressed, are as colorless and exact, within narrow limits, as photographs. It is not surprising, therefore, that their record of splendid service to the country has largely escaped attention and remained unwritten.

This paper is necessarily brief and confined to facts of a general nature only; yet every important statement is based upon contemporary reports and official documents.

The "regulars" in the great central army of the Union, known as the "Army of the Cumberland" during the Civil War, never numbered more than twenty-five hundred men previous to December, 1862, at which time they were organized into the "Regular Brigade"—one battalion, each, of the Fifteenth, Sixteenth and Nineteenth U. S. Infantry, and Battery H of the Fifth Artillery, associated with the First Ohio, Fifth Kentucky and Sixth Indiana Volunteers, constituting Rousseau's Brigade of McCook's Division, Buell's Army.

Our volunteer neighbors used to make much sport of us during our stay at Green River, opposite Munfordville, Ky., (from December, 1861, to February, 1862,) because we were continually drilled, no matter how inclement the weather. Old Major Carpenter, commanding the Nineteenth Infantry, gave the cue when he said we would undoubtedly have to march and fight during bad weather, and therefore might as well prepare for it by drilling.

Officers were instructed in tactics and army regulations like school boys—and indeed many of us were so, and at that time knew scarcely the A B C's of warfare. Some, however, were men of many years' army experience, who were

almost tyrannical in their efforts to make soldiers enlisted men were about as good, and certainly an the average volunteer; but here and there had seen service in garrison or on the "plains" vil War, and, like the "little leaven that leavened np," their example was a most valuable factor. e men afterwards became efficient officers. e leaders of this early period were Majors John he Fifteenth; Adam Slemmer, of the Sixteenth ens fame); Stephen D. Carpenter, of the Nine- ains W. R. Terrill, Fifth Artillery; Peter T. nth Infantry; Edwin F. Townsend and R. E. A. eenth Infantry; and Lieutenant F. L. Guenther, Artillery — all officers of previous training and nder whom the regular soldiers developed a y than their comrades of the volunteers. If be questioned, let the record speak, for it will "regulars" of the "Army of the Cumberland" pulsed in an attack they were ordered to make, r driven from a position they were ordered to lash and persistence in attack were especially at Shiloh, at Hoover's Gap, at Missionary Jonesboro; while their steadiness, courage and fense were equally proved at Stone River and ga by the appalling figures of casualties, that i desperate fighting.

THE BATTLE OF SHILOH.

nd weary, Rousseau's brigade arrived at Savan- nessee River, below Pittsburgh Landing, late

in the afternoon of April 6, 1862. From early morning on the march, we had heard the booming of cannon off to the southwest as we hurried in that direction. Rumor said the gunboats were shelling the woods; but by noon informa- tion reached us that our comrades of the Army of the Ten- nessee, encamped at Pittsburgh Landing, had that morning been attacked and driven back by an overwhelming force of the enemy, and that the help we were hastening to render was sorely needed. Each hour the roar of the battle grew more distinct; our pace was quickened; the ranks were closed up; the usual chaffing and jokes of the march ceased; and every one was seriously and earnestly animated by one over- whelming desire — to reach the battlefield before it might be too late.

At Savannah we were compelled, perforce, to wait for steamboats to take us to the battlefield, some miles above; embarking shortly after dark, by midnight our boats were tied up at Pittsburgh Landing. The masters of the boats, anxious perhaps to get back to a place of safety, insisted that we should disembark at once, but our officers refused, saying that, "as we had marched all day, we would be in better con- dition to fight to-morrow after a good night's rest under shelter, than if we stood out all night in the rain and mud." So, at early daylight, we marched up the bank of the river to the strains of "Benny Havens, Oh!" from the splendid band of the Fifteenth Infantry, stationed at the top, and play- ing with all the spirit of a Newport Barracks afternoon con- cert. As we were disembarking an excited officer dashed up and cried out: "Stop that damn noise; it will draw the fire of the enemy!" Old Major Carpenter directed the band to

continue, grimly remarking: "That's exactly what we are here for" — and the band played on.

Nelson's division, the head of our marching column, had reached the battlefield late on the afternoon of the 6th, and by the moral, no less than by the physical effect of its presence, was influential in staying the tide of disaster on the first day of the battle.

As we pushed our way in the dim light of dawn through the crowd of demoralized fugitives cowering under the bank, we were treated to about all the dismal prognostications the human mind is capable of; but in silence our men marched up the bank and out upon the timbered levels beyond, where, a short distance from the river, we found the remainder of our brigade, and with them General Rousseau, who made a ringing speech, that cheered us up amazingly. Here we were ordered to deposit knapsacks, which proved to be a permanent investment, for we never saw them again.

Moving forward through the woods in line of battle, with skirmishers in advance, we soon passed through camps from which the Union soldiers had been driven on the preceding day, leaving their dead behind. Tents were still standing, rent with bullet and shell, and near one of these lay a Colonel, evidently shot while in the act of dressing, his coat being half on.

Nelson's and Crittenden's divisions were at our left, and soon we were halted and ordered to load muskets. The battle began on our left, and the noise of musketry, deepening from the skirmish fire into the roll of the line of battle, crept nearer and nearer, and was finally taken up by our own skirmishers in our front. A few moments later they came in bearing their

wounded, and firing as they retreated, and following closely we saw battleflags amid the leafage of the trees, and beneath, the surging line of butternut and grey, which halted at about fifty yards and commenced firing. As the last skirmisher reached the lines, the ball opened on our side by command to "fire at will," and for an hour or more the whistle of the bullets about our heads was supplemented by the ear-splitting roar of our own musketry. Here and there men fell, and Captain Acker, a noble officer of the Sixteenth, was shot through the head; but in many cases flesh wounds were bound up and the wounded men returned to the lines and fought on. In time, although the firing had enveloped us with the stifling fog of powder-smoke, and we could see nothing but the flash of our own muskets, the angry buzz of whistling bullets became less and less violent, and we knew by a sort of instinct that the opposing lines were wavering and melting away. Thus the first attack was repulsed, but was soon renewed with greater fury, and again repulsed, and almost immediately we started forward after our enemies. We soon found them formed on a gentle ridge beyond, and again the battle went on with greater intensity than before, but with the same result. From that time on we felt that we had the advantage. By noon, after continuous fighting, we reached the Corinth Road, near Shiloh Church, and as we had far outstripped the general advance and were beyond our supports, we were halted for a time, as the cartridge boxes of most of our men had been long empty. We knew by the increased volume of musketry and artillery fire that the enemy had effected a concentration in our front, and were preparing for a final struggle against our column, that was being driven

like a wedge through the center of their battle line. Bayonets were fixed, and we advanced to the edge of a clearing, where the men were directed to lie down and be prepared to resist with the bayonet any attempt to dislodge us, while we waited for ammunition. Here Lieutenant Keyes, of the Sixteenth, another of our best officers, was struck by a musket ball, which shattered his shoulder and arm, and caused his death two days afterward.*

Willich's regiment of Germans (Thirty-second Indiana) came up during this time, and without waiting for orders, marched across the Corinth Road into the clearing. The regiment was in a compact mass, closed by companies in the center, and with flags flying and drums beating, made a fine appearance. Half way across the open fields, however, they were met by a terrible fire of musketry and canister fire, and before they could deploy, were driven back in disorder. They rallied behind us, and, our brigade having meanwhile replenished its cartridge boxes, was ordered forward, and firing as we advanced across the clearing, after a most obstinate contest we charged into the woods beyond. Here the struggle became most intense and prolonged, and the enemy gave back slowly for some distance.† In the crisis of the fight, Guenther came galloping with a section of Battery H, and swept our

* Lieutenant Keys and the writer were standing arm in arm, the traditional *esprit* of the service not permitting officers to hug the earth as we came to do later. The force of the bullet threw us both down, and Lieutenant Keys died two days later.

† General Sherman, who was an eyewitness to the gallant advance of the regulars, gives a most vivid and complimentary account of it in his *Memoirs*, Vol. I., p. 239.

front by a diagonal fire of canister, and at about 4 P. M. the enemy were routed, and fled panic-stricken from the field.*

In this last great struggle Lieutenant Mitchell, of the Sixteenth, was killed, and Wyckoff, of the Fifteenth, lost an eye. After the enemy finally disappeared from our front we were moved a short distance to the left rear, and bivouacked in line of battle for the night, ready to renew the contest in the morning.

Rousseau's brigade lost two officers killed — both regulars — and nine wounded, of whom seven were regulars. Twenty-seven enlisted men were killed, of whom fourteen were regulars; and two hundred and eighty-three wounded, of whom one hundred and forty-seven were regulars. The loss of the regulars — one hundred and seventy killed and wounded — was about twenty per cent. of those engaged, about double the average percentage of loss in Buell's entire army.

The "regulars" performed their full share of the picketing and skirmishing in the advance upon Corinth, to say nothing of building corduroy roads. But on May 26, when we had drawn quite near the works at Corinth, and the enemy, like a rat in a corner, was getting vicious, McCook's division was ordered to the front of Halleck's army to take a hill which commanded the enemy's works, Rousseau's brigade being placed on the right, directly in front of Sherman's intrenched position. Throwing forward our skirmishers, we pushed back the enemy in lively fashion. McCook says of

* Terrill's Battery had been operating with Nelson's division on our left; but Guenther, attracted by the heavy firing on our front, obtained permission to come to our assistance with his section.

this: "The firing at this point was so continuous and severe that I ordered Colonel Stambaugh's reserve brigade to the support of my right. While the Thirty-fourth Illinois was relieving the First Ohio, which up to this time held my center, my skirmishers, continuing to push forward on my right, drove the enemy across Bridge Creek over Serratt's Hill, and kept up the skirmish until 4 P. M., when the officers in charge of the skirmishers reported that the advance was in sight of the enemy's intrenchments and not more than two hundred yards from them." Serratt's Hill commanded the enemy's works at Corinth; and, during the night of May 28th, McCook brought forward the Seventy-seventh Pennsylvania, and built a strong intrenchment four hundred yards long on and over it, behind which was placed Terrill's battery, supported by the reserve brigade, with Cotter's battery on a hill to the left, where a spirited engagement soon after took place. Our brigade maintained the advance position until the evacuation. The writer was in charge of our picket line close under the works on the night of the evacuation, and heard the drums and bugle calls of the enemy distinctly, as they assembled and marched away. At daylight of May 30th our pickets and skirmishers were in the works long before Nelson's troops, who claimed the credit. The occupation of Serratt's Hill precipitated the evacuation. (Ser. 1, Vol. X., pp. 678-9.)

After the abandonment of Corinth by General Bragg, we marched eastward through North Alabama to Stevenson. When almost within sight of Chattanooga, our steps were turned northward, and for day after day, through stifling heat and dust, with little clothing and often without food — dirty,

tired and footsore — we marched, and grumbled at our Generals, and cursed Bragg, the author of all our woes. We arrived at Louisville, Ky., about the last of September, 1862, the raggedest, dirtiest, lousiest, and hungriest lot of soldiers ever on this continent.

Our first year of campaigning was over; we had marched fully a thousand miles, fought one great battle (Shiloh) and many skirmishes, and were now fifty miles nearer Washington than when we started, with an apparently endless vista of the same experience ahead. After a few days' enjoyment of the good things Louisville afforded, we again marched southward. On October 8th our brigade had quite a skirmish at "Dog Walk," but the affair was comparatively small, although for a time it looked threatening. We took no other part in the battle of Perryville, but our losses at "Dog Walk" were included therein.

On October 30, 1862, General Buell was superseded by General Rosecrans, and we became part of the Army of the Cumberland. Much to our delight, two battalions of the Eighteenth Infantry were added to ours, and together we constituted thenceforward the "Regular Brigade." The fine battalions of the Eighteenth Infantry pitched their tents beside ours, about five miles south of Nashville, on December 25, 1862; and Lieutenant Colonel Shepard, Eighteenth Infantry, took command of our brigade, the Fourth, of the First Division, Fourteenth Army Corps, under General George H. Thomas. Our old brigade commander, General L. H. Rousseau, was assigned to command the division.

Indeed, throughout, the officers of the Regular Brigade were capable men, for even those who at this time had had

only a short service were improved by the inspiring example of their more experienced comrades, and some of the brightest and saddest pages of our later history are adorned by their names. The brigade thus organized consisted of thirty-nine companies of infantry and one battery of artillery, and numbered in all but 1,568 officers and men. We had barely time to give to our comrades of the Eighteenth a hearty welcome when our cherished hopes of brigade drills, inspections, etc., in true "regular" style, were swept away by orders to move to the fateful battlefield of

STONE RIVER.

Time permits reference only to the crisis of this sanguinary and indecisive battle, at the point where the victorious hosts of the enemy were checked, and beyond which they could not force their way.

On the morning of December 31, 1862, the Army of the Cumberland was in line of battle about three miles northwest of and facing Murfreesboro, and embraced five divisions — Palmer's on the left, then Negley's, Sheridan's, Davis's, and Johnson's, in order — stretching three or four miles to the south. Wood's, Van Cleve's and Rousseau's divisions were not in line; the two former were preparing to cross Stone River to attack Breckinridge, while Rousseau's division was in reserve. The Regular Brigade was massed on the high cleared ground between the railroad and the turnpike, behind Palmer's division. To our front we could see the Confederate line of battle, about a mile off; and beyond, the steeples of Murfreesboro; while to our right, some three hundred or four hundred yards distant, was a cedar forest.

The battle commenced about 7 A.M. by the enemy attacking our right division (Johnson's) in force, and with great dash and gallantry. We could hear the firing, and almost from the very beginning disaster seemed to be in the air. By 9 A.M. it became apparent that the tide of battle was decidedly against our right. Responding to calls for help, our brigade started at once by the right flank, through the cedar forest, to the assistance of the right wing. The Fifteenth and Sixteenth Infantry being in advance, passed through the cedars and formed line of battle. Guenther, seeing that this forest was not a suitable place for his guns, obtained permission to retire to the high ground between the railroad and the turnpike, and the battalions of the Eighteenth and Nineteenth followed the battery out of the cedar wood. The Fifteenth and Sixteenth Infantry were thus left alone, and after a gallant attempt to rally the stragglers of the right wing, and stop the rapid and overwhelming advance of the Confederates, they slowly fell back, fighting, through the forest, and joined the rest of the brigade in line of battle. In this movement they lost many brave officers and men. Following closely, the Confederates issued from the cedar forest and started straight for our battery. We were ordered to hold our fire until the enemy was within one hundred yards; but the battery opened with its four twelve-pounder Napoleons and two ten-pounder Parrotts such a rapid, well-directed and deadly fire as tore the Confederate line into disorganized fragments, and drove the dismayed survivors back to the cedars for shelter. General Rains, who commanded this line of Confederates, was killed; and the flag of the Second Arkansas was left on the field, to be afterwards picked up by some men of the

Second Ohio Volunteers. After this repulse ensued a lull in the battle, for the Confederates had met their first great check; but our army was in a precarious situation; four of its five divisions had been driven from their positions; Palmer's alone held its ground, and unless a new line of battle could be formed, the battle was lost. For this new line, Rousseau's, Wood's, and Van Cleve's divisions were available, besides many men of the right wing, who had drifted to our position, humiliated by defeat, but still full of fight. But time was necessary, and must be gained for these divisions to reach their position in the new line — half an hour at least; for if the attack came sooner, there was little hope of resisting it. General Bragg saw his advantage, and to complete the victory already in his grasp, concentrated all his available forces to crush the left and center of our army.

General Thomas, after a hurried consultation with General Rosecrans, gave the order in person for the advance of the Regular Brigade, saying to its commander: "Shepard, take your brigade into that cedar forest and stop the rebels."

In modern phrase, we were "right up against it." Without our battery — for it could be of little use in that forest — we advanced in line of battle into the cedars. Here we were somewhat on an equality with the enemy, for the woods hid from them the smallness of our numbers; otherwise they would have run over us without stopping. We had just gained this position when the enemy came on; but none came nearer our front than fairly close musket range, for our men fired to hit, and our rifles dealt death and destruction. The Confederate line extended far beyond both our flanks, and this compelled us to throw back our right and left

battalions, and fight in three directions. Officers and men were falling all along the line, but not a man turned his back to the enemy; every one grasped the situation and strove to be worthy of the hope placed in him. General Thomas's order was literally obeyed. The enemy's onslaught on the center was repulsed, his victorious troops brought to a stand, and the key of the battlefield secured; but we still held on, and the massing of the enemy on our flanks rendered our situation more and more hazardous. The new line along the turnpike and railroad having been formed behind us, and the troops moved into position, the artillery posted, orders were sent to the Regular Brigade to retire.

[Major Lowe wishes here to place on record his personal recollection of the receipt of this order to fall back, he being in command of his company (A, First Battalion, Nineteenth Infantry). In the midst of the fight he heard the clear voice of Lieutenant Harrison Millard, of General Rousseau's staff, say to Major Carpenter: "The General directs the brigade to fall back to the railroad and support the battery." Major Carpenter replied: "Tell the General we can not fall back until we have repulsed this attack." "The order is imperative, sir," replied Millard, as he rode off to our left to deliver the order to the other battalions. This conversation took place within ten feet of Major Lowe, and he heard every word distinctly. It seemed a cruel order, and was a bitter disappointment to the men of the brigade. Had the order been to charge the enemy, it would have been obeyed more willingly.]

It seems necessary to be thus particular, because one historian of the battle says that the Regular Brigade was com-

elled to fall back from this advanced position; but this is not true. We moved back in obedience to orders. Major Carpenter mounted his horse, and, ordering his battalion to fall back, rode at a walk straight to the rear. His battalion followed him, and the enemy, rushing to the edge of the cedars, had a fair shot at our backs as we retired. About one hundred yards from the edge of the cedars, this gallant old soldier fell from his horse, dead,—shot in the back while obeying an order against which he protested! No less than six bullets struck him. He was mounted, and a conspicuous mark for the enemy, for we could hear the bullets whizzing over our heads like the buzzing of angry bees. As we retired across the open field, we were subjected not only to the musketry fire from our rear, but to a tornado of artillery fire from rebel batteries off towards Murfreesboro. Our next position was in a slight depression, where we made a temporary stand, soon assisted, however, by other troops on our right and left.

General Thomas says, in his report of the battle: "In the execution of this last movement, the Regular Brigade came under a most murderous fire, . . . but with the co-operation of Scribner's and Beattie's brigades, and Guenther's and Loomis's batteries, gallantly held its ground against overwhelming odds."

Van Horne, in his History of the Army of the Cumberland, says of this stand: "The exultant enemy soon emerged from the cedar woods, but then fell under the musketry of Rousseau's division at short range. Colonel Shepard's brigade of regulars quivered under the onset of the enemy."

The "quivering" of the brigade, here referred to, was the

tragic death of Major Carpenter, which was seen by all, and for a moment produced a feeling which, with less disciplined troops, might have resulted in a panic; but the officers soon restored the wonted steadiness of a movement on parade, and the inspiring example presented by this well disciplined body, scarcely more than a regiment in numbers, gave courage to those who came forward to our assistance. The batteries were in the rear line on higher ground, and fired over our heads.

General Bragg, in his official report, says: "Our heaviest batteries of artillery and rifle guns of long range were now concentrated in front of, and their fire opened on, this position."

While our men suffered from this concentrated artillery fire, we paid little attention to it; but finally, reaching the railroad, roll was called, cartridge boxes inspected, reports made, and we began to realize the terrible loss we had suffered. We thought then that "some one had blundered,"—that our comrades had died in vain, and that the sacrifice had been useless; but General Thomas, when asked why he had sent the Regular Brigade—less than fifteen hundred men—into the cedars four hundred yards in front of the remainder of the army, and in the face of thirty thousand victorious Confederates, replied: "It became a necessity to do so." And General Rosecrans said: "I was compelled to sacrifice my regulars to save the rest of the army."

What was left of the brigade took its place on the right and left of the battery, and had no further active part in the fighting.

Rousseau's division in this battle numbered about 6,240

men. Our brigade numbered about one-fourth of the division.

The losses in the division were: Officers killed, nine, of whom four were regulars; wounded, forty-seven, of whom twenty-two were regulars. Enlisted men killed, one hundred and seventy-three, of whom ninety-four were regulars; wounded, nine hundred and twelve, of whom four hundred and seventy-five were regulars.

Total loss of regulars, as shown by the company returns, twenty-six officers, and five hundred and ninety-five men killed and wounded.

Scribner's brigade lost two hundred and eight, and Beattie's brigade two hundred and eighty-one, each brigade having about equal effective strength with the regulars. Our loss, therefore, was about three times theirs. The number missing was three hundred and sixteen, of whom only forty-seven were regulars. General Rosecrans' army at Stone River lost about twenty per cent.; the regulars, forty-one per cent.*

HOOVER'S GAP.

After a long stay at Murfreesboro, the Regular Brigade—now the Third, of the First Division, Fourteenth Army Corps,—on June 24, 1863, marched out toward Hoover's Gap, in what came to be known as the "Tullahoma Campaign." Many changes had taken place. Majors King and Slemmer

BOSTON: S. R. OSGOOD & CO., 1869. USAMHI

* For interesting references to the gallant part of the regulars in this battle, see Stevenson's book on the Battle of Stone River; Rosecrans' Campaign, by W. D. Bickham; Rousseau's Official Report, and the fine tribute of Pont Mercy, correspondent of the *New York Tribune*.

(over)

were made Brigadier Generals of Volunteers for gallantry at Stone River, and, together with Caldwell and Townsend, had left the brigade; and the battalions, now reinforced by recruits from the North, found brave and efficient commanders among the Captains, while Major Sidney Coolidge, of the Sixteenth, commanded the brigade during this advance.

The affairs at Hoover's Gap could hardly be called a battle, and yet in it the regulars proved what was stated in the beginning of the article, namely: "They were never repulsed in an assault they were ordered to make."

The charge of the Regular Brigade was directed upon the center and key of the enemy's position. The victory was easy, because, when the brigade charged at double quick with fixed bayonets, the enemy fired a volley with nervous haste and ran.

The regulars numbered less than one-third of the division, yet their losses were one-half, including all the officers lost but one:

Men killed 4, and 3 were regulars.

Officers wounded 3, and 3 were regulars.

Men wounded 42, and 19 were regulars.

— —

Total 49, and 25 were regulars.

The marches of the brigade over the Cumberland Mountain; our stay in Crow Creek Valley; our advance to Stevenson, where we had camped a year before, on the way from Corinth to Chattanooga; our crossing the Tennessee River, and the two mountain ranges (Sand and Lookout); the night march of September 18th, 1863, and the staunch defense of the Kelley farm—a point as famous in relation to the battle

of Chickamauga as Hougomont to the battle of Waterloo,— these are incidents of history, and the Regular Brigade did its part.

CHICKAMAUGA.

The Regular Brigade, numbering eighty-four officers and 1,429 men — only a few less than at Stone River — under command of Brigadier General John H. King (Major Fifteenth infantry), and constituting part of Baird's division (Fourteenth Corps), after marching all night of September 18th, 1863, and resting two hours at Crawfish Spring, went into action about 9 A. M. on the extreme left of the corps. From the start the division drove the enemy, and little by little got beyond the general alignment. At about 11 o'clock, in the midst of a dense wood, where the limit of vision was about fifty yards, they were ordered to change front to the right (east), and while this movement was going on, and the Sixteenth was lying down in front of the battery, a long battle line came upon them in a rush from the right flank and rear in overwhelming force, driving back the troops on the right* in confusion, enveloping the Sixteenth and the battery. They made a futile resistance, for the enemy closed in on all sides, killing, wounding and capturing the greater part of the Sixteenth Infantry, and many from other battalions; also, more than one-third of the cannoneers of Battery H, Fifth Artillery. (Among the officers captured was Colonel Cochran, of this Commandery; and among the killed was Major Sidney Coolidge, commanding the Sixteenth.)

* Scribner's brigade, which lost its battery [Loomis'], and 743 men. Vol. 30, pt. 1, p. 276.

Captain Crofton (Sixteenth Infantry), who escaped, made the official report for the Sixteenth, in which he says:

"We were immediately in front of the guns, and the men were ordered to lie down. Here, without any warning whatever, the rebels came upon our right flank and got right on us before any disposition could be made to meet them. Consequently nearly the whole battalion was either killed, wounded or captured, and the battery was also taken. Of the men engaged, about sixty-two escaped, some of them slightly wounded. This remnant was attached to the Nineteenth Infantry, and remained with that battalion during the succeeding day's fight."

General Baird says:

"Complete destruction seemed inevitable. The enemy sweeping like a torrent, fell upon the Regular Brigade before it got into position, took its battery, and after a struggle, in which whole battalions were wiped out of existence, drove it back upon the line of General Brannan."

On looking over the various reports, and comparing one with another, we are able to form a tolerably accurate picture of this thrilling and disastrous episode. The general advance during the morning toward the north had carried them along the front of the troops of Walker, Cheatham and Breckinridge, which were moving southwardly on the opposite, or east side of Chickamauga River, seeking a crossing. These troops crossed the river in the rear of the Regular Brigade, and forming lines of battle, swept northwesterly through the dense woods.

The front line, consisting of Liddell's division, comprising

Walthall's and Govan's brigades,* and Adam's brigade,† of Breckinridge's division (a total of about five thousand men armed with Enfield rifles), with Cheatham's division‡ in the second line in support, were lying down about fifty to one hundred yards from the point where the Regular Brigade was changing front. Rising up suddenly, they started forward with a rush, firing rapidly and completely overlapping and enveloping the Sixteenth and the battery. (Volume 30, part 2, page 252.) The Sixteenth could have saved themselves by running away, but they remained with the battery to the last, fighting until overpowered. The battery fired four rounds of canister, but there was not time to form a line and no one to give the orders, for Major Coolidge fell at the first fire, killed, besides four other officers killed and wounded. Sixty-five horses of the battery were also killed and wounded, making it impossible to move the guns.

Every regiment in the attacking forces officially claimed the credit of the capture, as will be seen from the reports of the Twenty-fourth, Twenty-seventh, Twenty-ninth and Thirty-fourth Mississippi, constituting Walthall's brigade, and the Second, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Thirteenth and Fifteenth Arkansas, and First Louisiana, constituting Govan's brigade. I do not find recorded the regimental reports of Adam's brigade, but find the claim of participation in Adam's report. The strength of these three brigades, as claimed by the brigade commanders, was: Walthall's, 1,827; Govan's, 1,500, and Adam's, 1,320, making a total of 4,647,

* Vol. 30, pt. 2, pp. 273-276.

† Vol. 30, pt. 2, p. 252.

‡ Vol. 30, pt. 2, p. 218.

which, with the officers, would carry the aggregate total to something over five thousand, in the front line of attack, besides Breckinridge's division in the rear line.

The Sixteenth had in action three hundred and eight total, of whom two hundred and twenty-seven were killed, wounded and captured. The battery lost two out of its three officers, and forty-one men out of one hundred and seventeen total. The loss of the enemy was also great.

The commanding officers of the other detachments of regulars, taking advantage of the delay and confusion caused by the concentration of the enemy upon the Sixteenth and battery, drew off their commands about four hundred yards back to Brannan's division, where they formed on its right and resisted the further advance of these same troops; and so vigorous and successful a resistance was made that Liddell, the Confederate division commander, acknowledged his repulse, and by way of excusing it, says he was up against the entire Fourteenth Corps, "on which even Breckinridge, who attacked later and was fresh, could make no impression." (Series 1, Vol. 30, pt. 2, pages 218, 273, 276, etc.)

When seen later that afternoon, the survivors were the unhappiest lot that ever existed. With tears in their eyes, their pride touched to the quick and humiliated past endurance, they recounted the loss of the battery and the Sixteenth Infantry, and could not be comforted. The battery was afterward recaptured by the Ninth Ohio Volunteers, but abandoned by them, and later in the afternoon the Fifteenth Infantry went out and brought all the guns into our lines by hand. Within twenty-four hours the remnant of the brigade was destined to play a most conspicuous part and turn back

the tide of battle at a critical juncture, as at Stone River. At daylight on the 20th, the brigades took position on the left of its division, formed in four lines. Posted on a wooded ridge running parallel with the State road and about one-fourth of a mile to the east of it, and no force being on its left, the men constructed a barricade of fence rails, rocks and logs. General Thomas realizing that his left flank was "in air," and was both vulnerable and vital, made every effort to strengthen this exposed flank. In his report he says:

"I addressed a note to the commanding General, requesting that General Negley be sent to take position on General Baird's left and rear, and thus secure our left from assault."

But Negley's division never arrived.

General Baird says in his report:

"At about 9 o'clock the enemy in force advanced upon us through the woods, and attempted, by throwing strong bodies of infantry upon the Regular Brigade and Scribner's, on the left, to crush that portion of our line. This attack continued about an hour, during which repeated efforts were made to dislodge us from our position, but in vain."

During this attack an entire division of Confederates passed by the left flank of the Regular Brigade. Meeting no opposition, they reached the State road, and, wheeling to their left, advanced until directly in rear of the regulars. Here they were assaulted by Van Derveer's brigade and other troops of the reserve, and driven back around the left of our line. An hour later the Confederates made another and more desperate attack on our left; again their lines overlapped ours by a whole division front, and wheeling to their left, again enveloped the Regular Brigade, which at this time fought fac-

ing to the front and left and rear, and successfully withstood the assault and repulsed the enemy.

Had the little band of regulars, now less than one thousand in all, on the left of our line, proved less steadfast and courageous that day; had they given way when attacked in front, in flank and in rear, the reinforcements under Sherman and Hooker would have probably found the surviving remnant of the Army of the Cumberland north of the Tennessee River. General Thomas, seeing this second desperate attack repulsed, had no further fear for his left flank, and devoted his attention to the right. The glory of Snodgrass Hill has been described by others, and while the courage and determined resistance of the Regular Brigade made Snodgrass Hill possible, it bore no part in that splendid episode on the right. That glory belongs to our volunteer comrades alone.

After the second repulse of the enemy there was a lull in the battle. The four divisions (Baird's, Johnson's, Palmer's and Reynolds', around the Kelley farm, found themselves alone. The enemy seemed to have disappeared from their front. General Thomas had gone, and dense woods hid everything from our view. The four Generals commanding these divisions met, and it was suggested that, as none seemed to be left on the battlefield to give orders, the ranking officer present should assume command and order these divisions to retire from their isolated position. General Absalom Baird — be it said to his everlasting glory — replied: "No, we have repulsed two attacks of the enemy; he will try it again and we shall again beat him, and then the jig will be up with him." General Baird was the junior of these four Generals: his

division occupied the most exposed position; but his courage and excellent judgment probably prevented a further disaster to our army that day.

A short time after this conference, the attack on Snodgrass Hill commenced; then we knew where General Thomas was! For three hours this attack was almost continuous, and the roar of artillery and rattle of musketry a mile in rear of our line was most disquieting; but at 4 o'clock our attention was fully occupied by the third attack on our left flank.

General King says:

"At half-past 4 o'clock the enemy made an attack upon my front and flank, using both artillery and infantry. Notwithstanding all this, we held the enemy at bay and retained our position until 5 o'clock, at which time I was ordered by the division commander to fall back to the Rossville Road."

General Baird says:

"At 5 o'clock an officer arrived from General Thomas with orders for myself and General Johnson to withdraw our troops and fall back in the direction of Rossville."

General Baird's division was the last to leave its position, and the Regular Brigade the last of the troops to retire. The battalion of the Nineteenth, through some mishap, did not receive the order to retire, and remained in position till nearly all were killed or captured. The three officers and sixty men of the Nineteenth, who alone reached Chattanooga safely, were not in line of battle with the battalion when this last attack commenced.

The Army of the Cumberland retired to Rossville during the night of the 20th of September, and on the 21st, says General Baird, "My division was again put on duty to defend

one of the main approaches to that position, and was, I believe, the only one that was attacked. I lost five men killed and wounded from the brigade of regulars." These were the last men killed or wounded in the battle of Chickamauga.

The losses at Chickamauga were unparalleled in modern warfare. Every brigade in both armies suffered frightfully, and the Regular Brigade led them all, its loss being fifty-five per cent. The average loss of the entire army was about thirty per cent. Our brigade was the smallest in our division by one hundred men; our loss was the greatest by one hundred men.

On the morning of the 22d of September, 1863, the remnant of the Regular Brigade reached Chattanooga, the grand objective point of the campaign.

The brigade, organized December 25, 1862, at Nashville, Tennessee, with an aggregate force of 1,562 officers and men, in nine short months had lost in three battles as follows:

Stone River, December 31, 1862, six hundred and twenty-one officers and men; Hoover's Gap, June 26, 1863, twenty-five officers and men; Chickamauga, September 19-21, 1863, eight hundred and thirty-nine officers and men. Total loss in three battles, 1,485.

On September 24, 1863, it had present for duty in Chattanooga, seven hundred and sixty-three officers and men — fragments of five battalions — and in October, 1863, the brigade ceased to exist for a time as such, but formed a "demi-brigade," and with the Eighteenth and Sixty-ninth Ohio, Nineteenth Illinois and Eleventh Michigan, became the Second Brigade of the First Division, Fourteenth Army Corps. The demi-brigade of regulars was under the direct command

of the ranking regular officer present — Major John R. Edie, Fifteenth Infantry — while the brigade was commanded by General J. H. King. Our battery was detached and never served with us again. The regulars remained in Chattanooga during the next two months, enduring all the hardships and privations of the siege without a murmur.

MISSIONARY RIDGE.*

In the magnificent assault of Missionary Ridge the regulars were in the front line of assault on the right of Sheridan's division. They climbed up the ridge and were on its crest among the very first troops of the Army of the Cumberland. The strength and losses of the regulars at the storming of the Ridge were as follows:

Present for duty. 42 officers and 762 men.

Killed and wounded. . . . 3 officers and 54 men.

ATLANTA CAMPAIGN.

When at last the siege of Chattanooga was raised, recruits were hurried to us from the North; and at the opening of the Atlanta campaign there were more regulars present than ever before,— seven battalions, aggregating sixty-five officers and 2,081 enlisted men.

One might truthfully say that the battle of Atlanta commenced on May 1st and ended September 1st, 1864,— four long months of almost continuous fighting, in which the regulars bore their full share. Men of the Regular Brigade were killed and wounded in the affairs at Tunnel Hill, Buzzard's Roost, Resaca, Pumpkin Vine Creek, Pickett's Mill, New

* Vol. 31, pt. 2, pp. 458-488.

Hope Church, Kenesaw, Neal Dow Station, Beech Tree Creek and Utoy Creek; and on the 1st of September, 1864, the regulars closed their fighting in the most glorious and satisfactory manner at the

BATTLE OF JONESBORO, GEORGIA.

In the advance of General Sherman's army from Chattanooga to Jonesboro, every attempt to assault the enemy, when protected by breastworks, had failed, and generally at fearful loss. Kenesaw Mountain cost the army three thousand men; but now Hardee's corps, intrenched on a wooded ridge, was confronted by the Fourteenth Corps (General Carlin commanding our division, and Major Edie the demi-brigade of regulars). A reconnoissance made by the regulars was strongly resisted by the enemy, but was pressed until a commanding hill was carried, from the front of which the enemy's works could be attacked. The batteries were placed on this hill, and the Fourteenth Army Corps ordered to assault the enemy's works.

At 5 P.M. the line moved forward, and the attack was vigorously made along the whole battle front, led by the regulars, who had gone over the enemy's works in advance of the corps, and clung to the position gained under a most gallant fire until the whole line, encouraged by their example, rushed forward and completed the victory.* The entire rebel line of works was carried, with the capture of Govan's brigade of one thousand men, including one general officer,

* Van Horne's "Cumberland," Vol. 2, p. 144. General Davis' Official Report.

eight guns and seven battleflags. Thus was repaid the debt of Chickamauga!

The losses at Jonesboro were severe, but not nearly so great as at Stone River and Chickamauga. In the regulars it was as follows:

Aggregate number taken into the fight, eight hundred and eighty-four; loss in the fight, one hundred and seventy-four (about twenty per cent.).

Thus the regulars lost in their last battle (Jonesboro) the same percentage as in their first battle (Shiloh).

The regulars camped near Atlanta until September 29th, 1864, when they were sent to Lookout Mountain, and remained there until the war closed.

In the reports of losses in the Atlanta campaign, the loss at Jonesboro is included, making a grand total of seventeen officers and six hundred and seventy-six fighting men. The total losses of the Regular Brigade during the Civil War, in battle, were 2,435 officers and men, almost double its total strength at any time prior to the Atlanta campaign.

.

Such is the record; but it must not be forgotten that the "regular" of those stirring times was but a "volunteer" after all. Excepting a very few in the beginning who had served a term of enlistment in the old regular army, they were the same boys from the farms and workshops who made up the Ohio, Indiana and Illinois regiments. Their record is simply that of the average American volunteer under somewhat better training, and a strict business leadership free from politics.

The lesson to be drawn from it is expressed by General Sherman in his report of Shiloh:

"The well ordered and compact columns . . . whose soldierly movements at once gave confidence to our newer and less disciplined men."

It is simply justice, both to the dead and to the living, to say that the steadiness and discipline of this little body of men not only impressed themselves upon the enemy, but reacted in a most important degree upon our own men associated with them in line of battle.

Too few and too unpolitic to breed jealousy, they furnished an inspiring example which was noticeable wherever the strain of battle was heaviest. The pride of their volunteer comrades was stimulated, for their judgment said to them: "Are those not men like unto ourselves?" The sight of the little brigade of regulars moving in a battle charge with as true a line as on dress parade, or standing like a rampart of rock against which the wave of assault dissolved into harmless spray, nerved those to the right and left to emulate their courage.

The shock of assault against them always failed, because their coolness and discipline and their rapid and accurate firing gave the brigade a destructive power in action far beyond what is ordinarily due to numbers. The loss of life in its front was appalling, and the enemy came to know this and shrink from contact. Wherever the regulars stood in defensive battle, there was hard and desperate fighting; and when they charged in earnest, there was victory with apparent ease.

The affair at Hoover's Gap was significant in this latter

respect. The regulars charged in line of battle across open fields, directly against the center and stronghold of the enemy's position upon a ridge which gave them a full view of the advancing line. Our advance was directly in line of fire of the massed artillery of the enemy, prepared, as General Thomas has said, for "an obstinate resistance." The concavity of our line of battle brought the movement of the brigade into full view of our own comrades to right and left, so that the example of a steady advance across the open plain, and the double quick with fixed bayonets up the slope, inspired our own men and unnerved the enemy. The enemy saw that their guns were powerless to check us, for the ranks closed up the gaps and moved on without pause, and when, at close quarters, the double quick began and the glistening of bayonets could be seen, the artillerymen in consternation hauled off the guns in a gallop and the infantry lines fired their nervous volley and melted away.

It was Mission Ridge on a smaller scale; but there, the enemy taking warning from experience, placed opposing works at the foot, and half way up, to prevent a repetition of their discomfiture. But Hoover's Gap taught our forces the trick of successful charging. It was an object lesson that was but repeated at Mission Ridge; and the same lesson of courage made our men invincible at Franklin.

In comparisons of prowess between Northern and Southern soldiers in the West, it may fairly be noted that the persistence of attack shown by the Army of the Cumberland at Hoover's Gap, at Mission Ridge and in the Atlanta campaign, was never equaled by the Confederates. In charges by armies, in line of battle, as at Stone River and Franklin

(where the circumstances were reversely analogous), the Confederates failed to dislodge our troops; notably at Stone River, where the little brigade of regulars, with but partial assistance of two other brigades, successfully withstood the determined assault of overwhelming odds, and, as Van Horne, speaking as the mouthpiece of General Thomas, says: "Saved the center of the army."

And substantially the same may be said of Chickamauga.

Credit is not claimed for these regulars in any distinctive way as such. They were volunteers like all the rest,—inspired by the same motives, enlisted under the same circumstances, and entitled to the same credit. Their military record, however, shows the beneficial effect of systematic discipline, and of dealing with war as a business requiring a concentration of effort and strict attention to details. Cleanliness, order, regularity of habit, impartiality in assignments of duty, produced and maintained a soldierly pride that carried them through hardship without a murmur. Sickness was practically unknown among them, even where typhoid fever and other filth diseases ravaged neighboring camps. Our camp grounds were swept clean every day; tents were triced up and aired regularly; clothing and blankets sunned whenever practicable; camp utensils scrubbed clean after each use; sinks carefully covered each day; and all these things were systematically taught and practiced under rigid supervision.

Had this Government appointed some of the survivors of the Regular Brigade instructors for camps of rendezvous, there would have been no trouble in mobilizing troops for the Spanish-American War, and no epidemics of disease at

the Chickamauga camp or elsewhere. It took us years to learn the art of living on the ground in health and comfort; and had the lessons of our experience been made available in 1898, many lives would have been saved and much criticism avoided.

If I were asked to state the difference in fewest words between the volunteer and regular of those days, I would illustrate it by General Joe Johnston's remark upon General George H. Thomas. Some one said: "General Thomas never knew when he was whipped." "That," replied General Johnston, "hardly does him justice; I would rather say that he always knew when he wasn't whipped."

"He makes no fuss about the job,
He don't talk big and brave;
He knows he's in to fight and win,
Or help fill up a grave.
He ain't no 'Mamma's darling,' but
He does the best he can;
And he's the chap to win the scrap,—
The reg'lar army man,—
The dandy, handy,
Cool and sandy,
Reg'lar army man."

APRIL 3, 1901.