CHAPTER IV
THE TRAIL’S IMPACT ON FOUR INDIAN NATIONS

INTRODUCTION

Examining the history and cultures of Indian nations can help understand the dynamics of their relations with the trail. Each of them had a distinctive culture and history before the trail came into their lives. This approach enables us to comprehend the short- and long-term impacts of the trail on them.

The Shawnee, Delaware, Pawnee, and Comanche nations have been selected for consideration for two reasons. The first is that members of each of these nations are reflective of the historical complexity that typifies the diversity nature of Indian relations with the trail’s traffic. The second is that these Indian nations, if not their individual members, had a significant relationship with the road.

SHAWNEES

The movement of fragmented subdivisions of Shawnees onto an eastern Kansas reservation beginning during the late 1820s was part of a larger process of Euroamerican expansionism. The westward spread of U.S. society during the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries created an upheaval of such magnitude that it literally displaced thousands of people from many different Indigenous. The Shawnees were the first of many Indian nations that the U.S. government placed on a tier of reservations that extended from northern Kansas in the north to southern Oklahoma in the south. Because the lands selected for the Shawnee reservation bisected the Santa Fe Trail, Shawnees’ relation with the trail essentially began with their removal to Kansas. This meant that thousands of travelers with wagons, livestock would cross through the Shawnee lands.

Before entering Kansas, these Algonkian-speakers had experienced cultural change through a long and often tumultuous relationship with English and later Euroamerican colonizers. Conditions created by European and white American encroachments into the Old Northwest had brought years of intermittent violence to Indigenous nations. Following the American revolutionary war, many Shawnees, along with citizens of other Indigenous nations, participated in several coordinated efforts aimed at defending their lands, sovereignty, and cultures by checking the spread of U.S. settlers into Indian lands lying west of the Appalachian Mountains. The inability of Little Turtle’s confederacy to defeat U.S. forces encouraged Shawnee bothers Tecumseh and Tenskwatawa to form another military coalition. In a sense, coalition members were willing to stand up against what essentially amounted to a campaign of ethnic cleansing directed at them.

The brothers’ movement had a traditional component in that it advocated a return to the ancestral ways of living. It sought to counter a growing trend that saw Shawnees
and other Indians gradually abandoning their customary hunting-agriculture economic pursuits in favor of another way of living based on extensive agriculture and livestock raising. Rejecting assimilation, proponents of this traditional movement called for its followers to reject alcohol, Christianity, and life in log cabins with split-trail fences, gristmills, and sawmills. Although most Shawnees distanced themselves from the brothers, many Potawatomis, Delawares, Chippewas, Kickapoos, Winnebagos, Ioways, Foxes, and others did not.

Suffering defeat during the War of 1812, along with the battlefield death of Tecumseh, the war did not destroy the wish of many Indians to keep their lives free of foreign domination and their cultures vibrant. Before the rise of Tecumseh’s coalition, a competing viewpoint held that Indians could retain the vitality of their sovereignty and cultures by adopting a position of accommodation with white America. Those holding this belief hoped to preserve their autonomy and cultural integrity by voluntarily moving westward into territory considered part of the Spanish empire. In 1797, Shawnees and Delawares received a Spanish land grant near Cape Girardeau. Other migrants took up lands in Arkansas’ Ozark Mountains and elsewhere. They fought with Spanish and French colonists against the Osages, who had settled in that area first.

Unfortunately for them, Tecumseh’s defeat had opened the floodgate of expansionism. It would take less than a decade for land-seeking Euroamericans, many of whom held and acted on strong racial biases, to inundate them. In this racially-charged milieu, tensions flared and violence erupted, making life in Missouri and Arkansas increasingly unbearable not only for Shawnees and Delawares but also for Osages and Kaws who had lived in the region for generations. Compounding matters, by the 1820s, many segments of U.S. society, including politicians, embraced the concept of Indian removal. They called for a course of action that would both remove Indian nations from lands coveted by Euroamerican settlers and resettle them to the west.

On November 7, 1825, William Clark, the superintendent of Indian affairs, negotiated a removal treaty with the beleaguered Missouri Shawnees, who agreed to accept a reservation on lands in eastern Kansas ceded by the Osage nation. In keeping with the treaty, they chose a homeland south of the Kansas River and began settling there in 1828.

In 1831, several hundred Shawnees, who, following the collapse of Tecumseh’s coalition, had been confined to small plots of land in Ohio, entered into a removal treaty with the U.S. government. They agreed to cede their Ohio lands and join their Shawnee relatives in eastern Kansas. For its part, the U.S. government promised to protect the reservation and “guaranteed that said lands shall never be within the bounds of any State or territory, nor subject to the laws thereof.” The next year, other Shawnees in Missouri and Arkansas agreed to remove to the Kansas reservation.

Through the removal process, fragmented groups of Shawnees merged on a reservation under a single government. Many Shawnees rejected this political development, preferring instead to live under the old system where sovereignty laid in the
hands of autonomous towns. However, the missionaries who came with the Shawnees and U.S. agents assigned to them exerted a great deal of influence over internal matters. The new government apparently did not take a stance on the Santa Fe Trail, and Shawnee interaction with this road was largely an individualistic matter. A combination of factors including past experiences, necessity, and cultural traditions played a significant role in shaping their interaction with the trail. Having had exposure to Christian missionaries and U.S. settlers’ modes of living before reaching Kansas, numerous Shawnees had undergone varying degrees of social change, adopting a way of life that superficially resembled that of agrarian white America. Most of them nonetheless retained their language, core cultural values, and beliefs. Others sought to live as closely as possible to their traditional teachings. They fiercely guarded their identity even as increasing numbers of their children attended missionary schools. Realizing that military resistance was not a practical option, they continued to follow a policy of accommodation in their dealings with EuroAmericans.

Meanwhile, those nations indigenous to plains viewed the arrival of displaced Indians onto the southern plains with consternation and alarm. It was evident to them that these newcomers would encroach on their lands, buffalo herds, and lives. U.S. agents sought to remedy the problem through dialogue and treaty making. On June 23, 1828, Kitkahahki Pawnee leaders traveled from their town on the Republican River to Cantonment Leavenworth where they met in council with Omahas, Otoes, Iowas, Sacs, Kaws, Shawnees, and U.S. agent John Dougherty. The meeting resulted in the signing of a peace and friendship treaty among these Indians.

This treaty brought peace between Shawnees and Pawnees, one of the Indian nations that had intimate contact with the trail. By the 1840s, Shawnees, because of their geographic location, had adapted to their surroundings without confronting significant Euroamerican opposition. Many of them hunted buffalo on the plains and traveled to the Rocky Mountains on extended hunting and trapping expeditions. Frances Parkman visited the area in the spring and fall of 1846. Published from 1847 to 1849 in *Knickerbocker’s Magazine* in sixteen installments and subsequently reprinted numerous times under the title of *The Oregon Trail*, Parkman told of his trip up the Oregon Trail and return via the Santa Fe Trail. He recorded his observations of various Indians that spring in the border town of Westport, Missouri. By that time, thousands of displaced Indians lived nearby on a number of reservations. According to Parkman, Shawnees, Wyandots, Sacs, Kickapoos, Foxes, Kaws, and Delawares, were there, with each wearing their distinctive clothing. Reflecting on his party’s trip through the “beautiful country” of the Shawnee reservation, he observed, “Shawnees were constantly riding by on a canter, upon little stubborn ponies, and with their calico shirts fluttering in the wind.” His romantic description of intercultural relations in the region suggests that Indians, including Shawnees, were integral to the local economy. Other accounts written in 1846 support Parkman’s view. A soldier, whose Army of the West unit camped on Shawnee land on June 30 as it prepared to invade Mexico, described Shawnees as being industrious people who enjoyed the luxuries of civilized
life. With their reservation serving as a staging area for U.S. soldiers and supply trains en route to Mexican territory, a few Shawnees capitalized on the dramatic escalation of the trail traffic. Brothers Paschal and Charles Fish operated a profitable ferry on the Kansas River. They ferried wagons across the river at the rate of $1 per wagon. Paschal also owned a hotel that catered to travelers. Some other Shawnees sold produce, prepared meals, and whiskey to trail travelers.

Travelers occasionally commented on the demeanor, moral character, economic progress, and stage of civilization of the Shawnees. Some used the word industrious to describe them. Observers stated that they maintained good cornfields. One account described them as civil and accommodating. Another noted that daughters of a Shawnee named Rogers spoke English well and were very intelligent. On July 10, 1847, Christianized Shawnees open the door of their large long meetinghouse to Illinois infantry volunteers. At a Bull Creek trading post, an observer admired the riding skills of a Shawnee woman “dressed in semi-American style and mounted upon a sorrel pony.”

The description of Shawnee being conduits of U.S. expansionism only applies to a few Shawnees. Most of them were not interested in copying the Euroamerican value of accumulating and hording wealth. They must have viewed the escalation of trail’s traffic as a repetition of a disturbing pattern of white American expansionism. In 1842, a Quaker missionary documented the sentiments of an elderly Shawnee who declared that he “wanted to die and be buried there. [He] wished to know if we had heard the men at Washington talk about removing them again.” The old man wanted the Quakers who recorded his words to work to secure this peoples’ title to the land to ensure that Euroamerican settlers would not uproot them again.

Trail travelers sometimes harmed Shawnee timber and crops. A military unit camped near the Shawnee meetinghouse for two days in 1846 moved on after its cattle had invaded Shawnee fields. In 1849, a large civilian and military company departed for Santa Fe from a spot near chief Blackhoof’s home [in what became Johnson County]. A Shawnee “chief,” for instances, told party members not to cut any of green trees, but they were welcomed to take all the dead timber they wanted. That spring, H. M. T. Powell, a noted landscape artist, blamed Wel-a-peto, a Shawnee, and Wel-a-peto’s son of stealing cattle. Responding to the accusation, Wel-a-peto declared: “No, no Shawnee not steal.” Train members offered a reward for the cattle but they found the missing livestock, apparently without Indian help.

Contacting deadly disease carried by trail travelers and others was an ongoing concern among Shawnees. Powell noted that cholera was raging among the emigrants. A report indicates at that time cholera struck about two-thirds of the Shawnees. That June a westbound traveler, writing under the pseudonym of “Veni,” described their response to the epidemic: “I noticed at Bull creek, Kaw river and Willow Springs, among the Delawares and Shawnees, that they had all run off, and left their houses and gardens, with vegetables growing, to the mercy of the travelers. . . .” On July 10, 1847, Shawnees gathered at their meetinghouse in response to reports of smallpox at nearby
Fort Leavenworth. Fearful of the disease, they fled when they saw an approaching soldier who sought to assure them that the reports of the epidemic were false. They nonetheless received vaccinations for the highly contagious and deadly virus.20

Regarding the trail’s impact on Shawnees beyond the reservation, a number of men often traveled on extended hunting and trapping expeditions, sometimes using the trail as a transportation route. A few Shawnee men accepted employment with wagon trains, traders, exploratory expeditions, and U.S. army units in the capacity of hunters, guides, and teamsters. As Bent’s Fort employees, Shawnees and Delawares hunted and trapped for pay. Several Delaware and Shawnee teamsters, in company of Euroamerican bullwhackers, drove wagons during the annual Bent caravan to Missouri, which usually began in April. According to George Bird Grinnell, who studied the history of Bent’s Fort, Indian teamsters preferred to eat with one another, shunning the white American and Mexican mess.21

Referring to the prowess of Indian hunters in romantic terms, Grinnell stated: “Two hunters, one a white man and the other either a Mexican or an Indian, accompanied the train, and each morning as soon as the wagons were ready to start they set out to look for game. Usually when the train reached the appointed camping place for the night the hunters were found there resting in the shade with a horseload of fresh meat.” He added that, “[t]he Delawares and Shawnees were great hunters, and almost always when the train stopped to noon and their cattle had been turned out and the meal eaten, these Indian teamsters were to be seen striding over the prairie, each with a long rifle over his shoulder.”22

Not all observers held such positive views of them. In August of 1845, after reaching the Kansas River coming down the Santa Fe Trail, Philip St. George Cooke wrote that a “blundering Shawnee guide” led his command to Ft. Leavenworth. Conversely, ethnocentric travelers often described them as existing in a state between civilization and savagery. Using this language of racism, Parkman, for instance, referred to them as half-civilized who lived in log cabins and farmed.23

The arrival of Euroamericans, after their Congress passed the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854, led to the recurrence of the old pattern of ethnic cleansing. As Euroamerican pressure intensified to force Indians from their Kansas reservation during the 1850s, documented accounts of their contact with the trail diminished. In one instance occurring south of Fort Leavenworth on July 19, 1858, Shawnees assisted a company cross a gorge.24

The Santa Fe Trail was just one in many factors that contributed to the Shawnees’ removal to Oklahoma in 1871. Although it provided short-termed economic benefits to some Shawnees, the trail was essentially the spearhead of U.S. colonialism, and Shawnees had a paradoxical relationship with both. The Shawnees’ role, however minor, in the “opening of the West” ultimately undermined their land tenure in Kansas. Settlers followed existing roads and created new ones as they transformed the landscape. Self-
assured, arrogant, and confident, they vehemently rejected the concept of cultural diversity and ethnic cleansing became U.S. policy during the 1860s.

Rather than using its power to protect Indian rights, the U.S. government effectively betrayed its role as the Shawnees’ protectorate, opting instead to promote the interests of non-Indians. In 1854, Congress destroyed the concept of Indian country, established by an 1834 law, by opening formerly restricted lands to settlement by white homesteaders. In the same year, the executive branch imposed an oppressive treaty on the Shawnees that limited their sovereignty and diminished the size of their reservation from 100,600,000 acres of land to about 200,000 acres. The treaty, concluded in Washington, D.C., enabled U.S. agents to determine Shawnee membership, decide which Shawnees were competent to manage their small share of the nation’s annuity funds, and approve the final selection of individual allotments. Meanwhile, border ruffians, Quantrill’s raiders, and settlers disrupted Shawnee life with acts of violence and intimidation. In 1864, small groups of Shawnees sought to escape the turmoil, racism, and violence by moving to Oklahoma. Three years later, another treaty established a Shawnee reservation in Oklahoma. Those Shawnees who wanted to accept U.S. citizenship were given the option of staying in Kansas. Most of them chose to move southward, rejecting citizenship in favor of preserving Shawnee political autonomy and cultural identity.

DELAWARES

Similar to the Shawnees, before being removed to the trail’s vicinity, Delawares had experienced a series of events that had left them vulnerable and virtually unable to military physically resist the might of U.S. expansion. At the time of European contact in the seventeenth century, approximately forty autonomous Delaware bands lived in parts of the present-day states of New Jersey, New York, and Delaware. Calling themselves the Lenape, these Algonquian speakers had a concept of ethnic identity but not national unity. They were town dwellers who sustained themselves by mixing hunting and agricultural production. Following contact, they became engaged in the fur trade with Europeans and after that the beaver population in their lands diminished, they sold meats, agricultural produce, and land so they could purchase manufactured goods from European traders. The combination of factors -- land cessions, pressure from European settlers, depletion of game, and conflict with other Indians -- pushed them westward into western Pennsylvania and the Ohio River valley. Along the way, many of them became exposed to the teachings of Christianity.

Traditional Delawares viewed this process of acculturation as a cultural survival threat. The message of several cultural revitalization movements with a customary orientation brought political change to Delaware people. Along with rejecting Christianity and European ways of living and farming, they created a more centralized religious and governmental structure that sought to return them a life patterned after their ancestors’ culture and to unify them so they could act collectively to protect their traditions.
In the 1750s, Delawares, along with Potawatomis, Shawnees, and many others, became caught up in the French and Indian War, one of four European conflicts fought for control of the Americas. They sided with the French, who ultimately lost the war and their doctrine of discovery title to a vast section of the North American interior. Worried about British troops occupying abandoned French forts in the Ohio country and the Great Lakes area and a new British policy that treated Indians as a conquered people, Delawares united with Ottawas, Shawnees, Kickapoos, Ojibwas, Potawatomis, Hurons, Wyandots, Senecas, Piankashaws, Mingos, and others to drive the British out of the region. Fighting began in what was known as Pontiac’s Conspiracy in 1763 and ended in a stalemate three years later, with Indians unable to accomplish their objective and British forces unable to conquer the Indians. During the American revolutionary Delaware fought on both sides.

Following the war, Euroamerican settlers streamed across the Appalachian Mountains into Indian country, lands that Great Britain had ceded to the victorious rebels. Many Delawares, Shawnees, and others joined a confederation formed by the Miami Little Turtle to defend the Old Northwest, stop U.S. expansionism, and challenge the U.S. assertions of sovereignty over the region. In the “Little Turtle War,” Indian forces inflicted heavy casualties but, facing overwhelming odds, stopped the war when it became apparent that British troops would not join the fighting. In 1795, many members of the Indian confederation accepted terms of the Treaty of Greenville, which called for massive Indian land cessions and Indian recognition of U.S. sovereignty lands reaching to the Mississippi River. With the establishment of U.S. hegemony over the region, settlers poured into Indian lands. To escape the resulting problems and to preserve their independence, groups of them began migrating westward into Missouri, Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Texas.

During the War of 1812, the final attempt of a European nation to establish dominion over the eastern United States, many different Indians, including Delawares, Shawnees, Miami, Ottawas, Potawatomis, and Wyandots, united with Tecumseh and his brother the Shawnee Prophet, or Tenskwatawa, to stop U.S. expansion. Defeat in 1813 literally ended the viability of collective Indian resistance by military means east of the Mississippi River, opening the way for further Euroamerican expansion.

Meanwhile, many Delawares, Shawnees, and others sought to preserve their ways of life and autonomy by moving westward into Missouri and Arkansas. There strategy lasted a little more than thirty years. In 1829, succumbing to unrelenting pressures to removal, Delaware leaders in Missouri and Ohio signed treaties, agreeing to relocate to the eastern Kansas reservation. The treaty promised them a ten-mile strip of land, or outlet, that reached westward into unceded Pawnee country. It also pledged that their new land, located north of the Kansas River and the Santa Fe Trail, with Fort Leavenworth located nearby, would belong to them forever. By accepting the treaty terms, they sought to maintain their customary form of living, including hunting, trapping, and subsistence farming, in a new land.
This history means that by the time of their contact with the Santa Fe Trail most Delawares remained committed to living in accordance with the beliefs, values, customs, and worldview of their ancestors. Following the War of 1812, their leadership developed a consensus to pursue a policy of accommodation with the U.S. colonizers. For practical reasons, Delawares, as a nation, could no longer oppose U.S. expansion through military means either alone or in coordination with others without the running the risk of utter devastation. Put another way, the overwhelming pressures of contact forced them to accept a subservient position under U.S. domination but they were unwilling to surrender their autonomy and cultural identity.

These historical and cultural factors played a part in shaping Delaware relations with the trail. In the short term, these displaced people, following their policy of accommodation, largely enjoyed a cooperative relationship with the traffic on the thoroughfare and the U.S. government. Yet, upon their arrival in Kansas, suffering hunger and the loss of many horses because of a cold winter, they turned to living off of the land in a culturally-appropriate fashion. Before removal, their hunting operations took them occasionally on to the plains. Delaware men, and occasionally women, soon began traveling about familiarizing themselves more completely with the topography and resources of the plains and beyond. Their travels apparently took them over the trail.

Because of their proximity to the key departure points in Missouri for westward U.S. expeditions, friendly disposition toward Euroamericans, growing geographic knowledge, and hunting skills, a number of U.S. exploratory, scientific, military, and trading expeditions turned to them for assistance. In May 1832, several of them accompanied Captain Benjamin Bonneville’s expedition to the Rockies and beyond, traveling across present Johnson and Douglas counties on the Santa Fe Trail a distance before moving northward. Founded in the early 1830s, Bent’s Fort, a walled trading post situated on mountain route of the trail on the upper Arkansas, provided economic opportunities for them. Black Beaver became one of the most famous Bent hunters who along with other Delawares found employment as hunters, trappers, and guide for U.S. army expeditions, caravans, and trapping companies.

Perhaps because of economic incentives, some Delawares seemed eager to assist the expansionism goals of the U.S. government and its citizenry. For instances, in 1843, Black Wolf, “a noble specimen of the American Indian,” offered to mobilize a Delaware force against Indians who were attacking the frontier. During the 1840s and 1850s, Delaware men participated in the expeditions of John C. Frémont. Frémont’s route usually took him westward to Bent’s Fort, which included travel at least part of the distance over the Santa Fe Trail. In 1842, an unnamed Delaware father and his son accompanied his first scientific expedition, serving as hunters.

Three years later, twelve Delaware men accompanied Frémont’s third expedition to California as scouts and hunters. They included James Sagundai (or Secondyan or Secondine), James Conner, Delaware Charley, Wetowka, Solomon Evertt, Crane, and Bob Skirkett. After the United States declared war on Mexico, Frémont’s force, along with its Delaware members, transformed their role into combatants. Although these
Delawares received the designation of U.S. soldiers and served with “remarkable courage and fidelity,” they were denied patents of land and pay provided to other U.S. troops. In 1853, ten Delawares, including James Secondine, George Washington, and Captain Wolff, and four Wyandots joined Frémont’s fifth expedition with the promise of two dollars in compensation. Referring to their physical appearance and preparation for war, Salomon Nunes Carvalho wrote: “A more noble set of Indians I never saw, most of them six feet high, all mounted and armed cap-a-pie.” As late as 1886, none of them had received the money or land owed to them.

Delawares frequently crisscrossed and traveled over the trail with U.S. army forces in actions against Plains Indian resistance. In June 23, 1853, John Gunnison’s railroad surveying expedition, with three Delawares [John Moses, guide; Wahhone, hunter; and James Sanders, interpreter] began “in the midst of the various Shawnee missions.” Four years later, Jim Connor, George Washington, and Benjamin Love accompanied a surveying party throughout southwestern Kansas, the Oklahoma Panhandle, and northeastern New Mexico.

Also in 1857, Falls Leaf and several other Delaware men served as guides with a U.S. army bid to punish Cheyennes. At Fort Leavenworth, Falls Leaf showed some non-Indians gold he had received from several prospectors who had found the metal at Cherry Creek in what became Colorado. Fall Leaf inadvertently set into motion a gold rush that took thousands of Euroamericans into Colorado, igniting intense conflict with Plains Indians that lasted until there defeat about ten years later. Three years later, Fall Leaf, Sarcoxie, John Williams, Bascom, Wilson, and Bullit participated in the U.S. army’s indecisive expedition against Comanches and Kiowas. In 1860, six Delaware guide escorted troops commanded by Lieutenant J. E. B. Stuart over the trail in another campaign against defiant Kiowas and Comanches. Describing the attire and value of the Delawares, R. M. Peck, a member of 1860 Sedgwick’s command that was pursing defiant Indian resisters, wrote, they copy the “white man’s garb and ways to a great extent, and were far superior to the plains Indians. They did us excellent service throughout the trip.”

There are at least two accounts of Delawares being injury or killed in their work with the U.S. forces and traders. On June 17, 1848, Jicarilla Apaches killed Blackhawk, along with four non-Delawares, at Manco Burro Pass. Then, on June 28, 1860, east of Aubrey Crossing, Fall Leaf, a guide with Stuart’s command in a movement against Comanches and Kiowas, was injured when his rifle burst in this face.

Moreover, travel on the trail was not without its risks for other Delawares. In July 1852, four U.S. army deserters met an unnamed Delaware trader and his sister Mar-mar-trish-ey near Fort Mackay on the Arkansas River. After several days of travel, one deserter, John Schoen, beat the young man to death with a gunstock while Joseph Dodge struck the woman with a frying pan. Before fleeing with the pair’s horses and property, Schoen slashed the woman’s throat. The critically wounded woman survived the attack, managing to walk for several days before she met a party of Kaws who provided her food and a mule. In Missouri, she reported the crimes to authorities. Convicted by a jury for
their offenses, the two murderers met their fate in a public hanging on July 22, 1853, in St. Louis. This incident is rare in that it appears to be the only time that U.S. authorities filed charges against travel travelers accused of criminal acts against Indians.

The Delawares’ close connection with U.S. forces caused problems for them with other Indians. In late June or early July of 1844, a combined force of Sioux, Cheyennes, and Arapahos fought a party of Delawares on the Smoky Hill River, killing fifteen of them. On July 5, Sioux, Cheyennes, and Arapahos met Frémont’s party, stating that they wanted peace with Delawares. At Bent’s Fort in early August, 1845, Delawares met Cheyennes in a council with James Abert, a U.S. Army Topographical Engineers lieutenant, and other U.S. citizens. Old Bark, a Cheyenne leader, took advantage of the situation to speak about the harm brought to his people by Euroamericans, declaring that white invaders had entered Cheyenne land, cut timber, and killed buffalo and antelope.

About a year later during another Bent’s Fort meeting, Cheyennes expressed their concern that Delawares’ close association with white Americans. In Frémont’s 1853 expedition, however, Delawares traded for horses with Cheyennes.

Despite the Delawares’ service, at least one U.S agent questioned their loyalty. On August 29, 1847, during a time of warfare along the trail, Thomas Fitzpatrick, a U.S. agent assigned to the Upper Platte and Arkansas agency, averred that Delawares, along with Osages, had joined Comanches in fighting the U.S. government on the trail. Reiterating this view several weeks later, Fitzpatrick reported that Arapahos, Delawares, and Osages had united with Kiowa and Comanche raiders. He called for the violent subjugation of all Indians who harmed whites.

There is one instance in which a huge Delaware, possibly named En-di-ond, fought with others against the U.S. occupation of New Mexico. Known among white American circles as Big Nigger, he had spent time with other Delawares at Bent’s Fort, Hardscrabble, and Pueblo after 1842. While visiting his wife at Taos Pueblo in January 1847, a U.S. force attacked the Indian town to avenge the slaying of the recently appointed territorial governor, Charles Bent, and fifteen others. During the siege of the thick-walled church where Taos and Mexican resistance fighters had taken refuge, the Delaware purportedly killed a number of trappers with the U.S. army by luring them into the open by calling their names.

According to two accounts, he survived the bloody massacre. The first tells of him hiding out for a time in the canyon of St. Charles with the help of his kinsmen before returning to the Delaware reservation and proclaiming his innocence. Providing another version, U.S. agent Fitzpatrick suggested that “Big Negro” fled to the Arkansas River where he tried to convince Cheyennes and Comanches to fight white Americans. From there, he traveled to the states [probably a reference to the reservations in eastern Kansas] for the same purpose. Drawing on circumstantial evidence, Fitzpatrick believed that he fought with Comanches against the Santa Fe traffic. Not long after William Tharp’s death from a Comanche, or possibly Pawnee, attack on May 27 or 28, the Delaware had possession of a rifle belonging to Sharp [Tharp].
Microbes transmitted by Euroamerican travelers posed a near constant problem for Delawares. In an 1832 report, Isaac McCoy, noted that nine Shawnees and fifteen Delawares had died the previous summer and fall from smallpox. An inoculation effort apparently stopped the spread of disease, as did vigilance by the Indians, their agents, and other friends. In the spring of 1849, Delawares, Wyandots, Sac and Foxes, Otoes, Pawnees, Kickapoos, and Potawatomis, Osages, and others suffered widespread illness and death from the cholera pandemic. In June 1849, “Veni,” wrote: “I noticed at Bull creek, Kaw river and Willow Springs, among the Delawares and Shawnees, that they had all run off, and left their houses and gardens, with vegetables growing, to the mercy of the travelers. . . .” In the summer of 1851, cholera struck Shawnees, Delawares, Munsees, and Stockbridges, reportedly taking forty lives.

It was U.S. expansion rather than disease that posed the greatest threat to the Delawares’ autonomy and cultural independence. Treaty promises, no matter how solemnly articulated, and the invaluable service Delawares provided to cause of U.S. expansion did virtually nothing to protect their reservation. In 1854 and 1856, Delaware leaders ceded significant portions of their territory, opening thousands of acres of fertile lands for European settlers who began to flood into eastern Kansas following the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Act in 1854. In 1866, with a campaign of ethnic cleansing raging, Delaware leaders, pressured by U.S. officials and settlers, entered into another treaty, agreeing this time to remove to Oklahoma. They reluctantly consented to surrender their sovereignty and to incorporate themselves into the Cherokee nation.

PAWNEES

With a population that probably exceeded 30,000 people during the early 1800s, Pawnees were the largest and most powerful group on the central plains at the onset of the Santa Fe trade. In 1821, the year of Becknell’s trip to Santa Fe, they lived free of foreign domination. Actually, the Pawnee nation was a confederacy of four autonomous Caddoan-speaking bands or tribes, known among themselves as Chahui, Kitkahabki, Pitahawirata, and Skidi. Their existence on the plains stemmed deep into the past, probably much deeper than other Indians who had close contact with the trail.

With horses integrated into their culture by early 1700s, they followed a complex rhythm of life that took them from their respective towns in late June or July, following the second hoeing of their cornfields, to their buffalo hunting lands on communal hunts. These hunts often took them to the Arkansas River and elsewhere on lands that they claimed. After traveling hundreds of miles, dwelling in tepees along the way, and procuring large quantities of buffalo meat, they returned their towns. They arrived in time to harvest their crops and to hold their fall religious ceremonies. In November, they returned to the buffalo range on the winter buffalo hunt, returning home in January or February. In the spring they conducted ceremonies to awaken the plants and hibernating animals from their winter sleep.

Providing homes for several thousand people, their towns served as the spiritual and social centers of their existence. Extended families dwelled in circular structures
constructed with logs, branches, and earth. These mud-lodge homes comfortably housed up to forty people.

Buffalo, formally known as bison, held a significantly more profound place in their worldview than being a simple source of protein. Considering them as gifts from their Creator, Tirawahut, they used small portions of these sacred animals for ceremonial purposes and the remainder for food. Hides from these sacred animals provided them a durable material for manufacturing clothing, sinew, utensils, tool, and tent covers and items to trade for such things as knives, hoes, metal utensils, vermillion, bells, and firearms. Regarding these animals as theirs, they took steps to deter unauthorized hunting by outsiders. In their way, trespassing and pouching by outsiders constituted a serious offense. Noted African American frontiersman Jim Beckwourth [who incidentally harbored a strong anti-Pawnee feelings] described the spiritual value Plains Indians placed on the buffalo, declaring “the Indians believe the buffalo to be theirs by inheritance, not as game, but in the light of ownership, given them by Providence for their support and comfort, and that, when an immigrant shoots a buffalo, the Indian looks upon it exactly as the destruction by a stranger of so much private property.”

Beckwourth had lived among the Crows and developed an understanding of the close spiritual connection that linked Indians with the buffalo. Most white Americans could not comprehend this relationship.

Each Pawnee division possessed its own political and religious organizations. The chiefs, composed of both hereditary and elected leaders, functioned as the representatives of their people in matters involving diplomacy, maintenance of peace and harmony within the towns, and communal buffalo hunts. A society of priests conducted a seasonal round of religious ceremonies viewed as vital for preserving the integrity of the universe. Drawing their curative powers from animals and skilled healers, Pawnee doctors possessed knowledge of medicinal herbs and healing ceremonies that enabled them to treat a variety of health problems, injuries, and mental afflictions. They, however, lacked the ability to cure deadly diseases carried from Europe to the Americans. Warrior societies had the responsibility of defending their lands, towns, people, and culture from external threats.

The Pawnees’ first probable contact with Europeans occurred in August 1541 at a Wichita town situated just south of the Arkansas River, at a site near where the Santa Fe Trail would run less than three hundred years later. The Pawnee delegation had come there to meet Francisco Vázquez de Coronado, the leader of a small Spanish exploratory force of fortune seekers. Although Spanish accounts indicate that this encounter played out on rather amicable terms, the outcome may have been different if the Spaniards had detected any signs of precious metals. What Coronado did accomplish for Spain was to establish a doctrine of discovery claim to the region. In 1802, Spain transferred this title to France.

Unlike Shawnees, Delawares, and others east of the Mississippi, Pawnees, because of their distant proximity to the epicenters of European colonialism, did not become involved in the European wars for control of the Americas. During the late
1600s, however, a small number of French traders reached the central plains and Pawnee country. Although sharing imperialistic principles with their rival European counterparts, the French mostly went about the business of building an empire through the instrumentality of trade. Land acquisition for settlement purposes, at least on the central plains, was not a goal of France. This non-threatening backdrop produced an environment in which a mutually beneficial partnership thrived between Pawnees and French traders. Although willing to exchange furs and hides for manufactured goods, the Pawnees’ worldview about the sacredness of the flora and fauna discouraged them from slaughtering large numbers of animals for trade purposes.

Rumors of a Pawnee alliance with France reached concerned Spanish officials in Santa Fe. In 1720 the New Mexico governor sent a military expedition commanded by Lieutenant-General Pedro de Villasur to counter what was seen as French encroachments into Spanish territory. Possibly in the heart of Pawnee country near where the Loup River flows into the Platte on about August 14, a combined force of Pawnee and Otoe warriors, perhaps joined by a few Frenchmen, struck a preemptive blow against colonialism, killing the Spanish commander, thirty-four soldiers, and eleven Pueblo scouts. Through militant means, Pawnees ended Spanish plans to control the central plains. After that, Spain’s interest shifted to establishing trading relations with Indians of the region.

To the east, a more precarious threat was looming. In 1803, U.S. President Thomas Jefferson, without consulting any Indians within the vast affected area, purchased Louisiana territory from France, opening the door for westward Euroamerican expansion. In September of 1806 at the Pawnee town on the Republican River, just north of the present Kansas-Nebraska border, a chief named Saritarish greeted Lieutenant Zebulon Pike and a small party of U.S. soldiers. In his report, Pike indicated that he had informed the Pawnee leadership that they were now living under the authority of the United States. Of course, Pawnees lacked a reason to accept such a preposterous declaration. There would be other chiefs with the name Saritarish and most of them would have difficulties with the trail and U.S. colonialism.

Because of a series of early 1800s series of well-publicized encounters with Pike and other uninvited travelers, Euroamericans viewed Pawnees as a powerful but troublesome and dangerous people. The essence of this label stemmed from several factors. The first is that Euroamerican intruders possessed a proclivity for projecting themselves as the victims of Indian aggression. They sought the prerogative to pass freely through Pawnee lands without acquiring permission and to kill animals for food and fun. Relying heavily on buffalo for spiritual and nutritional subsistence, Pawnees often stood up to the Indian and non-Indians trespassers. In 1816, 300 Pawnees [or Comanches according to a few sources] laid siege to a party of hunters and trappers with Auguste P. Chouteau and Jules DeMun. Taking up defensive positions on an Arkansas River island, Chouteau’s men reportedly killed and wounded thirty attackers while suffering only four casualties, including one fatality. Located in what is now western Kansas near the town of Hartland, this site, known thereafter as Chouteau’s Island, became a landmark on the Santa Fe Trail. For years to come, travelers, in their dairies,
journals, and letters, recalled the violent connection of Pawnees to the island. Other
landmarks along the route with Pawnee names, including Pawnee Rock, Pawnee Fork,
and the old Pawnee forts, also connoted warfare.\textsuperscript{61}

With Euroamerican encroachments sparking conflict throughout the plains, U.S.
officials sought to control Indians throughout the region through treaties, trade, and,
military means. In 1818, leaders of the confederated Pawnee nations entered into
separate treaties of peace and friendship with U.S. representatives in St. Louis. Article
one states: “Every injury, or act of hostility, by one or either of the contracting parties
against the other, shall be mutually forgiven and forgotten.” Article three declares that
the Pawnee chiefs and warriors, on behalf of their nation, “do hereby acknowledge
themselves to be under the protection of the United States of America, an of no other
nation, power, or sovereign, whatsoever.”\textsuperscript{62} Given the language barrier and cultural
differences that came into play in most treaty councils, it seems unlikely that Pawnee
leaders understood what U.S. officials were asking of them.

The 1818 treaty, in terms of the future Santa Fe Trail, was of minor importance.
The independent-minded Pawnee leaders, although they referred to the U.S. president as
their “Great Father,” were not only unwilling to subjugate their people under the
unbridled authority of the United States but they were also becoming increasingly
intolerant to acts of Euroamerican trespassing. Yet, the development of the Santa Fe
trade, along with other forms of U.S. expansionism, slowly propelled the Pawnees
towards a state of dependency and political subservience under foreign dominion.

Almost from the trail’s onset, popular perceptions among Euroamericans and
Mexicans alike held that Pawnees were a formidable, unpredictable, and dangerous
threat. Conversely, Pawnees almost certainly held an almost identical view of them.
Over the twenty or so years that followed, interlopers on the trail attributed many
incidents involving tension, conflict, and violence to Pawnees and Comanches, whether
the true identity of the involved Indians was known. Other accounts periodically
indicated that Pawnee contact with the trail also included instances of trade, gift
exchanges, and other forms of friendly interaction.

A listing of dubious accuracy, compiled by Jedidiah Smith and U.S. agent
William Clark for propaganda purposes, alleges that Pawnees had robbed unidentified
traveler on the “road to Mexico” in 1821, taking horses, mules, and furs. Historical
sources, however, do not substantiate this claim. However, the first documented meeting
between Pawnees and trail travelers occurred near Cow Creek on June 18, 1822, shortly
before wagons came into general use on the trail. Thomas James, a co-leader of the
eastbound McKnight/James company, reported that a large Pawnee party, headed by a
principal chief’s brother, encountered his small eastbound party on the Arkansas River.
Although the meeting began with tension because two “Spanish” Indians, probably Taos
Indians, were traveling with the Euroamericans, it ended amicably.\textsuperscript{63} Explaining to
James his reasoning for wanting to co-exist peacefully with Euroamericans, the Pawnee
leader stated, [L]ast winter my brother went to Washington and saw our Great Father
[U.S. president] there. He said many great things to my brother and made him a great
many presents. And what he said went into my ear and down to my heart. Our Great Father told my bother to treat all Americans well who visited his country, and my bother promised the Great Father, in the name of the whole nation, that we would do as he wished us to do towards the Americans. You and your friends are safe. You shall not be hurt.”

Before the groups parted ways, James provided the Pawnee leader a gift of horse. The leader indicated that he would reciprocate the next time James came to Pawnee country.

These feelings of goodwill were short-lived. In 1823, Pawnees had several antagonistic encounters with travelers. In June or July they took thirty mules and personal property belonging to a party of several Americans and “Spaniards.” According to Louise Barry, whose research focused on the trail’s history, the site of incident became known as the Caches. That summer, eighty Pawnees confronted a company of thirty-two Missouri-bound traders. An account states that, although a “war hoop was raised,” both sides reached a compromise because the Pawnees could not rob the traders without losing some of their men. Pawnees also received blamed for killing a “Spaniard” with William Anderson’s caravan on the Arkansas that same year.

Amid clamoring that Pawnees, Comanches, and other Indians threatened the lives and economic opportunities of Santa Fe traders, Euroamericans sought protection from their national government. In 1824, Missouri legislatures petitioned Congress for “security against the robberies and murders which all savages are prone to commit on the traveller and merchant.” It also advocated assimilation programs to control Indians, declaring, “commerce is the civilizer of mankind.” In 1828, the legislature submitted another memorial, claiming that the powerful Pawnees [the only Indigenous people mentioned by name in the petition] “are now much disaffected towards us and are determined to spare no white man who falls in their way.”

Pawnee raids on Mexican settlements and trail traffic on the Mexican side of the border encouraged Mexican officials to seek a peaceful solution to end the conflict. In 1824, a delegation of twenty-six Mexicans departed Santa Fe en route to Fort Atkinson, a U.S. military post situated on the Missouri River, in hopes of negotiating a peace treaty with their Pawnee enemies. Somewhere along the way the party left the trail and proceeded in a northeastern direction to reach the outpost. This diplomatic occurrence is unique in that U.S. officials permitted representatives of a foreign government to enter lands claimed by the United States for the purpose of negotiating a peace treaty with an Indian nation considered to be under the exclusive authority of the U.S. government. Old animosities nonetheless continued to simmer and the resulting treaty failed to end the Pawnee-Mexico war.

The following spring, the U.S. Congress, in a belated act of obtaining belated approval for the road from selected Indian nations, allocated $10,000 for the survey and marking of the Santa Fe Trail and another $20,000 to enter into right-of-way treaties with Indians whose land touched the trade route. In return for the right-of-way agreement, U.S. government agreed to provide the Osage and Kaw nations $800 in goods a piece. The treaty stipulated that U.S. and Mexican travelers “who shall at all times pass and
repass thereon, without any hindrance or molest[ation]” may seek subsistence and “proper camping places” in an area “extending to a reasonable distance on either side” of the road. 72 George Sibley, another commissioner, apparently knew or soon learned about the Pawnees’ connection to the land along the Arkansas River. In an August 31, 1825, journal entry, he suspected that Pawnees and Arikaras had hunted there recently but had returned to their towns to harvest their crops. He referred to the area surrounding Big Coon Creek as the Pawnees’ usual “Summer Resort.”73

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Less than six weeks later after the Osage and Kaw treaties, another set of U.S. officials entered into a friendship and trade treaty with Pawnee leaders at Fort Atkinson. Regarding the issue of travel over the controversial road, the treaty stated that Pawnees agreed not to “molest or interrupt any American citizen or citizens, who may be passing from the United States to New Mexico or returning from thence to the United States.”74 Because the treaty failed to address the trespassing issue and matters pertaining to harm inflicted on the flora and fauna by the travelers, Indian relations with the trail became increasingly volatile.

Meanwhile, several weeks after the treaty with the Osage and Kaw leaders at the Cimarron River in Mexican territory, Pawnees reportedly laid in wait for an eastbound train carrying the U.S. commissioners back to Missouri. According to an account, they “planned to coerce from them a rich booty.” However, they struck the wrong caravan, taking a large number of horses and mules. Benjamin H. Reeves, one of the U.S. commissioners, speculated that they had conducted raids in Mexican territory “from a belief in them that they cannot be punished for an outrage committed beyond our bounds.” In early 1826 Pawnee raiders struck another eastbound caravan with six members of the survey company and fourteen others, taking public and private property. Speculating about the Pawnees’ objective, Reeves asserted that they “seem to be more for the sake of plunder than blood.” Reeves asked U.S. officials to take steps to recover the missing mules and property or to put into place “such further measures as the indignity offered the authority of the government would seem to require.”75

Reports of this nature further reified the Euroamerican view that Pawnees were a consistent threat to travel. In May or June of 1826, Pawnees allegedly attacked a party of Ceran St. Vrain with Kit Carson at Pawnee Rock. Another account about this occurrence states that a youthful Carson shot a mule there thinking it was an Indian. This incident is supposedly how this famous landmark received its name.76 In late June 1827 midnight raid, possibly near the Little Coon Creek, thirty Pawnees, or possibly Comanches, took livestock belonging to an eastbound party of a dozen or so traders. Petitioning the U.S. government for compensation, traders declared that Pawnees were lawless, violent, and driven by their love of plunder.77

In late August or early September of 1828, Euroamericans claimed that relations along the Arkansas River had reached an unprecedented level of volatility. At that time, unknown Indians killed Daniel Monroe and Robert McNees, members of the Sublette and Marmaduke party, near the Upper Cimarron Springs. The trappers subsequently took revenge on a group of unoffending Comanches who arrived at the scene of men’s funeral,
killing five or six of them without provocation. Conflicting reports initially blamed the pair’s death both on Pawnee and Comanches, but ensuing accounts mostly held the latter responsible.\textsuperscript{78} Several days later, Indians struck the Marmaduke and Sublette caravan, driving off between seven hundred and a thousand horses and mules. Again, reports implicated the Pawnees but it may have been Comanches or others who drove off the animals.\textsuperscript{79} During that same month east of the Upper Cimarron Springs, Pawnees received blame for killing John Means, the captain of a caravan of about twenty-five eastbound travelers. Statements from others, however, attributed the act to Comanches.\textsuperscript{80}

On the night of August 28 Indians, believed to have been Pawnees, took sixty-five to a hundred and thirty mules belonging to the Marmaduke, Sappington, and McMahan company. In September, Isaac McCoy, who was escorting with a delegation of Chickasaws, Choctaws, and Creeks about seventy-five miles from the mouth of the Kansas River, dreaded a meeting with roving Pawnee war parties.\textsuperscript{81} At that time, Euroamericans were circulating rumor alleging that the Pawnees had declared war on Euroamericans. In November, McCoy reported that 1,500 Pawnees had gone “en masse in a war excursion against the whites.”\textsuperscript{82} On November 18, the \textit{Missouri Republican} published a letter in which U.S. agent John Dougherty, written about two weeks earlier, asserted that 1,500 Grand [Chaui] and Loup [Skidi] Pawnees had “gone en masse in a war excursion against the whites; and their attention will be directed principally to the Santa Fe road to intercept our traders, and if they failed there, to fall on the frontier settlements of Arkansaw, having declared that determination to scalp all white men who they meet.” Infusing a bit of racial editorializing into the story, the \textit{Republican} added, “The Pawnees . . . are a strong, athletic race of men but destitute of courage. When united they can bring into the field several thousand warriors.”\textsuperscript{83}

Responding the following month to growing conflict on the trail and calls for protection, the Missouri legislator petitioned Congress for the establishment of a military post on the Arkansas River.\textsuperscript{84} Rather than trying to suppress the actual source of the conflict – the uncurbed growth of destructive trail traffic – U.S. officials opted for a militaristic solution aimed at protecting the traders and commerce. Apparently expecting contact, if not trouble, from Pawnees, Captain Bennet Riley, the force’s commander, took along a Pawnee-speaking interpreter. Riley’s command fought several battles and skirmishes with Indians, perhaps Comanches and others,\textsuperscript{85} but it does not appear that Pawnees participated in the combat.

Other factors contributed to the solidification of the Pawnees’ ignoble reputation. In the late 1820s, the unreliable list compiled by famed mountain man Jedediah Smith and William Clark of violence along the trail accused Pawnees of having committed criminal acts against trailers. Interestingly, despite numerous reports of Pawnees perpetrating acts of violence or theft along the trail, the enumeration contained very few references to Pawnees. Nonetheless, in an October 11, 1831 Santa Fe trader Alphonso Wetmore declared that Pawnees, Cheyennes, Comanches, Kiowas, Blackfeet, and Arapahos endangered the lives and property of traders. He attributed forays in 1827 and 1828, which cost traders nearly a thousand head of livestock, to Comanches and Pawnees.\textsuperscript{86}
Although a few documented accounts tell of friendly interaction between Pawnees and trail traffic, most travelers told a story of that contained the elements of fear, tension, and violent conflict. On the Arkansas River in the fall of 1830, Pawnees reportedly attacked a westbound contingent of trappers, taking seven horses and wounding others. At least one Pawnee may have died or received wounds during the confrontation. In a narrative regarding his 1831 journey along the Arkansas and elsewhere, Albert Pike declared the “wandering, savage, and hostile tribes” included the Comanches, Kiowas, Pawnees, and others. He noted that Pawnees always traveled to war on foot and seldom ventured south of the Canadian River. The following spring, Pawnees received blame for killing two caravan members who were hunting on the Pawnee Fork. Travelers during this period began to attribute unexplained occurrences to them. In May, for instances, Josiah Gregg’s caravan suspected that the smell of “lurking Pawnees” had caused its livestock to stampede.

By 1831, Euroamerican interlopers seemingly had a vendetta against Pawnees. That fall, a group of Pawnees received gifts from a passing caravan. Soon thereafter, a smallpox outbreak swept through their settlements with devastating consequences. On October 29, describing a scene of widespread suffering, dying, and death, a U.S. agent wrote:

They were dying fast, and taken down at once in such a large number that they have ceased to bury their dead whose bodies were seen in every direction laying about in the river lodged on the sandbars, in the hogweeds, around the villages & in the corn caches, others again now dragged off by hungry dogs into the Prairie where they were torn to pieces by more hungry wolves and Buzzards.

Although the epidemic cut the Pawnee population in half, between 8,000 to 12,000 survivors went about the responsibility of restoring their ways of living. Pawnees traced the epidemic to the gifts from Santa Fe traders. Albert Pike, a youthful member of Charles Bent’s caravan that reached Taos in November 1831, declared that Pawnees had sworn “vengeance against the whites for carrying [smallpox] among them.” A second incident occurring in the early 1830s further soured Pawnee relations with the trail traffic. Apparently drawing from secondhand information, Pike declared that a Pueblo Indian traveling with a caravan shot the son of a Pawnee chief in the back while he was parleying with traders. Echoing this story, Josiah Gregg, a trader who traveled with a caravan from States to Santa Fe during the spring and summer of 1831, dates the killing as having occurred in 1832. According to Gregg, traders disapproved of the murder, but Pawnees held all of them responsible nonetheless. Gregg, who failed to mention the smallpox incident, claims that the killing aroused the Pawnees’ ire, making them “among the most formidable and treacherous enemies of the Santa Fé traders.” A letter dated December 10, 1832, from Clark to Lewis Cass, the secretary of war, indicates that the killer was a white man, and that Pawnees would avenge the death. In a previous letter, however, Clark indicated that the culprit was a Spaniard. Despite these assertions, as we shall see, it appears that the Pawnees’ first strike of vengeance, it that is what it was, occurred in 1837.
Meanwhile, in the fall of 1832, Pawnees expressed their distress to U.S. agent John Dougherty about the destructiveness of trespassers. Relaying their concerns to the William Clark, the superintendent of Indian affairs at St. Louis he wrote:

They state however that they have one cause of complaint against their white brothers and that was the frequent passing and repassing in various directions of large parties of trappers and Santa Fe traders over their buffalo hunting grounds in consequence of which they are often obliged to go many days at a time without a mouthful to eat. They requested me to make known these facts to you that they might reach the ears of their great Father who they confidently hoped would have pity on his Pawnee Children and either prevent these parties from traveling through their Country, destroying their Beaver and running off their Buffalo or give them something annually as an equivalent for the loss they thus sustain. Clark promptly forwarded this information to the U.S. secretary of war.

In 1833, a U.S. treaty delegation visited the Pawnee towns for the purpose of acquiring millions of acres of land that reached from the Platte River southward. The roots of the treaty stemmed from the U.S. policy of territorial expansion. Not long after the Louisiana Purchase in 1803, U.S. policymakers viewed the newly acquired lands as a place where Indians, whose rich and fertile lands laid were the objects of Euroamerican desires, could be placed. During the mid 1820s U.S. officials initiated a policy responsible for pushing thousands of Indians, belonging to nearly thirty different nations, into eastern Kansas and Indian Territory. U.S. treaty representatives often resorted to such threats as intimidation, false promises, and deception to reach their expansionistic objective of moving Indians out of the way.

Shawnees followed by Delawares, Kickapoos, Potawatomis, and others forfeited their eastern and Midwestern lands in return for reservations in eastern Kansas near the vicinity of the road to Santa Fe. When Delaware hunters moved onto the plains in search of buffalo in 1831, they encountered a party of Pawnees. A fight erupted when the Delawares refused a Pawnee directive for them to abandon the hunt and leave Pawnee land. In the summer of 1833, Delawares retaliated for the loss of several of their men in that skirmish by burning a Chaui town on the Platte River while its inhabitants were on a communal hunt.

Inhabitants of each Pawnee town extended the U.S. treaty delegation a warm, if not totally trustful, welcome. Although the treaty’s finalized version asserted that Pawnees had ceded all of their lands lying south of the Platte River, which included their most productive hunting lands, they apparently believed that they had merely relinquished title a small piece of land where Delawares could hunt. According to the treaty, Pawnees retained the right hunt in common with other Indians on the ceded lands at the pleasure of the U.S. president. In a Pawnee worldview, ownership of the land could not be separated from the buffalo, meaning that cultural differences probably, if not deception, contributed to the misunderstanding. Regarding the issue of travel on the
Santa Fe Trail and elsewhere, article 9 states that the Pawnees would “not to molest or injure the person or property of any white citizen of the United States, wherever found.” Among other things, the treaty also provided for the establishment of an annuity fund and assimilation program for a ten-year period. The treaty did no address the Pawnee concerns about the “pass and repassing” of caravans through their lands.

By this point in time, most Pawnee leaders had adopted a policy of accommodation with the U.S. government, but groups of Pawnees began to raid along the trail in 1837, but not at the level expressed in Euroamerican propaganda. A report indicates that some of them killed two herders near Bent’s Fort in that year. That spring at Pawnee Fork, sixteen Pawnees fought Dick Wooten’s party of hunters. Wooten claimed that his companions killed thirteen of them and captured another one. They freed the captive with an understanding that he would inform his people that Euroamericans “would kill all the Pawnees if they didn’t behave themselves better in the future.” This warning, if true, had no discernable effected on the Pawnees’ growing discontent with the trail and their declining economic well-being because of the decline of the buffalo herds.

That September on soil claimed by Mexico, a Skidi party skirmished with a southbound Bent, St. Vrain & Company party on the mountain route on either the Timpas or upper Purgatorie rivers. The victorious Skidis returned home with appropriated horses and goods valued at more than $3,000. Dispositions given several years later, to support a claim for compensation from a Pawnee annuity fund established by the 1833 treaty, contain discrepancies regarding the number of casualties sustained by the traders. One statement indicates that the fight had resulted in the death of one trader and the wounding three others while another account says that two traders were wounded. When questioned about the affair by U.S. agents, Big Soldier, as Skidi, admitted to having led the attack on what he believed was a party of “Spaniards.” In 1845, Congress denied the request because the incident had occurred in Mexico.

As the 1830s came to a close, the Pawnees’ largely undeserved reputation as deadly foes remained firmly entrenched. Their population losses from epidemics, however, reduced the ability of the Pawnees to engage in more active militant actions. Another devastating smallpox epidemic stuck Pawnees in 1837, killing most of those who had not been born in 1831, when the previous outbreak had occurred. This deadly epidemic virtually wiped out an entire generation of Pawnees but not the will of these people to live in accordance with their revered customs, beliefs, and worldview.

Josiah Gregg recalled that on April 19, 1838, Pawnee raiders had failed to runoff with horses and mules belonging to this party of twenty-three Euroamericans and twelve Mexican servants. Later that summer, Pawnees reportedly killed two herds at Bent’s Fort. Echoing a common belief, Gregg asserted that Pawnees were “among the most formidable and treacherous enemies of the Santa Fé traders.”

From 1839 to 1845, travelers gave mostly anecdotal accounts telling of past acts of Pawnee aggression, Indian scares, and precautions taken after they entered the danger
zone just west of Council Grove. Thomas F. Farnham, a member of the westbound Peoria party, repeated commonly held views about dreaded Pawnees and Comanches. Travelers often wrote about the “old Pawnee fort” on the Arkansas and the 1816 fight at Chouteau’s Island. Old timers spun yarns about murderous depredations committed by thieving Pawnees. Matt Field, without specifying a date, related stories telling of an attack by fifteen Pawnee “savages” on four brave Euroamericans who were traveling on foot from Bent’s Fort to Arkansas. Summarizing the outcome of this real or imagined encounter, Field stated that “the miserable men were shot dead, and the scalps of the four victims were taken in triumph by the blood thirsty savages.” Suggesting that these Indians were no longer a threat to life, Field declared “no danger being dreaded from the quiet Pawnees in case of an encounter, though they will steal if by neglect any opportunity is left for them.” However, a fear of Pawnee violence continued to inspire caution, innuendo, and speculation for about ten more years.

In this tense milieu, travelers delighted in learning about tragedies that befell Pawnees. In late May or early June in 1841 at the Lower Cimarron Spring, an Arapaho force reportedly killed more than seventy Pawnees. Rufus Sage and his traveling companions learned about the bloody affair from another Santa Fe company. “An approving murmur,” Sage wrote, “ran through the crowd while listening to the recital, and all united to denounce the Pawnees as a dangerous and villainous set, and wished for their utter extermination.”

Several verifiable incidents did occur during that time period. At the Little Arkansas River in November 1841, Pawnees allowed a Mexican party, accompanied by fifteen Euroamericans, to pass by “without much difficulty.” In late October 1842, possibly at the Pawnee Fork crossing, twenty Pawnees scuffled with and took property from eastbound a small party that included the noted mountain man Thomas Fitzpatrick and “Vandusen.” The Pawnees voluntarily returned some horses to Fitzpatrick. A U.S. agent, however, later awarded Fitzpatrick compensation amounting to $207 for the property he had lost during the encounter. This money came from the Pawnee annuity fund.

The year 1842 was another one in which travelers mostly provided anecdotal information about Pawnees. Reflecting on his journey, Joseph Williams stated that Pawnees and Comanches made the route “very dangerous.” He heard that Indians on different occasions had chased a Euroamerican and killed eight others. However, other sources do not support Williams’s dubious account.

It was during this era that some Pawnees became frustrated with the position of accommodation that their leaders had chosen to pursue in U.S. relations. Rotten Moccasin was one who joined the Comanches to fight the tragic efficacy of U.S. expansionism. He was killed on the Arkansas River while returning from a visit to this family.

The next reference to Pawnee contact with the trail came from Lewis Garrard, an adventure-seeking teenager. In the spring of 1845, he reported that Pawnees at Pawnee
Fork had attacked three Bent and St. Vrain employees who had traveled strayed away from the safety of their caravan, killing one.113

The spring and summer of the following year saw numerous meeting Pawnees and trail travelers. On March 7, Indians identified as Pawnees raided Armijo's train and another trading party, taking two horses and forty-four mules.114 Writing under the name of John Brown to the Saint Louis Reveille on May 17, 1846, Richard Smith Elliot used stereotypical language to comment on the Indians’ disposition. He stated that Comanches, Utes, Cheyennes, Apaches and Pawnees were the most powerful and warlike Indians, adding that they were all “buffalo eaters” and “great scamps.” At Plum Buttes, some Indian hunters warned Marcellus Ball Edward’s command that they had seen signs of “wild” Indians, probably meaning Pawnees. This information encouraged Edward’s unit to switch to a more defensible camp. He learned that unidentified Indians had attacked other trains near Pawnee Fork.115

In early summer of 1846, when the Mexican War escalated traffic over the trail, travelers reported numerous incidents of conflict with Indians, with a few probable acts involving Pawnees occurring between Pawnee Rock and Pawnee Fork. On July 8, traders informed a U.S. command that Indians had recently attacked another train, killing one or two of its members.116 On July 14, Captain Waldo and thirty-six soldiers were sent to the scene to protect a supply train from an anticipated Pawnee attack. A member of Doniphan’s Expedition, John T. Hughes, asserted that “treacherous and wily” Pawnees “constantly beset the road for murder and plunder.”117 Three days later, five naked Pawnees with painted faces entered a U.S. army camp causing it inhabitants to find a more defensible position.118

Not all encounters involved violence. On July 18, a friendly but stressful meeting occurred on the Arkansas River. On that day, some Pawnees sold a camp of soldiers a quantity of dried buffalo meat “for a trifle.” Expressing contempt for them, a soldier wrote, “we knew their thievish propensity and want of faith, and told them to leave, which they did.”119 Fearing that their visitors might return after darkness, the soldiers carefully picketed their horses.

Most reports indicate that Pawnees were more of a nuisance than a threat. However, on August 11 or 12 at the Caches, Indians, variously identified as either Pawnees, Cheyennes, or Comanches, killed William Swan, a teamster who had wandered beyond the protection of his camp.120

As the summer waned, growing incidents of Indian opposition to the escalation of trail travel resulted in an exponential increase in the use of negative imagery about the Pawnees. Not since 1828 had the reports been so scathing. Francis Parkman and other travelers routinely stressed the horrors of Indian savagery. In doing so, they mostly based their flawed facts on hearsay and possibly erroneous information. Parkman claimed that parties of Pawnees and Comanches targeted every passing caravan soon after the Army of the West’s westward passage. Just east of Bent’s Fort, in response to news that the
route ahead was “infested by hostile Pawnees and Camanches [sic],” Parkman’s small party merged with seventy other travelers for protection.

He learned that Pawnees had shot and killed man named Ewing, possibly at a site east of Cow Creek. Another account indicates that Ewing’s caravan may have killed as many as three Pawnees. Whatever the number of reported deaths accounts of this nature, fueled by a fear of Indian retaliation, kept Euroamerican interlopers on edge. Parkman recorded that travelers “fired every night at real or imaginary Indians.” Yet, the threat was not severe enough to bring travel to a standstill or warrant U.S. military protection.

Parkman’s travel occurred at a time when certain nations of Indians, or at least parts of them, were becoming more forceful in their dealings with the disruptive effects of accelerating trail traffic. At this point, Pawnees, Comanches, and Arapahos were apparently the most active in the fighting. They targeted both civilian and military caravans. They did not differentiate between them because both types of travelers posed a threat to their buffalo herds, customary forms of land use, and economies. The area between the Pawnee Fork and the Cimarron River witnessed most of the conflict.

Mormon volunteers en route to New Mexico, and beyond, to participate in the U.S. invasion of Mexico, constituted a major portion of the U.S. military travel. At Pawnee Fork, one of them echoed a common refrain, stating that the Pawnees were “very fierce and warlike.” A civilian Mormon, John D. Lee, learned from U.S. soldiers that some Pawnees had taken seventeen horses and mules from Armijo’s train. Pawnee harassment of the train supposedly continued for a few days.

That fall, travelers blamed Pawnees for perpetrating other acts of violence. At Pawnee Fork around October 13, a report indicated that Pawnees attacked a U.S. mule train, killing a Euroamerican and wounding another. A few days later Pawnees, or other Indians, captured a caravan and destroyed eighteen wagons. Taking articles of clothing and about fifty mules, they supposedly left the nude teamster to fend for themselves. On October 28, 300 to 500 Pawnees reportedly defeated a Santa Fe-bound U.S. supply train under Captain Mann with forty men. In addition to taking all but twelve of the train’s horses and mules, the attackers killed a teamster. They also took blankets and clothing and burned a wagon with bacon and flouring. According to a dubious account, a hundred and sixty Cheyennes pursued the Pawnees who had defeated Mann’s train. However, another source indicates that the Cheyennes followed Mann’s men. At that time, Cheyennes were trying to maintain a fragile peace with Euroamericans, but, facing growing problems stemming of disruptive impact of Euroamericans, they would within ten years join the fight against U.S. colonialism.

The writings of Lewis Garrard, who traveled the trail at that time, assert the Pawnees imperiled trail travel. Accordingly, possibly on November 3, they struck a U.S. supply train with twenty-eight wagons and 169 mules, burning a wagon and taking most of the mules. Garrard was apparently referring to the October 28 fight with Mann’s train. Reflecting a sentiment shared by many of his counterparts, he declared that Pawnees had “the devil to pay.”
The last recorded Pawnee contact that year occurred in December. In that meeting, some of them met eastbound Lieutenant John O. Simpson. Although the encounter was a tense one, they did not “seriously molest” him.\(^{131}\)

A question is to what extent were the Pawnees involved in fight against the flow of traffic in 1846. Although an absence of reliable sources makes it virtually impossible to offer a definitive answer to this historical mystery, it appears certain that Chauis from Sharitarish’s town had participated in the conflict. Of all Pawnees leader, most of whom had taken an a position of accommodation toward the U.S. government, this elderly man had a reputation among Euroamericans as being a “bad” man for his outspoken opposition to U.S. expansionism. He had been born and come to an age during a time when his people lived in accordance with the customary rhythms of life, and he wanted to carry on the ways of his ancestors. It was a free existence, unimpeded by demands of U.S. society, that he sought to maintain for the well-being of his people. Considering the 1833 treaty to be fraudulent, he refused to move his people north of the Platte River in accordance with terms of the agreement. In 1847, some of their leaders told a U.S. agent that Chauis had attacked a U.S. train on the trail, killing a man and taking 160 mules. It is likely, however, that these and other Pawnees had engaged in most of the other raids.

The fall 1847 incident sheds light on how returning Pawnee raiding expeditions allocated booty appropriated from the Santa Fe Trail and how U.S. officials sought to undermine the Pawnee tradition without addressing the root cause of the conflict. Given that a cultural value of sharing pervaded their lives and values, Pawnee men had a strict obligation to redistribute the fruits of their war activities among their families, relations, friends, and the needy. Those who received the gifts could use the items as them as fit. The objects often served as a medium of exchange within a Pawnee town or with their neighboring Kitkahahki, Skidi, and Pitahawirata relatives. Although his distributive process was an important cultural practice that contributed to the economic well-being of the Pawnee confederacy, U.S. official acted to force them to surrender those goods acquired in 1847. The Kitkahahkis, Skidis, and Pitahawiratas apparently did so without much difficulty, but it took a measure of unspecified coercion to encourage Chauis to give up property remaining in their possession.\(^{132}\)

Indian raids on the trail continued virtually unabated during the following year. An estimation of the Indians’ success came in 1847 with the report of Lt. Colonel William Gilpin, who was appointed as the officer in charge of U.S. military force assigned to protect the trail. According to Gilpin, the Indians in 1847 had destroyed 330 wagons, plundered 6,500 head of livestock, and killed forty-seven Euromericans.\(^{133}\) On June 3, 1848, the Santa Louis Reveille reported that Indians had attacked most wagon trains on the plains in 1846 and 1847. Writing from Bent’s Fort, an observer claimed that “The Pawnees are playing the deuce with the provision wagons . . . [they have killed men, burned several wagons . . . and I am glad of this because now, perhaps, Uncle Sam, the old fool, will punish these Indians who have so long committed outrages upon the traders with impunity.”\(^{134}\)
Meanwhile, Indian resistance to the trail’s traffic remained constant, and travelers continue to express their fear of the Pawnees and others and demand U.S. protection. On January 8, 1848, George Ruxton, a British adventurer, noted that after having recently detained a Santa Fe-bound U.S. train the Pawnee captors allowed its members to resume their journey without their animals and wagons. Ruxton was probably referring to the aforementioned October 28, 1847, incident involving the Mann train.\footnote{135}

There were only a few accounts of Indian interaction with the trail’s traffic in January, but none of them tell of Pawnee involvement. On January 6, however, Abert’s party blamed them for the loss of mules taken at Jackson’s Grove, a site situated some distance beyond of the normal route of travel. Three days later about seven miles west of Ash Creek, a group of Pawnees engaged a series of tense relations with Abert’s party. As a show of their peaceful intentions, about six Pawnees crossed the frozen stream with a white flag entered Abert’s camp in hope of selling some mules in their possession. With frigid weather making travel extremely difficult, Abert allowed a small party of Pawnee visitors to spend the night in his crowded tent. He warned them to avoid moving around at night because his guards were looking for “thievish Indians and they might be shot by mistake.” The following day, Abert accompanied the Pawnees to their camp so he could see the mules in their possession. Returning to his camp without taking an axe belonging to his party that was used to break the ice during the crossing, Abert believed that those people had stolen the mules from his company.\footnote{136}

The next day, tensions ran high at the soldier’s camp. A Pawnee reportedly stated that this party would turnover the mules if the soldiers gave them more than what they were worth. According to Abert, the Pawnees departed in an irritated state when he refused to trade for the mules. He rejected the demands of his men that they should kill all of the Pawnees for having stolen their mule. Describing his reluctance to resort to violence, he stated that he “could never kill any of them in cold blood, nor would [he] consent that my men should shoot them down.” Abert’s men armed themselves nonetheless and headed for the Pawnee camp to retrieve the missing axe. Seeing approaching soldiers, the Pawnees broke camp and moved out of harms way. Abert wrote that they “continued to dog our trail” for about twelve miles.\footnote{137}

There was no other recorded contact until March. On June 1, the St. Louis Union reported that Pawnees had captured, robbed, stripped, and whipped Mr. [James?] Brown near Pawnee Fork in March. Their principal men, according to the account, kept the others from killing Brown who “succeeded in escaping and his clothes were finally restored to him.”\footnote{138} Rumors also blamed the Comanches for this deed.\footnote{139} On April 13, 1847, Ruxton painted a written picture of the warfare, stating that during the past six months Pawnees and Comanches had raided a caravan, taking livestock without apparently inflicting any casualties. Several weeks later in early May, Hector Garrard partially described Pawnee and Comanche motives for war, stating they were attempting to keep the land “preserved inviolate from the track-leaving wood-wasting and game scaring white-man.”\footnote{140}
It was during this period of heightened tensions and fighting along the trail that U.S. officials opted to construct a fortified way station near the Caches. Named Fort Mann, the outpost was meant to serve as a safe-haven where caravans could rest, repair damaged wagons, and restore worn out animals. In late April, on behalf of the U.S. army, forty teamsters began cutting timber as part of the construction. For surrounding Indians, whose delicate livelihood depended largely on availability of animals to hunt, the post represented an unprecedented step of Euroamerican aggression, environmental degradation, trespassing, and provocation.

Consequently, conflict in the surrounding area soon erupted. Although the extent of Pawnee involvement in disrupting the post’s construction was probably limited, if nonexistent, vigilant Comanches observed the development with consternation. On May 9, several days before Garrard’s arrival, a party of them killed a foolish worker who had gone fishing at a nearby stream. Two days later, a mounted group of unidentified raiders struck quickly, stampeding thirty oxen and forty mules. Giving an exaggerated if not false accounting of the situation on May 12, Ruxton claimed that Pawnees had besieged the fort, killing “everyone who showed his nose outside the gate.” Most other observers attributed the raids to the Comanches, possibly joined at times by Kiowas and Arapahos, who were apparently trying to destroy the small post.

Garrard described the physical appearance of completed post. Having a diameter of sixty feet, it had four, flat-roof buildings interconnected with timber standing up to twenty feet in height. The walls were constructed with loopholes for defensive purposes. Two large wooden gates served as entryways. Despite its protective design, the inhabitants of the fort were vulnerable and scared. Unrelenting Indian pressure encouraged them to abandon the outpost on June 22.

Several 1847 sources indicate that Pawnee warriors were conducting operations along the trail. In April or May, possibly near the Great Bend, Indians identified as Pawnees attempted to stampede the livestock belonging to a train with Kit Carson but only managed to take two horses. The following night, in an apparent act of revenge, they harassed the same train. On May 10, according to Ruxton, they struck a Mexican wagon train, taking 150 mules at the cost of losing a man. During an after-dark fight with a train of fifteen wagons on October 25, they reportedly suffered another fatality.

As in the past, interlopers, usually without knowing the perpetrators’ identity, often blamed Pawnees and Comanches. As a result, the ranting of newspapers editors and correspondents, soldiers, and travelers periodically expressed outrage and fear toward both of them. Experienced frontiersmen used the campfire as a forum for sharing their belligerent views about them and to provide embellished, if not blatantly erroneous, accounts. One reader and listener, Ruxton, a tenderfoot, wrote with passion about the fear he felt while envisioning a Pawnee or Comanche encounter. He noted that because of the probability “that Indians were lurking in the neighbourhood . . . the rifle always accompanied the fuel hunter.”

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Writing about Pawnees with unconstrained contempt and expressing a “final solution” for resolving the “Indian problem” on the plains, Richard Smith Elliot, a U.S. volunteer with the occupying force in New Mexico, wrote:

A more perfect set of depredators, when they feel themselves able, than those same Pawnees, does not exist. They are arrant cowards, as all the Indians are, unless they have the advantage; but they are essentially Ishmaelites in one sense, for their had is against every man, and every man’s hand ought to be against them. Though universally, almost, fairly dealt with by the whites, they return this fair treatment with treachery and outrage, and richly merit the fate of total extermination.”

In the fall of 1847, with Indian challenges to U.S. encroachments and raids on caravans mounting, U.S. officials intensified their efforts to protect trade and travel. In January 1847, the Pawnees’ old adversary, Thomas Fitzpatrick, now a U.S. agent, recommended the placement of two forts on the trail, one at Great Bend and another at the mouth of the Purgatoire River. Rather, Gilpin, or perhaps U.S. officials, opted to reoccupy Fort Mann that autumn. This decision marked a fundamental shift in the U.S. policy from the periodic use of mounted patrols to garrisoning troops in the heart of Indian country. Additional posts along the trail and within the surrounding region would be built.

Called Gilpin’s Volunteers, in honor of their commander, Lt. Colonel William Gilpin; the Indian Battalion; the Missouri Mounted Battalion; and other names, these poorly-trained, undisciplined, and inexperienced volunteers occupied the isolated military post. Yet, they would participate in some of the bloodiest fighting connected to the trail to that point in time. Gilpin left two companies of infantrymen and an artillery company at Fort Mann before he moved up the Arkansas with four cavalry companies to winter at Big Timber.

In late 1847 the Fort Mann area became a scene of two incidents of bloodshed. Jim Beckwourth, a U.S. army courier, claimed to have killed two Pawnees near the post without provocation. On November 16, several Pawnees died inside and beyond the post’s wall at the hands of Missouri volunteers. The following April, a U.S. agent in Nebraska recorded a survivor’s account of the massacre. Accordingly, members of a large Pawnee party who had been south of the Arkansas searching for other Indians, possibly Comanches or Kiowas, stopped near the fort in their journey back home. Some of them wanted to do “mischief” to the fort, but most others did not. A short distance away, a few other Pawnees met several Missouri volunteers who invited them inside to smoke tobacco and drink coffee. Soon thereafter, about forty more unarmed Pawnees entered the fort at the invitation of the post’s commander. Within the fort’s walls they received food and good treatment. The mood quickly changed when the soldiers began to arm themselves. Dodging sword blades and gunfire, most Pawnees reached the nearby timber where they had left their weapons. The Pawnee account placed of missing at seven, including the head chief’s son. A Euroamerican account indicates that the volunteers killed four Pawnees and wounded twenty others. The death
toll may have been dramatically higher, according to the Pawnee version, if a faction of the soldiers, who apparently disapproved of the trap, had not turned on their comrades. An additional problem, cold weather, beset the survivors. Having left most of their gear behind, they experienced the hardship of winter travel as they returned to their homes on the Platte River. Saritarish’s son, the leader of the expedition, was among the missing.  

Reporting this incident on December 16, 1847, *The Daily Reveille*, a St. Louis newspaper, waved the bloody banners of Indian savagery and deceitfulness to justify the Fort Mann tragedy, declaring

> It is well known that the Pawnees are among the most treacherous and hostile of the prairie tribes, and notwithstanding their many peaceful protestations, they have not hesitated, wherever an opportunity offered, to attack our troops, emigrating parties, traders, and government trains.

It speculated that the Pawnees had used the white flag of peace as a ruse post to create havoc within the garrison. It concluded: “The fact that they were Pawnees is a strong argument against their motives for visiting the fort, it being well known, as we have before stated, that this tribe are deadly hostile to the whites.”  

In St. Louis, the *New Era* blamed the massacre on the post commander for disobeying orders prohibiting Pawnees from entering the post.

Although some soldiers acknowledged the criminality of the massacre, U.S. officials refused to accept responsibility. During a March visit with a U.S. agent at Council Bluffs, the Pawnee chiefs demanded compensation for the men they had lost at Fort Mann. Their quest for justice went unheeded. U.S. policy enabled Euroamericans to seek compensation from Indians for damage and lost property, but it virtually denied the same opportunity to Indians who experienced harm from Euroamericans.

When the chiefs raised the troubling matter of the Fort Mann massacre, conditions among their people were very bleak. Reduced to eating “wild roots,” they lacked corn because of a poor harvest and meat because they had managed to only take a hundred and fifty buffalo during their winter hunt. Indians having an association with the Santa Fe Trail had been complaining bitterly to U.S. agents that the flow of traffic was driving away the buffalo herds, making it substantially more difficult for them to procure enough food to eat.  

As 1847 came to a close, Pawnees relations with the trail remained troubled. In his autobiography, Jim Beckwourth claimed some of them had chased him and his companions. In December, he stated that his small party hid from Pawnees who were hunting buffalo. He declared that at a spot two days west of Fort Mann he fired at eleven Pawnees without provocation, “leveling” five of them.  

Successful raids on wagon trains enabled Pawnee men to partially offset the growing desperation of their people, but problems beyond their control were making life increased risky for them. Beginning during the early 1840s, two new thoroughfares, the
Oregon and Mormon trails, directly penetrated the core area of their homeland along the Platte and Loup rivers. With thousands of people in rut-carving wagons transporting large numbers of livestock toward the West Coast, these interlopers spread disease, polluted the water, killed game, and destroyed timber and grasslands. Regarding deadly infections, in 1837, another smallpox visitation took the lives of the children who had not been alive during the previous epidemic six years earlier. During the late 1840s, an outbreak of whooping cough took way many of children. In the spring and summer of 1849, a cholera epidemic struck, killing more than a thousand of them or about a quarter of their population.

Another factor occurring in the summer of 1848 had profound implications for the Pawnees’ relations with the Santa Fe Trail and Euroamericans. On August 6, responding to a U.S. government request for a treaty, the destitute Pawnee chiefs ceded a strip of land about sixty miles long and five miles wide north of the Platte River to the United States for the construction of a U.S. army post that became known as Fort Kearny on Grand Island. Article four of the treaty declared that the Pawnee chiefs reaffirmed the Pawnee nation’s friendship with the Euroamericans, “their fidelity to the United States, and their desire for peace with all the neighboring tribes of Indians.” It added: “The Pawnee Nation, therefore, faithfully promise not to molest or injure the property or person of any white citizen of the United States, wherever found.”

After having the treaty terms read and interpreted to the Pawnee leaders, Lt. Colonel Ludwell E. Powell, the head U.S. representative, distributed two thousand dollars in goods and merchandize among all of those who had signed the treaty except for two “bad men:” the elderly Saritarish and Double Chief. Speaking in an arrogant and condescending manner, Powell declared that “if [Saritarish] did not behave better in [the] future he would hang him like a dog.” Powell accused him of the offenses of encouraging the Chauis to stay south of the Platte, refusing to surrender stolen U.S. government mules [taken from the Santa Fe Trail], and being a general problem for white people. Responding to these charges, Saritarish “replied that some time ago his son was killed on the Santa Fe road he had supposed it was done by whites & had felt badly towards them, but his heart had been opened. [H]e had been led to see that the whites were good.”

Before the soldiers departed the following morning, Saritarish and Powell engaged in a heated exchange, with the chief declaring that he did not want any of the goods because Euroamericans had killed his son. He then criticized Powell for having violated diplomatic protocol by berating him during the council. After proclaiming his innocence, Saritarish [who was not a Christian] pulled a bible from his robe and gave it to Powell, advising “him to read it & he hoped it would make him a better man.” Powell retorted that the bible taught “him that the good should be rewarded & the wicked punished.”

A language barrier nearly sparked a potentially bloody fight between the Chauis and soldiers. Several evenings later, on August 13, Powell received an express stating that a party of U.S. mail carriers was advised to avoid Saritarish’s town because the old
chief intended to kill them and that the wagon train accompany them had corralled in anticipation of an attack. At daybreak the following morning, Powell led three hundred mounted soldiers with two artillery pieces to Saritarish’s town intending to protect the mail carriers and level the Chaui town. Pawnees discovered the soldiers’ early morning approach. Chief Malane, who was considered the leading chief of the four confederated Pawnee nations and was apparently at odds with Saritarish, greeted the approaching force. In a display of hostility, Powell led his troops through the town before turning toward the nearby bluffs, where the soldiers apparently trained the cannons on the town. An observer reported that the “Indians regarded these movements with suspicion and great uneasiness.”

In council, the Pawnee leaders informed Powell that a misunderstanding had caused the tension. Chief Malane stated that he had used sign language to tell mail carriers that they “should not stop in the village lest their young men might steal them something.” Regarding Saritarish’s alleged threat to harm the mail carriers, Chief Malane stated that he had used signs to say that the old chief had been involved in a domestic violence issue involving his son-in-law’s killing of his daughter. One report indicated that Saritarish had killed his son-in-law while another asserts that Saritarish had wounded the man, who subsequently took his own life. Although the U.S. government lacked jurisdiction over offenses involving Indian-on-Indian violence, Powell, citing authority given to him by the U.S. president, violated the sovereignty of the Pawnee nation by taking Saritarish into custody and threatening the same for anyone who might come to the chief’s defense. A correspondent called “Nebraska” noted that Powell had taken this action “not for what he [Saritarish] has done lately . . . but for the misdeeds of a past life.”

The soldiers apparently held the old chief at Fort Kearny for less than two months without pursuing criminal action against him.

In a November 30, 1847, letter to his superior in Washington, D.C., Lieutenant D. P. Woodbury described the strategic importance of the new post.

Their is every reason to believe that the station in question, will add much to the security of the Oregon road, and gradually overcome the audacity of the Indians – Pawnees and Sioux – mostly Pawnees, who now infest it. Its situation in relation to the Pawnees is excellent, being intermediate between their villages where they spend five months of the year – the spring and autumn, and their hunting grounds, the Platte, the tributaries of the Kansas and the Arkansas – where they spend the remaining seven months – women[,] children and all. With these incumbrances [sic] they will be completely in our power for going in one body as they do, they can never escape a mounted force.”

Following this sequence of events and Fort Kearny in their midst, Pawnee interaction with the Santa Fe Trail came to a rather abrupt end. Subsequent reports of sightings and contact with them were based on insinuation as well as incomplete and perhaps erroneous information. On June 7, 1849, westbound H. M. T. Powell saw three graves near Walnut Creek. Without citing his source of information, he asserted that, at
some unspecified point in time, Pawnees had killed three soldiers who were fishing. Reflecting on the significance of this sighting to his train, Powell wrote, “[t]hese graves will not serve to lessen our vigilance.” In early July of that year, an Indian, possibly a Pawnee, took a trader’s horse. The following month, a group of them reportedly made a night attack on Aubry’s train with thirteen Americans and seven Mexicans in a few wagons and 120 mules. Before calling off the attack, the Indians wounded two mules.

At Walnut Creek on February 9, 1851, mounted Indians, reportedly Pawnees, sighted mailmen in two carriages escorted by riders. The report asserts that these men rode away after assessing the size of the mail party. That same day near Pawnee Rock, Indians identified as Pawnees chased a U.S. mail carrier. In February or March of 1850, either Pawnee or Kaw raiders took twenty-five mules and horses from a small train of eight Americans and four Mexicans. After this incident, few, if any, reports of contact involving the Pawnees are noted in the literature.

If true, this final report of Pawnee contact with the trail is illustrative of a substantive geopolitical shift that was sweeping across the central and southern plains and New Mexico. Pawnees, Osages, Kaws, and others who lived rather sedentary and politically centralized lives were more vulnerable to the stranglehold of U.S. colonialism than those who led a highly mobile existence. Knowing that the Pawnees’ seasonal rounds of life-sustaining activities took them between their towns and hunting lands, the agents of colonialism took advantage of the situation by placing a strong U.S. army post in their homeland. The imposition of two major thoroughfares through the Pawnee’s homeland produced ecological and biological crisis of unparalleled dimensions that dramatically undermined their self-sufficiency while depleting their numbers. To elaborate further, U.S. interlopers not only spread infectious disease with deadly consequences, but they also slaughtered the buffalo population with astonishing rapidity.

For the Pawnees, their world was literally being turned upside down. The catastrophic consequences of three major epidemics from the early 1830s to 1849 had caused their population to decline precipitously from about 20,000 to less than five thousand people. Warfare, mostly with other Indians, and bouts of starvation also contributed to their depopulation. The establishment of Fort Kearny at a distance of less than sixty miles from their fixed towns, although inhabited about half of the year, made them easy targets for intimidation and possible destruction by U.S. soldiers. The aggressive action taken by Powell’s force in 1848, because of a misunderstanding, is reflective of how susceptible Pawnees had become to the striking power of the U.S. government. U.S. officials could and did interpret any action taken by the Pawnees to defend their lands, rights, livelihood, dignity, and sovereignty as acts of aggression punishable by severe means. It should also be noted that the post commander of Fort Kearny periodically provided humanitarian assistance to the Pawnees during times of extreme destitution.

Facing these adversities, those Pawnees who raided the trail, along their leaders who supported them, made a pragmatic change in their operations so as to protect their families, relations, bands, and confederacy from harm. Their war with New Mexico, now
a U.S. territory, had also come to an end. Throughout the 1850s and 1860s, their life activities continued to take parties of them near and south of the trail, but travelers did not record any incidents of contact with them, except the untrustworthy accounts from 1850 and 1851. A former freighter recalled that during the 1850s and 1860s, Pawnees rarely caused problems.\(^{165}\)

Despite the severity of these changes and the proliferation of U.S. expansionism, the Pawnees remained firmly committed to maintaining their customary values, beliefs, and economic pursuits. The Kansas-Nebraska Act opened millions of unceded acres of lands for Euroamerican settlement. In an 1857 treaty, facing dire economic conditions, the Pawnee chiefs surrendered their remaining lands north of the Platte River, retaining an irregularly shaped reservation fifteen miles wide by thirty miles long. Their reservation soon became a cultural enclave surrounded by homesteads and small communities. A web of new roads cut through their lands. In 1864, the chiefs, forming a military alliance with the U.S. government, allowed hundreds of their men to serve in special U.S. army units known as the Pawnee Scouts. These men mostly served with distinction against Sioux, Cheyennes, and Arapahos, foes that had infringed on Pawnee lands and had fought Pawnee people beginning in the early 1820s. These men mostly served with distinction, but their sacrifices on behalf of the United States did nothing to ease the harm inflicted on their people and culture by the onslaught of U.S. society. In the early 1870s, the Pawnees succumbed to the effects of the Euroamerican blitz and ethnic cleansing, a campaign characterized the slaughtered of the buffalo herds, intensifying racial animosity, and the utter collapse of their economy.

From 1873 to 1875, Pawnees crossed the Santa Fe Trail the force of ethnic cleansing removed them to a small Indian Territory reservation. Departing their reservation in 1876, about a hundred Pawnee Scouts crossed the trail as they went north to participate in a campaign against the Sioux and re-crossed it the following years as they returned to their new reservation. This was the last significant contact of a large number of Pawnees with this thoroughfare that had brought so much harm and conflict to their lives.

**COMANCHEs**

Of all Indians, it was the Comanches who had the most contact with the trail. This relationship was shaped in large part by their resistance to colonialism. Like Pawnees, they exerted sovereignty over their lands, peoples, and buffalo. They had a powerful military presence that enabled them to dictate terms with those who came into their lands.

The Comanches, Uto-Aztecan speakers who call themselves Numunuh, had been part of the Eastern Shoshones before separating with them on the northern plains in what is now called Wyoming and moving towards the southern plains around 1700s. Unlike the town-dwelling Osages, Kaws, and Pawnees, Comanches lived a mobile lifestyle, inhabiting tepees year round, supported by extensive buffalo for food and hides for tent covers, clothing, and trade. They exchanged hides with other Indians, comancheros, and
Europeans for corn, horses, firearms, knives, and other manufactured items. Raiding over a vast region provided them horses, mules, cattle, and captives, who were either integrated into Comanche society or ransomed.

Comanche political culture consisted of various autonomous bands, including the Yamparikas, Kwahadis, Jupes, Kotsotekas, Tenewas, and Penatekas. By 1821, their lands, called “Comanchería,” extended southward from the Arkansas River to the Brazos River in southern Texas and from the Sangre de Cristo Mountains and Pecos River in the west to the Cross Timbers in the east. Inhabiting the northern region of Comanchería, Yamparikas were more closely associated with the trail than the others.  

Spanish colonizers in New Mexico and Texas lacked the strength and resources to subjugate the Comanches, who showed no respect for the doctrine of discovery claim. White Americans were fully aware of the Comanche relationship with New Mexico colonizers. During the early 1820s the St. Louis Enquirer described the Comanches as a warlike nation capable of fielding up to 15,000 warriors had overwhelmed Spanish frontier settlements. Continuing, it stated:

The Spaniards have never been able to do anything with them, and have almost relinquished the country to their possession. From St. Antonio, in Texas, to Santa Fe, in New Mexico, the Camanches roam at large, the undisputed masters of the soil. All the early frontier establishments of the Spaniards have long since cut off by those Indians, and the further ingress of the Europeans entirely checked by the fears which they inspired. But the Americans they have heretofore view in the most friendly manner, between whom and themselves there has always been kept up a kind and mutual intercourse.

The article, reprinted in Niles’ Weekly Register, essentially presented Comanches in the light as a barrier to U.S. expansionism.

Comanche interaction with the trail developed rather gradually, much slower than their negative reputation among white Americans as deadly, unpredictable threats. With the lure of huge profits in New Mexico driving Missouri traders, it would only be a matter of time before their crossings would create conflict. In May of 1823, Comanches received blame for the death John McKnight, although the identity of the killer or killers is uncertain. The incident appears to have occurred in Comanchería south of the trail on the Cimarron River, possibly in the Texas Panhandle, where McKnight had gone to establish a trading post. If it was Comanches who had slain the trader, they undoubtedly viewed him as an unwelcome intruder. Conversely, white Americans saw his death as a manifestation of Indian savagery.

Because a few early encounters resulted in violence, Missouri traders and politicians developed a discourse that presented the Santa Fe trade as being victimized by warlike savages, mostly Pawnees and Comanches. These Euroamericans used the death of McKnight and other incidents to request U.S. protection for growing Santa Fe trade.
In 1825, Augustus Storrs provided the Benton a report citing alleged acts of Indian violence against U.S. citizens on the trail.\textsuperscript{170}

Meanwhile, Comanches engaged in trade relations with the traders on the trail and in the surrounding area. These exchanges provided them sought after provisions, utensils, cloth, guns, and other items. Misunderstandings, disagreements, and breeches of protocol created periodically created tension during some of these encounters. During a September 1825 meeting, for example, James Ohio Pattie, along with his small party, declined an invitation from a Comanche chief to spend the night at his camp. Fearful of a Comanche attack, Pattie's party stayed awake all night in anticipation of a fight.\textsuperscript{171}

In 1828 was the most violent year to date on the trail. Comanches received blame for taking 300 mules valued at $7,500 from John Means and Samuel Lamb [Lamme]. Near the Upper Cimarron Spring, Indians, possibly Comanches or Pawnees, killed Means. Expressing outrage at Mean's death, the \textit{Missouri Intelligencer}, on October 28, indicated that he had been killed with his own rifle. In late August, unidentified Indians, usually identified as Comanches or Pawnees, killed two caravan members, Daniel Monroe and Robert McNees, with an eastbound Sublette and Marmaduke train. At the burial of the two men, surviving caravan members fired on a party of approximately eight innocent Comanches who came upon the scene, killing all but one.\textsuperscript{172}

The murderous and indiscriminat act of vengeance by the victims' companions sparked Indian reprisal. Several days later, Indians identified as Pawnees, but probably Comanches, drove off between 700 to 1,000 horses and mules belonging to the Marmaduke/Sublette company. Interestingly, the Monroe and McNees incident was not mentioned by any of the Missouri newspapers, which usually covered news of this importance.\textsuperscript{173}

The following year, in response to trader and politician pleas for protection, U.S. officials authorized the deployment of infantry companies to escort trains. On July 11, several hundred unidentified Indians attacked the Charles Bent, William Waldo, and James L. Collins caravan just beyond the international boundary in Mexican territory, killing Samuel C. Lamme. Riley’s infantry force crossed the Arkansas, violating Mexican sovereignty, and ended the siege. During the remainder of the summer, Indians, using guerilla warfare tactics, periodically skirmished the soldiers who had set up camp near Chouteau’s Island, killing four of them in three incidents. Before the soldiers returned to Jefferson Barrack, approximately ten Indians died and others were wounded as a result of the warfare.\textsuperscript{174}

The Indian combatants, possibly Comanches, Kiowas, Arapahos, and others, did more than hold their own against the slow moving U.S. force. They were neither winners nor losers, but their tactics showed the U.S. army that foot soldiers were unequally matched when facing skilled Indian cavalrmen. Reflecting this view in response to seeing Indians make off with an abandoned wagon and team as infantrymen watched, Lieutenant Philip St. George Cooke, one of Riley’s young officers, wrote that he was
“stung by the contempt which these well-mounted savages showed for our powerlessness.”  

Over the next few years, rumors and reports implicated Comanches in several attacks. An incident involving violence provides a possible scenario regarding what some of them may have done with their spoils of war. On May 26, 1831, on the Cimarron River possibly near Wagon Bed Spring, Indians killed Jedediah Smith, a famed mountain man who had left his westbound caravan to search for water. When Smith failed to return, members of the caravan continued their journey to Santa Fe, where they found Smith’s weapons and saddle in the possession of a merchant. When questioned about the items, the merchant stated that he had purchased them from a party of Comanches who said they had killed a white man on the Cimarron River. Non-Indians constructed a story saying that Smith had died heroically before being overwhelmed and killed. Smith’s death, however, did not spark a crisis but it added another incident to a growing list of allegations against Comanches.

In the spring of 1834, when Comanches and other Indians were on relatively good terms with the trail, the U.S. army, for the second time, sent sixty dragoons to protect the trail. This time, Captain Clifton Wharton used the power of his position to prevent a caravan with Josiah Gregg from committing atrocities. Wharton’s report indicates that Gregg and other belligerent caravan members attempted unsuccessfully to lure a group of Comanches in a position where cannon fired would kill them. Wharton criticized Gregg’s reckless and unruly behavior, writing: “I have pleasure in adding that none of the many intelligent and respectable persons interested in the Caravan took part in the scene I have described.” 

Wharton recommended against future escorts, stating: “[Indians] horse thieves may follow it [a caravan], and a small party of young warriors might rob a straggling trader even near the limits of Missouri, but past experience shows that any organized regular attack is not to be apprehended.”

The year 1840 was a significant one in terms of intertribal relations. Before then, various Indian nations had fought destructive wars among themselves over buffalo. Meeting on the Arkansas below Bent’s Fort, Comanches, Cheyennes, Arapahos, Plains Apaches, and Kiowas reached a peace accord in which they decided to share their hunting lands with one another and to end the fighting. This monumental agreement produced lasting results. Generally, harmonious interaction prevailed among them for the remaining of the history of the Santa Fe Trail. Peace also opened the gates at Bent’s Fort for Comanches to obtain firearms and other provisions through trading. Before then, the Bent’s close ties with Cheyennes and Arapahos had precluded Comanches from doing business there.

Comanches only had a few violent encounters with the trail until the summer of 1846, when traffic escalated to unprecedented proportions with the march of the Army of the West into Mexican territory. Numerous supply trains, with large herds of livestock, passed back and forth placing unparalleled stress on the ecological surroundings, diminishing the buffalo herds, destroying grassland, polluting the water, and negatively
impacting the quality of Indian life. Comanches, along with others, responded to the provocation and losses by raiding trains for horses and provisions, taking an occasional life or two and losing a few warriors in the process. In April 1847, tensions escalated significantly as civilian workers built a walled fortress named Fort Mann, initially conceived as a way station for caravans, about twenty miles below the Caches on the Arkansas. Comanches, apparently joined by Kiowas and Arapahos, disrupted the flow of traffic, fought several skirmishes and battles with U.S. army units, and forced the abandonment of Fort Mann by its handful of defenders within a month.  

After a hiatus during the winter months, when Indians wintered their horses and hunted buffalo, Indian resistance resumed the following spring and raged all summer. On August 1, 1847, a U.S. army reported indicated that Indians had killed forty-seven Americans, destroyed 330 wagons destroyed, and taken 6,500 head of livestock. On October 19, however, U.S. agent Fitzpatrick placed the number of dead travelers at twenty-seven. Conversely, Comanches and Kiowas said that they eliminated sixty travelers.  

Responding to the warfare, the U.S. government took two interconnected steps aimed at suppressing Indian resistance: the deployment of a battalion of volunteers to the scene and the conversion of Fort Mann into a military garrison. The Missouri Battalion, commanded by William Gilpin, used the post as a base to launch search and destroy campaigns against Comanches and the Kiowa allies.  

Although Comanches and their allies used their speed, knowledge of the terrain, and guerilla warfare tactics to evade pursuing troops, Gilpin in his 1848 report claimed a sweeping victory. At most, the Missouri battalion, according to questionable claims by its officers, killed seventy-nine Indians in four battles, not counting the Fort Mann fiasco involving Pawnees. His poorly-trained, incompetent, and insubordinate troops neither made the road safe for travelers nor defeated the enemy. He failed to effectively take the fight into Indian country and awe Indians into submission. Moreover, it is doubtful if the soldiers knew the identity of the warriors they fought in all of these incidences. Comanches and other Indians nonetheless mostly avoided conflict with the trail after the departure of Gilpin’s troops in the early August 1848. Although still free of foreign domination, and Fort Mann sitting vacant once again, changes to the environment set into motion by the white American invasion were eroding their economic stability.  

The fighting diminished in scope and intensity in 1848, but tensions continued to run high and the U.S army acted to further militarize the trail. In the spring of 1850, the U.S. army established a new garrison called Fort Mackay, later renamed Fort Atkinson, near the abandoned Fort Mann. The following year, it built a significantly larger post, named Fort Union, near where the mountain route merged with the Cimarron route.  

The U.S. government turned to the treaty-making process in an attempt to gain concessions from Comanches and their Kiowa and Plains Apache allies. The Fort Laramie treaty council in 1851, which Comanche, Kiowa, and Pawnee leaders did not
attend, sought to clarify the boundaries of Indian territories on the plains. The treaty recognized Cheyenne and Arapaho land as being located north of the Arkansas. U.S. officials convened a similar council for the Comanches and Kiowas. In the summer of 1853, possibly up to 12,000 of them gathered near Fort Atkinson, near present Dodge City, to discuss the proposed treaty with Thomas Fitzpatrick, the designated U.S. treaty representative, who showed up without a competent Comanche interpreter. The dialogue was carried out both through signs and a Mexican adoptee into Comanche culture who spoke Spanish and Comanche. Indian leaders rejected the major points laid out by Fitzpatrick, that they must allow the U.S. army could build roads and forts, stop raiding Mexico, and surrender their captives. On July 27, leaders of these nations, perhaps wishing to obtain $18,000 promised over ten-year period for damages caused by U.S. travelers or confused by the cumbersome translation process, accepted the terms of the treaty. The treaty lacked mention of white American culpability and measures to control, regulate, and punish the destructive behavior of U.S. citizens passing through Indian lands.

The treaty failed in its purpose to promote peace. Insisting that they had not agreed to stop raiding Mexican settlements and travelers, Comanche parties continued to go south for horses and mules. Because of the severity of the economic disruptions facing them, Indian nations and families along the trail became increasingly dependent on annuity goods. Consequently, Comanches, Arapahos, Cheyennes, Plains Apaches, and Kiowas traveled several times a year to Fort Atkinson, which was abandoned in 1854, and Bent’s New Fort at Big Timber to receive distributions. Their movements brought them into contact more frequently with travel traffic. These encounters were mostly nonviolent, but tensions ran high along the trail because many travelers fear Indian violence. After the Kansas-Nebraska Act, incoming settlers, followed the predictable pattern, demanded the removal of Indians from coveted lands.

In 1857, with U.S. settlers pushing into deeper into Kansas, Cheyennes, for the first time, went to war against the U.S. government. The fighting actually began on the northern plains and along the Oregon Trail before spreading southward to the Southern Cheyennes. Although Comanches and others on the Arkansas River faced the same problems confronting Cheyennes, none of them fought along side of the Cheyennes. Meanwhile, U.S. forces, Texas Rangers, and vigilantes in Texas were inflicting heavy casualties on the southern Comanches and Kiowas, pushing them northward toward the Cimarron and Arkansas rivers. The rapidly changing geopolitical environment increasingly weakened the prosperity and power of the various Comanche bands throughout Comanchería.

The discovery of gold in Colorado ignited a gold rush in 1859 that almost simultaneously increased the flow of traffic on the trail and undermined an already unstable political environment. In an October 15, 1859, letter, U.S. agent William Bent explained the gravity of the Indians’ situation, stating: A “smothered passion for revenge agitates these Indians. [It is] perpetually fomented by the failure of food, the encircling encroachment of the white population, and the exasperating sense of decay and impending extinction with which they are surrounded.”
The harm inflicted by hunger and foreign encroachments produced a volatile environment that could erupt in violence with the slightest provocation. In that year, the U.S. army intensified already strained tensions by resuming regular patrols to protect travelers and control Indians. Kiowas, joined by Comanches, retaliated in response to the slaying of one of their leaders named Big Pawnee by a U.S. army officer that September. They initiated a guerrilla warfare campaign against migrants, mail carriers, settlers, and soldiers. With white American blood flowing, U.S. officials authorized the construction of another military post, later named Fort Larned, on the bank of Pawnee Fork in 1859 and Fort Wise, later renamed Fort Lyon, at Big Timbers the following year. Nonetheless, warfare continued until the summer of 1862.\textsuperscript{189} Given the enormity of the U.S. population, the Comanches and their allies could not win a war of attrition.

With Comanches and Kiowas wanting a new treaty, in April of 1863, a U.S. agent obtained authority to take Comanche, Kiowa, Plains Apache, Cheyenne, and Arapaho leaders to Washington for that purpose. Among other things, this unratified treaty stipulated that these peoples would stay away from the trail.\textsuperscript{190}

Warfare returned to the trail in the spring of 1864, with Comanches playing a significant role in the fighting. In July, the U.S. army built Fort Zarah and established camps along the trail. The massacre of friendly Cheyennes, Arapahos, and Kiowas in late November by Colorado volunteers at Sand Creek not only escalated the conflict, but, it also encouraged politicians to question the U.S. army’s handling of the war and Indian relations. Others, however, advocated a Chivington solution for ending Indian resistance. The war, which lasted until mid August of 1865 led to the establishment of Fort Dodge, Camp Nichols, and Fort Aubrey along the trail. Only small groups of Indians continued the fight. Meanwhile, to the south in the Texas Panhandle on the Cimarron River on November 26, a U.S. punitive expedition struck Kiowas near Adobe Walls. Comanches encamped nearby joined the fight, driving the aggressors from the field.\textsuperscript{191}

With the oppressive weight of U.S. colonialism taking effect, many Comanches wanted to end the conflict. This setting influenced the outcome in the treaty of the Little Arkansas of October 18, 1865. With most but not all Comanche band leaders present, and wanting peace, U.S. treaty negotiators pursued the objectives of gaining a land cession, surrendering captives in Indian hands, establishing a reservation, tethering the Indians’ movement, and restricting tribal sovereignty. Several Comanche leaders objected to the notion of ceding land, but in the end those in attendance accepted a reservation located within the boundaries of Comanchería. The written version of the treaty also declared that the U.S. government had jurisdiction over crimes and that Euroamericans, excluding U.S. employees, would not to be allowed into the territory unless they were incorporated into the tribe. The Indians agreed not leave the reservation unless they had written permission from their agent and not to harm the person and property of any U.S. citizen while away. They could not camp within ten miles of any road of military post, town, or village without the consent of a nearby military commander or town official. The U.S. government could build roads and military posts
through and on the reservation necessary for preserving the peace and enforcing existing and future U.S. laws, regulations, and rules and to protect Indians on the reservation.192

Following the treaty, and with the buffalo population on the verge of collapse and hunger present, many Comanches refused to settle down and become pacifist reservation dwellers. Rather, they reinvigorated their raiding activities, striking settlements in New Mexico, Texas, and Indian Territory for cattle, supplies, horses, and captives. Reports of Indians on the trail in 1866 and 1867 reference Comanches only a few times, which suggests that their participation in the fighting that raged during those years was concentrated elsewhere. Meanwhile, trade with comancheros on the Llano Estacado provided them food, clothing, and weapons.193

This upsurge in resistance to colonialism was short lived, however. With many Indians from different nations from the northern to southern plains fighting desperately to maintain their sovereignty, independence, and way of life, U.S. policymakers, still reeling from the negative publicity resulting from the infamous Sand Creek Massacre, decided to take a humanitarian approach to bring closure to the longstanding conflict. This did not mean that they would take actions to halt U.S. expansions and allow Indians to live in accordance with their respective values, beliefs, norms, and customs. Rather, Indians would have to accept life on reservations, adopt farming, and assimilate as individuals.

U.S. commissioners carried the twin beliefs of Euroamerican superiority and Indian savagery as they traveled onto the plains during the fall of 1867 to negotiate treaties on behalf of their government. On October 21, near Medicine Lodge Creek, at a site located seventy-five miles south of Fort Larned, about five thousand Comanches, Kiowas, Cheyennes, Arapahos, and Plains Apaches amassed for the treaty council. Comanche chiefs expressed their outrage at the proposal that they would have to cede their lands and accept a diminished reservation in Indian Territory, where they would live in houses and farm, their children would attend school, and their sick would be treated by white physicians. In the end, Comanche leaders consented the terms of the treaty. They reserved the right to hunt south of the Arkansas River as long as there was enough buffalo to support this economic endeavor.194

Given language barriers and cultural differences it is very likely that the Comanches interpreted the treaty different from what the U.S. commissioners’ intended. In a Comanche worldview, it is likely that hunting on their lands meant they continued to have ownership of that region and they saw the treaty as recognition of their land claims in the Texas Panhandle, even if they had a reservation farther east. Most of them had no plans to live year round on the reservation in square houses.195

The following spring, Comanches, along with members of the four other defiant Indian nations, traveled beyond the reservation to collect their annuity distribution at Forts Dodge and Lyons and to hunt diminishing buffalo and other animals. The failure of the U.S. government to deliver promised goods in adequate quantities caused tensions to flare once again. In the spring of 1868, the five allied nations were fighting the elements of U.S. expansionism. On September 2, a joint force of them attacked Fort Dodge,
inflicting a number of casualties. However, the extent of Comanche participation in the fighting is uncertain because most sources simple state Indian.\textsuperscript{196}

Meanwhile, in late August, General Phil Tecumseh Sheridan directed U.S. troops to drive the Indian freedom fighters on to the Indian Territory reservations. The soldiers responded by taking the fight to surrounding areas during the winter months when Indians were the most vulnerable. Resulting battles and skirmishes undermined the Comanches’ ability to resist, but they were not defeated. However, by the closing months of 1868 the Comanche presence along the trail had effectively become a memory. Reports in the early 1870s note several contacts involving conflicts without mentioning Comanches. The Comanches and their allies continued to resist U.S. expansion until the mid 1870s, when the power of the U.S. government finally suppressed them.\textsuperscript{197}

**CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

Throughout much of the trail’s history Indians interacted travelers, soldiers, and U.S. government officials in contexts ranging from friendship to warfare. As citizens of an expanding nation, Euroamericans had established a blueprint for its relations with Indians that was replicated in the Great Plains and Southwest. This pattern, in place at the time of the opening of the trail, involved U.S. travelers, followed by soldiers and settlers, moving into Indian lands and then using a variety of means including military might and law to displace the Indian landowners. Although Indians along the route sought to maintain their homelands and sovereignty, the four discussed above, along with others, were gradually swept aside and placed on reservations in Oklahoma. These reservations were essentially concentration camps controlled by U.S. soldiers and agents. These lands were to serve as sites where Indians would be remade into the image of white Americans. Boarding schools, allotments, and religious oppression were used to hasten the breaking up of Indian cultures. The abusive U.S. policies during this era dramatically weakened Indian cultures but failed in their avowed intent to assimilate Indians. Today, Indian nations have been struggling to retain their languages, exert their sovereignty, decolonize themselves, and reestablish sustainable economies.

A major finding of this research is that nineteenth-centuries concepts avowing the superiority of Euroamericans and inferiority of Indians continue to influence historiography. The existing body of scholarship has not been attentive to and inclusive of the wide range of Indian interactions with the trail. Supercilious publications rarely discuss the trail as being part of a larger process of colonialism that brought cultural change, harm, and destruction to Indigenous America. Indian experiences with the trail rightly deserve to be incorporated in this story in an honest and critical manner that moves well beyond the norm of superficiality.

This research shows that the National Park Service must move beyond the old paradigm that privileges white American historical actors, scholarship, and worldviews. The first place to begin is with the creation of an Indigenous landscape that captures the rich diversity and divergent histories of Indian nations. Another step is to sponsor studies that tell the story in ways that conform to Indian realities. Moreover, Indian conflict with
the trail's traffic must be conceptualized as a legitimate response to an invasion that endangered their lands and lives, but that historical circumstances and cultural lifestyles precluded overt military resistance by many Indian nations. Finally, the telling of these stories must acknowledge that although the trail produced premature deaths, suffering, oppression, and displacements, Indians have survived the onslaught with elements of their sovereignty and cultures in place. These stories must be told in studies and at national historic sites and landmarks.

NOTES

2 Ibid., 79.
3 Ibid., 81-96.
5 Ibid., Treaty with the Shawnee, Etc, 1832, 370-72.
6 Ibid., Treaty with the Shawnee, 1825, 262-64.
7 Louise Barry, The Beginning of the West: Annals of the Kansas Gateway to the American West, 1540-1854 (Topeka: Kansas State Historical Society, 1972), 149.
10 Hughes, Doniphan’s Expedition, 30.
14 Quoted in Warren, Shawnees and Their Neighbors, 129.
15 Barry, Beginning of the West, 632.
16 Ibid., 869.
19 Ibid., 12.
22 Grinnell, “Bent’s Old Fort,” 54.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
36 Barry, *Beginning of the West*, 1167.
38 James Ewell Brown, “The Kiowa and Comanche Campaign of 1860 as Recorded in the Personal Diary of Lt. J. E. B. Stuart,” ed. W. Stitt Robinson *Kansas Historical Quarterly*


40 James P. Beckwourth, The Life and Adventures of James P. Beckwourth as Told to Thomas D. Bonner, introduction and with notes and an epilogue Delmont R. Oswald (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1972), 489, 593 n. For a list of those killed see, Chalfant, Dangerous Passage, 257. Manco Burro Pass was an alternative route east of Raton Pass that trail travelers occasionally took.


42 Stegmaier and Miller, James F. Milligan, 65-66, 183, 184 n.

43 Frémont, Memoirs, 406.

44 James W. Abert, Expedition to the Southwest: An 1845 Reconnaissance of Colorado, New Mexico, Texas, and Oklahoma (Lincoln and London: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), 14-16 and Talbot, Soldier, 28, 31-32.


46 Stegmaier and Miller, James F. Milligan, 133.


51 Isaac McCoy, “Country for Indians West of the Mississippi: Letter from the Secretary of War, Transmitting A copy of a report made by Isaac McCoy, upon the subject of the country reserved for Indians west of the Mississippi,” March 16, 1832, in News of the Plains and Rockies, 3: 302-15; and Barry, Beginning of the West, 864-65.

52 Barry, Beginning of the West, 863.

53 Ibid., 1011.

White Americans referred to Chaus as the Grand Pawnees, Kitkahahkis as the Republican Pawnees, Pitahawiratas the Tappage Pawnees, and Skidis as the Loup Pawnees.


Ibid., 110-11.


“Petition of Sundry Inhabitants of the State of Missouri upon the Subject of . . . Mexico, with a Letter from Alphonso Wetmore,” in *Plains and Rockies*, 2: 102.


Barry, *Beginning of the West*, 115-16.


Treaty with the Great and Little Osage, 1825 and Treaty with the Kansas, 1825, Kappler, comp. and ed., *Indian Treaties*, 246-50

Ibid.

“The Journal of George C. Sibley on an Expedition to Survey and Mark a Road from The Missouri Frontier to the Settlements in Mexico. St. Louis, June 22 to Santa Fe, November 30, 1825,” in *Road to Santa Fe*, 73.


Benjamin H. Reeves to James Barbour, April 15, 1826, in *Road to Santa Fe*, 231.
80 Barry, Beginning of the West, 151-52.
84 Missouri Legislature, “Memorial of the Legislature of Missouri praying that Adequate protection be extended by the Government to the trade between the State and Mexico,” in Young, Military Escort, 197-200.
85 The Comanches’ response to the presence of Riley’s force is discussed in the Comanche section of this study.
86 The Smith and Clark compilation actually listed alleged incidents that occurred not only before the trail came into existence but also others that took place elsewhere. “Alfonso Wetmore's Report,” in Senate Doc. 90, 22nd Cong., 1st sess., October 11, 1831 (Serial 213), 31 and “Alphonso Wetmore’s Diary of 1828,” in Southwest on the Turquoise Trail: The First Diaries on the Road to Santa Fe, ed. Archer Butler Hulbert ([Colorado Springs:] The Steward Commission of Colorado College and the Denver Public Library, 1933), 177.
91 John Dougherty to William Clark, October 29, 1831, National Archives, Office of Indian Archives, Record Group 75, Microcopy 234, Reel 833, Letters Received, Upper Missouri Agency.
92 Barry, Beginning of the West, 208.
93 Gregg, Commerce on the Prairies, 215-16.
Clark to Cass, December 10, 1832, Clark to Cass, November 29, 1832, and Dougherty to Clark, November 29, 1832, NA, OIA, LR, RG 75, M 234, R 883, UMA.

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“Council Trove, Documents, Trail Trip, 1841,” Wagon Tracks 3 (February 1989): 9-10; Sage, Rocky Mountain Life, 44; David A. White, comp. and annot., Plains and Rockies, 2: 138. For an account indicating that this event occurred in June 1842, see Richard Wilson, Short Ravelings from a Long Yarn, or Camp March Sketches of the Santa Fe Trail (Santa Ana: Fine Arts Press, 1936), 73-78.


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Ibid., 393.


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Barry, *Wah-To-Yah*, 43.

Barry, *Beginning of the West*, 660.


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**Barry, Beginning of the West**, 722, 780.


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