GUAM:

TWO INVASIONS AND THREE MILITARY OCCUPATIONS

A HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF
WAR IN THE PACIFIC NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK, GUAM
Memorandum

To: Associate Director, Management and Operations, National Park Service
    Attention: Assistant Director, Cultural Resources

From: Regional Director, Western Region

Subject: Guam: Historical Summary

Enclosed for your review are two copies of the historical summary of War in the Pacific National Historical Park prepared by Russ Apple. We would appreciate it if you would arrange to have one of them advanced to the National Technical Information Service as is, we understand, standard practice.

(SGD.) NORMA COX

Enclosures

cc:
Director Pacific Area w/o enc.
Assistant Manager, Pacific Northwest/Western Team, DSC
    Attention: Library w/c enc.
Manager, Western Archeological Center
    Attention: Library w/c enc.
Superintendent, War in the Pacific NHP, w/o enc.
GUAM:

TWO INVASIONS AND THREE MILITARY OCCUPATIONS

A HISTORICAL SUMMARY OF
WAR IN THE PACIFIC NATIONAL HISTORICAL PARK, GUAM

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U.S. DEPARTMENT OF INTERIOR

MICRONESIAN AREA RESEARCH CENTER
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PREFACE

Russell Apple is a man of the Pacific with the vision of a pioneer. He has dedicated himself to the welfare of the Hawaiian people and let this take visible form in his writing but especially in the "City of Refuge" on the island of Hawaii. His work in the National Park Service has taken him to Samoa and several other island communities. Now he has extended his talent and experience in the Pacific World to the island of Guam.

The vision of the pioneer takes shape in these pages. Here he presents the historical framework for the War in the Pacific National Historical Park. His knowledge of the physical terrain, documentary sources, and the insight gained from personal interviews, make this publication a unique beginning for the three-fold picture of the war--the Guamanian, American, and Japanese.

The work of Russell Apple leads us forward with confidence along the path of discovery. We are happy to have him as a colleague and look forward to learning more about the history of the island of Guam from his facile pen.

Thomas B. McGrath, S.J.
Director
American Naval Period Project
Acknowledgements

Two non-Guamanians who reviewed drafts of this paper were Dirk Anthony Ballendorf and Peg Apple. Both made substantial suggestions in their fields of expertise.

Drafts of this paper were reviewed by Guamanians Adrian Sanchez, Pedro C. Sanchez and Msgr. Oscar Lujan Calvo. They experienced the two invasions and three occupations. With patience, they helped the author understand the complex events which Guam and Guamanians experienced. They supplied details and backgrounds not otherwise available. Guamanian Diane Lupola, who was born during the Japanese occupation, assisted the author in Agana.

However, all errors of fact and interpretation are the author's.

These people are thanked for their help, interest and encouragement. Help, interest and encouragement also came from the staffs of Flores Memorial Library and the Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam.

Together, they made the preparation of this paper a pleasure.
INTRODUCTION

The purpose of the War in the Pacific National Historical Park is "to commemorate the bravery and sacrifice of those participating in the campaigns of the Pacific theater of World War II..."¹ Army, Navy and support personnel of Japan and Korea fought against Army, Navy and support personnel of allied Western nations—United States, Great Britain, Netherlands, China, New Zealand and Australia. Scenes of the fighting, occupations and offensive-defensive preparations were under, on and above the waters of the Pacific and Indian Oceans with their seas; underground, on and above islands of South East Asia and the Pacific; and the continents of Australia, Asia and America. Included is the bravery and sacrifice of Pacific Islanders as they interacted with those who occupied and fought on their islands in a war not of their own making. Conflict started in 1937 with the invasion of China by Japan, and ended in 1945 with the surrender of Japan to the allied nations.

Americans, Guamanians, Japanese and Koreans were involved with Guam as part of the Pacific theater of World War II. This paper deals primarily with two military campaigns and three of the four military occupations which center on the island of Guam, the location of six detached units in the National Historical Park established by Congress in 1978.

One campaign is the capture of Guam by Japan from the United States in 1941; the other is Guam's recapture by the United States in 1944.

Guam's military occupations were (1) by Spain, 1668-1898; (2) by the United States, 1898-1941; (3) by Japan, 1941-1944; and (4) by the United States, 1944-1962. The island people -- Guamanians -- had different experiences and fortunes in the two campaigns and four occupations.

**Spanish Occupation, 1668-1898**

Some historians and many Guamanians attribute the Western world's discovery of Guam to Magellan, in 1521. Legaspi claimed Guam for Spain in 1565. A century later, 1668, the island was colonized by Spanish priests and soldiers. During the Spanish military occupation, wars between the Chamorro inhabitants and Spanish soldiers reduced the number of Chamorro inhabitants from more than 50,000 to less than 5,000. Among the resultant changes: traditional Chamorro religion was all but eliminated to be replaced by Spanish-Catholic Christianity. By 1898, Spain's colonial empire had waned. Guam was almost a forgotten and certainly a neglected Spanish colony by the time of the Spanish-American War. By then there were about 9,000 descendents of the Chamorros on Guam who represented varied ethnic backgrounds. Over the centuries there had been intermarriages with outsiders. Nevertheless, Chamorros were and are a recognizable ethnic group. (The term Chamorro was accepted through 1945; thereafter the Guam people chose to be called Guamanians, the term used in this study.)

**UNITED STATES OCCUPATION, 1898-1941**

**Civil Affairs**

During the Spanish-American War, Guam was peacefully captured from Spanish officials on June 20, 1898, by a U.S. warship and three
troopships. With the short war in the Caribbean sea and Western Pacific over and lost, Spain asked for peace. By terms of the Treaty of Paris, December 10, 1898, upon payment of $20 million, the United States secured from Spain a protectorate over Cuba, and outright possession of Puerto Rico, the Philippine Islands and Guam (Guam's Governor Calvo publicly pointed out in 1980 that Guamanians were not represented at the Paris talks, nor was their advice asked). In 1898, the United States suddenly found itself to be a colonial power, joining other Western nations in control of "native" peoples and distant islands. A Presidential executive order dated December 23, 1898, placed Guam under control of the Navy Department (—it was so administered through August 1, 1950, when jurisdiction was transferred to the Department of the Interior). In 1899, the entire island was designated a naval station.

Island governors, 1899 through 1941, were all naval officers. Each held dual appointments: governor and naval station commandant — a

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one-man rule situation. In their isolation from distant headquarters, as with Spanish governors before them, the American naval Governors/Commandants controlled all local military, executive, legislative and judicial matters: their authority extended to all phases of island life. Proclamations and numbered General Orders were the laws. Naval officers headed governmental departments. Qualified Guamanians held lower departmental positions. Economics, agriculture, commerce, construction and public works, education, taxes, finance-banking, health, law, in-migrations and out-migrations, arrivals and departures, and politics were controlled by naval government. Apra harbor was maintained as a closed port. Neither the U.S. Constitution nor laws applied to Guam. Guamanians had no effective guarantee against deprivation of life, liberty and property, except that provided by local naval law. Guamanians had no right of protection by grand jury, nor of trial by jury. U.S. Marines were the constabulary: at least one was stationed in every village. General elections to the advisory-only Guam Congress began in 1931 and lasted through 1950. Through legal channels, some discontented Guamanian leaders petitioned for U.S. citizenship and sent delegations to Congress on locally-raised funds. Navy Department pressure blocked all moves in Congress for self-government by the Guamanians.

Laws and civil organization on Guam gradually changed from Spanish to American. Church matters were separated from civil. Spanish priests were deported at the turn of this century and again in the 1930's. Economic slavery and peonage were eliminated — large landowners and merchants in Spanish times had insisted on labor to repay debts. Personal labor to reduce debts was abolished by proclamation.
Guamanians thereafter worked for wages and paid debts in cash or goods. Free clinics were staffed by Navy medical personnel. Schools were established; land reforms made. The initial Guamanian-American mutual suspicion and distrust changed over years to mutual respect and friendship.

In spite of perpetual, paternalistic martial law which governed their island, Guamanians appeared satisfied with their traditional lifestyle which was predominately rural, agricultural, and centered about family and church. Half of the people lived at Agana, but even civil servants and private-sector employees spent weekends and vacations on small family farms called "ranches." Other Guamanians lived in or near villages, again alternating between village homes and family ranches. Guam was not self-sufficient from late Spanish times on. This situation has not changed under American rule. Cash value of imports -- flour, rice, cotton cloth, iron and steel, leather, meat, dairy products, sugar, soap, vegetables and lumber -- from the United States, Japan, Philippines, and other countries always exceeded the value of exports (mostly copra).

Many Guamanians worked for the naval station and the civil government. Wages they were paid were set from half to two-thirds that paid to their American counterparts. Early in 1941, about 110 Guamanian men were enlisted in the Insular Force Guard, an ill-equipped and little trained naval infantry unit. Another group of men, about 169, were in the Navy's Insular Force, which directly served naval station activities, wore enlisted men's uniforms, and worked for half the pay of their equivalent rates in the regular Navy. From 1917 on, there was also a Guam Militia, evolved during World War I when Guam adopted
universal military training for all men from 16 through 23 years of age. There were close-order drills at school for boys up to 16. Most of the Guam Militia's rifles were Mausers salvaged in 1917 from the German cruiser Cormoran (see below); the rest of the rifles were old Springfields. Many Guamanian youths enlisted in the Messman branch, the only billet open to U.S. Nationals in the regular Navy. Up to 15 per month were enlisted and admitted to the training school at Guam aboard the U.S.S. R. L. Barnes, an immobilized tanker. There were 41 new mess-attendant trainees on the station ship when the Japanese invasion began in 1941. Somewhere in the course of this American occupation, well before World War I, almost all Guamanians became loyal Americans.

Military Affairs

As a minor American naval station, Guam usually served only as a fueling stop for American warships travelling from Hawaii to the Philippines.\(^4\) A coal shed was on Cabras island. There was a station collier. At a major naval station, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, coal was mechanically moved from on-shore bunkers by an elaborate, overhead conveyer system to ships, but at Guam, coal was often shoveled, when winches were out of order, from coal shed to collier and again to ships. As U.S. fleet technology changed, an immobilized tanker at anchor in Apra Harbor supplied fuel oil to naval ships and army transports.

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\(^4\) Unless otherwise noted, information for this section comes from: Carano and Sanchez, History of Guam; ONI-99; Beers, Naval Occupation; JICPOA Bull. 52-44; Earl S. Pomeroy, Pacific Outpost, American Strategy in Guam and Micronesia, hereafter cited as Pomeroy, Pacific Outpost; Annual Reports to the Secretary of the Navy from Guam's Governors, for fiscal years ended 1899 through 1940, hereafter cited as Governor's Report and year(s).
Guam was a closed port. Few merchant vessels, either domestic or foreign, and fewer foreign warships were admitted to Apra harbor, and then only on an emergency basis. Of these, one is important, the German cruiser Cormoran.

During World War I, before America was involved, on December 14, 1914, the Cormoran, short on coal and provisions, sought refuge from the enemy (the Japanese cruiser Iwate) in the neutral port of Apra. The warship was interned by the American Navy. At any rate, there were not adequate supplies of coal and food ashore on Guam to supply a cruiser. Her 33 officers and 340 enlisted men outnumbered the U.S. Marines ashore. The Germans became semi-permanent interned "guests" as they lived aboard the Cormoran anchored in Apra harbor. They were freely granted visits ashore until early in 1917. The Germans had post exchange privileges and all other perquisites afforded officers and men of the U.S. Navy. The German band gave concerts ashore; the German and American naval officers invited each other to social affairs. All bills for the Germans' food and essentials were forwarded to the U.S. State Department in Washington, which was then reimbursed by the German embassy. It is even said one U.S. Navy nurse married a German officer.

On April 6, 1917, the United States declared war on Germany. Captain Roy C. Smith, U.S.N., Guam's Governor/Commandant (informed of the declaration of war by cable), demanded surrender of the Cormoran. Instead of surrendering the cruiser, the Germans exploded charges in her coal bunkers to scuttle the warship — with the loss of nine crewmen. The Cormoran sank in 120 feet of water at her anchorage in Apra harbor. Over the next several years, U.S. Navy divers recovered much of the
cruiser's gear. (The hull of the Comoran now attracts recreational scuba divers; at least one suffered an accidental death inside the hull in 1980.)

Officers, with their servants, were imprisoned at Camp Barnett, near Mt. Tenjo's summit. Enlisted men were billeted in a prison camp at Asan Point. Guam, as usual, was low on stockpiled food, and the Cormoran personnel, now prisoners of war, were sent east on the first available army transport, the Thomas. They left Guam on April 30, 1917. Four Chinese laundrymen and 28 New Guineans were released from the Asan PW camp to stay on Guam. They immediately found employment.

From World War I on, Guam must be seen in the context of political reality in the northwestern Pacific, virtually a Japanese ocean. Guam was an isolated, minor, American naval station, an island surrounded by other islands controlled by Japan: to the north, Rota, Tinian, Saipan, and continuing up the rest of the Mariana archipelago through the Bonin islands to Japan's home islands; to the east the Marshall islands; to the southeast, south and southwest, the Caroline islands. These were the Pacific Islands "given" to Japan in 1919, first by the Supreme Allied War Council, then as a mandate by the League of Nations. They were not to be fortified. The Marianas (except Guam), the Marshalls and Carolines were former German possessions. (Germany bought them from Spain in 1898.) Except for the British-occupied Gilbert islands and Guam, Japan held after 1914 all of the Micronesia. Japan closed and made secret its islands, as American had closed and made Guam secret.

From World War I on, many Navy, Marine and Army officers saw Japan as the potential enemy in the Pacific. The leader of this viewpoint was Lt. Col. E. H. Ellis, U.S.M.C. War Plan Orange was approved in 1924; it
was updated thereafter in response to international situations (as Japan increased in military power), but largely to Congressional views and military budgets. The Orange series dealt with a potential war with Japan. Generally, the Orange series foresaw such a war as naval in character. If possible, the Army was to hold Manila until the fleet arrived. It was recognized, however, that the locations of Manila and Guam were strategically in favor of Japan. Japanese forces could reach either in days, American forces in weeks.\footnote{Louis Morton, Strategy and Command: the First Two Years, United States Army in World War II, the War in the Pacific, hereafter cited as Morton, Strategy and Command, pp. 25-26, 29, 30, 33-43; Hector C. Bywater, Sea Power in the Pacific, p. 280; Dirk Anthony Ballendorf, personal communication to Apple, April 3, 1980.} Realistically, America abandoned the concept of effective defense of the Philippines and Guam.

Occasionally it was proposed that Guam be so fortified that it would be impregnable, thus insuring a base in the Western Pacific from which the U.S. fleet could operate, should the need arise, particularly in the defense of the Philippines. A strong American Guam could "neutralize" a strong Japanese Saipan. But Congress feared that a fortified Guam, combined with a superior U.S. fleet, would be a threat to Japan that might provoke war.\footnote{Morton, Strategy and Command, p. 43; Thomas H. Buckley, The United States and the Washington Conference, 1921-1922, pp. 90-95; Samuel Eliot Morrison, The Rising Sun in the Pacific, 1931-April 1942, History of the United States Naval Operations in World War II, Vol. III, pp. 33, 34, hereafter cited as Morrison, Rising Sun.} In practice, America's position was in conformity with views of naval strategist Alfred T. Mahan: unless Guam was made impregnable, a costly venture, military resources there
should not be extensive for Japan to take. Guam was not made impregnable. Its military resources were not extensive. Between the two World Wars, Congress made no appropriations to fortify Guam. Cost of such fortification was part of the reason. Also running through part of the period were the agreements made at the Washington Naval Conferences, 1921-1922. Island bases were part of the discussions. Both Japan and the United States agreed not to further fortify their Western Pacific islands. The status quo was to be held on bases as well as in relative fleet strengths. Thus, there was little of tactical military value on Guam when Japan took the island in 1941. Japan was later put to the total expense and labor of preparing for the defense of Guam when a Japanese-held Guam was in danger of attack.

No Guamanians helped prepare the Orange Plans. No Guamanians sat in on the Washington naval talks, nor testified in the Congressional hearings which resulted in a vulnerable Guam. And vulnerable it was. Guam, in 1938, was professionally assessed as "practically defenseless against determined attack by any first-class power based in the Western Pacific."


Between the World Wars, two off-island U.S. Marine Corps activities were to affect Guam's future. The "Guam Problem" (defense of, and recapture of an enemy-held Guam) was a part of a course offered frequently. It served at the least to familiarize some of the officers who participated in Guam's 1944 recapture with terrain. Secondly, in anticipation of a Pacific war and the foreseen need to capture enemy-fortified islands, the Marines evolved the basic amphibious doctrine, techniques and some of the landing craft successfully used by the United States and allies in the African, European and Pacific theaters. "... Japanese bases in the Pacific were captured on the beaches of the Caribbean, where the problems involved were worked out in Marine maneuvers," wrote General Holland M. Smith, U.S.M.C. He also wrote:

These Marine Exercises were not secret from the Japanese. When we attacked Guam in 1944, I was convinced by the Japanese commander's disposition of his defenses that the enemy had obtained a copy of our original plan for the recapture of Guam, rehearsed years before. 10

Some of America's World War II landing craft, the ones with bow ramps such as the Higgen's boats (LCT's), utilized the ramp concept evolved earlier by the Japanese and used successfully in war for coastal and river landings in China. 11 Japan's successful amphibious landings on Pacific islands preceded those by America. It should be noted, however,

10 Smith, Coral and Brass, p. 18, see also Dyer, Amphibians, p. 206.

that the island fortifications the Japanese met were minor compared to fortifications Japan built on those same islands after capture.

Fortificational status quo for their Pacific island bases was agreed to by Japan and the United States at the 1922 Washington conference. The status quo for Guam was the armament as reinforced during World War I, a Marine flying boat and land plane squadron which arrived in 1921, and a radio station which began operating in 1917. All but the radio station were gone by 1931.

First to the Marine Corps aviators -- up to ten pilots and 90 enlisted men. This aviation unit served (except for some Philippine duty in 1927-1928) on Guam from 1921 through 1931. On Guam, land for their air station on Orote peninsula was leased from several Guamanians; some were forced to evacuate their homes. Fiscal compensation for their property and real estate was long delayed. The shore-side facilities and sea plane ramp,\(^{12}\) abandoned in 1931, later were leased by the Navy to Pan American Airways for its flying boats, the China Clippers. The Clippers started flying between San Francisco and Hong Kong in 1935. Passengers flew island-to-island (Oahu in Hawaii, Midway, Wake, Guam, Luzon in the Philippines) during the day and spent nights ashore on islands. The Pan American hotel on Guam was on Orote peninsula. (Several Guamanians working in the hotel kitchen were killed by bombs

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\(^{12}\) A map which shows the sea lanes used by flying boats is found with ONI-99. Photographs of the flying boats, the ramp and shore facilities, taken in 1921 and 1922, are in the National Archives: Yards and Docks, Record Group 71-CA-149EEE, numbers 1-10. The Micronesian Area Research Center (MARC), University of Guam, has 8x10 inch prints, filed by the National Archives numbers. Apparently the 1921 USMC sea plane ramp was too narrow and waters adjacent too shallow for the large Pan American Clippers and USN PBY's in 1940 and 1941--they moored in Apra Harbor.
dropped by Saipan-based Japanese aircraft on December 8, 1941, December 7 in Hawaii, a few hours after the Japanese attacked the U.S. fleet in Pearl Harbor.) The PanAm hotel on Orote peninsula shared the Guamanian village (1941 est. pop. 2,000) of Sumay with the cable office, Standard Oil fuel tanks, the Marine barracks and homes of Guamanians.13

Guam's communications with the outside world were by shipborne messengers and messages, mail, cable and radio. Since most naval ships which stopped at Guam were westbound, official and civilian mail to the United States often travelled by way of the Philippines, then east via Hawaii. The Pacific Commercial Cable Company linked Guam to Manila and Hong Kong to the west; to German, then Japanese-held Yap to the southwest; and east via Wake and Midway islands to Hawaii and San Francisco. America's cable system in the Pacific became operational in 1903. During World War I, Guam's naval government censored and restricted outgoing cable messages in the interests of security. By 1918, the Navy's radio network had all but eliminated the cable for official messages. Most cable messages were sent and received in code. The Navy used code, of course, but high cost per word and desire for privacy put many commercial messages in code as well. A number of different code books were on the market, and were bought and used by businessmen.14

13 The thesis that "PanAm collaborated with the Navy and State Departments in the mid-1930's in a plan to extend the U.S. Military presence in the Pacific under the guise of establishing commercial stopovers," has been advanced. Ronald W. Jackson (author of China Clipper), as quoted in a UPI dispatch from San Francisco, Pacific Daily News, March 10, 1980.

14 Russell A. Apple and Gerald Swedberg, History of the Midway Islands, pp. 3-13; Governors' Reports, 1914-1918.
About 1908, the Navy had a small radio station (for sending and receiving locally) on Agana Heights.\textsuperscript{15} In 1911, a new road was built for access to a higher site and a new mast went up. In 1917, two masts, 400 feet high each, went up even higher near Libugon (now Nimitz Hill), close to Fonte plateau. This station was major; had operators' quarters, transmitters and receivers, water system and power house. Its road was a spur from the ca. 1915 road to the summit of Mt. Tenjo. In 1920, the two 400 foot towers were joined by a 600-foot tower; there were extensive improvements in the ground facilities and in radio equipment. In 1932, radio equipment was moved from Libugon to a new radio station behind the Governor/Commandant's palace in downtown Agana. The radio-operators' quarters at Libugon were then rented to naval personnel. The towers at Libugon still stood. At least one was dynamited down in 1940; the others were left standing and were bombed by Japanese aircraft on December 9, 1941. Guamanians who were prisoners of war dismantled them in place, from top to bottom. Tower parts were salvaged for use by the Japanese.\textsuperscript{16} It was the radio equipment at Agana which was destroyed by the men on watch as the Japanese landed in 1941.\textsuperscript{17}

\textsuperscript{15} Msgr. Calvo, pers. int., April 4, 1980; see also Emilie Johnston, "Nimitz Hill History" mss., p. 2.

\textsuperscript{16} Governors' Reports, 1911-1914; Louis Martinez, pers. int. in his office, Anigua, March 18, 1980; ONI-99, p. 254; Msgr. Calvo, pers. int., March 17, April 8, 1980; George R. Tweed and Blake Clark, Robinson Crusoe, USN, The Adventures of George R. Tweed, Rmlc on Jap-Held Guam, p. 5; Photographs: Record Group 71-CA-149; WV 1, 8, 14, 20, 21, 22; TT 1, 4; WW 11; AAA 2; all available at MARC.

\textsuperscript{17} Tweed/Clark, Robinson Crusoe, p. 4; George R. McMillin, Surrender of Guam to the Japanese, report to the Secretary of the Navy, 1945, para. 5.
Apra harbor was the military and topographic feature most valued on Guam during the period before air power's full potential in Pacific warfare was realized. Traditionally, ports like Apra were protected from attack from surface ships. Spanish forts had once protected Apra. To protect Apra, U.S. naval planners, like the Spanish before them, wished to place heavy guns where they would command the harbor's mouth and approaches.18

By 1911, the United States had built a military road to the edge of high sea cliffs on the tip of Orote peninsula. Two 6-inch guns were mounted on the cliff edges by mid-1911; two other 6-inch guns were on hand to mount. Over the next decade, a "guncotton house," squad shelters, ready magazines, searchlight installations, a "concrete shell house" for storage of 6-inch shells, and other armament paraphernalia joined the defensive facilities on Cabras island, at Piti navy yard, the Marine barracks area at Sumay, and on the tip of Orote peninsula. Additional 6-inch guns were mounted on Orote's tip, and perhaps one on the sandbar-like Cabras island, which forms the side of the harbor opposite Orote peninsula. As newer, bigger and more powerful guns became available, "old type" guns were dismounted and shipped to the United States. All annual reports but one (1931) by Governor/

18 Yolanda Degadillo, Thomas B. McGrath and Felicia Plaza, Spanish Forts of Guam, p. 26. Neither the Japanese in 1941 nor the Americans in 1944 invaded Guam through Apra Harbor. In both invasions, the harbor and shoreside facilities were taken from the land side. However, in 1898, the U.S.S. Charleston (Capt. Glass) entered Apra Harbor to capture Guam under the menacing guns of Fort Santiago. The U.S. warship could not elevate her guns high enough to return any fire from the fort on top of lofty sea cliffs. There was no fire from the fort. Unknown to the Americans: the fort was unmanned and there was no powder. Spanish officials ashore were not aware that Spain and America were at war.
Commandants speak of 6-inch guns and 6-inch support facilities when size is mentioned at all. All of the above facilities were on the shores of Apra harbor.19

The chasing of the cruiser Cormoran by the cruiser Iwate into the neutral, but closed, port of Apra was but a symptom of the war between Japan and Germany which was fought for a few months in 1914 on and around islands to Guam's north, east, southeast, south and southwest. Japan seized Germany's Micronesian possessions (and occupied most of them through 1945). Upon seizure in 1914, Japan dropped a curtain around its islands and sustained it for decades. Both friend and foe were excluded. Japan's closing of Micronesia was an act which generated much distrust of Japan in American naval circles.

Congress made no appropriation to fortify Guam, but two parts of the U.S. Navy teamed together in 1914 to fortify Guam as an "advance base" with "temporary defenses" until Congress decided to act. The two parts of the Navy were the Bureau of Ordnance and the Marine Corps. A portion of the equipment and personnel they supplied went to increase Guam's defenses, through additional or replacement guns on Orote. The rest went into a new battery on Mt. Tenjo, from whose summit, 1,028 feet above sea level, three guns would command a wide arc out to sea over Apra harbor.

Naval guns, ammunition, and additional Marines arrived on Guam February 1, 1914, from Olongapo naval station in the Philippines. In 1915, more than $13,000 was expended on Guam's "advance base" affairs,

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19 Governors' Reports, 1912-1932; Photographs: Record Group 71-CG-149; L 1 through 7; N1 through 4 (1917); P 1 through 4 (1917); and M 1 through 3; all available at MARC.
of which less than $3,000 went into the emplacement of guns. Most of the funds probably went into building a road to the top of Mt. Tenjo, to install and maintain the 3-gun battery there. Mt. Tenjo's battery was three, 7-inch, pedestal-mounted guns. To maintain the road and service the battery, by 1916 the Marines established Camp Barnett in a relatively flat area behind (inland) of Mt. Tenjo's summit battery. In 1922, about 200 Marines were in tents there, doing "road work, etc."20 It is believed Camp Barnett was in use through 1931.

On June 11, 1931, the Secretary of the Navy ordered Guam's Governor/Commandant to demilitarize the island.21 This order was probably in reaction to rising Japanese military activity in Manchuria, seized by Japan in toto later that year. It may have been hoped that a defenseless Guam would confine any Japanese military moves to Manchuria -- remote from Hawaii, Guam and the Philippines -- and not provoke any incidents on Pacific islands.22

"All guns and mounts, and the mobile battery of the Marines were disassembled and returned to the United States on all transports that could take same," reported Capt. Edmund S. Root, U.S.N., the Governor/Commandant. "On account of the lifts involved," two 8-inch howitzer guns with mounts, eight 7-inch rifles (including the three guns from Mt. Tenjo), and two 7-inch tractor-mounted guns were left on Guam.

20 Governors' Reports, 1912-1932; L. M. Cox, E. J. Doun, K. C. McIntosh and M. C. Cook, The Island of Guam; ONI-99, p. 256; Photographs: Record Group 71-CA-149; K 1 through 5 (Feb. 1922); F 1 (Apr. 20, 1917); all available at MARC.

21 Governor's Report, 1932.

22 Herbert Feis, The Road to Pearl Harbor, the Coming of the War between the United States and Japan, p. 5; John Toland, The Rising Sun: the Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945, pp. 4-7; Saburo Ienaga, The Pacific War, 1931-1945, pp. 55-60.
Apparently the transports could not load guns heavier than 6-inch. Ammunition was also left in the magazines until sea transport could be found for it as well as for the stockpiled and dismantled guns.

Soon after Guam was demilitarized, Captain Root visited Saipan on the station ship, the U.S.S. Gold Star. He and his staff spent Monday through Friday, August 31 through September 4, 1931, as guests of the Governor-General of the Japanese mandated islands, Baron Matsuda. Matsuda, in turn, visited Guam on October 16 and 17, 1932. The exchange of visits was for friendship and probably for mutual assurance of military weakness. Presumably all ammunition and guns were gone before Baron Matsuda arrived on Guam.

While Japanese and American officialdom was limited to an official exchange of visits in 1931 and 1932, the Japanese schooner Kibara Maru, based at Saipan, made frequent visits to Guam. She carried trade goods to Japanese stores on Guam, took Guam's copra to Saipan, and carried passengers among Guam, Rota, Tinian and Saipan islands. All a Guamanian needed to visit friends or relatives on Saipan was a letter from the U.S. Navy on Guam certifying that he was a Guamanian. After 1936, however, some Guamanians were never permitted to leave the schooner at Saipan; others were permitted ashore, restricted in the places they could go, and watched by the Saipan police. It is not known if any Guamanians who visited Saipan were interrogated on their return by U.S. naval authorities. It is suspected that Japanese nationals resident on Guam informed the Japanese government about Guam affairs via the Kibara Maru.23

With Guam's big guns gone, this left on Guam two 6-pound guns for saluting, 12 Browning automatic rifles, four Browning machine guns, 688 Springfield rifles (for Guam Militia) and 260 Springfield rifles for the Marine Corps and Insular Force.24 (The Insular Force Guard was not organized until 1941.) This was the armament Guam, the largest island north of the equator between Hawaii and the Philippines, had after 1931. Guam stood, ripe for the picking, in a Japanese ocean.

JAPAN'S CAMPAIGN FOR GUAM, DEC. 8-10, 1941

Guam's capture by Japan was but a small campaign in a simultaneously launched, successful combat operation across a linear distance of 6,000 miles -- from Hawaii to Singapore. The successful operation caused an abrupt reversal of the Asiatic-Pacific balance of power. About a thousand aircraft of the Japanese naval air force were involved in initiating the operation. Few of the aircraft were lost.25 Air strikes were followed by successful landings and occupations in chosen locations.

By 1941, Japan had the world's first carrier-based fighter that could outperform corresponding land-based models. This was the Mitsubishi A6M Zero-Sen, the famous Zero, code named by the Allied enemy as Zeke. Its point-to-point range, with a drop-tank full of aviation gas to supplement its standard wing tanks, was about 1,940 miles. It could, and often did, fly 500 or more miles from a land or carrier base, drop bombs, strafe and/or engage in a dogfight, and fly back to its

24 Governor's Report, 1932.

25 Masataki Okumiya and Kiro Horikoshi with Martin Caidin, Zero, the Air War in the Pacific during World War II from the Japanese Viewpoint, p. 65.
starting point.\textsuperscript{26} One reason Japan wanted Guam was to build an airstrip there for its Zeros and its land-based, twin-engine bombers. (Japanese occupation forces started to build Guam's first modern airstrip -- on Orote peninsula -- shortly after Guam was captured.) Although Zeros were to be based on Guam, the Guam airstrip (later two, with another under construction) was foreseen primarily as one of a number of alternate ferry bases to refuel aircraft enroute between other Japanese (or potential Japanese) held islands. In practice, aircraft in transit usually hopped island-to-island, but could overfly islands if weather or urgency dictated.

Flying distances in miles from Guam and in non-stop ferry range for the Zero:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Northerly-</th>
<th>Southerly-</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Saipan, 125</td>
<td>Woleai, 370</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pagan, 290</td>
<td>Yap, 455</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chichi Jima, 835</td>
<td>Truk, 566</td>
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<tr>
<td>Marcus, 845</td>
<td>Palau, 705</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tokyo, 1350</td>
<td>New Guinea (Lae) 1220</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Guadalcanal, 1655</td>
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</tbody>
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<tr>
<th>Easterly-</th>
<th>Westerly-</th>
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<tr>
<td>Ponape, 885</td>
<td>Manila, 1400</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enewetok, 1040\textsuperscript{27}</td>
<td>Formosa (Taiwan), 1515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kusai (Kosrae), 1200</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kwajelain (Roi), 1365</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Makin, 1795</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Tarawa (Betio), 1835</td>
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\textsuperscript{27} JICPOA Bull. 52-44. The Enewetok spelling is obsolete. Modern usage is Enewetok, in keeping with the desires of the Enewetokese.
Thus, Guam was foreseen by Japan in one light as but another potential alternate airfield among a number in the western Pacific, especially as an alternate to Saipan, Tinian or Rota when they were closed by weather (or later, by enemy action).

Japan looked not upon Guam, however, as a mere dot in the Pacific. Guam was an American island in a long-time Japanese ocean -- reason enough to take it. Its possession would also ensure denial to the United States of a waypoint enroute to the Philippines -- the real prize. The Philippines were needed for natural resources, yes, but more importantly to protect the vital sea route which lay between Manila and French Indo-China (fully in Japanese hands since July 1941).

Oil and other natural resources needed by Japan lay in Southeast Asia, especially in the Netherlands East Indies and in British Malaya, Southeast Asia was designated Japan's "Southern Resources Area."

To open, and keep open, a 3,000-mile long sea route for tankers, freighters and naval vessels, enemy bases in the Philippines, Hong Kong and Singapore were to be captured first and then used by Japan. American Wake and Guam, the British Gilberts and Burma, and the Australian Solomons were to be taken as the last remaining parts of the outer ring of protection for the sea route. In attacking such distant points as Midway and Pearl Harbor (where the target was the U.S. fleet), Japan planned to eliminate long-range menaces to its ocean lifeline. Japan had to fight World War II on imported oil.28

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28 United States Strategic Bombing Survey (USSBS), Reports 51 and 52, Oil in Japan's War, p. 45; hereafter cited as USSBS, Oil in Japan's War.
Finally, the 200 or so square miles of Guam represented the largest and potentially richest island within a 900 mile radius. Nearby Saipan and Tinian produced bountifully for the Japanese: Guam could be made to produce more.29 So Japan believed. Guam was to become part of the "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere," which Japan planned for the western Pacific and eastern Asia, a sphere in which Japan replaced several Western nations as the colonial power. This change of colonial masters was the abrupt reversal of the balance of power in late 1941 and early 1942. Guamanians were among the peoples not consulted about Japan's plans.

Japanese Invasion

Japan's Imperial High Command, in December 1940, ordered Army commands in China to begin studies for the capture of targets in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Detailed plans for the amphibious invasion of Guam were completed in October 1941. Meanwhile, government printing presses in Japan printed military currency for use in areas to be occupied (Guam, like the mandated islands, used regular yen), and three army divisions in China trained for tropical warfare and received tropical clothing and gear. From one of these divisions, the 144th Infantry Division, came a regimental combat team named the South Seas Detachment. With naval militia and other units to reinforce it, the South Seas Detachment was assigned the tasks of first taking Guam, and then Rabaul on New Britain island in the Solomons.

From October 1941 on, the 18th Air Unit, Imperial Japanese Navy, flew secret, high altitude, photo reconnaissance flights over Guam from

29 OIN-99, p. 308.
its base on Saipan. Waters surrounding Guam were regularly patrolled, secretly at night, from October on.

Japan's South Seas Detachment, about 5,000 soldiers, staged in the Bonin islands and proceeded on December 4, 1941, toward Guam. Enroute, it picked up, off Rota, ships which held about 500 men of a special naval landing force drawn from the 5th Defense Force stationed on Saipan. While the Guam invasion fleet -- three cruisers, three destroyers and eight merchant ships full of troops -- organized off Rota, planes of the 18th Air Unit at Saipan bombed and strafed Guam on December 8 (Dec. 7 in Hawaii) and December 9 for pre-invasion softening. They also flew over Guam in victory after daylight on December 10 -- Guam had surrendered before dawn.

The state of war with Japan was known by Governor/Commandant McMillin early on December 8. Japanese nationals were arrested and jailed.

Virtually unopposed air raids on December 8 and 9 destroyed several houses and stores in Agana; a bomb fell in the Governor/Commandant's garden but missed his palace and adjacent navy radio station. Near Piti, the Pomeroy (Navy contractor) barracks was hit. On Orote peninsula, bombs and strafing ignited the Standard Oil tanks, hit the Marine Barracks and golf course, damaged the cable station and Pan American

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30 Philip A. Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas, United States Army in World War II, the War in the Pacific, pp. 22-23, hereafter cited as Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas; Morton, Strategy and Command, pp. 64, 107, 199-200; James M. Burnes and Marjorie Cline, Guam, Operations of the 77th Division (21 July - 10 April 1944), p. 17. On yen used in Guam: Msgr. Calvo, pers. int. April 8, 1980.
hotel and flying boat buildings. Small boat handling facilities at the Piti navy yard were extensively damaged. Several villages were strafed.

The old minesweeper U.S.S. Penguin completed an early morning offshore patrol and was back at anchor in Apra harbor by 8 a.m., December 8. As Japanese planes strafed and bombed her, she got underway but was hit. The crew scuttled the minesweeper off Gabgab beach, Orote peninsula, and swam ashore.

Guamanian Louis Ignacious, an Insular Force boatswain's mate on the U.S.S. Barnes, the immobilized tanker, saw bombs repeatedly miss his ship. With another Insular Force member, Francisco Augen, he prepared Lewis sub-machine guns for fire at the low-flying Japanese aircraft. He received orders not to fire. After the Barnes was strafed, her crew swam to Sumay village, Orote peninsula. (Later, the Japanese towed the Barnes to Saipan.) Apparently, the only fire returned at the attacking aircraft came from small yard craft at the Piti naval yard.

On December 8, a Japanese patrol boat placed eight young, Chamorro-speaking Saipanese men in dugout canoes about halfway between Rota and Guam. The men landed on Guam. The three who came ashore at Tarrague were apprehended and interrogated by American naval authorities. The five who landed at Inarajan were not officially noticed. Their mission was to advise the Chamorro-speaking Guamanians to evacuate Agana, to stay away from shorelines and not to interfere in invasion matters. The eight served, and more came later to serve, the Japanese on Guam as interpreters during the occupation.31

31 Pedro C. Sanchez, Uncle Sam, Please Come Back to Guam, pp. 17-18, hereafter cited as Sanchez, Uncle Sam; Msgr. Calvo, pers. int., April 4, 1980.
Japan's plans anticipated invasion warfare on Guam to be a joint Army-Navy affair; in practice only the small naval militia unit had to fight. The prize initially sought by the Army and Navy was Orote peninsula, since it controlled Apra harbor and was the site selected for initial airstrip construction.

Sizes attributed to the naval militia unit range from 400 to 700 men. The unit crossed a half-mile of reef and landed just before 3 a.m., December 10, 1941, on Dungca's beach. During the two-mile advance overland westerly to downtown Agana, the militia eliminated a machine gun emplacement at a road intersection (spotted the day before by a plane from Saipan); killed and injured an unknown number of Guamanians who were fleeing Agana; set fire to at least one house; and were halted temporarily by machine gun and rifle fire by the Insular Force Guard in defensive positions around the Plaza de Espana in downtown Agana. At 5:45 a.m., still in darkness, all firing ceased. Guam's Governor/Commandant, a U.S. Navy captain, humiliated by being forced to remove his trousers and coat, signed surrender documents shortly thereafter to the Japanese Navy commander who headed the militia. Word to surrender was passed to Sumay on Orote peninsula, where most of the U.S. Marines were deployed.

Casualties included several wounded and dead Japanese (numbers never revealed); U.S. Navy and Marine Corps officers and men killed -- 13; also an American civilian and four members of the Insular Force Guard. Between 30 and 40 Guamanian civilians were killed. Wounded included 37 U.S. Navy and Marine Corps officers and men; eight enlisted Guamanians, and an unknown number of Guamanian civilians. No one kept count of the Guamanian casualties. Casualty figures are for the three
days — December 8, 9, 10, and include deaths and injuries caused by aircraft attacks on the ships as well as in land action.

While and after naval militia landed on and conquered Guam, the Army's South Seas Detachment made unopposed landings at points on Guam far from Agana. One was at Tumon bay to the north, and later that morning others were far south between Facpi Point and Merizo. Once ashore in roadless southern Guam, they found no easy land route to Agat, their destination. From Agat they were to take Orote peninsula from the land side. (The Agat access to Orote was also used in 1944 by the Americans.) The detachment reboarded and relanded at Agat and occupied Orote with its by-then empty U.S. Marine barracks. Units from Agat also proceeded to Agana, to join the naval militia and the soldiers who came from Tumon bay. Guamanians living on Orote peninsula were forced to evacuate immediately.

South Seas Detachment soldiers who were temporarily ashore on December 10 at Merizo, a remote village and port, arrested the priest, the Marine Corps patrolman and the navy hospitalman, all Americans. The Americans were left behind when the unit reboarded for Agat. During their few hours in Merizo, the soldiers rounded up all the Guamanians they could find and held them at the school house. (Many Merizo residents had left for their ranches — Merizo had been strafed several times and bombed by Japanese aircraft the day before.) A Japanese officer read a prepared statement to the assembled Guamanians. "The Japanese Army is here to protect you, by the grace of the Emperor."
Your people and ours are all of one color ..."32 The attempt to make Guam a contributing member of Japan's Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere was beginning.

JAPANESE OCCUPATION, 1941-1944

Two of the four dead Guamanians of the Insular Force Guard died of wounds received during the surrender ceremonies at the Plaza de Espana. These men were Angel Leon Guerrero Flores and Vicente C. Chargulaf. Whatever the details of the cause of their deaths -- the substance of the story told and retold throughout the island was the same -- Flores and Chargulaf refused to obey Japanese orders to lower the American flag and raise the Japanese flag. Both were bayoneted. To Guamanians at a critical time in their history the story was important. The story gave the Guamanians the courage to face adversity in the midst of American defeat and surrender, a frightening and demoralizing event for a people who relied on American resolve and strength. (Posthumous citations to Flores and Chargulaf came from the Navy in 1978.) Flores and Chargulaf became the first heroes of the occupation for the Guamanians.33


33 Unless otherwise noted information for this section comes from Sanchez, Uncle Sam, pp. 28-30; Pedro C. Sanchez, pers. int. in Agana, April 10, 1980; Carano and Sanchez, History of Guam.
Guamanian Pedro C. Sanchez, a historian whose 1979 book *Uncle Sam Please Come Back to Guam*, details the experiences of Guamanians under Japanese rule, writes:

In three distinct periods of occupation the people of Guam went through varying degrees of hardship. The first period began on invasion day, December 10, 1941, and ended with the departure of the invading Imperial Army in March (sic) 1942.

The second and longest period took place between the departure of the invading army and the arrival of the Japanese defense force in March of 1944.

The third occupation period included the last months before the liberation of the people by the United States Armed Forces in July-August 1944.  

First Occupation Period, December 10, 1941 to January 14, 1942

While the Minseisho, the civilian affairs sector of the South Seas Detachment, organized and dealt with the Guamanians, the soldiers dealt with the prisoners of war. Soldiers also looted stores and homes, strutted, paraded, menaced and hit the Guamanians. All 2,000 Guamanian residents of Sumay on Orote peninsula were forced from their homes on December 10 and never permitted to return (except to pick up a few personal possessions). Army prostitutes arrived on December 20 from Japan, and stayed through 1944.

By the end of December 1941, the Americans who were prisoners of war had been concentrated in the Plaza de Espana where they could be paraded, maltreated and humiliated in sight of long, slow-moving lines of Guamanians called to Agana for identification tags and for family

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34 Sanchez, *Uncle Sam*, p. 34.
food ration coupons. Hundreds of Army horses feasted in family gardens; millions of flies accompanied them; hundreds of military vehicles, driven on the left, crowded walking Guamanians off streets and roads. Open palm slaps, a few fists, and sometimes sticks taught Guamanians the art of Japanese bowing.

In its proclamation of occupation, the Army promised courtmartial and execution by shooting for defiance or spying. Two Guamanians who were shot by a firing squad became the second set of Guamanian occupation heroes: Alfred Leon Guerrero Flores (cousin of Angel) and Francisco Borja Won Pat. Flores may have been guilty of plotting sabotage, but apparently Won Pat was falsely accused of theft from a Pomeroy warehouse. After torture, both confessed, and were taken to Pigo cemetery for public execution. Among the 300 witnesses forced to watch: relatives and children.

Perhaps 500 American prisoners of war were crowded, without adequate sanitation facilities, into Guam's Catholic cathedral and an adjacent church building. The prisoners included all American civilians. Some Americans were forced to leave Guamanian wives and children. The only women interned were five navy nurses and a navy wife with newborn daughter. (All other navy dependents who were not Guamanian had been evacuated from Guam by October 1941. The nurses, wife and daughter were repatriated from Japan on the Asamu Maru in June-1942.) Among the prisoners were the Catholic Bishop and his secretary (both Spanish citizens), and all American priests and brothers. That left only two priests, both Guamanians, for 20,000 Guamanian people, all but a few of them Catholic. Fr. Jesus Baza Duenas took the southern end of Guam; Fr. Oscar Lujan Calvo took the northern.
American prisoners of war, plus the Spanish Bishop and his Spanish secretary, were shipped from Guam on January 10, 1942, in the hold of the Argentina Maru for prison camp in Japan. Shortly after their departure, the 250 Guamanian prisoners of war were put on a work-release-parole arrangement. Members of the Insular Force Guard, the Insular Force, Guamanian members of the civilian police, and the regular navy mess-attendant trainees from the Barnes had been interned in a school building by the Plaza de Espana. They marched to work daily as stevedores to unload and load the ships of the South Seas Detachment in Apra harbor. Some also worked in the navy cold storage plant. In this situation, their food and other support arrangements fell on the Japanese Army. Under work-release-parole, the Guamanian prisoners of war walked home after work and walked to work the next morning. Thus, they fed themselves, could work the family garden, and help produce food for the occupation forces. They later worked as miners at the manganese mine opened by the Japanese near the site of the radio towers at Libugon. Ore which ran as high as 40% pure was mined from exposed veins.35

Roving troops in war regalia were everywhere. They met no armed resistance anywhere. But they found no welcoming committees, no welcome-to-Guam signs, no jubilant islanders either. To the inhabitants of this American possession, the Japanese invasion was no rescue mission, Imperial proclamation notwithstanding.

The Guamanians had never before seen so many soldiers and so much implements of war. Not knowing what to expect, they were terrified by the threatening sights of Japanese invaders in

war attire. There were officers with swords dangling noisily on their sides; troops with machine guns and cannons poised for action. Every soldier was covered with camouflage of leaves and branches on their helmets and backs. They were indeed a menacing spectacle to the peaceful islanders.

Japan's South Seas Detachment, more than 5,000 soldiers, departed from Guam about January 14, 1942. Escorted by carriers and other units of Japan's Fourth Fleet, it was reinforced at Truk and then took Rabaul on January 23. This left perhaps 400 naval militiamen to occupy Guam.

Second Occupation Period, January 15, 1942 to March 1944

With a thousand-year occupation in mind, Japan changed Guam's name to Omiya Jima. Agana became Akashi; Agat was Showa Mura and Asan was Asama Mura. The English language, American songs — anything American — were banned. Omiya Jima was to be Japanized. Schools gave Japan hope that Guamanian students would become followers of and believers in the new Japanese regime.

Civilian management was transferred from the army's Minseishō to the navy's Minseibu. While a subordinate branch of the Keibita (navy garrison — the naval militia, now renamed the 54th Keibita), the civil affairs branch (Minseibu) operated almost autonomously. Generally, the people were left alone, could live at their ranches (most did), and avoided as much contact as possible with the feared Japanese police, who were usually accompanied by Saipanese interpreters. In contrast to the American system, an accused Guamanian was assumed guilty. Torture most

36 Sanchez, Uncle Sam, pp. 34-35.
37 Morton, Strategy and Command, p. 199.
always accompanied questioning. Crimes ranged from speaking English to murder and espionage.

"Throughout this period, the people of Guam managed to live off the land and sea -- something they had not done before, nor have done again since the war ... Guam was able to produce, in time, enough food for its population -- and some left over for the Japanese army." Naval militiamen cultivated friendships, and engaged in barter with the Guamanians -- the navy had candy and cigarettes to exchange.

Guam was peaceful, if the Minseibu, the police and those few who came from Japan to plant castor beans, could be ignored. In Japan's second occupation period, it was mutually expedient for Guam's occupiers and those occupied to be friendly.

By 1941, under American's first occupation, there were about 5,500 Guamanian children enrolled in schools taught in the English language. The schools taught in the Japanese language sponsored by the Minseibu had a small enrollment -- perhaps up to a thousand at any one time. For one thing, many children were at the scattered ranches; for another, even parents near villages did not care to send their children. Attendance, especially in Agana, was compulsory, but enforcement was spotty. For the first few months there were also compulsory evening Japanese language schools for adults, again centered in Agana. Japanese vocabularies, simple sentences and phrases and Japanese patriotic songs were the heart of the curriculum. In October 1942, a residence school for teaching assistants was started -- a saturation course in Japanese language, history and culture -- for selected Guamanian young men and

38 Carano and Sanchez, History of Guam, p. 278.
women. Graduates assisted teachers from Japan and Japanese Micronesia in all schools. Later, as Japan began to lose the war, the graduates became interpreters; some became foremen on agricultural or defense projects.

Arleen Bast Smith, in her master's thesis on Guam's occupation schools under the Japanese, wrote, "The one recurring idea that I found in each interview was that people learned the Japanese language because it was advisable to do so but their devotion to their church and to the United States was only made stronger by the Japanese occupation of Guam." 39

As Japan's position in the Western Pacific deteriorated, work gradually supplanted learning. Students planted corn, gathered seaweed and sea slugs, picked ferns for vegetables, gathered mushrooms and fruit, made coconut oil, juiced papaya, stockpiled coconut husks and gathered wood to fuel the Agana power plant, helped clear vegetation and rocks from the Orote airfield, and eventually became full-time labor gangs. Often, they were required to bring food to school for the military -- eggs, vegetables, chicken, fruit. Rotten eggs were sometimes brought -- but the children were punished if they were caught. When U.S. bombing started, they dug fox holes near their schools, 40 in the villages, and on the ranches.

Six American navy men escaped from Agana on the Japanese invasion day to hide in Guam's boondocks. Five were caught and executed within a relatively short time; the sixth, George R. Tweed, survived the war by

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39 Arlene Bast Smith, "Schools of Guam during Japanese Occupation."

successfully hiding, and by being hidden from the Japanese. All were helped by various Guamanians; in so doing the Guamanians put their bodies and lives (and sometimes the bodies and lives of their friends and families) in jeopardy. Guamanians suspected of helping, hiding, or of knowing of American whereabouts were subjected to torture, sometimes followed by decapitation. Searching for the sixth man became a full-time job for a few naval militiamen. It has been said that Tweed's survival "became a symbol of American freedom to the hard pressed natives." A more realistic appraisal would be: as long as the Japanese searched for Tweed, all Guamanians knew they might be summarily arrested and accused of knowing of his hiding place.41

Two Catholic priests and a Baptist minister, all Guamanians, were left on-island. The Baptist minister served a small, but scattered flock, perhaps five percent of the population. The priests had to serve more than 20,000 Catholics. Catholic services were conducted in Latin, which unlike English, was not prohibited by the Japanese.

The Japanese government sent two Japanese priests to help. They came with the permission of Bishop Olano, Guam's bishop-in-exile, to serve on Guam. In their letter of authority, Olano formalized his earlier verbal appointment of Fr. Duenas as pro-vicar apostolic, that is to head Guam's church in the absence of its bishop. Incoming Monsignor

Fukahori and Fr. Komatsu were disliked and suspect in Fr. Duenas' view. But being Japanese, they could, and did, intercede with Japanese authorities on behalf of Guamanians, especially if falsely accused. One beneficiary of such intercession: Fr. Duenas -- authorities were persuaded not to exile him to Rota island. Fr. Duenas was openly hostile to Japanese authority, and included official announcements and proclamations in his services only if he felt they were beneficial to Guamanians. Fr. Duenas was under constant surveillance. His arrest seemed to be always pending.

Fr. Calvo, who served in Northern Guam, proved more circumspect and prudent but as effective in his defense of "the Chamarros in their encounters with the Japanese government," as Bishop Olano directed. Father, later Monsignor, Calvo was the only survivor of the two Guamanian priests. He attributes his survival to the intercession of the "Blessed Mother of Kamalin" and to the will of God.

Villages and districts of Agana were assigned daily worker quotas. In the beginning, quotas left a few men behind for village and ranch work. Men who worked for the Japanese (or for a Japanese firm -- the airport contractor) were paid one to five yen per day. Yen were practically worthless. They could be used to purchase rice when it was available. Sometimes, in addition, each worker was paid daily with a cup of uncooked rice, a welcome victual of his family.

Men of Merizo village, as in all villages, were divided by the Soncho (the Guamanian appointed without his consent as village boss) into work groups, each under a permanent Guamanian work leader, a

42 Sanchez, Uncle Sam, pp. 81-83; Camba, "Merizo Massacre," p. 52.
Kumicho. Absenteeism was a daily problem in Merizo. One frequent absentee was finally officially so reported, in spite of a recommendation by the local Saipanese interpreter that he not be reported. The school house was the scene of the absentee's public punishment. Two Japanese held him while a third beat him with a club. When he fainted he was revived with splashes of water. This beating-fainting-revival cycle was repeated three or four times. The victim was then returned to his family for care. This did not stop all absenteeism, but it did stop reporting of such.43

One of the duties of the Soncho was the frequent calling together of their charges for informational lectures. At them, Japanese officials of the Minseibu boasted of the latest Japanese victories, usually starting each lecture with mention of Pearl Harbor. Sometimes the Agana people were forced to march in victory celebration. "Every few hundred yards, at the urging of gun-toting troops and Samurai-sword wielding officers, the marchers shouted banzai!, banzai!, banzai!" But, as the Guamanians later told the Americans, "we noticed the 'victories' got closer and closer to Guam."44

When U.S. carrier-based aircraft strafed and bombed Guam's Tiyan airfield on February 22, 1944, the raid brought joy to the Guamanians. It meant that the Americans were returning. Search by the Japanese for the last American holdout intensified. Guamanian labor increased as


44 Sanchez, Uncle Sam, p. 67; "Liberation of Guam."
work on the airfields escalated. But the worst period lay ahead. From February 24 on, all able-bodied Guamanian males from 12 to 60 years of age, worked on defense projects.

Third Occupation Period, March 4, 1944 to July 21, 1944

The Japanese Army returned to Guam on March 4, 1944. The Gilbert and Marshall islands had been lost; the massive naval base at Truk was neutralized. American forces were starting a drive westward across the central Pacific -- toward the Philippines, or toward Japan itself? The Army came back to defend Guam against American aggression. Guam had changed from an island Japan once hoped to make agriculturally productive to an island which was a vital part of Japan's inner defense perimeter. With Saipan, Tinian and Rota, Guam had to be kept Japanese. In American hands the Marianas could be an arrow pointed toward the heart of the Japanese empire. (When Saipan fell to the Americans, Japan's Premier Tojo and his cabinet resigned, an admission of failure in their conduct of the war.)

Japanese Army troops who came to Guam in 1944 were not the same ones who left early in 1942 for Rabaul. The newcomers were also seasoned combat troops from Manchuria: the 29th Division, heavily

reinforced, commanded by Lt. General Takeshi Takashina, IJA. Misfortune hit his convoy enroute — U.S. submarines torpedoed two troop transports. Losses included 1,400 men, much military equipment, construction materials and eight tanks.

On Guam, Takashina's 11,500 soldiers, mountain artillery, anti-aircraft guns and 35 or so tanks joined the reinforced 54th Keibitai — now 7,000 Navy personnel, including 2,000 men who flew and serviced Zeros and other aircraft. Also included in the naval forces were two construction battalions staffed with Korean laborers. Airfields were their speciality. Airfield repairs took their attention as spring turned to summer. Americans were bombing Guam's airfields.

Incoming Army anti-aircraft units joined Navy anti-aircraft units to protect the Orote airstrip, the Tiyan airstrip (now Brewer field at the U.S. Naval Air Station; also used by commercial airlines) and the Dededo airstrip (later the U.S. Army Air Force's Harmon field), then under construction. (It was never finished in Japanese hands.)

By 1944, the Zero had lost its place as the world's leading carrier plane to newer U.S. aircraft; but more importantly, by 1944 Japan was short of experienced combat pilots. Japan's experienced-pilot shortage was partly due to a shortage of aviation gasoline to train more. Japanese tanker tonnage had been greatly reduced. The 3,000 mile-long sea route between Japan's Southern Resources Area and the home islands was no longer safe for Japanese transit.

During this third period of Japanese occupation of Guam, most of Guam's Japanese aircraft were eliminated. Some were shot down attacking U.S. carriers. Others were flown south and lost in battles there. Still others were attacked and destroyed on Guam's airstrips. Japan's
naval supremacy in the Marianas, and elsewhere, rapidly declined -- to leave American naval aircraft fairly free to fly over Guam at will. Their only real hazard was anti-aircraft fire from land.

During this third period of Japanese occupation, General Takashina reorganized his Guam guard forces into two basic tactical units, with many units held in reserve.46

But even 18,500 men were too few to protect all vulnerable points on an island the size of Guam, and in the end the Japanese were victims of the same half-measures against which Admiral Mahan had warned the United States.47

With the army came the Kempeitai (military security police) and the Kaikuntai (tough, no-nonsense agricultural "Seabees" -- their job was to feed the Japanese military). Both groups were concerned with the Guamanians. The first move was to close all schools and churches.

Japan's Kaikuntai was ruthless. All able-bodied women (and some men deemed too frail for heavier work) and all female children over 12-years old labored from 8 a.m. daily until sundown in food production. Rice plantings at Piti, Asan, Agat, Inarajan and Merizo were extended. New fields inland were cleared of tangantangan; sweet potatoes, corn, taro, tapioca and other foods were planted. Family quotas of chickens, pigs and eggs were increased. Work days were marred by physical punishment of women and children thought to be not working hard enough. Slapping was an ordinary punishment.


Guamanian males, 12 to 60 years of age, were conscripted for labor. They worked without heavy equipment (most of it was lost at sea), handled wheelbarrows, iron bars, picks and shovels in the rain and sun. They were slapped, kicked, punched and clubbed by Japanese and Korean supervisors. Guamanians worked side-by-side with hundreds of Korean laborers, who received better treatment than the Guamanians. (Most of the Koreans died during the American recapture.)

Guamanians in the forced labor gangs stopped work and got out of the sun or rain only during air raid alerts. In the spring, alerts were false alarms; by June they were real. They dug foxholes near their work sites to escape American bombs and strafings; shrapnel from Japanese anti-aircraft often fell near or on them -- an unknown number of Guamanians were injured and killed.

About June 15, labor gangs were not dismissed each night to return to homes and ranches. Instead they were moved as units to temporary camps inland. At night, anti-aircraft shells exploded over the camps.

Guamanians began to suffer from malnutrition -- foraging Japanese raided ranches and caches of food. By the first week of July, Guamanians were suffering and their survival as an ethnic group was in jeopardy. It should be noted that some Japanese were kindly to Guamanians in this period.

The labor gangs repeatedly repaired the two airfields and worked on the one under construction. They built and paved roads, dug hillside caves, trenches and tank traps, built structures such as tank barriers, pillboxes and gun emplacements. About 75 of these defensive installations

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48 Sanchez, Uncle Sam, pp. 115-122; Carano, "Liberation Day," pp. 3-9.
have survived and been identified within six detached units of the War in the Pacific National Historical Park.\textsuperscript{49} A 1980 oral history research project, conducted in the Chamorro language with Guamanians who worked for the Japanese in this period, may link named individuals with certain installations and generally add details and understanding of the Japanese occupation of Guam.\textsuperscript{50}

Guam's terrain features, such as long stretches of high sea cliffs, limit the number of places on the island where invaders can land. Potential landing places lie here and there around the perimeter. Takashina met this situation by scattering his forces over the island and by improving roads so that he could concentrate his forces where a U.S. landing was attempted. The tip-off as to the beaches selected by the Americans came on June 16, 1944, when U.S. cruisers, battleships and aircraft bombed and shelled Asan and Agat beaches, which straddle Orote peninsula and Apra harbor. (At the time of this initial naval gunfire, Guam's invasion was scheduled for two days hence; the invasion of Saipan was already underway. But a major fleet engagement — what turned out to be the "Marianas Turkey Shoot;" more formally, the Battle of the Philippine sea — loomed. The U.S. rescheduled Guam's invasion for July 21, a date unknown, of course, to the Japanese.)

\textsuperscript{49} Duane Denfeld and Guam Territorial Archeologists, Surface Survey, Summer 1979, for War in the Pacific National Historical Park, National Park Service. See also Tweed/Clark, Robinson Crusoe, p. 171.

\textsuperscript{50} Contract CX 8000-0-0013, awarded March 4, 1980, between the National Park Service and the Micronesian Area Research Center, University of Guam, "To prepare a report on the construction of defensive military structures for the Japanese during the Japanese Occupation of Guam, Tinian and Saipan."
This preliminary shelling plus the long pre-landing bombardment of the same beaches later in June and in July permitted Takashina to concentrate his land defenses on and inland of Agat and Asan beaches. (By late June, his aircraft were gone.) Takashina assigned defense of the Agat area to Colonel Tsunetaro Suenaga. Suenaga established his headquarters (an observation post, pillboxes, gun positions and a trench complex) on the slopes of Mt. Alifan. Suenaga's responsibility included the defense of Orote peninsula.

Major General Toyashi Shigematsu commanded the area which included Tumon bay, Agana, Asan beach, Piti and Cabras island. Shigematsu established his headquarters near Takashina's on Fonte plateau near Libugon (now Nimitz Hill), which overlooks Asan beach. Probably the most permanent and initially elaborate defensive installations were placed at Tumon bay (where part of the South Seas Detachment had landed in 1941). There was not time to move the most permanent and larger installation from Tumon bay to Asan by the time of the U.S. landing. Many of them survived the invasion unused and intact. Indeed, several of the major defensive installations at Asan (and Agat) were incomplete by the time they were needed. Also incomplete and not operational by invasion time: a three gun, 6-inch battery on a hill at Piti to control Apra harbor. This should not imply that the operational Japanese defensive installations at Asan were not effective. They were not as complete and as extensive as Takashina desired.

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51 Probably Surface Survey Site No. 49, Mt. Alifan unit.

52 Surface Survey Site No. 60, Piti unit.
For the Japanese on Guam the period following the Saipan landing was a continuous nightmare. Stabbing raids by planes from TF 58 occurred with ever increasing frequency as the month of June wore on. Even during the height of the Japanese fleet's attack on TF 58 [Battle of Philippine Sea] the weary defenders had no respite. Reinforcement flights from Iwo Jima and Japan being sent to aid the Imperial Navy in its effort to stop the Saipan landing, found Admiral Mitscher's flyers ready to halt such attempts. [Japanese] pilots seeking to stage their attacks through Guam's airfields found their landing plans interrupted by American interceptor planes.

Battleships, cruisers and destroyers from the [American] fast carrier task force began a series of harassing raids on 27 June, concentrating their fire on Orote Peninsula installations, that increased the damage wrought by bombing. Guam was now cut off effectively from all hopes of relief. The heckling attacks of TF 58 lifted the curtain on the most thorough pre-landing preparation seen thus far in the Pacific.

The bombardment pace was stepped up on 4 July ... round the clock bombardment.53

While rest was difficult under sustained day and night bombardment for the Japanese and Koreans (and the Guamanians), the Japanese were prepared with caves into which to retreat. This technique was effective both in the pre-invasion and invasion times. When shelling let up temporarily, they would emerge to man their anti-aircraft and dual-purpose guns. Some of the smaller, more mobile guns went into the caves with the soldiers and militia men. Intermittent work on defenses under bombardment conditions was pursued but was dangerous to Japanese, Korean and Guamanian alike.

53 Lodge, *Recapture*, p. 33.
Japanese morale on Guam was benefitted at the news that Saipan had fallen to the Americans. They became angry and more "vigorou". When Saipan fell, the Japanese on Guam knew that Guam gained in importance strategically to the defense of the home islands -- to keep Guam Japanese would provide a land base for counterattacks by the Japanese Navy and Air Force. Reinforcements from the homeland were expected at any time.\(^{54}\) (With the fall of Saipan, the Japanese Imperial command wrote off Tinian, Rota and Guam, but this was not the word passed on Guam through the Japanese radio network.)

About July 8, Fr. Duenas, the priest who served Southern Guam with headquarters at Inarajan, was arrested along with his nephew, attorney Eduardo Duenas. They were interrogated and tortured.

There is not direct evidence to connect the arrest with an intensified search for Tweed, the only American still at large. It is more likely the immediate cause for the arrest was the priest's public criticism of a Guamanian woman of half American parentage who lived openly with a high Japanese official. The woman was told of the remarks and reported the matter to her companion. Thus, revenge for public ridicule may have been a great part of the motive.

At one point, the police hog-tied (magodin balako as the Guamanians would say) Father and paraded him in the narrow village streets. The people were summoned from a rice field nearby to watch the torture, intending to frighten them to submission. Police warned the people not to utter any word of pity nor to cry for the priest. One woman couldn't hold back her grief and cried out 'ay Yu'us Tata logue. Na para ...' (Oh, God the Father please stop ...) Before she

finished her plea she was clubbed to silence by a soldier nearby.\textsuperscript{55}

At other times, Fr. Duenas and his nephew were subjected to water torture. Beatings were frequent and sustained. On his last day of torture at Inarajan, the Father's bruised and bleeding body was placed in the hot sun for ants and flies to do their work. Priest and nephew were then taken to Agana Heights for more torture by the Kempeitai.\textsuperscript{56} Finally orders were given to kill Fr. Duenas.

The Kaikuntai sent three others to their death at the same time and in the same manner. They were Attorney Duenas, Tun Juan (Mali) Pangelinan, a retired U.S. Navyman ... The fourth man was not positively identified but believed to be a member of the Namauleg (Raraj') family of San Ramon district in Agana.\textsuperscript{57}

The execution spot was Tai in central Guam. The Father Duenas Memorial High School now stands not far from the site. Beheading was the method of all four executions, early on the morning of July 12. (In March 1945, the body of Fr. Duenas was exhumed and reburied under the altar of St. Joseph's Church, Inarajan.) Fr. Duenas' status as a Guamanian hero came in post-World War II times.

There is no ready answer as to why the Japanese forced the Guamanians into concentration camps on July 15. Many Guamanians believe to this day that it was to be killed. Some Guamanian women believed the foxholes they were ordered to dig at the camps could be their own

\textsuperscript{55} Sanchez, Uncle Sam, p. 127.

\textsuperscript{56} Msgr. Calvo, pers. int., April 8, 15, 1980.

graves. Some young men from the camps were forced at night into service by Japanese soldiers to carry ammunition and other heavy supplies to distant island points. Some were called to work days. Many of the men never returned. Certainly there were enough killings of groups of Guamanians at diverse places about this time to justify the belief. If Guamanian genocide was the purpose, the Japanese suddenly found themselves too busy killing Americans and being killed to attend to the people in the camps.

Perhaps the concentration camps were only to relocate the Guamanians where they could not aid the Americans, through sabotage or other means. (Some men and their families were held behind to work -- many escaped to hide inland.) Had most of the Guamanians been forced to continue to work on defenses or on their ranches in areas of Guam close to American invasion beaches of Agat and Asan, or in the northern sector where fighting was heavy, most would have been killed under the

58 About July 15, some 30 Guamanians were forced into a cave at Tinta, inland of Merizo. An estimated six hand grenades were thrown in after them. One man who staggered out was beheaded; others were bayonetted, a few lived. In retaliation to this murder of their people, six Merizo men stormed a Japanese camp near Merizo -- 16 Japanese soldiers were either killed or forced to flee. The Merizo men were unarmed and struck in daylight. Most Merizo people then escaped to the hills to wander until rescued by the Americans. The six volunteer guerrillas paddled out to American warships off Merizo. In another atrocity, 40 men were tied to trees and either beheaded or bayonetted. Only a few lived. There are other stories by survivors which involve caves and hand grenades, beheadings and bayonetting, verified by Guamanians who inspected the bodies. The total number of Guamanians who died at the hands of the Japanese in the week before and the week after American landings is unknown. Many others died enroute to concentration camps or while interned. See Camba, "Merizo Massacre; Cruz, "Chamorro Sailor;" Luis P. Untalan, "The Long Trek Manengon," in Pacific Profile, Vol. III, No. 6, July 1965, hereafter cited as Untalan, "Long Trek Manengon; "Sanchez, Uncle Sam, pp. 133-142; Carano and Sanchez, History of Guam, pp. 290-292.
bombardments or in the gun fights. The concentration of Guamanians into camps in safer areas of Guam was the single move by the Japanese occupation forces which insured the survival of Guamanians as a viable ethnic group.

Known concentration camps were located at Malojloj, Payesyes, Atate, Talofofo and Asinan; and at Maimai and Tai, which were in effect but stopping points enroute to the main camp at Manengon or camps beyond. Between 10,000 to 15,000 Guamanians were forced to march to Manengon, where people lived in the open on both sides of the Ylig river. People from the various districts and villages stayed together to make a number of contiguous groups. (Not all Guamanians obeyed or were aware of the marching orders -- they survived the U.S. invasion by hiding in caves for up to two weeks.)

Japanese soldiers swept Guamanians from northern Guam -- to clear them from the end of the island where the Japanese would prepare for any necessary last stand. Some details are known of their forced marches, but people from Southern Guam were also forced into the camps. Northern Guam's people from Mt. Santa Rosa followed the Yigo people on one march. Behind them were people from Dededo, Barrigada and Mangilao, some of whom bypassed Manengon and continued on to Talofofo. People from Agat, Asan, Sinajana, Agana, Ordot-Chalan Pago and Yona followed.

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Tired and hungry men, women and children carrying boxes and sacks; invalids on stretchers; loaded carabao, cows and bullocarts comprised the walking groups. Roads -- really unpaved trails -- were often slippery. No stops were permitted. Stragglers were clubbed. The exhausted were helped by relatives and friends. Some died enroute; their bodies were left along the roadsides. Shells from the American bombardment landed near the marchers to cause injuries and perhaps some deaths.

At 7:30 p.m. the walk from Yigo school began in two long groups. They reached Maniglao -- Maimai and Tai -- about 4:30 p.m. the next day. This was their first and only rest; the walk to Manengon resumed a night later. At Manengon, heavy rains began; the ground was wet and a sea of mud. Men lashed shelter frames from tangantangan poles; women wove coconut palms into mats for roofs, walls and floors. In one small shelter, 17 people representing four families survived. Coconut water was a better, tastier and safer drink than river water. But clothes and bodies could be washed in the Ylig river. Food carried along ran out shortly after arrival. One teenage girl passed out the last of her ginger snaps to hungry children. The statement has been made that some small children who survived the camps became stunted and deformed from disease and malnutrition.60 There were no medical supplies and no sanitation facilities. At times, the Japanese guards permitted fires, but other times representatives from families who built fires were beaten. Tenure at Manengon for many Guamanians lasted more than a month or longer and spanned the time of the U.S. invasion, July 21. (Because

60 Lodge, Recapture, p. 9.)
of the physical condition of some of the people and because there was some shelter there, Manengon was turned into one of the refugee camps by the Americans. Healthier families left as soon as they felt it safe to do so for their ranches or other refugee camps.)

With most of the Guamanians out of the bombardment and potential combat zone, the Japanese tried to finish preparations to follow their prevailing military doctrine for island defense: meet and annihilate the enemy at the beaches; if this failed, make an organized counter-attack against the beachhead soon after the enemy landed; and finally, if the invaders established and held their inland beachhead perimeter, retire to the hills and fight on. To most Japanese, surrender was not a culturally acceptable option.

For artillery weapons, the Japanese had on Guam about 19 20-cm., 22 12.7-cm., and 10 12-cm. coastal defense guns; 16 12-cm. dual purpose (anti-aircraft, anti-tank) guns; 6 105-mm. howitzers; 38 75-mm. mountain guns; 14 75-mm., 60 25-mm., and 12 20-mm. anti-aircraft guns; 2 57-mm. and 20 37-mm. anti-tank guns; and probably more than 30 tanks. There were also anti-boat guns.

Typical Japanese beach defenses were arranged in four parallel lines: (1) on the fringing reef -- obstacles and mines; (2) on the beaches and immediately inland -- obstacles and tank traps; (3) further inland -- machine gun positions, pillboxes, heavy weapons, artillery and coast defense guns; and (4) higher inland to shoot down on the beaches -- machine guns, heavy weapons and artillery.61

61 Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas, pp. 332-335; Philip Warner, Japanese Army of World War II, p. 5.
As massive and as prolonged as was the American pre-invasion bombardment and bombing of the Asan, Agat, and Orote areas, it had less devastating results than expected by the Americans. For instance, about half of the naval guns in caves along the shore remained operational; half of the field positions and many pillboxes were untouched; anti-aircraft artillery was virtually intact; naval gunfire had no effect against installations in valleys and in jungles; no military telephone lines were damaged. American bombs and shells did destroy most of the buildings in Piti, Asan, Agana and Agat. The bombardment/bombing did stop new construction and daylight repairs of damaged installations. It did put the airstrips out of use and limited ground movements to nighttime. Japanese troop morale suffered, and the prolonged, day and night, month-long series of frequent and intermittent concussions did some psychological damage which reduced combat effectiveness. During the bombardment and under covers of fire from ships, U.S. Navy underwater demolition teams (with the loss of only one man) destroyed about 300 obstacles on the reef off Agat, and 640 on the reef at Asan (no offshore mines were found), thus clearing the way to the beach over the reefs for the U.S. Marines and the U.S. Army. One Japanese anti-boat gun crew was among the observers. The crew was almost close enough to throw rocks at one team, but one one ordered them to fire their guns.62

AMERICA'S CAMPAIGN FOR GUAM, JULY 21-AUGUST 10, 1944

Selection and invasion of target islands that gave major strategic advantage together with leapfrogging over Japanese-held islands that could be neutralized was a life-saving and time-saving American practice

62 Croll, Campaign in the Marianas, pp. 335-337; Lodge, Recapture, p. 35.
in the Pacific theater of war. The big leap was the thousand-mile one from Enewetok in the Marshalls (secured in February 1944) westward over neutralized Truk in the Carolines to the Marianas. The Enewetok-Marianas islands move was part of an east-to-west American move across the central Pacific toward the Philippines under the overall command of Admiral Chester W. Nimitz. A simultaneous south-to-north move from Australia up the far-western Pacific toward the Philippines was under the overall command of General Douglas MacArthur. Units of a very mobile U.S. fleet shuttled between the two commands as directed, often completing one combat action under one command to steam immediately off to start combat under the other command.

The code name of FORAGER was assigned to the capture, occupation, and defense of Saipan, Tinian and Guam.

The Commander in Chief, Pacific [Nimitz] had four principal purposes in mind in launching FORAGER. The obtaining of an island base from which the Japanese homeland could be bombed was the one appealing to all Services, although more strongly to the Army Air Force, since it would permit them to really pull an oar in the Pacific War. [The B-29 could fly round trip between the Marianas and Japan.]

A second principal purpose was to obtain a base which would permit the isolation and neutralization of the Central and Western Carolines [for it would cut the aircraft ferry line to Woleai and Truk]. This one appealed particularly to the Army as it was anxious to facilitate General MacArthur's movement to the Philippines, and this would be made more practical if, as he advanced, Japanese island positions on his right flank were isolated or neutralized. [The B-29 could also fly round trip to parts of the Philippines from the Marianas.]

The other two principal purposes were primarily naval.
The Navy thought it was highly desirable to have effective command of the sea in the general Marianas area, and thus a forward position on the flank of the Japanese communication lines to the Philippines and Southeast Asia. This was in order to harass or break these Japanese lines of communication. [Nimitz established his forward headquarters, August 10, 1944, on Libugon -- now Nimitz Hill -- and directed the rest of the war from there.]

There also was a strong naval desire to secure a large base from which a direct amphibious assault could be launched against the Ryukyus, the Bonins, or the Japanese Homeland. 63 [Guam and Saipan became major supply centers, but because Guam's Apra harbor had limited capacity, a second fleet support facility was established 400 miles southwest of Guam at Ulithi atoll in the western Caroline islands.] [Bracketed information supplied.]

Recapture of U.S. territory and liberation of the Guamanians were among the lesser justifications for FORAGER. Code name for the Guam operation portion of FORAGER was STEVEDORE.

FORAGER included Saipan, Tinian and Guam. What about Rota? Rota was one of the mandated Japanese islands. It lies between Tinian and Guam and about 40 miles north of Guam. The American plan was to isolate and neutralize Rota. Its single airstrip was bombed and shelled during the Marianas invasions. Later, U. S. naval aircraft based on Guam made almost daily bomb runs on Rota. Rota's Japanese garrison surrendered on the Emperor's orders in August 1945, as did Japanese military on other by-passed Pacific islands. By that time, Rota's anti-aircraft crews were among the world's best.

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63 Dyer, Amphibians, pp. 856, 859; see also ONI-99, p. 1; Lodge, Recapture, p. 2; Hough, Island War, p. 221; Shaw, Nalty and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, pp. 231-237.
After preliminary bombardment and bombing, the invasion of Saipan began on June 15, with the Guam invasion scheduled for June 18.

The imminent Battle of the Philippine Sea caused a postponement of the Guam operation. Because of the unexpected and fierce nature of the Japanese resistance on Saipan, some other American plans changed. 64

Fighting ashore on Saipan were the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions. Held offshore as reserves to be used if needed was the Army's 27th Infantry Division, with one of its three regiments slated for Guam. All three Army regiments were needed for Saipan. Another Army division, the 77th, was then ordered up from its training bases in Hawaii, to help attack Guam. When the arrival date of the 77th Army Division became known, the Guam invasion was finally rescheduled for July 21. (A few days later, July 24, the Saipan invaders successfully made a shore-to-shore invasion from Saipan to Tinian).

Up from its training area at Guadalcanal, via Kwajalein, and standing by in ships on June 15 at its assembly area a hundred miles east of Saipan was the III Amphibious Corps, under Major General Roy S. Geiger, U.S.M.C. This amphibious corps included the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and the 3rd Marine Division, the III Corps artillery, and other units. Many of the troops were veterans of campaigns in the Solomons. They were ready to invade Guam on June 18. When this date was cancelled, the ships cruised in circles for weeks -- standing by for use, if needed, on Saipan. They eventually were sent to Enewetok to await the 77th Army Division's arrival.

64 Unless otherwise noted, information on the American invasion comes from Lodge, Recapture; Shaw, Nalty and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive; Croll, Campaign in the Marianas; and Burns and Cline, 77th Division.

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Idle, boring days aboard ships circling in the hot sun and limited visits ashore on Enewetok told on the Marines, once keyed for action. Confinement, heat, crowding and lack of exercise aboard also affected the Marine's highly-trained war dogs. All were more than eager to begin the fight for Guam. Fighting was better than waiting.

By March 1944, the Army's 77th Infantry Division was in Hawaii for three months of training in Pacific amphibious warfare. It left for Guam early in July -- the 305th Regimental Combat Team joined the Marines at Enewetok; the 306th and 307th Regiments sailed directly to Guam to standby offshore in ships until ordered ashore. Marines and soldiers at Enewetok also left for Guam.

At Guam were the ships assigned to the pre-landing bombardment, to cover the landing teams with a protective cover of fire, and to direct fire on selected targets as requested as the assault troops moved inland. As part of a coordinated, directed plan, ships' guns didn't fire shells higher than 1,200 feet, while naval aircraft pulled out of bombing runs no lower than 1,500 feet -- leaving a safety margin of at least 300 feet. During the establishment of the beachhead, naval gun fire, aerial bombing and strafing and shore-based artillery could be coordinated so that all three sources could concentrate on one target on call, or be simultaneously working over a number of targets.

Two battleships, three cruisers and three destroyers stood by off Agat; four battleships, three cruisers and three destroyers stood by off Asan. There were also a host of smaller ships and landing craft who could fire from ship to shore. The pre-landing bombardment started before dawn, at 5:30 a.m., July 21, 1944. During the day, ships lobbed 342 rounds of 16-inch; 1,152 rounds of 14-inch; 1,332 rounds of 8-inch;
2,430 rounds of 6-inch; 13,130 rounds of 5-inch shells; and 9,000 4 1/2-inch rockets; all at Guam's invasion areas.

Dawn was at 6 a.m. By dawn, ships which carried the assault troops were about seven miles out from Agat and Asan. Planes were overhead to provide cover against possible Japanese air or submarine attack. From 7:15 to 8:15 a.m., aircraft from Vice Admiral Marc A. Mitscher's carriers bombed and strafed the 14 miles of coastline from Agana to Bangi Point. Observation planes flew overhead, ready to drop parachute flares to signal when ships and planes should stop targeting the beach and shift inland so as not to endanger those landing on the beach with fire from their own side, and to keep the Japanese on the hillsides seeking cover, and too busy to fire on the landing craft and troops.

Now the amphibious assaults of Asan and Agat invasion beaches could begin.
Simultaneous American Invasions, July 21, 1944

Agat Invasion Beach

Off Agat floated 20 troop transports containing the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and the Army's 77th Infantry Division and others (about 31,000 men), plus cargo ships, numerous other vessels and destroyers to guard. Included were 16 Landing Ships Tank (LST). This was at 6 a.m., 7 miles out.

7 a.m.: The LST's moved toward shore to the launching area to unload 178 armored landing vehicles-tracked (LVT-A) and landing vehicles-tracked (LVT) full of assault troops. The (LVT)(A)'s and LVT's circled at sea until it was time to form the rows which would move one after the other to the beach. Each row was a "wave." The LVT(A)'s would form the first wave; 2nd through 7th waves were LVT's packed with Marines keyed for combat. By 8 a.m. the waves were formed and moving.

Offshore was also a Landing Ship, Dock (LSD) holding 20 tanks preloaded on small craft that would carry the tanks to the reef edge. The LSD would fill with water to float the small craft, then open bow doors to send the tanks towards reef edge.

Agat had four self-propelled barges to anchor at the reef edge as floating docks; and 8 pontoon causeways to bridge the reef from deep water to beach. These could only be placed after the beach was secure. When the beach was secure, LST's could also come to the reef edge and unload directly onto the reef, a dock or causeway.

Asan Invasion Beach

Off Asan floated 12 troop transports containing the 3rd Marine Division and others (about 24,000 men), plus cargo ships, numerous other vessels and destroyers to guard. Included were 16 Landing Ships Tank (LST). This was at 6 a.m., 7 miles out.

7 a.m.: The 16 LST's moved toward shore to the launching area to unload 180 armored landing vehicles-tracked (LVT-A) and landing vehicles-tracked (LVT) full of assault troops. The LVT(A)'s and LVT's circled at sea until it was time to form the rows which would move one after the other to the beach. Each row was a "wave." The LVT(A)'s would form the first wave; 2nd through 7th waves were LVT'S packed with Marines keyed for combat. By 8 a.m. the waves were formed and moving.

Offshore were also two Landing Ships, Docks (LSD) holding 40 tanks preloaded on small craft that would carry the tanks to the reef edge. The LSD would fill with water to float the small craft, then open bow doors to send the tanks towards reef edge.

Asan had four self-propelled barges to anchor at the reef edge as floating docks; and 8 pontoon causeways to bridge the reef from deep water to beach. These could only be placed after the beach was secure. When the beach was secure, LST's could also come to the reef edge and unload directly into the reef, a dock or causeway. Life rafts floated some supplies and men over the reef.
Agat had 40 amphibious trucks (DUKW) which, loaded, could move in deep water, cross the reef and land howitzers, field artillery, supplies and ammunition. These would follow the waves of LVT's onto the beach.

Troops aboard transports climbed down cargo (landing) nets into Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel (LCVP), which took them to the reef edge, where troops boarded LVT's as they returned empty after landing previous troops. (On invasion day, men of the 77th's 305th Regimental Combat Team waded over the reef due to a shortage of LVT's.)

To lead the LVT(A)'s ashore, Agat had nine "gunboats." These were Landing Craft, Infantry, Gunboat (LCI-G), each fitted with 40 rocket launchers plus its usual guns. They moved ahead of the leading wave of LVT(A)'s, firing at the beach. About 200 yards from the reef edge, they swung away to the sides and continued firing. The LVT(A)'s continued on to the beach firing under way.

At the reef edge, each LVT(A) and LVT had to climb over the edge on its tracks and move over the reef to the beach. Again, the assault order:

Asan had 60 amphibious trucks (DUKW) which, loaded, could move in deep water, cross the reef and land howitzers, field artillery, supplies and ammunition. These would follow the waves of LVT's onto the beach.

Troops aboard transports climbed down cargo (landing) nets into Landing Craft, Vehicle and Personnel (LCVP), which took them to the reef edge, where troops boarded LVT's as they returned empty after landing previous troops.

To lead the LVT(A)'s ashore, Asan had nine "gunboats." These were Landing Craft, Infantry, Gunboat (LCT-G) each fitted with 40 rocket launchers plus its usual guns. They moved ahead of the leading wave of LVT(A)'s, firing at the beach. About 200 yards from the reef edge, they swung away to the sides and continued firing. The LVT(A)'s continued on to the beach firing under way.

At the reef edge, each LVT(A) and LVT had to climb over the edge on its tracks and move over the reef to the beach. Again, the assault order:
Agat’s first wave hit the beach at 8:32 a.m., two minutes behind schedule.

Deafened and shocked Japanese had many beach defenses still intact—concrete pillboxes, trenches, machine gun installations, tank traps. Marines on Yellow Beach 2 received heavy fire from Gaan Point. All beaches received heavy fire—small arms, rifle, antiaircraft, mortar, machine gun—from Mt. Alifan slopes, Bangi Point, Bangi island, Yona island and Orote peninsula.

LTV(A)'s and LTV's: 24 were put out of service by Japanese fire, reef-damaged treads, or mechanical trouble.

Tanks (in Landing Craft, Tank, and Landing Craft, Medium, discharged from LSD's) reached reef edge at 8:40 a.m. Two tanks submerged in holes in reef while crossing. All tanks then used the better reef off the White beaches to come ashore. Still, some tanks had to be towed. Tanks destroyed the 75mm and 37mm guns in blockhouses at Gaan Point. The 75 mm gun atop Gaan "hill" was destroyed from the rear; the pillbox on the Old Agat side of the hill from its front.
Some Marines were casualties before they reached land; others within minutes of landing—the Japanese enjoyed perfect observation and firing points from high ground. Silt at the inner edges of the reef caused some LVT's and DUKW's to bog down. Getting sufficient supplies ashore at Agat was a problem in the first few days. All cranes at reef edge at Agat were mounted on barges—the reef edge was not suitable. Jagged coral heads and pot holes caused trouble for LVT's, tanks and DUKW's. Unloading went on after dark.

American assault troops were ashore on two separate beaches on Guam. They had the beaches; the beachhead was yet to be established. High ground inland of both beaches, up to mountain ridges, held Japanese in well fortified and concealed positions which could, and did, place continuous fire onto the beaches and flat land inland. The hills could, and did, support counterattacks designed to drive the Americans back into the sea. (The major counterattack came on the night of July 21 for Agat; the night of July 25 for Asan. Both counterattacks were repulsed with casualties heavier on the Japanese side than on the American.)

To secure the beachhead, that is to make it safe for U.S. Marines and Army soldiers to live, sleep, eat, regroup, stockpile supplies and otherwise prepare on land to take the rest of Guam, the high ground up to the ridges had to be in American hands. The area seaward of the ridges was declared the beachhead— and included the heavily defended Orote peninsula as well as Apra harbor.

The ridge line which starts at Adelup Point, crosses over Mts. Chachao, Tenjo and Alifan to end at Facpi Point was designated the Force Beachhead Line (FBL). Land on the Asan and Agat beaches side of the FBL
was the beachhead. Once the FBL was taken by the Americans, the
beachhead was secure, and troops could safely use the beachhead as a
base to take the rest of Guam.

Just inland of Bangi Point at Agat, Hill 40 was first taken on
Invasion Day, lost twice and retaken twice by Marines that night in
night fights. Mt. Alifan was in U.S. hands July 22. Over at Asan,
Chorito cliff was taken by noon on Invasion Day; Adelup Point that
afternoon. Matgue/Nidual valley and hills were in Marine hands July 22,
and Bundschu ridge (still well below the Force Beachhead Line) was
finally taken on July 23. The last firm Japanese resistance inland of
Asan was at Fonte -- it fell on July 28 to complete the capture of the
Force Beachhead Line. When Orote peninsula -- a tough battle -- fell on
July 29, the beachhead was secure. (Some of the details of capturing
land up to the ridge line and beyond are in Appendix B.)

It took until August 10 to eliminate organized resistance on the
rest of Guam island. Small groups of Japanese and individuals were
hunted down for years afterwards -- Guamanians participated in this
hunting and capture. The last known Japanese straggler was Sergeant
Yokoi, who spent 28 years in the Guam jungles. He was discovered in
January 1972, and went home to Japan as a curiosity as well as a hero.65

In general, within the beachhead: Marines assaulted the beaches,
took Orote peninsula, the land behind Asan and the Force Beachhead Line
from Adelup Point to Mt. Chachao; the Army's 77th Infantry Division took
Mt. Alifan and the Force Beachhead Line from Facpi Point to Mt. Tenjo.
The Army scouted southern Guam. Side by side the Marines and the Army

65 Asahi Shimbun staff, 28 Years in the Guam Jungle: Sergeant Yokoi;
Home from World War II.
swept to the northern shores of Guam. From Fonte, the Marines took the west half; the Army the east half.

About 55,000 U.S. Marines and Army soldiers invaded Guam. Of these an estimated 2,124 were killed in action or died of wounds. About five and a half thousand Americans were wounded. Of the Americans killed and wounded, most were Marines. Japanese and Korean defenders numbered about 18,500; 1,250 were taken prisoner -- the rest were killed, died of wounds or committed suicide. It is unknown how many Guamanians died or were wounded under the American bombardment or in American-Japanese crossfire. Most were in concentration camps away from action.

**AMERICAN OCCUPATION, 1944-1962**

Starting July 21, 1944, Invasion Day, two non-combat military activities began simultaneously on Guam. On the heels of the assault Marines came the Navy Seabees and a Navy Civil Affairs group. The Seabees started to repair and build roads, airstrips and shore installations. The Civil Affairs unit started to care for the Guamanians. Both activities were in full swing by August 10, the day organized Japanese resistance was declared at end.

By mid-1945, Seabees and Army Engineers had changed Guam's surface. Marine Drive, a wide highway named in honor of the U.S. Marines who recaptured Guam, ran from the Naval Operating Base on Orote peninsula to the Army Air Force's main B-29 base in northern Guam (now Anderson Air Force Base). Navy planes crowded fields at Orote and Tiyan; the northern plateau had three B-29 fields. Advance headquarters of the Pacific fleet sat atop Libugon. Camps and supply installations were everywhere. Orote peninsula, Piti and Cabras island were a vast naval operating base. Apra harbor had been deepened by dredging and was
full of ships. Guam's population in mid-1945 was 220,000, mostly U.S. military personnel, but included 21,000 Guamanians.

July 1944 through mid-1945 was the period of military buildup during which Guam reached the potential seen by Admiral Nimitz to justify its recapture: island base for bombing flights to Japan; denial to Japan of aerial routes; advance fleet headquarters; and naval base. Ownership of the land selected for necessary military facilities was apparently ignored during the buildup period -- land condemnation cases-after-the-fact and the necessary legal moves by the Navy came in post-war years. The question of fair compensation for the land taken and retained to date for military uses is now in federal court. Some Guamanians feel that the compensation they received for their land did not reflect the actual value of the land. Some Guamanians believe the existing bases (with what appears to them to be much unused land) are on the most valuable agricultural lands -- a situation which makes it impossible for most Guamanians to return to their traditional living pattern of part-time occupancy of small family ranches.

Post World-War II collections of scrap metal; the aerial seeding with tangantangan of war-damaged hillsides and flatlands to control erosion and protect watersheds; sales of military equipment, supplies and structures, typhoon Karen in 1962 and supertyphoon Pamela in 1976 again changed Guam's surface. Guam lost its war-buildup look.

On Invasion Day, some aged and sick Guamanians were brought to the beaches by combat Marines. This started the work of the Navy Affairs unit.

The unit -- eventually 27 officers and 159 enlisted men, was on the staff of Maj. General Henry L. Larsen, U.S.M.C. island commander, and
headed by Col. Charles L. Murray, U.S.M.C. The unit was formed at Pearl Harbor prior to the invasion where plans were made and food, clothing, agricultural instruments, fertilizer, insecticides, seeds, fishing gear and medical supplies were ordered. As a U.S. possession, the Navy handled all Guam civilian matters, unlike Rota, Tinian and Saipan where the Foreign Economic Administration handled the civilians. "... the Navy desired to regain control of Guam without ingress of private or other governmental interest as long as possible."  

Protective compounds (armed Japanese stragglers tried to steal food) turned into vast refugee camps which housed at their peak 18,000 Guamanians. The large concentration camp at Manengon was turned into a refugee center. This was because of the large number there, many of whom were weak, sick or aged. Other camps were at Asan (later moved to Anigua) and at "old" Agat (later moved a mile or so south). By August 3, people began moving to their ranches. (See Appendix B). Guamanians soon became self-supporting again, but based more on a wage economy than on agriculture.

In 1946, wartime military government reverted to naval government, patterned much the same as in the period 1898 through 1941. An admiral became Governor/Commandant. Guam's government departments were headed by Navy officers. A new Agana arose whose street system had no relationship to the old. Guam's civilian economy expanded; demand for goods and services were high. Government-funded hospitals and schools

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66 Dorothy Richard, United States Naval Administration of the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands, pp. 189, 295.

were reopened. Wage scales differentiated between local Guamanian labor and U.S. citizens shipped to Guam to work. Navy policy prevented most non-Guamanians from entering the island to engage in business through control of business licenses; retired Navy personnel were not permitted to remain or to return to enter into private enterprise. Apra harbor continued to be a closed port.

Guamanian desires for U.S. citizenship and self-government began to be realized in 1949. On September 7, 1949, President Truman's executive order transferred Guam's civilian government from the Navy to the Department of the Interior.\(^6^8\) The Organic Act of Guam was signed into law and became effective July 21, 1950, an anniversary of Invasion Day, by then called Liberation Day on Guam. Guamanians became U.S. citizens living in an organized territory of the United States with an elected delegate to Congress who could not vote, but could introduce bills. Guam's governors, even though civilians, were still appointed, not elected. Guam's legislators were elected, however.

Although the Navy officially stated it favored Guam's Organic Act, it reinstituted a security clearance entry program for Guam less than three months after the act became effective in 1950. Enforcement was not difficult. The two permissable ways to enter Guam were (are) through naval reservations -- the naval station by sea or the naval air station by air. Civilian transportation agencies were required to insure that prospective passengers held clearances before issuing tickets. Employees hired from the Philippines or America were deported.

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\(^6^8\) Presidential Executive Order 10077, Sept. 7, 1949 (Truman).
if their security clearances were revoked. Revocation could be as arbitrary as denial.

Constitutional and other legal difficulties with the program were pointed out in 1960 by two attorneys who practice on Guam. In July 1962, a suit was filed by a local resident in Guam's federal district court over a denial of clearance to his family members. Before it could come to trial, in August 1962 President Kennedy issued an executive order which ended the Navy's security clearance entry program for Guam. America's second military occupation of Guam cannot be said to have ended until this executive order. "Before that there was no way that Guam was going to grow or move into tourism." 69

A 1980 note on the continuing loyalty of Guamanians to the United States: "There are more Guamanians, per capita, in the U.S. service than there are inhabitants of any other state. Only American Samoa comes close to the record Guam is setting, as far as men and women in the Armed Forces goes ... Even before World War II Guamanians proudly enlisted in the service, and have continued to do so at high levels, even through the ordeal of Vietnam. The fact that more Guamanians were killed, per capita, than were residents of any other state, in Vietnam was no accident ... a young kid on Guam just looks forward to joining the service. They're not more patriotic or anything, but their desire is stronger. And parents here are very supportive of the military ... In a way all of this is very understandable. The military has been a

vital part of Guam since Capt. Glass fired his cannon [in 1898] at the Spanish fort.\textsuperscript{70}

It should also be noted that while the 1980 Guamanian life style is no longer predominately rural and agricultural, it is still centered about family and church.

\textsuperscript{70} Joe Murphy, editorial, \textit{Pacific Daily News}, April 16, 1980, p. 15; Joe Murphy, pers. int. at Agana, April 11, 15, 1980.
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APPENDIX A

TANGANTANGAN

Many areas of the Park contain tangantangan (Leucaena), a tropical leguminous tree. It originated in Latin America and was planted throughout the tropics and subtropics as a browse legume for its protein-rich foliage. It is also a source for fuelwood, shade, charcoal, fences and for poles. Tangantangan is famous for being pest-resistant and durable under grazing, cutting, fire and drought.

Tangantangan probably came to Guam via the Philippines, ca. 1860, at about the same time that it was believed to have been introduced to Hawaii (where it is called ekoa and koa-haole) from the Philippines.

During the Japanese occupation of Guam (1941-1944), known places where it was growing include Tai, Fort Apugal (now Navy housing), Talofofo, and Manengon, where it was used for poles in shelter making. These are only documented places—it was probably growing in stands in many places, but not as widely spread about Guam as in 1980.

Tangantangan was selected by the Naval administration in 1947 for the revegetation of Guam. Guam's hillsides were not recovering from the American invasion of 1944, drought and brush fires had left the mountainsides black and erosion was removing soil. Watersheds were in danger, Boy Scouts and school children gathered about 2,200 pounds of tangantangan seeds. Mass reseeding was performed from aircraft. This effectively spread tangantangan into all areas of Guam where it could grow.

Tangantangan seeds for aerial revegetation of Saipan and Tinian came from seeds collected at Corregidor in the Philippines. Some may have also been gathered locally.

APPENDIX B

Unit by Unit Historical Notes:

War in the Pacific National Historical Park

ASAN BEACH UNIT (Includes Asan Point and the shoreline between Asan and Adelup Points; land and reef seaward of Marine Drive)

Pre-World War II Use of Reef, River Mouths

Part of Guam's fleet of 200 or more outrigger canoes were used on Asan reef to assist in subsistence fishing. They helped place seine nets, reach fish weirs, and were handy for hand and spear fishing, edible shell fish collecting and for pole fishing. People also waded on the reef for these activities and for use of throw nets.

River water uses were various: drinking, bathing, swimming, household cleaning, watering animals, catching fresh water eels.

Sources: Jennison-Nolan, Land and Lagoon Use, pp. 6, 44, 46.

1892-1900: Leprosy Colony

When the leprosy hospital (est. 1890) at Pago was destroyed by typhoon in 1892, the Spanish governor built a new leprosarium at Asan Point. The Asan facility was inherited by U.S. Naval administration in 1898. In the lapse of authority after the Spanish governor left and before the first American governor took firm hold, most of the ambulatory patients ambled home to leave only a few bedridden and dying ones. The typhoon of 1900 wrecked the Asan leprosy facilities. American Naval authorities thought that Hansen's Disease no longer existed on Guam until several patients were discovered in 1902 hidden by family and village associates. Because Asan Point was by then in use as a prison camp, a new leprosy hospital was built at Ypao beach, Tumon bay. The Ypao facilities included a sewered latrine, hospital buildings, kitchen, chapel and cemetery; these may have been more extensive than the facilities they replaced at Asan. Hospital buildings, kitchen and a cemetery would have been the minimum at Asan. There are no known remains.

Sources: Governor's Report 1902; Beers, Naval Occupation, pp. 66-67.

1901-1903: Presidio of Asan

From February 11, 1901 through February 16, 1903, Asan Point was a prison camp, officially termed the Presidio of Asan, for exiled Filipino insurrectionists confined in Guam to keep them out of touch with the Philippines. Apolinario Mabini was the most famous internee and still a Philippine hero. In total

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there were 42 insurgents and 15 servants. An Army major was the first camp commander; U.S. Marines were the guards. Marine Corps officials in Washington objected. The Army major was soon replaced by a Marine Corps officer detailed from the naval station. The Presidio contained 14 buildings; officers' quarters and separate kitchen; Marine barracks, guard house and wash room; Filipino prisoners' barracks, commissary, hospital, dispensary, sterilizing shed and bath house; police sergeant's storeroom; stable, barn and a wagon house. There are no known remains. Mabini reported to his family in the Philippines that Asan Point had a surface of fine sand to walk on; that there were many coconut trees, but planted too far apart for good shade.

Sources: Beers, Naval Occupation, pp. 66-67; Jennison-Nolan, Land and Lagoon Use, p. 43.

1917: Prisoner of War Camp

The German cruiser Cormoran had been held in the neutral port of Apra since 1914. In April 1917, when the U.S. declared war against Germany, U.S. Naval authorities demanded the surrender of the Cormoran. The cruiser was scuttled instead. From April 6 through April 30, 1917, 289 enlisted men of the German Navy (plus 4 Chinese laundrymen and 28 New Guineans) were held at Asan Point. They lived in tents and were surrounded by a barbed wire fence. There were 68 U.S.M.C. guards. Some of the prisoners started gardens. The Germans were shipped east on an Army transport; the others were released to work on Guam. The 1917 pictures of the POW compound show a sandy, grass-covered ground and many standing, mature coconut trees, again too scattered to provide continuous ground shade.

Sources: Governors' Reports 1917-1919; Beers, Naval Occupation; Navy Photos., April 20, 1917, 71-CA-149, G1, G2 and G3 (MARC).

1922: U.S. Marine Corps Uses

Because of its somewhat central location between Agana and Sumay, two centers of military activity, the Marine Corps in 1922 had a quartermaster depot, a small arms range and a barracks at Asan Point. It is not known the extent of the facilities nor how long the facilities were in use.

Source: Governor's Report 1922.
Asan Beach Unit

1937: Proposed Navy Housing

Six officers' quarters were proposed for the 1939 fiscal year, in about a line with the 1980 location of the Mabini monuments. The proposal was labeled Project No. 21. The drawing of the proposal shows the then existing road system at Asan Point.


Ca. 1940: Conditions

Asan Point: The seaward face to the hill contained a quarry. A ledge of "good quality limestone" varied from six to ten feet in thickness. The road from the quarry joined the Agana-Sumay road, closer to Agana than directly inland.

Beach/road close to Adelup Point: A seawall about 480 yards long existed on the ocean side of the Agana-Sumay road, which ran between the seawall and the steep Chorito cliff. (The remaining short portion of the seawall carries NPS surface survey No. 33). On the Asan Point end of the seawall was a still existing hump of Cascajo (hard, durable coral) about 60 feet high. Between the other end and Adelup Point was a line of coconut trees. Coconut trees lined both sides of the road in this area, and beyond the cascajo hump toward Asan Point.

Beyond Chorito cliff and the hump, on the Asan Point side, were the very few houses of Asan village which stood on the ocean side of the road. (Most of the houses were on the inland side, now excluded from the Park, on what was a one-street village. Houses stood 60 to 80 feet back from the road, with lawns, gardens, coconut groves, breadfruit and citrus trees.

Sources: ONI 99, pp. 228, 274; Map USAEPOA, No. 5439-1, Sheets 5 and 6, June 1945, which reflect the ca. 1940 conditions.

July 1944: Defensive Installations

Japanese defensive positions were placed on top and on both sides of Asan and Adelup Points, along the beach and among the coconut trees between the two points. Underwater demolition teams removed 640 barriers on the reef between the two points, leaving only a few between Asan Point and Camel rock (Alupat island), and some barbed wire entanglements offshore from the curve between the east side of Asan Point and the run of the beach between the two points. The land-based defensive positions were destroyed or neutralized during the U.S. pre-invasions bombardment or on invasion day. A NPS inventory of the surviving structures was made in 1979 to number about 22.
Asan Beach Unit

Photographs taken of the beach area during the invasion period show a profusion of predominately topless coconut trees whose trunks survived the landing and bombardment. Ground cover appears to have almost eliminated.

Sources: Lodge, Recapture of Guam. pp. 35, 39; Croll; Campaign in the Marianas, pp. 335-337; Japanese defenses of Guam, microfilm reel 32, MARC; Navy Photos., 80-G-239017, 238983, 248245, 237602, 247854, 239429, all undated; Aug. 2, 1944, 80-6-237602.

August 1944: Terrain Changes

In enlarging the Agana-Sumay road, Army Engineers and Navy Seabees "altered the appearance of Chonito [sic] Cliff so that, as one Marine officer recalled 'the area was not recognizable when I returned several weeks after the landing.' General Craig noted that the same situation held true regarding Asan Point, where Army Engineers set up a quarry and rock crushing machine and tore down most of the ridge leading from the point for road construction material." Then, or later, the inner face of Asan Point was cut back for the road.

Sources: Shaw, Naity, Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, p. 465n; Lodge; Recapture of Guam, p. 4n.

1945-1947: First Camp Asan

Scars of quarry and rock crusher material—gathering from the top plus seaward and inland (roadcut) faces of Asan Point ridge show clearly in 1945 aerial photographs. The half of the flat area between Asan Point and Asan river, the half closest to Asan Point, was used for orderly open storage, perhaps including parking of small landing craft -- their tracks in and out of the water are evident. About 41 quonset huts plus other buildings are neatly lined in rows on the flat half toward Asan river. It is believed this was the headquarters-barracks area for Island Command troops or Seabees. Other structures show between Asan river and Adelup Point, all seaward of the now-wide and re-aligned beach road. (It became Marine Drive in 1945, in honor of the U.S. Marines who liberated Guam.)

The entire flat area between Asan Point ridge and Asan river is white coral fill; no grass or other vegetation shows. Nor are any coconut trees evident between Asan and Adelup Points. There is a small edge of grass or low vegetation rimming the Asan Point flat-area shoreline, and vegetation appears thick on those parts of Asan Point ridge top and ends not scarred by equipment.
Asan Beach Unit

Wider areas of low or grassy vegetation are seaward of Marine Drive between Asan river and Adelup, interspread with bands of white coral fill between the road and the beach. Some of the fill-bands hold small buildings.

Sources: Navy Photos., March 5, 1945, 80-G-346066, April 24, 1945, 80-G-346117, 346118, 346129, 346130, 346208.

1948-1967: Second Camp Asan

This was the "Civil Service Camp" -- housing for civilian employees, including school teachers, of the Naval government. At its height, the camp consisted of 16 two-story barracks (Butler-style steel construction), an outdoor theater, chapel, a club, softball field, tennis courts, basketball court, administration building, a massive mess hall, fire station, underground water and sewer lines, including fire mains, power and telephone poles, fire station, etc., plus many small buildings, concrete sidewalks and paved parking areas and roads. Some of the barracks buildings were built on a curve which bowed toward Asan Point ridge; other paralleled Marine Drive; barracks were orderly, in a row. (Bowling alley quonsets were across Marine Drive in the Asan Inland Park Unit.)

Additional fill, probably including topsoil, may have been added before or during construction late in 1947; the camp opened in February 1948. Landscaping included grass and exotic subtropical shrubs and many coconut trees. (A few archeological tests pits in 1979 found varying depths of stratified fill over coarse sand.)

Sources: O'Mallan, pers. int., March 18, 1980; Thomas (Pacific Studies Institute) report of Sept. 20, 1979; USN Marianas Area Dwg. No. 10532, March 18, 1953, Navy Photograph, undated, 80-G-669034. The paved roads were named in 1954: Craig road followed the outside circle of the barracks; Parker road the inside circle; the road which paralleled the beach was aptly named Blue Beach road. Library road connected Blue Beach and Parker roads. Shuler memo., Aug. 12, 1954.

1968-1972: Navy Hospital Annex

The structures of the civil service camp were converted into a 400-bed annex to the Navy Regional Medical Center, Guam, for use during the Vietnam war. The annex opened March 1, 1968. There is no data readily available on the extent of use. The facilities were vacated and abandoned in 1972.

1975: Vietnamese Refugee Camp

When thousands of Vietnamese refugees arrived on a few hours notice on Guam, the abandoned Camp Asan became one of the reception centers. It held at any one time between 5,000 and 6,000 of the total 111,000 refugees. At Camp Asan, at a tent city on Orote peninsula, at Tin City on Anderson Air Force Base, at the Naval Air Station and other places, men, women and children lived while they were processed before moving to camps on the mainland United States, to one of 14 other countries, or to return at own request to Vietnam.

Navy Seabees worked far into the first night within the abandoned Camp Asan buildings (which were described as being in shambles) with brooms, shovels and hoses. Navy Public Works employees followed to install plumbing, wiring, and sewage lines. As floor space was cleared, refugee families moved in. Camp Asan was no longer needed by December 1975.


1976: Supertyphoon Pamela

With winds averaging 140 miles per hour, and gusts to 190, supertyphoon Pamela moved over Guam May 21. Camp Asan barracks, mess hall and most other buildings were destroyed, with the rubble subsequently cleared by the Navy. Remaining in April 1980 were the fire station (housing YACC activities) and a Butler-style work building (housing Territorial park division maintenance activities).

Also surviving in 1980 were underground utilities, roads, some concrete slabs and other concrete structures, and many coconut trees.


Note on placenames: Guamanian place name for Asan Point may be Acahi–Fanahi; the Spanish called it Punta Asan. Adelup Point has also been known as Devil's Point, Missionary Point and Punto del Diablo. "Devil's Horns" referred to both during the American invasion in 1944. Jennison-Nolan, pp. 36, 41.

ASAN INLAND UNIT (Includes the area within the Park boundary at Asan Inland of Marine Drive)
Asan Inland Unit

Pre-World War II Road System and Matgue/Nidual Bridge

The unpaved road came almost directly inland from the beach vicinity at Asan Point, roughly parallel to Asan Point ridge, and made a sharp right turn directly behind the inland end of Asan Point ridge. The road, enroute toward Piti, then made an "S" turn through a gap between "an almost vertical promontory" perhaps a hundred feet high. The gap was between the Asan Point ridge and the ridge inland. Within the "S" turn and about at its middle was a "small culvert bridge," (estimated capacity 30 tons) -- the road then continued on with only gentle curves within a coconut grove near the shore. (Remnants of that grove exist in 1980). It is obvious that most of the cut made in 1945 for Marine Drive was on the inland end of Asan Point ridge and Marine Drive itself by-passed this "S" turn section of the old Agana-Sumay road. Traces of the "S" turn may still be found. The "small culvert bridge" was over the Matgue, also called the Nidual river.

Marines attempting to cross this bridge on invasion day retreated for a short distance because of fire from Japanese machine gun positions, "cleverly camouflaged" along the west face of Asan Point ridge. This portion of the ridge has apparently been eliminated for Marine Drive.

The "small culvert bridge" description was applied at least three years after last being seen and from a distance of at least 9,000 miles as Naval Intelligence specialists prepared documents for American planning of the invasion of Guam. Maps and descriptions prepared for Guam at this time proved to be frequently inaccurate, especially in road matters.

Thus, the existing concrete bridge over the Matgue/Nidual river just inland of Marine Drive, and identified in 1979 as NPS Surface Survey No. 86, is probably the bridge the Marines crossed on invasion day after silencing the machine guns. The road between Naval headquarters at Agana and the Marine barracks at Sumay was a so-called federal road, maintained with federal funds and would have good bridges. Most of the rest of Guam's roads were maintained through locally raised taxes.

Sources: Lodge, Recaputre of Guam, pp. 6, 23, 39; ONI 99, pp. 228-229; Map USAEPOA No. 5439-1, June 1945 (reflecting 1942 conditions), sheets 5 and 6; personal re-inspection, April 11, 1980.
Valley inland of Asan Point ridge (Matsue/Nidual river valley)

As part of the first Camp Asan (1945-1947), three long, giant, quonset huts, and one short, all interconnected, used for bowling and other indoor recreation, stood just inland of Marine Drive and opposite to the flat area on the Agana side of Asan Point ridge. They were retained for the Second Camp Asan, Navy hospital annex and perhaps for the refugee camp. If they still stood in 1976, supertyphoon Pamela finished them. Their concrete slabs exist in 1980. The pads were numbered in 1979 as NPS Surface Survey No. 70.

On the ridge inland of Asan Point ridge, and along the inner valley face and within the upper valley, was the Asan Tank Farm. It shows in April 1945 aerial photographs. A 1953 map shows it consisted of 3 (plus one abandoned) 10,000-barrel tanks, three 80,000-barrel tanks, plus pipelines, pump station and administration building. An explosion and fire at the tank farm, August 22, 1948, caused the evacuation of the first Camp Asan across Marine Drive. The tank farm was probably removed in 1968. The only surviving evidence, except for man-made terrain features is NPS Surface Survey No. 96 -- pieces of fuel tank strewn about.

Nearby No. 96 is No. 95 -- remnant of water (?) reservoir, with valve and pipe system. It has not been possible to tie this reservoir with any known pre- or post-war activity.


Rice Paddy Area

This area fronts Marine Drive on the Agana side of the bowling alley area and runs inland to the foothills.

This was part of the total Guam acreage in rice as of 1939, and was under intensive cultivation during Japanese times. On Invasion Day, the 3rd Marine Division Artillery Regiment set up their guns in the rice paddies. In 1949, a Navy wire division cable yard occupied this site.

Asan Inland Unit/Piti Unit

Asan Military Cemetery

From 1945 through 1947, this area contained the bodies of Marines killed in action or who died of wounds in the invasion. It was also called the 3rd Marine Division Cemetery. The remains were disinterred in 1947 and escorted to cemeteries in Hawaii and the U.S. Mainland. The Asan cemetery was formal with white grave markers in neat rows, entrance posts and a white fence. The cemetery stood on former rice land, inland from Marine Drive and on the Piti side of the Asan river.


Bundschu Ridge

This ridge, actually a complex of hills and draws, extends toward Chorito cliff from Asan river. It is high ground which permitted crossfire from the Japanese positions along the ridge. The ridge was named on board ship for Capt. Geary R. Bundschu, whose company of Marines was assigned to take the ridge. He lost his life on the ridge, Invasion Day.

Sources: Lodge, Recapture of Guam, p. 43, Shaw, Nalty and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, p. 466.

Chorito cliff

This is a place name note: pre-war U.S.M.C. maps and descriptions misnamed it Chonito. The misnomer has been repeated in much of the literature.

PITI UNIT

No mention has been found in the invasion literature of the three Vickers-type coastal defense guns manufactured by the Japanese. They carry NPS Surface Survey No. 60. Apparently they were not completely installed by the time of American invasion and evidently were never fired from the Piti hillside.

Below the guns in pre-war times was the Guam Agricultural Experiment Station (1909-1932) then an agricultural school (1932 through a 1940 typhoon). The mahogany trees behind the guns started with plantings ca. 1928, and are perhaps the only evidence now to be found in the vicinity of the former governmental agricultural activities.
Piti Unit/Mt. Tenjo-Mt. Chachao Unit

Patrols of the 9th Marine Regiment undoubtedly inspected the Piti naval guns as companies of this regiment fought their way along on the flat below. In so doing, most of the Japanese company of the 320th Battalion were killed. The 9th Marine Regiment took the Piti Navy Yard by 5 p.m. on July 22. Other parts of the regiment made a shore-to-shore invasion of Cabras island that afternoon, landing with Sherman tanks from LCT's (landing craft, tank). They found Cabras heavily mined and there were dummy coastal defense guns made of wood--designed to draw American fire away from camouflaged real guns elsewhere. The Marines completed taking Cabras island on the morning of July 23.

Source: Jennison-Nolan, pp. 27-31; Shaw, Nalty and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, pp. 486-487.

MT. TENJO-MT. CHACHAO UNIT

The ridge road between Mts. Chachao and Tenjo was built ca. 1915 to permit installation and maintenance of a battery of three 7-inch, pedestal mounted, coastal defense guns. From Mt. Chachao the road wound down through Libugon (now Nimitz Hill) to near Adelup Point where it joined the Agana-Sumay road. Marines, who kept the road in repair and who manned the battery, stayed at Camp Barnett (1916?-1927?). In 1917, officers with their servants from the German cruiser Cormoran were held at Camp Barnett as prisoners of war.

The guns were removed in 1931 during the demilitarization of Guam. The portion of the road above Libugon was probably reopened by the Japanese with Guamanian labor in 1941.

Between March and July 1944 the Japanese built a strong point atop Mt. Chachao to control the road on the Mt. Tenjo. Its central feature was a concrete emplacement, surrounded by foxholes and machine gun positions. It was taken by U.S. Marines on July 28, with 135 Japanese dead. Remnants of the strong point have yet to be found.

The ridge between Mts. Chachao and Tenjo was part of the inner perimeter of the American beachhead. By July 26 the Japanese had retreated to this part. Atop Mt. Tenjo the Japanese had an observation post (from there 274 vessels of the U.S. invasion fleet were counted on July 21) and had surveillance of all of the American beachhead. Soldiers of the 77th Infantry Division took it July-28. Three high-power Japanese telescopes were found left behind. U.S. soldiers atop Mt. Tenjo were strafed and bombed accidentally by Navy planes on July 28. They were saved only by quick display of identification panels. From this ridge line the Americans could see northern Guam--still to be captured. NPS Surface Survey No. 77 encompasses the Mt. Tenjo summit complex, both
Mt. Tenjo-Mt. Chachao Unit/Agat Unit

American and Japanese. Along the ridge toward Mt. Chachao are foxholes in good condition, and perhaps a U.S. howitzer position.

Sources: Governor's Reports 1912-1932; Cox, McIntosh and Cook, Island of Guam, ONI 99, p. 256; Lodge, Recapture of Guam, pp. 86, 86n, 96, 99, 101, 102, 105, 120; Shaw, Nalty and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, pp. 456, 470n, 510, 528; Crowl, Campaign in the Marianas, pp. 316, 357, 371, 373, 374; Army Photos., Feb. 1922 71-CA-149-K1, K2, K, K4 and K5, August 1, 1944, SC 211187 (MARC).

AGAT UNIT

Pre-World War II Agat

For reef and river mouth uses, see Asan Unit; they appear to be identical. Agat was, with Piti and Asan, a major rice growing area -- this was along the approximate half-mile wide flat strip inland from the beach. The population of "old" Agat village (now the north end of post-war Agat) was 791 people. (Old Agat was destroyed in the bombardment.) The shoreline areas and some of the half-mile wide flat strip were full of coconut trees. (A pre-war aerial map-type photograph of Old Agat and vicinity is in ONI 99, p 243.) (Bombed out ruins of Old Agat, which shows rice paddies, craters, are shown on aerial photographs taken March 25, 1945, Navy photos., 80-G-248230 and 394658-MARC).

American Invasion

Aerial photographs taken on or shortly after Invasion Day which show ships, reef and beach areas are numbered 80-G-248257 and 239717 (MARC).

Ground photographs of actions and defensive installations ashore are numbered: Navy Photos, all 80-G-

| 239008 | 243782 | 247621 | 247656 |
| 239021 | 243784 | 247623 | 247657 |
| 239716 | 243796 | 247632 | 247659 |
| 243757 | 243803 | 247645 | 247668 |
| 243759 | 247617 | 247647 | 247643 |
| 247768 | 247618 | 247648 | 287296 |
| 243769 | 247619 | 247653 |

Army Photos, all SC-

| 210332 | 210557 | 210562 | 272336 |
| 210548 | 210558 | 211198 | 345977 |
| 210549 | 210559 | 256285 | 366287-1 |
| 210551 | 210561 | 272333 | 395742 |

(all above available at MARC)
Agat Unit

Japanese Defense

Col. Tsunetaro Suenaga, commanding officer of the 38th Infantry Regiment (with his headquarters on Mt. Alifan), led a full strength counterattack on the night of July 21. His plan was to attack and crush any enemy assault landing at the water's edge. When Suenaga reached a small hill on the north side of a Japanese naval gun position (Gaan? Bangi? Apaca?) he was wounded in his thigh by mortar fire. He continued to fight; then received a bullet wound in his chest and died.

Sources: Takeda letter; Lodge, Recapture of Guam, pp. 12, 56, 77n.

Shepherd Command Post

Brig. Gen. Lemuel C. Shepherd, commanding general of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, landed leading elements of his brigade on Agat beach about 8:30 a.m. on July 21. "At 10:25 I came ashore and established my command post in a grove of trees near Bangi Point where I could personally direct the advance of my two regiments, the 4th and 22nd Marines." Another source places the Shepherd command post about 200 yards southeast of Gaan Point, in a coconut grove. On July 25, a III Amphibious Corps command post (Maj. Gen. Roy S. Geiger, who commanded Shepherd) was established in Old Agat village in anticipation of the battle for Orote peninsula and the clearing of southern Guam.

The existing "Shepherd Command Post" sign along the road in the Old Agat portion of modern Agat appears to be closer to Geiger's command post than to Shepherd's.

Sources: Shepherd, Salutes (1969); Lodge, Recapture of Guam, pp. 49, 88; Shaw, Nalty and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, p. 533.

Agat Refugee Camp

The initial post-invasion Guamanian refugee camp at Agat was on the site of Old Agat; later it was moved a mile or so south. At first the Guamanians shared the mess line and water cart with the Marines; later a civilian kitchen and mess line were set up. Salvage parties found abandoned Japanese food supplies and construction materials. Tents and crude shacks were the housing. Heavy rains were a problem and at times supplies were hand carried into camp. Adult men in the camp were hired for labor -- often to dig graves. Agat's camp was opened on July 25 -- by 11 p.m. that night there were at least 700 refugees. The peak reached 6,689 on August 5.
Agat Unit/Mt. Alifan Unit

By August 15, it was down to 5,009 as some Guamanians had returned to their ranches. Ranch dwellers often returned to Agat for hot meals and to load up with supplies to take home. All refugee camps were administered by the Navy's Civil Affair group. Navy doctors and corpsmen supplied medical attention. Navy Catholic chaplains conducted masses.

A supply center for refugees was established at Pedro Martinez's ranch on the Piti-Agat road. It contained 87 1/2 tons of rice; 185 gallons of soy sauce; 400 cases of canned vegetables; four tons of barley; 150 cases of canned noodles; 500 cases of canned fish; 25 cases of canned beef; barbed wire, miscellaneous medical and other supplies. Most of these were Japanese goods found cached here and there in southern Guam. Food for the Guamanians remained a problem until corps were planted and harvested--about half a year.

Sources: Souder, "Problems of Feeding ...," p. 25; only known surviving photographs of the Agat refugee camp are in the Emilie Johnson collection.

MT. ALIFAN UNIT

Suenaga's Command Post

Col. Tsunetaro Suenaga, commanding officer of the 38th Infantry Regiment was charged with the Japanese defense of the Agat-Orote peninsula areas. He was killed on July 21 in the Agat unit.

The Mt. Alifan unit contains an elaborate fortification --3-gun battery, pillboxes, trenches, fire control center and an observation post. It is the most extensive single fortification which survives on the slopes of Mt. Alifan. It probably was Suenaga's command post. It carries NFS Surface Survey No. 49, and is surrounded by other fortified, but less elaborate, positions.

American Invasion

Aerial and ground photographs taken on or shortly after invasion day are numbered:

Army:

SC 211188
SC 272338
SC 325207
Mt. Alifan Unit/Fonte Unit

Navy: all 80-G-

237559    242207
238975    242209
242195    243753
242203    243758
242205    243789
242206    247606

(plus several in the Emilie Johnston collection)

(all above available at MARC)

Refugee Camp Era and Later

The Agat Memorial Cemetery, comparable to the Asan Military Cemetery, stood on the slopes of Mt. Alifan but not within the boundaries of the Mt. Alifan unit. It apparently contained the dead of the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and the Army's 77th Infantry Division before the remains were transferred under escort to cemeteries elsewhere. Army photographs are dated May-30, 1947 and are numbered SC 310110, SC 310113 and SC 310115.

On July 31, 1944, a Catholic Mass was celebrated for Guamanians on Mt. Alifan, again apparently not within the park unit. Pictures of it are numbered 92470, 92472 and 92473 in the Emilie Johnston collection (MARC). See also Army Photograph SC 335416, August 2, 1944. Note the clean and fancy dresses worn by the Guamanian women. Apparently these dresses were hidden away during the Japanese occupation and saved for important occasions after the Americans returned.

FONTE UNIT (proposed)

This area is also known as Nimitz Hill. Libugon hill, near the proposed Park addition, was selected by Admiral Nimitz for his headquarters and living area shortly after he landed on Guam, August 10, 1944. It was first called Forward Area Pacific Command then Marianas Area Command. Fleet Admiral Nimitz and his staff departed in August 1945 and the Libugon area soon became known as COMNAVMAR for Commander Naval Forces Marianas. The change to Nimitz Hill came in the early 1950's. It still serves as the Navy command headquarters.

From the proposed Park addition, an excellent view of northern Guam provides opportunity for interpreting the final phases of the re-capture—the American sweep and the Japanese retreat to the north.
Fonte Unit

This area of Libugon contains the depression and other parts of the Fonte area whose capture ends the assault phase and started the northern sweep. The Fonte fight was the final fight for the Force Beachhead Line (FBL), the inner perimeter of the American beachhead which needed to be in American hands before the landing area was safe and from which landing area the rest of Guam could be taken.

The 3rd Marine Division opened full-scale attack to clear Fonte on July 27. Fonte contained many bunkers, caves, tunnels and trenches. The powerline (right of way still in use) was the first U.S. objective. It was reached before noon. A Japanese counterattack about 1 p.m. was repulsed. Any advance beyond the powerline was exposed to heavy Japanese fire. Marines dug in for the night. A depression (within the proposed Park unit) remained the main source of enemy resistance on the 28th.

U.S. tanks, machine guns and bazookas blanketed every cave entrance in the depression. Under cover of this fire, an assault group with flamethrowers and demolition bombs worked their way down from the rim and methodically destroyed every enemy position without losing a man. The rest of the Fonte plateau was then cleared. Fonte plateau was the Japanese anchor position of the Force Beachhead Line, and the U.S. lost 62 Marines killed and 179 wounded in the Fonte area. The Japanese lost a thousand men or more.

Gen. Takashina's Command Post

Lt. General Takeshi Takashina's command included Guam, Rota and Tinian after the fall of Saipan. At the time of the general Japanese counterattack on the night of July 25, Takashina commanded the counterattack from natural caves west of Fonte. As U.S. tanks moved into that area on July 26, he moved into his Fonte command post. On the 27th, he directed the defense of Fonte. His losses of men were high and he found it difficult to assemble his troops. On July 28, he oversaw their assemblage north of the Agana river and ordered their withdrawal to the Ordot area. Shortly after leaving his command post he was hit in the chest by American machine gun fire and died instantly, about 2 p.m., July 28. Lt. General Obata assumed command.

The command post is within the proposed Park unit. It was later converted to a civil defense shelter by the U.S. Navy. It is easily accessible and faces the post-war quarry.

Sources: Shaw, Nalty and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, pp. 528-529; Takeda letter; Eddy, pers. ints. Jan. 25 and 26, 1980; Pacific Profile, July 1965, p. 31; Johnston, "Nimitz Hill History."
Post-World War II Roads and Quarry

The road which makes the quarry command post accessible and places the depression in view was built by 1945 as part of the new roads to Nimitz hill. The old road to Libugon, and on to Mt. Tenjo, is still in use but does not reach the proposed Park unit. The quarry was in full use by 1948.

Sources: April 1948 picture of quarry (MARC); Navy aerial photographs of Libugon-Fonte area Nos. 80-G-331878, 346010, 346172, 431001, 431002, 444619.
APPENDIX C

Additional Sites on Guam Recommended, as per Public Law 95-348, Sect. 6, (d): "Other points on the Island of Guam relevant to the park may be identified, established, and marked by the Secretary in agreement with the Governor of Guam." These sites have historical significance:

**Tweed’s "CAVE," Pagua Point**

George R. Tweed, a U.S. Navy radioman was one of six American sailors who hid from the Japanese on Guam and the only one who survived. The other five were caught and executed within a relatively short time. All were helped by various Guamanians; in so doing these Guamanians put their bodies and lives (and the bodies and lives of their friends and relatives) in jeopardy. Numerous Guamanians suspected of hiding or aiding Tweed were tortured during interrogation, sometimes followed by beheading. As long as the Japanese searched for Tweed, all Guamanians knew they might be summarily arrested and accused of knowing of his hiding place. Tweed lived in the "cave," actually a crevice in a cliff, for his last 21 months on the island before he was picked up by a U.S. warship. Tweed’s survival represents the loyalty of the Guamanians for the Americans, and their humanity.

**Father Duenas Execution Site, Tai**

Father Jesus Baza Duenas, 30, was beheaded by the Japanese before dawn, July 12, 1944, only a few days before the American liberation of Guam. His arrest came July 8; his death came after torture. Executed with him were his nephew, attorney Eduardo Duenas, Tun Juan (mili) Panjilinan, a retired Navy man, and a fourth man, unidentified. Father Duenas, one of three Catholic priests on the island at the time, was openly hostile to the Japanese but was prominent as a Guamanian leader. The Father Duenas Memorial High School stands near the site. The execution site stands for the numerous Guamanians who were tortured or died during Japanese arrest.

**Camp Manengon, near Ylig**

The Japanese, through forced marches, herded the Guamanians into concentration camps about July 15, 1944. Tired and hungry men, women and children carried boxes, sacks and invalids on stretchers. Loaded carabao, cows and carts accompanied them. No stops were permitted. Stragglers were clubbed. The exhausted were helped along by relatives and friends. Some died enroute; their bodies were left along roadsides. At Manengon, the largest camp (10,000-15,000 people), heavy rain arrived with the marchers. It was a sea of mud. People lived in the open on both sides of the Ylig river. Men lashed shelter frames from poles they cut; women wove coconut palms into mats for roofs, walls and floors. Food ran out shortly after arrival; people then lived off the land. Many of the men called away for labor never returned; most were victims of Japanese atrocities. Shortly after the American invasion, Manengon became a refugee camp -- food, medicine, doctors, friendly guards against Japanese stragglers, clothing and good will were
delivered by carabao carts over mud roads. Healthier families left for their ranches or other refugee camps as soon as it was safe to do so. Manengon represents the single move by the Japanese which insured the survival of Guamanians as a viable ethnic group. In such camps, they were removed from the American bombardment, invasion beaches and the crossfire. Manengon also represents the succor provided immediately by the Americans to the Guamanians in time of great need. The Manengon camp site now lies among peaceful ranches in a rural setting.

WAR DOG CEMETERY, Yigo

Sixty members of the "K-9 Corps" assisted the U.S. Marine Corps in the recapture of Guam. War dogs were used by both the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade and the 3rd Marine Division. Their strong sense of smell and acute hearing made them particularly effective in night security — men slept more restfully when not actually on watch if dogs were on duty nearby. During the early days on Guam, the war dogs barked if the enemy came too close, but they were quickly taught to give silent signals to their handlers so as not to give the patrol's position away. Dogs were also sent in caves. Their safe return permitted scouts to enter for a more detailed inspection. They also worked with the Military Police to guard installations and patrol trails. Under fire, one dog on Guam successfully delivered a message to an isolated outpost. At least 23 war dogs who were killed in action, died of wounds, or otherwise lost their lives on Guam are buried within an enclosure. Each has a white marker. Dogs buried include four corporals (Yonnie, Hobo, Bunkie and Koko); sixteen privates (Silver, Poncho, Brockie, Pepper, Kurt, Ludwig, Blitz, Skipper, Arno, Bursch, Blackie, Max, Ricky, two Dukes and an unknown) and several unidentified war dogs. The war dog cemetery commemorates the role dogs played in saving American lives in the recapture of Guam.

GENERAL OBATA'S COMMAND POST, Yigo

Lt. General Hideyoshi Obata, commanding general of the Japanese 31st Army, was forced to stop at Guam when the American invasion of Saipan caught him returning to Saipan from an inspection of the Palau Islands. He left the defense of Guam to Lt. Gen. Takeshi Takashina. When Takashina was killed at Ponte on July 28, 1944, Obata took direct command of the remaining Japanese forces on Guam. He ordered a general withdrawal into Northern Guam. Obata set up his command post in a tunnel complex within a small jungle-covered hill near Mt. Mataguac. On August 10, the day organized resistance on Guam was declared over by the Americans, the Army lost 8 men, with 17 wounded, in an attack on Obata's strong point. On August 11, American soldiers tossed pole charges and white phosphorous hand grenades into tunnel openings; later 400-pound blocks of explosives were used to seal the entrances. Opened four days later, the tunnels held 60 Japanese dead. Sometime in the fighting around his headquarters, after he had apologized by radio to Imperial General Headquarters for the loss of Guam, Gen. Obata died, perhaps by suicide. His body was never identified. Obata's command post of interconnected man-made tunnels within a hill, represents the bravery and sacrifice of the Japanese who defended Guam; as well as the expertise of the Japanese army in preparing underground fortifications on Pacific islands.
ADDITIONAL SITES GUAM: SOURCES


GENERAL OBATA'S COMMAND POST: Lodge, Recapture of Guam, pp. 12, 122, 122n, 152, 159; Shaw, Nalty and Turnbladh, Central Pacific Drive, pp. 516, 530, 545, 567; Cowl, Campaign in the Marianas, pp. 64, 329, 371, 377-378, 408, 417, 437.