Contents

1 Introduction and Findings
2 Study Legislation, Purpose and Tasks
3 Historical Narrative
4 Significance Themes
5 Historic Use of the Route
6 Resources
7 Bibliographic Essay
8 Study Team and Illustration Sources
Introduction and Findings

This report evaluates the national significance of the trail known as the Washington-Rochambeau Revolutionary Route, which leads from Newport, Rhode Island, to the siege of Yorktown, Virginia, and back to Boston, Massachusetts. It is a network of land and water routes traversing nine states and the District of Columbia over which traveled the American and French armies and navies, either individually or combined, at different times between June 1781 and December 1782.

Congress authorized the National Park Service to identify the range of resources and themes associated with the route; identify alternatives for NPS involvement with the route’s preservation and interpretation; and provide cost estimates for any acquisition, development, interpretation, operation, and maintenance associated with the alternatives presented in the study (PL 106-473). Although the study authorization was not structured as a proposed National Historic Trail (NHT) under the National Trails System Act (16 USC 1241 et seq.), the study will apply the criteria of the Act to determine the feasibility and desirability of designation as one alternative for NPS involvement. To qualify for designation as an NHT the route must meet three criteria:

1. It must be a trail or route established by historic use and be historically significant as a result of that use. The route need not currently exist as a discernible trail to qualify, but its location must be sufficiently known to permit evaluation of its public recreation and historical interest potential. A designated trail should generally accurately follow the historic route, but may deviate somewhat on occasion of necessity to avoid difficult routing through subsequent development, or to provide some route variations offering a more pleasurable recreational experience. Such deviations shall be so noted on site. Trail segments no longer passable due to subsequent development as motorized transportation routes may be designated and marked on site as segments that link to the historic trail.

2. It must be of national significance with respect to any of several broad facets of American history, such as trade and commerce, exploration, migration and settlement, or military campaigns. To qualify as nationally significant, historic use of the trail must have had a far-reaching effect on broad patterns of American culture. Trails significant in the history of native Americans may be included.

3. It must have significant potential for public recreational use or historical interest based on historic interpretation and appreciation. The potential for such use is generally greater along roadless segments developed as historic trails and at historic sites associated with the trail. The presence of recreation potential not related to historic appreciation is not sufficient justification for designation under this category.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

The study team, comprising professional staff from the NPS Northeast and National Capital Regions, with assistance from respected scholars and consultants, makes the following findings regarding national significance:

1. The Washington-Rochambeau Route is of national significance as a domestic cross-cultural experience.

This report focuses on Criterion 2, national significance. Future documentation will be prepared to evaluate the Washington-Rochambeau Route against the other criteria, pending review of this draft Statement of Significance. Later phases of the study include developing management alternatives and preparing an Environmental Impact Statement as part of the final report to be submitted to Congress. The ultimate objective of the study is to determine how best to promote the preservation of, public access to, travel within, and enjoyment and appreciation of the outdoor areas and historic resources associated with the Washington-Rochambeau Revolutionary Route.

The Route is significant as:

a) an indispensable component of the campaign of 1781: it is the route that took the combined Franco-American armies to victory;

b) a watershed in the development of an American identity: in 1781–82, the thirteen colonies took a gigantic step toward becoming a nation;

c) a prime illustration of the American Revolutionary War as a truly diverse effort; and

d) a visible expression of the hope for independence and the gratitude that greeted the returning French army on its march north in the summer of 1782.
The Washington-Rochambeau Route is of national significance as a manifestation of the international war effort. The Route is significant as:

a) a symbol of the global character of the American War for Independence;
b) the culmination of the crucial contributions of France to the achievement of American Independence;
c) an example of joint Franco-American cooperation under Washington’s overall leadership; and

Subsequent chapters present the study’s legislative background, a brief historical narrative of the route, a description of the significance themes in greater detail, a discussion of the historic use and development of the route, and a summary of the types of resources associated with the route. The report concludes with a bibliographic essay on historical sources.
The Washington-Rochambeau Revolutionary Route National Heritage Act of 2000 directed the Secretary of the Interior—in consultation with preservation groups and agencies at the state and local levels—to submit to Congress a study of the 600-mile route followed in 1781 by American and French armies under the command of General George Washington and General Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, comte de Rochambeau. The allied forces marched through Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Maryland en route to Yorktown, Virginia, where they engaged and defeated British troops under General Charles Cornwallis in one of the most decisive victories of the American Revolutionary War. Following winter encampments, the French army returned to Boston, Massachusetts, in the summer of 1782, along the path it had taken the previous year.

Forty-two members of Congress, including seven from outside the project area, joined the bill’s original sponsors, Representative John Larson (CT) and Senator Joseph Lieberman, (CT) in introducing the legislation.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY
Under the act (now Public Law 106-473) Congress authorized the National Park Service to study the route taken by General Washington and the General comte de Rochambeau to assess whether the National Park Service should be directly involved in the preservation and interpretation of its resources.

Should the NPS determine that the route is nationally significant and has the potential for public recreation, Congress could designate it a National Historic Trail. Designation could enable the NPS to assist a variety of groups, projects and activities associated with the trail’s preservation and interpretation. The study will also identify nonfederal alternatives for preserving and interpreting this important part of America’s historical heritage.

TASKS
- Route reconnaissance
- Historical research
  - Historical narrative
  - Bibliography
  - Resource inventory
- Public meetings and outreach
- Newsletters

A scholars’ symposium on the Washington-Rochambeau route was held at West Point in June 2002.
France had supported the colonies since the summer of 1775, well before their final break with Great Britain on 4 July 1776, and had formalized the relationship in two treaties of February 1778. The decision to send ground forces across the Atlantic for stationing on the American mainland, however, had only been made in January 1780, following three unsuccessful French attempts to defeat Britain: a failed amphibious assault on the British stronghold at Newport in 1778; another assault at Savannah, Georgia, in 1779; and an equally disastrous attempt at an invasion of England in the summer of the same year. Though Louis XVI and his foreign minister, Charles Gravier, comte de Vergennes, had placed no high hopes in the invasion scheme, the seeming inability of France to lighten the pressure on the Continental Army was straining the alliance with the United States.

The American troops, for their part—short of men, weapons, food, clothing, training, and money—were not strong enough to attack the British forces and win a decisive battle. They adopted instead a defensive strategy of containment.

The shift in favor of sending French troops to America came in late January 1780, following three unsuccessful French attempts to defeat Britain: a failed amphibious assault on the British stronghold at Newport in 1778; another assault at Savannah, Georgia, in 1779; and an equally disastrous attempt at an invasion of England in the summer of the same year. Though Louis XVI and his foreign minister, Charles Gravier, comte de Vergennes, had placed no high hopes in the invasion scheme, the seeming inability of France to lighten the pressure on the Continental Army was straining the alliance with the United States.

The arrival of 55-year-old General Jean Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, comte de Rochambeau, with an army of 450 officers and 5,300 men in Narragansett Bay off Newport, Rhode Island, on 10 July 1780, marked the beginning of a most successful military cooperation that culminated 15 months later in the victory at Yorktown.
and American armies would meet on the Hudson River for an attack on New York “as the only practicable object under present circumstances,” as Washington wrote to Rochambeau on 13 June 1781. A march southward had been ruled out, since the summer heat would decimate the troops.

From his headquarters in Newburgh, Washington implored the various states to fill their quotas and to gather supplies for man and beast for the coming campaign. The Continental Army’s chief engineer Louis le Begue de Presle du Portail thought the main army alone would need, among other supplies, an initial allotment of 3,106 horses and 2,132 draft oxen during the summer campaign. In Newport, French quartermaster general Pierre François de Béville’s assistants started drawing maps and picking campsites. The French army’s American purchasing agent, Jeremiah Wadsworth, began collecting the vast amounts of provisions needed to feed the men, their 2,000 or so horses—just for the wagon train he drafted 855 horses, the artillery added another 500—and more than 600 oxen. On 11 June, a French convoy carrying 592 infantry and 68 artillery replacements arrived in Boston, but only about 400 were healthy.

French troops board ships in the harbor at Brest in preparation for the voyage to Newport in May 1780.

Rochambeau’s copy of “General Map of the Camps and Marches of the French Army commanded by General Rochambeau, 9 June 1781 to 1 December 1782,” is in the collection of the Library of Congress and attributed to Louis Alexandre de Berthier. The yellow line indicates the land and water routes of the march to and from Williamsburg, with deviating green and red branches indicating, variously: separate sections of the return route; flanking travel by Lauzun’s Legion through Connecticut and New York (en route) and through New Jersey (returning); and the route of the wagon train from Scott’s House in Maryland to Williamsburg.

Enough for duty. Since Rochambeau had to leave 400 men behind as garrisons in Newport and Providence and detach 700 men to the navy, he had around 425 officers and 3,200 enlisted men plus at least 500 servants, 239 wagon conductors, and 15 cooks in his columns.

After Rochambeau’s army sailed from Newport to Providence, the First Division of the French forces marched out of Providence on Monday, 18 June 1781, for Waterman’s Tavern. Three days later the volontaires étrangers de Lauzun, about 600 cavalry and light infantry men, left their winter quarters in Lebanon, Connecticut. They followed a route some 10-15 miles to the south of the infantry, protecting its flank. Rochambeau, who rode in the First Division, had established the following order for the march:

- the regiment Bourbannais under the comte de Rochambeau, to leave on 18 June;
- the regiment Royal Deux-Ponts under the baron de Vioménil, to leave on 19 June;
- the regiment Soissonnais under the comte de Vioménil, to leave on 20 June; and
- the regiment Saintonge under the comte de Custine, to leave on 21 June.

Each division was led by an assistant quartermaster general and preceded by workmen who filled potholes and removed obstacles. Dressed in gaiters, wigs, and tight-fitting woolen underwear, each man carried, in addition to his musket, equipment weighing almost 60 pounds. Next came the horse-drawn carriages of the field artillery and the staff baggage train, followed by the ten regimental wagons, one per company. They carried the tents of the soldiers and the luggage of the officers: 300 pounds for a captain, 150 pounds for a lieutenant. Next came a wagon for stragglers, the hospital wagons, wagons for butchers, others loaded with supplies, and wheelwrights and farriers bringing up the rear.

To avoid having to march in the heat of the day, the regiments got up early: reveille was around 2:00 am and by 4:00 am the regiments
were on their way. Captain Samuel Richards of the Connecticut Line, on leave at home in Farmington, in June, recorded that “They marched on the road in open order, until the music struck up, they then closed into close order. On the march, a quartermaster preceded and at the forking of the road would be stuck a pole with a bunch of straw at top to shew the road they were to take.”

The next campsite, 12 to 15 miles away, was reached between 8:00 am and noon, and the soldiers set up tents according to their eight-man chambrées. Here they received meat, bread, and other supplies for dinner. Captain Richards was among the many spectators who “viewed their manner of encamping over night, the perfect mechanical manner of performing all they had to do: such as diging a circular hole & making nitches in which to set their camp kettles for cooking their food.” While general officers lodged in nearby taverns, company-grade officers slept two to a tent near their men. This order, with variations, was maintained for the entire march.

The early arrival provided an opportunity to meet the locals, who came from afar to see the French, and for dancing with the “beautiful maidens” of America, music courtesy of the regimental bands.

On 2 July, the duc de Lauzun and his legion joined Rochambeau’s infantry on its march across the

New York line to Philipsburg in Westchester County. There the French met up with George Washington’s 4,000-man Continental Army on 6 July 1781. The Continental Army had spent a tense and difficult winter around Morristown and in the Hudson Highlands. As winter turned into spring, the army barely maintained its strength while Cornwallis was marching almost at will across the southern colonies. Despairingly, Washington wrote on 9 April: “We are at the end of our tether, and...now or never our deliverance must come.” The campaign of 1781 had to produce results.

Upon learning that the French forces had left Newport, Washington on 18 June ordered his troops quartered around West Point, New York, to leave their winter camp beginning on 21 June and to join up with Rochambeau’s forces approaching from Connecticut. The Continental Army marched to the Franco-American camp at Philipsburg. On 8 July, Washington reviewed Rochambeau’s troops, which, according to the comte de Lauverdière, “appeared in the grandest parade uniform. M. de Rochambeau took his place in front of the white flag of his oldest regiment and saluted General Washington. ... Our general received the greatest compliments for the beauty of his troops. It is true that without doubt those that we have with us were superb at our departure from France.”
The following day, Rochambeau returned the compliment, but he and his officers, such as Baron von Closen, were in for a surprise. “I had a chance to see the American army, man for man. It was really painful to see these brave men, almost naked with only some trousers and little linen jackets, most of them without stockings, but, would you believe it? Very cheerful and healthy in appearance. A quarter of them were negroes, merry, confident, and sturdy. … Three quarters of the Rhode Island regiment consists of negroes, merry, confident, and sturdy. … Three quarters of the Rhode Island regiment consists of negroes, and that regiment is the most neatly dressed, the best under arms, and the most precise in its manoeuvres (sic).”

Naked and hungry, yet confident and cheerful — such were the allies with whom Rochambeau had joined his forces for an attempt on New York.

But the attack on Sir Henry Clinton never materialized. While

Roadside markers commemorate the Washington-Rochambeau Route in many states. This Connecticut series was erected by the state with the assistance of local groups, including chapters of the Daughters of the American Revolution and the Knights of Columbus.

New York may have been their primary objective, the two generals always tried to keep their options open. In the same letter of 13 June in which Washington had reminded Rochambeau “that New York was looked upon by us as the only practicable object,” he had also suggested that “should we be able to secure a naval superiority, we may perhaps find others more practicable and equally advisable.”

Following the death of Admiral de Ternay, the comte de Barras had arrived in May to take command of the French fleet in Newport. Sufficient to provide transport and artillery for the French army, this fleet was not strong enough, nor intended to, attack the British navy.

The only person who could provide that naval superiority was Admiral de Grasse in the Caribbean, but the decision of where he would sail was his alone. On 28 May, Rochambeau, who never liked the idea of attacking New York, wrote to de Grasse that “There are two points at which an offensive can be made against the enemy: Chesapeake and New York.

The southwesterly winds and the state of defense in Virginia will probably make you prefer the Chesapeake Bay, and it will be there where we think you may be able to render the greatest service. … In any case it is essential that you send, well in advance, a frigate to inform de Barras where you are to come and also General Washington.” As he was weighing the odds of a successful siege of New York, particularly after the Grand Reconnaissance of 21–23 July, Washington’s thinking too turned to Cornwallis: on 1 August he wrote in his diary that he “could scarcely see a ground upon which to continue my preparations against New York, and therefore I turned my views more seriously (than I had before done) to an operation to the southward.”

For the time being, all the two generals could do was wait for news from de Grasse, who would determine the point of attack. When they learned from the fast frigate Concorde on 14 August that de Grasse was headed for the Chesapeake with all the ships and troops he had been able to gather, they quickly shifted gears.

Fortunately the tactical situation in the south had changed as well: Cornwallis had done exactly what Washington and Rochambeau would have wanted him to do. In late June, Cornwallis had already briefly occupied Williamsburg, but on 19 July, he began his march to Yorktown and Gloucester, where he started digging in on 2 August 1781. This was known in Philipsburg on 14 August when the decision was made to march south. Everything was falling into place, but there was no time to lose. De Grasse would only stay until 15 October, and as Washington wrote in his diary, “Matters having now come to a crisis and a decisive plan to be determined on, I was obliged to give up all idea of attacking New York; and instead thereof to remove the French Troops and a detachment from the American Army to the Head of Elk to be transported to Virginia for the purpose of co-operating with the force from the West Indies against the Troops in that State.”

From among the troops assembled at Philipsburg, Washington chose the Rhode Island Regiment, the First New York Regiment, the Light

the right column (i.e., the infantry) departed on the 19th. The Continental Army followed no formal marching order. Marching along the Hudson, the two armies met only at river crossings, such as from Stony Point to King’s Ferry on the 24th, or on the Delaware at Trenton on 2 September.

Deception and secrecy had been vital for the success of the plan, and in both armies as few officers as possible were informed of the decision to march to Virginia. Boats were built ostensibly for the purpose of crossing over to Staten Island from the Jersey shore, ovens were built in Chatham, contracts for foodstuffs to be delivered in New Jersey were issued, letters were written and sent via the most dangerous routes with the express intent that they be captured, and different rumors as to the purpose of the troop movement were spread. Even though “some were indeed laughable enow,” as Washington’s private secretary Jonathan Trumbull, Jr., wrote, they achieved their purpose of keeping Clinton in New York and Cornwallis in Yorktown guessing long enough for the allied armies to disengage.

Once Trenton was reached, there could no longer be any doubt that Cornwallis was the target of the campaign, and as the French marched through Philadelphia, the

**Freeman’s Journal** reported on 5 September that “the appearance of these troops far exceeds any thing of the kind seen on this continent, and presages the happiest success to the cause of America.”

That same day, 5 September, Washington and Rochambeau learned of the arrival of de Grasse in the Chesapeake. But Williamsburg and Yorktown still lay more than 200 miles south, and three more weeks passed before the siege of Yorktown began on 28 September.

Washington rode on to Wilmington while Rochambeau spent the night of 5/6 September in Chester. The next day, Rochambeau encamped with his First Division in Wilmington, while

The Second New York Regiment and Moses Hazen’s Regiment—which had floated down the Dela-
ware from Philadelphia then up the Christiana River with Colonel Lamb’s Second Continental Artillery—spent the next two days, 7 and 8 September, “Constantly employed in loading and transporting ammunition together with other stores to the Head of Elk.”

Washington had hoped to find enough vessels at Head of Elk to transport both armies to Yorktown, but only twelve sloops, eighteen schooners and a few dozen smaller vessels were waiting there. They were barely enough for most of the Continental Army, Rochambeau’s grenadiers and chasseurs, and for the infantry of Lauzun’s Legion, about 3,000 men in all. Anxious to reach Mount Vernon after a six-year absence, Washington and a small group of aides rode ahead and reached his estate on 9 September, Rochambeau and his staff arrived the following day. On 12 September, the two commanders continued their journey, which ended with a visit to Admiral de Grasse on his flagship, the Ville de Paris, on 18 September. The commanders were ready for the siege to begin, but their troops were still far behind. On 11 September, Dr. James Thacher of Scammel’s Light Infantry set sail from Head of Elk for the Chesapeake on the Glasgow, with four other officers and sixty men. The remainder of the troops, between 3,800 and 4,000 men, marched through Baltimore and reached Annapolis on the 18th. Embarking on 15 vessels sent by de Grasse, they set sail for the James River, arriving near Jamestown on the 24th and reaching Williamsburg on 25 September. Three days later, on 28 September, the two armies set out for and reached Yorktown. Concurrently the duc de Lauzun’s cavalry, which had separated from the wagon train, took up siege positions at Gloucester Point across the river from Yorktown.

Presssed for time, knowing that de Grasse would only stay through 15 October, Washington had decided to open the siege without the supplies carried on the French army’s wagon train, which had set out from Annapolis on 21 September. Traveling via Bladensburg, the train crossed the Potomac into Virginia at Georgetown—a process that required two days. Passing through Colchester, Dumfries, Fredericksburg—here they crossed the Rappahannock—Bowling Green, and Hartfield, the wagons reached Williamsburg on 6 October.

The First Parallel was dug on 6 October, and on the 9th French and American siege guns opened fire on the British defenders. The completion of the Second Parallel was blocked by a portion of the British outer works—two detached earthen forts called Redoubts 9 and 10, located 400 yards in advance of the British inner defense line on the extreme right of the siege line. On 14 October, Allied artillery bombarded Redoubts 9 and 10 most of the day, preparing them for American and French assaults. That evening, Colonel Alexander Hamilton took Redoubt No. 10 while the French carried No. 9. The capture of these redoubts enabled the besiegers to finish the Second Parallel and to construct the Grand American Battery which, combined with the French batteries, formed a continuous line within point-blank range of the British inner defense line.

On 18 October, two British officers, an American officer and a French officer met at the home of Augustine Moore to negotiate surrender terms. Around 2:00 pm on 19 October 1781, the British troops with their American Loyalists and German auxiliaries marched out of Yorktown to lay down their arms.

On 27 October, the troops of the marquis de Saint-Simon, who had sailed from the Caribbean with the fleet of Admiral de Grasse, began to re-embark. On 4 November de Grasse’s fleet sailed out of Lynnhaven Bay for Fort Royal in Martinique, where it arrived on 26 November. The Continental Army, too, left for New York almost immediately after the siege was over.

**Strength of the Continental Army on the Washington-Rochambeau Route**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGIMENT</th>
<th>COMMANDING OFFICER</th>
<th>OFFICERS &amp; MEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Commander-in-Chief’s Guard</td>
<td>Captain Caleb Gibbs</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island Regiment</td>
<td>Lt.-Col. J. Jeremiah Onley</td>
<td>360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First New York Regiment</td>
<td>Col. Goose Van Schaick</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second New York Regiment</td>
<td>Col. Philip Van Cortlandt</td>
<td>420</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combined New Jersey Regiment</td>
<td>Col. Mathias Ogden</td>
<td>330</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canadian Regiment (Congress’s Own)</td>
<td>Brevet Brigadier Moses Hazen</td>
<td>270</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Light Infantry Regiment</td>
<td>Lt.-Col. Alexander Scammel</td>
<td>380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Continental Artillery</td>
<td>Col. J. John Lamb</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corps of Sappers &amp; Miners</td>
<td>Captain James Gilliland</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artiller Regiment</td>
<td>Lt.-Col. Ebenezer Stevens</td>
<td>unknown</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Strength of Rochambeau’s forces after the Siege of Yorktown**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>REGIMENT</th>
<th>COMMANDING OFFICER</th>
<th>OFFICERS &amp; MEN</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Bourbonnais</td>
<td>marquis de Montmorency-Laval</td>
<td>ca. 70 officers and 1,025 men, incl. 221 detached and 105 sick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soisonnais</td>
<td>comte de Saint Maisme</td>
<td>ca. 70 officers and 1,044 men, incl. 28 detached and 68 sick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Saintonge</td>
<td>comte de Custine</td>
<td>ca. 70 officers and 1,030 men, incl. 47 detached and 69 sick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Royal Deux-Ponts</td>
<td>Christian comte de Deux-Ponts</td>
<td>ca. 70 officers and 1,029 men, incl. 218 detached and 129 sick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Auxonne Artillery, Miners and Workers</td>
<td>de la Tour, de Chazelle</td>
<td>ca. 52 officers and 545 men, incl. 227 detached and 48 sick</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lauzun’s Legion</td>
<td>duc de Lauzun</td>
<td>ca. 45 officers and 550 men, incl. 8 sick</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Total:** ca. 371 officers and 5,223 men, incl. 741 detached and 427 sick

Source: Charles H. Lesser, *The Sinews of Independence. Monthly Strength Reports of the Continental Army* (Chicago, 1973), p. 206. Unit strength figures—rounded to the nearest 10—are for 26 September 1781; no strength reports for August have survived. The figures for the closest surviving report are given for the Artillery and Sappers & Miners (july 1781) and for the Commander-in-Chief’s Guard (june 1781).
Over. By 20 November, Head of Elk was reached; they crossed the Hudson at King’s Ferry on 7 December and moved into winter quarters. The French spent the winter of 1781-82 at sites in and around Williamsburg. Hampton provided lodging for Lauzun’s Legion until February 1782, when, at the request of General Nathanael Greene, it relocated to Charlotte Court House on the North Carolina border.

Yorktown proved once and for all to Americans that the French could fight as well as anyone. Out of the victory arose the “new” Frenchman whose virtues were extolled by Israel Evans, a military chaplain, who while still on the battlefield of Yorktown spoke “of that harmony, that emulation, and that equal love of danger which subsisted among the allied troops, as if the same generous fire of true glory glowed in their bosoms, or one patriot soul animated them to the cheerful performance of every military duty, and to encounter every danger. Witness the emulation of those French and American troops, who at the same time entered the trenches of the enemy, and with equal intrepidity and vigour of attack, stormed some of their redoubts.”

History did not bestow the epithet “the Great” on Louis XVI, but the year 1782 saw a series of festivities in which a grateful America celebrated the birth in October 1781 of Louis-Joseph-Xavier-François, the long-awaited dauphin and heir to the throne of France. Two winter quarters in New England and in Virginia, 1,300 miles of marches through nine of the thirteen colonies, a month of fighting, and thousands of personal encounters along the way had brought the French and American peoples closer together than they had ever been before.

Rochambeau’s march north from July 1782 provided Americans an opportunity to give thanks to their country’s ally, for when the French infantry sailed out of Boston Harbor on Christmas Day 1782, King George III and Parliament had acknowledged the United States “to be free Sovereign and independent States.”
The Two Generals

Born in 1725 into a wealthy family that could trace its ancestry in the Vendôme to the year 1378, Jean-Baptiste Donatien de Vimeur, comte de Rochambeau, was George Washington’s senior by seven years. Destined for the priesthood, he left ecclesiastical orders after the death of his older brother and embarked on the military career appropriate for a member of the high aristocracy.

Barring another war, Rochambeau had reached the zenith of his career just as Washington was settling down to the life of a squire. Following the death of his father when he was eleven, Washington grew up on the periphery of Virginia’s landed aristocracy, with limited financial resources and few prospects. Washington learned early that he had to rely on himself if he wanted to succeed. An opportunity arose when his older half brother Lawrence, Virginia’s adjutant general and owner of Mount Vernon, introduced him to some of the colony’s most influential families, such as the Belvoirs and Fairfaxes, who arranged for him to become surveyor of Culpeper County in 1749.

Washington’s military career began in 1754 when he became Colonel of the Virginia Regiment sent into the Ohio Valley to oppose French incursions. The following year he participated in General Edward Braddock’s disastrous campaign. Although not implicated in the defeat, he resigned his commission in 1758 to marry Martha Dandridge, one of Virginia’s wealthiest widows, the following year. Ten years earlier, Rochambeau had married Thérèse Tellès da Costa in 1749.

The outbreak of the American Revolution found Washington on the side of the rebels: “I think the Parliament of Great Britain hath no more right to put their hands into my pocket, without my consent, than I have to put my hands in yours for money,” he wrote to Bryan Fairfax on 20 July 1774. His fellow delegates in the Second Continental Congress unanimously elected the Virginian to command the Continental Army on 15 June 1775; he was 43 years old.

For the next seven years of the war, Washington led the Continental Army in a series of battles and skirmishes with the much more formidable British army and navy. After the siege of Boston, he commanded his troops through the New York, New Jersey, and Philadelphia campaigns, before wintering and training at Valley Forge (1777-78) and returning north, outside of New York by the time French troops were sent to America. Washington’s reputation had grown as an effective leader of great strength, integrity, and perseverance. His skills in military strategy had been most apparent at the battles of Princeton (1776) and Trenton (1777).

In 1778 France joined the war on the side of the Americans and the following year embarked on an ambitious plan to invade Great Britain. Rochambeau, 54 years old and father of two children, was appointed to command the first wave of assault. After cancellation of the plan, King Louis XVI appointed him to command ground forces being sent across the Atlantic to assist the Continental Army in its struggle with Great Britain.
The king could not have made a more fortunate choice. When the two generals met for the first time at Hartford in September 1780, they took an immediate liking to each other. The quiet, patient, matter-of-fact Rochambeau approached his task in America in the calm and methodical way of a professional soldier, never challenging the overall leadership of Washington and always keeping an eye on the reason for his presence in America: the defeat of Great Britain. The equally reserved Washington, often judged as cold by outsiders, in turn deferred when necessary to the military expertise of his French ally while reserving the final decision to himself. At Yorktown they reaped the rewards of their collaboration.

Rochambeau returned to France in the spring of 1783. Elected to the Assembly of Notables in 1789 as a liberal, he voted to support the demands of the Third Estate. Commanding officer of the Army of the North in September 1790, he was appointed the last Marshal of France under the ancien régime in December 1791. Opposed to an offensive war against the anti-French coalition, he resigned his commission in May 1792. In 1794, during the Terror period of the French Revolution, Rochambeau was arrested and imprisoned for six months in the notorious Conciergerie, known as the “vestibule of the guillotine.” The duc de Lauzun had already been executed, as had other former officers of the king’s armies. Rochambeau escaped the same fate only because the execution of Robespierre that year ended the Terror.

A few years later, First Consul Napoleon Bonaparte introduced his generals to Rochambeau as his, the comte’s, pupils. Among the officers was now Louis-Alexandre de Berthier, the cartographer of the Washington-Rochambeau route, and other veterans of the American war. Rochambeau replied to Napoleon: “The pupils have far surpassed their master.” Rochambeau died in May 1807.

The victory at Yorktown had not ended the war and it was another two years before the last British forces left the territory of the United States. In his Farewell Address in Annapolis, Washington expressed his happiness “in the confirmation of our Independence and Sovereignty” and his pleasure for “the opportunity afforded the United States of becoming a respectable Nation. ... Having now finished the work assigned me, I retire from the great theatre of Action.”

Washington returned to Mount Vernon on Christmas Eve 1783, after an absence of more than eight years, to enjoy the life of a country gentleman. But it was not long before he was called back to that “great theatre of Action” he thought he had left for good. In 1789, the American people elected Washington the first president of the United States. As he had shaped the Continental Army and led it to victory, he now helped shape the young nation and lead it through its first difficult years, serving two terms. He died at Mt. Vernon in December 1799.
**Timeline**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1763</td>
<td>First Treaty of Paris</td>
<td>Ends the French and Indian War. France cedes Canada and territories east of the Mississippi to Great Britain.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1764</td>
<td>British Parliament passes the Sugar Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1765</td>
<td>British Parliament passes the Stamp Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1766</td>
<td>British Parliament passes the Quartering Act</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1767</td>
<td>British Parliament passes the Townshend Act</td>
<td>Imposing duties on tea, paper, and other items imported into the colonies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1770</td>
<td>British troops in Boston fire on rioters</td>
<td>The event becomes known as the Boston Massacre. Repeal of most of the Townshend Act duties.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1773</td>
<td>Boston Tea Party</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1775</td>
<td>British Parliament declares Massachusetts to be in rebellion</td>
<td>February 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1776</td>
<td>First shipment of arms and ammunition in support of the American rebels leaves France for the New World</td>
<td>May 2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1777</td>
<td>Congress ratifies the Declaration of Independence</td>
<td>July 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1778</td>
<td>American representatives in Paris sign a “Treaty of Amity and Friendship” and a secret “Treaty of Alliance” with France</td>
<td>February 6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1779</td>
<td>A French Acte Royal sets 17 June 1778 as the date when hostilities with Great Britain began</td>
<td>April 5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1780</td>
<td>Congress ratifies Treaty of Alliance with France</td>
<td>May 4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1781</td>
<td>Following the Battle of Monmouth, Lafayette returns to France and requests more assistance from the king</td>
<td>June 28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1782</td>
<td>First official use of the term United States of America</td>
<td>July 11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1783</td>
<td>French Admiral d’Estaing arrives with a fleet outside Newport, RI, to support the American attack on the city. The attack fails.</td>
<td>July 29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1784</td>
<td>Spanish forces under General John Burgoyne are defeated at Savannah, GA.</td>
<td>October 9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1785</td>
<td>Charleston, SC, falls to the British</td>
<td>May 12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### 1780

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Winter</td>
<td>Lafayette returns from France to Morristown, NJ, with the promise of more support from the king.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 10</td>
<td>Commanded by Admiral de Ternay, a fleet carrying some 450 officers and 5,300 men under the comte de Rochambeau sails into Narragansett Bay in Newport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 21</td>
<td>Generals Washington and Rochambeau meet at the Hartford Conference.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 25</td>
<td>Benedict Arnold's attempt to hand West Point over to the British fails.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1781

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>May 22</td>
<td>Washington and Rochambeau meet at Wethersfield, CT, to discuss their strategy for the upcoming campaign.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 10</td>
<td>The French infantry leaves its winter quarters in Newport.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 19</td>
<td>The Regiment Bourbonnais is the first French unit to cross into Connecticut from winter quarters in Rhode Island on its way to Philipsburg, NY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June 21</td>
<td>Lauzun’s Legion leaves Lebanon, CT, for Philipsburg, NY, on a route that covers the left flank of Rochambeau’s infantry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 6</td>
<td>French forces join the Continental Army near Philipsburg, NY.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August 18</td>
<td>The Franco-American armies depart Philipsburg for Virginia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 5</td>
<td>In the Battle of the Capes, Admiral de Grasse prevents a British fleet from entering Chesapeake Bay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 28</td>
<td>The siege of Yorktown begins.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 19</td>
<td>Cornwallis surrenders. The Continental Army marches north to its winter quarters in early November. French forces will spend the winter of 1781-82 in and around Williamsburg.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 4</td>
<td>Admiral de Grasse sails from Yorktown for Martinique.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>Lafayette sails back to France.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1782

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 1</td>
<td>Rochambeau’s infantry begins its march north to Boston.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 30</td>
<td>Preliminaries of Peace between the United States and Great Britain are signed in Paris.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 25</td>
<td>Rochambeau’s infantry sails out of Boston Harbor for the Caribbean. Lauzun’s Legion winters in Wilmington, DE.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1783

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>January 20</td>
<td>Preliminaries of Peace between France, Spain, the United Netherlands and Great Britain are signed in Paris.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 3</td>
<td>Hostilities end in the territory of the United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 3</td>
<td>Second Treaty of Paris ends the American Revolutionary War. Great Britain acknowledges the independence of the United States of America.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 5</td>
<td>A final transport of 85 French soldiers sails from Baltimore for Brest, where it arrives on 10 November 1783.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 2</td>
<td>Congress disbands the Continental Army.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1784

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

### 1787

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 7</td>
<td>Delaware is the first state to ratify the Constitution.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1789

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>February 4</td>
<td>George Washington is elected first president of the United States.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 30</td>
<td>George Washington is sworn in as first president of the United States.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 1791

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December</td>
<td>Rochambeau is named Marshal of France, the last marshal under the ancien régime.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Detail from a map drawn by Simeon DeWitt in 1781, depicting the route of the Continental Army through Wilmington, Delaware, on 4 September 1781.

American brush huts, September 1777. Detail from “The Battle of Paoli” (Xavier della Gatta, 1782).

Detail from a map drawn by Simeon DeWitt in 1781, depicting the embarkation point of most of the Continental Army and Rochambeau’s chasseurs and grenadiers at Head of Elk in September 1781. About 200 Continental Army troops embarked a few days later on French transports in Annapolis. On the return march in November and December 1781, the Continental Army sailed back to Head of Elk; no Continental Army troops marched the routes to or from Williamsburg even though DeWitt had mapped them.

Tent patterns and models used by Rochambeau’s forces as regulated in a 1753 ordonnance.
The dates of the encampments are those of the first regiment of the four-regiment French army. Regiments usually camped at the same site one day apart from each other. When marching together, American troops preceded French troops. Therefore many of the encampment dates represent the mid-point of a train of marching troops and succession of encampments.
The Washington-Rochambeau route is significant as an indispensable component of the campaign of 1781: It is the route that took the combined Franco-American armies to victory.

By early 1781, the war in America had reached an impasse and the colonies were, in the words of George Washington, “at the end of our tether.” But the very presence of French forces and the knowledge of their cooperation in the coming campaign lifted many spirits. On 17 May 1781, Washington’s aide Tench Tilghman wrote to Robert Morris that he would “set out tomorrow with His Excellency for Weathersfield where he is to have an interview with the Count de Rochambeau. ... The expectations of the people are high and perhaps they may expect a change more suddenly than it is possible to affect one.” A month later, on 18 June 1781, Thomas Rodney, Delaware’s representative to Congress, reported from Philadelphia, of “this unlimited confidence we have placed in the Court of France and indeed when there (sic) own interests is not materially in view perhaps she may do better for us than we could for our selves.” If a victorious peace could be achieved, Rodney was convinced that “if they give us our rank among the nations our Own natural advantages will soon lift us above them all.” That peace arrived in the wake of the decisive victory at Yorktown in October of that year, a victory the Washington-Rochambeau route made possible.

Keeping the armies supplied was an enormous and expensive task. Rochambeau, who could not impress needed services and had to pay for everything he needed, required a minimum of 375,000 livres per month to keep his army supplied. On 15 July 1780, his American agent, Jeremiah Wadsworth, estimated that the French in Newport would need “two hundred cattle that will average 400 lbs... and two hundred Sheep” per week, with an additional 200 head in reserve. To meet the needs of his clients, Wadsworth’s agents spread out across New England and as far south as Pennsylvania to purchase animals.

Wadsworth’s order books reflect the scale of the operation. On 25 January 1781, he received an order for 3,000 barrels of flour, 300 barrels of salt pork, 15,000 gallons of cider, 1,000 cwt (cwt=hundredweight, approximately 112 pounds) of peas, 3,600 gallons of vinegar and 300 cheeses, to be delivered by 15 March. Once the campaign had started, Wadsworth and his agents set up supply depots at the campsites. While the French army was encamped at Philipsburg, daily rations were 1 pound of bread, 8 ounces of corn, and 1 1/2 pounds of fresh beef: Henry Champion of Colchester, Connecticut, alone delivered 927 oxen and 356 sheep from 5 July to 11 August.

The French had hard currency to pay with, but Washington’s purchasing agents did not. Given the opportunity, American farmers preferred to sell for specie to the French than for Continental dollars or on credit to their fellow countrymen. On the same day that he received the French order, Wadsworth lamented “the American Army is literally starving.” That plight continued for the rest of the war. On the march to Virginia, Colonel James Hendricks wrote from Alexandria on 21 September 1781, that as long as French agents paid with specie, “the American Army will be starved.”

Once the siege had begun, supply needs pushed the logistics system to its limits. Deputy quartermaster Ephraim Blaine wrote to Delaware’s chief executive Cesear Rodney on 4 October 1781, that the siege army consumed “Sixty thousand Rations per day,” and pleaded “Men who are day & night upon fatigue and exposed to the greatest Danger ought to be regularly Supplied with Provision and every refreshment they are entitled to--for God sake give me every Assistance and let no...
excuse prevent the Commissioners from doing their duty.” Vast amounts of foodstuffs made their way south: on 15 November 1781, Samuel Canby of Brandywine Village, Delaware, and Zebulon Hollingsworth of Maryland, sent 3,569 bushels of wheat to Virginia; another 9,333 bushels followed on 21 January 1782. But they were for the French; the Continental Army had long since been in winter quarters on the Hudson.

Artillery lieutenant comte de Clermont-Crèvecœur was one of many who recorded in his diary how the French troops supplemented their diet with local produce. “We lived very well during our passage through [Connecticut]. The poultry here is excellent and quite cheap. The Americans crowded round, not only to hear the bands, but also loaded with every sort of produce, so that the camp was a continual market, offering the most delicious wares.” The money they spent gave a boost to local economies, as even Americans such as Dr. Thacher admitted. “They punctually paid their expenses in hard money, which made them acceptable guests wherever they passed; and, in fact, the large quantity of solid coin which they brought into the United States, is to be considered as of infinite importance at the present period of our affairs.”

But the French needed other foodstuffs as well, primarily flour, 2.5 tons daily, for bread, which played a much larger role in their diet than in that of the Americans. Americans baked their own bread. “They trouble themselves little with provisions: actually they are given just a bit of corn meal of which each soldier makes his own bread,” observed the comte de Lauberdière. For the French, however, this would not do. For the officers, wheat flour for white bread was imported from France and the Caribbean. Among the rank and file, complaints about the poor quality of bread were persistent.

National and international in scope, yet local in focus, the route provides a unifying theme for the war effort on many levels, as it enables a large number of communities to participate—in a way that no single site can—in commemorating the people and events of the war through their local history, traditions and circumstances.
In 1781/82, the thirteen colonies took a gigantic step toward becoming a nation. The campaign of 1781 ranks with the Battle of Bunker Hill and the winter at Valley Forge as one of the most important symbols for the American states’ coming together as a unified nation. The Argentine author Jorge Luis Borges once wrote that, “History is mere history. Myths are what matter; they determine the type of history a country is bound to create and repeat.” America continues to define itself along the lines of events and myths created in and by the War for Independence. One of the most persistent but necessary fictions of the conflict is the assumption that America won her independence by herself, with the concomitant propensity to discount the vital contributions of France after 1775. It is one of the goals of the Washington-Rochambeau route to amend that perception.

Though the presence of thousands of French is but little known today, its long-range effects were immense. In a continuous and large-scale educational process, Franco-American encounters along the 600-mile-long route challenged centuries-old prejudices harbored by anti-Catholic, anti-French colonists. The Washington-Rochambeau march allowed Americans to see the French for the first time as allies rather than as enemies and showed them that the French were not the effeminate dandies of British propaganda.

British propaganda had portrayed Frenchmen as effeminate dandies while contrasting French absolutist despotism with the liberties enjoyed by the colonists as British subjects. Rochambeau’s officers experienced this hostility at the beginning of the march. Artillery lieutenant comte de Clermont-Crèvecœur believed that “the local people, little disposed in our favor, would have preferred, at that moment, I think, to see their enemies arrive rather than their allies.” He thought the British were to blame; they “had made the French seem odious to the Americans... saying that we were dwarfs, pale, ugly, specimens who lived exclusively on frogs and snails.”

This reception hurt all the more because the French were equally bound by their preconceived notions of what they would encounter. Theirs was an idealized image of an America peopled by noble savages and citizen-soldiers who had risen against the British empire in a universal spirit of patriotism and sacrifice. But instead of sacrifice many saw only greed. Axel von Fersen wrote to his father in Sweden in January 1781, that “the spirit of patriotism only exists in the chief and principal men in the country, who are making very great sacrifices; the rest who make up the great mass think only of their personal interests. Money is the controlling idea in all their actions.” They “overcharge us mercilessly.”

Even more difficult to comprehend were the societal norms of America. New England society in particular was composed largely of equals who saw no reason to defer to someone simply because he had a title of nobility and wore epaulettes. Property rights were sacred, which meant that the rules of warfare were different in America. The chevalier de Coriolis told his father: “Here it is not like it is in Europe, where when the troops are on the march you can take horses, you can take wagons, you can issue billets for lodging, and with the aid of a gendarme overcome the difficulties the inhabitant of your face tells you he doesn’t want to lodge you, you must go seek a lodging elsewhere. Thus the words: ‘I don’t want to’ end the business, and there is no means of appeal.” Such language was anathema to a nobility unfamiliar with American norms.

Just as far removed from European experience and norms, Americans did not find it inappropriate that their militia was officered by “shoemakers who are colonels.” Being an officer was not a trade, and Americans were sincere when they asked their French counterparts “what their trade is in France.” Much to his amusement, the duc de Lauzun rose considerably in the esteem of his hosts when he replied to the question about his trade that he himself did not have one, but that he had
nor were they surrounded by Jesuit priests carrying pails of holy water. In towns and along rural roads and campsites, crowds came out to meet the troops. The American view of the French underwent a thorough revision, and in the process Americans found themselves.

If the shared experience of the war bound the French and the Americans together, the encounter with foreign forces provided tens of thousands of Americans in hundreds of communities the opportunity to set the frameworks of their own American identity.

Crossing nine states and the District of Columbia, the Washington-Rochambeau route touches on or runs close to every major battle-field and site of American revolutionary triumph and disaster in New England and the Mid-Atlantic states, with the notable exception of the Saratoga campaign. By the time Williamsburg, the staging area for the siege, was reached, Washington’s army contained troops from ten states as well as French-Canadians of Moses Hazen’s Regiment, making the Washington-Rochambeau route an outward symbol of the shared sacrifices and struggles and the ultimately successful cooperation of all rebellious colonies for independence.
The Washington-Rochambeau route is significant as a prime illustration of the American Revolutionary War as a truly diverse effort.

The colonies of the eighteenth century were, like the United States of today, a nation of immigrants, defined by their multiracial, multi-ethnic, and multicultural composition. The Continental Army of 1781 reflected this reality with a degree of racial integration that would not be achieved again until the twentieth century during the Korean War. Close to 25% of the troops encamped at Philipsburg, New York, were African-Americans, serving mostly in integrated units. The First Rhode Island, organized in Providence in 1778 with African-American enlistment, received a large core of black soldiers. There were also German-speaking regiments in the Continental Army, and as late as 1781, the Canadian Regiment (Congress’s Own), which by now had become a regiment for any recruit not from one of the lower thirteen colonies, still had two companies recruited among the French-speaking inhabitants of Canada. This multi-ethnic and multiracial picture was rounded out by a liberal sprinkling of Native Americans.

But the French troops fighting in America as part of the expédition particulière were multi-ethnic as well. The officer corps of the army of the ancien régime recruited itself from among the European, not just the French, nobility, and the army itself was divided into Scotch-Irish with about 25% to 30%, followed by about 275,000 German-speaking settlers. The remainder of the Europeans came from a scattering of French Huguenot, Swiss, Dutch, Swedish, and Scottish immigrants.

The ethnic composition of the Continental Army reflected this society at large, with the important exception that most of the officers came from English stock, the earlier and by now better-off group of immigrants, while the rank and file was recruited from among the more recent and poorer immigrants. Foremost among them were the Scotch-Irish. The Presbyterians among them, about 33,000 between 1771 and 1775, had come for economic reasons; the Catholics, more than 10,000 between 1770 and 1775 alone, had been deported as convicts. What bound them together was their animosity toward the English, leading the bishop of Derry to warn Lord Dartmouth in 1775 of the “near thirty three thousand fanatical and hungry republicans” that had recently emigrated to America.

Both anecdotal evidence and statistical data suggest that the Scotch-Irish were indeed in the forefront of the rebellion. If Hessian Jager Capt. Johann Heinrichs would “not call the war an American Rebellion, it is nothing more than an Irish-Scotch Presbyterian Rebellion,” historian Charles P. Neimeyer uses 1777 as his benchmark to argue “that roughly one out of four Continental soldiers was of Irish descent.”

With the exception of pacifist groups such as Dunkers, Mennonites, or Moravians among them, Germans as a rule supported the Revolutionary War as well. As early as 31 October 1774, Joseph Hewes, North Carolina’s delegate to Congress, could write that “the Germans who compose a large part of the inhabitants of this province are all on our side; the sweets of liberty little known in their own country are here enjoyed by them in its utmost latitude.”

Using 1778 as his benchmark, historian Charles P. Neimeyer estimates 12% of the Continental Army to have been “German or of German heritage.”
French and foreign regiments as well. Rochambeau brought three French infantry regiments and the Royal Deux Ponts of the infanterie allemande, recruited in the Duchy of Zweibrücken, in the Holy Roman Empire, and in the German-speaking parts of Alsace and Lorraine ruled by the French crown. He also brought the volontaires étrangers de Lauzun, a 600-man light infantry and cavalry unit under the duc de Lauzun. Women and children have always formed an integral part of the world’s armies, and it was no different in the American Revolutionary War. Even though their numbers were always strictly limited, at least in theory, and attempts were made to keep women of questionable conduct out of the camp and to keep those within closely supervised, Washington found it impossible to do without them. The vast majority of them were either the wives of soldiers or women looking for employment who were primarily used as washerwomen “to keep the Soldier’s clean” or assigned for “the use of the Hospital.”

The earliest available general return for the Continental Army of December 1777 gives the number of women drawing rations (equal to that of an enlisted man) at about one

George Washington convened a Council of War to discuss, among other topics, the role that blacks, free and slave, were to play in the military. The council decided that henceforth no “deserter from the Ministerial army, nor any stroller, negro, or vagabond” would be recruited. The Continental Army was to be a white army.

When the colonies declared their independence in July 1776, few blacks remained in the ranks of the Continental Army. When soon after the British had captured New York City and were threatening Philadelphia, a frightened Congress ordered the states to raise 88 infantry battalions to serve for three years or the duration of the war; in December, Washington was authorized to raise another 16 battalions. When enlistment did not meet manpower needs, Congress asked the states in January 1777 to fill their units “by drafts, from their militia, or in any other way.”

Washington opened the door to black Americans in instructions to recruiting officers of 12 January 1777 to “enlist none but Freemen,” the implication being that the recruits could be black as long as they were free. Black Americans became an integral component of the Continental Army when New England states began to accept slaves as recruits.

• New Jersey, May 1777: permits masters to enlist slaves as substitutes.
• New Hampshire, early fall 1777: opens the door to slaves to fill the state’s quota.
• Connecticut, October 1777: allows slaves to enlist.
• Valley Forge encampment, January 1778: Washington legalizes the New England arrangements and approves Rhode Island’s plan to raise a black regiment.
• Rhode Island, March 1778: raises the First Rhode Island Regiment. Some 250 former slaves and freedmen served in the First Rhode Island, including at the siege of Yorktown, where the regiment was led by Lt.-Col. Jeremiah Olney. The First Rhode Island stayed on active duty for five years, through the end of the war in November 1783.
• Massachusetts, spring of 1778: raises an all-black unit, the “Bucks of America,” under Samuel Middleton, the only known black commissioned officer in the Continental Army.
• New York, after March 1781: actively recruits slaves to enlist in the army.
• Maryland, October 1780: accepts “any able-bodied slave between 16 and 40 years of age, who voluntarily enters into service...with the consent and agreement of his master” as a soldier.
• Maryland, after May 1781: all free blacks are subject to the draft. When Lord Cornwallis seems to threaten their state, desperate regimental commanders raid jails and gallow for likely recruits. On 17 April 1781, Colonel Zachariah Forrest asks Governor Thomas Sims Lee “to send some orders respecting the Negro man under sentence of Death, he is so young and healthy and would make a fine soldier if acquitted.”
• Virginia, May 1777: the draft law greatly increases the number of blacks in the Virginia line.
• Virginia, winter of 1777-78: free blacks are the first to be called up as the draft is more strictly enforced. “It was thought that they could best be spared,” Governor Thomas Nelson informed George Washington on 21 November 1777.

When faced with a draft notice, Virginia masters often presented a slave to the recruiting officer as a free man and therefore able to be a substitute. Many a runaway also told the nearest recruiter that he was free and anxious to wear the uniform of a
Continental soldier. To put an end to such behavior on the part of some masters and to the self-emancipation of slaves, the Virginia legislature amended the Militia Law in June 1777. It forbade "any recruiting officers within the Commonwealth to enlist any negro or mulatto into the service of this, or either of the United States, until such Negro shall produce a certificate...that he is a freeman."

Once the war was over, many Virginians tried to deny slaves their freedom, even when it was a well-deserved reward. But even a legislature such as Virginia’s, dominated by slave-owners, felt obliged to speak out against this obvious injustice. In the fall of 1783, it passed a bill condemning owners who “contrary to principles of justice and to their own solemn promise” kept their substitutes as slaves. They were freed by law with instructions to the attorney general of Virginia to act on behalf of former slaves held in servitude despite their enlistment.

At the same time, however, Virginia continued a practice begun in October 1780 of offering each recruit willing to serve for the duration of the war a bonus of 300 acres of land and the choice of a healthy black male slave between the ages of 10 and 30 years or £60 in specie. The slave bonus was financed by a special tax on whites owning more than 20 slaves.

On 24 August 1778, an army report listed 755 African-American soldiers as serving in the Continental Army. When the French and American armies joined forces at White Plains for the march to Virginia in June 1781, their numbers had almost doubled. French officers estimated the American army to be about one-fourth black. Among them was the First Rhode Island Regiment, which Closen considered the best American unit: “the most neatly dressed, the best under arms, and the most precise in its manoeuvres.” Throughout the war, American policy toward black soldiers wavered between exclusion and grudging admittance in times of need. Some 5,000 blacks, 1% of the 500,000 African-Americans living in the American colonies, are thought to have fought on the American side. Many more, 80,000 to 100,000 African-Americans, are said to have fled behind British lines, where an unknown number served in the Royal Army. It is not that they were necessarily pro-British, but that first and foremost they were pro-black, prepared to support the side that held out the greatest promise of freedom and a better life. That side was the British, though their promises rarely came true. Thousands who had fled behind British lines died or were recaptured by their American masters, thousands more ended up as property of British officers or as slaves in the Caribbean possessions of the crown. Between 1775 and 1785, more than 65,000 slaves were brought into the port of Kingston in Jamaica alone, though the main slave traders on the island recorded but few ships arriving from Africa. Even when the British wanted to keep their promises, the result was often disappointing. According to American historian Sylvia R. Frey, all of 1,336 men, 914 women, and 740 children were admitted “as a reward for their wartime services” and transported to Nova Scotia, where they were given the poorest land. A few hundred ended up in England. Neither welcome nor accustomed to life in the Canadian Maritimes, about 1,200 of the survivors left for Sierra Leone in February 1792.

African Americans who enlisted in the Continental Army usually served in integrated units, on equal footing and pay with their white comrades. Most became professional soldiers, serving for at least three years, if not for the duration of the war. It was their professionalism that officers like Closen admired.

woman for every 44 NCOs and men, or 2.5%. At the beginning of the 1781 campaign in June, a return for the brigades encamped at New Windsor (except the Connecticut Line) shows 137 women, one for every 32 men. Male-female ratios varied from a high of 1 woman for every 11 men in the artillery (429 men) and 1 for every 14 men in the Commander-in-Chief’s Guard (69 men) to a low of 1 to 87 in the New Hampshire Brigade. About 40 to 45 women, one-third of the 137 women listed in the return, can be reasonably expected to have accompanied the troops on the march to Yorktown.

Only a tiny fraction—fewer than a dozen altogether—of women, such as Deborah Sampson, are known to have enlisted under the pretense of being male and to have served until they were discovered and dismissed. One of them, Anna Maria Lane, enlisted in September 1777 (maybe earlier) with her husband, and followed him and his regiment after her gender was discovered until the end of the war. Another woman, Mary Ludwig Hays McCauley, followed her husband into battle at Monmouth in June 1778 and became famous as Molly Pitcher.
One Woman’s Story

Aaron Osborn in January 1780. Osborn was a commissary sergeant in Captain James Gregg's company of Colonel Goose Van Schaick's First New York Regiment.

Women in Rochambeau’s Army

Both Rochambeau’s French and Foreign regiments brought women with them from Europe. In French regiments, women were but tolerated, but Foreign regiments such as the Royal Deux-Ponts were allowed 30 women each. On the march, they received pay of 1 sol per day and a bread ration. Officially, Rochambeau could have brought but 30 women and their children from the Royal Deux-Ponts. The number of camp followers in 1781 approached this total, but only one-quarter were from the Royal Deux-Ponts.

The most reliable numbers are in the embarkation lists of 1782. When Rochambeau’s infantry left Boston on Christmas Day 1782, it embarked 25 women and 4 children:

- Bourbonnais: 5 women or children
- Soissonnais: 6 women and 1 child
- Saintonge: 5 women or children
- Royal Deux-Ponts: 6 women and 3 children (at least two were girls, one but 4 years old)
- Artillery: 3 women

The siege artillery as well as Lauzun’s Legion wintered on the American mainland and left in May 1783. An embarkation list dated Philadelphia, 4 May 1783, gives 5 women as passengers “à la ration” (i.e., soldier’s wives). That brings to 34 the total of women and children in Rochambeau’s infantry and cavalry.

One of the families traveling with Rochambeau’s forces emerged from anonymity. While the Royal Deux-Ponts was encamped on the property of the Rev. George Colton in Bolton, Connecticut, on 22 June 1781, this “Presbyterian minister… a large, fleshy man, very prosperous, married, but childless, suggested to the wife of the grenadier, Adam Gabel, of the Royal Deux-Ponts, that she leave him one of her daughters. He would adopt the four-year-old as his own child, in return for some 20 louis to ease the campaign for her.” Baron Closen recorded, however, that “The grenadier and his wife, who were very much attached to this child of four, steadfastly refused M. Coleban’s (sic) offer, and thus proved their fine character and disinterest.”

In June 1781, Rochambeau hired wagoners and cooks in Connecticut for the march south; 7 of the 15 cooks were female. If they are added to the known American and French women and children, the combined total reaches 80-85. This number is virtually equal to that of the women accompanying the troops of Cornwallis surrendering at Yorktown.

The end of the war found Matthews at Continental Village in New York, and when Osborn left her for another woman in 1784, she married a third time in 1787. Forty years later, in 1837, she applied for a pension and submitted her autobiography and Revolutionary War experiences as part of the application. Her application was successful and she lived to enjoy her pension for another 20 years. Sarah Matthews died on 26 April 1858, at about 102 years old.

One of the women accompanying the armies to Yorktown was Sarah Mary Matthews, born in 1756 in Blooming Grove, Orange County, New York. After her first husband had been killed in an early battle of the Revolutionary War, she married Lieutenant Forman and Sgt. Lamberson as well as a black woman named Letta—traveled with the regiment across New Jersey, working alternately as a seamstress, washerwoman, and baker for the soldiers. In Baltimore she boarded a ship and sailed down Chesapeake Bay to Williamsburg. At the siege of Yorktown she cooked for four soldiers besides her husband, carrying water and taking care of wounded soldiers. At some point she encountered Washington who asked: “Young woman, are you not afraid of the bullets?” “No,” she replied, “the bullets would not cheat the gallows.”

Sarah Matthews (1756-1858)
When artillery lieutenant Clermont-Crèvecœur first encountered the Continental Army at Philipsburg in July 1781, he was struck by the number of "children who could not have been over fourteen" enlisted in its ranks. One of them could well have been John Hudson of the First New York regiment, which was encamped at Philipsburg. Born on 12 June 1768, Hudson was still two months shy of his 13th birthday when he enlisted in a militia levy raised in April 1781 near Canaan, New York. Next his unit marched to Saratoga, where Hudson became a soldier in the Continental Army.

"The levies mounted guard with the regular troops, and one morning just after being relieved at the usual hour, I had gone into our quarters and was sitting on the ground with my gun between my knees when it went off accidentally... the guard immediately came in with a file of men and took me to the guard house. Here a conversation took place between the sergeant major and quartermaster sergeant, and one of them remarked with an oath, that it was a shame to give a boy like this an hundred lashes for what was notoriously an accident. This was said, purposely loud enough for me to hear. Then turning to me he added— 'Come my lad, the best way for you to get out of this, will be to enlist— come along with us.'"

Hudson enlisted for the duration of the war in the First Company, Captain Aaron Aurson, First New York Regiment. Three months later, he, and the dozens of teen-age boys in his regiment, were on their way to Virginia. Historian Charles P. Neimeyer estimates that about 20% of the soldiers in the "New York regiments... were teen-aged boys." In neighboring Pennsylvania, 122 (11%) of 1,068 soldiers who gave their age upon enlistment were seventeen or younger.

After the war, Hudson moved westward, eventually settling in southern Ohio. In 1846, the 78-year-old Hudson told his story to Charles Cist, publisher of Cist's Advertiser in Cincinnati, who published Hudson's reminiscences in his weekly paper. French enlistment records contain the names of child-soldiers as well. Numbering about half a dozen per regiment, boys aged 15 and younger were enfants de troupe. The sons of soldiers who could enter the rolls at half-pay at the age of six, they began their careers as musicians until they were sixteen, when they could enlist as regular soldiers. Inspection reports of Rochambeau's units (except Lauzun's Legion) on 10 and 11 November 1781 (i.e., right after Yorktown) list five enfants de troupe in the Saintonge and one in the Royal Deux-Ponts.
The Washington-Rochambeau route is significant as a visible expression of the hope for independence and the gratitude that greeted the returning French army on its march north in the summer of 1782.

After a string of defeats and setbacks during the previous years—the failed siege of Savannah in 1779, the treasonous desertion of Benedict Arnold in September 1780, and the mutiny at Morristown in the winter of 1780-81—the victory at Yorktown in the fall of 1781 gave Americans hope that independence might finally be within reach. When news of Yorktown reached Wilmington, Quaker and mill owner Samuel Canby recorded in his diary that “people seem… more disposed to expect an Independance might take place.” Others were even more optimistic. On 22 October 1781, Robert R. Livingston of New York informed Francis Dana of the victory and expressed his hope that “you will not fail to make the most of this intelligence which must fix our independence not only beyond all doubt but even beyond all controversy.”

This hope and gratitude toward the French allies expressed itself in the celebrations that greeted them on their return march of 1782, and in the many celebrations for the birth of the dauphin in June and July of 1782. Concurrently Congress passed a resolution on 29 October 1781, which called for the construction of a monument at Yorktown to commemorate the victory. In view of the state of American finances, Livingston wondered in a letter of 16 December 1781 to Benjamin Franklin whether the monument ought not be postponed until a better time. It took a full century before the Yorktown Victory Monument was unveiled at the centennial of 1881.

The origins of the celebrations for the dauphin’s birth were totally political, which is not surprising. Anne César, chevalier de la Luzerne, the French minister to the United States, carefully studied the needs of the alliance and attempted to arrange events accordingly. ... Symbolically, the celebrations of the birth offered Americans a chance to bid farewell to the French and to recognize the value of their aid and alliance. This remained implicit in the celebrations, at least thirty to forty of which were held throughout the summer of 1782. In newspaper coverage at least eighty, and probably closer to one hundred, articles appeared in American papers describing the celebrations. No other event during the Revolution, with the possible exception of the Silas Deane affair, received so much concentrated attention in the American press.”

The memory of the successful Franco-American cooperation along the Washington-Rochambeau route has survived in many manifestations, such as the houses and homes where French and American officers stayed and in the campsites for the enlisted men. It continues to survive in dozens of monuments, historical markers, gravestones, and in the various Rochambeau High Schools along the route. It is kept alive in commemorative events such as the annual Rochambeau Day in September in Hartford, which commemorates the Hartford Conference of 1780, and the victory celebrations in October in Yorktown. It can be found in local names such as French Hill and Hussars Place, and in the names of towns along the route such as Crompond, New York, re-named Yorktown Heights in 1787. In 1778, George Rogers Clarke founded a city in what would become the state of Kentucky and named it Louisville after the King of France. Ten years later, citizens of Vermont, a state that had not even existed during the Revolutionary War, founded Vergennes, named after the French foreign minister.

The name Rochambeau has been adopted for a variety of sites and land uses.
The Route as Manifestation of the International War Effort

The Washington-Rochambeau route is significant as a symbol of the global character of the American War for Independence.

The American War for Independence was a worldwide conflict that the fledgling United States was able to survive only with the support of the French and, to a lesser extent, the Spanish and the Dutch governments. Commemorating the Washington-Rochambeau route introduces Americans to the little-known fact that America’s independence was won with the help of powerful friends, that it was won as much in the East and West Indies, in Africa, and in Minorca as it was on the American continent. This international alliance kept Britain from concentrating her forces in the colonies, which gave Washington, Rochambeau, and de Grasse the breathing room they needed to execute the campaign.

The War for Independence as a Global War

The 1778 Treaty of Alliance between France and the United States and the entry of Spain and the Netherlands into the conflict in 1780, turned the American rebellion into a global contest. By 1781, the war in America was but one, and by far not the largest, theater of war.

In the West Indies, the marquis de Bouillé, governor-general of Martinique, had captured British Dominica as early as 7 September 1778. During the course of the war, 27 French metropolitan infantry battalions, smaller detachments and two artillery battalions joined the colonial infantry, artillery, and volunteer battalions in the West Indies, bringing the total to more or less 48 battalions. By comparison, Rochambeau brought to America in 1780 all of 8 infantry battalions, one battalion of artillery, and 600 light troops.

In the fall of 1778, the duc de Lauzun sailed to Africa with a military force of about 400 men and took Senegal in January 1779. The Dutch entry into the war in December 1780, meant that the French fleet could now use Dutch bases on the Cape of Good Hope and in Ceylon and that the global war would return to the African continent. In July 1781, the Pondicherry regiment and the Canonniers-bombardiers de l’Inde arrived at Capetown to reinforce the Dutch garrison. In May 1782, the Volontaires du Luxembourg, a French colonial corps transferred to Dutch service in April, joined them.

With bases along the long sea route to India, France could hope to regain some of the influence and territory she had lost there in 1763 and during the first years of the current war against Britain. All French posts in India had fallen between August and October 1778. From this nadir, France began a steady build-up of forces. In the summer of 1780 the four battalions of colonial troops on the Île-de-France (Mauritius), some 1,500 men, were joined by the Second Battalion of the Austrasie regiment. In late March 1781, Admiral de Suffren sailed from Brest in the Caribbean-bound convoy of de Grasse but broke with his convoy for the Cape in April. Once the First Battalion of the Austrasie and the 3rd Legion of the Volontaires étrangers de la Marine had also arrived in India in October 1781, these forces under the marquis de Bussy—a veteran of the Seven Years War in India with thorough knowledge of the country and its people—joined with the native forces of Indian ally Hyder-Ali and its people—joined with the native forces of Indian ally Hyder-Ali at Porto Novo on 25 February 1782. On 19 March 1783, four more infantry battalions and an artillery brigade, some 2,300 men, arrived from France; British forces—15,000 men, including 3,500 European troops—were losing control of the military situation both on land and on sea, where Admiral de Suffren beat British Admiral Hughes off Cuddalore. British power in India was preserved by the arrival on 29 June 1783 of a fringe bearing news that Preliminaries of Peace between France and Great Britain had been signed on 20 January 1783.

In Europe, French and Spanish forces captured the British stronghold of Fort St. Philip at Port Mahon (Minorca) on 5 February 1782. They went on to reinforce a combined Franco-Spanish force of some 28,000 men laying siege to Gibraltar, defended by General Elliot with 7,000 British troops. A general attack on 13 September 1782 failed.

The expansion of the conflict meant that by the summer of 1781, even before the victory at Yorktown, French priorities and war aims were shifting. Rochambeau was to get 830 replacements in 1781; 600 French troops were to go to India, and 4,000 to the Caribbean, where France now had to protect Dutch and Spanish possessions as well. But as the strategic and political situation developed, the ministry in Paris decided to limit the replacements to Rochambeau to two dozen canonniers of the First Battalion of the Auxonne Artillery and a few well-placed officers who arrived on the frigates l’Aigle and la Gloire only in mid-September 1782. Meanwhile, the contingent to India was increased by 3,900 men to 4,500 by the end of the war. France had more troops in India than in America.
Soon after the alliance between France and the United States was signed, copies of the treaty text appeared in both countries.

The Washington-Rochambeau route is significant as the culmination of the crucial contributions of France to the achievement of American independence.

The success of the Yorktown Campaign and the winning of America’s independence were made possible by monarchist France’s political, diplomatic, financial, and military assistance to the American colonies. Through her generous aid starting in 1775, France first figuratively, and then, beginning in Newport in June 1781, literally, walked side by side with the American rebels toward independence. Without France’s aid, the United States could not have prevailed against the Royal Navy, the British army, or the resources of the motherland.

The Continental Army used French arms and ammunition, cannon and powder, uniforms and saddles, none of which could have reached America’s shores without a powerful French fleet to protect the merchant ships. French naval forces managed to keep the British at bay, which meant that troops could be transported from France, from the West Indies, and along the US coast with relative safety. The loss of Britain’s absolute mastery of the sea was a decisive factor in America’s victory. Without this loss, French weapons, Rochambeau’s troops, and French gold would never have reached America.

French actions should not be taken for granted. Rochambeau could have acted much less tactfully in his relations with Washington. Admiral de Grasse could have concentrated on capturing lucrative British islands in the West Indies. Louis XVI and Vergennes could have ruined the whole strategy by establishing as a priority a military effort to regain French Canada, as was advocated by some...
politicis in Versailles as well as by some members of the military. Colonel Desandrouïns, Rochambeau’s chief engineer in America, submitted such a plan to the war minister, prince de Montbarrey, and the naval minister, comte de Sartine in August 1778. Under the honor code of the eighteenth century, Admiral de Barras, who had assumed command of the fleet in Newport following the death of Admiral de Ternay, could have refused to serve under de Grasse, who had once been his junior in rank. Instead, everything was done to subordinate French interests to America’s needs, to assist an American victory, and to bring about the complete independence of the United States.

The value of the eighteenth-century coins was determined by their weight and bullion content irrespective of the issuing country. All coins, which are reproduced in original size, have the same observe and reserve images without denoting a specific value.

British crowns, Spanish Milled Dollars, and French écus were similar in size, weight, and silver content and circulated freely in the colonies. While encamped at Head of Elk in early September 1781, Rochambeau loaned Washington 24,000 écus in French coin to pay the Continental Army; Robert Morris repaid the loan in February 1782 with Spanish dollars, the famous Pieces of Eight.

One French écu, often called a French Crown in the colonies, represents approximately three weeks wages for a common soldier in Rochambeau’s army.

\[\text{The Role of the French Navy}\]

Spain (1779) and the Netherlands (1780), ended that advantage.

More important than absolute numbers was where vessels were deployed. Until 1778, Great Britain was able to concentrate all of her naval forces in the North American theater and in the West Indies; once France had joined the Americans, the distribution of British Naval forces changed dramatically (chart, right). In 1777, more than 40% of the Royal Navy, 25 to 27 ships, had been in American water. The perceived French threat to the Sugar Islands reduced the presence of the Royal Navy in American waters by two-thirds. The high number of vessels fitting in British ports or on convoy duty in 1780 and 1781 clearly shows the strain on the Royal Navy. Finally, the reduction in numbers of British ships in North American and European waters after Yorktown—with all the freed-up capacity going either to the Caribbean or to India—indicates that Britain was prepared to cut her losses on the American mainland but determined to defend her other possessions.

In the spring of 1781, when Great Britain had all of 37 capital ships in North America and the West Indies, France had 30 ships either in the Caribbean or en route there and another 8 in North America or en route there. (Six were in India, with another five en route. There were also 20-plus Spanish capital ships in Havana and other Caribbean ports). Since the Royal Navy had to leave a number of ships to guard Britain’s Caribbean possessions, de Grasse in 1781 enjoyed the temporary superiority in numbers that enabled him to take the initiative, and the calculated risk, that made the victory at Yorktown possible.

\[\text{Distribution of British ships, 1778-1782}\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>North America</th>
<th>West Indies</th>
<th>Europe</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Elsewhere/fitting/convoy duty, etc.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1778</td>
<td>14 (+13)*</td>
<td>4 (+1)</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>1 (+1)*</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1779</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>27 (+1)</td>
<td>31 (+10)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1780</td>
<td>5 (+6)</td>
<td>31 (+6)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1781</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>5 (+5)*</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1782</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>11 (+6)*</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figures in parentheses indicate number of additional vessels en route. (Order of battle as of 1 July 1778 and 1779, 1 April 1781 and 1782)
Between 1776 and 1783, France spent 1,054 million livres on the war effort. 91% of this outlay had to be financed by loans, and by the end of the war her total constituted debt stood at 4,538 million livres with an annual debt service of more than 200 million. At the same time the marquis de Lafayette’s annual income of about 100,000 livres made him one of the wealthiest people in France. A 74-gun ship cost about 1 million livres to build and equip, and in 1776, the ordinary income of the French crown stood at 377.5 million livres.

Most of the money after 1775 went to the navy: its budget rose from 93.5 million livres in 1775 to 95 million in 1783. Arrears in interest alone for being the first in which the Troops of the United States received one month’s Pay in Specie—all the civil and military staff are excluded.” For many a Continental soldier this was indeed the first and only time he ever received “real” money during his years of service. Private Martin recalled that it was at Head of Elk that “I received the only pay that I ever drew for my services during the war, being six French crowns, which were a part of what Robert Morris borrowed on his own credit from the French commander to supply the most urgent necessities of the soldiers. My comrades received the same amount.”

During the encampment at Head of Elk, Washington paid his troops with about 24,000 écus he had borrowed from Rochambeau.

“This day,” 8 September 1781, wrote Major William Popham, “will be famous in the annals of History for being the first in which the troops of the United States received one month’s Pay in Specie—all the civil and military staff are excluded.” For many a Continental soldier this was indeed the first and only time he ever received “real” money during his years of service. Private Martin remembered that “we each of us received a MONTH’S PAY, in specie, borrowed, as I was informed, by our French officers from the officers in the French army. This was the first that could be called money, which we had received as wages since the year ’76, or that we ever did receive till the close of the war, or indeed, ever after, as wages.” Another enlisted man, John Hudson of the First New York Regiment, who had celebrated but his 13th birthday on 12 June 1781, recalled that it was at Head of Elk that “I received the only pay that I ever drew for my services during the war, being six French crowns, which were a part of what Robert Morris borrowed on his own credit from the French commander to supply the most urgent necessities of the soldiers. My comrades received the same amount.”

The allied supply wagon train left the Alexandria, Virginia, encampment (right) on 26 September for Yorktown.
The Washington-Rochambeau route is significant as an example of joint Franco-American cooperation under Washington’s overall leadership.

Planning for the march and its execution stands as a testimony to the professionalism of the French and American general staffs. Planning such an extensive campaign that depended on the cooperation of the French navy must have been very difficult for men of different languages, backgrounds, and cultures. Most Americans, including General Washington, spoke no French and had to communicate through interpreters, mostly French volunteers in the Continental Army. Rochambeau spoke no English; neither did many officers on his staff, with the notable exceptions of the chevalier de Chastellux and the duc de Lauzun. Here, too, the communications gap was bridged by Frenchmen such as Du Bouchet and Fleury who had served in the Continental Army. American officers such as Henry Knox were largely self-taught. The French were career soldiers, and their engineers and artillery officers had trained at the most advanced military and technical schools of the time.

Washington’s command of a foreign army as well as his own on American soil is an extraordinary episode, unique in US history. There would have been no Yorktown and no American independence without Washington. The American force he led demonstrated his tenacity in holding together and building an effective army, trained and disciplined in the crucible of war. Yet as supreme commander, he proved enormously flexible, keeping on excellent terms with his more experienced military partner Rochambeau, who in turn accepted Washington’s leadership for the common good. Together they recognized the opportunity that offered itself in Virginia, but it was Washington who took the brave decision to change strategy and march south, and together they brought the campaign to a successful conclusion.

That victory would have been impossible without the naval component provided by the fleet of Admiral de Grasse, but the coordination of the movements of land and naval forces, thousands of miles and three-weeks in travel time apart, was the most difficult component of the campaign. The virtually flawless execution of the campaign has led American historian Jonathan R. Dull to single it out as the “most perfectly executed naval campaign of the age of sail.”
Francois Joseph Paul comte de Grasse—born into an old noble family in southern France in 1722—was a career officer in the French navy, and served the king in campaigns in the Mediterranean, in India, and in the Caribbean. In 1779 he commanded a squadron under the comte d’Estaing at Grenada and was commanding officer of the French fleet in the Caribbean once d’Estaing had sailed for Europe after the unsuccessful siege of Savannah. His health failing, the 58-year-old officer sailed for France in late 1780 as well.

His stay in France was short. On 22 March 1781, Louis XVI promoted de Grasse to rear admiral, and sent him back to the West Indies with 20 ships of the line, three frigates and 156 transport. Concurrently, the ships of the line, three frigates and 156 transport. Concurrently, the vicomte de Rochambeau sailed for Newport with badly needed cash for his father, and the news that the second division of infantry would not be coming after all. Rochambeau was free to draw up his own plans for the coming campaign, possibly in cooperation with de Grasse, who could provide naval support. De Grasse’s convoy, reinforced by six ships of the line from Martinique, arrived off Port Royal, Martinique, on 28 April. British Rear Admiral Samuel Hood was waiting for him, but in a stroke of that good fortune that would shine on the Franco-American alliance all year, Hood had but 18 ships of the line against de Grasse’s 26. Hood’s superior, Admiral George Rodney, had captured the Dutch island of St. Eustatius in February, and booty estimated at more than £3,000,000 (70 million livres) had fallen into British hands. Wanting to protect the loot, Rodney had withdrawn four of Hood’s ships, giving de Grasse the superiority he needed to get his convoy safely into Port Royal on 6 May. Following his conquest of Tobago in early June, de Grasse sailed for Santo Domingo, where four more ships of the line joined his fleet on 16 June.

As de Grasse was sailing for San Domingo, Rochambeau on 8 June learned of the admiral’s arrival in the West Indies. On 15 June Rochambeau had information from de Grasse that he would be in San Domingo later that month and could be in American waters by 15 July at the earliest. Rochambeau immediately dispatched the aptly named Concorde to San Domingo to apprise de Grasse of Franco-American plans. He also informed him of Cornwallis’s arrival in Virginia, and hinted strongly that he would prefer de Grasse to sail for the Chesapeake:

There are two points at which an offensive can be made against the enemy; the Chesapeake and New York. The southwesterly winds and the state of defense in Virginia will probably make you prefer the Chesapeake Bay, and it will be there [sic] where we think you may be able to render the greatest service. In any case it is essential that you send, well in advance, a frigate to inform de Barras where you are to come and also General Washington.

Upon reading this letter in mid-July 1781 (it took even a fast sailing frigate two-and-one-half to three weeks to make the trip), de Grasse opted to sail for the Chesapeake. His choice involved considerable risk, since it was based upon reading between the lines of Rochambeau’s letter. If the Franco-American army remained before New York rather than marching to Virginia, the campaign of 1781 would end in failure, and like d’Estaing, he too would return from America in disgrace. Next, de Grasse made another bold gamble. Rather than detaching ships to protect the annual homeward-bound convoy from the Caribbean, he entrusted it to the care of a single 64-gun vessel. The risk was rewarded: the Actionnaire left San Domingo with 126 merchantmen in late October and made it safely to France.

The stage was set when de Grasse raised anchor with 28 ships of the line and supporting frigates at Cap Français (Haiti) on 5 August and headed north. His ships were bursting with passengers: an 80-gun-ship, 190 feet long, a 46-foot beam with a hold of 22 feet, carried a regular crew of some 940 men. Most of them were needed to work the cannon: it took one of the thirty 36-pounders on the main deck during battle.

The stage was set when de Grasse raised anchor with 28 ships of the line and supporting frigates at Cap Français (Haiti) on 5 August and headed north. His ships were bursting with passengers: an 80-gun-ship, 190 feet long, a 46-foot beam with a hold of 22 feet, carried a regular crew of some 940 men. Most of them were needed to work the cannon: it took one of the thirty 36-pounders on the main deck during battle. They were also carrying some 3,000 men of the infantry regiments Gâtinais, Agenais, and Touraine under the comte de Saint-Simon, 100 artillerymen, their guns, and 100 dragoons.

Along the way de Grasse dispatched the frigate Aigrette to Havana to pick up 1.2 million livres that Rochambeau had requested in July to pay and feed his army. It took all of five hours to collect these funds from public and private sources, and on 17 August the Aigrette rejoined de Grasse’s fleet.

On 31 August de Grasse’s fleet dropped anchor in the mouth of the York and the next day began unloading men and material for the siege of Cornwallis.

De Grasse’s hour of glory was still to come. Cruising off Cape Charles, the lookout on the Aigrette at around 9:30 a.m. on 5 September reported sails approaching from east-northeast. The sails were those of Vice Admiral Thomas Graves, Rear Admirals Samuel Hood and Sir Francis Drake and their 19 ships of the line—two 98s, twelve 74s, one 70, and four 64s—a 50-gun ship, six frigates and a fire ship. Going full speed, around 6 knots, or 7 mph, they were making straight for the main entrance of the bay.

Though he knew that 19 sails were approaching Hampton Roads, there was not much de Grasse could do. Wind and tide were against him, and much of his personnel was on land. De Grasse had to leave some 90 officers and about 1,900 men behind when he cut cables around noon as the tide was turning. De Grasse’s flagship, the 104-gun Ville-de-Paris, three 80s, seventeen 74s, and three 64s moved out of the channel to meet the enemy. Short of hands and hampered by the north-northeast wind, they were slow forming a battle line. De Grasse, the 11th ship in line, did not clear the bay until almost 1:00 p.m.

Rather than order “close action” and head straight for the French line as it was straggling out of the bay, Graves at around 2:15 p.m. gave
Hood later claimed that Graves forgot to lower the flag signaling “line ahead” as the standard “close action” went up. Graves maintained that he flew “engage the enemy” throughout the day and hoisted “line ahead” only twice. Hood and his captains, according to Graves, misunderstood the signal. Irrespective of flag signals, once the cannon began roaring, Hood knew that the battle had begun and should have fallen on the French rear. Why he did not will always remain a mystery.

Confusion reigned on board the British fleet: Drake’s leaky division followed the signal and at 4:15 p.m. the Shrewsbury opened fire; but with the wind blowing toward land and the French fleet, British vessels could only use their upper gun decks while the French could employ their full firepower. Hood continued with “line ahead,” until Graves sent a frigate ordering him to attack at once. But the French held the advantage: when hundreds of cannon began to spit fire and destruction, de Grasse’s ships fired broadside after broadside into Drake’s division, which still had to turn before its cannon could reach them. Seven ships, including Hood’s Barfleur, never caught up. At 5:30 p.m. they began trading long-distance fire; an hour later Graves continued with “line ahead,” until the French could only use their upper gun decks while the French could employ their full firepower. Hood continued with “line ahead,” until Graves sent a frigate ordering him to attack at once. But the French held the advantage: when hundreds of cannon began to spit fire and destruction, de Grasse’s ships fired broadside after broadside into Drake’s division, which still had to turn before its cannon could reach them. Seven ships, including Hood’s Barfleur, never caught up. At 5:30 p.m. they began trading long-distance fire; an hour later Graves ordered the fleet to disengage.

Both fleets spent the next day, 6 September, making repairs and drifted to the south on the 7th. At nightfall on the 9th, de Grasse headed back north. As he approached he saw de Barras’ fleet riding at anchor in Lynnhaven Bay. De Grasse knew that he had achieved his goal: Washington and Rochambeau were on the way, and with de Barras’ seven ships of the line and two transports safely in the Bay, Cornwallis was caught. Graves returned briefly to the Chesapeake on the 13th only to find de Barras there. Seeing that it would be unwise to attack the now 35 French ships with his 18, Graves—unaware that Rochambeau and Washington were marching on Yorktown—returned to New York. On his arrival, he was dejected. He wrote to the Earl of Sandwich, “The signal was not understood. I do not mean to blame anyone, my Lord. I hope we all did our best.”

De Grasse’s victory at the Capes highlights more than any other event the vital importance of the French navy for American independence. It was de Grasse’s fleet that kept the Royal Navy from rescuing Cornwallis when it sailed out to meet the British on 5 September 1781. There was no Continental Navy that could have stopped Graves, Hood, and Drake.

Though he spent but two months in American waters and never set foot on American soil, de Grasse is among the three Frenchmen who contributed most to American independence. His “strategic vision,” writes Jonathan R. Dull, “made possible the most important naval victory of the 18th century.”
The Washington-Rochambeau route is significant as the first true acknowledgement of America as a sovereign nation.

If the alliance of 1778 brought the diplomatic recognition of the United States as a sovereign nation, the behavior of French troops toward their American allies put this recognition to the test. Recognizing General Washington as the commander-in-chief of the joint force brought much-needed prestige. The parade of Rochambeau’s troops before the Continental Congress, the review of these same troops by Washington, and the surrender of British General Charles O’Hara to American general Benjamin Lincoln rather than to Rochambeau all proved that the French were prepared to treat their ally as an equal on the international scene.

By its alliance with France, the United States gained international recognition, and through its recognition by the French army, the Continental Army as an outward symbol of American sovereignty was elevated from a rebel revolutionary force to the status of a national army. In the US military in particular, French influence remained strong long after the end of the conflict. Throughout the war Americans lacked the expertise and training necessary in the technical branches of the armed forces, such as the artillery, engineering, or cartography. French volunteers provided this expertise. Training and expertise provided by French advisers and volunteers helped shape the Continental Army and its successor, the United States Army, into a skilled, professional fighting force. Even today, the US Army Corps of Engineers awards the Fleury Medal for excellence in engineering, while the coat of arms and the motto of the US Army Engineering School are that of the French school at Mezières: Essayons!—Let us try!

In late September 1782, American and French forces met at Peekskill to say their farewells. To the French, the transformation of the Continental Army since Yorktown was startling. On 20 September, the French army passed in review before Washington, and then, on the 22nd, Clermont-Crèvecœur and his fellow officers “went to watch the maneuvers of the American army and were truly impressed. This proves what money and good officers can do to make good soldiers... we found 8,000 of the American army. Now they were all uniformed and well groomed. We were struck with the transformation of this army into one that was in no way inferior to ours in appearance. Their officers too were well turned out.”

Rochambeau and his staff were impressed as well and gave the Continental Army the highest praise possible in the late eighteenth century when they put it on par with the army of Frederick the Great. Dr. James Thacher described the scene thus: “The whole army was paraded under arms this morning in order to honor his Excellency Count Rochambeau on his arrival from the southward. The troops were all formed in two lines, extending from the ferry, where the count crossed, to head-quarters. A troop of horse met and received him at King’s Ferry, and conducted him through the line to General Washington’s quarters, where, sitting on his horse by the side of his excellency, the whole army marched before him, and paid the usual salute and honors. Our troops were now in complete uniform, and exhibited every mark of soldierly discipline. Count Rochambeau was most highly gratified to perceive the very great improvement, which our army had made in appearance since he last reviewed them, and expressed his astonishment at their rapid progress in military skill and discipline. He said to General Washington, ‘You have formed an alliance with the King of Prussia. These troops are Prussians.’ Several of the principal officers of the French army, who have seen troops of different European nations, have bestowed the highest encomiums and applause on our army, and declared that they had seen none superior to the Americans.”
On 6 January 1781, a French landing party of about 800 men under the command of Baron de Rullecourt landed on the Channel island of Jersey. In the subsequent fighting both Rullecourt and Major Francis Pierson of the 95th Regiment were killed. The French force was defeated and had to surrender but such raids forced Britain to commit substantial resources to the defense of the waters around the British Isles.

Island of St. Eustatius
Until its capture by British Admiral Rodney on 3 February 1781, this tiny Dutch island in the Caribbean was one of the most important neutral entrepôts for trade with the North American Continent. Rodney's booty was estimated at £3,000,000 or 70,000,000 livres, almost six times the 12,000,000 livres the expédition particulière cost the French crown.
5 Historic Use of the Route

The roads that constitute the Washington-Rochambeau route predate the American Revolutionary War by decades, some even by centuries. The Eastern Seaboard of Colonial America was traversed by a network of roads, some of which had been used by Native Americans for centuries prior to the American Revolutionary War. These roads, known variably as “Post Road” or “King's Highway” or the “Old Trail” in Colonial America, were used for travel, trade, and military campaigns. After the outbreak of the revolution, the armies of both sides followed these roads on many occasions during their operations. Their use as conduits for the deployment of the opposing forces was well-established before the French and American armies took them in 1781 and 1782 during and after the Yorktown Campaign.

The roads are historically significant by themselves as the lifelines of the economies of Colonial America, but they take on additional importance as components of the Washington-Rochambeau route. The route consists of sections of various lengths of these colonial roads, such as the Boston Post Road in Connecticut, the Albany Post Road in New York, the Assunpink Trail in New Jersey, and the King’s Highway in Delaware. These roads are interspersed with mountainous passes such as the Clove in Suffern, New York, and the crossing over the Susquehanna at Bald Friar Ferry and Ford in Maryland. When strung together, they formed the fastest and most convenient way to reach Williamsburg in the summer of 1781.

The historic locations of the land routes that form the Washington-Rochambeau route can be identified with great accuracy. Based on original documents, the roads taken by the various components of the French and American armies can be traced on a modern map with a high degree of precision. The roads that formed the French route were surveyed shortly following the march, in great detail, by Louis Alexandre de Berthier. His maps were published by Anne S. K. Brown and Howard C. Rice, Jr., in 1972. On the American side, George Washington's cartographer Robert Erskine surveyed the roads in New York and New Jersey during the 1770s. The Washington-Rochambeau route throughout consists of multiple routes. Military needs of providing flank cover from British attacks determined the route taken by Launau's Legion in Connecticut in June 1781 and that of Continental Army units through New Jersey in August of that year. The logistics of providing thousands of men with food, firewood and shelter made it necessary for the units to follow separate routes as well. Even Philadelphia—at 28,000 inhabitants, America's largest city—could not long feed and house the armies, now 7,000 strong, and their thousands of animals. Smaller towns along the route, such as Baltimore with 10,000 inhabitants and Wilmington with 1,200 people, were in no position to handle the multitudes at their gates.

The Christiana Tavern in Christiana, Delaware, where Washington, Rochambeau, and Lafayette all stayed at various times: an example of a significant resource in need of preservation.
After the arrival at Head of Elk, the slow-moving artillery and the wagon train took the land-route to Williamsburg, while the soldiers boarded ships at Head of Elk, in Baltimore and in Annapolis. French officers used every opportunity to visit battlefields, natural sites, and famous Americans along the way. Washington took the opportunity to deviate from the most direct route to Williamsburg, hosting Rochambeau and senior French officers at his estate at Mount Vernon.

Though the route is of great diversity, it is clearly discernible in a multitude of manifestations. Many, if not all, of these roads still exist today under different names and in different conditions, ranging from six-lane interstate highways to abandoned road segments listed on the National Register of Historic Places. Driving through sections of eastern Connecticut along country roads flanked by eighteenth-century stone walls, or through rural Virginia to Gloucester, one is aware of traveling along a historic route. On other sections of the route (e.g., through Philadelphia or Hartford), 200 years of economic development have all but obliterated the original routes. But even there, memorials and annual celebrations keep alive the knowledge of being on a historic trail and on historic ground. In some states, such as Virginia, the marking is consistent and highly visible. Other states, such as Connecticut, are engaged in re-marking the trail. But the trail also comprises hundreds of miles of water lanes and river crossings, some of the most scenic components of the Washington-Rochambeau route. Water routes were as well established in 1781 as were land routes, with interconnecting portage routes, five between the northern Chesapeake and the Delaware River alone. The most direct of these water routes, and the one taken by the French and American armies in 1781 and 1782, was that from Christiana, Delaware (or Christeen, as it was called in the eighteenth century), past Cooch’s Bridge to Head of Elk in Maryland. Economic historian Richard Buel, Jr., found traffic on that route “sufficiently heavy to justify the maintenance of a regular shallop service between Christian Bridge and Philadelphia.”

At the beginning of their march, French forces used watercraft to cross Narragansett Bay from Newport to Providence. The crossing of rivers such as the Hudson from King’s Ferry to Stony Point as well as the Connecticut, Housatonic, Delaware, and Schuylkill rivers were major logistical achievements. But rivers and waterways did not only pose obstacles. Despite the dangers inherent in coastal trade after the outbreak of the war, they provided opportunities as well. Water transportation, especially of heavy or bulky goods was faster and cheaper than transporting goods on land. In a military campaign this meant primarily artillery, foodstuffs, and baggage, and wherever possible Washington used the waterways along the route in 1781 to his advantage. From Trenton onward, Colonel John Lamb’s Second Continental Artillery, except for a short, ten-mile portage through Delaware, traveled to Virginia by water.

By 29 August 1781, Deputy Quartermaster Samuel Miles had 31 craft capable of carrying more than 3,200 men waiting for the armies at Philadelphia. Once the head of the Chesapeake had been reached, Washington tried everything to get enough watercraft to ship his troops to Williamsburg. At least 12 sloops and eighteen schooners were waiting at Head of Elk, and dozens more were hired before the year was out. An Estimate of Money due on Contract made for the passage of the Army stores, Baggage &c. …from Christiana Bridge to Virginia, and from thence to the Northward Commencing 28 August 1781 brings the total of watercraft employed in the campaign to at least 22 sloops, 60 schooners, as well as shallops and a myriad of smaller vessels. And though the building patterns on the shore have changed since 1781, the water routes on the Chesapeake in particular recall the anxious weeks of September 1781 leading up to the siege.
The Washington-Rochambeau Route offers numerous and varied resources. Based on statewide studies in Connecticut, New York, and Delaware, and preliminary overviews in the other states, an estimated 750 resources are directly associated with the route, with an indeterminate number of resources on side-trails. The resources of the Washington-Rochambeau route can be divided into twelve categories:

1. Campsites and bivouacs
2. Historic road segments
3. Water routes and river crossings
4. Archeological and underwater sites
5. Buildings and building sites
6. Tombstones and/or grave markers and other emblems
7. Natural landscape features
8. National parks
9. State parks
10. Historic districts
11. Plaques, tablets, and markers
12. Paintings and murals

Many or most of these resources are already protected as National Historic Register sites or National Historic Landmarks; others have or will receive this status as a result of state efforts carried out in connection with the Washington-Rochambeau route. Some are federally owned, some are state parks, some are owned by communities or private organizations. A few are already well-established destinations; others are being restored and readied for historical interpretation.

Numerous plaques, tablets and markers attest to the commemoration of the route since the 1781 march. They were placed by federal, state and local authorities; by patriotic organizations such as the Daughters of the American Revolution, the Sons of the American Revolution, the Society of the Cincinnati; by historical societies; and by organizations such as Rotary Clubs.

Except for those of the Saratoga campaign in New York, all major battlefields of the Revolutionary War in New England, the Middle Colonies, and in Maryland and Virginia lie along or near the route. So do many of the nation’s most cherished historical treasures, such as Newport, Independence Hall, Mount Vernon, Colonial Williamsburg, and Colonial National Historical Park in Yorktown. The Washington-Rochambeau route therefore functions as an overarching theme that binds together geographically many American Revolutionary War sites along the east coast. Both a land- and water-based trail, it passes through most major population centers along America’s east coast. Its multitude of resources provides a wealth of diverse historical, educational, and recreational experiences for more people than any other scenic or historic trail within the National Park System.

Numerous resource clusters along the Washington-Rochambeau route combine within a concentrated area historical, educational, and recreational opportunities. This is most obviously the case in Newport, Rhode Island, and Boston, Massachusetts, the route’s two anchors in New England. The same holds true for Williamsburg and Yorktown, the route’s southern ends in Virginia, where rich historical and educational opportunities are coupled with primarily water-based recreational possibilities. Other land-based route segments, such as Washington’s Mount Vernon, Washington, DC, or the city of Philadelphia, offer a “whole trail experience” as well. Water-based segments from the northern tip of the Chesapeake, from Baltimore, and from Annapolis, to Cornwallis’s sunken fleet off Yorktown and Gloucester, offer multiple trail experiences as well. Linking the resources along these trails, the Washington-Rochambeau route offers a unique context and potential for historical interpretation, for educational and recreational programs, and for commemorating the Franco-American alliance and the national effort for independence in 1781.

Hallock’s Mill Pond at Yorktown Heights, New York. Looking to keep his troops occupied while he and Washington determined a military strategy, Rochambeau ordered them to dig a canal that rerouted a stream through their camp (and reversed its flow into this pond).
To celebrate Admiral de Grasse’s victories in the Caribbean and in the Battle of the Capes as well as the victory at Yorktown, the inhabitants of Paris and its suburbs were ordered to illuminate their houses on 27 November 1781, during the time that a Te Deum was celebrated at the Cathedral of Notre Dame.
Scholarly as well as popular history studies of the Franco-American campaign of 1781 have traditionally focused on three themes:

1. the marquis de Lafayette’s Virginia campaign in the spring and summer of 1781;
2. the role of the French fleet under the comte de Grasse; and
3. the siege of Yorktown and the surrender of Lord Cornwallis.

The march of the French army from Newport, Rhode Island, and of the Continental Army from Newburgh, New York, is usually covered in a transitional chapter necessary to lead the combined armies to the plains outside Yorktown. No in-depth study of the march proper—its planning, logistics, the interaction between the troops and the civilian population, and the impact of the march on the local economies, to name but a few topics—has ever been undertaken, either at a state or national level. With its focus on the march proper, a study and assessment of the Washington-Rochambeau Revolutionary Route, for possible designation as a National Historic Trail, could fill that void.

The historical research necessary for such a study presents numerous challenges, not so much from a lack of French and American primary sources as from their nature and location. The geographic extent of the route means that the sources are widely distributed among dozens of collections in state libraries and archives in at least nine states, and in federal repositories in Washington, DC. Primary sources used in this study are extraordinarily diverse. They are written in three languages: English, French, and German. They encompass traditional resources, such as diaries, letters, and maps, as well as less traditional resources such as orderly books, enlistment records and pensions applications, mill ledgers and account books, National Register and National Historic Landmark files.

Telling the story of the march requires giving equal attention to the grand strategy and to the micro-history of the hundreds of localities and sites that make up the route. It requires familiarity with local histories, state histories, and international relations. It requires using the papers and writings of the key decision makers such as George Washington and the comte de Rochambeau, as well as those of the mill-owners and tavern-keepers along the way. Frequently the events occur within a very tightly focused time frame, often just a few days in 1781 and in 1782, but cover a vast geographic area. Alternately, in the case of winter quarters the focus is a small area but a six- to eight-month time frame. The nature of the sources—which flow more amply for one aspect in one state or locality and less so in other areas or regions—as well as the fact that no Continental Army troops marched through Rhode Island, Connecticut, or Massachusetts in 1781 and 1782, shifts the focus of the project from year to year, from state to state, and from region to region.

The following bibliographical overview provides a complete inventory of French primary sources, but is not meant to be complete or exhaustive with respect to American sources. Nor does it list available secondary source materials, except where they relate to the primary sources mentioned. As in the more extensive bibliography included in a separate Appendix to the Historical Narrative, it is arranged topically and is meant to give an idea of the range of resources available and the many-faceted possibilities for interpretation arising from them.

1) CARTOGRAPHY
Any study of the march of the combined Franco-American armies to Virginia has to begin with the identification of the routes and their location on the ground today. On the French side, the indispensable collection of primary source materials is the compilation of maps and routes published by Howard C. Rice, Jr. and Anne S. K. Brown in The American Campaigns of Rochambeau’s Army 1780, 1781, 1782, 1782. Volume 2 reproduces maps of the routes and camp sites located in the Rochambeau Papers and the Rochambeau Family Cartographic Archive (GEN MSS 146) at the Beinecke Rare Book and Manuscript Library at Yale University and in other repositories worldwide. These maps were drawn mostly by Louis Alexandre de Berthier and, though not always to scale, provide the exact location of the camp sites. This superbly edited volume is indispensable for anyone interested in the march of Rochambeau’s troops from Newport to Yorktown in 1781 and back to Boston in 1782. There are very few sites and routes that Rice and Brown either could not locate or that lay outside their immediate research interest. These include the route of Lauzun’s Legion through Connecticut in June 1781, the camp of Rochambeau’s Second Brigade near Newport, Delaware, in September 1781, and the 1782-83 winter quarters of Lauzun’s Legion in Wilmington. Using sources either not available to Rice and Brown or not used by them, this study attempts to fill in these gaps in our knowledge of the marches of the French forces.

On the American side there also exists a complete body of cartographic work for the marches of 1781 from Philadelphia to and from Yorktown. Once the decision to march to Virginia was made in August 1781, George Washington ordered his cartographer, Simeon

---


2 There is a map of that campsite in the journal of an unidentified officer of the Soissonsais regiment in the Huntington Library. The journal is listed in Rice and Brown, but the authors did not inspect it for their work.


4 For a list of these sources see below: 3) Personal Accounts
DeWitt, to draw up maps of the routes to be taken by the Continental Army to Yorktown. These maps are preserved as Erskine DeWitt Maps in the New-York Historical Society (NYHS) under the call numbers 124 A-U for the march from Philadelphia to Yorktown in August and September 1781, and 125 A-K plus half-sheet C 125 for the march from Yorktown to Elkridge Landing in November and December 1781. There are no maps for the routes of the Continental Army from Philadelphia, New York, through New Jersey to Philadelphia, but there are many contemporary maps of New Jersey on which the route can be traced with the help of orderly books, diaries, and other primary source materials. Unlike the French maps, DeWitt’s maps are drawn to scale, with mile markers indicated on the maps where available. They do not show the campsites but point out numerous landmarks, such as inns, churches, fords, ironworks, etc., which makes these, in the majority unpublished maps, important resources not only for the Washington-Rochambeau project but for state and local history as well.

2) LOGISTICS AND ARRANGEMENT OF THE MARCH

On the French side, orders and arrangements for the march as well as supply issues are addressed in itineraries and official orders for the march published in Volume 2 of Rice and Brown. These official road descriptions are supplemented by the account of Louis Alexandre de Berthier, published in Volume 1 of Rice and Brown. Berthier, an assistant quartermaster general, provides a very detailed description of the order and organization of each column of the march until late August 1781, when his account ends abruptly in mid-sentence. Another invaluable source for French troop movements is the Livre d’ordre of Rochambeau’s corps which allows a minute reconstruction of the daily life of the soldiers in America. The livre, equivalent of an Orderly Book in the Continental Army, is preserved in the Archives Générales du Département de Meurthe-et-Moselle in Nancy, France, under the call number E 235. Unfortunately it ends on 17 August 1781 just as the troops got ready to break camp and set out for the march to Yorktown.

A continuation of sorts of the Livre d’Ordre is the “Journal des opérations du corps Français, Depuis le 15 Août,” a 14-page manuscript narrative of the march of the French army to Virginia, the siege of Yorktown, and the surrender of Cornwallis. From the appearance of the handwriting throughout this volume, it seems that it is the original day-to-day record dictated by Rochambeau. For the return march of 1782, there exists a 19½-page manuscript, partly autographed, with heading on first page, “1782,” and heading on page 16, “1782,” giving Rochambeau’s narrative of the military and other events of that year and early 1783. Both of these manuscripts are in the Rochambeau Papers at Yale University. A major source for French army logistics are the Jeremiah Wadsworth Papers in the Connecticut Historical Society. Wadsworth was the chief agent for the French forces in America, and his agents supplied Rochambeau’s troops throughout their stay on the American mainland.

Reconstructing the logistics behind the American march is both easier and more difficult than for the French side. It is easier because the Americans—unlike the French, who paid in cash for their purchases—left a trail of IOUs along the way. But these IOUs, which cover everything from purchases to ship rent, make the march to Yorktown in August 1781—1st New Jersey, 2nd New York, 1st Rhode Island, Hazen’s Canadians, Lamb’s Artillery, the Light Infantry as well as the

...
Commander in Chief’s Guard, Joseph Plumb Martin’s Corps of Sappers and Miners, and the Corps of Artificers—made the return march in November–December 1781. Unlike for the march to Yorktown, not a single Orderly Book has survived; the first orderly book that we have is for Col. Lamb’s Artillery Regiment, which wintered in Burlington, New Jersey, from 7 December 1781 to 4 February 1782, and marched to the Highlands in August 1782, preserved in the NYHS, microfilm: #152; reel 15. Moses Hazen’s regiment escorted British POWs to Lancaster, Pennsylvania, and wintered there.

3) PERSONAL ACCOUNTS

While sources such as the orderly books or the Livre d’ordre have rarely been used in historical analyses of the 1781-82 campaigns, personal accounts by American and French military personnel—letters, diaries, and memoirs—have provided a wealth of source material for the history of the war. Nevertheless, much new ground remains to be broken in this area, historians having traditionally focused on a few well-known and easily accessible sources rather than the treasure trove of lesser-known material available in out-of-the-way places.

In an appendix to Volume 1 (pp. 285–348) of their American Campaigns, Rice and Brown provide a list of journals, diaries, memoirs, letters, and other primary sources available at the time of publication of their book. Since then, almost two dozen primary sources have appeared in European and American archives that can be added to the 45 sources (i.e., accounts of events in America written by officers in Rochambeau’s army) listed by Rice and Brown.

Most surprising is the fact that three journals/diaries/memoirs of enlisted men have come to light since 1972. The most important of these three is the journal of Georg Daniel Flohr, an enlisted man in the Royal Deux-Ponts, in the Bibliothèque Municipale of Strasbourg, France.7 Among the Milton S. Latham Papers in the Library of Congress was found the Journal Militaire kept by an unidentified grenadier in the Bourbonsais regiment.8 Finally there is the Histoire des campagnes de l’Armée de Rochambaud (sic) en Amérique written by André Amblard of the Soissonnais infantry.9

Also added now is a most valuable new source, the papers of Antoine Charles du Houx baron de Vioménil, Rochambeau’s second in command. Comprising some 300 items and about 1,000 pages, the Fonds Vioménil is preserved in the Académie François Bourbon in Le Creusot, France. This material has never been used before and sheds much new light on the decision-making process at the top of the French military hierarchy. For Lauzun’s Legion, long the only component of Rochambeau’s army without a contemporary eyewitness account, a manuscript journal kept by Lieutenant-Colonel Etienne Hugau entitled Détails intéressants sur les événements arrivés dans la guerre d’Amérique. Hyver 1781 à 1782. Hampton, Charlotte et suite has come to light in the Bibliothèque municipale in the town of Evreux, France.10

Among new sources are also the correspondence of Captain Charles Malo François comte de Lameth, aide-de-camp to Rochambeau and aide-maréchal général des logis (May 1782), and of his brother Captain Alexandre Théodor Victor chevalier de Lameth, who replaced Charles Malo François in the summer of 1782.11 Also unavailable in 1972 was the Journal de l’Armée aux ordres de Monsieur le Comte de Rochambeau pendant les campagnes de 1780, 1781, 1782, 1783 dans l’Amérique septentrionale kept by comte de Rochambeau’s 21-year-old nephew, Louis François Bertrand Dupont d’Aubevoye, comte de Lauberdière, a captain in the Saintonge infantry and one of his aides-de-camp.12

The largest body of materials not listed in Rice and Brown concern the Royal Deux-Ponts, regiment of infantry; a letter by Jean-François de Thuilliére, a captain in the Royal Deux-Ponts preserved in the Archives Nationales,13 two letters by Louis Eberhard von Esebeck, lieutenant-colonel in the Royal Deux-Ponts, dated Jamestown Island, 12 and 16 December 1781,14 and the papers and letters of Colonel Christian de Deux Ponts, which have been in part deposited in and in part acquired by German archives.15 Copies of four letters written from America by her ancestor Wilhelm de Deux-Ponts are in the possession of Ms. Nancy Bayer.16 Journals kept by Duplex de Cadignon of the Agenois,17 and Xavier de Bertrand, a lieutenant in the Royal Deux-Ponts, have not been located.18

Indispensable for biographical research on the 1,034 French officers serving in d’Estaing’s, Rochambeau’s, and Saint-Simont’s forces, as well as on the French officers serving in the Continental Army is Gilbert Bodinier’s Dictionnaire des Afro-Créoles et Deservants d’Amérique.19

1 Reisen Beschreibung von America welche das Hochlöbliche Regiment von Zweybrücken hat gemacht zu Wasser und zu Land vom Jahr 1780 bis 84. Robert A. Selig is currently preparing an English translation and edition.
3 Amblard, who enlisted at age 19 in 1773, was discharged as a captain in 1793. His manuscript is located in the Archives Déparmentales de l’Ardèche in Privas, France. For unknown reasons, numerous passages from his journal can be found verbatim in a journal kept by an unidentified officer of the Soissonnais regiment that is listed in Rice and Brown. See Robert A. Selig’s “A New View of Old Williamsburg.” A Huntington Library Manuscript provides another glimpse of the city in 1781. “Colonial Williamsburg: The Journal of the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation Vol. 22 No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 30–54.
5 The letters are in the Archives du Département Val d’Oise in Cergy-Pontoise, No. 191 and 1J 337/338.
7 The letter is catalogued under B4 172, Marine.
9 The papers of Christian von Zweibrücken deposited in the Bavarian Hauptstaatsarchiv-Geheimes Hausarchiv in Munich are owned by Marian Freiherr von Gravenreuth; those deposited in the Pfälzische Landesbibliothek in Speyer were acquired at auction and are owned by the library.
10 The letters are owned by Anton Freiherr von Cetto in Oberlauterbach, Germany.
11 The last known owner of this manuscript was Bernard Zublena, domaine de lagarde, 32 250 Montreal, Canada.
12 The journal is quoted in Régis d’Oléon, “L’Esprit de Corps dans l’Ancienne Armée” Carnet de la Sabretache 5th series (1958), pp. 488–496. Régis d’Oléon is a descendant of Bertrand.
naire des officiers de l'Armée Royale qui ont combattu aux États-Unis pendant la guerre d'Indépendance 1776-1783 3rd edition (Chailland, 2001), Enlistment records or contrôles of enlisted personnel in Rochambeau’s corps, indispensable for statistical data on his troops, are preserved by the Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre in the Chateau de Vincennes; only those of Lauzun’s Legion are in the Archives Nationales in Paris.

While the correspondence of officers such as Rochambeau is of the greatest importance for the identification of the route and the grand strategy behind the campaign, it is in the papers, letters, and accounts of its participants that one finds the details, the personal encounters, and the stories that bring the route to life. The same, of course, holds true for the American side, but the body of resources is infinitely larger. In his Revolutionary America 1763-1789. A Bibliography (2 vols., Washington DC, 1984), the last major bibliography published on the Revolutionary War, Ronald M. Gephart lists more than 20,000 items just in the holdings of the Library of Congress. Since then, thousands of titles have been added to those listed in Gephart’s bibliography. Other valuable resources include Stetson Conn and Robert W. Coakley, An Army Chronology of the American Revolution (revised) (Washington, D.C., 1974); Joyce L. Eakin, Colonial America and the War for Independence Special Bibliography 14. (Carlisle Barracks, 1976); Terry M. Mays, Historical Dictionary of the American Revolution (Lanham, 1999); J. Todd White and Charles H. Lesser, eds. Fighters For Independence: A Guide to Sources of Geographical Information on Soldiers and Sailors of the American Revolution (Chicago, 1977); Robert K. Wright, Jr., Continental Army. Army Lineage Series (Washington, D.C., 1983); Charles H. Lesser, ed. Sinews of Independence: Monthly Strength Reports of the Continental Army (Chicago, 1976); and Howard H. Peckham, ed., Toll of Independence: Engagements & Battle Casualties of the American Revolution (Chicago, 1974).

If less than half of the accounts by officers in Rochambeau’s little army have been published in their entirety, the situation is similar for accounts by American participants. The papers of major participants such as George Washington, Henry Knox, and Benjamin Lincoln are available either in print or on microfilm; a complete list of diaries kept by enlisted men and NCOs, many of them unpublished, can be found at http://www.RevWar75.com, though the best-known source is the account penned by Joseph Plumb Martin, Private Yankee Doodle (Hallowell, ME, 1830; repr. Boston, 1962). Martin’s account contains much information on the campaign of 1781/82, as does the unpublished diary of Sergeant-Major Hawkins of the Canadian Regiment in the Pennsylvania Historical Society and numerous other journals and diaries listed in Gephart’s and other bibliographies. A unique source on individual soldiers and the war that can be easily overlooked is the pension applications of Revolutionary War veterans in the National Archives. The autobiographies attached to these applications are lengthy at times and full of information not found anywhere else. On numerous occasions soldiers who deserted or were discharged from Rochambeau’s regiments applied for pensions as well, and their biographical essays shed much light on the integration of immigrants into post-revolutionary American society.

4) PRIMARY SOURCES DESCRIBING FRANCO-AMERICAN ENCOUNTERS

Another often-neglected resource of paramount importance for the Washington-Rochambeau Revolutionary Route study are diaries, letters, or memoirs by civilian Americans describing encounters with their French guests. Some of these sources, such as the diaries of Ezra Stiles, president of Yale, are published and easily available. Many were published locally in small, private editions or in county historical magazines and newsletters that are not usually indexed or accessible through computerized searches. The majority of these sources, however, are not yet published and need to be researched on site.

A unique resource for Washington-Rochambeau study is the McDonald Papers in the Westchester County Historical Society in Elmsford, New York. John McLeod McDonald (1790-1863) had been trained as a lawyer. After a stroke in 1835, he could no longer practice law and became interested in the history of the Revolutionary War. Accompanied by Andrew Corsa, Washington’s and Rochambeau’s guide during the Grand Reconnaissance of 21–23 July, 1781, he traveled through Westchester County interviewing eyewitnesses in preparation for a history of the Revolutionary War. His interviews with 241 men and women, white and black, free and slave, fill more than 1,100 pages of handwriting. McDonald never wrote his history, but his interviews form a unique oral history resource for events in the ‘neutral ground’ between British and American lines.

5) ECONOMIC IMPACT

The presence of French forces—and their bullion—had an enormous economic and emotional impact on the cash-starved colonies, but research on this economic impact is still in its infancy. Even a brief look into the ledgers and account books of tavern keepers, mill-owners, trading firms, and merchants operating along the route confirms the enormous impact French forces had wherever they went. On 24 August 1781, “7 French guines” show up for the first time in the Lea Mills Account Book of Brandywine Village. By early September, 3/4s Joes, pistols, doubloons, and guineas have completely replaced Continental dollars, so that on 11 November 1781, Thomas Lea’s neighbor Samuel Canby expressed in his diary the hope that: “as I apprehend from the present prospect of things in our Country that people generally will rather be encouraged to go into Business more than there has been opportunity for these several Years past as there is nothing but Specie now Circulating as a currency.”

When French forces returned to Wilmington the following year they commented with surprise on the number of houses built between 1781 and 1782, and attributed their construction to French silver. Lee Kennett has estimated that between public and private funds, “French forces may well have disbursed 20 million livres in coin,” possibly doubling the amount of specie circulating in the thirteen colonies. Even if the amount of specie was closer to the estimate of Timothy R. Walton—who writes in The Spanish Treasure Fleets (Sarasota, 1994), p. 183, “On the eve of the American Revolution, about half the coins used in
the British North American Colonies, some 4 million pesos (24 million livres) worth, were pieces of eight from New Spain and Peru—an infusion of 20 million livres was bound to have had a major impact on the American economy. But Kennett may still be right. In his “Las Damas de la Havana, el precursor, and Francisco de Saavedra: A Note on Spanish Participation in the Battle of Yorktown,” The Americas Vol. 37, (July 1980), pp. 83-99, James A. Lewis estimates intergovernmental loans, such as that for de Grasse in August 1781, at about 2 million pesos and loans arranged by private lenders at 3 million, possibly 4 million pesos, for a minimum of 30 million livres (at an exchange rate of 6 livres per peso).

6) INTERNET RESOURCES
This listing eliminates the standard prefix http:// from web addresses, but many browser programs will add it automatically when the web address is typed.

American Revolution
Bibliographies at the US Army Center of Military History: www.army.mil/cmh-pg/

American Revolution documents: www.americanrevolution.org

Archiving Early America: www.earlyamerica.com/

There is a section of advice on how to read 18th-century documents.

Battle Road site and useful links to other sites: www.ziplink.net/~mrkmcc/resources.htm

Battles and skirmishes—more than 2,600 sites with references plus transcripts of primary sources: www.281.com/robertson/battles/battlen.htm

Brigade of the American Revolution (reenactment organization): www.brigade.org

Chronology of major events in literature, theater, politics, science, religion, music, and art: www.english.upenn.edu/~jlynch/Chron/

Continental Congress: www.memory.loc.gov/ammem/bdshome.html

Eighteenth-century bibliographies: www.personal.psu.edu/special/C18/engrave.htm

Eighteenth-century clothing resources: www.costumes.org

Eighteenth-century maps: www.libs.uga.edu/darchive/hargrett/maps/maps.html

Expédition Particulière: www.xenophongroup.com/mcjeynt/ep
A series of web pages that cover all aspects of the French expeditionary army and its activities on the American continent from 1780 to 1782, such as a list of the dates and places of encampments from Providence to Yorktown at www.xenophongroup.com/mcjeynt/march, an extended chronological description of strategy and movements from July 1780 to September 1781 at www.xenophongroup.com/mcjeynt/campaign, or the route of the French wagon train from Annapolis, Maryland, to Yorktown, Virginia, in 1781 at www.xenophongroup.com/mcjeynt/wagon.htm

George Washington Diaries: www.memory.loc.gov/ammem/gwhtml/

The 147,000 photographic images are organized into eight series that can be searched by keyword or browsed with a hyper-linked series list. Successive pages are linked, allowing one to read complete documents and journals.

George Washington Papers at the University Press of Virginia: www.virginia.edu/gwpaper/

Interdisciplinary resources for 18th-century studies: www.personal.psu.edu/special/C18srssr.htm

John D. Rockefeller, Jr. Library’s catalog at the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation in Virginia. The library has some popular finding aids on the web—choose Library to get to the Library’s offerings: www.history.org

Johnson, Samuel, Dictionary of the English language. This site has a search engine that allows many types of searches: www.htl.umich.edu/english/johnson/main.html

Lauzun’s Legion: www.lauzunlegion.com

Military actions of the American Revolution: www.sar.org/history/docsbat.htm

Military documents, including extracts from diaries and journals written during the American Revolution: www.hillsdale.edu/dept/history/documents/war/index.htm


Northwest Territory Alliance (a reenactment group): www.nwta.com/main.html

Orderly books of units can be found at www.rewars75.com/
There is also a list of major and minor repositories, archives, and libraries (with links) where primary-source materials are located.

Primary-source documents pertaining to early American history—formation of American politics, culture, and ideas: www.universitylake.org/primarysources.html

Primary sources: culture, politics, military, etc.: www2.pitnet.net/primarysources/

Revolutionary War web site, including documents: www.grandrepublican.com

Rochambeau Revolutionary Road: www.ctssar.org/revroad/index.htm

Royal Deux-Ponts Regiment of Infantry: http://bluepost.tcimet.net/deuxponts/.html

Saintonge Regiment of Infantry: www.ai.mit.edu/people/sfelshin/saintonge/85hist.html

Sons of the American Revolution: www.sar.org/history/rochambo.htm, a site on the Washington-Rochambeau route efforts

This is the regularly updated website of the “Washington-Rochambeau Revolutionary Route Historic Trail Association” with information on upcoming events, links to state and local studies, and to websites of sponsors and stakeholders in the project.

Yale Law School Avalon Project—documents bearing principally on diplomatic history: www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacyb1814.htm
8 Study Team and Illustration Sources

Study Team

NATIONAL PARK SERVICE
NORTHEAST REGION
- Boston Support Office
  - Larry Gall, Team Manager for Stewardship & Partnership
  - Brian Aviles, Project Manager
  - Vicki Sandstead, Historian
  - Paul Weinbaum, Historian
- Philadelphia Support Office
  - Terry Moore, acting Chief of Planning
  - Deirdre Gibson, former Chief of Planning
- National Capital Region
  - Gary Scott, Chief Historian

CONSULTANTS
- Goody, Clancy & Associates
  - Christine Cousineau, Project Manager
  - David Spillane, Senior Project Associate
  - Steve Wolf, Graphic Designer and Editor
  - Paul Santos, Graphic Designer
  - Dr. Robert A. Selig, Project Historian

SYMPOSIUM SCHOLARS AND CONTRIBUTORS
- René Chartrand, author and former senior curator, National Historic Sites, Canada
- Dr. Harry Dickinson, Robert Lodge Professor of British History, University of Edinburgh, Scotland
- General Gilbert Forray, retired Chief of the Army Staff, French Army, and recipient of the Grande Croix de la Légion d’Honneur, France
- Jean-René Géhan, Counselor for Cultural Affairs to the French Embassy, Washington
- Dr. Sarah Purcell, Assistant Professor, Department of History, Grinnell College, Iowa
- Dr. Ray Raymond, MBE, FRFA, Political Officer, British Consulate General, New York
- Dr. Sarah Purcell, Assistant Professor, Department of History, Grinnell College, Iowa
- Dr. Ray Raymond, MBE, FRFA, Political Officer, British Consulate General, New York
- Dr. Robert Erskine maps 124B, New York Historical Society
- “The Battle of Paoli”, John U. Rees
- French tents, André Gousse, Parks Canada
- Maps produced by Impact LLC, Red Hook, New York, edited by study team

NPS REVOLUTIONARY WAR PARKS CONTRIBUTORS
- Karen Rehm, Colonial National Historical Park
- Diane DePew, Colonial NHP
- Frances Delmar, Independence NHP
- Special acknowledgements to the Connecticut Historical Commission

Illustration Sources

2—STUDY LEGISLATION, PURPOSE AND TASKS
Page 2-1
Both photographs: study team

3—HISTORICAL NARRATIVE
Page 3-1
Siège d’Yorcktown by Louis-Charles-Auguste Couder, 1836. Galerie des Batailles, Château de Versailles, France
Page 3-2
Map: Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University, Providence, Rhode Island
Drawing: Art Division, New York Public Library
Page 3-3
All photos: study team
Map: Berthier Papers, No. 21-25, Princeton University Library
Page 3-4
Top photos: study team
Map: Berthier Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society
Page 3-5
All: Anne S.K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University, Providence
Page 3-7
Map: National Park Service
Photo: study team

4—SIGNIFICANCE THEMES
Page 4-1
Henry Knox Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society
Page 4-2
Top: Henry Knox Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society
Bottom: Delaware Historical Society
Page 4-3
Library of Congress
Page 4-4
Left: study team
Right: New-York Historical Society

Page 3-8
Portrait of Washington: painted by Robert Edge Pine, 1785-87, Independence National Historical Park
Page 3-9
Collection of Robert A. Selig
Page 3-12
Robert Erskine maps 124B, New York Historical Society
Page 3-12
“The Battle of Paoli”, John U. Rees
French tents, André Gousse, Parks Canada
Page 3-13—3-16
Maps produced by Impact LLC, Red Hook, New York, edited by study team

Page 4-14
Henry Knox Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society
Page 4-2
Top: Henry Knox Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society
Bottom: Delaware Historical Society
Page 4-3
Library of Congress
Page 4-4
Left: study team
Right: New-York Historical Society

Page 4-6
Top: Musée Historique, Strasbourg, France
Bottom: Collection of Robert A. Selig
Page 4-7
Right: Anne S. K. Brown Military Collection, Brown University, Providence
Left: Robert A. Selig
Page 4-8
DAR Magazine, November 1984
Page 4-9
The Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York; bequest of Charles Allen Munn, 1924
Page 4-11
Upper right: www.geocities/kdw72696/tour-peq.htm
DeGrasse: www.photogallery.com/places/virginia/527.png
Lower left photograph: Alicia N. Wayland
All other photos: study team
Page 4-14
Coins: Robert A. Selig
Page 4-15
Right photo (marker): www.xenophongroup.com/mcjoynt/vawrrmrk.htm
Left photo (tavern): Robert Reyes, National Parks Mid-Atlantic Council, Inc.
5—HISTORIC USE OF THE ROUTE

Page 5-1
Study team

Page 5-2
- Lower left: Robert Reyes,
  National Parks Mid-Atlantic Council, Inc.
- Top: www.xenophongroup.com/mcj0yn/vawrrmrk.htm
- Lower right: study team

6—RESOURCES

Page 6-1
Study team

Page 6-2
Bibliothèque Nationale de France, Paris