THE USS ARIZONA MEMORIAL
AND VISITOR CENTER

An Administrative
and Legislative History

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Finally, I would like to state for the record that I have been employed at various times in the past by several agencies and organizations mentioned in this study: the National Park Service, the Arizona Memorial Museum Association (successor organization to the Arizona Memorial Museum Foundation), the Hawaii State Legislature, and the Pearl Harbor Memorial Museum.
PREFACE

The story of the USS Arizona Memorial and visitor center is a story of persistence and hard work. Because it involved hundreds of people and spanned more than three decades, it necessarily includes conflict, confusion and setbacks.

This account does not ignore or minimize those aspects. They comprise part of the historical record. They are included out of respect for the whole truth and to give an objective account of the USS Arizona Memorial and visitor center.

I have tried to deal with those negative factors in a spirit of appreciation for the vision, dedication, and goodwill required to overcome the obstacles in the path of all who worked to establish the memorial and the visitor center.

In writing history it is inevitable that some names appear more often than others. It is not my purpose to exaggerate or denigrate the work of any individual, group or agency but to reflect the facts recorded in available sources. Everyone mentioned in this account—and many more who are not—contributed to the achievement of a common goal. One of those individuals expressed it best when he said, "Nobody was more important than everybody."
MEMORIAL DAY

The USS Arizona Memorial was dedicated in the warm sunshine of Memorial Day 1962. White was the dominant color for the occasion with Navy uniforms blending with the freshly painted surfaces of the memorial. As the waters of Pearl Harbor lapped gently against the rusted hulk of the sunken battleship, the 200 invited guests and another 800 on the nearby shore of Ford Island listened to speeches by admirals and other dignitaries. After a prayer from the chaplain, a band played the Navy Hymn followed by the haunting notes of taps. The Marine honor guard provided final punctuation with a volley of rifle fire.

Among those gathered for the dedication were two whose efforts had been critical in bringing to reality the idea of a memorial over the remains of the Arizona. They were H. Tucker Gratz, chairman of the Pacific War Memorial Commission (PWMc), and John A. Burns, Hawaii's former Delegate to Congress. Ironically, neither man was on the rostrum for the occasion.

Burns had abandoned his seat in Congress to run unsuccessfully for Governor in Hawaii's first post-statehood election and was an out-of-office politician. Gratz had developed a close relationship and high regard for Burns during their joint endeavor, and when he saw the former delegate among the spectators he left the platform to join Burns in the crowd.1
In their personal histories and experiences Gratz and Burns personified many of the themes that dominate the story of how the Arizona Memorial and its shoreside visitor center came to be. Burns was a Honolulu police captain on December 7, 1941, and served throughout the war as liaison between naval and military intelligence agencies and Honolulu's beleaguered Japanese community. Architect of the postwar political revolution which brought Hawaii's Americans of Japanese Ancestry into full participation in the Islands' public life, Burns represented the territory in Congress from 1954 to 1959. In Congress he initiated federal legislation to permit the construction of the Arizona Memorial on Navy property. During his three terms as governor, from 1962 to 1974, he developed state policies which promoted the growth of tourism bringing millions of visitors to Hawaii—most of whom wanted to visit the site of America's catastrophic entry into World War II. Burns' career encompassed events directly related to the Pearl Harbor attack, the construction of the Arizona Memorial, and the crushing increase in numbers of visitors to the memorial, an increase which ultimately made necessary improved shoreside facilities.

H. Tucker Gratz served as a Navy officer at Pearl Harbor during World War II and remained in Hawaii to pursue a postwar career in business and government. From 1949 to 1966 he chaired the Pacific War Memorial Commission, a territorial (later state) agency which raised most of the funds to build the Arizona Memorial. Under Gratz's leadership the commission
provided the necessary cohesion, continuity and focus for the national effort to bring to fruition the idea of a permanent memorial over the remains of the *Arizona* and her crew.

Important as they were, Burns, Gratz and the PWMC were but part of the history of the memorial and visitor center. This study is an attempt to explain how and why those facilities came to be. It will treat the motives and methods of those who worked toward that end. That story includes the public and private institutions within which those individuals acted. Except where necessary for a clearer understanding of those subjects, the physical construction and operations of the memorial and visitor center are outside the scope of this study.

This account will trace the growth and development of the idea for a memorial at Pearl Harbor from its inception in the midst of World War II to its realization in 1962. It will follow the story through the 1960s and 1970s as the need for a complementary shoreside visitor center became ever more pressing.

The narrative is divided chronologically into three parts. The first period, 1941-1954, saw the germination of the concept, early unsuccessful attempts to realize it, and the increasing focus of attention on the hulk of the USS *Arizona* as the most suitable site for a memorial at Pearl Harbor.

The second period, 1955-1962, was one of concentrated effort to build the USS *Arizona* Memorial. During those years the Navy, the PWMC, Congress, and the territory and state of
Hawaii worked to secure legal authorization, raise funds, and execute the design and construction of the Arizona Memorial.

During the third era, 1963–1980, the focus was on the increasing need for a shoreside visitor center to accommodate and enhance the experience of growing numbers of visitors to the memorial. It included the struggle for Congressional appropriations, fundraising, and the transfer of the operation of the Arizona Memorial from the Navy to the National Park Service.

Cutting across these chronological lines are a number of important themes which shape this history. They include: the question of what, exactly, the Arizona Memorial commemorates; the conflicts and problems inherent in different approaches to fundraising; the growth and maturation of Hawaii as a state and a tourist destination; the role of the PWMC over a three decade period; the politics of securing Congressional action; and the issues surrounding the Navy's connection with the Arizona Memorial, and the Navy's relationship with other groups and agencies interested in the memorial.
PART I: 1941-1954

REMEMBERING PEARL HARBOR

Pearl Harbor was burned into American consciousness by the shock of the nation’s initial defeat and sudden entry into World War II. Few Americans who heard the news that December Sunday doubted that the nation had crossed an historic watershed. That awareness, shock and thirst for revenge were expressed in the ubiquitous wartime propaganda theme "Remember Pearl Harbor." Not surprisingly, then, suggestions for a memorial to fix the event permanently in national memory appeared even before the war was over.

In the fall of 1943 a civilian worker at Pearl Harbor, Tony Todaro, proposed a "Shrine of Pearl Harbor." The shrine would be a series of structures built step-like on the slopes of Diamond Head or Punchbowl, extinct volcanic craters in Honolulu. It would house archives relating to the Pearl Harbor attack and other Pacific War battles, as well as headquarters for veterans groups. It was to have the names of all the Pacific War dead (presumably limited to American) inscribed on its walls.¹

In 1944 another Pearl Harbor worker, Herbert Knowles, proposed that a memorial be built in Washington, D.C., to honor those who died on December 7, 1941. Knowles' design
pursued the theme to the point of monomania. Seven steps, the number representing the day of the month of the attack, would lead to a 200-foot shaft. The base of the shaft would be forty-one feet in diameter and surrounded by twelve pillars. The dimensions of the shaft's width and the number of pillars alluded, of course, to the year and month of the attack. The structure would be surmounted by a clock stopped at 7:55.

The proposal also called for red, white and blue fountains and a statue of Joseph Lockhart, the radar operator whose report of the approaching Japanese raiders was ignored. Knowles planned to have the names of all of America's World War II dead inscribed on plaques in the memorial.²

Todaro and Knowles put forth their ideas as individuals, but there was at least one concerted group effort toward the same end. The Pearl Harbor Memorial Trust was a coalition of Hawaii veterans and patriotic groups. They organized to raise money to build a memorial honoring all who fought in the Pacific War. The organization planned to raise funds nationwide, but the memorial would be built in Hawaii.³

The authors of all three wartime plans paid tribute to the psychic power of the image of Pearl Harbor by including it in the names of their proposals. But when it came to specifics, their scope broadened to include the names of far more casualties than those suffered in the Pearl Harbor attack. Perhaps it was just too painful for Americans then to contemplate such a crushing defeat in isolation; it needed to be treated as a point of reference for the victories which followed.
THE PACIFIC WAR MEMORIAL COMMISSION

In any event, public interest faded after the war as attention in Hawaii and the mainland U.S. shifted to postwar concerns. That interest, though, was not quite dead. It began to revive several years after V-J Day. In 1949 the territory of Hawaii established the Pacific War Memorial Commission, an agency authorized to plan and raise funds for the erection of war memorials in the territory.

The commission was composed of seven unpaid members who collectively represented the business community, Hawaii's social elite, and the Islands' Japanese-American veterans. It was chaired by H. Tucker Gratz, a man with solid political connections and formidable diplomatic skills. He was at various times in his career a naval officer, a businessman and a federal bureaucrat. The talents of Gratz and the other commissioners would receive ample exercise, for the commissioners received virtually no operating funds from the territorial government.

Its enabling legislation charged the commission, as its name implied, with duties relating to war memorials. However, the territorial government originally envisioned a very different collateral (perhaps even primary) duty for the PWMC. It was to serve as liaison with the Pacific War Memorial, Inc., a private nonprofit group formed to sponsor a wide variety of scientific research activities in the Pacific Basin.
The Pacific War Memorial, Inc., seemed to promise great things for Hawaii. Its board of directors included a thick slice of the Eastern establishment: Henry Stimson, William Donovan, Ovetta Cupp Hobby, Artemus Gates, and a sprinkling of Roosevelts and Rockefellers. There was talk of locating the organization's field headquarters in Honolulu, with no telling how much money and prestige might accrue to Hawaii.5

As fate would have it, though, the promise of the Pacific War Memorial, Inc., never materialized. The PWMC turned its attention to consideration of war memorial structures for Hawaii.

The PWMC quickly concluded that the Pearl Harbor area and the December 7th attack provided obvious themes for a memorial. Actually, the commissioners arrived in 1951 at a conception for an entire system of memorials. It would include sites and structures at Red Hill, the Marine parade ground, the main gate of Pearl Harbor Naval Station, the wreckage of the USS Arizona, and a connecting boulevard between Nimitz and Kamehameha Highways.

It is clear that the PWMC recognized the importance of the Arizona within the scheme. As early as 1946 H. Tucker Gratz had been struck by the neglect of the sunken battleship when he visited the wreckage to place a wreath on the anniversary of the attack, only to find the dead wreath he had put there the previous December 7th.

The commission's plan called for a permanent platform over the ship. It would be connected by a ramp to Ford Island,
where there would be an observation tower, archives and a museum. A territorial legislator speaking on the commission's behalf affirmed, "the Arizona is very much a factor in any memorial system that is desired." 6

The PWMC did not, of course, operate in a vacuum. It is impossible to say who first thought of the idea of a memorial at the Arizona, but the Navy commands at Pearl Harbor at the same time were well aware of the Arizona's presence and bothered by the lack of tangible acknowledgment of its significance.

In the early 1950s, as the PWMC was formulating its proposals, others were making their own plans for the Arizona. On March 7, 1950, Admiral Arthur Radford, commander-in-chief of the Pacific Fleet, caused a flagpole to be installed on the protruding base of the hulk's rear mast. At the same time he ordered that the American flag be raised and lowered daily. Later that year a wooden platform was built over the amidships area. On the ninth anniversary of the attack a commemorative metal plaque was installed at the base of the flagpole and another welded to the deck of the wreck of the target ship USS Utah. Radford envisioned these steps as stopgap preliminaries to a permanent solution to the problem of ignominious deterioration and ordered a study on "rehabilitating" the Arizona. 7
NATIONAL INTEREST

On the mainland, too, there was interest in the Arizona. Collier's magazine printed an editorial calling for a memorial over the ship as "a fitting tribute to the men of the Arizona, and to the others who died at Pearl Harbor and Hickam Field."\(^8\)

Congressman Thomas Lane of Massachusetts submitted bills in 1950 and 1951 to authorize a "shrine" at the Arizona so "we shall be awakened to the need of protecting [freedom] from the lurking enemies who would corrupt, undermine, and destroy man's last best hope on earth."\(^9\) The Navy Club of the United States suggested a bronze marker on the Arizona's hull "commemorating Pearl Harbor Day."\(^10\)

With such widespread interest the PWMC began to think of the fundraising required to build its memorial system. Greatly overoptimistic, the commissioners seriously underestimated the difficulty of raising money from private donors. There were sanguine estimates that $10,000,000 might be raised by such means as the sale of vanda orchids on the mainland.\(^11\)

Then reality closed in. The early flurry of interest failed to generate enough momentum to overcome the inertia. For one thing, there was no meeting of the minds on why there should be a memorial. Radford and other officers at Pearl Harbor saw an Arizona memorial as a Navy obligation to what had been one of the fleet's proudest ships and the sailors who went down with her. Collier's editors viewed the issue as basically one of marking the graves of all American service-
men killed in the attack. Congressman Lane, riding the flood
tide of McCarthyism, wanted an opportunity to remind Americans
of the dangers of internal subversion. The Navy Club wanted
to recognize December 7, 1941, as a decisive turning point
in American history. With such a wide diversity of motives
it is little wonder that the proponents failed to carry the
day in the early 1950s.

There were also other, less abstract, reasons. Congressional
budget restrictions during that period virtually
guaranteed that "frills" such as an Arizona memorial stood
no chance of federal funding. In addition, security regulations
then in force barred the general public from Pearl Harbor.
Who would expect a Congressional appropriation for a monument
which most taxpayers could not visit? 12

Finally, a decade after the most spectacular defeat in
U.S. military history there remained a deep reluctance on the
part of many to recall that occasion. Collier's felt that the
Navy's hesitation to press for an appropriation stemmed less
from tight budgets than to a desire to forget a shameful
defeat. 13 President Harry Truman encouraged such an attitude
when he had his secretary write the PWMC (in a negative response
to a request that he proclaim December 7th a "national day of
prayer") that the anniversary of the attack should be remem-
bered, if at all, "only as a day of infamy." 14 At least one
member of the PWMC shared those sentiments and objected to the
commission's planned observances on December 7th as "uncalled
for." 15
The early 1950s were not quite ripe for an Arizona memorial. But the idea was not dead. It would not be long before proponents would once again marshal their resources and conduct a successful effort to realize their goal.
PART II: 1955-1962

NAVY OVERTURES

The first harbinger of success—albeit a modest one—arrived in 1955. On December 7th of that year the Navy Club dedicated on Ford Island, near the Arizona, a ten-foot high basalt stone with a plaque dedicated to the memory of American servicemen killed in the December 7, 1941, attack. It was the first permanent memorial at Pearl Harbor.¹

Whether or not that example spurred the Navy to further action, the command at Pearl Harbor did renew its efforts. Two weeks before the dedication of the Navy Club monument the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District (the command responsible for Pearl Harbor and other Navy bases in Hawaii) wrote the Secretary of the Navy pointing out the need for a memorial over the remains of the Arizona:

Whether or not the Navy has done its best to preserve the dignity of the Arizona's remains, it is still blamed because this burial place for 1,102 men is a rusted mass of junk . . . .

... an appropriate memorial should be constructed to honor the many valiant men who went down with her and who now lie entombed within her hull.²

The sentiment was endorsed by the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Arleigh Burke, and Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, World War II commander of the Pacific Fleet and honorary chairman.
of the PWMC. Despite those weighty endorsements, there was no immediate action forthcoming at the cabinet or Congressional level.

The Navy was resolved, however, to explore alternative routes to its goal. In early 1956 Commander Jay Smith, a Fourteenth Naval District staff officer approached the PWMC for help. He noted that the Navy Club was exploring the possibility of raising funds nationally for an Arizona memorial. Would the PWMC participate, too? The commission mulled over the request. In May, when Navy Secretary Charles Thomas publicly endorsed the Navy Club campaign, the PWMC offered to work with that organization. Responding to that offer, the Fourteenth District Commandant directly requested the PWMC to raise funds for an Arizona memorial.

It soon became apparent that, for reasons not clear, the Navy Club would be unable to fulfill its commitment. The commission then faced the question of whether to undertake the campaign on its own. It was not an easy decision. Hawaii then was considerably more isolated—both psychologically and in terms of travel time—from the mainland United States than it was after the advent of statehood (1959), jet passenger travel and mass tourism. Could a group working from Hawaii command the national attention and credibility needed for such a task?

After balancing those factors against its legal mandate and its advantages (the most important being Navy backing) the commission decided to proceed with the project. One of
its first actions was to establish an Arizona Memorial fund trust account at the Bishop Trust Company; it then secured the agreement of the Post Office to route mail addressed to "USS Arizona, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii" to Bishop Trust.\textsuperscript{7}
AUTHORIZING LEGISLATION

After deciding to continue the PWMC and the Navy encountered problems no one had considered. First, the Navy had no legal authority to accept money from the PWMC for the memorial. Second, even if it could accept the money, the Navy had no authority to erect a memorial over the Arizona.

It would require an act of Congress to win an exemption from the principle that federal agencies could be funded only from the federal treasury. An even stickier point was the jealously guarded perogative of the American Battle Monuments Commission (ABMC).

The ABMC was a federal agency charged with erecting war memorials such as the one proposed for the Arizona. It was no lightweight organization, but included General of the Army George Marshall and members of both houses of Congress. To make the legislative obstacle course even more difficult, the PWMC would have to rely mainly on the territory's single nonvoting Delegate to Congress, John Burns. 8

Burns turned to the task with a will and a large fund of political common sense. In January 1957 he introduced HR 5809, which would provide the necessary authority for the Navy to build the memorial, to accept funds from the PWMC, and to give the commission incidental assistance during the fundraising drive. He was careful to draft the bill so that it could not possibly be construed to authorize the expenditure of federal funds for the memorial. He continually emphasized that selling point in public and private discussion.
In addition, he obtained from the Navy a list of Arizona casualties and their home towns. His staff proceeded to break down the list by Congressional districts, and Burns provided every Congressman with a list of crew members from his or her district who had been killed on the battleship on December 7, 1941.9 That this touch provided a powerful incentive to support the bill was attested to by, among others, Representative Barratt O'Hara of Illinois, who told his colleagues:

in reminding us that among the heroes of the nation . . . were some who had been our own constituents, the gentleman from Hawaii gave us the added personal sense that in supporting HR 5809 we were aiding in building a memorial not only for our countrymen personally unknown to us but also for the members of our own community families.10

Burns knew additionally that, as was the case in the early 1950s, many people inclined to support a bill to authorize the Arizona Memorial would have widely varying and emotionally charged opinions on the reason(s) a memorial was needed.

The Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District (as noted above) seemed at least as concerned with the disgraceful spectacle of the Arizona's deteriorating remains as with the memory of those killed in the attack.

The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General R. McC. Pate, wrote, "Besides memorializing the brave men who lost their lives at Pearl Harbor, such a shrine will serve as a reminder . . . . of the courage, hardship and sacrifice [required] to bring World War II to a successful conclusion."11
The senior surviving officer aboard the Arizona during the attack, Rear Admiral Samuel Fuqua, saw the issue as being one of providing "a suitable resting place" for his late shipmates.\textsuperscript{12}

Fuqua's feelings struck a responsive chord in H. Tucker Gratz and the Navy's Chief of Legislative Liaison, Rear Admiral E. C. Stephan. They saw the memorial as "a fitting tribute to the personnel of the USS Arizona who gave their lives . . . and whose remains have not been and cannot be recovered from the hull."\textsuperscript{13}

Admiral Burke thought of it as commemorating "all American servicemen who lost their lives in the Pacific area during World War II and it will remind the people of the Free World that they must never allow an attack such as that which sank the Arizona to reoccur."\textsuperscript{14}

Burke's afterthought found amplification in Congress. This was the period of President Eisenhower's "bigger bang for the buck" defense policy with its reliance on strategic nuclear weaponry. The year Burns introduced the Arizona Memorial bill saw the climax of the race between the United States and the Soviet Union to build the first Intercontinental Ballistic Missile. The potential for a surprise attack that would dwarf the results of the Japanese raid on Pearl Harbor was frighteningly obvious. Senator Carl Hayden of Arizona vented a full charge of Cold War rhetoric in support of the bill:

it is imperative that we be prepared either to win a war against Godless communism or to
prevent such a war by being so strong that the dictators in Moscow will be afraid to drop the first bomb.

It is, therefore, appropriate that, through this memorial, we focus our attention on our most striking example of unpreparedness, so that we may be perpetually reminded of the security that is found in strength.\(^{15}\)

Yet, it would not do to push that theme too far. Admiral Nimitz, whose cooperation in the fundraising drive was vital, had a strong distaste for dwelling on that day the fleet was crushed by surprise attack. "I have always regretted," he wrote, "that we memorialize Pearl Harbor Day—which was a great defeat for us."\(^{16}\)

It was important to keep supporters, both in and out of Congress, from becoming embroiled needlessly in conflicting interpretations of the need for a memorial. Burns solved that problem neatly when he drafted the bill. He avoided any preamble or clauses justifying the need for a memorial. The measure contained no unnecessary verbiage or references to who or what would be memorialized, just cleanly written text to authorize "a United States Ship Arizona Memorial at Pearl Harbor."\(^{17}\)

It was well that Burns had done his political spadework, exercised careful draftsmanship, and avoided clashes about appropriations and metaphysics. The American Battle Monuments Commission was ready with objections to this incursion into its domain. Senator Charles Potter of Michigan, an ABMC member, spoke against the bill, opposing it on two counts.
First he said, "This proposal relates to what is essentially a Navy ship. We are considering what really is a one-service affair." The ABMC knew from experience how easily inter- or intraservice jealousies could mar a memorial project if one ship, unit or service felt that the sacrifices of its members or crew had been slighted in inscriptions, statuary or a host of other symbolic representations. That jealousy could linger like a pall over public attitudes toward a memorial long after the structure had been completed.

Second, Potter cautioned, too many monuments had been erected by individual units or services. Those who built them rarely thought of the need for routine maintenance and upkeep. Most had deteriorated disgracefully. The ABMC was created, he pointed out, to deal with precisely that problem. It had the experience and institutional resources to guarantee permanent upkeep. Therefore, he concluded, functions such as the building of the Arizona Memorial were rightly, and for good reason, the province of his commission.

Potter's qualms about the problems of upkeep were given little weight by his colleagues. Senator Leverett Saltonstall of Massachusetts responded offhandedly, "The Navy estimates that the cost of maintaining such a memorial will be no more than the cost it now incurs in maintaining the battleship Arizona in its present condition."

The work of Burns and his allies had been thorough. Potter was the only member of either house to speak on the floor against the bill. Seeing that he had little chance of
defeating it with delaying tactics, he declined the chance to try to kill the measure by "amending it to death."18

PWMC chairman, H. Tucker Gratz, a naval reserve officer, had arranged for temporary active duty in Washington while the bill made its way through Congress. He watched from the Senate gallery as it passed on final vote.19 The measure was signed into law as Public Law 85-344 on March 15, 1958.
PACIFIC WAR MEMORIAL COMMISSION FUNDRAISING

With legal authorization secured, the PWMC turned its attention to the task of raising funds to build the Arizona Memorial. Although fortified with the authority of PL 85-344, the commission still faced the disadvantages of being based in a distant island territory. In addition, the unpaid citizens who formed the commission were unable to undertake the demanding responsibility of operating a national fundraising drive on a day-to-day basis.

They sought at that point a professional who had the expertise to conduct such a campaign. After a period of deliberation, the commissioners selected Darrel Brady, a Southern California fundraiser cum publicist. Brady had worked with H. Tucker Gratz for the Boy Scouts of America before the war, and the commission followed its chairman's recommendation in selecting a professional coordinator for the national campaign.20

On June 16, 1958, Brady contracted with the PWMC to conduct the national campaign in return for a 15 percent commission on all monies raised for the PWMC's Arizona Memorial fund. The agreement was to run for 18 months (it was later extended to July 31, 1960). Brady's firm, Darrel Brady Associates, was to bear all operating expenses.21

The relationship between Brady and the commission was not a happy one. Brady too often proclaimed exaggerated fundraising goals and too seldom delivered on promises that major breakthroughs were right around the corner. Many times
he assured the commissioners that he was on the brink of enlisting decisive support from unspecified prominent figures and organizations, support that never materialized. Even more troublesome, he did not always exercise good judgment in selecting local area coordinators for the campaign.22

Brady's approach is suggested by his first proposal to the PWMC. He envisioned a giant piggy bank which would be trailered from place to place to solicit donations for the Arizona Memorial from people throughout the country.23

If his methods seemed odd, even amateurish, Brady's goals were wildly exaggerated. The PWMC originally estimated a $250,000 cost for the memorial.24 It realized that projects had a tendency to run over estimated costs and, in any event, fundraising goals had to allow for some shortfall in effort. Consequently, the commission felt that $500,000 was a realistic target. Brady, however, took the bit between his teeth and announced a goal of $2,000,000. He proclaimed it not only to the commission but caused embarrassment by spreading the exaggeration among national publications, veterans' groups and public officials.25

The commission remonstrated gently at first: "your proposal for a $2,000,000 goal leaves us a little breathless; . . . our goal is a more modest $500,000."26 When Brady persisted, the tone became icier: "Such a figure has no foundation in fact. Such statements can not only be misleading and confusing. . . . they can be most damaging both to the commission and the campaign."27
The commission's dissatisfaction was evidenced in a February 1959 letter from Joe Custer, its executive secretary, to Brady. Custer pointed out that the fund was only at the halfway mark (to the commission's goal, not Brady's) and that most donations to date had come from members of military units and veterans' and patriotic organizations. The inference was clear that those sources needed little selling and probably would have donated whether or not Brady had been involved.28

The commissioners' frustration with Brady's always impending, but never quite realized, coups was even more evident in file memos. Gratz wrote, "Brady has failed to answer my questions satisfactorily and therefore has nothing definite lined up." Another commissioner complained of Brady's "far too nebulous" promises.29

Brady, for his part, felt that despite his 15 percent commission, his best efforts were unappreciated. He claimed to be $30,000 in debt as a result of expenses incurred in the Arizona Memorial campaign and appealed to the commission to overlook the contract clause which obligated him to bear all operating expenses. He asked for at least partial reimbursement. If it were not forthcoming, he threatened that his creditors' "attitude is bound to be then 'the Pacific War Memorial Commission' is next in responsibility."30

Some degree of tension and minor disagreements were perhaps inevitable in any relationship between a freewheeling fundraiser-publicist and a commission nervous about the actions of its distant and loosely supervised agent. But the most
important test of Brady's efforts was the amount of money he brought in. In that regard the results were clearly lacking.

Between mid-June 1958 and mid-December 1959, the eighteen months covered by the original contract, the Arizona Memorial fund received about $155,000 in donations. Of that amount $50,000 was from an appropriation of Hawaii's territorial legislature, and another $95,000 had been engendered by a broadcast of the television program "This Is Your Life." Brady had little or nothing to do with generating income from those sources (see below for more detailed treatment of the broadcast and Hawaii legislative appropriations). This left $10,000 at most which had come from Brady's efforts.

Yet Brady had received a 15 percent commission on all donations to the Arizona Memorial fund. Clearly, the commission was not getting its money's worth from Brady. As a result, the commission, after two short-term extensions to give Brady a chance to produce results, allowed the contractual arrangement to expire at the end of July 1960. Experience had taught the commissioners to turn a deaf ear to Brady's final claim, "we are now taking a nationwide endeavor."32

In terms of donations from private sources, the most significant event in the Arizona Memorial fundraising drive was undoubtedly the December 3, 1958, national telecast of "This Is Your Life." Hosted by television personality Ralph Edwards, the program's format centered on a different individual (usually a celebrity) each week. The guest shared the stage with Edwards as former acquaintances spoke from
off-stage about shared experiences with the guest of honor. An emotional reunion would usually follow as the acquaintance would emerge after speaking.

The idea of using the show as a vehicle for the memorial fund drive first occurred to Mrs. Neil Deitrich, wife of the commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District. The idea was passed on to the PWMC by January 1958. The commission deliberated on it and contacted Ralph Edwards, who agreed to use his show to promote the fundraising effort.33

The December 1958 broadcast was timed to coincide as closely as possible with the anniversary of the attack. It featured, more than any one individual, the battleship USS Arizona. Admiral Fuqua, as senior surviving officer, stood in as the main guest. Appeals for contributions to the memorial fund were a prominent part of the program. Fuqua maintained a controlled military demeanor throughout the show, but, according to one witness, broke into sobs as soon as it was over.34

The response was stunning. Contributions began to pour in immediately. During the single month from December 16th to January 15th over $78,000 was received. By the time they stopped the commission identified over $95,000 in donations attributable to the broadcast.35

The second big event stimulating private contributions generated less cash than "This Is Your Life," but lodged more permanently in public consciousness. It featured Elvis Presley, the performer who dominated American popular music in the 1950s.
In late 1960 the memorial fund was still well short of its $500,000 goal. The editor of the Honolulu Advertiser, George Chaplin, volunteered to help by writing about 1,500 letters to the editors of daily papers across the nation. He asked them to help the fund drive by publishing stories or editorials about the Arizona Memorial project and, in turn, ask their readers to send contributions to the fund.\textsuperscript{36}

Among those papers which responded was the Los Angeles Examiner. Presley's manager, Colonel Tom Parker, read the Examiner editorial and immediately telephoned Chaplin with the offer of a Presley benefit performance in Hawaii for the Arizona Memorial (Presley was scheduled to come to Hawaii in any event for movie location work). Parker's single condition, and in this he was inflexible, was that all ticket proceeds must go directly to the memorial fund. He insisted that any overhead be covered from other sources.\textsuperscript{37}

Chaplin quickly referred the offer to the PWMC. The commission lost little time in accepting Parker's offer and arranged for the donation of incidental services for the concert (ticket sales, sound system, etc.). The Navy, under its authority to cooperate with the PWMC, made available its Bloch Arena at Pearl Harbor for the performance.

The March 25, 1961, concert was a sellout, with seat prices ranging from $3 to $100. The star wore a gold lame silver sequin lapelled sport coat and performed to the accompaniment of what one observer called "sub-navel quaking and shaking" and the screams of several thousand fans.\textsuperscript{38}
For the accountants, too, the show was a smashing success. When the proceeds were finally tallied, the memorial fund was $64,696.73 richer.\textsuperscript{39}

Even with the help of Elvis Presley and national television exposure, the PWMC realized that it would have to seek public, as well as private, funds. Since the explicit language of PL 85-344 eliminated (for the time being) the possibility of federal money, the commissioners turned to the Hawaii territorial (after August 1959, state) legislature.

In 1959 they found an ally in state Representative David McClung, a World War II Navy veteran and an ardent champion of the memorial fund drive. McClung enlisted the support of other legislators with his arguments that the Arizona's dead deserved a more fitting and permanent memorial.\textsuperscript{40} But the commissioners felt the need to present the legislature with a dollars-and-cents reason to appropriate state funds for the memorial.

They articulated a well-calculated appeal based on the Arizona Memorial's potential for Hawaii's then modest tourist industry. The commissioners knew that argument would have to be based on the rationale that the appropriation would be seed money for a developing economic base which could (and later did) become Hawaii's largest employer.\textsuperscript{41}

The commission canvassed key tourism executives on the memorial's potential drawing power, and all predicted that it would become an important focus of visitor interest. Prominent PWMC commissioners lobbied key legislators for an
appropriation. They pursued the theme with justifications based on the memorial's certain power to stimulate "tourist interest."\(^{42}\)

The strategy worked. The legislature appropriated $50,000 in 1959. It appropriated another $50,000 in 1961 after Congressman Olin Teague of Texas pledged that if the state would contribute $100,000, Congress would appropriate the funds to cover any remaining shortfall in the Arizona Memorial fund.\(^{43}\)
CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATION

The law authorizing the construction of the Arizona Memorial banned the use of federal funds for the project, but the PWMC did not accept that prohibition as permanent. The commission recognized that it was an unavoidable compromise necessary for the enactment of the law. The commissioners felt, however, that once enacted, the law was subject to amendment.

That view was expressed less than a year after it passed when H. Tucker Gratz wrote Delegate Burns asking for a $150,000 appropriation for construction of the memorial. Burns refused to introduce the measure replying:

One of the prime objections to HR 5809 was that after the bill . . . was passed by Congress, there would be a request of the Congress for the appropriation of funds. This is the usual program. Consequently, the members of Congress are inclined to view such a memorial with a jaundiced eye.

Burns went on to say that he had given his word to the skeptics that there would be no appropriation request and, "I don't want to go back on my word."[4]

Burns' position was understandable inasmuch as being the author of HR 5809 his personal credibility was at stake. But the following year Hawaii had different representation in Congress and, as a newly admitted state, a full voting delegation in both houses. Senator Hiram Fong and Representative Olin Teague sponsored companion bills to authorize $200,000 for the memorial in the 1960 session.
But the memory of Burns' promise was too fresh. Not even Hawaii's majority Senator Oren Long could bring himself to support the appropriation. He wrote, "... as meritorious as this proposal may be, the original legislation ... was predicated on assurances that the Federal Government would not be called upon to make appropriation for construction." Nor would the Navy attempt to contravene such a recent pledge. Its representative, referring to the promise of no appropriations, stated, "in view of the ... legislative history of Public Law 85-344, the Department of the Navy is obliged to neither support nor oppose" the appropriation authorization. 45

Although the bills died that year, the sponsors did enlist some powerful support. The influential Senate Majority Secretary, Bobby Baker, promised his help in future efforts when he pledged, "I am a private in your army." 46

The following year, 1961, saw the reintroduction of Congressional proposals to authorize the use of federal funds for the construction of the Arizona Memorial. Representative Daniel Inouye submitted H.R. 44 to that end. Inouye's bill originally called for $200,000 but was amended to authorize $150,000 for the memorial. It cleared both houses of Congress and was signed into law as PL 87-201 on September 6, 1961.

Its passage was not trouble-free. The most important opponent was Senator Richard Russell of Georgia, chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee. Russell's chief objection to the bill was the legacy of PL 85-344, the promise that the Arizona Memorial would be built without federal funds.
He wrote:

The Committee report on the original authorization indicated that there would be no cost to the government for the construction of the memorial. Because of this history, I anticipate that there will be some reluctance to approve (HR 44). 47

Russell was eventually won over by a strong lobbying campaign which required Joe Custer, the PVMC executive secretary, to travel to Washington. Also instrumental were the national staff of the American Veterans of World War II (AMVETS) and Bobby Baker, whose entreaties moved Vice President Lyndon Johnson to persuade Russell to allow the bill unhindered passage through his key committee. 48

The appropriation authorization provided for the first time an "official" definition of the memorial's purpose. According to PL 87-201 it was to "be maintained in honor and commemoration of the members of the Armed Forces of the United States who gave their lives to their country during the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941." 49

That sense of purpose, however, was not shared by everyone. As in the past, a wide variety of justifications were put forth for the memorial.

In 1960 Senator Fong had opined:

The USS Arizona Memorial will have a dual significance to the United States, for it will not only provide appropriate tribute to the deceased men of the Arizona but it will also stand as a national memorial to eternal vigilance against the dangers of surprise attack,

Representative Inouye echoed that theme in 1961 when he promised, "the Arizona Memorial will serve also as our reminder and our inspiration never again to be caught unprepared." 50

32
Other reasons were also advanced in floor discussions. Speakers stressed the rationale of treating the Arizona as a burial site, with Inouye referring to the ship as a "common grave" for her crew. The point was elaborated on by Representative Mendel Rivers, who noted that the $150,000 would amount to far less than the combined military burial allowances for the entombed crewmen.\textsuperscript{51}

The one argument, however, made by all speakers for the bill in 1961 was that most of the funds had already been raised, turned over to the Navy, and construction actually begun. It was one thing to resist authorizing funds for a project still in its conceptual stage, but quite another to refuse funds for one which was already under way. That argument, more than any other, marked the difference between the 1961 debate and previous Congressional discussion about federal funding for the Arizona Memorial. That point, as Congressman Teague had promised, carried the day.
JAMES ROARK AND THE FRA

While the PWMC sought contributions from public and private sources, it was also confronted with a different kind of challenge—a breakaway fundraising campaign for the Arizona Memorial.

The commission took the position that PL 85-344 made it the sole authorized agency to solicit funds for the Arizona Memorial on behalf of the Navy. It was anxious to exercise total control over the effort for a number of reasons. On one level, the PWMC saw the issue as one of usurpation of its authority. Central to the commissioners' objections to independent campaigns, however, was the protection of the PWMC's credibility and hence its effectiveness.

The commission kept scrupulous accounts of the money passing through its hands, for it knew that the campaign's chances for success could be fatally wounded by public doubts about the manner in which funds were handled. The PWMC would have no control over independent fundraising groups, which might or might not keep such painstaking accounts. The public would be hard pressed to distinguish between competing Arizona Memorial campaigns, and doubts about the methods of one group would cast a shadow on the PWMC.

The full potential for conflict between the PWMC and a separate drive materialized in the person of James Roark of Phoenix, Arizona. Roark was a member of the Fleet Reserve Association (FRA), a national organization of active and
retired Navy, Coast Guard and Marine Corps personnel. He was drawn into the PWMC campaign but branched out with independent operations.

The pattern of those operations is complex and difficult to trace, but Roark led at least four different campaigns related to the USS Arizona, often simultaneously. First, Darrel Brady deputized Roark to head the PWMC drive for the state of Arizona sometime in 1958. Second, Roark established during the same year a private nonprofit corporation called the USS Arizona Memorial Foundation, Inc., for the purpose of establishing a museum in the state of Arizona to exhibit artifacts related to the battleship. Third, the governor of Arizona established a USS Arizona Memorial Committee, with Roark as chairman. Fourth, he also chaired the PFA's National Committee To Enshrine The USS Arizona.52

The boundaries between these organizations and their mandates were vague and often nonexistent. Roark frequently presented himself as head of one or another without much regard for legal niceties in their respective charters. Sometimes he used stationery letterheads implying nonexistent legal connections between the organizations.53 He was also negligent in presenting the accounting statements so fundamental to fundraising work.

It was inevitable that Roark and the PWMC would come into conflict. In fact, tension arose as early as June 1958 when, upon learning of the USS Arizona Memorial Foundation's existence, H. Tucker Gratz objected that the foundation would
"duplicate and usurp the authority and responsibility" of the PWMC. Roark replied that he intended to pursue the project regardless of the commission's objections.\textsuperscript{54}

Despite the uneasiness of the PWMC, Darrel Brady appointed Roark to head the commission-sanctioned fundraising drive in Arizona, an appointment which ran until January 1, 1959. The two men then devised another arrangement whereby Roark headed an FRA project in which that organization raised money for the PWMC by selling plastic model kits of the USS Arizona. As the PWMC representative, Brady sanctioned that project until March 31, 1959.\textsuperscript{55}

Roark promised to forward the proceeds to the PWMC account as they were received and to render a "final accounting of all funds received to date" before the end of each month. Neither the accounting nor the funds arrived on time. It was not until the end of May that Roark turned over to the PWMC $5,603.35 in proceeds from the Arizona state campaign. The accounting, despite repeated promises from Roark, never arrived.\textsuperscript{56}

More ominously, Roark was no longer content to act as a functionary of the PWMC and confine his activities to the state of Arizona. As early as January 1959 (while still a participant in the commission's Arizona state campaign) he announced that the governor would appoint a new committee, which would presumably include Roark, and that committee "will handle all matters pertaining to the USS Arizona both within the state and on a national basis" (emphasis added).\textsuperscript{57}
As it turned out the gubernatorial committee never conducted any serious effort. But Mr. Roark was not to be sidetracked so easily. In the spring of 1959 the model kit sales campaign, which was to operate in Arizona under PWMC auspices until March 31st, took on a life of its own. That life was provided by the sponsorship of the FRA's national organization, which continued the model kit program under Roark's chairmanship. This effort, with a goal of $100,000, was to be completely independent of the PWMC's Arizona Memorial fund.58

It would be an understatement to say that the PWMC was upset. The spectre of confusion, damaged credibility and resulting damage to the campaign haunted the commission. Darrel Brady, who would be deprived of his commission on every dollar that went into another memorial fund, vented his anger in a cable to the PWMC:

"You have an insubordinate, opportunistic, sometimes stupid sailor on your hands. The authorities who have licensed, bonded and insured this national [Brady's] project demand he give a complete accounting to you and me. 59"

The PWMC directed its expressions of alarm to the Navy, reiterating its position that Roark's efforts would "usurp the authority and responsibility" of the commission and stressing that all Arizona Memorial contributions should be addressed to its fund in Hawaii.60

The PWMC was well advised to be concerned about the Navy's attitude. Like the sorcerer's apprentice, Brady and the
commission had unwittingly created a situation that had spun out of control. In this case the potent force lay in the FRA's special relationship with the Navy. The association traditionally functioned as a quasi-official arm of the Navy, and its leaders enjoyed ready access to senior admirals. What would be the Navy's attitude toward these two campaigns, one claiming the sanction of Congress and the other possessing close and long-standing ties to the service?

On one level, at Fourteenth Naval District headquarters, the PWMC continued to enjoy Navy support. It was a support that went beyond Hawaii because the district commandant had been designated the Secretary of the Navy's official liaison with the PWMC. But the FRA executed a flanking maneuver and obtained the endorsement of Admiral Arleigh Burke, Chief of Naval Operations.

This support was manifested in June 1959 when Roark's committee organized a series of premiers of the movie "John Paul Jones." The producers agreed to donate the proceeds from the premiers to the FRA drive. Called the "Governor's Premier," Arizona Governor Paul Fain promoted it by writing other state governors urging them to publicize the event in their areas. The key endorsement was not Fain's, but that of Burke, who wrote in a letter the governor circulated to his colleagues, "The Fleet Reserve Association is working hard to build a memorial that will serve as an appropriate tribute to these men."61
The PWMC responded swiftly. H. Tucker Gratz dispatched a diplomatically worded cable to Admiral Burke pointing out that PL 85-344 designated the PWMC as the official fundraising agency and, most importantly, asked the admiral to specify that all contributions should be mailed to the commission's Arizona Memorial fund account. In addition, Delegate John Burns asked the Secretary of the Navy to require "all groups volunteering their services on behalf of the Arizona Memorial to have their programs and projects approved in advance and sanctioned by the Pacific War Memorial Commission."62

The commission continued to press its case directly with Navy officials in Washington. In November 1959 Gratz wrote Rear Admiral C. C. Kirkpatrick, Navy Chief of Information, objecting to the FRA campaign not only on grounds of usurpation, but also because it failed to "provide proper accountability of funds." He reiterated that all donations for the Arizona Memorial should be sent to the PWMC's fund. Kirkpatrick's reply was cool, and it implicitly endorsed the FRA. He wrote that, although federal law prohibited the Navy from actively aiding any other drive, it was free to accept contributions directly from the FRA. The latter opinion directly contradicted the Navy's position of 1957, when it informed Congress that special legislation would be required before it could receive funds from the PWMC.63

The question was eventually referred to the Navy Judge Advocate General, who issued an ambiguous opinion stating that "primary responsibility" for fundraising was vested by
Congress with the PWMC. It stated further, "any assistance provided by the Navy to other organizations in that matter [should] be provided only upon the request or with the approval of that Commission." The opinion was silent on whether official endorsements of the Roark/FRA effort constituted "assistance."64

The issue was rendered largely moot in December 1959, when the FRA presented the Navy a check for $40,000, the proceeds of its Arizona model kit campaign.65

But even after that conclusion of the FRA drive, James Roark continued his efforts on behalf of his Arizona Memorial Foundation, still invoking his now-defunct connection with the PWMC. On behalf of himself and the commission, Darrel Brady wrote Roark threatening:

> If you do not cease using my name and, or, The Pacific War Memorial Commission in any connection with your present activities, letterheads, etc.,

> Or, if you attempt in any way to deceive people into believing you hold any position or are in any way authorized by the Pacific War Memorial Commission, legal action which you so keenly deserve will be taken.66

Roark persisted nonetheless, but the conclusion of the FRA campaign denied him the all important backing of that organization and the Navy. Still his activities caused concern by the PWMC and confusion in other quarters. He was particularly active in Oklahoma, where he was either vague or misleading about his connection with the PWMC. Roark also played fast and loose with data concerning the numbers of Oklahomans among the Arizona casualties, a matter which caused confusion among Oklahoma's Congressional delegation at the
time Congress was considering the authorization of federal appropriations for the memorial. 67

It is difficult, if not impossible, to judge the extent to which the PWMC campaign was compromised by the competing efforts of James Roark and the FRA. Those efforts did result in raising more than $40,000 for the Arizona Memorial, and there is no evidence that they actually harmed the commission's fund drive. Yet there undeniably existed the potential for widespread public confusion over the split effort and poor accounting practices, so the PWMC's alarm was not unjustified. If this chapter in the story of the Arizona Memorial proves anything, it is that by the late 1950s the idea was so powerful that it could no longer be contained or monopolized by the PWMC.
DESIGN, CONSTRUCTION AND DEDICATION

The design and construction of the Arizona Memorial were under way before the fundraising was completed. As soon as it became apparent that the money would be raised, the Navy began to draw funds from the PWMC account to begin the project.

There were many ideas for the Arizona Memorial design, and it is worth looking at a few of them for a notion of the variety of concepts being circulated. One writer stated that the memorial should enclose and seal the hulk of the Arizona to prevent the corpses of the crew from drifting loose. Another, a captain on the staff of the Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet, suggested that the remains be disinterred, buried at Punchbowl National Cemetery and the battleship be dismantled, because "the general public will soon lose [sic] interest in the proposed memorial and it will gradually go into decay." A Navy public works official proposed burying the Arizona in a landfill extending from Ford Island and setting aside the spot as a picnic area.\(^6\)

Navy officials in charge of the project, however, had different ideas. Because of security and transportation requirements, they rejected the idea of incorporating any part of Ford Island in the memorial. In addition, they stipulated that the memorial was to be in the form of a bridge which would not touch any part of the sunken battleship and that it be capable of accommodating 200 people. Beyond that they imposed no design specifications.\(^7\)
The Navy selected the architect but leaned heavily on the PWMC for advice. That reliance was natural, for the commission had been in regular contact with members of the Hawaii chapter of the American Institute of Architects since the early 1950s. Those architects donated their services in conceptualizing design ideas for various PWMC projects over the years. In fact, the first money released from the Arizona Memorial fund was $26,000 to allow the Navy "to ascertain bids for the architectural and engineering plans for the memorial." 70

The selection process consisted of interviews of the prospective architects by a committee of Navy officers and Louise Dillingham, chairperson of the PWMC's design committee. The architect selected was Alfred Preis of the firm Johnson & Perkins, Preis Associates. The partnership was awarded the commission in August 1959. 71

Preis had actually conceived a design for a memorial at the Arizona site as early as 1950. He had envisioned a rock wall on the shore of Ford Island and a floating flame on the hulk of the Arizona. 72

At the 1959 selection interview Preis first submitted a design that, in his words, "confronted the physicality of the sarcophagus." Born and raised in Vienna, he had been impressed at an early age with the jewel encrusted crypts of the Hapsburg emperors and the immanent presence of death they conveyed. Preis first proposed a boat landing anchored on the Arizona's mooring quays which would descend to a sub-surface enclosure open to the sky and fronted with a viewing wall
pierced by portholes. Visitors would be able to view the underwater remains of the ship, encrusted with the rust and marine organisms which reminded the architect of the jewelled imperial sarcophagi.73

That proposal met an unenthusiastic response from the Navy (even his own partner called it "morbid"), so Preis offered a second concept calling for a bridge which, in accordance with the Navy's original specifications, spanned the sunken battleship. That idea received a more positive reaction. It envisioned a catenary span over the Arizona and, in contrast to the first proposal, created an open and soaring effect.

He used that structural vocabulary to express his philosophical approach to the memorial's purpose. Preis viewed the United States as an essentially pacifistic nation, one which inevitably would sustain the first blow in any war. Once aroused by that shock the nation could overcome virtually any obstacle to victory. Because of that characteristic, it was unavoidable—even necessary, in Preis' view—that this nation suffer the initial defeat at Pearl Harbor. He meant his design for the memorial to be a reminder to Americans of the inevitability of sustaining the initial defeat, of the potential for victory, and the sacrifices necessary to make the painful journey from defeat to victory.74

Such a complex message required a serene and noncoercive atmosphere for contemplation, so Preis designed an open assembly deck for the memorial. It would be separate from the
shrine room listing the names of the Arizona's dead, who embodied the pain and sacrifice the architect saw as an essential element in the memorial's design.\textsuperscript{75}

Much has been said and written of the symbolism of two of the memorial's most striking design features: the roofline, which dips in the center and rises to peaks at either end, and the twenty-one large open spaces in the structure's sides and roof. They have been taken to represent, respectively, the low point in American fortunes in World War II eventually culminating in victory, and a continuous twenty-one gun salute to the Arizona's dead.

Preis feels that those interpretations are consistent with his purposes, but he incorporated those features in the design for utilitarian, rather than symbolic, purposes. The dip and peak gave the structure the proper distribution of weight for the catenary design. The large openings were included to save as much weight as possible.\textsuperscript{76}

The Navy began site preparation work after the PWMC released approximately $250,000 for the project in early 1960. In October the Walker-Moody Construction Company won the contract to build the memorial, which eventually cost slightly more than $500,000.\textsuperscript{77}

Behind the dedication ceremonies on Memorial Day 1962 lay the unsettled question of the Arizona Memorial's purpose. Was it primarily to entomb the dead or was it to commemorate the significance of the events of December 7, 1941?
In 1960 and 1961 that issue revolved around the question of the memorial's dedication date. A Memorial Day dedication would imply that it was essentially a cemetery; a December 7th dedication implied a commemoration of the attack. There was much confusion among officials of the PWMC and the Navy. Plans for the dedication wavered back and forth between December 7, 1961 (the twentieth anniversary of the attack) and Memorial Day 1962. The latter date was chosen for the reason, as much as any other, that construction could not be completed in time for a December 7th ceremony.78
PART III: 1963-1982

CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS FOR A VISITOR CENTER

The Arizona Memorial proved as popular as predicted. In 1963, the first full year of operation, over 178,000 people visited the memorial in Navy shuttle boats. The numbers rose each year, and in 1968 the figure had climbed to 283,000 in a steady and substantial rise each year.¹

The memorial was clearly fulfilling expectations, but, in a sense, it was a victim of its own success. Increasing numbers of visitors were forced to wait in ever longer lines at the Navy's nondescript shuttle boat landing at the mouth of Halawa Stream. Those waits were often boring, inconvenient and exposed to inclement weather.²

There arose a growing feeling among those connected with the Arizona Memorial that it needed improved shore-side facilities not only for visitor comfort and convenience, but also to create an opportunity to present an historical perspective on the Pearl Harbor attack. In 1967 there was a flurry of interest and a brief exchange of correspondence on the subject among senior Navy and political figures. But it was left to those on the working level on the scene in Hawaii to take the first steps forward.³

That year Rear Admiral Richard Lynch, Fourteenth District Commandant, asked the PWMC for help in improving the shore-side
facility. The commission responded by turning to Hawai‘i's Congressional delegation in January 1968 asking for appropriations to build a full-scale visitor center with a museum and theater complex. Congressman Spark Matsunaga, a former PWMC member, responded by submitting to the Navy and the commission a "discussion draft" for such a bill.  

Discussion and correspondence continued during 1968. Many of the questions aired then came to dominate the planning and decision making for the visitor center in the decade that followed.

First was the issue of who should operate the museum-theater complex. In July the district commandant told the PWMC that the National Park Service (NPS) would be a more appropriate choice for the job than the Navy. The idea struck the commissioners by surprise since it was the first suggestion that the Navy was considering another agency for the operation of what had been until then a strictly Navy affair.

Other Navy officers, however, had different ideas. The Office of Naval History suggested that the complex be operated as part of the Navy’s museum system. The Commander-in-Chief Pacific Fleet overruled the commandant by informing the Chief of Naval Operations, "Under no circumstances should the responsibility for operation and maintenance of this Navy Memorial and its supporting facilities, . . . be transferred to another U.S. agency, . . . ."  

That proprietary attitude did not extend to providing Navy funds for the construction of the visitor center. In
August 1968 the Fourteenth District Commandant submitted to Washington plans and cost estimates for a $1,400,000 museum-theater complex at the shuttle boat landing. But he informed Congressman Matsunaga that, because of the demand of the Vietnam War on Navy resources, funds should be sought from private contributors and the state of Hawaii. In fact, the commandant asked the PWMC to once again assume the lead in fundraising for the proposed visitor center.  

The Commission, however, looked to Hawaii's Congressional delegation for help. In January 1969 Matsunaga introduced HR 4044, the first of many such bills, to authorize an appropriation for the Navy to construct a shoreside visitor center for the Arizona Memorial. Despite Navy intentions to retain control of the complex, Congress clearly was thinking in terms of a National Park Service operation. House Armed Services Committee Chairman Mendel Rivers referred the bill to the Department of the Interior (the parent organization of the NPS), as well as the Pentagon, for review and comment. Matsunaga wrote that he envisioned a facility "similar in scope and purpose as [sic] the edifice at Gettysburg [National Military Park]."  

The National Park Service, however, remained silent on the issue and did not respond to Rivers' request for its views. The Navy continued to look to the PWMC to raise the money. The Chief of Naval Operations wrote, "Funds for the construction of this facility will not be available through Navy programs. Continued cooperation with the Pacific War Memorial Commission
in pursuit of funding is recommended." The Deputy Director of Naval History sounded the same theme when he testified before Congress to the Navy's opposition to HR 4044 saying erroneously, "the Pacific War Memorial Commission is taking positive steps to obtain funds for the construction of this project."9

Because of the Navy's negative response, the bill made no progress and died in committee. But Matsunaga persisted and in 1971 introduced HR 206, which was similar to HR 4044. Meanwhile, in Hawaii Rear Admiral Thomas Hayward, Fourteenth Naval District Commandant (and future Chief of Naval Operations) pressed on doggedly in the Navy's efforts to persuade the PWMC to conduct the fundraising drive. The commission, perhaps recalling the difficulties encountered in raising funds for the Arizona Memorial, declined and continued to put its faith in Congress. Harold Wright, H. Tucker Gratz's successor as chairman of the PWMC, wrote to Hayward, "it would be somewhat premature to proceed at this time with any [fundraising] plan as such action may have the effect of impeding the enactment of House Bill [sic] 206 . . . ."10

Hayward's disappointment was obvious in his reply:

Quite obviously I would support his bill completely and am willing to hold off on any lesser proposal of my own in the hopes that Congress will come up with adequate funding to do the job right. I must say, however; that I find little reason to be optimistic at the pace we are presently proceeding; nevertheless I will necessarily abide by the wishes of the Pacific War Memorial Commission.11
By the end of 1971 the situation resembled the Gordian knot. The Navy refused to support legislation which might mean a cut in other Navy programs, and instead looked to the PWMC to repeat its fundraising performance of the late 1950s and early 1960s. The commission declined the responsibility and looked to Congress to provide the funds. But, given the Navy's opposition to the authorization bills, mobilizing Congressional support was a hopeless task.

It was natural for Congressional sponsors to intensify the focus on the prospect of National Park Service participation in the project. In November 1971 Congressman Matsunaga explored the idea in a letter to Interior Secretary Rogers Morton noting, "existing shoreside facilities are painfully inadequate" and citing the exposure to rain and sun for waiting visitors. When the Navy opposed yet another measure for the visitor center in 1972 Matsunaga suggested an amendment to the bill which would allow "another Federal agency" to operate it.12

In August he introduced HR 16201, calling for the Navy to spend $2,500,000 building the facility, which the Park Service would subsequently operate. The Navy opposed that proposal, too, because it would draw construction funds away from other Navy programs. The Park Service broke its silence by joining the Navy in opposing the bill on similar budgetary grounds. Despite the negative reaction of the two agencies, the House passed HR 16201. It died in the Senate, however, where Senator Strom Thurmond of South Carolina offered his opinion that "the Navy's failure to support this bill" doomed its chances.13
Although his measures failed to pass in 1972, Congressman Matsunaga had the chance to express his frustration with the Interior Department's tardy response to Congressional requests for the agency's views. When National Park Service acting director Stanley Hulett finally appeared before a House Armed Services subcommittee, Matsunaga made his point:

... it appears that the word [from the departmental level] has not gotten down to him [Hulett], but both in the 91st Congress and the 92nd Congress the Department of the Interior was asked to make comments on the bill which I introduced. No reply came to the committee. Your committee, Mr. Chairman.14

If things were not moving well in Washington there was some movement on the scene in Hawaii. Beginning about 1970 Admiral Hayward began to develop a working relationship with the senior National Park Service representative in Hawaii, General Superintendent Robert Barrel (Barrel's title was changed later to Hawaii State Director, then Pacific Area Director). Hayward was pursuing a plan to open the waters and shoreline of Pearl Harbor to civilian recreational use. He contacted Barrel for advice because of the Park Service's experience in recreational planning and management. Barrel joined a working committee that prepared a plan to develop the Aiea Bay area in a joint effort by the Navy, the NPS and local government. It encompassed plans for recreational facilities, including camping, nature trails, boating and a new landing for the Navy's Arizona Memorial shuttle boats.15

As a result of their contact Hayward asked Barrel informally for his views on ways the Arizona Memorial operation might be
improved. They discussed the possibility of informal Park Service assistance and training for Navy personnel dealing with memorial visitors. Both men suggested to their respective superiors in Washington involving the NPS in the operation of the Arizona Memorial. Partially as a result of those discussions, Barrel undertook to prepare a study of a possible "urban-oriented national recreation area" in Honolulu which would include the Arizona Memorial.16

In the end Park Service efforts on the study progressed only to the point of listing sites (including the Arizona Memorial) that might be included in the national recreation area. However, the National Park Service did cite the lack of the completed study as an excuse to recommend Congressional delay of legislative proposals to give the agency responsibility for the memorial complex.17

Acting Director Hulett told House Armed Services Subcommittee No. 4 that it should wait for the study before moving Matsunaga's bills. Assistant Secretary of the Interior Nathaniel Reed wrote the chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, "We urge delay of any further consideration of [NPS] administration [of the Arizona Memorial] by the Department of the Interior pending the consideration by both Departments [Navy and Interior] of potential use areas in southeast Oahu . . . ." As late as January 1973 Park Service officials in Washington took the position that legislation should await the study. But by February they recognized that the study "seems infeasible and should no longer be a factor in considering" Congressional proposals.18
That retreat did not mean the end of all Park Service, much less the Navy's, objections. The 1973 session of Congress saw continued attempts to establish the shoreside visitor center. Representative Matsunaga introduced several bills, and other legislators including Senator Daniel Inouye did the same. The scenario was by then well rehearsed.

Matsunaga's HR 746 met with Navy objections that a Navy appropriation to build the visitor center "might ultimately result in the elimination or reduction of funds for more vital operational facilities in the military construction program." Such objections, added to continuing NPS reservations, were enough to keep the bill mired in committee. Matsunaga relayed the gloomy news to the PWMC with the observation that the Navy's and the Park Service's "lukewarm or unfavorable reports" caused House Armed Services Committee chairman F. Edward Hebert to halt the bill's progress.19

Even though the National Park Service no longer cited the need for further studies as a reason to delay the legislation, the agency still had reservations. Those reservations turned out to be remarkably similar to the Navy's budgetary objections.

The Navy suggested in 1973 that any legislation for the Arizona Memorial visitor center should provide that funding for both construction and operation come from the NPS budget. That proposal met with a pained reaction from Park Service officials, one of whom wrote, "No consideration is given to the fact that the National Park Service also has serious
financial burdens and budget restraints. 20

In fact, the Park Service suggested to Congress a mirror-image program which would require the Navy to operate, as well as build, the visitor center. The Navy, of course, refused to support the measure, noting that operation of the center would require an additional $500,000 annually. With such a deadlock it is not surprising that the Navy considered once again the possibility of raising funds from private donors, with one officer suggesting an approach to the Retired Officers Association. 21
FOURTEENTH NAVAL DISTRICT STUDY

At this point the Navy faced a pressing need to make a thorough study of the requirements for a shoreside center for the Arizona Memorial and to develop a strategy for building and operating that facility. To achieve that goal Rear Admiral Richard Paddock, Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District, appointed a committee of Navy officers and civilian specialists to conduct the study in late 1973 and early 1974.²²

The committee studied various sites and different design and operating factors. In considering the need for the visitor center the committee concluded that, strictly from its perspective as an armed service, the Navy did not need the Arizona Memorial visitor center. But the members noted that the substandard facilities at the Arizona landing tarnished the Navy’s public image and that pressure from Congress and the general public made the facility a practical necessity.²³

In turning to the question of which agency should run the visitor center once it was built, the committee considered a wide range of alternatives: the Navy, the National Park Service, the Pacific War Memorial Commission, the American Battle Monuments Commission, state and municipal government, private enterprise, and a private nonprofit corporation.²⁴

The Committee rejected the option of Navy operation on the grounds that the task was an unjustifiable departure from the service’s primarily military mission. The sentimental attachment to the Arizona was so strong, though, that the
committee felt it worthwhile to note some dissenting Navy voices in its final report. It included a proposal by an earlier commandant that the Navy retain control of the memorial structure while the Park Service operate the visitor center, "since the USS Arizona is a Navy ship and we do not want to abandon the Navy's relationship with her and her final resting place." Another Navy officer took vigorous exception to turning any part of the operation over to the NPS:

... transferring the visitor program to the Park Service will have the effect of creating an amorphous national shrine--important and meaningful but without the same sentimental attachment the Memorial has with the Navy.25

Of the other possibilities considered in the study, the PWMC and the Battle Monuments Commission rejected suggestions that they might operate the visitor complex. State or municipal agencies were unsuitable because they "might open up problems in downstream areas that pertain to the security" of the naval base. Private enterprise operation was judged inappropriate for the special nature of the Arizona Memorial. A private nonprofit organization might, if it met strict Navy requirements, be suitable.26

The most desirable option, the study concluded, was operation by the National Park Service. It gave several reasons for that conclusion:

1) Congress would probably approve, since the idea had already achieved wide circulation there in the form of authorization bills.

2) It might mean that construction funds could be taken from the NPS budget instead of the Navy's.
3) The operations would not be affected by Defense Department or Navy cutbacks.

4) National Park Service appropriations would "carry a more perpetual connotation."

5) The Park Service was "steeped in experience in control and direction of large numbers of visitors."

6) The Park Service was "steeped in experience in maintaining national parks and shrines."

7) It would continue operation of the Arizona Memorial "in an atmosphere of respect and dignity."

8) "No unfavorable incidents concerning the general public would reflect on the Navy's image."27

That position was expressed succinctly by a subsequent district commandant who wrote:

... we have become greatly concerned over the increasing trend in Hawaii tourism and its spillover effect on the Arizona Memorial Visitor program. By default the Navy at Pearl Harbor has found itself deeply involved in the tourist business, where we do not belong either by mission or experience, and we look forward to the day when the professionals from the National Park Service will take over the Arizona Memorial and the new visitor center...."28
THE ARIZONA MEMORIAL MUSEUM FOUNDATION

In the matter of funding the study committee discounted the chances for a Congressional appropriation in the near future. The most likely candidate to lead a fundraising drive, the PWMC, had rejected the proposal. The Navy turned then to Branch 46 of the Fleet Reserve Association, a group already providing financial help for minor improvements and maintenance in the Arizona Memorial system. (Branch 46, the Pearl Harbor branch of the FRA, was entirely separate from the earlier FRA fundraising drive which aroused so much animosity more than a decade earlier.)

In 1973 Branch 46 had planned a drive to raise $120,000 to improve the current Arizona landing. During the latter part of that year branch officers were approached by the chief civil engineering officer at Pearl Harbor. He noted the repeated failures to obtain Congressional authorization for the visitor center and asked them to take on the task of conducting a national campaign to raise the money from private donors. The members of Branch 46 considered the request, agreed, and in January 1974 organized the Arizona Memorial Museum Foundation (AMMF), a private nonprofit corporation chartered to lead the drive.29

In February retired Navy Chief Petty Officer C, E, Burns, whom the Navy "generally recognized as the driving force..."
behind the ... effort," announced a goal of $6,000,000 for the AMMF campaign. But his announcement was premature, for the Navy refused to commit itself formally to the AMMF effort and told the news media that it was weighing the relative merits of the AMMF proposal (which had been solicited by a Navy spokesman) and that of another private nonprofit organization.30

The competing proposal was put forth by Warren Sessler, director of the Pearl Harbor Memorial Museum (PHMM). Sessler's group proposed to build a museum in the Pearl Harbor area which would adhere to a general interpretive theme of World War II in the Pacific. The PHMM asked the Navy for the use of property adjacent to the Arizona Memorial landing on which to erect its museum building.31

Sessler opposed the involvement of both the federal government and the AMMF in the establishment and operation of a museum at the visitor center. He wrote Interior Secretary Rogers Morton that the AMMF "proposes to duplicate our efforts in establishing a museum at Pearl Harbor." He objected further:

... ours is a private organization, and it would be a needless waste of public funds for the federal government to spend money in the operation of a museum at Pearl Harbor when this task can be performed by the Pearl Harbor Memorial Museum ... .32

The Navy study committee examined the PHMM proposals and recommended against accepting them. The committee felt that the PHMM had not done sufficient legal groundwork and its prospects of raising the necessary funds were dim. In addition,
the study observed:

> The concept of the Pearl Harbor Memorial Museum encompasses a much larger scope than that required should a museum be included as part of the Arizona Memorial facilities. Such a museum should be limited to a presentation of an historical record of events occurring at Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. 33

The Navy delayed for several months before coming to a final decision, a delay that caused uncertainty and tension for all involved. The frustration even included the general public. It was expressed in a Honolulu Star-Bulletin editorial urging the Navy, the National Park Service, the AMMF and the PHMM to transcend their "private rivalries and a certain amount of skepticism between the parties" and propose a joint plan for the visitor center. 34

The Fourteenth Naval District broke the tension at the end of June 1974 when it publicly announced that it would endorse the AMMF fundraising drive. But that did not mean immediate action, for the proposed Navy-AMMF agreement was making its leisurely way through the Pentagon review process. Chief Burns reflected his organization's impatience and frustration with Navy channels when he pointed out, "The Navy asked the PHMA to begin this project," and complained of Admiral Paddock's "wishy-washy [sic] attitudes towards our proposals." 35

Finally, in December 1974 Burns and Paddock formalized the agreement by signing an eleven point memorandum of understanding. In that document the AMMF undertook to raise $4,500,000 for the construction of the visitor center under
conditions subject to Navy approval.

Between 1975 and 1979 the AMMF raised over $500,000 by direct solicitation of visitors at the Arizona Memorial. Substantial contributions to the AMMF fund also came from the Pearl Harbor Survivors Association, the national Fleet Reserve Association and its ladies' auxiliary, and the Disabled American Veterans. The total also included a $350,000 appropriation from the state of Hawaii. 36

To obtain those state funds the legislative sponsor, Representative Faith Evans, and the AMMF had to overcome the opposition of the PWMC. The commission adhered to its position of looking to Congress, and only Congress, for financial help. For that reason it objected (without success) to the state appropriation, and refused even to endorse the AMMF campaign. 37

Despite the obstacles the foundation raised nearly $1,000,000 during its four years of operation. That money was turned over to the Navy, as promised, for the construction of the Arizona Memorial visitor center. 38
CONGRESSIONAL APPROPRIATION
AND TRANSFER TO THE NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

While the AMMF was in the midst of raising funds, the political-bureaucratic logjam in Washington began to break. Ironically, despite nearly a decade of legislative discussion, the first break occurred in the executive branch.

The Navy was anxious to transfer responsibility for the memorial and visitor complex to the Park Service, but at the same time, reluctant to expose itself to the financial liability of constructing the center—a feature of most Congressional proposals. The Navy took the initiative in solving that problem with a March 12, 1975, letter from Navy Secretary William Middendorf II to Interior Secretary Rogers Morton offering to transfer the operation to the NPS "at the earliest possible date." With that strategy the Navy could begin the groundwork for the transfer without supporting legislation requiring it to spend its construction funds for the visitor center.39

The first Interior Department response to the offer was a noncommittal acknowledgment stating that a more definitive reply would be forthcoming after a thorough Park Service review. On August 19, 1975, Acting Secretary of the Interior Kent Frizzell wrote Middendorf agreeing to the transfer "only following the appropriation of funds necessary to operate the facility at appropriate standards."40

This exchange was a strictly informal statement of principle by the two departments. The Navy had no legal
authority to divest itself of the responsibility, nor did the Interior Department have the authority to assume that obligation. Still, it was a start. Most importantly, it showed Congress that there was enough goodwill and agreement in principle between the two agencies to effect a successful transfer if only the right formula could be found.

That general agreement did not mean, however, that either agency was prepared to drop its opposition to the type of legislative proposal which had surfaced in Congress session after session. The Navy continued to oppose legislation following the formula "Navy construction, NPS operation"; the Park Service still maintained that it had too many authorized projects awaiting funding to assume immediate responsibility for the Arizona Memorial system. A case in point was Congressman Matsunaga's HR 1882, submitted January 1975. In June 1976 he wrote pessimistically to the PWMC that the bill was stalled, because neither the Navy nor the NPS would support it.41

Matsunaga was so discouraged that he did not even propose a fresh bill in 1977, his first year as a Senator. He wrote there was little point in repeating the exercise, since the Interior Department "has been dragging its feet in getting out a report on this." Hawaii's senior Senator, Daniel Inouye, submitted in April S 139, a bill to have the NFS accept responsibility for both construction and operation of the visitor center. But that measure, like others before it, failed to elicit support.42
At that point Inouye adopted a different strategy. Until 1977 all attempts to authorize construction of the visitor center and turn it over to the National Park Service had been in the form of individual bills drafted, submitted and considered for those specific purposes.

In 1977 Senator Inouye succeeded where previous attempts had failed. He did so by attaching the visitor center proposal to a larger and more powerful engine—the annual military construction authorization act. Each year Congress passed an omnibus military construction bill to authorize billions of dollars in military construction projects for the following fiscal year.

During the 1977 Congressional session, when the Senate considered military construction authorizations for 1978, Inouye proposed the inclusion of a $3,300,000 item for Navy construction of a visitor center complex for the Arizona Memorial. His Senate colleagues concurred, but the House of Representatives were reluctant to accept the authorization. The inter-house differences were reconciled in a conference committee, which agreed to fund the project for $2,000,000. The conference committee report, adopted by both houses, included language which specified Congressional wishes that the facility be built by the Navy and operated by the National Park Service. It read, in part:

... prior to the award of any construction contract for the proposed ARIZONA Memorial facilities, an agreement must be executed between the Navy and the National Park Service providing that the National Park Service will
assume responsibility for the operation of the memorial upon the completion of such facilities. 43

Why did Senator Inouye’s efforts succeed in 1977 when so many previous attempts had failed? Part of the answer may lie in the sponsor’s identity; Inouye was a senior Senator and, ranking third in the majority part heirarchy, a powerful one as well. Another reason might be that previous efforts, although unsuccessful in the short run, had paved the way by winning each year an increasingly wider acceptance of the need for a visitor center operated by the National Park Service.

The choice of legislative vehicle, too, undoubtedly helped. Riding piggy-back on a multi-billion dollar measure, the visitor center was a comparatively minor detail on a very important bill. Congressional and military opponents of the program would be reluctant to jeopardize the entire military construction program just to eliminate the Arizona Memorial visitor center. Finally, there was no need to solicit the views of the nonforthcoming National Park Service in the deliberations that accompanied the military construction authorization bill.

The passage of funding authorization was a signal achievement, but it was not a law. The authorization language was contained in the text of the conference committee report, not the bill itself. It was the bill, minus the report, which was signed into law by the President. The report served notice of Congressional intent that the Navy spend $2,000,000 of its 1978 construction budget on the visitor center, but in the absence of Presidential concurrence it was not law.
But as a practical matter, the 1975 cabinet-level exchange of correspondence between the Navy and Interior Departments went far to bridge that gap. Coupled with the language of the committee report, it provided a clear statement by both Congress and the executive branch that the National Park Service should operate the Arizona Memorial visitor complex.

There remained the matter of the Navy-NPS agreement required by the Congressional authorization. The transfer agreement would involve countless details concerning privileges, obligations and logistics. It would require much time and meticulous work before such details could be agreed upon by the Navy and the Park Service. But such an agreement had to be reached before awarding the construction contract. Since construction was strictly the Navy's responsibility, it made little sense to have the process delayed by the time-consuming negotiations dealing with post-construction operation.

That problem was solved in early 1978, when representatives of the Navy and the NPS signed a letter of agreement in which the Navy promised to transfer, and the Park Service agreed to accept, responsibility for operating the memorial and visitor center. The letter acknowledged that the details would be worked out later in support and use agreements between the agencies.44

The way was now clear for work to begin. Accepting a design for the museum-theater visitor complex submitted by the architectural firm of Chapman, Cobeen, Desai, Sakata, the
Navy awarded the construction contract to S & M Sakamoto. Ground was broken for the project on October 19, 1978. The $2,000,000 authorization and the approximately $1,000,000 from the ANMF proved inadequate for the center's eventual $4,900,000 price tag, but the Navy made up the difference from savings on other projects and funds not encumbered for specific purposes.\textsuperscript{45}

Even before awarding the architectural and construction contracts the Navy realized that, although the visitor center would be a Navy construction project, it would be operated by the National Park Service. The Navy therefore deferred to Robert Barrel and other NPS officials in functional planning of the visitor center. The Navy's district civil engineer wrote Barrel in May 1977:

\begin{quote}
In view of the National Park Service's role as ultimately having \ldots\ responsibility for the permanent shoreside facilities, your input regarding National Park Service facilities' criteria is requested as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{46}
\end{quote}

Responding to that invitation, Barrel designed the complex's visitor flow pattern taking visitors first to a front desk where they would be issued a program ticket. With the announcement of their program number visitors would then go to one of the two theaters for a twenty-minute film and a short talk by a park ranger. Then visitors would exit the theater and board a Navy shuttle boat for a round trip to the \textit{Arizona} Memorial.

Barrel was aware that the system had a variable but finite capacity, depending on the intervals between programs,
shuttle boat speeds and other factors. He knew also that between 1963 and 1976 the annual number of people visiting the Arizona Memorial by Navy shuttle boat had increased from 178,872 to 585,953—a rise of 300 percent. If that rate of increase continued (and there was no indication it would not) it would be only a matter of time before the memorial-visitor center system faced more visitors than it could accommodate.

Barrel confronted the problem and decided not to attempt to design a system with an infinitely expandable capacity. He accepted the fact that, in order to preserve the quality of visitor experience, some people would not be accommodated. The system’s finite carrying capacity was a fundamental precept in NPS planning for the visitor center.47

Concurrent with the basic planning, NPS administrators worked with the Navy and other agencies to lay the groundwork for the operation of the visitor center. In 1979 the AMMF changed its name to the Arizona Memorial Museum Association and became a nonprofit cooperating association that would operate a bookstore at the visitor center. Proceeds would be used to support the Park Service’s interpretive programs.48

On March 21, 1980, the Navy and the NPS executed a use agreement formally permitting the Park Service to manage the visitor center and adjacent grounds which lay on Navy property. On September 10th representatives of the two agencies signed a support agreement spelling out in detail what services would be supplied by the Navy, which would be reimbursable, and which would be free.49
On October 10, 1980, in a ceremony reminiscent of the 1962 dedication of the memorial, the Navy turned over to the National Park Service the visitor center and operation of the Arizona Memorial. That act closed a major chapter in the history of the Arizona Memorial. It also heralded the advent of a new era in which the Park Service would provide professional management for one of Hawaii's most important visitor attractions.
CHALLENGES FOR THE FUTURE

That professional expertise is sure to be challenged in the years to come by the persistence of old problems and changing conditions. The principal questions looming in the foreseeable future bear striking resemblance to issues that have surrounded the Arizona Memorial and visitor center from their inception.

The most immediately pressing and obvious of those issues is the increasing number of visitors. The unrelenting rise in numbers which first prompted the need for the visitor center continues unabated. In 1981, the first full year of operation, 851,320 people visited the complex and memorial. There is every indication that the totals for 1982 and subsequent years will be substantially greater. On especially busy days the NPS staff may turn away more than 1,000 visitors because program capacity is unequal to the demand.

The Park Service can make and has made adjustments to accommodate the flood. Theater capacity was increased by more than 10 percent in 1982, as was shuttle boat capacity and speed. The NPS has experimented with shortening the intervals between programs. It might be possible to increase the number of hours per week of operation (the visitor center now operates six days per week).

These changes undoubtedly allow, or would allow, the Arizona Memorial visitor center to accommodate thousands of people who otherwise would be turned away. They do, however, have a price. Compressing program intervals, stretching
staffing resources, and packing increasing numbers into each program will, in the long run, dilute the quality of each visitor's experience.

The designers of the system's components chose to impose limits. In designing the interpretive program Robert Barrel consciously accepted three premises: 1) a certain standard of program quality should be irreducible; 2) maintaining that standard depended on respecting the finite capacity of the system and the site; 3) visitors beyond that limit should be turned away rather than compromise minimum quality standards. When Alfred Preis designed the memorial, he saw the opportunity for contemplation as essential to drawing the full meaning and significance from the site.

Just how crowded and rushed can the NPS allow visitation on the memorial become before the experience becomes just another meaningless stop on the tourist agenda? Should the Park Service draw a line beyond which it will not compromise the quality of its interpretive program? If so, where should that line be? These questions will be settled no doubt by striking a compromise between the ideal of maximum quality and public and political pressure to accommodate everyone wanting to visit the Arizona Memorial.

The question of how best to reconcile the competing demands of popularity and quality standards is a continuing one, and the solution most likely will be reached gradually through experimentation. Unfortunately, the National Park Service may not enjoy that luxury with another potential
problem—the ambiguous legal status of the Arizona Memorial and visitor center.

Both are located on Navy property in the midst of an important military base. The memorial and visitor center are unique (or nearly so) among U.S. National Park Service operations in that there exists no authorizing legislation defining the facility's boundaries and definitively establishing it as an NFS-administered site.

The language of the interdepartmental executive agreements and the conference report of the 1978 military construction authorization act are adequate for the day-to-day relationship between the Navy and the Park Service. But, as noted earlier, they are not law.

There are many reasons why a firmer legal cornerstone might be needed. Navy officers have often expressed a proprietary attitude toward the Arizona Memorial. It is not beyond the realm of possibility that someday a prominent Navy personality would launch a drive to "return the Arizona" and its visitor center to the Navy. Such a campaign might fly in the face of budgetary and political reality, but an emotionally motivated campaign might be willing to confront those obstacles. Or, operating more indirectly, it might take the form of quasi-official groups and/or the general public making the same demand.

At least as likely is the prospect of a pressing Navy need (or the perception of such a need) to reclaim control of the memorial or the visitor center site for security or
operational reasons. There always exists the possibility of war, a major military buildup at Pearl Harbor or the construction of a sensitive installation nearby. In such an event Navy officials might review the status of the memorial and Park Service operations with an eye toward exerting more direct control or even eliminating the visitor program entirely.

Also, for reasons entirely unrelated to its relationship with the Navy, the Arizona Memorial visitor center might need more definitive legislation. If Park Service budget cuts ever become so severe that NPS activity at one or more sites has to be reduced or even terminated, then ambiguous legal authorization might well be among the criteria used to select candidates for a drastic cut.

These are admittedly far-fetched possibilities. Yet the fact remains that there is limitless potential for confusion, dispute and disaster arising from the lack of a clear law establishing the Arizona Memorial and visitor complex as an NPS site. Clearly, the last chapter in the long history of Congressional deliberation on this matter has yet to be written.

The most abstract challenge facing the National Park Service, and in many ways the most difficult to come to grips with, is the continuing question of the meaning of the Arizona Memorial. In past public discussions proponents have expounded on a wide variety of themes to define its purpose. The "official" purpose put forth in PL 87-201 notwithstanding, there remains an enormous diversity of private interpretations.
The only overt statement the NPS makes to all visitors is in the film shown before they board the shuttle boat. The narration incorporates an amorphous, emotionally strident message summed up in the conclusion that to forget Pearl Harbor is to "forget what America stands for." That unedifying commentary may or may not be supplemented by the remarks of individual park rangers.

The NPS visitor program does not really confront the issue of the memorial's purpose and for good reason. There are potentially as many purposes as there are individual visitors. Some view it as a reminder that America should be eternally vigilant and never again be caught unprepared by the outbreak of war. Others see it as evidence of the tragic price of war, a monument to the need to seek peaceful solutions to international differences.

Many, especially those of the generation that played an active role in World War II, view the Arizona Memorial as a proud tribute to American ability to achieve a great victory after facing initial disadvantage. For others of that generation, a visit to the Arizona Memorial rekindles the passions of that period, reawakening a hatred of Japanese (exacerbated by current economic tensions). Still other Americans are moved by a stirring of patriotism ranging in tone from xenophobia to simple love of country.

Nor is the commemoration of the dead overlooked. Visitors are certainly reminded of the Arizona's casualties. Others remember all who were killed in the December 7, 1941, attack.
And some think of those killed in other battles and other wars.

Younger visitors, who have no personal recollection of World War II, usually take a more detached view of the memorial and its meaning. For many it is a history lesson, an intellectual experience rather than an emotional one. Others take to heart the various meanings older visitors ascribe to the memorial.

Foreigners may invest the memorial with entirely different meanings. Those from nations allied with the United States in World War II may see the program's content as slighting their nations' contribution to the common victory. Some, from nations which suffered millions of deaths in the war, see it as another kind of American chauvinism—giving an exaggerated significance to American deaths, which pale into insignificance when compared to the much greater casualty figures of other countries. And what goes through the minds of Japanese visitors, who comprise an increasingly large share of the visitor total?

Obviously, then, there can be no single meaning or significance applicable to all visitors to the Arizona Memorial. Regardless of how many "official" statements of purpose are promulgated, each visitor will approach the experience with and be guided by his or her personal predisposition. It is not possible to be all things to all people. The National Park Service faces not the task of imposing a single meaning on the visitor program, but of developing an objective interpretive synthesis that transcends the wide range of individual views while respecting all of them.
Public Law 85-344

AN ACT
To authorize construction of a United States Ship Arizona Memorial at Pearl Harbor.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Secretary of the Navy may—

1. accept contributions for the construction of a memorial and museum to be located on the bulk of the United States ship Arizona or adjacent United States property in Pearl Harbor, Territory of Hawaii;

2. authorize Navy activities to furnish material to the Pacific War Memorial Commission for use in national promotion of a public subscription campaign to raise funds for a United States Ship Arizona Memorial;

3. authorize Navy activities to assist in conceiving a design and in determining the construction cost for the memorial;

4. undertake construction of the memorial and museum when sufficient funds have been subscribed for completion of the structure; and

5. provide for maintenance of the memorial and museum when completed.

Approved March 15, 1958.
Public Law 87-201

AN ACT
To authorize the appropriation of $150,000 for use toward the construction of a United States Pacific War Memorial.

September 6, 1961
[No. 44]

AN ACT
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the Act entitled "An Act to authorize construction of a United States Ship Arizona Memorial at Pearl Harbor", approved March 15, 1958 (Public Law 85-244; 72 Stat. 36), is hereby amended by adding at the end thereof the following:

"Sec. 2. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated to the Secretary of the Navy, for use toward the construction of such memorial and museum, the sum of $150,000.

"Sec. 3. Such memorial and museum shall be maintained in honor and in commemoration of the members of the Armed Forces of the United States who gave their lives to their country during the attack on Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, on December 7, 1941."

Approved September 6, 1961.
MILITARY CONSTRUCTION AUTHORIZATION ACT, 1978

JULY 12, 1977.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. Nether, from the committee of conference, submitted the following

CONFERENCE REPORT

[To accompany S. 1474]

KINGS BAY, GA.—BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINE BASE

The Navy requested $19.5 million for the first increment of facilities to accommodate the ballistic missile submarine squadron that is to be redeployed from Rota, Spain to the east coast of the United States. The House approved the request for Kings Bay, Georgia, which the Navy identified as the "preferred" site. The Senate deferred the request on the basis that the Navy is still evaluating other possible sites and will not make a final site selection until January 1978. Since the Senate bill did provide sufficient emergency authority for the Navy to proceed with the required facilities unless a final site is selected, the House conferees agreed to recede to the Senate position.

PEARL HARBOR NAVAL STATION, HAWAII—ARIZONA MEMORIAL

In its bill, the Senate added $3.3 million for visitor facilities at the ARIZONA Memorial, Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. House conferees expressed reservations about providing authority under the Military Construction Authorization Act for the construction of memorial facilities and questioned the scope of the proposed project. The House conferees were of the opinion that $2.0 million should be sufficient to provide suitable facilities for the memorial. After a thorough review of the history of this project, the conferees agreed to authorize $2.0 million.

Further, the conferees agreed that prior to the award of any construction contract for the proposed ARIZONA Memorial facilities, an agreement must be executed between the Navy and the National Park Service providing that the National Park Service will assume the responsibility for the operation of the memorial upon completion of such facilities.
The Honorable Rogers C. B. Morton  
The Secretary of the Interior  
Department of the Interior  
Washington, D. C. 20240

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I am writing in the belief that our respective Departments should have a compatible objective for the eventual disposition of the United States Ship Arizona Memorial in Pearl Harbor. My staff has met with representatives of the National Park Service on this subject. I understand that, in principle, and without commitment as to timing, they are in basic agreement.

The Navy is concerned that the number of visitors desiring to tour the Memorial has outstripped the capacity of facilities for their accommodation. There is now insufficient parking, boat capacity, and on-shore reception area. More than 500,000 persons visited the Memorial in 1973. The number is increasing on a trend of 18% a year.

We have completed a study of necessary improvements of facilities, and the associated investment and annual operating costs. Quite frankly, I cannot foresee that Navy appropriations will ever be adequate to support the reasonable convenience and necessity demands of public visitors. While I regret that prospect, I respect the judgement that Navy should not divert funds from a military readiness mission, to tourist support.

I propose that we agree on the objective of transfer of the Memorial to your Department, at the earliest date that you consider resources of your Department adequate for its care and operation. On our part the Navy will support such legislation for that purpose as may be agreeable to the Department of the Interior, and is prepared to fully cooperate with your Department to ensure that current Navy management of the Memorial is consistent with your longer term planning. In that regard we would prefer to commence procurement of new boats and to carry on the boat transportation function in a manner fully compatible with your overall management of the Memorial operation.
Navy would like to offer, for your affirmation, Navy participation in a consultative role in development of your plans for improvements, displays and exhibits at the Memorial, and an understanding that the naval character of the Memorial will be preserved.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

J. William Middendorf II
Secretary of the Navy
Honorable J. William Middendorf II  
Secretary of the Navy  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. Secretary:

We are pleased to respond further to your letter of March 12 proposing a transfer of the U.S.S. "Arizona" Memorial to the Department of the Interior. We have had an opportunity to consider the views of the National Park Service and the recommendation of the Advisory Board on National Parks, Historic Sites, Buildings, and Monuments on the proposal.

We concur with the statement that you have made in the next to the last paragraph of your March 12 letter that the "Arizona" Memorial be transferred to this Department at the earliest date that resources are available for its care and operation. We appreciate the Navy's concern for the perpetuation of this memorial and that such related interpretive services are diversions from the Navy's military readiness mission.

The National Park Service believes that it would be appropriate to include the memorial and the shoreside facilities as a part of the National Park System. The Advisory Board has recommended that the Service conduct a feasibility study. Accordingly, the Service will program a study for fiscal year 1977. This study will develop cost estimates and other data for a Departmental recommendation on legislation to implement the transfer. The study will be under the direction of the National Park Service Western Region Director, whose address is Western Region Office, National Park Service, 450 Golden Gate Avenue, Box 36036, San Francisco, California 94102, and telephone number is 415-556-4196. Navy participation in the study will be voluntary.

Owing to the fiscal constraints applicable to both our Departments, it is our intention to recommend legislation which would provide for a transfer only following the appropriation of funds necessary to operate the facility at appropriate standards.
We appreciate very much your interest and the cooperation of the Navy staff in this matter.

Sincerely yours,

/ S / KENT FRIZZELL
Acting Secretary of the Interior

bcc:
Secretary's Files
Secretary's Reading Files (2)
S
U/S-Mr. Lyons
ES
CL
FW

[COL-Mr. Powell
Regional Director, Western Region (2)] w/c of inc.
Mr. Robert L. Barrel  
State Director  
National Park Service  
Department of the Interior  
Box 50165  
Honolulu, Hawaii 96850

Dear Mr. Barrel:

LETTER OF AGREEMENT  
ARIZONA MEMORIAL COMPLEX

COMFOURTEEN letter 002:241:EC:nzt serial 19 of 10 February 1978 discussed the requirement for two agreements in connection with the operation of the Arizona Memorial Complex by the National Park Service.

The support agreement, to be negotiated when plans for the shoreside facilities have been finalized sufficiently to determine the extent of Navy support to be required, would cover the respective operations and services to be performed by the Navy and your agency. The use agreement, a draft copy of which was forwarded for your review, would provide the National Park Service with the necessary real estate rights for the operation of the memorial. These two agreements are planned to be effective as of the date that title to and plant accountability for the shoreside facilities are transferred to the National Park Service.

It has been advised that the House Armed Services Committee, in authorizing the funds for the construction of the shoreside facilities, imposed the condition that, prior to the award of any construction contract, the National Park Service and the Navy must execute an agreement which provides that the National Park Service will assume the responsibility for the operation of the memorial upon completion of construction. A copy of the applicable page of the conference report is enclosed for your information.

It is recommended that a letter of agreement be utilized to satisfy the above-mentioned condition, as attempting to finalize the aforementioned support and use agreements at this time will only serve to delay the construction of the proposed shoreside facilities. If your agency has no objection to this proposal, it is requested that this letter of agreement
be signed on behalf of the National Park Service to acknowledge acceptance of the following condition:

"Upon completion of Fiscal Year 1978 Military Construction Project P-153, (title) USS ARIZONA MEMORIAL Shoreside Facilities, the National Park Service hereby agrees to assume responsibility for the operation and maintenance of the Arizona Memorial Complex, comprised of the Arizona Memorial and associated shoreside facilities, in accordance with the provisions of a support agreement and a use agreement to be executed between the National Park Service and the Department of the Navy."

Upon signing on behalf of the National Park Service, it is requested that the original of this letter of agreement be returned. The duplicate original may be retained for your records.

Thank you for your cooperation in this matter.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

R. P. Nystedt
CAPTAIN, CEC, USN
District Civil Engineer
By direction of the Commandant

Encl:
(1) Conference Report No. 95-494
    (Title page and page 34)

ACCEPTED:

[Signature]
NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

4-21-78
Date

RECEIVED
MAR 8 1978
HAWAII STATE OFFICE
### ARIZONA MEMORIAL ANNUAL VISITOR COUNT

*(via Navy shuttle boat)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Visitor Count</th>
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<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>178,872</td>
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<td>1970</td>
<td>358,502</td>
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<td>1971</td>
<td>367,816</td>
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<td>707,487</td>
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<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>851,320</td>
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</table>

(Compiled from Navy and National Park Service sources)
SOURCES

This study is based primarily on documentary evidence found in the files of organizations and agencies which played important roles in the history of the USS Arizona Memorial and visitor center. The most significant documentation is in the files of the Pacific War Memorial Commission, now located in the Hawaii State Archives in Honolulu. The commission was not only instrumental in bringing the memorial into existence, but was frequently consulted by the Navy on subsequent issues relating to the memorial (such as the establishment of the visitor center).

Another important source was the files of the National Park Service's Pacific Area Office in Honolulu. They contain material relating to the role of the Park Service in Hawaii during the transfer period. Important documents shedding light on the legislative process in Congress are also in those files.

The holdings of the Navy's Pearl Harbor command (COMNAVBASE) were digested in the form of a volume entitled Arizona Memorial Shoreside Facility Study. That study, available from the Public Affairs Office at Pearl Harbor, includes important documents reproduced in its numerous appendices. Completed in 1974, the study also has a number of other documents physically attached to the volume available from the Public
Affairs Office. When cited in the notes, these attached documents are so noted. Additional Navy documents are in the files of OICC, Mid-Pacific at Pearl Harbor.

Other sources consulted include daily newspapers, the files of the Arizona Memorial Museum Foundation (now in the custody of Branch 46, Fleet Reserve Association at Pearl Harbor), and the personal files of David McClung, a Honolulu attorney.

Written records were supplemented by personal interviews with Robert Barrel, Gary Beito, George Chaplin, Faith Evans, H. Tucker Gratz, David McClung, and Alfred Preis. C. E. Burns provided additional information in a personal communication.

The following abbreviations are used in the notes:

- **Ady**: Honolulu Advertiser
- **AMMF**: files of the Arizona Memorial Museum Foundation
- **AMSFS**: the Navy's Arizona Memorial Shoreside Facility Study
- **McClung**: Personal files of David McClung
- **PAAR**: the files of the National Park Service's Pacific Area Office
- **PWMC**: the Pacific War Memorial Commission record group in the Hawaii State Archives
- **SB**: Honolulu Star-Bulletin
NOTES

Memorial Day


Part I: 1941-1954


4The original appointees were: H. Tucker Gratz; Mrs. Walter (Louise) Dillingham; George Miki; Frank Midkiff; Dwight Styne; and Brig. Gen. Fred Makinney, territorial adjutant general. Later appointees included Duke Kahanamoku and future U.S. Senator Spark Matsunaga.

5For material on the Pacific War Memorial, Inc., see "Background History" file, especially Midkiff to Gratz, Dec. 1, 1950, PWMC.


8"Lest We Forget . . .," Collier's, July 22, 1950, p. 74.

10 Solomonsen to Cross, Oct. 2, 1952, PWMC.

11 Minutes, Dec. 12, 1952, PWMC.

12 "Plans For Memorial On Hulk Of Arizona Face Big Obstacles" SB, Aug. 8, 1950, p. 5.

13 "Lest We Forget . . ." op. cit.

14 Short to Gratz, Nov. 26, 1952, PWMC.

15 Minutes, Nov. 4, 1954, PWMC.

Part II: 1955-1962


2 COMFORTEN to Secretary of the Navy, Nov. 23, 1955, PWMC.

3 Burke endorsement cited in Gratz to North, Aug. 27, 1957, PWMC. Nimitz endorsement in Minutes, July 12, 1956, PWMC.

4 Minutes, Mar. 29, 1956, PWMC.


6 PWMC minutes of Dec. 7, 1956, refer to an Aug. 3, 1956, meeting at which the commandant made the proposal.

7 Minutes, July 11, 1957, PWMC.

8 For the legal impediments see U.S. Congress, 85th Congress, 1st Session, House of Representatives Report No. 1125.

9 Burns to Gratz, June 16, 1957, PWMC.


11 Pate to Roark, Oct. 31, 1958, PWMC.

12 Fuqua to Roark, Nov. 21, 1958, PWMC.

Burke to Roark, Oct. 24, 1958, PWMC.


Nimitz to Gratz (holograph), July 11, 1961, PWMC.

U.S. Congress, 85th Congress, 1st Session. HR 5801.


Ibid.

Brady-PWMC Agreement, June 16, 1958; Supplementary agreement, Oct. 20, 1959 and April 7, 1960, PWMC.

See "James Roark and the FRA."

Minutes, May 8, 1958, PWMC.

Minutes, June 25, 1956, PWMC.

Custer to Brady, March 26, 1958; Brady to Yanofsky, June 1, 1958; Brady to PWMC, March 11, 1958; Pesl to Quinn, undated (1960), PWMC.

Custer to Brady, March 26, 1958, PWMC.

Miki to Peal, April 7, 1960, PWMC.

Custer to Brady, Feb. 6, 1959, PWMC.

Handwritten "Memo to the file," undated (1960); Styne, "Memo to the file," June 4, 1960, PWMC.

Brady to Gratz, Aug. 7, 1959, PWMC.

Custer to Ramelb, May 4, 1960, PWMC.

Brady to Gratz, May 17, 1960, PWMC.

Custer to Deitrich, Jan. 22, 1958; Minutes, May 9, 1958, PWMC.

H. Tucker Gratz interview with author, Honolulu, June 18, 1982. "This Is Your Life" Dec. 3, 1958 (16mm film), PWMC.
35 Custer to PWMC, Jan. 8, 1960; Minutes, Dec. 18, 1959, PWMC.

36 Chaplin to "My Dear Fellow Editor," Nov. 25, 1960, PWMC.


39 Gratz note to file, Mar. 29, 1961; Bishop Trust Co. statement, April 30, 1961, PWMC.


41 Gratz to Burns, Mar. 6, 1959, PWMC.

42 PWMC to McClung, Mar. 16, 1959; Mirikitani to Gratz, April 28, 1961; Gratz and Dillingham to members of State House and Senate Capital Improvement Committees, May 24, 1961; Miyake to Gratz, April 26, 1961, PWMC.

43 The 1959 sum was from McClung's "pork barrel," a custom which allowed each legislator discretion to include projects for his or her district in the state budget. Additionally, the 1959 legislature authorized a $77,000 bond issue for the Arizona Memorial, but technicalities in Hawaii's statehood legislation invalidated the authorization. David McClung interview with author, Honolulu, Sept. 13, 1982.

44 Gratz to Burns, Mar. 6, 1959; Burns to Gratz May 3, 1959, PWMC.

45 Long to Gratz, July 9, 1960; Office of the Secretary of the Navy, Legislative Affairs, to Vinson, N.D. (1960), PWMC.

46 Baker to Gratz, Sept. 21, 1960, PWMC.

47 Custer to Gratz, July 15, 1961; Russell to Gratz, July 24, 1961, PWMC.

48 Howard to Custer, Sept. 11, 1961; Custer to Gratz, July 19, 1961, PWMC.

49 United States. Public Law 87-201.


52 Brady to Custer, Aug. 16, 1958; Gratz to Solomons, June 4, 1958; State of Arizona Certificate of Incorporation for USS Arizona Memorial Foundation, Inc., Dec. 7, 1959; McFarland to Quinn, Nov. 21, 1958; Roark to Gratz, Jan 16, 1959, PWMC.

53 Roark to Quinn, Sept. 11, 1959, PWMC.

54 Gratz to Solomons, June 4, 1958; Roark to Gratz, June 27, 1958, PWMC.

55 Brady to PWMC, cablegram May 31, 1959, PWMC.

56 Roark to Gratz, Jan. 16, 1959; Gratz to Solomons, Dec. 11, 1958; Gratz to Brady, July 27, 1959; Brady to Roark, Mar. 11, 1959; Gratz to Roark, Feb. 17, 1961; "Digest Of Meeting With Roark," undated, PWMC.

57 Roark to Gratz, Jan. 16, 1959, PWMC.

58 Roark to Quinn, Sept. 11, 1959, PWMC.

59 Brady to PWMC, cablegram May 31, 1959, PWMC.

60 Gratz to Solomons, June 4, 1959; PWMC.

61 Burke to Fanin, June 17, 1959, PWMC.

62 Gratz to Burke, cablegram July 7, 1959; Burns to Franke, July 3, 1959, PWMC.


64 Navy Judge Advocate Opinion, April 8, 1960, quoted in "Joint Statement of Policy by the Fourteenth Naval District and the Pacific War Memorial Commission," June 27, 1960, PWMC.

65 Elke to Solomons, Dec. 7, 1959; Solomons to Secretary of the Navy, Dec. 24, 1959, PWMC.

66 Brady to Roark, Feb. 16, 1960, PWMC.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Custer to Wright, Jan. 28, 1960; Custer to Topp, April 4, 1961; PWMC to Hawaii State Dept. of Budget and Review, Aug. 29, 1961; Campbell to Sallet, Nov. 3, 1961. PWMC.

Part III: 1963-1982

See chart, Appendix I.

Personal communication from C. E. Burns to the author, Sept. 6, 1982. Burns was the line supervisor of the shuttle boat operation for several years.


AMSFS, III-5. Notes of Jan. 4, 1968 meeting between Lynch and PWMC; Albright to Hawaii Congressional delegation, undated [1968]; Matsunaga Discussion Draft, n.d. [1968], PWMC.

Minutes, July 28, 1968, PWMC.

Manning to Gratz, July 22, 1968; CINCPACLT to CNO, July ?(date illegible), 1968, PWMC.

94
7. COMFOURTEEN to CNO, Aug. 9, 1968; Bakutis to Matsunaga, Aug. 20, 1968; Bakutis to Tobin; Aug. 9, 1968, PWMC.


9. CNO to COMFOURTEEN, May 15, 1969; Ryan to House Armed Services Committee, April 23, 1970, PWMC.

10. Wright to Hayward, Sept. 21, 1971, PWMC.

11. Hayward to Wright, Sept. 23, 1971, PWMC.


20. Griswold to Chief, NPS Div. of Legislation, June 20, 1973, PAAR.

Committee members were: Capt. G. P. Peed, Capt. F. W. Benson, Capt. C. Nelson, Lt. Cdr. E. N. Keliikoa, Lt. Cdr. R. M. Cugowski, Mr. R. H. Rothrock, Mr. S. Oberg, Mr. S. Pinn, Mr. M. H. Yamamoto, and Mr. J. Busekrus, AMSFS, VII-3.

AMSFS, III-21-28, IV-1-3.

AMSFS, III-30-40.


AMSFS, III-30-40.

ibid.

CONFORAGE to Director, Naval Historical Center, Mar. 24, 1978, filed in AMSFS.

Burns to Nolan, undated (Jan. or Feb. 1974); AMMF "Petition for Charter of Incorporation," Jan. 14, 1974, AMMF.


PHMM prospectus, PWMC.

Sessler to Rogers, Mar. 15, 1974, PAAR.

AMSFS, III-11, V-2, Appendix E-14.


Middendorf to Rogers, Mar. 12, 1975, PAAR.

Lyons to Middendorf, April 11, 1975; Frizzell to Middendorf, Aug. 19, 1975, PAAR.


File memo, n.d. [1977] re meeting between Matsunaga and PWMC staff, PWMC. Nystedt to Peters, April 4, 1977, AMMF.


Bill Loo interview with author, Pearl Harbor, Aug. 16, 1982.

Nystedt to Barrel, May 10, 1977, PAAR.


Barrel to Wentworth, June 21, 1979; Wentworth to Barrel, July 9, 1979, AMMF.


NPS figures.