Science, Politics, and the “Big Dig”
A History of the Southeast Archeological Center

Cultural Resources
Southeast Region
July 17, 2007

Dear Colleague:

Enclosed is a copy of *Science, Politics, and the "Big Dig": A History of the Southeast Archeological Center and the Development of Cultural Resources Management in the Southeast* written by Cameron Binkley of this office. This study is part of an ongoing effort to provide comprehensive documentation regarding cultural resources and resource management for the National Parks of the Southeast Region. This specific history documents the origins and development of the Southeast Archeological Center, tracing and analyzing the role of archeology in cultural resources management and its relationship to historic preservation. Focused upon the evolution of Federal archeology in the Southeast, the study touches on many concepts of more general importance, including archeological curation, NPS management of underwater archeology, efficiencies of the center concept, and NPS relations with academia, Congress, other agencies and organizations, and the public. The study assesses accomplishments and setbacks and provides valuable information for NPS archeologists, park managers, planners, interpreters, and others interested in the history and management of archeological resources in the Southeastern United States.

Sincerely,

[Signature]

Daniel Scheidt
Chief, Cultural Resources Division

Enclosure
Science, Politics, and the "Big Dig"
A History of the Southeast Archeological Center and the Development of Cultural Resources Management in the Southeast


January 2007
written by Cameron Binkley
This administrative history exists in two formats. A printed version is available for study at the Southeast Archeological Center, at the Southeast Regional Office of the National Park Service, and at a variety of other repositories around the United States. For more widespread access, this administrative history also exists as a PDF through the web site of the National Park Service. Please visit www.nps.gov for more information.
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Cameron Binkley
Historian, Southeast Regional Office
National Park Service
Foreword

This study is a detailed, carefully written account of the early origins, development, management, and operation of the Southeast Archeological Center (SEAC). It is the history of that organization, the programs it has administered, and its dedicated managers and staff who have consistently provided archeological services in support of the National Park Service's resource preservation mission. Author Cameron Binkley deals with policy decisions, their impact, and the challenges that the center has faced over the years. The narrative appropriately begins with the roots of federal archeology in the 1930s before moving on to the origins of SEAC at Occoneechee National Monument. It chronicles the center's later move to the campus of Florida State University in Tallahassee and then off campus to Innovation Park. Bringing his history up to the present, Binkley concludes with a candid account of the recent "outsourcing" study of the center.

As a research historian in the Park Service's Southeast Regional Office, Binkley was well positioned to write this fine history of the Southeast Archeological Center. He had ready access to the relevant historical files and to former and current Park Service managers and staff, making extensive use of oral history interviews to convey the perspectives of these individuals. Their voices lend authority and depth to the narrative. Indeed one of the strengths of this narrative is that it reflects multiple perspectives.

As part of this history, the author traces and analyzes the often complex and sometimes strained relationship between the National Park Service and Florida State University (FSU), viewing that relationship from various perspectives. The result is a balanced discussion that can tell us much about the benefits and challenges of long-term close partnerships between the Service and academic institutions. Closely tied to the NPS-FSU relationship is the center's curation of an extensive collection of artifacts stemming from major Depression-era excavations that were crucial to the development of early American archeology. Binkley addresses the transitory politics influencing government officials, agency managers, academic administrators, and university professors, as well as the nitty-gritty background of the day-to-day grind of archeological analysis and curation, which is at the heart of the center's long-term legacy to the world of science and scholarship.

More broadly, the author traces and analyzes the role of archeology in cultural resource management and its relationship with historic preservation. The study reveals how Park Service archeology developed along lines distinct from other cultural resource professions and effectively highlights the critical role that federal archeology has played in preserving the cultural heritage of the Southeast. Binkley does not shrink from criticism where warranted - notably discussing the center's seminal role in launching a federal underwater archeology program and the mishandling of the promising initial efforts to the detriment of both effective underwater cultural resources management in the Southeast Region and NPS-FSU relations.

One major aspect of the Service's archeology program has been the consolidation of the professional expertise and resources in geographically-based centers. The author provides a frank discussion and assessment of the center concept, concluding that the Southeast Archeological Center has met the needs of the Service, the public, and the archeology profession. History, he observes, has vindicated the center concept, revealing that such centers have been an efficient and effective response to the need to pool and maximize human and financial resources.

This book is solidly rooted in the history of the National Park Service and the broader national trends in the field of archeology. Cameron Binkley has skillfully placed his story in the context of contemporary development of public archeology in the United States, including relationships with Congress, other
federal agencies and public organizations, and in the context of the major themes in the development of archaeology programs within the Park Service. He has contributed greatly to our understanding of the important role of archaeology within the Southeast Region and the National Park Service and the development of cultural resource management in the Southeastern United States. Appropriately, the major audience for this history will be current and future Service managers and staff. Binkley has provided them with an excellent management tool. However, there is enough historical context and analysis to ensure that this history will have a broader appeal and usefulness both within and outside the Service.

All of the nearly four hundred units in the National Park Service consistently rely on technical assistance from Service professionals to ensure that their cultural and natural resources are preserved in accordance with the Service's fundamental mission. The federal archaeology program has consistently provided leadership, guidance, and technical support to the parks and other federal agencies, states, Native American communities, and local governments. This book serves as a reminder of the importance of preserving our cultural heritage and the important role of Service professionals. The voices of National Park Service archaeologists are well represented and the profession of archaeology is well served.

Janet A. McDonnell
Bureau Historian
National Park Service
Introduction

On October 31, 2001, National Park Service archeologist John E. Ehrenhard submitted a research project proposal to the Project Management Information System (PMIS), an electronic project funding database. Park Service managers use PMIS to initiate, adjudicate, and allocate scarce dollars for projects important to the management and oversight of the National Park System. This particular proposal sought to:

Prepare SEAC administrative history, which will include the development of archeological, collection management, and cultural resources management programs of the Southeast, as they are an integral part of SEAC and these programs are not documented by separate administrative histories.1

In Park Service parlance, the acronym SEAC is pronounced “see-ack” and the initials of the abbreviation come from Southeast Archeological Center. Ehrenhard was its director from May 1994 until December 2006. In justifying his proposal, Ehrenhard attempted to explain briefly the significance of the archeological center, whose origins can be associated with the massive work-relief efforts under the Works Progress Administration and similar bodies during the 1930s that led to the creation of Ocmulgee National Monument near Macon, Georgia. Excavations at and near Ocmulgee provided early archeologists with significant understanding of prehistoric Mississippian culture in the Southeast. Because of this significance, the Park Service created SEAC at Ocmulgee in the 1960s to conduct investigations to provide Southeastern parks with archeological interpretive, legal compliance, and planning information. In his statement, Ehrenhard also noted the importance of SEAC’s association with Florida State University and its Department of Anthropology, the center’s key role as a repository for park archeological collections and documentation, and its services to regional parks, including under the Native American Grave Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA), a sensitive area of law governing the treatment of aboriginal remains and funerary artifacts. A final function of the center was in assisting state and other federal agencies by advising on archeological matters. Ehrenhard argued that this project needed to commence in the short-term because several key figures central to the establishment of SEAC, including John W. Griffin, a prominent Southeastern archeologist and the first Center Chief, had already passed away while many others had retired.2 In an interview with the author, Ehrenhard also expressed an additional interest in documenting SEAC’s history - the center had been slated for a “Competitive Sourcing Review,” a test of its operations in comparison to potential commercial providers. If SEAC failed to demonstrate the required degree of efficiency, much of its work and staff stood to be outsourced.3 With this backdrop, on May 8, 2002, a regional council of NPS officials met and approved PMIS Project Statement 79878. The present study commenced in the spring of 2003.

Purpose

This study is a work of history. Its intent is simply to bring historical perspective to long-term trends in the management and development of federal archeology in the Southeast Region of the National Park Service. The report focuses primarily upon the background, creation, evolution, cooperative activity, and oversight of the Southeast Archeological Center, which is located in Tallahassee, Florida, through special arrangement with Florida

2. John Ehrenhard, PMIS Project Statement 79878.
State University. The Southeast Archeological Center is an administrative division of the Service’s Southeast Regional Office (SERO). The National Park Service has deployed SEAC for almost forty years as the primary designated authority responsible for assisting Southeast Region parks to manage and preserve their archeological resources.4

Using historical theory and methodology, this report attempts to catalog the key figures, decisions, and processes that have influenced SEAC from its inception to the current time. Such information can help NPS managers, planners, archeologists, and interested outside parties to gain a basis by which to measure the long-term effectiveness of the National Park Service in carrying out its primary responsibilities as required by congressional mandate and executive order. This effort is important because historical inquiry can cast light upon important policy issues of current or future concern. The document also serves as a factual record and may therefore be a utility for Service personnel during the course of their everyday activities. A historical work, of course, is necessarily also only a snapshot of selected moments judiciously chosen by the author to illustrate or profile specific issues of high relevance. Thus, however desirable, this report cannot document every accomplishment or identify every important individual who has contributed to the work that SEAC, or the Park Service, has accomplished over the past several decades. Nor can it report every shortcoming. On either account, the author apologizes for any significant omission.

Theory and Definitions

Archeology is a branch of anthropology.5 Anthropology can be defined as the scientific and humanistic study of the present and past biological, linguistic, social, and cultural variations of the human species. Commonly, anthropology is divided into four major subfields, which include physical or biological anthropology, the study of the origins and development of human beings; linguistics, the study of human language; cultural anthropology, the study of human culture or the means by which human beings sustain life; and finally archeology, the study of human life based upon the recovery and study of material remains, that is fossil relics, artifacts, and monuments made or used by human beings. A subfield of archeology, historical archeology, employs historical methods to aid in locating, identifying, or interpreting archeological artifacts. The primary goal of archeology as a professional discipline within anthropology is to use the artifactual record to explain the nature, origins, and change of human culture over time.

Federal archeology is “applied archeology” or archeology conducted on behalf of the American people’s interest in the identification, preservation, scientific excavation, and interpretation of sites, areas, and objects associated with the material remains of past human societies. As such, it uses archeological methods and theory to help manage cultural resources in the public interest. Public funding makes public archeology possible because as a society, American citizens through their legislators have deemed it important to preserve the nation’s cultural legacy. Beginning with the Antiquities Act of 1906, Congress has systematically enacted a series of increasing authorities that direct executive branch effort to identify, preserve, and interpret archeological sites on federally managed land. Since its own establishment in 1916, the National Park Service has played a key role in carrying out congressional mandates to preserve the archeological record both within the national park system and to assist other federal, state, and tribal agencies in carrying out those same mandates.

The practice of archeology within the National Park Service builds upon traditional academic methods to include archeological resources management. As such, NPS archeologists fulfill a role similar to that of NPS historians and historic architects. However, NPS archeology also exhibits some striking dissimilarities with these professions, which traditionally compose the field of “historic preservation.” At times, Service archeologists have found themselves in competition with their peers in the historic preservation movement, even viewing

4. NPS Southeast Region states today include: Alabama, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North and South Carolina, and Tennessee as well as Puerto Rico and the U.S. Virgin Islands. In 1966, this region also included Virginia and Arkansas. SEAC has also provided archeological assistance beyond the region’s parks at various times when requested and funded as authorized by law or policy.

5. Federal agencies generally use the spelling “archeology” as opposed to “archaeology,” which is preferred in scholarly circles. Following Park Service usage, in this report the spelling “archeology” is retained only as appropriate in citations and quotations.
their goals as a threat to archeological prerogatives and institutional ambitions. An early illustration of this phenomenon was a predication in 1934 that later led the Park Service to hire a young architect-archeologist by the name of Jean C. Harrington.

In that year, the National Park Service acquired most of Jamestown Island in Virginia as part of Colonial National Monument (now Colonial National Historical Park). Using labor provided by the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), the Service began an excavation project that ran from 1934 to 1941. At first, this excavation operated using practices developed by the Association for the Preservation of Virginia Antiquities (APVA), the original conservator of historic Jamestown, and its lead architect Henry C. Forman. Architects thus oversaw the Jamestown project with archeologists working under them. NPS archeologists who were at Jamestown between 1934 and 1936 included H. Summerfield Day, Carl F. Miller, Alonzo Pond, and John Winter. The archeologists dug until reaching foundation remains, at which time the architects took over. Project managers believed that this arrangement worked best since they were dealing with structural remains. However, professional rivalries between the architects and archeologists developed, with ensuing turf battles and even the threat of violence. Smithsonian archeologist Frank Setzler visited the site in 1936, noted the problems, and suggested that the Park Service hire a new project lead he had recently met - Harrington.⁶

Harrington, universally known and remembered by his nickname “Pinky,” held a Bachelor of Science degree in architectural engineering from the University of Michigan. He first worked for an architectural firm that failed during the Great Depression and afterwards pursued three years of graduate work in anthropology, including archeological field schools at the University of Chicago. In January 1936, he left Chicago to participate in an archeological research project in Yucatan. This background in architecture and archeology made him well qualified to direct the Jamestown project. Indeed, at Setzler’s suggestion in July of that year, the Park Service offered Harrington the job. In accepting it, Harrington left off completing his doctorate. A long line of federal archeologists would for one reason or another follow in his tradition, including a good many senior NPS archeologists who have served in the ranks of SEAC or in the Southeast Region. Between 1937 and 1941, Harrington conducted a pioneering archeological effort at Jamestown, refining both the techniques and artifactual knowledge of a budding new field that combined traditional archeological methods with those used by historians.⁷ As a result of this work, and later excavations at Fort Raleigh, North Carolina, and Fort Necessity, Pennsylvania, Harrington emerged as a leading proponent of a new field in anthropology, which became known, as described above, as historical archeology. He was to go on to become Regional Archeologist for the old “Region One,” which included most East coast and Southern states, serving in that capacity until 1954. Between then and his retirement in 1965, he served as regional chief of interpretation. His accomplishments are generally revered by those concerned with historic sites archeology. His work helped place the Park Service at the forefront of this developing field at a time when academic scholars were focused upon prehistoric archeology.⁸ Indeed, as prominent archeologist Ivor Noel Hume of Colonial Williamsburg has said, Harrington was “the father of historical archeology in America.”⁹ After the Society for Historical Archaeology was

finally organized nationally in 1967, it chose to call its most preeminent award the J. C. Harrington Medal.

Harrington had a huge impact upon the development of archeology, both within and outside the National Park Service. Similarly, John Wallace Griffin, who succeeded to Harrington’s position in 1958, was also influential. Although he did not have a PhD, Griffin had earned a master’s degree in archeology at the University of Chicago and was working as an assistant professor for the University of Florida when hired to replace Harrington. Before then he had served many years as the first state archeologist for Florida. In that capacity, Griffin laid the conceptual, informational, and institutional foundations of Florida archeology at a time before any college in the state had a department of anthropology. Griffin is still remembered for several important works, including *Investigations in Russell Cave* (1974), *Archaeology of Everglades National Park: A Synthesis* (1988), and his early pioneering historical archeological work, *Here They Once Stood: The Tragic End of the Apalachee Missions* that was published in 1951 with Mark Boyd and Hale G. Smith, the latter of whom founded the Department of Anthropology at Florida State University. This study defined expectations about the nature of Spanish mission archeology in Florida. Griffin carried forward Harrington’s torch in the Southeast and was to become the first Chief of SEAC. His familiarity with both prehistoric and historic archeology and previous experience in public service archeology in Florida made him a perfect match for the position of Regional Archeologist.

The arrival of Harrington resolved the problematic relations between historic architects and archeologists at Jamestown, but that situation also illustrates a number of points that have proven an enduring relevance to the practice of archeology in the National Park Service:

First, public archeology is driven by management needs. The Park Service emerged as an early leader in the field of historic archeology because archeological techniques demonstrated positive utility in the recovery of key data needed by management for interpretation and resource protection at historical or cultural NPS sites. Archeological research in the Park Service is thus necessitated, defined, and self-limited by the nature of the resources entrusted to its care, not by any current fashion, trend in academia, or personal preference. Eventually, the formalization of archeological resources protection culminated with passage of such landmark legislation as the Reservoir Salvage Act of 1960, the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (NHPA), the Archeological and Historic Preservation Act of 1974 (Moss-Bennett), and the Archaeological Resources Protection Act of 1979 (ARPA). These federal laws require archeological investigation and clearance of property prior to disturbance by federally sponsored projects or projects on federal lands, greatly increasing managerial reliance upon public archeology. From the 1970s onward, such compliance work led to a boom for archeology, including the methods pioneered by Harrington at Jamestown. Harrington’s experience also points out an important difference between public and academic archeology. In academia, prestige generally requires hiring applicants holding PhDs. In the National Park Service, those able to do the work, with or without a doctoral degree, have risen to important archeological positions.

Second, Harrington’s example helps to illustrate why archeology and historic preservation, despite being allied fields, are also distinct and at times rivalrous professions. They compete for authority over and funding for historic sites. One emphasizes the existing built environment (or its reconstruction); the other chiefly focuses upon what lies beneath. Preservationists use traditional research techniques, such as library research or comparing old drawings, apply historical building techniques,

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9. Ivor Noel Hume, Roanoke Island: America’s First Science Center, booklet reprinted from Colonial Williamsburg: The Journal of the Colonial Williamsburg Foundation (Spring 1994): 1. John L. Cotter, a WPA archeologist who began a long NPS career in 1940 as Superintendent of Tuzigoot National Monument, is also esteemed as an important early student and proponent of historical archeology. He was the first president of the Society for Historical Archaeology (1967), made important contributions as an excavator at Jamestown in the 1950s, was awarded the SHA’s Harrington medal in 1984, and was even honored by having its third medal named after him - the John L. Cotter Award in Historical Archaeology.


and focus upon preserving existing historical structures. Archeologists, on the other hand, use historical methods, but rely chiefly upon "exca-
vation." Thus, traditionally, archeologists have sought to "preserve" archeological sites by meticulous excavating them. They sought to preserve the knowledge and artifacts found at sites, but not the sites themselves, which archeology invariably sacrificed for the sake of data recovery. Rivalry stemming from these professional differences inspired early archeologists and historic preservationists to perceive that "historic preservation," while not exclusive of archeological sites, was generally dedicated to preserving historic buildings and monuments. In recent years, clamor between historic preservationists and public archeologists has muted as the latter have increasingly focused upon the in situ preservation of existing and unexcavated archeological sites, more effective and accountable management of archeological artifact and museum collections, and the means to deter both archeological and historic site looting and vandalism. Perhaps as well, there is greater sense today among historic preservationists that historic buildings are also archeological sites.

Third, Harrington was able to solve problems and blaze pathways for historic archeology within the Park Service during the Great Depression because he was atypical. Especially out West, and as far as the discipline was concerned, archeology mainly concerned prehistoric sites. Undoubtedly, one reason for the professional rivalries revealed by the Jamestown excavation was the enduring perception that archeology was only about "dead Indians." During the 1930s, academic archeologists remained focused upon ancient aboriginal sites, as they had since before passage of the Antiquities Act. Eventually, their successful lobbying drove considerable government-sponsored work-relief projects. Archeologists obtained funding to launch unprecedented large-scale excavations of several well-known sites. Working with the Smithsonian Institution, the Park Service emerged as the lead agency responsible for managing these work-relief projects even though they generally involved non-park excavations. After World War II, the archeological community remained concerned with the fate of prehistoric sites as federal reservoir-construction projects began to threaten to inundate huge swaths of archeologically fertile valleys and river basins. Again, the Park Service became a major participant in these projects driven by external archeological constituencies generally unrelated to parks and historic archeology, much less historic preservation. Yet, these programs brought the Park Service considerable funding and responsibility for "salvage archeology," which as a matter of course gave NPS archeology responsibilities for projects far beyond the scope of most park superintendents or even the Service's regional directorate.

NPS archeology has evinced strong professional differences with the disciplines of historic preservation even as historical archeology significantly contributed to the Service's ability to manage historical sites. Simultaneously, NPS archeology possessed strong external constituencies that exerted outside political influence, support, and direction. It is not surprising, therefore, that NPS archeology has developed something of a split identity. Management is geared to focus upon parks, that is, the preservation and interpretation of their resources. Historical archeology beginning with Harrington emerged in the Park Service to solve specific management concerns, which it does very well. However, for much of its early history, external funding drove NPS archeology toward the excavation, although often haphazardly, of prehistoric sites, where the intent, if not the outcome, was to generate knowledge drawn from archeology. After academic archeology was infused by the teachings of Lewis Binford in the late 1960s, who sought to deduce the "laws" of archeology, some NPS archeologists became more concerned with the need to select their excavations using scientific or research-based criteria instead of being ever driven by the exigencies of relief and salvage-style work. They also sought to develop park-based archeology, piggybacking on the far more extensive funding for salvage archeology and were wary of any who might jeopardize those funds that gradually became available. In the 1970s, NPS archeologists helped to originate the very term

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12. This process excludes site stabilization, which has also become an important function of NPS archeology. And modern methods of archeology are less destructive of sites than previously. To the extent that public archeology focuses more on site stabilization, preservation, survey, and compliance mitigation, that is conservation archeology, the more it has in turn evolved away from academic archeology, which retains a primary focus upon excavation and the publication of important new findings or interpretations, and the more it has become similar to historic preservation.
"cultural resources management" to distinguish themselves from historic preservationists and to put themselves on a par with natural resource managers. Eventually, occasionally frustrated Service managers classified this fundamental attitude simply as the "keep archeology separate" school.\textsuperscript{13}

In 1976, after years of subtle and not so subtle organizational insurgency, several prominent NPS archaeologists, including the Midwest Archeological Center's Chief F. A. Calabrese, and the Service's own Chief Anthropologist, Douglas H. Scovill, openly criticized the perceived dominance of historic preservation within the Park Service. Their concerns, expressed at the 41\textsuperscript{st} Annual Meeting of the Society for American Archaeology in St. Louis, Missouri, boiled down to the desire of archeologists to follow a research agenda consistent with management support needs, but nevertheless dictated by the state of knowledge. They sought to shift from "a dominant concept of 'specific-site salvage archeology'," in Scovill's words, "to a philosophy of conservation archeology within the framework of cultural [read 'archeological'] resources management concepts." They were especially unhappy about the evaluation of archeological sites being determined on the basis of criteria established by the National Register of Historic Places, a pre-eminent fixture of the NHPA. Scovill called for archeologists "to examine our place in the historic preservation movement because its current structure and philosophy is not meeting our needs."\textsuperscript{14} Essentially, he was asserting a basic archeological impulse to avoid being preempted by historic preservationists. Associate Director Ernest Allen Connally had a fit - how Calabrese and Scovill escaped with their careers intact is the story for another day. Later on, however, former Chief Historian and Assistant Director Robert Utley gave Scovill credit for reversing this openly separatist course and making a significant effort to bring the disciplines of cultural resource management closer together and into a better relationship with NPS management.\textsuperscript{15}

Those who have sought to develop archeological resources management within the Park Service have had to contend with and harness powerful forces. NPS archeology has evolved along lines distinct from other cultural professions, disciplines more thoroughly integrated and perhaps better understood by NPS management. Nevertheless, archeologists have long enjoyed greater leverage than these disciplines. Since the time of Pinky Harrington, NPS archeology has followed a separate path. In due course, that path led to the creation of several formal archeological research centers, including the Southwest Archaeological Center, the Midwest Archeological Center, the Southeast Archeological Center, the Chaco Archeological Center, and a Denver Service Center group in Maryland. Trials and tribulations ensued, but the center concept has endured.\textsuperscript{16} Professional and political dynamics inherent in public archeology were important determinants leading to the creation of such centralized facilities that are, as Ehrenhard attested, "virtually unique among the nation's land managing agencies."\textsuperscript{17} Nevertheless, no such archeological center could exist independent of the concurrent interest of NPS

\textsuperscript{13} The quote "keep archeology separate" was used in 1983 by an anonymous author, possibly Howard H. Chapman, Chairman of a Regional Office Reorganization Task Force, in a memorandum to the Director to summarize how NPS archaeologists divided into two schools of thought, one wanting to keep archeologists separate from fellow historians and architects and the other being more open to integration. In his own comments to the Director, Chapman observed "a notable tendency on the part of archeologists to want to maintain their identity," suggesting that the separatist school was prevalent. See Howard H. Chapman, Memorandum to the Director, National Park Service, July 20, 1983, and attached memorandum entitled "Interviews - Summary of Responses, Existing, Archeological Centers (SEAC, WAC, MWAC, SWAC, Cummings, Logan)," in "Archeology Centers: Admin. History and Reorganizations" folder, Michele Aubry files, Archeology and Ethnography Program, National Center for Cultural Resources, Washington, D.C.

\textsuperscript{14} Douglas H. Scovill, Chief Anthropologist, "Regional Center: Opportunities for Federal-Institutional Partnership in Cultural Resources Management," paper presented at the 41\textsuperscript{st} Annual Meeting of the Society for American Archaeology held at St. Louis, Missouri, May 6-8, 1976, abstract and page 2, and noted attached to paper by "EAC" addressed to Mr. Rogers, September 14, 1976, and similar note addressed to Mr. Utley by Connally, August 27, 1976, in Ernest Allen Connally Papers, "Archeology Program 1975-76." Box 2, Harpers Ferry Center. The basic frustration of many archeologists was that what was deemed important or significant by National Register standards was not necessarily what was important from the perspective of deriving understanding from research. A relatively unimportant site by National Register standards, therefore, might contribute significantly to new understanding. Because federal policy was driven by standards of significance derived from the National Register, it was a source of great concern to archeologists.

management. The centers are not freestanding academic-style “think-tanks” with a writ to pursue their own intellectual fancies. That has never been a possibility. Instead, by pooling scarce resources, the centers provide at least a minimum of the essential and complex “applied” archeological services required to manage and comply with the laws governing modern parks and, when required, to support non-park areas as well. That is not to say that NPS management of the centers has been flawless. Certainly, the present study of the Southeast Archeological Center demonstrates some cause to reflect upon the history and future course of NPS policy. SEAC has been in existence for nearly forty years. As an organization, indeed, an institution, SEAC’s origins, development, major difficulties and achievements, and ultimate survival offer a case study - and a testament - to both the vitality and the failures of archeological exceptionalism within the National Park Service. In the end, of course, there can be no doubt about the crucial role that federal archeology has played in preserving the cultural heritage of the Southeast.

Methodology and Organization

It will be apparent to the reader that this study has made extensive use of oral history interviews. It is possible to gather information from oral history interviews that would not be available without them. This is vital, of course, regarding events not

16. The Southwest Archaeological Center was later renamed the Western Archeological and Conservation Center. The Chaco Canyon Archeological Center, focused strictly upon the archeology of Chaco Canyon and its surrounding region, is now defunct as it was deliberately planned with a finite lifespan. The Park Service also disbanded the group in Maryland. At various times, the Service has considered establishing other archeological centers, including, for example, a "Northeastern Archeological Center" as well as a center associated with Hopewell Cultural National Historical Park focused upon the study of Eastern Woodland Indians.

17. John Ehrenhard, Speech given at the University of Umeo, Sweden, October 2001, in possession of the author. The three existing NPS archeological centers, in order of their creation are: the Western Archeological and Conservation Center (1955), located in Tucson, Arizona, the Southeast Archeological Center (1966), located in Tallahassee, Florida, and the Midwest Archeological Center (1969), located in Lincoln, Nebraska.
otherwise documented in known written records, but the interactive nature of an interview, as well as follow-up questions and answers, allows the historian to conduct a more penetrating analysis than might otherwise be the case. However, while such interviews can tease out important overarching insights and provide significant information about conflict and change over time, living memory also has problematic qualities. People, for example, tend not to remember specific dates or more obscure names, often falsely remember events out of historical sequence, and rarely achieve complete objectivity concerning their own participation in those events, tending to discount the negative or to overemphasize the positive. Nevertheless, the strength of this report is the strong narrative voice provided by its interviewees whose recall of significant events, conflicts, background information, and behind-the-scenes commentary deeply inform this study.

The author conducted and documented six specific oral history interviews for this study. The oral interviews are on file with the Southeast Archeological Center, the Southeast Regional Office, Harpers Ferry Center Archives, and the National Center for Cultural Resources. The interviews include:

- **John E. Ehrenhard**, Director of the Southeast Archeological Center (1994 - 2006) and head of its Technical Assistance and Partnerships division

- **Richard “Pete” D. Faust**, retired Chief of the Southeast Archeological Center (1972 - 1994)


- **Patricia C. Griffin**, anthropologist, author of *Mullet on the Beach: The Minorcans of Florida, 1768-1788*, and widow of John Griffin, first Chief of SEAC (1967 - 1971), to whom she was married for 48 years


- **George S. Smith**, SEAC Associate Director for Investigations and Evaluation (1989 - present)

Additionally, this study draws upon similar oral history interviews previously conducted by other historians. Prominent among these were two interviews of Ernest Allen Connally, former Chief of the defunct Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation, by Charles B. Hosmer Jr. (1981) and James Arthur Glass (1986). Other exceptionally useful interviews include one with former NPS Chief Historian and Assistant Director Robert M. Udey by Melody Webb and Richard West Sellars (1985), of former NPS archeologist Wilfred D. Logan by Midwest Archeological Center archeologist Thomas D. Thiessen (1992), and a recent interview of former NPS Director Roger Kennedy by NPS Bureau Historian Janet McDonnell (2004). The study is also informed by a series of author dialogues or conversations with several other individuals who participated in the history of SEAC or who were contemporary observers. The author also conducted a lengthy interview with John Jameson Jr., who was involved in the Interagency Archeological Services (IAS) division and in many of SEAC's major archeological outreach efforts. Retired NPS research archeologist John W. Walker was similarly interviewed. Walker began his NPS career at Ocqueoc National Monument in December 1958, participated in the excavations that led to the creation of SEAC, and served with SEAC until he retired in 1990. Other significant informants include Allen Bohnert, former SEAC curator and Chief of Museum Services, Southeast Region; retired NPS archeologist Zorro Bradley, who helped to establish SEAC; Sylvia Flowers, former long-time Chief Ranger of Ocqueoc National Monument; Paul Hartwig, Associate Regional Director for Cultural Resources and Stewardship and an old hand in the Southeast Regional Office; George B. Hartzog Jr., former Director of the National Park Service; Alan Marsh, Cultural Resource Specialist at Andersonville National Historic Site and author of *Ocqueoc National Monument Administrative History*; retired NPS archeologist Jackson Moore, a participant in the “Big Dig” at Ocqueoc National Monument in the 1960s; and Robert C. Wilson, SEAC’s current Head of Archeological Collections and Information Management. Many other informants are listed in the footnotes or acknowledgements.
Despite the importance of these informants, this history also relies heavily upon documentary records, which have proven of sufficient abundance to provide considerable insight into the development of SEAC and federal archeology. The study attempts to use these documents to complement and substantiate the comments or recollections of living informants whenever possible. Primary source documents for this study were obtained from: SEAC, which maintains an excellent set of official records; the historic National Park Service collection at Harpers Ferry Center; the Archeology and Ethnography Program records of the National Center for Cultural Resources in Washington, DC; records of Ocmulgee National Monument, which proved useful despite a regrettable purge of the park's files at some past point; records of the Southeast Regional Office, which were useful to some extent although files had also been lost due to repeated reorganizations and relocations; and personal papers and records provided by the interviewees themselves.

This study is organized chronologically with significant topics treated as they arise logically in the narrative. Some overlapping is unavoidable, but an effort was made to minimize this problem and to include all significant topics in the index. In some cases, the reader will achieve greater comprehension of a given subject by consulting the index. There are six major chapters. After a basic review of the early history of federal archeology in Chapter One, Chapter Two moves on to reconstruct the origins and creation of the Southeast Archeological Center at Ocmulgee National Monument in 1966. Chapter Three covers SEAC's operations at Ocmulgee. Notable events covered in this section relate to SEAC's management of the monument as well as its effort to orchestrate and negotiate the center's move to the campus of Florida State University (FSU) in 1972. Chapter Four covers roughly two decades of SEAC's history while located on the FSU campus. Besides relations with the FSU Anthropology Department, Chapter Four concerns itself with the management of SEAC's vast archeological collection, two national-level administrative reorganizations that impacted the center, and the origins of underwater archeology in the National Park Service. Chapter Five concerns history that is more recent. It addresses SEAC's move off campus to Innovation Park, new directions undertaken by Director John Ehrenhard, and the impact of the "competitive sourcing" or "outsourcing" study conducted upon SEAC between 2002 and 2003. While each section offers analysis and conclusions, these are summarized and reviewed in Chapter Six's concluding essay on the future of federal archeology in the Southeast.

To facilitate management use of the history as an encyclopedic reference, this report also includes several important appendices. Appendix A provides a factual chronology listing major events in the history of the Southeast Archeological Center. A brief annotated listing of several primary legislative authorities for NPS Archeology follows in Appendix B. Appendix C lists and briefly describes the major cooperative agreements in effect on January 1, 2005. Appendix D provides a brief summary of the oral history interviews conducted for this study as well as a biographical sketch of each participant. Appendix E provides a summary of the state of SEAC's archeological collection as of 2005 while Appendix F lists selected FSU Anthropology Department masters theses based upon those collections. Appendix G provides two fact sheets that provide detailed information on SEAC's services. Finally, a selected bibliography includes major sources used in this study while an index has been supplied and cross-referenced to help the reader track specific topics scattered in the text.
Chapter One: Federal Archeology in the Southeast Region (1906-1960)

Federal involvement in efforts to document and preserve the physical remains or archeological evidence of past inhabitants of the United States began in the West. At the end of the nineteenth century, the United States entered into a period of reform that historians have labeled the Progressive Era. Middle-class citizens, concerned by problems stemming from rapid industrialization and population growth, urbanization, and cultural change, launched a wide-ranging social and political reform movement. Nationalism and renewed respect for traditional American symbols generated restrictive anti-immigrant laws, but also helped mobilize support for the preservation ethos emerging from within popular culture and from such professional fields as forestry. Conservation measures were then successfully applied to preserve forests and scenic wonders, first in the West, but later all across the nation.

Similarly, patriotic organizations began to advocate the preservation of buildings and artifacts that symbolized the virtuous American past. Private citizens and the scholarly community also began to recognize the threat posed by the looting of prehistoric aboriginal sites by so-called “pot-hunters,” especially at Casa Grande in Arizona, the first site to receive federal protection in 1892, and later at Mesa Verde in southwest Colorado. Lacking safeguards, these archeological treasures were ripe fruit to be picked by any amateur archeologist, entrepreneur, casual tourist, or deliberate vandal who was increasingly able to visit such places due to improvements in transportation. The situation resulted in the destruction of archeological sites, the loss of their value to science, and the decrease in their utility to boost local tourism. A variety of scholars, civic groups, and politicians soon began to work for better federal protection for these sites, once generally referred to as “antiquities.”

"American Antiquities" and the National Park Service

In 1906, a long campaign by reformers resulted in the passage of Iowa Rep. John F. Lacey’s “Act For the Preservation of American Antiquities.”1 The Antiquities Act authorized the President of the United States to proclaim “historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest” as national monuments. Similar to national parks established by Congress, but without the same level of protection, national monuments were nevertheless “set aside” and protected from encroachment. The Antiquities Act created an important lever for preserving public lands in that it eschewed the difficult legislative process and for the first time authorized the president to decree national monuments and to set aside federal land for the purposes of preservation (or accept others through donation). One drawback of the Antiquities Act, however, was that it placed more than one agency in charge of the administration of the monuments. The secretary of the department having jurisdiction over the land on which the antiquity was located retained control of the monument. Naturally, this division resulted in

uneven administration and maintenance of the monuments by the Departments of Interior, War, and Agriculture. Some monuments received improvements while others continued to deteriorate or suffer from vandalism.²

By 1910, twelve national parks and thirteen national monuments existed. J. Horace McFarland, president of the American Civic Association, led a group of enthusiasts to take action in lobbying for the formation of one governing bureau to administer the parks. At the same time, the Secretary of the Interior produced a proposal for a park bureau. Congress remained uninterested but controversy among conservationists over how to manage the national parks and monuments continued and grew more heated.³ Some conservationists wanted to utilize the parks by harnessing water through dam construction, while others sought strict preservation of park natural resources.⁴ Progress in the effort to create a new agency was made when the Interior Department hired Stephen T. Mather. A wealthy, well-connected businessman, Mather came to Washington in January 1915 as special assistant to Interior Secretary Franklin K. Lane for national park concerns.

In 1913, a climactic national debate took place over the damming of Hetch Hetchy, a scenic valley within Yosemite National Park. San Francisco sought to intrude on the park to meet the city's water and power demands. After opponents failed to stop the dam, support galvanized for the creation of a national service to protect the nation's parks and monuments. Mather, working closely with his assistant, Horace M. Albright, continuously promoted the economic usefulness of parks as tourist destinations. Mather even hired a publicist and convinced several western railroads to fund an elaborately illustrated publication, The National Parks Portfolio, which was sent to congressmen and others of influence. Through such efforts, Mather and Albright successfully campaigned to increase the popularity of national parks and to convince Congress to establish a single agency to govern them. President Woodrow Wilson approved the legislation that formed the National Park Service within the Department of the Interior on August 25, 1916. Secretary Franklin K. Lane then appointed Mather to be the first NPS Director.

The legislation that created the National Park Service also authorized it "to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life [of parks] and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations." The phrase "historic objects" provided the Park Service with the latent authority to involve itself in the preservation of culturally significant sites as well as those it sought to protect for essentially aesthetic reasons. Under this rubric, Secretary Lane transferred Casa Grande Ruin Reservation to the National Park Service in 1918. Casa Grande Ruin, the first cultural site to be set aside on federal land, was established under the auspices of the General Land Office, which had no interest in tending to such an oddity.⁵ Likewise, the Park Service inherited several national monuments of archeological character created under authority of the 1906 Antiquities Act, such as El Morro in New Mexico, an ancient petroglyph site. Of course, the Park Service also inherited Mesa Verde National Park, which Congress had authorized simultaneously with the Antiquities Act. All these sites were protected to preserve some of the extensive, world-class archeological ruins of sophisticated ancient American Indian societies that were threatened by looting, vandalism, and general neglect. By the 1930s, the Park Service controlled numerous archeological sites, mainly in the West.⁶

⁶ Mackintosh, The National Park Service: Shaping the System, 13-14. In March 1923, President Warren G. Harding proclaimed the establishment of Mound City Group National Monument, Ohio, the first aboriginal NPS archeological site east of the Mississippi River. Ocmulgee National Monument followed in December 1936, but no similar park was established in the East until Russell Cave National Monument was proclaimed in May 1961.
While NPS responsibility for historical and archeological sites grew, many remained within the Departments of War and Agriculture. The Park Service sought possession of these areas, but the onset of U.S. involvement in World War I and the illness of Mather delayed the growth and consolidation of the new system. Eventually, however, Mather and Albright, who was appointed Assistant NPS Director in 1919, began to develop clearly defined park standards and policies, took steps to acquire national monuments neglected by other agencies, and sought to create new parks as well. Albright particularly sought to expand the agency's work in historic preservation and pushed to transfer War Department parks and monuments to the NPS. In 1923, President Warren G. Harding outlined a major reorganization proposal of the executive departments that included recommendations to transfer nine military parks to the Department of the Interior. The War Department approved of the notion to transfer parks under its jurisdiction, largely as a cost-cutting move. However, the transfer proposal somehow became, in Albright's words, "lost in the shuffle" and was ignored by the Joint Committee on Reorganization.

The transfer proposal received further consideration during the administration of Herbert Hoover. In 1928, Secretary of the Interior Hubert Work backed a bill, drafted by Interior and War Department staff and sent to Congress, which proposed the transfer of all War Department military parks, national monuments, and national parks to the Department of the Interior. Congress, however, quarreled over the bill. Opponents argued about the different goals of the two agencies, including potential loss of respect if military cemeteries were managed by a civilian agency also responsible for public leisure. In 1929, the Park Service, now directed by Albright, finally began to make progress on the issue. After his inauguration, President Hoover appointed John W. Good and Ray L. Wilbur to be Secretaries of War and Interior, respectively. Both happened to be old Albright acquaintances. Hoover sent several messages to Congress about reorganizing the executive branch, but his administration quickly became preoccupied by the Great Depression. With the election of Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1932, Albright's initiative finally succeeded. When invited on an excursion by President Roosevelt in April 1933, Albright jumped at the chance to convince the new president of the need to consolidate administration of parks and monuments. Roosevelt concurred and permitted Albright to present the necessary materials to the chief of staff of the reorganization activities. On August 10, 1933, Roosevelt signed Executive Order 6166 to consolidate administrative functions of public buildings, reservations, national parks, national monuments, and some national cemeteries in the Department of the Interior.

The principal impact of the federal reorganization of 1933 was that it firmly oriented the Park Service toward the protection and preservation of historic and archeological sites, as well as areas important for their scenic beauty. Moreover, the reorganization provided the Service with a much desired basis on which to expand its involvement in the eastern and southern portions of the nation where historic and prehistoric sites were relatively more common. Finally, these administrative arrangements expanding the role of the Park Service in the area of historic preservation helped spur passage of the Historic Sites Act (HSA) of 1935.

The HSA solidified and expanded the legislative authority for NPS historic preservation activities by defining "a national policy to preserve for public use historic sites, buildings and objects of national significance for the inspiration and benefit of the people of the United States." It gave the Secretary of the Interior responsibility for conducting a federal historic preservation program, including survey, research, and documentation efforts for historical and archeological properties of national significance. Perhaps most important, the law authorized the secretary to designate national historic sites, acquire historical and archeological properties, preserve significant resources, maintain museums, administer sites for public use, and enter into cooperative agreements. The secretary could designate national historic sites without congressional approval, although Congress had to approve funds for land acquisition. To some extent, the HSA provided a way to create new parks without having to go through the congressional process. To assist the secretary, the law established the Advisory Board

7. Unruh and Willis, Administrative History: Expansion of the National Park Service, 22-50.
8. Unruh and Willis, Administrative History: Expansion of the National Park Service, 50-59. The consolidation was not absolute, however. Arlington National Cemetery, for example, is still managed by the U.S. Army.
on National Parks, Historic Sites, Buildings, and Monuments. The Park Service became the primary agency responsible for carrying out the provisions of the new law, and this authority ensured its involvement in the development of “New Deal” archaeology.9

The New Deal Brings the “Big Dig” to the Southeast

During the Great Depression, the Roosevelt administration sought to combat widespread unemployment and economic malaise through massive spending programs that put out-of-work Americans into productive jobs created under the auspices of a number of special work-relief programs. The first of these efforts was the famous Civilian Conservation Corps or CCC (originally known as the Emergency Conservation Work organization), authorized by Congress and established within weeks of Roosevelt’s inauguration in March 1933. Another was the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA), established in August 1933. The Civil Works Administration (CWA) followed in November 1933. The CWA was a short-lived program designed to meet the unemployment challenge of the bleak winter of 1933-1934. Shortly thereafter, Congress passed legislation preventing Roosevelt from creating additional relief agencies without approval, and the CWA was abolished. Under authority of the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act of 1935, Roosevelt then created the Works Progress Administration (WPA), which would oversee a number of programs in the area of conservation. Conservation was an important element of Depression-era work-relief programs because Congress prohibited government spending when it competed in areas where private sector business opportunities existed. As a result, public lands, both federal and state, enjoyed a brief period of spectacular activity as CCC, FERA, CWA, and WPA workers constructed roads, bridges, trails, campgrounds, drainages, and other erosion control works throughout the nation’s forests, parks, and seashores, and on other public lands.10

Work-relief, a great and long-lasting benefit to the nation, also launched an unparalleled period of archeological excavations as New Deal archeological programs sprouted up in areas of the country with a warm winter climate suitable for sustained outdoor work. These programs were arranged through cooperative agreements between the relief agencies, the National Park Service, and the Smithsonian Institution. While agencies like the WPA established operating procedures, the Park Service or the Smithsonian handled technical review of the projects.11

As detailed by Edwin E. Lyon, New Deal archeology began in the South at Markville, Louisiana, in 1933. Markville was the site of several Indian mounds that officials planned to convert into a swimming pool and recreation area using FERA funds until locals interested in archeology convinced the city council to allow excavation and restoration of the mounds under the direction of the Smithsonian Institution. Using FERA funds, Smithsonian archeologists oversaw a crew of one hundred laborers who excavated and restored the site. Their preliminary data indicated that the builders of the site possessed culture-phase characteristics similar to those of the “Hopewell” culture found at Mound City Group National Monument in Ohio. The conclusion that Hopewell culture extended into the Southeast demonstrated the potential for relief archeology, and CWA archeological efforts soon followed justified specifically on this experience.12 The first of eleven CWA projects began on December 20, 1933, at “Ocmulgee Old Fields” near Macon, Georgia. Work at Peachtown Mound in North Carolina and Shiloh Mounds located in Shiloh National Military

10. See John C. Paige, The Civilian Conservation Corps and the National Park Service, 1933-1942: An Administrative History (Washington, DC: National Park Service, 1985), and Unrau and Willis, Administrative History: Expansion of the National Park Service, for more information on conservation-related work-relief programs of the National Park Service during the 1930s.
Park in Tennessee began the day after. Projects also took place in Florida and California.

A key component of relief archeology was the need to employ large numbers of workers who were not professional archeologists. The capacity of American archeology to engage in the management of such large-scale operations using manual laborers developed in conjunction with the requirements of relief archeology as first demonstrated at Marksville. Prior to 1933, a paucity of funds, especially in the South, had previously limited the possibility for such activity. Another key aspect of relief archeology was the role of the Smithsonian Institution, which created the first archeological program using CWA funds and employed some 1,500 workers.

In 1934, Smithsonian archeologists, increasingly concerned about the worsening condition of the nation's archeological patrimony, initiated a nationwide survey to inventory and determine the extent of archeological site destruction. The Smithsonian issued a report discussing 585 such sites, including 180 in the Southeast that required attention. It concluded that the 1906 Antiquities Act was failing to achieve its stated aims of preserving American antiquities, that new legislation was needed to improve the care of archeological resources, that the care of archeological sites on federal land should be improved through their designation as national monuments, and that non-federal sites should be acquired. Along with the 1933 government reorganization that expanded Park Service involvement in preserving battlefields and other historic sites, the Smithsonian survey helped build momentum for the Historic Sites Act of 1935.

One of the most important work-relief programs of the New Deal-era was President Roosevelt's plan to develop the Tennessee River along the valley running through Tennessee, Northern Alabama, and Western Kentucky. To administer this massive development project, Roosevelt established the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). In 1934 archeologists responded to the imminent threat the TVA posed to numerous archeological sites, many of which faced inundation by large-scale water impoundments, by obtaining funds, first through the CWA, then later through the WPA. The WPA chose William S. Webb, a professor at the University of Kentucky, to direct its archeological programs under the TVA. “Major Webb” as he was known by his WPA colleagues, was actually a physicist. In the words of John W. Walker, who knew him as a student, Webb was “an ardent amateur” in the fields of archeology and anthropology and widely published. He applied his CWA and WPA funding to what was probably the most important work-relief archeological project of the 1930s. TVA archeology began in January 1934, a month later than the projects at Okmulgee and Shiloh. Despite a lack of centralized WPA administration and friction between competing archeologists of the three states, TVA archeology proved crucial to the rescue of data and artifacts. Moreover, large-scale archeology conducted by the WPA and other New Deal agencies created important precedents for post-World War II archeological programs. These later efforts were needed to grapple with similar massive construction projects by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation, especially in the West and along the upper Missouri River valley.

In the meantime, however, important CWA-sponsored excavations were taking place near Macon, Georgia. These excavations, fondly remembered by a later generation of archeologists as the “Big Dig,” came to play a major role in the history of the Southeast Archeological Center. The Macon site consists of two distinct “Indian Mound” groups, the Macon Plateau and Lamar sites, which are about three miles apart and near the Okmulgee River. Work on the Macon Plateau began on December 20, 1933, and at Lamar on January 2, 1934. Human occupation of the Macon Plateau dates back some 12,000 years to the Paleo Indian period, although the site's mound structures were

16. Lyon, A New Deal for Southeastern Archaeology, 173.
built between 900 and 1200 AD. The site was also inhabited by Creek Indians in historic times, ending about 1715.\textsuperscript{18}

In the early 1920s, the site's mound groups caught the attention of a prominent local attorney and retired general named Walter Harris. In 1929, Harris successfully solicited the interest of the Smithsonian's Bureau of American Ethnology, which sent a representative to evaluate the mounds. Once the Smithsonian had designated the site important, local organizations then mobilized to purchase and preserve it. They also sought work-relief funds to conduct excavations. In December 1933, with the help of Rep. Carl Vinson, Macon authorities succeeded in obtaining CWA funds to begin site excavation. The Smithsonian appointed Arthur R. Kelly, a Harvard-trained anthropologist, to direct the project, which grew with local support under CWA, FERA, and then WPA auspices into the largest archeological field party of the time.\textsuperscript{19} In 1937, cutbacks in WPA funding forced Kelly to scale back these excavations. He immediately retooled his strategy and launched a series of less extensive stratigraphic surveys that sampled sites around the area. Such creativity ensured that Kelly was to play an important role in the field of federal archaeology.\textsuperscript{20}

Prompted by sudden national attention, Macon leaders asked the National Park Service to consider the area's significance. Rep. Vinson submitted legislation in February 1934 requesting that the government purchase 2,000 acres for "Ocmulgee National Park." After amendments were attached specifying the park be purchased with local funds, President Roosevelt signed an act authorizing the creation of Ocmulgee National Monument on June 14, 1934. The park's actual establishment was contingent upon land acquisition. The Service had no "Chief Archeologist" at the time, so it sent its first Chief Historian, Verne E. Chatelain, to Macon to select the lands to be purchased. Chatelain and other NPS officials then spent several months wrangling with locals and working out deed issues until sufficient lands, about 678 acres, could be purchased. With this accomplishment, on December 23, 1936, President Roosevelt issued a presidential proclamation formally establishing the new park. The Park Service continued to employ various relief agency employees for excavation work at the new monument, adding some two hundred CCC workers in 1937.\textsuperscript{21}

In 1938, the Park Service reorganized its Branch of Historic Sites and Buildings into the Branch of Historic Sites with two separate subdivisions, the Historic Sites Division and the Archeological Sites Division, both under Chief Historian Ronald F. Lee. Arthur Kelly had been successful in his efforts managing the large-scale archeological projects near Macon, and the Service offered him the job of "Chief, Archeological Sites Division." Kelly accepted the position, making him in essence the first "chief archeologist" of the National Park Service with responsibility for all NPS archeology in the states and territories.\textsuperscript{22} These responsibilities included researching and surveying archeological sites nationwide and coordinating with other agencies, work he was already accustomed to doing. Kelly soon promoted a national archeological survey to produce a list of nationally significant archeological sites. He focused his attention, however, on a regional survey of the Southeast as a test case that would also have the benefit of promoting the alignment of WPA archeological survey work with the methodological requirements of the HSA as administered by the NPS. Kelly hoped that WPA funds could be obtained to conduct a regionwide survey that could stimulate archeological efforts in the area for decades. To that end he negotiated an inter-bureau agreement with the Smithsonian on survey planning and coordination of federal archeological work. Kelly's Southeast survey also promoted NPS cooperation with several Southern universities,

\textsuperscript{18} Walker, Comments on the draft of August 19, 2005.
\textsuperscript{19} Lyon, A New Deal for Southeastern Archaeology, 182-183. Note, the term "Big Dig" is somewhat inaccurate in that there were actually a series of excavations at or in the vicinity of the Macon area in the 1930s and the term was probably not used by archeologists at the time. Instead, later archeologists used "Big Dig" to refer back to the Macon excavations, which remain some of the most expansive ever conducted by federal archeology.
\textsuperscript{20} Lyon, Ocmulgee National Monument: An Administrative History, 2-17, 22.
\textsuperscript{21} Lyon, Ocmulgee National Monument: An Administrative History, 7-8, 20.
\textsuperscript{22} Mark Williams, ed., In His Own Words: An Interview with Dr. Arthur Kelly [by Marilyn Pennington, 1973], Lamar Institute Publication 44 (Athens: Lamar Institute, University of Georgia, 1997). 18. Kelly was probably not known as the "Chief Archeologist," however, because he reported to the director of the Branch of Historic Sites who was also the Chief Historian.

16 Southeast Archeological Center Administrative History
namely the Universities of Alabama, Kentucky, Tennessee, Georgia, and Louisiana State.23

While Kelly sought to build inter-institutional affiliations for his archeological program, he made plans to use Ocmulgee National Monument as the site for a regional archeological museum. This museum was to house archeological collections while also providing administrative space where archeologists could work while surveying, locating, testing, and excavating sites primarily in central Georgia. In other words, Kelly sought to establish a nascent archeological center at the monument. As early as January 1934, John T. West had been assigned to catalog Ocmulgee-related artifacts. He was still in that position in early 1938, when Ocmulgee archeologists under Kelly organized a laboratory in the Macon Municipal Auditorium. After Charles H. Fairbanks arrived in Macon late in 1938, he took charge of this temporary lab, which had 35 employees processing collections from the Ocmulgee excavations.24 Park Service plans, of course, envisioned a permanent structure from the beginning of NPS tenure of the site. Locals led by Walter Harris, and Georgia politicians, successfully pushed for a WPA allotment in the NPS budget to construct the facility, which became the Museum and Administration Building or visitor center of Ocmulgee National Monument.25 By 1939, Ocmulgee’s collections had grown to over a million objects and the lab became a central depository for collections from excavations conducted throughout the Southeast region.26 The artifact laboratory was transferred to the basement of the Ocmulgee visitor center in May 1940. Unfortunately, the Park Service had only received sufficient funds to complete 65 percent of the structure by 1941 when the project was postponed because of World War II.27

With Kelly in Washington in 1938, the Branch of Historic Sites decided to stop non-construction-

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related excavations at Occmulgee until material collected between 1936 and 1938 was properly examined and processed, mainly by WPA workers. Even though Kelly and others published several reports on their research, more archeology was being accomplished than was being written up. All archeological and construction work at the monument ended with American entry into World War II and the nationwide termination of the Depression-era work-relief programs.  

During the Great Depression, federal archeology, especially in the Southeast, made critical contributions to the development of archeological theory and method. Foremost, of course, relief-agency funding and manpower made possible research that was previously impossible for lack of funds. An enormous reservoir of potential data dug up by relief archeology provided analytical potential that is still being mined, although the criticism was leveled early on that more was dug up at the time than could be meaningfully evaluated, the emphasis having been placed upon jobs creation rather than scientific need or merit. Still, Depression-era archeology made undeniable contributions to the scholarship on the prehistory of the Southeast and also helped to launch the careers of numerous archeologists who would become distinguished in their field. Importantly, the National Park Service exercised a major and increasingly significant role in New Deal archeology. In the field of historical archeology, for example, Park Service activities prompted significant and original advances. As noted in the introduction, when rivalry between historical architects and archeologists working together in NPS-supported excavations at Jamestown produced friction, the Park Service placed Jean C. Harrington, an NPS architect interested in archeology, in charge. Harrington spent many years at Jamestown and later conducted important excavations at Fort Raleigh National Historic Site. Harrington demonstrated "that a great quantity of historical knowledge can be obtained by careful, painstaking archeological research, no matter how recent the site." Other NPS archeologists, including John L. Cotter and John W. Griffin, followed in his steps. Prior to the New Deal, American archeologists shunned work on historic as opposed to prehistoric sites, deeming the recent past the domain of historians. After the New Deal and the arrival of federal support for historical archeology, that attitude slowly began to change.

In a broad sense, federal funding during the New Deal allowed numerous archeologists a chance to

cut their teeth. According to Lyon, by 1941 these archaeologists had developed a basic chronology, geographic distribution, and sophisticated typologies to classify pottery types. In the process, they had begun sorting through the complex cultural interrelationships that would make possible a synthesis of a Southeastern aboriginal prehistory. The same group had also organized itself intellectually on a regional basis by founding the Southeastern Archaeological Conference in 1938. The Conference provided a professional framework to help further work in the field. Departing from an older generation’s methods and theories, this new generation of archaeologists rose to dominate the post-war field of Southeastern archaeology. The creation of the Southeastern Archaeological Conference, underwritten as it was by much work-relief archaeology, was a major accomplishment and marks a fundamental shift in the history of archeology in the region.30

“Salvage” Archeology

Relief-era archeology proved significant even with regard to its own postmortem. In 1944, J. Alden Mason, president of the Society for American Archaeology, created a Planning Committee to investigate the work of WPA-era period archeology. He took this action in response to the suggestion of several influential archeologists, especially Frederick Johnson of the Robert S. Peabody Foundation for Archaeology at Phillips Academy. The committee’s goal was to identify problems with large-scale federal archeology as experienced during the 1930s so that such problems could be avoided in any similar future undertaking.31 The committee’s investigation raised several important concerns. Namely, it found that federal archeological efforts were plagued by a lack of strong central program direction, insufficiently trained supervisory personnel, administrative ineptitude,
serious publication lag, as well as the scattering or loss of data and the failure to report on some completed excavations at all.\textsuperscript{32}

The National Research Council also appointed a committee to review WPA efforts. Among the prominent archeologists on this committee was William S. Webb, who had headed WPA archaeological efforts for the Tennessee Valley Authority. Webb’s committee found similar shortcomings in WPA archeology and recommended that the National Park Service take a major role in safeguarding the nation’s archeological sites for the future.\textsuperscript{33} By 1944, such recommendations had stirred interest in the profession among those concerned with proposed post-war reclamation activities stemming largely from passage of the Flood Control Act, which authorized massive dam construction projects all across the country. As the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers began to initiate such projects, Julian Steward, a Smithsonian anthropologist, cajoled his colleagues to develop plans or a program to cope with the archeological challenge posed by these massive engineering projects. Some cite this event as the origin of “cultural resource management,” although the flowering of this specialty came much later.\textsuperscript{34} At any rate, Steward’s colleagues paid attention to the various reservoir proposals that were circulating in Washington and made their own concerns known to the National Research Council, the Society for American Archaeology, the American Anthropological Association, and the American Council of Learned Societies. These organizations in turn raised the problem with various federal agencies.\textsuperscript{35}

In April 1945, a group of archeologists drawn from the organizations noted above met and organized the Committee for the Recovery of Archaeological Remains (CRAR). Originally, these members were J. O. Brew, Fred Johnson, A. V. Kidder, and William Webb. As previously discussed, archeology had been a component of New Deal work relief. One element of work relief archeology included the survey and excavation of sites threatened by reclamation and electrification projects in Alabama, Kentucky, and Tennessee resulting from TVA activity during the 1930s and early 1940s. Post-World War II planning by the Bureau of Reclamation and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, however, spelled disaster on a much broader scale. These agencies planned to construct new dams, especially within the Missouri River Basin, that would destroy huge numbers of archeological sites. The CRAR thus sought to make government bodies aware of the need for post-war emergency or “salvage” archeology, as it became known.\textsuperscript{36} The CRAR soon called for legislative mandates to provide adequate conservation of archeological resources, although these would take many years, and began to establish liaisons with the Smithsonian and the National Research Council.\textsuperscript{37}

At the urging of the CRAR, the Smithsonian Institution, and others with a general interest in archeological research, the federal government established a special mechanism to manage salvage archeology in conjunction with post-war water resource development projects undertaken by the Corps of Engineers and Bureau of Reclamation. This effort, dating to the summer of 1945, became identified as the Interagency Archeological Salvage Program (IASP). The program was designed to survey, inventory, evaluate, and excavate, on a selective basis, archeological sites threatened by federal reservoir development.\textsuperscript{38} Under provisions

\textsuperscript{32} Lyon, A New Deal for Southeastern Archaeology, 201-202; Thiessen, Emergency Archeology in the Missouri River Basin, 2. Lyon points out that neither the Smithsonian Institution nor the National Park Service had the resources to supervise effectively work-relief archeology. The WPA did respond to criticism by appointing anthropologist Vincenzo Petruzzo as a national consultant in February 1938, a move backed by Arthur Kelly and the Park Service. Petruzzo, however, faced significant opposition from field archeologists who resented attempts to gain control over their projects. See Lyon, A New Deal for Southeastern Archaeology, 67-68, 202. Such tension between administrators and field archeologists would remain an important theme in the history of Southeastern archeology.

\textsuperscript{33} Thiessen, Emergency Archeology in the Missouri River Basin, 2-3.


\textsuperscript{37} Thiessen, Emergency Archeology in the Missouri River Basin, 4.

of the HSA, the National Park Service assumed a prominent role in the coordination of IASP efforts especially because its own administrative structure essentially mirrored that of the construction agencies, a development stemming from NPS management of conservation-related relief work in the 1930s.

The basis of NPS involvement in the IASP was a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) signed in August 1945 between NPS Director Newton B. Drury and Smithsonian Secretary Alexander Wetmore that was approved in October by Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes. The MOU spelled out the basis for NPS-Smithsonian cooperation in the conduct of salvage archeology and clearly distinguished the division of labor between the two parties. According to the memorandum, the Park Service assumed the major role of coordinating with universities, museums, and the Smithsonian, whose archeologists did much of the early field work. The Park Service also drew plans, established programs, and handled funds. This critical agreement was later revised in 1961 and again in 1964. Initially, however, the salvage program was administered by NPS using the same institutional organization as had been used for its involvement in work-relief archeology. That is, archeology was assigned to the Branch of Historic Sites under the aegis of the Chief Historian, first Ronald F. Lee and then Herbert E. Kahler. In 1948, administration of NPS salvage work was handed over to archeologist, John M. Corbett, as discussed further below.\footnote{Lehmer, "Introduction to Middle Missouri Archeology," 1-2.} A forceful figure, Corbett was to exert tremendous influence over the course of Park Service archeology. Indeed, Corbett capitalized upon the NPS-Smithsonian agreement to build a thoroughgoing NPS archeological program, a program that became the foremost archeological research arm of the federal government. In summary, after 1945, the Park Service became actively committed to "out-house" archeology, as it was sometimes humorously called.\footnote{McGimsey III, Public Archeology, 104-105.} The Drury-Wetmore MOU thus marks a fundamental transformation in the attitude of the Park Service toward its role in federal archeology.

The foremost component of the IASP was the River Basin Surveys (RBS) and the major program within the RBS was the Missouri Basin Project (MBP), which was set up in Lincoln, Nebraska, in 1946 under the direction of Waldo R. Wedel. The MBP was responsible for the survey and recovery of archeological remains threatened by over one hundred dam projects in the Missouri River Basin. The RBS was administered by the Smithsonian, in consultation with the National Park Service, for the purpose of conducting its research under the IASP arrangement. Smithsonian archeological teams set up offices in the river basins where major reservoir construction activities were to take place. Over time most of these offices shut down. The major exception was the MBP in Lincoln, which continued in existence until 1969 when its facilities and personnel were transferred to the National Park Service.\footnote{Thiessen, Emergency Archeology in the Missouri River Basin, 9-10, 14-16, 18. According to Thiessen, the Korean War probably also contributed to the cutbacks.} The other major aspect of the IASP involved investigations that were conducted by cooperating partners, generally university researchers, who shared the cost of their research with the federal government. Beginning in 1950, RBS salvage archeological work conducted outside of the Missouri River Basin was transferred to university partners through short-term projects funded through the Park Service. Apparently, as a result, the need for the Smithsonian to maintain its own local operations was undercut and these offices were closed by 1952.\footnote{National Museum of Natural History, "River Basin Surveys (1946-1969), Records," http://www.nmnh.si.edu/naa/guide/r2.htm}
FIGURE 5. Following World War II, the Park Service expanded its role in federal archeology by joining with the Smithsonian Institution and contracting with academic partners to conduct a "salvage" program. This photo, taken at a conference in Florida in August 1947, depicts several figures key in the history of Southeastern archeology. Left to right: John M. Goggin (Yale University), Charles Brookfield (National Audubon Society), Al Manucy (National Park Service), John W. Griffin (Florida Park Service), Hale G. Smith (Florida Park Service), Wesley Hunt (Alabama Museum of Natural History), Charles H. Fairbanks (National Park Service), Dr. Antonio J. Waring Jr. (Savannah, Georgia), and Dr. Gordon R. Willey (Bureau of Ethnology, Smithsonian Institution). Photograph by Patricia C. Griffin and used by permission.

not to have terminal degree credentials. Finally, as academic archeology blossomed, many Smithsonian archeologists began to favor "research-oriented" rather than "salvage-oriented" projects.

As a result, even Smithsonian archeologists like Waldo Wedel, the first MBP director, and Robert Stephens, lobbied to phase out the RBS field offices. Publication was another source of friction between the MBP and Smithsonian archeologists in Washington. Whatever the merits of its publishing record, the MBP was often criticized for slowness in the publication of results and also for the quality of those results. After the MBP found itself in competition with the Park Service for funds and projects, criticism of its performance from administrators both inside and outside of the Smithsonian increased. Some wanted the MBP terminated and its facilities and staff transferred to the Park Service. In 1968, the Secretary of the Smithsonian appointed a committee to review its commitment to the MBP. This committee did indeed recommend that the Smithsonian transfer its salvage responsibility to the Park Service because MBP work was already funded by that agency and was contributing to the completion of the Service's statutory responsibility. In other words, the MBP was redundant.

Thomas D. Thiessen pointed out that the biggest problem with the MBP was its vague administrative relationships. The MBP had great autonomy from the Smithsonian, but conducted work for the Park Service, a separate agency. Hence, as the Smithsonian review committee determined, "the River Basin Surveys has [sic], in effect, two masters but without clear lines of authority to either." In 1969, Warren Caldwell, as RBS Director and Chief of the MBP, attempted to preserve the MBP by advocating future directions for MBP research in salvage

44. Thiessen, Emergency Archeology in the Missouri River Basin, 25, 35-41.
and in other areas. However, he failed to account for the declining role of salvage archaeology (after completion of the largest dams), the firmer legal basis of NPS involvement in those activities, and the attitudes of his Washington colleagues who were generally dissatisfied with MBP work. Not only were Caldwell’s plans poorly formulated, but he alienated erstwhile supporters, including John Corbett. Corbett had long promoted opportunities to expand the NPS role in archaeology and was better poised to do so than was Caldwell with regard to the Smithsonian. Caldwell’s gambit thus hastened the Smithsonian’s decision to cut off funds to the MBP. He left the RBS on January 25, 1969, after accepting a faculty position with the University of Nebraska. The Smithsonian and the Park Service then worked out an arrangement, which took effect on June 30, 1969, whereby most of the MBP’s staff and equipment were transferred to the Park Service to become the Midwest Archeological Center.47

The Antiquities Act of 1906 and the Historic Sites Act of 1935 provided general authority for NPS involvement in the reservoir salvage operations of the post-war period. However, by the 1950s the Park Service had become extensively involved in this activity, which nevertheless remained voluntary for the Bureau of Reclamation, the Corps of Engineers, and the Bureau of Public Roads, which began to participate later.

To provide specific legal authority and to ensure the cooperation of construction agencies and other parties operating under a federal permit, Congress passed the Reservoir Salvage Act in June 1960. This act codified the then-existing salvage programs, which strengthened their legal basis, and made the Secretary of the Interior responsible. It also established a procedure to ensure better coordination of archaeological salvage investigations with those planning the construction of dams. Importantly, the bill authorized the Park Service to accept funds from any public or private party seeking to construct such a dam but required as a condition of its permit or by law the recovery of historical or archeological data. The Park Service could also use such funds to contract with qualified institutions.48 The Reservoir Salvage Act, though limited, was an important precedent as the first legislation recognizing that archaeological sites are important for their data content. Additionally, the act designated a specific source of funding to collect such data. Meanwhile, concern with the loss of archeological sites resulting from roadway construction also led Congress to pass with the Federal-Aid Highway Act of 1956 a measure to prohibit the use of historic lands unless there was no feasible alternative.49 Two years later, Congress also authorized states to use federal highway construction grants for archeological and paleontological salvage in compliance with the Antiquities Act. This legislation set a precedent in designating a specific source of funds for such work and would have an important, if indirect, bearing on the origins of SEAC.50

One of the important contributions of salvage archaeology was that it helped to create an underlying culture, or at least broad acquiescence, within government that recognized the scholarly importance and the public obligation to conduct archeological research to help mitigate the negative impact of major federal development projects. Through salvage archaeology, the federal government began to accept some degree of responsibility for its own impact on heritage resources. By the 1960s, two generations of officials, university scholars, and state and local organizations interested in archeological preservation had experienced what was possible through federal archaeology. The emergence of archeology as a significant scholarly field, while undercutting Smithsonian interest in the MBP, also promoted further general awareness of the continued need for federally sponsored archeological research.

The Southeast Archeological Center arose in the early 1960s from the context of significant NPS

47. Moore, Letters to Cameron Binkley, March 29 and May 15, 2003. In retrospect, Caldwell might have better served his interests and those of his staff by seeking to merge his organization with the Park Service. The factors making that case were evident at the time.
49. Passed as Public Law No. 91-605 in 1956, the Federal-Aid Highway Act’s prohibition on the needless destruction of historic sites or natural beauty areas is the basis for Section 4(f), 49 U.S.C. Section 303.
involvement in salvage archeology. NPS archeology was clearly moored in a world beyond the parks and driven by general concerns of the profession. This background, the basis of archeological exceptionalism, is important in understanding both how SEAC and archeological resource management developed in the Park Service. That is not to say that no park research was conducted in the Southeast between the end of World War II and the creation of SEAC. Under Regional Archeologist Pinky Harrington, a scattering of small-scale archeological projects were conducted in the Southeast Region while one large-scale project continued at Jamestown under John Cotter. Park projects during this period included excavations of major portions of the town and fortifications of Fort Frederica (successively by Charles H. Fairbanks, Joel L. Shiner, and Jackson W. Moore), test excavations at Cumberland Gap and several structure excavations at Appomattox Courthouse (both by Moore), archeological surveys and excavations along the Natchez Trace Parkway (by Jesse Jennings and then by Cotter), and an investigation of the Natchez Trace mound group (by John Corbett and Cotter, reported in Archeology of the Bynum Mounds, Mississippi, 1951, NPS Archeological Research Series).  

Still, funding for park archeology to support park interpretive and planning purposes was limited. Over time, some archeologists thus attempted to link their interests with the public's increasing concern for historic preservation that was an expression of the overall environmental movement. By the late 1960s and early 1970s, archeologists working mainly in the West had begun to seek funding for salvage archeology using provisions of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 and

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the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. Archeologists also pushed for more expansive salvage legislation, especially the Archeological and Historic Preservation Act, finally passed in 1974 after many years of effort. These merging interests eventually led the disciplines of archeology and historic preservation to be known by a single term - "Cultural Resource(s) Management." Some archeologists, including within the Park Service, would also become increasingly concerned with issues of professional methodology that they saw in conflict with the interests of historic preservation. In the long run, however, environmentalists, historic preservationists, and archeologists all sought to institutionalize consideration of their values in the planning stage of federally sponsored projects, not just prior to their execution, so that a project's impact on significant cultural or natural resources could be better mitigated or even avoided entirely.

52. Thomas King, Bill Lipe, and Thomas R. Wheaton, eds., History of CRM (internet mailing list, 1999), American Cultural Resources Association (ACRA), http://lists.nonprofit.net/listproc/archives/acra-l/ (accessed November 3, 2003). The NPS-sponsored conferences held at the Airlie House in 1974 are often cited as the point where the professional disciplines of archeology and historic preservation were first grouped together beneath the now familiar rubric of Cultural Resources Management.
Chapter Two: Origins of the Southeast Archeological Center (1961-1966)

The National Park Service began a new archeological project at Ocmulgee National Monument in the interim between the passage of the Federal-Aid Highway and Reservoir Salvage Acts and the new cultural resource laws. On September 8, 1961, Director Conrad L. Wirth, bowing to political pressure from Georgia officials, agreed to allow construction of an interstate freeway through the monument. The highway, Interstate 16 from Macon to Savannah, was going to separate the Ocmulgee River from the park's major temple mounds and would likely damage or destroy a number of important prehistoric and historic sites. The director's decision, however regrettable, also set in motion events that would lead to the creation of the Southeast Archeological Center.

Another "Big Dig" at Ocmulgee National Monument

The Park Service had failed to take an early stance against the highway expansion proposal as it evolved in the late 1950s. Most Macon civic and business leaders, including Rep. Carl Vinson, the same congressman who had sponsored creation of the park some twenty-five years previously, supported the project. Locals hoped a more direct route to Savannah would increase Macon's business opportunities and buy the town a new bridge. NPS Regional Director Elbert Cox and Ocmulgee National Monument Superintendent Louis R. Caywood, despite being an archeologist himself, reacted slowly. Cox, in fact, chose acquiescence on the grounds that there was already so much development in the area that "it is a little hard to become exercised about one more intrusion in the picture." Caywood was replaced as superintendent by Albert L. Dillahunty in January 1961. According to John W. Walker, who was then serving as a staff archeologist at the park, Dillahunty was quickly "embroiled in controversy." The Society for American Archaeology also protested the planned highway and this had the effect of forcing the Park Service to take a stand against the project. The new NPS position was immediately unpopular to both Macon locals and the influential Vinson. Facing an untenable political situation, the Park Service even offered to sacrifice the McDougal or Dunlap Mounds, two of the site's smaller con-
structions, rather than have the road separate the river from all of the mounds. These efforts to reroute the highway proved unsuccessful, but the Park Service did succeed in getting the route moved nearer to the river than the mounds and obtained a commitment from the Bureau of Public Roads to conduct “a thorough” archeological survey and salvage effort prior to the beginning of construction. John W. Walker prepared a paper justifying the need and extent of an archeological dig along the proposed route. The state’s highway department, using federal funds available through provisions of the 1958 highway bill, then agreed to pay costs up to $600,000 for data recovery. Because of political pressure, work on the dig began immediately, which happened to be December 5, 1961. Winter being the rainy season in Georgia, the project was somewhat hampered by flooding. An average of fifty-four local laborers were hired to staff four field crews.5

By agreement, an advisory committee was established to oversee the excavation, which included John O. Brew, James A. Ford, Frank H. H. Roberts Jr., George I. Quimby, and Stephen Williams. Chief Archeologist John Corbett assigned Wilfred D. Logan to head the project and to organize the team’s “Supervisory Field Archeologists.” These were: Jackson W. Moore, John E. Ingmanson, C. Fred Bohannon, Charles B. Voll, and Walker, who transferred to the team from his post at the park. Corbett, Assistant Chief Archeologist Carrol Burroughs in Washington, DC, and John W. Griffin, the Regional Archeologist stationed in Richmond, Virginia, provided guidance for the project.6 Logan came down with hepatitis, so Moore supervised the field work, signing off on actions and reports in the absence of the above named “Acting Chiefs.” In letters to the author, Moore clearly recalled the oddity of being headquartered at a park, but not being subordinate to a superintendent for the first time in his career. Instead, the field crew was assigned to the Regional Office and reported to Corbett, Burroughs, or Griffin, depending on which was in the field at the


time. Under these archeologists worked 54 laborers hired locally. Unofficially, team members referred to the project as the “Big Dig” in reference to the massive relief-era digs around Ocmulgee that had employed hundreds of laborers and were among the largest excavations ever undertaken in the United States. While the new Ocmulgee project was not as vast it certainly was a big dig. Grasping for an official designation, however, Moore referred to the team as the “Archeological Research Unit.” Apparently, Corbett sanctioned the designation, which was later applied to NPS archeological operations under Moore at Fort Smith and under Bohannon at a reservoir salvage project near Pine Bluff, Arkansas. The Archeological Research Unit worked from the same building as park staff and set itself up in the basement of the Ocmulgee visitor center, the purpose for which it was originally designed.7 The unit was not a part of the park in an administrative sense - it was set up to do a salvage operation in advance of highway construction. However, after completion of the Big Dig, the designation “Archeological Research Unit” was applied to all team members who continued to conduct work in the Southeast Region.9 In form, if not name, therefore, the establishment of the Archeological Research Unit marks the beginning of an NPS “Southeast archeological center.”

Big Dig archeologists were not able to excavate the entire highway corridor inside the park; theirs was not a work-relief project. The Archeological Research Unit was also hampered by bad weather and a near-term deadline of June 30, 1962. Still, team members did uncover evidence of earlier settlement. Especially important, according to John W. Walker “was a stratified projectile point sequence that began with fluted points and contained both Early and Middle Archaic types not previously found in situ within the park.” Also recovered was evidence for Paleo Indian, Late Archaic, Woodland, Early (Macon Plateau) and Late (Lamar) Mississippian, and Historic (Creek) occupations. However, the team only began to find significant stratified data, that is, artifacts having good provenance, until near the end of the project and only reached the Paleo-Indian level on its last day. The Ocmulgee Advisory Committee included some prominent archeologists, most of whom had done work in the Southeast (the exception being Brew). With the exception of Ford, however, none had actually done work at the monument. The committee met first in late November 1961 at Ocmulgee. Little of the significant data discussed above had been recovered when the committee met again on April 28, 1962. The members thus recommended not to extend the project beyond its deadline, even though remaining funds would have allowed the more important archeological data to be recovered.9 When the roadway itself was constructed, local artifact collectors gathered many items from the road fill, including at least one Clovis spear point dating to the last Ice Age.10

John M. Corbett and the Research Center Idea

The idea of an NPS archeological center in the Southeast Region was not new. After all, the Park Service designed and constructed the Ocymulgee museum and visitor center in the 1930s with the view that it would become a research center, at least for central Georgia archeology. Apparently, some thought was also given to creating such a center at the Effigy Mounds site in Iowa. The Park Service also established its first genuine regional archeological center at Globe, Arizona, in 1954. This was the Southwest Archeological Center (SWAC), later to become the Western Archeological and Conservation Center. SWAC grew out of its expertise in ruins stabilization, not archeological research per se. Today, it focuses upon museum and collection conservation and management in the West and Southwest. The early Ocymulgee and later SWAC facilities were important precedents preceding the creation of SEAC.

In 1948, as noted before, John M. Corbett was promoted from an archeological field project on the Natchez Trace Parkway to manage NPS involvement in salvage archeology. Corbett, who held a doctorate in anthropology from Columbia University, assumed an administrative position—coordinating NPS involvement in the Smithsonian’s River Basin Surveys. In 1950, he also became responsible for park area research when promoted to be head archeologist within the Division of History and Archeology in the NPS Washington office. The Smithsonian program, along with the early Ocymulgee and later SWAC examples, apparently influenced Corbett’s thinking about how to organize NPS archeology and seems to be the model for NPS plans to create regional archeological research centers. The strength of the RBS was in how it conducted a full spectrum of projects using staff headquartered at central venues, especially the Missouri Basin Program office in Lincoln, Nebraska. This staff also aspired, although it often failed, to produce university-level research and scholarly publication, a goal senior NPS officials increasingly sanctioned. The RBS, of

11. Logan and Calabrese, “National Park Service Archeological Programs,” 59. Dates differ as to when Corbett joined the Service; and Walker, Comments on the draft of August 19, 2005.
course, did not belong to the Park Service and could not serve the needs of NPS management. On the other hand, an in-house research capability along the lines of an MBP would allow the Park Service to plan research for reasons that served its own specific needs while still allowing for salvage work.

In 1958, according to the New York Times, NPS Director Conrad L. Wirth established the Branch of Archeology (parallel to the Branch of History) in the Division of Interpretation to help manage new archeological work arising from increased water control and pipeline construction projects. He also intended the new branch to manage the archeological needs of “Mission 66,” a congressionally approved multi-million dollar spending program intended to beef up park infrastructure needs by the fiftieth anniversary of the National Park Service in 1966. With this reorganization, Corbett, who held a PhD at a time when many NPS archeologists did not, no longer reported to the Chief Historian, but to Assistant Director and Chief of Interpretation Ronald Lee, to whom they both reported. Corbett, therefore, is remembered as the Service’s first “Chief Archeologist.” In this position, Corbett significantly expanded NPS archeological activity far beyond what anyone had foreseen in the immediate post-war years. Indeed, Corbett exercised more influence in the 1960s than any “chief” archeologist before or after him. Corbett was an ex-Army captain and a veteran of World War II who had returned to duty during the Korean War. He had good relations with the “old-line” NPS regional directors and superintendents. Before the rise of the various centers, most NPS field archeologists reported to a regional director. However, Corbett was well-liked and well-liked. He could influence, therefore, a regional director’s hiring decision. NPS field archeologists held Corbett in high esteem both for his professionalism and this institutional influence.

According to Wilfred Logan, “Corbett’s influence on federal archeology became immense. John was a man of vast energy and imposing appearance. From the beginning, he saw clearly the needs of the Service in archeology. He gave his career and his life, in effect, to see that these needs were filled.” Corbett negotiated contracts, involved university partners, and guided the evolution of a national archeological research program for which the Park Service itself initially held little interest. Following passage of the Reservoir Salvage Act in 1960, Corbett continued to seek opportunities to expand the bureau’s role in archeology. In 1962, he launched an annual publication that promoted NPS archeology by summarizing and evaluating the Service’s archeological operations, progress, and accomplishments for each previous fiscal year.

The breadth of work revealed by these reports is impressive even if the scale of activity was less than desired. In his 1963 report, Corbett especially noted a developing trend whereby “the ratio of National Park Service archeology to reservoir archeology again improved - 46.5% of total funds available were expended in Service areas or on Service archeological activities as compared to 42.7% in the previous year. This reflects the fact that we are continuing to catch up on and keep abreast of the reservoir salvage program, and thus devote more time and funds to Service areas.”

Corbett did not plan to divert funds from archeological efforts launched by Bureau of Reclamation or Corps of Engineers hydrological construction projects. NPS archeology had buttered its bread with such work for a long time. Indeed, according to a 1996 NPS study, 68 percent of archeological funding in the Southeast Region in fiscal year 1966

13. Although it did supply archeologists to the Park Service to assist in park projects from time to time. See Table 6 in Thiessen, Emergency Archeology in the Missouri River Basin, 57.
15. Moore, Letters to Cameron Binkley, March 29 and May 15, 2003. Corbett, for example, had only one tier of management between himself and the Director whereas three tiers of hierarchy separate the current Chief Archeologist from the Director.
was devoted to archaeological contracts for survey and salvage operations tied to reservoir construction projects while most of the rest went to administering and planning such work. Instead, Corbett sought to leverage the Service’s salvage role to develop a park-focused archaeological capability. He hoped to establish a nucleus of staff that could eventually operate as a bigger in-park program. Funding was the primary limitation on this capability so Corbett went after bodies first, the archeologists themselves. Indeed, the principal reason that the research center idea probably appealed to Corbett was that there were simply too few archeologists in the Park Service. In June 1966, according to Corbett’s “Review and Analysis” for the 1966 fiscal year, there were just forty-one NPS archeologists serving in archeological positions, thirteen as staff, four at the Southwest Archaeological Center, and twenty-four in various parks. Only five of these positions were outside the Southwest and only two were in the Southeast. Twenty-three other archeologists held non-archeological positions, mostly as curators and superintendents. Among the senior positions (GS-11 and above), most had some salvage component while most of the junior positions (GS-5 to GS-9) involved interpretation and visitor services, not research. During this same period, the Park Service was experiencing a period of rapid growth. Between 1952 and 1972, a hundred permanent park unit additions were made to the National Park System. While Mission 66 increased the archeological work load, Congress did not match rapid system growth with equivalent increases in park staffing. Indeed, Corbett had five fewer archeologists on duty in 1966 than in 1963.

To address imbalances in park research and staffing needs, Corbett sought to leverage his scholarly credentials to build tight relations among academic archeologists and their institutions. His close associates included Jesse D. Jennings at the University of Utah, Preston Holder at the University of Nebraska, Emil W. Haury at the University of Arizona, and Gordon R. Willey at Harvard University. Most importantly, Corbett was able to influence the NPS budget through his liaison with the Committee for the Recovery of Archaeological Remains. The CRAR was an extremely effective instrument for obtaining salvage funds from Congress. Such funds may have been insufficient, but they were at a solid and predictable level and they kept increasing. While Corbett contracted out most of these funds to the Smithsonian and the universities, some were used to keep and increase his corps of NPS field archeologists. Where it was possible, this cadre also looked after the parks.

Decades after these events, NPS senior archeologist Calvin Cummings explained the basis of the research center by stating that “the National Park Service can not afford the 380 (or so) positions to place one archeologist in every park area. And even if this were possible, the type of duties and functions accomplished by a Park Archeologist do not encompass most of the NPS service wide (or even region wide) archeological needs.” In other words, if professional NPS archeologists were to have any voice or impact, they would need a better mechanism than expecting to have capable representatives stationed at the parks themselves. According to Cummings, the archeological center idea involved concentrating the talent of “a small group of anywhere from 6 to 20 archeologists located in a Center.” While actual staffing levels would vary by need, Cummings argued that the center “achieves a critical mass necessary to provide archeological services to 40 to 80 parks.”

John Corbett’s annual reports in the 1960s document a struggle to juggle numerous funding sources just to keep his existing program going. Moreover, as noted by Cummings above, park-based archeologists tended to serve as interpretive rangers or “bodies,” and not as resource managers or researchers. Corbett, who did not have sufficient funding to place an archeologist at every park that needed one, could not have accomplished his...
research goals even if that had been remotely possible.  

What support existed could be maximized by the efficiencies of a central research center, the notion for which is more clearly associated with John Corbett than with any other person.  

During Corbett's tenure as Chief Archeologist, he was substantially involved in creating both the Southeast Archeological Center and the Midwest Archeological Center (MWAC). Corbett, Zorro Bradley, who was Deputy Chief Archeologist, and Wilfred Logan, who became Chief of MWAC, also promoted the establishment of a research center at Chaco Canyon National Monument. Indeed, Corbett had even hoped to be its first chief.  

Corbett's retirement made that impossible, but through his efforts the Park Service and the University of New Mexico, which had a long-standing interest in Chaco research, did establish the Division of Cultural Research or "Chaco Center" under the direction of Robert H. Lister in 1971.  

At any rate, by 1963, the National Academy of Sciences Advisory Committee on Research in the National Parks had completed a major study, The Robbins Report, named after its chairman, W. J. Robbins. The Robbins Report strongly supported the creation of genuine research laboratories or centers within the National Park Service when these could be justified because of the importance of a park or the type of research. It recommended that these facilities serve not only park staff but scientists from universities and independent research organizations. It even advocated the creation of such research centers, "whenever possible, outside the limits of a park in some instances supported, administered and used jointly with other agencies or organizations." Thus, clearly, professional consensus and practical bureaucratic rationales were beginning to coalesce within the federal government around the notion of creating research centers within the Park Service in the 1960s.  

Creation of the Southeast Archeological Center  

The opportunity to conduct salvage excavation at Ocmulgee National Monument arose at the same time that Corbett was pushing the creation of a Chaco Canyon research center. For Corbett, a research center at Ocmulgee made similar sense to foster further archeological understanding of the considerable material unearthed at or near Ocmulgee during the relief-era excavations of the 1930s. He was particularly interested in promoting work related to Lamar, which is a detached unit of Ocmulgee. This material had been in storage for years and had entered a "dormant" status, such that conducting new research upon it was a difficult problem of reorganizing material and re-associating supporting documentation. According to former SEAC Chief Richard "Pete" D. Faust, re-energizing the Lamar-relief-era research was indeed part of Corbett's justification for moving archeologists to Ocmulgee, which he had already begun to call a "center."

Corbett deliberately sought to use the Ocmulgee project to expand in-park archeology in the Southeast. Possibly, Griffin put the notion to

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27. John W. Walker said the same in describing his own account as a staff archeologist at Ocmulgee prior to the Big Dig. Walker, Discussion with Cameron Binkley, May 29, 2003.  
28. Cummings also noted that NPS management, at some point, folded park discipline classifications into a general "025" series instead of maintaining a separate "193" Park Archeologist series. This move de-emphasized the incentive for park staff to hold archeologist credentials and when trained archeologists moved on, they were often replaced with a park ranger, not an archeologist. See Cal Cummings, Memorandum to Dan Lenihan, March 18, 1996, in Arnold "Archeology Centers: Admin. History and Reorganizations" folder, Michele Aubry files, National Center for Cultural Resources, Washington, DC.  
29. Moore, Letters to Cameron Binkley, March 29 and May 15, 2003; Faust, Oral History Interview, 3-4. See, also Thiessen, Emergency Archeology in the Missouri River Basin, 48, for Corbett's role in creating MWAC.  
31. National Park Service, "A Brief History of Chaco Culture National Historical Park," http://www.nps.gov/chcu/briefhis.htm (accessed November 5, 2003). The center conducted multi-disciplinary research, archeological surveys, and limited excavations that the Park Service curtailed after 1981 to accommodate Native American concerns and because of the wealth of data that already existed or that could be acquired from new non-destructive technologies, such as ground-penetrating radar. The focus of the Chaco Center was exclusive to the study of the Chacoan cultural complex. It was based on the campus of the University of New Mexico.  
33. Faust, Oral History Interview, 6.
Corbett of using the Archeological Research Unit as the basis to create a Southern archeological “center.” Griffin had the most to gain by promoting archeology in the region. Regardless of whose idea it was first, both Griffin and Corbett supported it enthusiastically.

Ocmulgee was a logical location to place an archeological team that could do park work on a regional basis. Again, the Ocmulgee facility was originally designed as a research center and was also centrally located in the region. Moreover, it even had a surplus of space. Georgia was transferring federal funds to the Park Service for a major salvage excavation project at a park. Normally, such funds were expended on lands controlled by the Bureau of Reclamation or the Army Corps of Engineers. At Ocmulgee in 1961 and 1962, a confluence of interests came together that encouraged Corbett and Griffin to try and leverage the situation to further a park-based program. Once the Archeological Research Unit was in existence, transforming it into a center was a short step only obstructed, of course, by the significant issue of how to fund its operations over the long term. Eventually, Corbett and Griffin would have to keep the center going with subsequent funding made available through other park or salvage projects in the region. The main point, however, is that the Big Dig was envisioned as the genesis of a southeastern archeological research center. As John W. Walker wrote in his “Brief History of Ocmulgee Archaeology,” when the dig ended, “it was hoped that the Archeological Research Unit could continue operation by having the archaeologists carry out needed field work on parks throughout the Southeast Region and return to Ocmulgee for analysis and report writing as [Charles H.] Fairbanks had done in the 1950s.”

That goal was hard to achieve, however. Officially, the Archeological Research Unit ceased to exist on
June 30, 1962. At that point, Charles Voll transferred back to the Southwest Archaeological Center. There was an attempt, however, to keep the unit going by reassigning the former Big Dig archaeologists to other Park Service archeological projects in the Southeast Region. Jackson W. Moore went to Fort Smith, Arkansas, which was in the region at that time, although not yet a park. Fred Bohannon also went to work in Arkansas but on a river basin project. John W. Walker went to Appomattox Courthouse, Virginia, which was still within Region One, while Ingmanson, with Griffin, went to Russell Cave in Alabama. Both Walker and Ingmanson, however, came back to Ocmulgee to complete their reports between October and December 1962. Walker then accepted a promotion to the Washington office to oversee thematic archeological studies prepared under contract for the National Historic Sites Survey. Griffin returned to the Regional Office, then located in Richmond, Virginia, but also did more extended work at Russell Cave National Monument. Ingmanson was the only Big Dig archeologist to remain at Ocmulgee although he, too, left in September 1965. Ingmanson was apparently trying to report on excavations done at the park during the 1930s. Reporting on Ocmulgee’s collections was one of Corbett’s main arguments for justifying the establishment of a research center at the monument. Apparently, when Griffin’s funding for the work at Fort Smith ran out, Moore took a position outside the region and did not return to Ocmulgee.

Between 1963 and 1966, John Corbett struggled but ultimately succeeded in securing and shifting funding to allow the creation of a permanently and professionally staffed research organization based at Ocmulgee National Monument. Funding was available because by then the parks were receiving small amounts for archeological work, as evidenced by Walker’s work at Appomattox and Moore’s at Fort Smith. Corbett’s success, however, probably

followed simply from his ability to convince Southeast Regional officials to go along with his plan to transfer two existing Regional Office positions to Ocmulgee. They agreed and the Regional Archeologist position (held by Griffin) and a regional staff archeologist position were assigned to the monument. Later, a research archeologist position was created as were two curator positions and one for a secretary. Corbett managed the new archeological center as a “field dependency” of the Washington office, that is, it reported to him directly. John W. Walker then gave up his position as a National Survey archeologist and returned to Ocmulgee late in October 1966. His major responsibility was to oversee park-related archeological research. With the arrival of its first staff members, the former Archeological Research Unit was duly re-designated the “Southeast Archeological Center.”

Corbett assigned Walker to be Acting Center Chief until John Griffin could assume his duties as SEAC’s first chief in mid-June 1967. Just as SEAC was created, Griffin took advantage of an opportunity to further his professional expertise by beginning a PhD program at the University of Chicago. Director George B. Hartzog Jr. had approved the training at NPS expense and Griffin was to report to Ocmulgee in June 1967. Griffin was the logical choice to head the new center despite his initial absence: He was both prominent in Floridian archeology and Pinky Harrington was his mentor in the Park Service. Moreover, by the time Griffin appeared again in the Southeast, Corbett had been able to get Griffin’s Regional Archeologist position, which had reported to the Regional Director, transferred to the research center at Ocmulgee. This action created the Center Chief position and placed that position under Corbett’s line authority. The fact that Griffin was working on a PhD was probably another plus in his favor.

Corbett also chose Pete Faust, who had served two years on his staff in the Division of Archeology, to transfer to the new archeological center. Faust actually arrived at Ocmulgee before Walker, on October 17, 1966, to assume the position of Chief, Archeological Research, which essentially meant that he managed contracting for the River Basin Salvage Program. Faust coordinated with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, obtained archeological services, wrote contracts, usually with universities, and developed out-year budgets. Previously, he had also spent a year as Acting Superintendent of the Mound City Group (Hopewell Culture National Historical Park), then in the old Northeast Region, and was perhaps already seeking a leadership role in NPS archeology. Soon after Griffin arrived at Ocmulgee, he secured funding to hire a curator, Lee Hanson, who was actually an archeologist with curatorial training. Hanson then began the considerable work of improving curation of the monument’s archeological collections, which had endured a long period of neglect.

The historical factors that gave rise to the Southeast Archeological Center are clear. They include: strong traditional Park Service involvement in relief-era and salvage archeology, Chief Archeologist John Corbett’s interest in promoting a park-based archeological program in the Southeast, the need for an organizational model that maximized the efficiency of a bare-bones park archeological program, and a confluence of archeological, commercial, and political forces centered around Ocmulgee National Monument that brought these factors to the fore between 1961 and 1966.

43. Patricia C. Griffin, Oral History Interview by Cameron Binkley, September 9, 2003, National Park Service, 8.
44. Faust, Oral History Interview, 8, 11; Biographical data sheet on Richard Faust supplied to author by George R. Fischer; Historic Listing of National Park Service Officials (Washington, DC: National Park Service, 1991), http://www.cr.nps.gov/history/online_books/olson/histlist14.htm#B (accessed November 28, 2003). John W. Walker gives the arrival date of Faust as October 17, 1966, although some reports have Faust arriving on October 25. Faust was promoted on that date, which may explain the discrepancy. See Walker, “A Brief History of Ocmulgee Archaeology,” 33.
Chapter Three: SEAC and Ocmulgee National Monument (1966-1972)

At the same time that Corbett and Griffin were working to create SEAC, Congress was debating how to address significant threats to the nation's cultural patrimony unleashed by massive federal highway expansion projects, urban renewal efforts, and sprawl that was gutting historic buildings, neighborhoods, and archaeological sites at an increasing rate across the land. In October 1966, Congress passed the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). The NHPA became the cornerstone of national efforts to protect historically and culturally significant properties. It mandated the creation and maintenance of a National Register of Historic Places, and provided for the designation of State Historic Preservation Officers (SHPOs) and State Historic Preservation Programs to conduct comprehensive statewide surveys of historic properties important in U.S. history, architecture, archeology, engineering, and culture. The act also provided matching funds to the states and the National Trust for Historic Preservation to preserve historic properties and promote historic preservation. In addition, Section 106 of the act requires that prior to funding or licensing any undertaking, all federal agencies must "take into account" the effect of such undertaking on the integrity of any district, site, building, structure, or object listed or eligible to be listed in the National Register. The effect of the law was broad and far-reaching and required a major shift in the federal government's attitude toward the management of historic resources. In complying with the NHPA, the profession of archeology played an important role, which it characteristically strove to define on its own terms.

George B. Hartzog Jr., who served as NPS Director from 1964 to 1972, strove hard to secure the prominence of the Park Service in implementing the NHPA. Hartzog was a member of the Rains Committee that had pushed for the new federal historic preservation legislation. He was a major backer of that legislation, at least in the beginning. To implement the NHPA, Hartzog enlisted the advice of a Special Committee on Historic Preservation to which he appointed historian Ronald F. Lee, a senior NPS official. On Lee's recommendation, Hartzog then added J. O. Brew, director of Harvard's Peabody Museum and a prominent archeologist, and Ernest Allen Connally, a professor of the history of architecture at the University of Illinois. The Lee-Brew-Connally committee produced a report that recommended a major reorganization of NPS professional services. Hartzog took the committee's recommendations seriously. The Service needed to reorganize to address the requirements of the NHPA that did not match with its traditional emphases. The Park Service had tended to shun involvement in historic preservation unless it involved structures, objects, or sites of national significance or which were directly tied to the purposes for which a park was established. Yet, the NHPA linked the Park Service to state and local authorities and preservation interests across the land through the mechanism of the National Register and through other require-

1. See James A. Glass, The Beginnings of a New National Historic Preservation Program, 1957-1969 (Nashville: American Association for State and Local History, 1990), for a detailed account of the NPS's role in the movement that led to the NHPA.
ments of the act. According to historian James A. Glass, some of the values and ideas inherent in the so-called “New Preservation” thus had to be imposed upon the rank and file of traditional NPS managers not previously accustomed to serving these constituencies. Moreover, the new emphases of preservation included historic architecture, important landmarks, and urban conservation. The Service also lacked updated skills in restoration. Lee recognized the need to link the NPS more closely with the outside preservation movement and recommended to Hartzog that he hire Connally to oversee the needed organizational makeover. Connally had good ties to and specific background in historic and architectural preservation. Hartzog offered Connally the job. Connally accepted the position with the proviso that he would have an explicit mandate to reorganize the bureau’s historic preservation-related professions to obtain an optimum benefit relative to the goals of the NHPA. Indeed, Connally sought nothing short of the creation of a “European-style monuments” agency within the Park Service, something like the French Monuments Service, which being entirely separate from that country’s natural parks, had a comparably stronger interest in cultural resource management than NPS authorities.

Connally accepted the position in September 1966, although he waited to join the Park Service until June 1967 to discharge academic obligations. Immediately, however, Connally began working up an outline of the new NPS organization Hartzog had chartered him to create. It was called the Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation, or OAHP. OAHP would for the first time administratively combine and integrate NPS professional services in the fields of historic resource preservation at the national level. These fields included the disciplines of history, historic architecture, and archeology (museum curation was added later). Archeology was a component from the beginning of OAHP because J.O. Brew, who had great pull with Director Hartzog, had strongly argued that it was a preservation discipline, dealing as it did with cultural resources. The gradual emergence of “conservation archeology” would make this ever more true.

As a practical matter, however, Connally struggled to create a new organizational arrangement within the Park Service based not upon function, but academic research practice. He sought to organize the three primary history-related preservation disciplines into separate divisions, similar to university departments. These were then grouped within an overarching interdisciplinary organization. He intended this body to oversee preservation projects from their start to their finish, a task that might begin with historic or archeological research and might end with restoration by a historical architect.

Connally’s secondary goal was to uplift the standards of cultural professionals through advanced training and education, closer association with academic institutions, and the provision of greater responsibility within NPS. He also generally supported Hartzog’s policy for “key personnel in those disciplines in which a PhD degree is a normal requisite in academic circles to have the same doctoral credentials.” On all of these counts, Connally’s goals were worthy, more so than his actual influence for his policies also engendered much friction within the National Park Service, especially among archeologists. That friction was to bear greatly upon the Southeast Archeological Center.

**Washington Absorbs Ocmulgee**

SEAC’s location at Ocmulgee National Monument complicated its early administration. The site offered several advantages as the base for a regional archeological team, given its central location and storage and laboratory facilities. In retrospect, the location generated several problems. One persistent problem was the confusion that resulted by

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7. Ernest Allen Connally, Memorandum to the Director, March 5, 1970, in Ernest Allen Connally Papers, "Personnel OAHP," Box 1, Harpers Ferry Center. Connally later claimed that while he promoted greater professionalization, Director Hartzog sometimes pushed the issue too far, alienating otherwise competent staff. Hartzog was under pressure from the Smithsonian Institution whose chief, S. Dillon Ripley, denigrated NPS professionals, especially archeologists, for their lack of scholarly credentials. As a result, Hartzog pushed the issue on NPS archeologists. See Connally, Oral History Interview by James Arthur Glass, 97-102.
having the "regional" archeological team conduct its operations from an isolated but major archeologically oriented park from which the team was actually separate. Superintendents and staff at other parks were not always able to recognize that the center was a regional resource and not simply a supplement to the staff of Ocmulgee. The fact that SEAC was formed in conjunction with the Big Dig project, that Ocmulgee salvage was really SEAC's first project, and that there appeared to be a continuity in staffing (Walker, Griffin, and Bohannon) abetted this confusion from the start. Moreover, a major justification for SEAC's perpetuation was the need to work off the backlog of relief-era artifacts left over from the original Ocmulgee excavations. Third, SEAC was administered from Washington, not a regional office, which probably also contributed to some inherent administrative confusion regarding SEAC's role. For example, any disagreements between superintendents and the center would have to involve both the Regional Director and the Washington office to resolve. Finally, this confusion reached its apex on September 4, 1968. Pursuant to a memorandum of that date, Director Hartzog ordered that the management of Ocmulgee National Monument be integrated with the management of SEAC. This directive became effective on October 1, 1968. At the same time, Hartzog transferred authority over the monument's administration to the Division of Archeology under OAHP. This episode requires a little discussion.

Hartzog's enthusiasm for the National Historic Preservation Act apparently led him to take an interest in the management of the significant archival, museum, and archeological collections of the National Park Service. Hartzog established a new set of NPS priorities soon after assuming the directorship in January 1964. One of these priorities related to park interpretation and the need to reorient museum work. Hartzog's interest eventually expanded to include archeology, and by October 1967, he was in correspondence with Supt. Bohannon, recently promoted from the fieldwork on the Natchez Trace Parkway, regarding the nature of Ocmulgee's curatorial efforts. In response to a query from Hartzog, Bohannon wrote that Ocmulgee did not have a "formal archival program" or records of "trans-NPS significance." However, much Ocmulgee material related to Southeastern archeology, and was an "extremely significant part of the archeological program of the National Park Service." Hartzog was interested in learning about how the park managed its extensive archeological collection. Bohannon explained that the collection was jointly managed by SEAC, himself, and the park archeologist, although it was scheduled to be managed by a permanent curator assigned to SEAC. Obviously, this memorandum indicates that SEAC had already moved toward involvement in the management of Ocmulgee's archeological collections. Hartzog's interest in the state of their care was likely prompted by Chief Archeologist Corbett, or his staff. Undoubtedly, the Big Dig and the creation of SEAC had well acquainted Corbett and Deputy Chief Archeologist Zorro Bradley with some long-standing problems in curating the monument's collections. On top of that, their new staff archeologist was George R. Fischer, who had just completed a tour at Ocmulgee. According to Bradley, "there was never any question in Corbett's mind, or mine, that the Ocmulgee collection would be moved to SEAC as soon as possible to get the collection out from under the monument's supervision." All they needed was an opportunity. When opportunity struck, however, it was more than they had bargained for.

At some point after the director's informational exchange with Supt. Bohannon, Hartzog made a personal trip to the monument and inspected its facilities. He came away unhappy. According to former Chief Historian Robert M. Utley, Hartzog found "the collections in great disarray in the basement." Hartzog's specific concern may have been the ground and rain water leaks into the collection and lab storage areas that had been a problem at the monument for many years. Dampness had caused some of the metal storage cabinets to rust and threatened the preservation of

10. "Activities" (Division of Archeology, NPS, September and October 1968), in "Archeology" Box H22, Harpers Ferry Center.
records and historic metal objects. Bradley recalled on his own first visit to Ocmulgee being “appalled at stacks of rott ing cardboard boxes spilling sherds and other artifacts out onto the floor. Inadequate shelving and lack of proper workspace in the basement was apparent.” Back in Washington, Hartzog “created a great crisis,” in Utley’s words, by setting the staff into a frenzy of activity. Further inquiry revealed that “some 90 percent” of NPS artifacts were uncataloged, that the situation was bad everywhere, not just at Ocmulgee, and that the Park Service had no idea what it had. Hartzog was on good terms with Julia Butler Hansen, Chair of the House Appropriations Committee. He explained the situation to her and had his staff develop budget proposals to do something about upgrading the collections.

Unfortunately, although senior NPS managers had become aware of serious shortcomings in the state of the management of NPS archeological collections, this activity did not result in any significant new funding.

Director Hartzog did like to “tinker” with organizational arrangements, however. He not only authorized Connally to create OAH, but he made numerous other adjustments to the Park Service’s administrative structure, as is evident by looking at organization charts during his tenure. Although Utley had only a vague recall of Hartzog’s interest in Ocmulgee, he felt that the director was concerned with the management of the monument’s collections. Hartzog apparently thought that improvement in the situation might follow a change of leadership and organization. He therefore specifically directed the merger of SEAC and Ocmulgee. After all, with a cadre of archeologists stationed at Ocmulgee, many of whom had done work there and knew more about the site than anyone else, why not let them run the park? Such thinking would have fit neatly with Hartzog’s overall goal of improving NPS interpretive efforts. As John W. Walker noted, archeological investigations at the park could have been reasonably devised, perhaps in conjunction with exhibits, to accommodate an ongoing public interpretation program. At any rate, an NPS press release put a favorable spin on the matter by announcing that the planned administrative changes would “put more emphasis on archeological research” while providing “a reduction in administrative work.”

Despite perceived benefits, the attempt to integrate the management of SEAC and Ocmulgee National Monument was not successful. De facto results were problematic. First, the decision further confused the role of SEAC as a regional resource by

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14. Sellars and Webb, An Interview with Robert M. Utley, 22. Former SEAC Chief Richard Faust did not recall this specific incident, but acknowledged that Hartzog “was much exercised about the situation at OCMU [Ocmulgee].” Hartzog even “braced” Faust at one point during an archeological conference in the late 1960s or early 1970s and “delivered to [him] and those nearby a short lecture about our problems preserving ‘important baseline data.’” Hartzog continued, according to Faust, “with a homily about how, when he was a boy back in Smoke, South Carolina, if the roof leaked someone just got the tar bucket and fixed the problem.” Richard D. Faust, e-mail to Cameron Binkley, April 5, 2004, National Park Service.
15. Richard D. Faust, e-mail to Cameron Binkley, April 5, 2004, National Park Service. Most of SEAC’s collections were ceramic or lithic objects not especially susceptible to moisture damage, but the records relating to these objects were, of course, composed of paper.
18. Utley, e-mail to Cameron Binkley, March 23 and 26, 2004. Hartzog, in conversation with the author, did not recall these distant events.
19. This “brainstorm,” according to Faust, may have been Connally’s idea. Faust, Oral History Interview, 11.
actually placing SEAC in charge of the region’s main archeological park. The question now became: was Ocmulgee a park or a research center? And, if a research center, was it a regional center or one dedicated mainly to Ocmulgee? After all, a large percentage of Ocmulgee’s collections related to Georgia. Many could be forgiven for having some misunderstanding about SEAC’s mission. Another problem with the arrangement was that Region One Director J. Leonard Volz lost authority over the park, its interpretation, and its budget and was probably not enthusiastic about the plan. Indeed, this episode likely helped undermine his support for OAHP. Possibly, the merger idea was Connally’s to begin with, but the end result put Connally in charge of Ocmulgee and he and Volz did not get along. According to Utley, Volz was an “old-line” NPS manager and not prone to favor an NPS outsider, especially an urban sophisticate like Connally. Connally’s administrative innovations only further soured many rank and file NPS administrators, some of whom, like Volz, feared or resented OAHP and the rising power of “the historians.”  

Another failing of the merger was the assumption that SEAC archeologists were interested in interpreting Ocmulgee. In time, public archeology would embrace this function as an element of the profession, especially at SEAC, but that was years in the future. In the 1960s, this new task distracted center archeologists from their primary responsibility of planning and executing regionwide archeological projects. Although Washington may have approved the merger, which seemingly provided greater professional control over the archeological collections, SEAC staff probably resented it. Certainly, Chief John Griffin, who considered research his main duty, was not enthusiastic about shouldering additional administrative responsibilities. While he surely regarded interpretation and park management as valuable, these traditional NPS functions were not the most important activities to him. Despite their interest in managing Ocmulgee’s collections, it is not likely that Corbett, his staff, or anyone at SEAC, sought control over the park’s interpretative and administrative functions.  

Chief Griffin apparently sought to downplay the impact of the director’s order. He did not want to overshadow Bohannon at the park. Bohannon, of course, was upset. He complained to the Southeast Regional Director about constraints being forced upon park management by the anticipated loss of his own position. Bohannon even directed park staff to shorten the monument’s hours as he expected his own position to be abolished. His duties were to be assumed by the park archeologist. Bohannon’s position was not actually eliminated, but four months after the official merger in October 1968, he found the park’s administration uncertain and personally unsatisfactory. Bohannon only grew more frustrated the longer the arrangement prevailed. According to Pete Faust, Bohannon finally confronted Director Hartzog in person while both attended a superintendents’ conference. In Faust’s words, Bohannon “braced the director in no uncertain terms, told him what he thought of the idea,” and “had a transfer fairly quickly after that [September 1969].” Thus, the main reason that SEAC’s experimental administration of Ocmulgee failed was that it interfered with the normal and self-perceived roles and responsibilities of the respective staffs of the center and monument. Understandably, Bohannon was engulfed by a personal crisis over the threat to his own position while Chief Griffin approached his increased authority at Ocmulgee without marked enthusiasm. In fact, instead of focusing upon Ocmulgee’s management, Griffin soon turned his effort to removing SEAC from the monument all together.  

At about the time Bohannon transferred out, Washington handed administration of Ocmulgee back to Regional Director Volz. According to Volz, “the format, content, and quality of the interpretive program” was to remain “under the professional direction of the professional personnel at the Archeological Center.” Volz also maintained that the new arrangement created “a total unit that demonstrates, at high standards, the Service’s  

22. Sellars and Webb, An Interview with Robert M. Utley, 8-9, 79-80. Possibly, Connally originated and sold the idea of merging SEAC and Ocmulgee to Hartzog as a means to improve interpretation at a park that had almost entirely missed out on Mission 66.  
23. Faust, Oral History Interview, 12-13; Utley, e-mail to Cameron Binkley, March 23 and 26, 2004.  
25. Faust, Oral History Interview, 12.
capabilities in research through interpretation.” 26 However, given the potential for conflict between respective SEAC and Ocmulgee chiefs, Volz replaced Bohannon with a “management assistant,” W. Pingree Crawford, in December 1969. Crawford reported to the superintendent at Kennesaw National Battlefield Park. This awkward arrangement remained in place until March 1971 when Crawford was appointed superintendent of Ocmulgee. 27 By then, planning for SEAC’s exodus from Ocmulgee to new quarters was well underway and it was presumably safe to relieve Kennesaw Mountain from administrative authority over the monument. Thus, the Park Service’s first and apparently only attempt to combine the management of a national park with that of an archeological research center came to a quiet and uncelebrated conclusion.

SEAC Considers Leaving Ocmulgee

Director Hartzog’s memorandum of September 4, 1968, primarily dealt, in the words of SEAC Chief John Griffin, “with the now discarded idea of the center running the Monument.” 28 That same memorandum, however, also directed Ernest Connally to:

initiate steps promptly to relate Ocmulgee National Monument to an appropriate University as a research station for the University. Steps should also be taken to relate Ocmulgee to the University with a Research Center on the University campus. 29

The first notion enunciated in the phrase above, that Ocmulgee should serve as the “research station” of a university, seems to have meant an arrangement by which a suitable university would agree to administer Ocmulgee’s archeological collections as a storage facility and laboratory both for itself and for the Park Service. Undoubtedly, the Director was fishing for a way to bring a greater curatorial capacity to those collections in the absence of new funding. However, in a “Catch-22” situation, no university would be interested, according to John Griffin, unless the Park Service provided that funding. 30 The more promising idea in Hartzog’s memorandum was the notion “to relate Ocmulgee to the University with a Research Center on the University campus.” Hartzog did not explicitly authorize the wholesale relocation of SEAC, which, after all, was now in charge of the monument. However, the possibility of moving the center is what clearly drew the focus and hope of the center’s staff and supporters.

The idea of associating government professionals with academic professionals, as previously noted, was a public policy concern in the late 1960s. In 1963, The Robbins Report had extolled the virtues of locating government laboratories and centers on university campuses where it made sense, and explicitly encouraged such efforts within the National Park system. 31 The Federal Council for Science and Technology published a similar report in 1968. 32 The notion was that government professionals could improve job performance within their own disciplines by maintaining a closer association with academic professionals. Of course, Connally, with Hartzog’s blessing, had made increasing the professionalism of the Park Service a major goal of OAHP. Chief Archeologist John Corbett happily supported this Connally initiative (though he disputed others) because it supported his own efforts to create an effective archeological organization that was still struggling to escape the shadow of more established cultural professions within the Park Service. 33 Connally credited Corbett for his

28. The memo is quoted and discussed in the correspondence of John W. Griffin, but the author has not located an actual copy. See Griffin, Letter to John Corbett, January 5, 1970.
30. Griffin claimed no university was interested in this proposition unless the Park Service entirely paid for the Ocmulgee-based center. Griffin, Letter to John Corbett, January 5, 1970.
33. Faust, Oral History Interview, 10.
support on this issue years after the archeologist's death.34

Eventually, it became clear that SEAC's administration of the monument was a bad idea. By the time Ocmalugee Superintendent Bohannon transferred out in October 1969, Corbett and Griffin were engaged in an active dialogue with officials at two major universities regarding the possibility of completely relocating SEAC to one of their respective campuses. These were the only two schools that appeared to harbor the requisite academic departments, geographic conveniences, and staff interest to merit serious consideration. They were the University of Georgia (UGA) in Athens and Florida State University (FSU) in Tallahassee.35 Officials of both universities were interested in SEAC's plans and each tried to influence the outcome of the NPS decision.

How the Director's "initial memo" to associate Ocmalugee, that is, the SEAC-administered national monument, with a university, became authority to move the organization entirely is unclear. Griffin, however, had strong motives and desire to extricate SEAC completely from Macon. The monument's isolated location made it difficult both personally and professionally for Griffin and his staff to conduct operations. SEAC's close association with Ocmalugee, which included staff responsibility for the park's interpretative program, also complicated the center's mission and regional role. The decision to combine the two organizations had left a legacy of uncertainty regarding the disposition and purpose of the archeological center. Administrative delays and indecision had also caused frustration on the university affiliation question. In January 1970, Griffin complained to Corbett that the morale of SEAC's staff was "quite low." He noted that "we have gone through several years of indecision" and declared that "a statement of what we are, and are not, going to do would help."36

What troubled Griffin about the Macon area was its social climate. In the 1960s, Macon was a small rural and conservative Southern city. There were few amenities. Macon practiced discrimination by maintaining separate schools for blacks and whites. After public school desegregation was imposed by court order, the city integrated its students but retained a separate system for males and females to help prevent miscegenation. Macon was also one of the last public school systems to require compulsory military education for boys, which was an issue for the Griffin family. In general, SEAC staff found the academic caliber of the Macon school system deficient. John Griffin, a native Floridian, had also cut his teeth on Florida archeology, and his parents even lived near Daytona. Thus, for personal reasons, the Griffins wanted to move back to Florida. Eventually, John Griffin sent his wife, Patricia, and their children to Tallahassee while he remained in Macon. Patricia, a trained social worker, found a position on the faculty of FSU as an instructor. Certainly, this situation ensured that John Griffin was predisposed in favor of moving SEAC to Florida. In fact, according to Patricia Griffin, her husband and his close friend Hale G. Smith, the founder and Chairman of FSU's Anthropology Department, actually first conceived of moving SEAC to Tallahassee for this reason, although it is not known when they first discussed the idea.37 Griffin's inclination to move SEAC to Florida, his past association with Florida archeology, his family situation, and close friendship with Smith, complicated his dealings with Washington. Nevertheless, Director Hartzog had explicitly ordered SEAC to relate the archeological center to a suitable university. That is what made thinking about moving the center possible in the first place.

Hartzog intended his October 1968 memorandum to bring improvements in the status and professionalism of SEAC's staff but instead it brought further frustration. SEAC was struggling to define itself

35. In January 1972, near the end of the selection process and after a draft memorandum between FSU and SEAC had already been signed, Charles H. Fairbanks of the University of Florida, expressed interest in entering the UGA-FSU competition for SEAC. This belated expression of interest came as a surprise to Richard Faust, SEAC's Acting Director, who certainly did not initiate it. SEAC was by then only a few days away from signing the MOU with FSU. Moreover, Faust felt that the University of Florida's Anthropology Department was not strong in archeology, which is probably why Griffin ruled it out from the beginning. Richard D. Faust, Letter to Charles H. Fairbanks, January 31, 1972, in A6435 folder, SEAC files; and Richard D. Faust, Letter to Chief Archeologist, WASO, January 31, 1972, in A6435 folder, SEAC files.
37. Patricia C. Griffin, Oral History Interview, 10-13.

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amid resource constraints, confusing directives, bureaucratic indecision, and conflicting personal goals. By 1970, which Griffin called the “Year of Decision,” he was ready to act, one way or another. It was also illustrative to him that the NPS Southwest Archaeological Center had recently negotiated an arrangement with the University of Arizona that allowed that unit to move out of its remote Globe, Arizona, location.  

Regardless of how the decision to move SEAC evolved, the University of Georgia established an early lead over Florida State University in winning NPS approval for some kind of partnership arrangement. In October 1968, shortly after receiving the Hartzog directive, Connally and Corbett traveled to Athens, Georgia, and the NPS Region One headquarters, located in Richmond, Virginia, to meet with officials from UGA “on potential research relations with the center at Ocmulgee.” OAHP staff archeologist George R. Fischer also attended the meeting in Richmond. Fischer was to play a pivotal role in the development of SEAC.

**The University Competition for SEAC**

The University of Georgia gained early NPS attention as a likely institution with which to associate SEAC. John W. Walker favored UGA as a candidate for SEAC’s move because Athens was closer than Tallahassee to the Regional Office, which was then located in Atlanta, and was more centrally located in the region. Far more important, however, UGA had a thoroughgoing salvage archeology program and did contract work for SEAC. Joseph Caldwell, who had an interest in NPS archeology, and the influential Arthur R. Kelly, who had administered NPS relief-era work in Georgia, and even worked for the Park Service for several years, were both on the university’s faculty. The Park Service was thus quite familiar with the institution’s academic capabilities, scholarly resources, and business operations. The most important reason for NPS interest in the University of Georgia, however, was that Kelly hoped to see SEAC affiliate with it and he had good political ties. His neighbor, in fact, was the influential Georgia Senator Richard B. Russell. Indeed, Kelly called the effort to move the center and all its collections to Florida “a vast mistake.”

Politics certainly played an important role in the Park Service’s initial preference for selecting UGA as SEAC’s partner, although the influence of Sen. Russell did not turn out to be a decisive factor.

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39. The fact that NPS originally planned to affiliate SEAC with UGA is clear from comments and context provided in a letter by John Griffin to John Corbett in which Griffin makes a concerted effort to argue the merits of his case that FSU was the better choice. Although he did “not expect this letter to alter your [Corbett’s] thinking,” he still thought “we are missing our best bet for university affiliation by limiting our thinking to Georgia.” Griffin, Letter to John Corbett, January 5, 1970.
40. Activities (Division of Archeology, NPS, September and October 1968), in “Archeology” Box H22, Harpers Ferry Center.
41. Walker, Discussion with Cameron Binkley, May 29, 2003. Others argued that Tallahassee was more central to the region, but in either case, the transportation situation was not the deciding factor in choosing between FSU and UGA.
42. Activities (Division of Archeology, NPS, February 1968), 2, in “Archeology” Box H22, Harpers Ferry Center.
43. Faust, Oral History Interview, 13-14; Walker, Discussion with Cameron Binkley, May 29, 2003.
44. Williams, ed., *In His Own Words: An Interview with Dr. Arthur Kelly*, 29.
SEAC, which only consisted of three archeologists and a secretary, was a very small concern after all for a U.S. Senator from a state the size of Georgia. Still, the Park Service wisely anticipated potential political obstacles to the proposed relocation of SEAC and thought these obstacles could derail such plans if not properly addressed. For example, NPS officials were aware and very concerned that local political and business leaders might object if they transferred artifacts from Georgia out of state when SEAC moved. Indeed, in January and February 1970, there erupted a specific controversy regarding just such an issue. Informed by an amateur archeologist in early January 1972, John W. Walker visited an archeological site near Hawkinsville, Georgia, which he found to contain a Weeden Island burial mound. This type of site had not been previously reported on Georgia’s Atlantic drainage. When the site became threatened by looters, Walker, assisted by amateur archeologists and UGA students, conducted an emergency excavation recovering 55 Swift Creek, Weeden Island, and Napier vessels from an east side pottery deposit. Influential citizens of Hawkinsville claimed “…this material was too important to allow it…” to leave the state and that the site should be made a National Park. Sensitivity to the disposition of SEAC’s collections, in addition to the cost and storage issues, influenced how John Griffin developed his proposal to move SEAC. As discussed further below, Griffin originally proposed that Ocmulgee’s archeological collections be permanently “retained as a Research Station of the Southeast Archeological Center” and kept at Ocmulgee under the care of a curator.

A second potential political obstacle to moving SEAC out of Macon, Georgia, was the fact that the center was located in the congressional district of Rep. Jack Flint, who happened to be the ranking majority member of the House appropriations subcommittee responsible for NPS affairs. Presumably, an “ok” from the congressman would be needed to ensure that any plan to move the center could be realized. With Hartzog’s blessing, OAHP chief Connally devised a plan to win the congressman’s support. Conveniently, a movement was just beginning to bring Creek people back to Georgia, their ancestral homeland. The Ocmulgee site was infused with sacred meaning for them. The Macon Chamber of Commerce seized upon the notion of “The Return of the Creeks,” as it was called, and began drumming up a plan to bring groups of native youth back to “the old traditional hunting grounds.” The U.S. Army was supposedly going to allow free passage on military aircraft so they could travel there to hold folk festivals. Apprised of the situation, Connally went to Rep. Flint and expressed strong NPS enthusiasm for facilitating the plan by helping to set the Creeks up at Ocmulgee. When Flint expressed his approval of the notion, Connally added that, to make it possible, the Park Service would have to place the Creeks in the basement of the Ocmulgee visitor center, thus displacing the four SEAC staff members who would otherwise be in the way. There is no record of whether or not they discussed the movement of the collections. Connally then asked for Flint’s permission to move the staff out and the congressman replied “you have it.” With that simple quid pro quo, the way was clear to move the center.

Meanwhile, by September 1969, Griffin was in serious consultation with FSU Anthropology Department Chairman Hale Smith and higher level FSU officials about the possibility of establishing a formal association between SEAC and Florida State University. Smith was enthusiastic and claimed SEAC would have “100% backing of the University.” In October, Griffin, Corbett, and various FSU officials met to inspect available facilities on the campus and at the university’s research station at Alligator Point harbor, which the university promoted because of the NPS interest in coastal and underwater archeology. By this time, George

46. Griffin, "Proposal for the Relocation of the Southeast Archeological Center," 1970. Also, Director Hartzog had not explicitly authorized movement of the collections from Ocmulgee, only the establishment of an NPS research center on a university campus.
47. Ernest Allen Connally, Interview by Charles B. Hosmer Jr., July 1981, in Ernest Allen Connally Papers, Box 5, Harpers Ferry Center, 121-122. See also, "The Creeks Return," promotional brochure jointly produced by the National Park Service, the Macon Chamber of Commerce, the Ocmulgee Auxiliary Corporation, and the Creek Indians, October 1972 (SERO Library). The brochure was printed by Southern Press, Inc., of Macon, Georgia. Enthusiasm for this initiative would later wane but the “Creek Indian Week” event, held at Ocmulgee National Monument October 2-8, 1972 can be regarded as the forerunner to the successful Ocmulgee Indian Celebration later held every September and promoted as a top attraction in the Southeast.
Fischer was also separately consulting with FSU officials on that matter.

Fischer was a pioneer in the field of submerged archeology. In the late 1960s, he began the earliest efforts to start up a federal underwater archeology program under OAHP auspices. In early 1968, Fischer and colleague Marion J. Riggs began a formal study of NPS and DOI responsibilities for submerged cultural resources, the potential for new park research, and the possibilities for the development of an NPS underwater archeological program. Underlying NPS interest in this work was new technology that was making submerged archeological sites both more accessible for scholarly purposes and more threatened due to public use of similar technology. Fischer and Riggs also found that significant potential existed to expand archeological studies on submerged NPS lands and that few institutions possessed the capacity to undertake such investigations.49 As a result, OAHP’s Division of Archeology supported Fischer and Riggs in obtaining diving training. In the fall of 1968, they led a trial NPS underwater archeological investigation at Montezuma Well, a remote NPS unit near Flagstaff, Arizona. Calvin Cummings, who was both a diver and an archeologist stationed at Tuzigoot National Monument in the Verde Valley, also participated. While the results of this dive were negligible, Fischer found the experience useful and soon began to develop plans for a more extensive program.

In this task, Deputy Chief Archeologist Zorro Bradley was an ally. Both took advantage of Hartzog’s memorandum directing SEAC to establish a research center on a university campus to help foster the development of an NPS sub-

merged archeological function. As a glance through the back issues of the Division of Archeology’s monthly newsletters for the period reveals, Fischer was engaged in consulting with various institutions about their potential to co-sponsor or partner with the Park Service to conduct underwater archeology projects. He was looking for an institution with both archeological and programmatic expertise and the necessary facilities and proximity to major submerged NPS resources to help expand Service involvement in this field. Fischer’s aggressive promotion of underwater archeology was to generate friction within NPS management, but Director Hartzog explicitly directed Connally to broaden NPS involvement. When the prospect of moving SEAC became serious, Fischer jumped at the chance to merge Service interest in underwater archeology with the establishment of a university-based NPS archeological center. The economies thereby achieved would be considerable.

By late 1969, Fischer was investigating the possibility of setting up an underwater archeology unit in Florida, which was in geographic proximity to the most extensive submerged U.S. archeological resources both in NPS park sites and otherwise. The state of Florida had also recently hired its own underwater archeologist to address the rising issues associated with the recovery of Spanish gold from sunken vessels in Floridian waters. Eventually, Fischer would have to find a new home for his nascent underwater archeology unit. Washington, DC, was hardly the best venue for a field-based operation, but more significantly, Fischer was becoming associated with Chief Archeologist Corbett and his deputy Bradley, who, as later detailed, were opposing some of OAHP Chief Connally’s goals.

At any rate, it was about this point that the notion of co-locating SEAC and an underwater archeology unit at FSU emerged. FSU had available facilities for

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50. Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation Chief, Memorandum to Deputy Director, Operations (Approved and signed by George B. Hartzog Jr.), January 26, 1971, in A6435 folder, SEAC files.
both functions and there would be some savings in personnel and administration obtained by merging this effort with SEAC. Fischer was probably already lobbying for SEAC to move to Tallahassee from Washington. John Griffin certainly saw the synergism and moved to convince John Corbett "that we are missing our best bet for university affiliation by limiting our thinking to Georgia." The Washington office still favored UGA because of fear about the political implications of moving SEAC out of state. Griffin asserted that the Park Service had overestimated Arthur Kelly's influence with Sen. Russell and that Joseph Caldwell would not stand in the way. He argued that the decision to move SEAC should not "be decided on the basis of political grounds" and instead should be made "upon the basis of the best place to solve our problems and begin working more effectively."\(^{53}\)

Shortly thereafter, John Griffin wrote the proposal to move SEAC to Tallahassee, which he formally submitted on January 20, 1970. Although the Park Service informally favored the University of Georgia, Griffin did not; his professional and social ties to Florida were very strong. However, he did not hide these connections and stated that they did not compromise his impartiality.\(^{54}\) Still, Griffin was also not above some lobbying on behalf of his personal choice. For example, he encouraged Robert Johnson, FSU Graduate Dean and Director of Research, to meet and introduce himself to Ernest Connally shortly after Griffin made his proposal to affiliate SEAC with FSU.\(^{55}\) Despite his professed impartiality, Griffin claimed that the FSU selection made sense on the basis of its inherent merit.\(^{56}\)

Griffin did conduct at least a cursory evaluation of those institutions with sufficient merit to warrant official consideration, but in the end argued persuasively for Florida State University in Tallahassee. Officially, he made his selection upon the basis of four specific factors: (1) the academic strength of the department in Southeastern archeology, (2) the availability and suitability of space, (3) NPS interest in the university's existing and potential programs, and (4) the geographic suitability of the university with regard to SEAC's travel needs. Griffin deter-


\(^{54}\) Griffin, Letter to John Corbett, January 5, 1970.


\(^{56}\) Griffin, Letter to John Corbett, January 5, 1970.

to allow SEAC to conduct and expand its operations over time was considered a vital element in Griffin’s proposal to move SEAC to FSU. Florida State had recently constructed a new social sciences building. The Anthropology Department occupied the ground floor, possessed a fully equipped laboratory, and was willing to make space available for SEAC within this setting. The Anthropology Department of UGA, on the other hand, was divided among different, old, and considerably separated buildings. Another important consideration, as noted before, was that FSU already possessed underwater facilities on the Gulf of Mexico directly south of Tallahassee, which included buildings, docks, tanks, and space for the use of an NPS archaeological facility.
Finally, Griffin proposed specifically that SEAC’s archeological collections be maintained at Ocmulgee as a remote “Research Station” of the center. Griffin had abandoned the idea in the Director’s memorandum that sought to link the onsite collections of Ocmulgee to a specific university as “a formal field station” of that institution. No university was interested in this idea because university archeology was at the time driven by salvage contracting and, of course, the problem-oriented research of faculty members, which was no longer focused upon the collections at Ocmulgee. Griffin proposed instead to leave these collections under “resident curatorial care.” SEAC would continue to plan and contract for appropriate research as needed from FSU. This notion was cost- and space-effective but it was the one element of Griffin’s proposal that would face the most revision.

Politics and Resignation

Even as John Griffin drafted his formal proposal to move SEAC to Tallahassee, senior officials of Florida State and its congressional allies began to lobby Director Hartzog for the move. Indeed, someone at FSU apparently had good ties to a high-ranking official in the Department of the Interior, Assistant Secretary Nathaniel P. Reed, whose influence would help convince reluctant NPS officials to overcome political opposition to moving SEAC out of Georgia. Griffin and Hale Smith also worked up a draft Memorandum of Understanding based upon the agreement previously negotiated between the University of Arizona and SWAC. The draft MOU recognized the official NPS policy “to align its research endeavors more closely to those of the professional research institutions” and asserted the “mutually advantageous” arrangement that would result from relocating SEAC to FSU. The draft MOU also asserted that FSU agreed “to make arrangements to furnish to the National Park Service necessary space for its Southeast Archeological Center to carry on its activities, including underwater archeology, on the campus of the Florida State University.” However, the provision was left contingent upon additional “contracts or agreements as may be negotiated between the two parties.” The lack of specificity on this point would later become a problem. Mainly, it did not specify the requirement for the university to provide space for SEAC’s archeological collections. Another important point about the draft MOU is the frequent reference to “underwater archeology,” which suggests the influential role that George Fischer and Zorro Bradley had played in the NPS-FSU consultations. Beyond these arrangements and the general sharing of resources and facilities between the parties, the draft MOU also spelled out a final item of importance. The item was what the university sought to gain through the agreement. Certainly, FSU expected graduate students to find opportunities at SEAC, but FSU’s main expectation was that the MOU would provide the Anthropology Department with archeological contracts in salvage, survey, excavation, and site stabilization, as well as in investigations under the Interagency Archeological Salvage Program, and, of course, through underwater archeology projects relating to Southeastern national parks. These contracts would not have to be bid competitively and thus represented a major potential income source for the university.

There was another reason for Florida State’s enthusiasm for bringing the National Park Service to its campus. The Department of Anthropology had lost some important staff members, including Charles H. Fairbanks around 1963, who went to the University of Florida. Fairbanks, incidentally, had started as an NPS archeologist based at Ocmulgee National Monument in the 1950s, published several important articles about it, including the well-known *Archeology of the Funeral Mound* (NPS, 1956), but later resigned to teach at Florida State. After moving to the University of Florida, Fairbanks helped to expand that school’s anthropology department, which became within a few years a

major PhD-granting institution. With staff transitions and the University of Florida beginning to train its first PhD students, Hale Smith probably felt an urgency to advance the interests of his own FSU Anthropology Department.

By the time that Smith was working to bring SEAC to Florida State, however, accrediting officials had already determined that the FSU Anthropology Department lacked suitable credentials to confer doctoral degrees. Smith kept this distressing information under wraps for a while, perhaps hoping to avoid inspiration for further faculty defections. J. Anthony Paredes, as a junior faculty member, was not aware of FSU’s negative ratings until some time after the fact. He and other faculty members, such as George Percy, operated on the assumption that they could transform the FSU Anthropology Department into a major academic, PhD-granting department.

From Smith’s perspective, an alliance with the National Park Service would help to counterbalance the department’s recent setbacks, especially the negative review of its proposed doctoral program. Smith was probably motivated to achieve a cooperative agreement with SEAC for this reason alone, despite its other genuine advantages to FSU. For some faculty members, however, especially those not in the loop regarding the department’s negative rating, the issue was cast in a different light. Despite Smith’s enthusiasm and promise to the Park Service of “100% backing,” he had to overcome opposition within the Anthropology Department to the cooperative relationship.

The first source of opposition was concern over how the department’s intellectual character might be influenced by a close association with the Park Service and its salvage archeological efforts. Some anthropologists may have feared that the intellectual direction of the department would be channeled away from the academic track leading to a doctoral program. They were afraid of becoming a “salvage archeology-dominated department.” Beyond this concern was that archeology already dominated the department and so a cooperative relationship with SEAC would serve only to further impede efforts to build a program more balanced in the four main fields of anthropology (archeology, linguistics, ethnology, and physical or biological anthropology). Paredes felt that Florida State had potential to become known for work in physical anthropology and ethnology. It even had an interest in linguistics, which was not an interest of Hale Smith. The decision to cooperate with SEAC thus appeared to some faculty members to be a move toward greater domination by archeology and a move away from the department’s effort to create a doctoral program in scientific anthropology. That program would not be built for another twenty-five years, but that had nothing to do with SEAC.

In the end, however, Hale Smith overcame the faculty opposition, probably because the potential financial support that SEAC could bring to the department’s students, PhD candidates or otherwise, was a welcome prospect, as was the thought, presumably held by faculty members, of easily obtaining contract work. The most significant problem Smith had to overcome was practical and far more immediate: where was the department to find sufficient space to house SEAC on campus? Perhaps because it was not adequately spelled out in the original MOU, this issue turned out to be a major source of friction between FSU and the Park Service. Indeed, it was an issue that endured for years.

In the meantime, FSU President Stanley Marshall wrote Director Hartzog on December 3, 1969, to express approval of the draft MOU. Having evaluated John Griffin’s proposal and arguments to move SEAC to FSU, Ernest Connolly replied politely, but not favorably, on the director’s behalf on February 3, 1970. He did agree to allow further negotiations. Connolly was not in favor of FSU. On March 24, 1970, Griffin wrote Corbett that the

64. Paredes, Oral History Interview, 4.
65. Percy, ironically, did not complete his dissertation, but did later go on to head Florida’s state historic preservation program.
66. Paredes, Oral History Interview, 11.
67. Paredes, Oral History Interview, 8.
General Counsel of FSU had given preliminary approval of the MOU, but suggested that “the space agreement be negotiated separately.” By April 22, the Park Service’s own solicitor had approved the MOU. Griffin was encouraged by these developments, but by early May there was still no indication that the Washington office had made any change in its commitment to select UGA for the relocation. Moreover, the decision was apparently postponed during a debate about whether moving SEAC would “constitute a new activity” or “merely the same activity in another setting.” Funding issues related to the move were cleared when the latter interpretation was adopted. Similarly, no decision had yet been made to move the archeological collection from Occoneechee. At the time, Griffin was researching the “shuddering” prices of standard steel storage cabinets and “casting around for alternate solutions to part of our storage problems.”

Throughout the rest of the year, Connally dragged his feet regarding SEAC’s possible relocation to FSU. He was either convinced that it was politically impossible to move the center out of state or he simply did not want the center moved to Florida. In January 1971, Hale Smith met Connally at a symposium in Gainesville and tried to extract his commitment to establish either an underwater archeological center at FSU, or to move SEAC there. Connally rebuffed Smith bluntly saying “that there was no chance of our moving SEAC out of Georgia and no hope for our establishing an additional center at Florida State.” He added “that there were many places where we would like to have archeological centers but there was simply not enough of us to go around.”

In addition to the political problems stirred up in Georgia by Arthur Kelly and by Macon locals concerned about artifact removals, Connally had become aware in the latter half of 1970 that the Division of Archives, History, and Records Management in Florida’s Department of State had recently acquired a new archeological laboratory with underwater equipment. In fact, this organization had even made “impressive recent recoveries of gold and other objects.” The Director of this division, Robert Williams, was very concerned that if the Park Service encouraged Florida State University to develop similar facilities it would create unnecessary duplication and competition for state funds. Williams was politically powerful, being a former state politician and an active voice in the historic preservation movement. In fact, he was the Florida State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO) and had worked closely with Connally in developing the national standards for that program.

Certainly, Williams had cause to be apprehensive about the interest of the Park Service in establishing an underwater program at Florida State. As a pioneer in underwater archeology, George Fischer was already involved in non-NPS maritime issues in Florida. As early as 1968, for example, Fischer and Marion Riggs had spent two weeks in the Florida Keys participating in a Smithsonian Institution project investigating a sunken Spanish galleon of the 1733 “plate” fleet. The arrival of a federal underwater archeology program centered in Florida could easily influence what was happening in the state. To forestall further momentum in that direction, Williams assured Connally that Florida’s underwater archeological lab, boats, and other equipment would be available for use by the Park Service for its own underwater archeological projects. Not surprisingly, Connally noted Williams’s concern, and wrote forcefully to the Deputy Director on January 26, 1971:

Our underwater archeological program is specifically directed to units of the National Park System. At the current and predictable

69 John W. Griffin, Letter to Dean Robert Johnson, March 24, 1970; John W. Griffin, Letter to Dean Robert Johnson, April 22, 1970; all in A6435 folder, SEAC files.
70 John W. Griffin, Letter to Dr. Hare G. Smith, May 18, 1970, in A6435 folder, SEAC files.
71 Chief Ernest Allen Connally, Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation, Memorandum to Deputy Director, Operations (Approved and signed by George B. Hartzog Jr.), January 26, 1971, in A6435 folder, SEAC files.
72 Chief Ernest Allen Connally, Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation, Memorandum to Deputy Director, Operations (Approved and signed by George B. Hartzog Jr.), January 26, 1971, in A6435 folder, SEAC files.
75 Indeed, this issue would eventually bring stress between NPS managers and SEAC archeologists as the former grew increasingly concerned by the jurisdictional friction that underwater archeology caused between the state of Florida and the federal government.
level of activity I see no justification for the establishment of an archaeological center in Florida and recommend that no commitment be made favoring such establishment. Instead I recommend that we avail ourselves of the use of the archeological facilities of the Division of Archives, History and Records Management as needed.76

George Hartzog himself signed and approved Connally’s recommendation, originally conveyed to the Deputy Director.77 Connally was firmly against moving SEAC to Florida, and the Director concurred. This memorandum was a major disappointment to John Griffin. He may well have fought it. Pete Faust, who succeeded Griffin as SEAC Chief, clearly recalled that “there was some fussing going on between the Washington office and John about something...along about ’71.”78 Undoubtedly, that fussing was over Griffin’s unhappily received proposal to move SEAC to FSU, which Connally steadfastly opposed. If Griffin continued to lobby for the proposal, it might easily have antagonized Connally, who still had line authority over the archeological center. Indeed, according to Patricia Griffin, “when they made the decision that they were going to move, because they were committed, pretty much, to FSU, he [Connally] indirectly sent the message to John that he was not going to be the director [chief]. They were going to lateral him somewhere in the country.”79 In other words, Connally threatened to re-assign Griffin in retaliation for undercutting his preference not to move SEAC to FSU. If true, and the account cannot be confirmed, it explains why John Griffin suddenly resigned in August 1971.80 Exactly at that moment a position opened for a “Director” of the St. Augustine Historical Association. Given the circumstance, with his wife and family already in Florida, Griffin had to make a tough decision. Either he did not expect SEAC to move to Florida, or he did not expect to move with it. Thus John Griffin, a respected and able archeologist, chose to leave the Park Service.81

From George Fischer’s perspective in Washington, Griffin’s resignation was a major disappointment because he had encouraged Fischer’s work in underwater archeology and felt it would help to build the center.82 Despite this setback, however, Fischer still had much hope for that enterprise. Although Hartzog approved Connally’s January 26 memorandum nixing any move of SEAC to Florida State, he also inscribed a note in the margin expressing his view that “we should broaden our concern and program” in underwater archeology.

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76. Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation Chief, Letter to Deputy Director, Memorandum (Approved and signed by George B. Hartzog, Jr.), January 26, 1971, in A6435 folder, SEAC files.
77. Director Hartzog scratched out “Deputy” next to “Director” on the signature line in the memorandum and signed his own name.
78. Faust, Oral History Interview, 14-15.
79. Patricia C. Griffin, Oral History Interview, 13.
80. “Lateral” assignment is an occasional tactic used by government officials to direct within grade transfers of personnel from one spot to another. The tactic can be to the incumbent’s advantage or disadvantage, but when the latter it is sometimes the supervisor’s intent to force a disfavored employee to resign or retire. The information postulating Griffin’s imminent re-assignment cannot be confirmed and while Patricia Griffin is a highly credible source, she has no direct knowledge that Connally made this threat. Connally spoke well of Griffin in a letter to NPS archeologist Thomas Thiessen on August 31, 1992 (SERO and MWAC files), although his remarks were likely tempered by his knowledge that Thiessen was conducting an NPS historical study. For some reason, John Griffin perceived his position threatened and thus initiated a job search. Yet, he had no reason to leave the Service once SEAC’s move to Florida was likely. Given Connally’s difficult relationship with archeology (as discussed throughout this chapter), his resistance to moving SEAC to Florida, and his documented involvement in “retiring” Chief Archeologist Corbett, it is credible that he made such a threat.
81. Another issue that may have caused trouble between Griffin and Washington was the drive by OAH to increase NPS professional qualifications. Griffin had returned to school under NPS-sponsorship to further work on his doctorate, but never actually completed it. (He did receive an honorary PhD near the end of his life.) His arrival as Chief of SEAC was even delayed while he completed work at the University of Chicago on his PhD at NPS expense. Connally may have appointed Griffin as head of SEAC with the assumption that he would soon have a terminal credential. After Griffin’s PhD failed to materialize, it may have soured Griffin’s relations with his superiors in Washington. Jackson W. Moore recalled that Griffin was under pressure “to complete that degree!” Moore, Letters to Cameron Binkley, March 29 and May 15, 2003. Still, according to George Fischer, Griffin had time to finish his PhD dissertation when he resigned. His impression was that Griffin was discouraged by the state of affairs of SEAC in Macon, lack of progress toward moving SEAC to Florida, and general discontent with bureaucratic work. Fischer, Oral History Interview, 21-22. However, John W. Walker noted that Pete Faust, who did not hold a PhD either, was assigned as Acting Chief, a title he held for some time, under the assumption that the next Center Chief would be required to hold a doctorate. Walker, Comments on the draft of August 19, 2005.
82. Fischer, Oral History Interview, 21-22.
Connally did later argue that one of his goals in improving the performance of the NPS archaeological programs was to eliminate the "favoritism" complaint in contracting that was often enough leveled, fairly or not. Finally, some have offered that Connally, whose primary interest was preservation, simply was not driven to expend more funds than necessary on the development of archeological centers.  

The Tipping Point - Choosing Florida State

During the summer of 1971, two important events occurred. First, as noted before, Ernest Connally learned about the effort by Macon interests to bring Creek Indians back to Ocmulgee. The area’s representative, Congressman Jack Flynt, supported this initiative, which allowed Connally to secure his approval for relocating SEAC in Florida. Second, and of key importance given Connally’s refusal to support SEAC’s move to Tallahassee, Florida State was able to exert considerable political influence on the Department of the Interior through Nathaniel P. Reed. Reed had joined the Nixon Administration while serving as Special Assistant to the Governor of Florida for the Environment, a position he secured after first serving on the Florida Board of Antiquities in the early 1960s. Reed served as Assistant Secretary of the Interior for Fish and Wildlife and Parks from 1971 through 1976. In 1972, the National Park Foundation awarded the Cornelius Amory Pugsley National Medal Award to Reed for his outstanding achievement in the promotion of public parks. Reed, who was just 39 years old that year, reportedly preferred to ignore agency chiefs, and often went directly to agency offices for information or advice and to express his wishes. In other words, he was engaged in park matters. Director Hartzog had actually recommended Reed to Interior Secretary Rogers C. B. Morton for the position when he turned down the offer himself. When Reed left the Department, he returned to Florida to immerse himself in environmental and philanthropic issues, and was especially interested in the Everglades. He was probably quite predisc-

83. Fischer, Oral History Interview, 5.
84. Bradley, e-mail to Cameron Binkley, April 15 and 24, 2004.
posed to assist FSU in its quest to acquire SEAC. According to John W. Walker, he was also a good friend of Stanley J. Olsen, a noted zooarcheologist on the staff of the Department of Anthropology at Florida State.87

From January through September of 1971, Florida State pressed its connections. The National Park Service continued to delay action on any move, however, possibly because of fiscal constraints, but probably because of Connally’s resistance. Then suddenly, in mid-September, Associate Park Service Director J. E. N. Jensen wrote Assistant Secretary Reed that the decision had been made - in favor of Florida State University. “We have concluded,” he wrote, “that Florida State is the best university at which SEAC might be located. Its programs in archeology and anthropology most closely parallel our own; it has the strongest department, good library and other resources.” He noted that the Park Service had moved “to formulate a sub-

stitute for SEAC at Macon” involving the Creek Indians, and that an understanding had been reached with Robert Williams regarding an NPS commitment not to jeopardize the State of Florida’s underwater archeology program as a result of any relocation of SEAC to Florida.88 On September 14, Secretary Morton wrote Dean Robert Johnson. Morton noted the fiscal limitations of making any move and specifically explained that the Park Service could not duplicate the underwater archeological research facilities that the State of Florida’s Division of Archives, History, and Records Management had recently developed. The point of the letter, however, was to inform Dean Johnson that the department had authorized Ernest Connally and OAHP to proceed to discuss “other practical considerations and the mutual benefits which might be expected by such a transfer” of SEAC.89 In other words, the Secretary had directed deliberate NPS negotiations to reach an understanding with FSU, overruling Connally’s previous objections.

In January 1972, Connally wrote Director Hartzog about the status of NPS efforts to relocate SEAC. His memorandum updated the earlier memo of January 1971 in which he recommended against moving SEAC to Tallahassee. This memo, however, represented a complete change of view. Connally began by detailing a meeting held in December 1971 at Ocmulgee where Claude Cox, Chief of the Creek Nation, proposed to establish a trading post in the basement of the Ocmulgee visitor center by April 15, 1972. All parties backed the proposal, including local Macon political representatives and NPS officials from the Southeast Region. In addition, Connally noted that Rep. Flynt’s congressional district was being reapportioned due to the 1970 U.S. Census. Presumably, since Flynt would not be running to represent Macon, this even further reduced potential political opposition to the move. Connally also explained that negotiations with the University of Georgia “were fruitless” and praised the “stronger, more prestigious Department of Anthropology” at Florida State, but it seems his last point was the most important - that “Assistant Secretary Nathaniel Reed has expressed interest in relocating SEAC in Tallahassee and can be given due credit for the move.”890

88. J. E. N. Jensen, Memorandum to Assistant Secretary for Fish and Wildlife and Parks, September 16, 1971, in A6435 folder, SEAC files.
Reed’s interest in SEAC’s move to FSU may explain, to some degree, why the issue about how much space the university would provide was not resolved prior to SEAC’s move. If FSU officials knew that the Park Service had determined that Florida State was the best choice for SEAC, they may have been stiffer in their negotiations than they would have been if that choice was still in doubt. Reed had close ties to Florida and the news, which he knew by mid-September 1971, had ample time to leak out. At any rate, Pete Faust, who had become Acting Chief of SEAC after Griffin’s resignation in August 1971, arrived in Tallahassee in January 1972 to obtain specific information from FSU officials about the availability and cost of space and also to attend a meeting of the Society for Historical Archaeology. At almost the same time, Connally was informing Washington officials that SEAC would move to Tallahassee. Indeed, he even sent a draft Memorandum of Understanding to FSU, unbeknownst to Faust. For these reasons, the Park Service chose to expedite signing the NPS-FSU accord prior to reaching a clear understanding on how much space was to be made available for the center on campus.91

While attending the conference in Tallahassee, Zorro Bradley and George Fischer engaged Faust about the move. According to Faust, the question of space and how to approach that topic with regard to Florida State emerged as a “marked philosophical difference” between Fischer and Bradley on the one hand and Faust on the other. Faust believed his mission was to obtain the necessary cost and space data from FSU officials, namely Smith and Johnson, even though these steadfastly refused to provide solid information throughout his visit. They, again, were still fighting to convince reluctant members of the Anthropology Department to give up lab space or share graduate students with SEAC. George Percy was mentioned several times as an obstacle on both counts.92

Faust, along with SEAC curator Donald Crusoe, had developed several detailed alternative plans to utilize various amounts of space at FSU. The plan

90. Director Ernest Allen Connally, Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation, Memorandum to George B. Hartzog, Director, National Park Service, January 19, 1972, in A6435 folder, SEAC files.
91. Acting Chief Richard D. Faust, Southeast Archeological Center, Memorandum to Chief Archeologist, January 19, 1972, in A6435 folder, SEAC files. This is a detailed multi-page trip report.
92. Faust, Memorandum to Chief Archeologist, January 19, 1972.
underwater archaeology. Faust informed Smith and Dailey that he needed the cost and space numbers because the center now planned to move part or all of its archeological collections, the largest Southeastern archeological collection in existence. As he had already stated to Faust privately, Fischer then reportedly stated to Smith and Dailey that the most important thing was to sign the basic document agreeing to agree. He also let them know that the Park Service had already mailed an MOU for FSU to sign. Faust had little hope to solve the space problem after Fischer’s remarks, which he felt undercut his mission. Still, Smith and Dailey seemed hamstrung by their own bureaucracy and urged Faust to try and get Connally or some other high-ranking NPS official to visit the campus to discuss with the faculty the advantages that SEAC could bring to the campus, probably in hopes of building FSU support for the initiative.93

The incident as reported by Faust might have a certain bias but it seems clear that the Park Service was not of one mind in its consultations with FSU officials. The university was interested in hosting SEAC for the potential contracts, the prestige, and the underwater archeological expertise that would be brought to its campus, but there was a major disagreement within the department, at least in practical terms, over how much space could be provided to SEAC. Certainly, the university also wanted to maximize the amount it could charge the government for overhead costs and for leased space. With NPS officials not working from the same score, or with political pressure compelling a near-term agreement, Florida State was able to waffle on the space question. Faust got nowhere on his visit. A “reliable source” later informed him that FSU had only two rooms to provide SEAC at that time and both were for office use only. Faust believed that campus officials were being cagey about the availability of space because they expected NPS to build its own structure as an annex to Bellamy Hall, an idea that was “completely new” to him and, if true, would indeed require high-level intervention.94

High level intervention, of course, had already occurred. On April 12, 1972, despite no clear understanding about the space issue, the National Park Service signed a Memorandum of Understanding with Florida State University that finalized SEAC’s relocation to Tallahassee. The agreement was signed by FSU President Stanley Marshall and Southeast Regional Director David D. Thomson Jr., whose office had just assumed line authority over SEAC (a topic discussed further below).95 Louis Polatty, executive vice-president of the Tallahassee Area Chamber of Commerce, and Robert Johnson, the university’s graduate studies dean, also attended the meeting. In his remarks, President Marshall emphasized the benefits of the arrangement to Floridians by saying “an academic interest in the past peoples and cultures of the Southeastern region of the United States has long been a fact at Florida State. The working relationship just established between the National Park Service’s Archeological Center provides additional opportunities to explore the rich historical heritage of our area.” The Tallahassee Democrat clarified Marshall’s remarks by noting that the new relationship built upon the Service’s responsibility under law to conduct salvage excavations and that Florida State’s interest in the Southeast was a key

93. Faust, Memorandum to Chief Archeologist, January 19, 1972.
94. Faust, Memorandum to Chief Archeologist, January 19, 1972.
95. Faust, Memorandum to Chief Archeologist, January 19, 1972.
factor motivating the government’s choice to move SEAC to Florida and to authorize the unusual accord. “Academically,” Marshall added, “it is a boon to our Anthropology Department.” He expected the Service to benefit from FSU archeological expertise and for the university to benefit from SEAC’s vast archeological collections. Regarding curation contracts, the latter would prove to be true. “Working together,” he concluded, “the university and the park service can continue to unlock the secrets of the past, a task to which both have been committed independently, for a number of years.”

While FSU did not push the plan for a government-funded annex to house SEAC on campus, it did succeed in acquiring NPS commitment to move SEAC in the absence of an adequately negotiated space agreement. The high-level interest of Assistant Secretary Reed, Director Hartzog’s immediate supervisor, explains what prodded Connally’s change of heart. For its part, Florida State, despite some division within the Anthropology Department, had reason enough to secure agreement at an early date. Certainly, Hale Smith, battling against the sinking prestige of the Anthropology Department, was only too eager to do so even if his long-time friend John Griffin was no longer SEAC’s chief. Moreover, despite Acting Chief Faust’s misgivings about the lack of a guarantee of adequate space to house the center’s collections, SEAC staffers were probably relieved to learn that they would soon be moving out of Macon. Also, as a matter of record, the final SEAC-FSU accord mysteriously dropped underwater archeology as a specific provision for cooperation between the parties, although it was implied in the general provisions. Griffin had included the provision in his drafts of the accord and the topic was discussed on several occasions with FSU staff. NPS officials probably struck out underwater archeology to appease Florida state officials, but its sudden absence from the NPS-FSU agreement was also somewhat portentous.

SEAC Moves to Tallahassee

The relocation of SEAC to Tallahassee took place in two phases. The staff and office equipment moved in June 1972 with the collections following some six months later. The two-phased move was likely a result of the serious complications in finding adequate space, both for the archeological collections and for the staff, but also perhaps because the arrangements to lease space had to be made through the General Services Administration (GSA), which added another layer of bureaucracy to the process. Faust made preliminary inquiries about available space near the campus. Then, in early May, he requested that GSA lease a building with 8,100 square feet, to be located within a restricted perimeter of the FSU campus. The major reason for this was simply that Florida State was unwilling to provide or did not have space immediately available to house SEAC’s staff or its collections. SEAC’s move to Tallahassee and its affiliation with a university had been mandated by national level policy and decision-making but whether or not SEAC, at least its collections, actually ended up on campus was apparently still in doubt. The effect of seeking off campus space, however, may have helped to sharpen Florida State’s focus. It probably began to dawn on FSU administrators that if SEAC ended up leasing space off campus, that would not be to the advantage of the university. Certainly, fewer funds would be available for contracts if SEAC began to lease with some other entity.

Whatever it suggests about relations between NPS and FSU, SEAC did initially set up operations in Tallahassee in temporary quarters. The arrival of the Creeks in Macon may have imposed some urgency. Unfortunately, this meant that SEAC would have to pick up and move once again when FSU finally provided on-campus space, at least for staff offices. Fortunately, temporary facilities were available in Tallahassee to SEAC at no cost. The NPS Florida-Caribbean District Office, a sub-regional management arm of the Southeast Regional Office that oversaw NPS units in Florida, made sufficient temporary office space available to

95 National Park Service, Memorandum of Agreement between the National Park Service and Florida State University, April 12, 1972, SEAC files. A photograph of the signing ceremony was taken, but it was not published, and regrettably, has since been lost.
97. Richard D. Faust, Memorandum to Director, Southeast Region, May 5, 1972, in A6435 folder, SEAC files.
98. For example, Faust received space and cost information from a private photography company that was leasing studio space. David A. Avant Jr., Letter to R. P. Faust, March 16, 1972, in A6435 folder, SEAC files.

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SEAC to allow the move. The staff moved into these offices in June.

While preparing to relocate, Pete Faust computed that SEAC possessed some two hundred tons of archeological material. However the lab and storage space question was to be resolved, through successful negotiation with FSU or by lease arrangement elsewhere, space would probably be limited and/or expensive. SEAC thus developed and began to execute plans for the “disposition of collections in excess of center needs.” These plans included the negotiation of a $2,500 contract with the University of Georgia to provide for the study and indefinite loan of some 30,000 lbs. of material (48 storage cases) from Chatham County, Georgia. The center would retain only a 10 percent sample share of the collection. This contract eliminated some fifteen tons of material for which SEAC was responsible. SEAC also sought to return materials that it held for parks that were no longer within the Southeast Region. Eighty cartons were returned to Colonial National Historical Park and Arkansas Post National Memorial and some ethnological items were returned to the NPS Branch of Museums in Washington, DC. Materials that had been thoroughly studied were returned to Ocmulgee’s own park collection. SEAC also sought out universities to disperse reservoir salvage material. For example, all material from reservoir surveys in South Carolina was transferred to the Institute of Archeology and Anthropology at the University of South Carolina. Just prior to moving the collections and obtaining the needed space from FSU, center Curator Donald Crusoe was promoting the dispersion of the center’s excess collections to any university with an interest. SEAC’s archeological collections were “huge” and everything that staff could do to reduce their size made obtaining space from the university easier. Of course, the smaller the collection, the easier it was going to be to manage. This emphasis in managing the collections continued after the move. In 1974, FSU Research Associate Thomas J. Padgett noted that sporadic care over the preceding forty years meant that “some parts of the collections have been found to be of no worth to scientific investigations due to poor data collection techniques, improper treatment, or loss of materials.” Thus, a significant early concern of FSU curators was to assess and cull from SEAC’s active collections extraneous material that no longer retained much value.

As one would expect, SEAC was able to place greater pressure upon FSU to find space after the staff actually took up residence in Tallahassee. At meetings with FSU officials in August 1972, SEAC made proposals for obtaining space from the university that finally met “noticeable enthusiasm.” Indeed, the university directed the Department of Anthropology “to work toward identifying space adequate for [SEAC’s] needs.” Meanwhile, the center continued to negotiate with the Department of Anthropology regarding proposals for its involvement in curatorial maintenance and research contracts. The parties achieved a major understanding that leasing charges were only to be made for administrative space and that charges were not to be made for space that was considered “shared used” or where contract work was done by FSU for SEAC. This breakthrough was important. The parties also apparently obtained an understanding that the cost of renovation of the office space in Bellamy Hall could be absorbed by the center over a period of years, perhaps through the proposed contracts for curatorial maintenance or through overhead charges on research contracts. FSU did agree to absorb the upfront costs.

100. Reports Presented at the Annual Meeting of the Committee for the Recovery of Archaeological Remains, February 23 and 24, 1972 (Washington, DC: OAHP, 1972), 7. By which he probably meant all artifacts, files, steel storage containers, lab and office equipment, etc., that had to be moved.
101. Faust, Memorandum to Director, Southeast Region, May 5, 1972.
103. Thomas J. Padgett, “Administrative Report of the Curatorial Maintenance of the Southeast Archeological Center’s Collections (Fiscal Year 1974)” (Tallahassee, Florida State University, 1974), 1, in Richard R. Vernon files, SEAC.
104. Acting Director Richard D. Faust, Memorandum to Director, Southeast Region, August 21, 1972, in A6435 folder, SEAC files.
In August 1972, after a long period of debate within the Anthropology Department and between it and the FSU administration, the university made a sudden push to find space for SEAC’s collections. As it turns out, finding that space was less an issue than who was occupying it. Florida State had a relatively large physical plant for anthropology, including a brand-new building at the time - the university had just acquired an archeological research facility on the coast at Alligator Point. The facility had previously served as a marine lab. There was storage space available at this off-campus venue. The department also had laboratory space available on campus, although this space was being used by Stanley Olsen, George Percy, and others. Hale Smith had envisioned providing some of this area to the Park Service under lease, a plan that required a reluctant faculty to relinquish some space. After signing its MOU with the Park Service, however, FSU did move to accommodate SEAC. The loss of faculty lab space may thus have generated some degree of resentment. Eventually, to make room for SEAC, a large part of the department’s archeological collection was packed up and sent to the former marine lab on the coast. That facility then suffered a space cramp. SEAC also displaced the department’s ethnographic collections, but the university relocated much of this to another site on campus.106 In the fall of 1972, SEAC staff finally moved from their temporary offices to the Bellamy Hall building.

As important as the space, SEAC also obtained substantial university assistance to curate NPS archeological collections. Direct FSU curation continued until 1981 and represented a significant transformation in SEAC’s program responsibilities. Salvage contracting and park research continued essentially as at Occoneechee (with the addition of underwater archeology). Curatorial activities, however, to the extent that they had existed, were substantially modified as a result of the move. Maintenance, curation, research, analysis, reporting, and appropriate disposition of the col-

lections was now done though contracting.\textsuperscript{107} According to Padgett in 1974, “the program was conceived as the most economical approach to the problem of providing proper care for the Center’s massive archeological collections.”\textsuperscript{108}

The Park Service and Florida State made this arrangement possible by accepting certain compromises. As with many agreements, neither party was completely satisfied. For FSU, the MOU chiefly meant large no-bid curatorial contracts and associated overhead. To obtain these contracts, however, the Anthropology Department had to recognize SEAC’s collections as “shared use” and provide no cost storage, which displaced its own collections and limited space available to faculty. For the Park Service it meant obtaining cost-effective curation (including a reduced overhead rate), access to students, and university resources. However, SEAC’s allocation of space was insufficient while its negotiations with campus administrators over space had only just begun. Professionally, of course, the new arrangement also seemed to acknowledge “the fact that there are functions which the University can more efficiently discharge.”\textsuperscript{109} Nevertheless, the arrangement fulfilled the intent of Director Hartzog’s memorandum seeking to upgrade the management and long-term care of SEAC’s archeological collections by placing them, one way or another, under university oversight. At FSU, professional standards could be applied better and maintained more consistently over longer periods than had been the case at Ocmulgee. Unquestionably, association with FSU improved the physical environment for both SEAC and its collections, which were to be moved into a new building whose immediate former occupant had been the Department of Anthropology. The fact that the department relocated its own archeological collections to make room for those of SEAC suggests that FSU provided the best facilities it had available to house the NPS collections. Unfortunately, the fact that the department was forced to give up its own space to accommodate SEAC’s needs presaged future stress between the Park Service and the university on the issue of on-campus housing.

The Rebellion against Ernest Allen Connally

When Ernest Allen Connally took the reins of professional services relating to cultural resources in the National Park Service, they came with a mandate from Director George B. Hartzog Jr. “I intend,” Hartzog said before a meeting of the Society of Architectural Historians in 1967:

> that the Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation will be viewed in the Federal Government - and out - as the equivalent of the European monuments offices with which you are all familiar. I intend it to be as effective and as prestigious as its European counterparts. I intend it to be a scholarly institution drawing strength from such groups as the Society of Architectural Historians and the College Art Association. Our distinguished Secretary of the Interior, Stewart L. Udall, supports me in these objectives.”\textsuperscript{110}

The mandate to create a monuments-style organization similar to those in the United Kingdom or France, where cultural and natural resources were managed by separate government bureaus, was a major recommendation of the committee composed of Connally, J. O. Brew, and Ronald F. Lee that had advised Hartzog on how to implement the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA). As recounted by James A. Glass, Congress had bestowed responsibility for the NHPA upon the Park Service after Hartzog’s energetic promotion of the idea.\textsuperscript{111} Connally, a preeminent architectural historian, was a chief backer of the plan to create the Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation or OAHP. However, according to Robert Utley, Connally was reluctant to leave his tenured aca-

\textsuperscript{107} Acting Chief Richard D. Faust, Southeast Archeological Center, Memorandum to Director, Southeast Region, July 7, 1972, in A6435 folder, SEAC files.

\textsuperscript{108} Thomas J. Padgett, “Administrative Report of the Curatorial Maintenance of the Southeast Archeological Center’s Collections (Fiscal Year 1974)” (Tallahassee, Florida State University, 1974), 1, in Richard R. Vernon files, SEAC.

\textsuperscript{109} Acting Chief Richard D. Faust, Southeast Archeological Center, Memorandum to Director, Southeast Region, August 8, 1972, in A6435 folder, SEAC files.

\textsuperscript{110} George B. Hartzog Jr., “Speech given to the Annual Meeting of the Society of Architectural Historians in Cleveland, Ohio,” January 27, 1967, in George B. Hartzog Jr., Papers, Subject File Series, Box 93, Folder 1156, Clemson University Special Collections [Storm Thurmond Institute].

demic position to lead the new organization until Hartzog gave him explicit permission to create a “bureau within a bureau” and to set it up along disciplinary lines. This understanding was the basis of OAHP. While the Park Service had previously had an important role in leading such early programs as the Historic American Buildings Survey and had actively sought authority over historic War Department battlefields, agency bureaucracy remained focused nonetheless upon big natural parks and continued to be organized and managed to provide outdoor recreational opportunities. In other words, the Park Service had remained relatively uninterested in the preservation and research of cultural sites. OAHP marked a major reorientation of NPS policy. Cultural education, historic preservation, and research were secondary or even tertiary considerations of NPS management until Hartzog authorized the creation of OAHP.

Park archeology fits this basic premise. Despite the pioneering historical archeology of Pinky Harrington, John Cotter, and others, and the exemplary work by Charles Fairbanks at Ocmulgee, archeological research within the parks by the Park Service was limited. Much NPS archeology was externally oriented, especially work done within the Southeast and the Midwest regions. This external orientation grew out of funding derived from Depression-era work-relief and later reservoir salvage programs. As a result, NPS archeologists cultivated strong links with academia and the Smithsonian Institution and through these ties were able to wield some independent power in Congress. Thus, although the Park Service was relatively weak regarding park archeology, it was relatively strong in terms of external projects. Chief Archeologist John Corbett, of course, was seeking to leverage that external strength to promote the development of an archeological program for the parks themselves.

These unusual factors allowed archeology to develop as a strong, separate, and somewhat distinct professional enclave within the Park Service that was set apart from the development of the disciplines of history and historical architecture. Archeology was also set apart from these other disciplines, because its primary modus operandi is research that necessarily leads to the destruction of the site excavated. Indeed, use of the term “salvage” was emphasized by archeologists in their early dealings with government construction agencies who it was hoped would be less leery that archeologists were interested in “conserving” sites and thus interfering in their operations. Archeologists certainly hoped to identify and protect sites in situ as possible and to prevent looting, but in the end what archeologists “preserved” was the knowledge and artifacts obtained from sites. Preservation of the site itself was thereafter immaterial. This key distinction set archeologists apart from early preservationists who valued and sought to save sites for their historical or architectural significance.

Under Corbett’s leadership, Service archeologists developed an even stronger sense of their own identity, taking especially to his promotion of the “center” idea. NPS management had not previously allowed such concentrations of resource professionals, instead tending to scatter archeologists and historians at various administrative levels. The practice of concentrating and segregating archeologists both suited their dispositions and further strengthened their professional and structural parochialism within the Park Service. At the same time, archeologists generally maintained good relations with the park staff. Like them, archeologists were field-oriented and many did not have terminal degrees of the type that, according to Utley, promoted something of a class division between Connally’s PhD-educated cultural program leaders in Washington and NPS superintendents. This independent mindset predisposed many NPS archeologists, including those at SEAC, to oppose Connally’s plans. Indeed, archeology played a major role in the Servicewide rebellion that forced Director Hartzog to downgrade the authority of OAHP. Principal figures in SEAC’s early history participated in this rebellion and understanding the history of the center requires understanding the

113. This analysis is well established, see for example, the work of NPS Historian Richard W. Sellers, Preserving Nature in the National Parks: A History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1997).
114. In recent times, a “conservation” archeology attitude has developed to support in situ preservation whenever possible, and only partial excavation when necessary to allow for subsequent research and to minimize long-term preservation costs. This development greatly increased the preservation ethos within NPS archeology and narrowed its distance from other disciplines within historic preservation.
broader context of this struggle and how it played out.

What Connally specifically set about to do was to integrate and elevate the profile and influence of the primary disciplines of the field now called "cultural resources management" within the Park Service, that is archeology, history, and historical architecture (museum management was added later). He sought to make OAHP responsible "for all historic external preservation programs of the Park Service and all historic preservation projects within the National Park System from their beginning in the research stage through the final construction-supervision stage." 116 In other words, OAHP research, conducted as appropriate by one or more of the three disciplines, initiated every restoration project and every restoration was completed under the supervision of those same professions. One important handicap for Connally was that Director Hartzog probably interpreted OAHP's mission in a different light. In discussion with the author, Hartzog reiterated his strong support for OAHP, criticized later directors who failed to have "equal fervor," but also stated his view that OAHP "was not intended to be a line management-type operation with responsibility from beginning to end." 117

Together, Hartzog and Connally made important strides in reorienting the Park Service to meet the terms of the NHPA and they should rightfully be credited for that significant accomplishment. 118 However, the NHPA, while including archeology, was fundamentally driven by potent social and political forces whose interests were closely tied to preserving the historic and architectural qualities of the modern urban environment. Whatever the impact of the NHPA, NPS archeologists like Corbett and the many external archeologists whose influence brought salvage dollars to the Park Service, did not consider it of seminal importance to their profession. Certainly, prominent archeologists outside the service, like J.O. Brew and Emil Haury, supported Hartzog's effort to raise the prominence of the Park Service in the management

117. George B. Hartzog Jr., Discussions with Cameron Binkley, November 22 and 29, 2005, National Park Service.
118. Again, see Glass, Beginnings of a New National Historic Preservation Program.
of national cultural resources. Hartzog later strongly credited these archeologists for their early help in the establishment of OAHP.\textsuperscript{119} Nevertheless, this support did not imply a willingness by NPS archeologists to be integrated within OAHP or governed by the strictures of the NHPA. In another vein, according to Utley, OAHP raised the profile of the cultural professions in NPS decision-making, which inherently challenged older traditions and bureaucratic attitudes. Connally’s intention and his perceived authority cut against the grain of regional directors and superintendents who felt their influence diminished by his drive to oversee historic preservation projects from start to finish.\textsuperscript{120}

Moreover, unlike the historians, few archeologists showed much interest in becoming part of the NPS bureaucracy. A few, such as Bohannon at Ocmulgee and Bradley at Russell Cave National Monument, did take up the management of archeological sites, or else worried over the state of collections management. The dismal experiment of placing SEAC in the charge of Ocmulgee, however, is illustrative of the general attitude toward administration taken by NPS archeologists. John Griffin had no liking for it. Most NPS archeologists seemed content to pursue their professional interests. The monthly reports of the Division of Archeology tend to agree—they are filled with accounts of professional conferences attended, salvage activities underway, publications in progress, and who was analyzing which collection. They give only cursory indication that NPS archeologists were part of the Park Service or had any significant exposure to other disciplines. Fieldwork and publication did not require interdisciplinary organization or administrative experience.

The detachment of NPS archeologists from the NPS bureaucracy was a political liability, but they probably had less to lose than other professional groups. For example the influence of NPS biologists, as recounted by historian Richard W. Sellars, had declined so far by the 1960s since their innovative work of the 1930s that the Park Service failed to support the historic Wilderness Act of 1964. Biologists, increasingly concerned with ecology and habitat protection faced an NPS management structure skewed strongly towards recreation and park development.\textsuperscript{121} The basic concerns of NPS archeologists, on the other hand, could be met by adequate excavation of threatened sites. Archeologists could thus generally evade serious conflict with pre-development NPS management philosophies while other groups, such as biologists, could not.

At any rate, Connally’s objective to integrate archeology with historic preservation predisposed NPS archeologists to oppose him, and they did. Connally readily acknowledged this opposition and the perception of archeologists to OAHP:

I had always worked very hard to try to maintain good relations with the archeological community and maintain credibility with them, and to keep them assured that we counted archeology as a part of historic preservation and that it wasn’t improperly subservient to the historians. Archeologists were terribly separatist and terribly sensitive about what they perceived to be a subsidiary or minor role assigned by the Park Service to archeology, and that everything went to history.\textsuperscript{122}

Nevertheless, Corbett and his staff archeologists, especially Deputy Chief Archeologist Zorro Bradley, reacted negatively to Connally, whom they perceived as undermining their efforts to promote a significant NPS capability in archeology from salvage work. These did support some of Connally’s goals, especially associating the archeological centers with universities. Bradley, however, maintains that Connally actually sought “to level the playing field” by trying to shift funds from archeology’s much larger accounts to historic preservation.\textsuperscript{123} Whether Connally had a truly hostile attitude toward archeology or NPS archeologists simply perceived him as hostile because of their own parochial inclinations is unclear, but several accounts agree that Connally was at odds with the body of NPS archeologists.\textsuperscript{124} Connally did understand how powerful archeology was and gave “Archeology” equal billing alongside “Historic Preservation” in the very title of his new organization.

\textsuperscript{119} Hartzog. Discussions with Cameron Binkley, November 22 and 29, 2005.
\textsuperscript{120} Sellars and Webb, An Interview with Robert M. Utley, 79-80; Utley, e-mail to Cameron Binkley, March 23 and 26, 2004.
\textsuperscript{121} See Sellars, Preserving Nature in the National Parks. This work offers a comprehensive review of the history of NPS management of natural resources.
\textsuperscript{122} Connally, Oral History Interview by Charles B. Hosmer Jr., July, 1981, 245.
\textsuperscript{123} Bradley, e-mail to Cameron Binkley, April 15 and 24, 2004.
but these superficialities failed to elicit a high degree of support from an archeological community suspicious of its subordination to an historic architect.\textsuperscript{125}

Much of the strife within OAH P probably happened beneath the busy director’s level of attention. Decades later, Hartzog gave “high marks” to the archeologists and remembered Corbett as “a first-class guy.” Nevertheless, he, too, acknowledged that “rumblings” about the integration of archeology and historic preservation continued despite the support for OAH P by such prominent authorities as Brew and Haury. Moreover, Hartzog generally agreed with Utley that NPS archeology had a distinct orientation due to its strong external ties, that archeologists were “site-oriented” (as opposed to document-oriented historians), and that any conflict between Connally and archeology was derived from these professional divisions.\textsuperscript{126}

In Bradley’s view, Connally was against the establishment of additional archeological centers despite his avowed commitment to professionalize the Service and his encouragement of Corbett to acquire the Missouri Basin Project (MBP).\textsuperscript{127} Bradley’s perspective resonates with Connally’s comments to Hale Smith about the Park Service not needing an underwater archeological facility in Florida and that “there was simply not enough of us to go around” to allow SEAC to move to Florida State.\textsuperscript{128} However, when directed to do so after Assistant Secretary Nathaniel Reed expressed his interest, Connally easily overcame political resistance by Georgia to moving SEAC to Florida, so this argument may have been a “strawman.” Perhaps Connally’s overall focus on promoting historic preservation did have something to do with his resistance to moving SEAC to FSU. Indeed, if it is true that Connally gave higher priority to preservation than archeology, an argument that he would have denied, it certainly would have tested the relations between OAH P and the body of Service archeologists.

What is clearly known is that the archeologists rebelled against OAH P. One major aspect of their “insurrection” was antagonism by the staff archeologists in Washington to Connally and even Director Hartzog. As a result, Chief Archeologist Corbett was fired. Bradley, and Fischer to some extent, also attempted to stir up field opposition to Connally’s organizational schemes and eventually alienated themselves.\textsuperscript{129} Bradley got into trouble for resisting the often unappreciated directive that all positions “in which a Ph.D. degree is a normal requisite in academic circles [must] have the same doctoral credentials.”\textsuperscript{130} As previously mentioned, this initiative might have resulted from pressure applied on Hartzog by competition with the Smithsonian Institution. James Bradley, Assistant Secretary of the Smithsonian, was particularly critical of the Park Service for having research programs administered by staff who lacked doctoral degrees.\textsuperscript{131} There is little doubt that Connally strongly backed this policy, if he was not its originator. Zorro Bradley was so brazen in his opposition that, at Fischer’s

\textsuperscript{124} Bradley, e-mail to Cameron Binkley, April 15 and 24, 2004; Connally, Oral History Interview by Charles B. Hosmer Jr., July 1981, 92; Sellers and Webb, An Interview with Robert M. Utley, 11, 81. Connally had some legitimate concerns in attempting to reform NPS archeology, and he did shield the institution from retribution by senior NPS management when, as discussed in the introduction, open separatist attacks erupted in 1976. See Associate Director Professional Services (Ernest Allen Connally), Memorandum to Acting Deputy Director (John E. Cook), April 7, 1976, in “IAS” folder, History of Archeology files, Archeology Program, National Center for Cultural Resources. Nevertheless, Connally’s relations with NPS archeology remained strained.

\textsuperscript{125} The incongruity of the title was protested by some who found it “terminological awkward and inadequate in the sense of that it does not connot properly the scope and purpose of this Office.” This commentator recommended an alternative: the “Office of Cultural Research and Preservation.” Publications Editor, Division of Archeology, Letter to Chief, Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation, April 3, 1968, in Ernest Allen Connally Papers, “OAH P Personnel and Organization,” Box 1, Harpers Ferry Center. The problem with the title was that it juxtaposed “archeology,” a professional discipline with “historic preservation,” an activity.

\textsuperscript{126} Hartzog, Discussion with Cameron Binkley, November 22 and 29, 2005.

\textsuperscript{127} Bradley, e-mail to Cameron Binkley, April 15 and 24, 2004; Logan, Oral History Interview by Thomas D. Thiessen, 33.

\textsuperscript{128} Chief Ernest Allen Connally, Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation, Memorandum to Deputy Director, Operations (Approved and signed by George B. Hartzog), January 26, 1971, in A6435 folder, SEAC files.

\textsuperscript{129} Sellers and Webb, An Interview with Robert M. Utley, 81; Utley, e-mail to Cameron Binkley, March 23 and 26, 2004; Bradley, e-mail to Cameron Binkley, April 15 and 24, 2004.

\textsuperscript{130} Quote from a memorandum of record sent by Connally to Hartzog with a list of decisions that the Director had agreed to authorize. The memo also covered important staff selection decisions, largely related to archeological issues. Ernest Allen Connally, Memorandum to the Director, March 5, 1970, in Ernest Allen Connally Papers, “Personnel OAH P,” Box 1, Harpers Ferry Center.

\textsuperscript{131} Bradley, e-mail to Cameron Binkley, April 15 and 24, 2004. There is no relationship between the two Bradleys.
suggestion, he applied for a PhD degree from Millard Fillmore Institute and was awarded one for ten dollars. At one staff meeting Bradley held up his new “certificate” and told the director that while his new policy directed staff to have a PhD he had not said from where the degree had to come. Because of such antics, the agency returned Bradley to the field, in fact, to Alaska, where he later resurrected his career.

The Hartzog/Connally policy giving strong preference to individuals with PhDs was a further slap in the face to many NPS archeologists who lacked that degree, including John Griffin. The impact of this policy upon Griffin’s decision to resign as Chief of SEAC has already been discussed, although, again, the main source of friction between Griffin and Connally was likely Griffin’s effort to move SEAC to Florida. Whatever its merit, the NPS policy preferencing employees with doctoral degrees undermined much support for Connally among field archeologists. Support eroded further when Connally promoted Rex L. Wilson to be Chief Archeologist. Wilson was willing to work within the structure of OAHP. Connally hired him as Chief Archeologist because he had removed John Corbett from that position. Connally carried out this task in August 1971 by reassigning Corbett to be Special Assistant to the Director, OAHP. Hartzog refused to allow Corbett to become Departmental Consulting Archeologist, however, for fear that the function, a Departmental responsibility, might be more easily removed from the Park Service. Corbett was thus left with little to do and soon retired. According to Utley, Connally had found that Corbett, and Bradley as well, could not

132. Bradley, e-mail to Cameron Binkley, April 15 and 24, 2004. Faust resented the requirement as well, but it did not prevent him from eventually assuming full responsibility for SEAC. Faust, Oral History Interview, 16.
134. Faust clearly recalled Griffin fussing with Washington over the issue, as did Jackson W. Moore. Faust, Oral History Interview, 14-15; and Moore, Letters to Cameron Binkley, March 29 and May 15, 2003.
135. Incidentally, Wilson was also pressured to complete a doctoral degree. Like Griffin, the Park Service sent Wilson back to school at NPS expense, but he, too, failed to complete his program. Later, Wilson left the Park Service for the Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service. Bradley, e-mail to Cameron Binkley, April 15 and 24, 2004; and Robert Utley, e-mail to Cameron Binkley, March 23 and 26, 2004, National Park Service; Sellars and Webb, An Interview with Robert M. Utley, 81.
“loyally cooperate” because of their opposition to the interdisciplinary integration of archeology into OAHP.137

As it turned out, by the fall of 1971, opposition to OAHP was much more widespread than among the ranks of NPS Washington Office and field archaeologists and had bubbled into areas of concern to the profession in general. Service archaeologists were still well connected to their academic colleagues due to NPS sponsorship of salvage work. The Park Service had gradually overtaken the Smithsonian as the most important government agency with a legislatively mandated responsibility for archeology. The major archeological professional associations, such as the American Anthropological Association, the Society for American Archaeology, and even prominent members of the CRAR who supported OAHP, remained engaged with NPS policies. Of course, they worried about funding, but it was probably as important that the Park Service was poised to play a major role in setting the direction on leading issues of national concern to archeologists.

Some in the archeological community complained that the Park Service was dragging its feet on improving park archeology. They complained about confusion in the relations among the parks, the regions, and the service centers. Calls were made to revitalize and restructure the NPS archeological program to improve its ability to coordinate with other federal, state, and private agencies.138 In a major manifestation of professional frustration with NPS management and politics concerning the archeological program, Charles R. McGimsey III, a noted archeologist and Director of the Arkansas Archeological Survey, launched an effort to remove the archeology program from OAHP altogether.139 McGimsey hoped to establish archeology as a separate entity administratively parallel to and not subordinate to OAHP. Such separation was necessary, he argued, because OAHP’s major emphasis was preservation and interpretation while the archeological program was “primarily one of the recovery of scientific data and identification of significant archeological resources.” Only after the latter was done could the former begin. Hence, “both programs can operate with maximum effectiveness in a parallel administrative situation.”140 McGimsey offered a set of proposals that, if implemented, would allow the Park Service to develop a nation-wide problem-oriented approach to archeology that he thought it lacked. McGimsey sought specifically to free NPS archeology from “necessary identity with specific construction projects” that prevented a program of research driven by the needs of knowledge as opposed to the needs of expediency.141 According to Utley, “because of all the fuss and hassle that Hartzog had to endure from archeologists, he was at least intrigued by this proposition, because bear in mind that whatever you might say about the archeologists, for many years they had been organized in a politically effective way and could mount a significant voice in the Congress when it came time to pass out the money… The archeologists could deliver the money and the political influence, and that appealed greatly to Hartzog.”142 Connally was willing to implement many of these ideas, but he did not support admin-

istrative changes that would have weakened OAHP's authority over archeology. The chorus of complaints against OAHP's administration of archeology thus continued.

Gradually, the simmering relations between archeologists and preservationists emerged as a political threat to both Connally and Hartzog. Significantly, the struggle could be linked to a broader issue. OAHP had stirred up opposition among another influential group - the old-line NPS managers and regional directors. These reacted negatively to the growing power of OAHP and Connally's avowed goal of having historians and architects control the process of historic preservation from start to finish. Some superintendents and senior NPS officials may also have disliked Connally for personal reasons having to do with his class, cultured affectations, and his status as an NPS outsider, but most probably did not want to surrender any authority. In Utley's words, they "fear[ed] that the historians would take over and acted to prevent it." They responded by complaining to the Director and by taking indirect action. NPS archeologists, who were at odds with Connally for their own reasons, and NPS field managers thus became allies in the bureaucratic struggle to undo OAHP.

According to Connally, Hartzog worried that archeology might be taken out of NPS by the department because of the pressure exerted by NPS archeologists and their academic allies, a prospect perhaps appealing to some NPS archeologists whose salvage responsibilities had long accustomed them to work outside the park system. The possibility that he might even lose OAHP itself - and with it a great degree of Park Service responsibility for American cultural resources - was probably another real concern for the director. Both Connally and Hartzog acknowledged the intense competition between the National Park Service and the Smithsonian Institution over responsibility for cultural resources management in the United States. In discussion with the author, Hartzog cited as one example how Smithsonian chief S. Dillon Ripley challenged the Park Service over which agency would represent the United States on the governing committee of the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). Ripley used his connections to have a rider attached to a bill providing Smithsonian authority for such representation, but Sen. Alan Bible, an NPS supporter, "squashed" the effort in committee. Secretary of the Interior Stewart L. Udall elected to give OAHP the assignment. Utley and other historians would later argue the merits of removing OAHP from the Service. However, knowing Hartzog would "have put us before a firing squad," they prudently awaited the administration of subsequent directors before raising the idea.

At any rate, Hartzog had good reason to fear the loss of his archeology program as a result of high-level politicking. He also faced complaints from senior field managers regarding the influence of OAHP. His promise to Connally that OAHP would become an effective "European-style monuments agency" ran counter to these forces. At first, Hartzog and Connally tried to co-opt their archeological critics by creating a new position directly beneath Connally, Deputy Director, OAHP, to be staffed by a prominent archeologist. This position, in fact, was offered to Haury, perhaps in hope that it would help silence complaints. Haury turned the job down, citing his age. They also sought to hire McGimsey as Chief Archeologist while watering down some of his more threatening administrative proposals, mainly removing archeology from OAHP. The remaining proposals would have left in

144. Sellars and Webb, An Interview with Robert M. Utley, 10-11, 79-80; Logan provides a similar account of how Connally struggled against the regional directors who had no interest in history and who sought to expand their own bureaucratic empires at the expense of OAHP. Logan, Oral History Interview by Thomas D. Thiessen, 46-47.
146. Connally's own handwritten notes of meetings held with Hartzog clearly indicate the Director's concern with high-level pressure from archeological critics and his fear that the archeology program might be removed from NPS as a result. Connally, Notes of meeting with Director Hartzog, various dates, 1971. He also explained Hartzog's concern in an interview in 1981. See, Ernest Allen Connally, Oral History Interview by Charles B. Hosmer Jr., July 1981, 124-125, in Ernest Allen Connally Papers, Box 5, Harpers Ferry Center.
147. Hartzog, Discussions with Cameron Binkley, November 22 and 29, 2005; see also Connally, Oral History Interview by Charles B. Hosmer Jr., July 1981, 167-168.
place a strong Washington-controlled archeology program. McGimsey, however, was also unwilling to take a position with the Park Service, at least on the terms offered. Ultimately, Hartzog could not silence discontent raised by some prominent outside critics, his own field staff, and the Regional Directorate and still accommodate Connolly’s vision for OAHP.

According to Utley, the ax began to fall on OAHP in 1970 when Hartzog removed Connolly’s research historians and historical architects and transferred them to the Washington Service Center on Wisconsin Avenue, which handled design and construction for Eastern parks. In this action, Hartzog probably sought to appease the complaints of field managers. If the idea of OAHP, however, had been full oversight of the design and construction process by resource experts, it was not a move in that direction. As previously noted, the former director disagreed with this characterization. Hartzog interpreted the mission of OAHP as a “European-style monuments agency” being the chief professional source of federal authority on cultural resource management. In his view, OAHP was intended to provide vital professional advice, including outreach to the public and other government agencies, but OAHP was not intended to be a line management operation.

Concerned that McGimsey’s plan to remove archeology from OAHP might prevail, former NPS Chief Historians Ronald F. Lee and Herbert E. Kahler, who had replaced Connolly on Hartzog’s NHPA advisory committee, along with J. O. Brew, counseled the director in late November 1971 that an “interdisciplinary approach” was key to the success of historic preservation overall. Indeed, they argued, “historic preservation has been specifically defined by Congress as embracing sites, buildings, structures, objects and districts significant in history, architecture, culture and archeology [original emphasis].” While the trio informed Hartzog that they had “tried to view organization problems from your standpoint,” they strongly advised him that:

To achieve close coordination between history, historic architecture, and archaeologists ... it is the view of your committee that the preferred organization is one that groups these professional staffs into three divisions within one overall professional unit, much as you have these professions organized now in the Office of Archaeology and Historic Preservation. While this is not the only way, in our view it is the most efficient and economical way to provide these professional services and more importantly should insure the highest attainable professional standard.

Brew, Kahler, and Lee also reminded the director that he had previously supported OAHP in similar words. They praised OAHP as “loyal, capable, diligent, and even astute.” Still, the trio acknowledged “that a very serious problem developed in the archeological program during the past two years.” They simply did not see the separation of archeology from OAHP as the solution. Instead, “the greatest need now, as we see it, is promptly to appoint a new Chief Archaeologist and give him and the Chief of OAHP the task of completing the straightening out of the program, and developing long range objectives.” The CRAR, they indicated, was willing to help the Park Service reach this goal.

This passionate expression of concern from Hartzog’s most trusted advisors indicated the serious possibility that OAHP was facing dramatic reform and that archeology was a major instigator for it. Hartzog mulled the matter over for several months, as he admitted at the time. In April 1972, he replied to his advisory committee’s November memorandum regarding the Service’s management system. Hartzog diplomatically rebutted some of its concerns about role and function statements. These

150. Utley, e-mail to Cameron Binkley, March 23 and 26, 2004; Connolly, Oral History Interview by Charles B. Hosmer Jr., July 1981, 196. This service center, which had several names, subsequently merged with the Western Office of Design and Construction, San Francisco, to create the Denver Service Center.
151. Hartzog, Discussions with Cameron Binkley, November 22 and 29, 2005.
tie positions more closely to their functions, as opposed to their professions, and can be used to impose tighter organizational command and control. Obviously, control was an issue within OAHP. "Clear statements understood by all, and applied, do avoid misunderstandings," Hartzog informed Lee. The director acknowledged that Lee's view on staff relationships was "extremely meaningful." "Hopefully," he went on, "we have incorporated this philosophy in role and function statements also."154 Bowing to the wishes of his advisors, Hartzog did not sever archeology from historic preservation.

Nevertheless, in early 1972, to tamp down institutional hostility to OAHP, the director did again demote its influence. He simply returned line authority for archeology to the regional directors. This move helped alleviate disputes between Connally and NPS archeology as well as between OAHP and the field. Connally immediately tried to forestall the event. He and his new Chief Archeologist, Rex L. Wilson, who had just replaced Corbett and was much more willing to follow Connally's lead, went to a CRAR meeting where they asked the attending NPS archeologists to sign a memorandum to the director affirming their confidence in OAHP and their willingness to remain beneath Washington. Needless to say, the archeologists took a dim view of this proposal. Not being under Connally's thumb suited their interests. Wilfred Logan, Chief of the Midwest Archeological Center, and Pete Faust, who was then Acting Chief of SEAC, went to their respective regional directors, explained the situation, and requested "protection." Although no organizational changes had been made, Hartzog's memo had already gone out, effectively authorizing the regional directors to assume authority over the archeological centers, which they were happy to do. Logan and Faust thus obtained specific instructions forbidding them from undertaking any action without prior approval from "their" regional directors. These "orders" allowed Logan, Faust, and the other archeologists to tell Connally and Wilson that they could not sign the memorandum supporting OAHP.155 Lacking the support of NPS archeologists, Connally was unable to undo what had been done. Rather than risk losing archeology to the department, Hartzog returned it to the regions. This move pleased both the Regional Directorates and the archeologists themselves and avoided the bisection of OAHP at the national level. To some extent, Connally was thus a victim of his own success in building up a program that had threatened the NPS status quo. The administration of SEAC and the other archeological centers as "field dependencies" of OAHP had come to an end.156

154. Associate Director J. Leonard Norwood [on behalf of Director Hartzog], to Mr. Ronald F. Lee, April 11, 1972, in George B. Hartzog Jr., Papers, Subject File Additions, box 19, folder 139 ("Lee, Ronald F."); Special Collections, Strom Thurmond Institute, Clemson University.

155. Logan, Oral History Interview by Thomas D. Thiessen, 18-12.

156. As discussed in the introduction, NPS archeologists continued active resistance to Connally until Chief Anthropologist Douglas Scovill reconsidered the merit of openly attacking historic preservation policies at the 1976 Missouri Conference of the Society for American Archaeology. In 1972, Connally was promoted above OAHP to become Associate Director, Professional Services, and the programs of OAHP were regrouped into externally and internally oriented divisions beneath separate assistant directors. The title "OAHP" disappeared from organizational charts as did the goal of creating a mini "European-style monuments" agency within the Park Service after several cultural resource functions were transferred to the Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service in 1978, somewhat as Hartzog had feared might happen.
Chapter Four: SEAC and Florida State University (1973-1995)

The arrival of the Southeast Archeological Center at Florida State University marks an important phase in the history of SEAC and the development of federal archeology in the Southeast. It suggests both the failure and the success of the National Park Service in curating what was probably the largest holding of recovered artifactual remains from aboriginal civilizations of the Southeastern United States. NPS archeologists had deemed it essential to relocate this huge assemblage from Ocmulgee National Monument to redress deficiencies accrued from a prolonged period of inadequate attention. After the move to Florida State, the collection did begin to receive better management while staff capabilities and professionalization increased with exposure to a university environment, although not without some ups and downs in NPS-FSU relations. Meanwhile, congressional interest in park matters spurred the center toward ever greater accountability on curatorial issues while imposing ever greater restraints on the viability of SEAC’s on-campus arrangements. Still, detached from Ocmulgee, SEAC’s mission as a regional archeological resource center became more clearly defined, despite unanticipated complexities in its relations with Ocmulgee. Finally, Servicewide reorganizations and underwater archeology also became issues of great focus as the promise and the limitations of the NPS-FSU cooperative agreement played out.

Disposition and Curation of Archeological Collections: Part I

In January 1973, SEAC completed the second major phase of its move to Tallahassee. SEAC Curator Donald Crusoe organized the packing and shipment of some fifteen truckloads of archeological artifacts. The cost to ship the collection, estimated to weigh between 318,000 and 397,000 pounds, was approximately sixteen thousand dollars. The moving vans arrived in Tallahassee in hourly intervals from Macon, apparently upon a single day, and were unloaded by FSU graduate students and SEAC staff. Most of the two million plus artifacts were packed inside their steel museum cases and moved into archeological storage areas of the Department of Anthropology in the basement of Bellamy Hall where it later took weeks to unpack and count them. By some estimates, this event marks the true establishment of SEAC at Florida State.

When Director Hartzog ordered SEAC to take charge of Ocmulgee, no matter to what extent John Griffin took the directive seriously, it created some discomfort for the staffs of SEAC and the monument. The removal of the monument’s collections, long thought to belong to it, created additional stress between respective staffs. However, no accounts have surfaced to suggest any serious opposition to the move by Ocmulgee employees. As much could be said about the reaction of most Macon-area residents, the majority of whom were probably little concerned or

1. Bradley, e-mail to Cameron Binkley, April 15 and 24, 2004.
2. Invoice for estimated cost of services, AERO Mayflower Transit Company, February 14, 1972, in A6435 folder, SEAC files. It would cost roughly one hundred thousand dollars to move an equivalent weight in 2004 terms.
informed about activities at the monument. A few, however, wrote the Park Service soon afterwards to lament the loss of the artifacts. Their concerns would linger.

Several years after the move, John Holley, executive director of the Macon-Bibb County Planning and Zoning Commission, ignited a controversy. When Holley discovered that the Park Service had shipped the WPA-era archeological collections to Florida, he demanded their return. *The Macon Telegraph*, a local newspaper, supported Holley's complaints and encouraged citizens to join a letter-writing campaign to force the Park Service to return the artifacts. Subsequently, the Bibb County Commissioners contacted Georgia Senator Sam Nunn, who formally queried the Park Service about the situation. The Park Service informed Nunn that it would return the artifacts to Macon after they had been "analyzed." Ocmulgee Superintendent Walter T. Barrett explained that the artifacts were excavated from what was basically a "garbage dump" and that "everything that's fit to display is on display now" at the park. Still, the newspaper played up the controversy. It attributed uncomplimentary remarks made by Barrett about Holley "not knowing what he is talking about" and reported sarcastically that the material would be returned to Macon "as soon as federal officials analyze the 2.5 million objects and artifacts they have hoarded in a Florida laboratory." The paper did print a letter by Barrett that attempted to clear up misunderstandings regarding the relocation of SEAC and the archeological collections. Barrett explained how the Park Service had "made some progress in analyzing the material [during the 1960s] but the pace and extent of this work was inadequate and clearly an ineffective way of proceeding." Barrett put forth the reasons that the Park Service created SEAC. He explained that one of SEAC's mandates was to inventory and report on the vast Ocmulgee collection, as well as other collections held at Ocmulgee but not related to it, and that the agreement with Florida State had provided SEAC with access to facilities, faculty, and student resources that greatly improved its ability to study the Ocmulgee material. He also noted that "SEAC is better able to provide proper curatorial attention to the collection at FSU," but nevertheless that "about one-fourth of the artifacts taken from Ocmulgee to FSU have been returned to the park" already.

This sudden uproar occurred in 1977, five years after the collections left the monument. It can probably be attributed mostly to John Holley, who may have had his own ax to grind with the Park Service. However, Holley only succeeded in generating such anti-NPS publicity because of a lingering reservoir of local resentment. This attitude was undoubtedly present in 1972 when SEAC actually moved the archeological collections. That no similar uproar occurred at that time is curious and seems to indicate how successful NPS officials were in controlling negative publicity about the event. It was impossible to keep the move secret, of course, but SEAC and Regional Office staff deliberately sought to maintain a low-key posture to avoid controversy. In late December 1972, for example, a local citizen called the "Bill Powell" radio show to find out why the Park Service was removing the artifacts. A television news crew then decided to air a segment on the impending move. SEAC Curator Donald Cruso, still at Ocmulgee, alerted SEAC staff in Tallahassee. George Fischer, who took the

5. Archeological material connected to Ocmulgee National Monument and Central Georgia (including WPA-era excavations represented the bulk of SEAC's collection, but, as reported in 1975, the Center had significant other collections in the following areas: Florida Northwest Gulf Coast, Everglades National Monument [now Park], Georgia Coast, Natchez Trace Parkway, Fort Frederica National Monument, Russell Cave National Monument, and Virgin Islands National Park, as well as miscellaneous site and ceramic type collections, and some whole ceramic vessels. Thomas J. Paideitt, "Annual Report: Curatorial Maintenance Program for the Southeast Archeological Center (Fiscal Year 1975)" (Tallahassee, Florida State University, 1975), 9, in Richard R. Vernon files, SEAC.

6. Bradley, e-mail to Cameron Binkley, April 15 and 24, 2004; Richard D. Faust, e-mail to Cameron Binkley, April 5, 2004, National Park Service.


8. "Artifacts to Come Back," *The Macon Telegraph* (December 7, 1977), clipping in "Ocmulgee News Articles, 1970s," Ocmulgee National Park files. There was a surge of anti-NPS letters to the paper as well. However, not all Maconites concerned with the issue opposed the relocation. One local, claiming to be "one of the few Indians here in Macon who can actually produce federally documented proof" of her Native American heritage, wrote that the Ocmulgee artifacts "DO NOT belong to Macon or its citizens except as citizens of the United States" and if the Park Service saw fit to relocate the artifacts to improve their study, she gave it her "full support." Agnes K. Webster, "Indian Relics Belong Elsewhere," *Macon News*, November 20, 1977, 6A.

call, was greatly concerned and advised Crusoe to "soft pedal the thing" as much as possible. Fischer then alerted the Regional Office and staff there prepared to handle any repercussions. As it turned out, the television coverage was factual and not antagonistic. The potential for controversy clearly existed, however, and the Park Service took it seriously. Indeed, Ernest Connally's reluctance to act on archeologists' arguments for moving SEAC to Tallahassee is partially justified on this record, although he was also concerned about archeological favoritism and costs. Allan Marsh, who served at Ocmulgee National Monument between 1985 and 1992, recalled that even during his tenure "local visitors still occasionally complained that few artifacts were on display and asked where they were and if they would come back."

The sensitivity of local citizens around Macon and officials in the Park Service regarding the removal of Ocmulgee's archeological collections helps explain, if it cannot confirm, an interesting story, an oral tradition among monument staff concerning the timing of the move. According to the story, SEAC moved the archeological collections during the night such that the last vans were leaving the monument as park staff were arriving for duty the next day. The explanation for moving the collections "in the dark of night" is that it was a security measure to avoid any potential interference by locals, possibly even a "highjacking." Another explanation for such a tactic is that it would have limited disruption at the park during normal hours and would have eliminated the prospect of upsetting any visitors who happened by, which might have generated unwanted publicity. The collections might also have been moved during the night for simple logistical reasons. The existence of this story, dubbed the "Mid-night Move" by some, whether true or not, suggests the degree of tension that was created by the NPS decision to relocate the Ocmulgee collections to Florida. Creation of the story, if untrue, or remembrance of it, if true, was probably fed by that original tension while lingering public resentment ensured its retelling over the years. In that sense, the existence of the story is more important than whether it is true. Removing the archeological collections from Ocmulgee was a difficult task for political reasons, but the Park Service persevered because it was committed to improving their care. Perhaps professional judgment and issues that are politically sensitive cannot always be balanced in an agency whose ultimate responsibility is heritage preservation. NPS archeologists have had to face the issue many times. This case is a good example, however, of how Service personnel have tried to walk one of the finer lines in cultural resource management.

Several years after Florida State took over responsibility for SEAC's archeological collections, Dr. James W. Stoutamire, a research associate of FSU's Department of Anthropology, completed an annual end-of-year report on the status of the university's curatorial efforts under the MOU. At the time, the department's primary goals for curating this collection included continuous collections inventory, collections maintenance and repair, records maintenance and repair, the implementation of standardized curatorial procedures, and the creation of long-term curatorial and research objectives. The department also sought to support SEAC by evaluating the research potential of the collection, by providing research assistance, and by disseminating research results.

Stoutamire's report reveals that problems in managing the archeological collections at Ocmulgee were far more problematic than deficiencies in the adequacy of the museum building to prevent water damage. Indeed, Stoutamire details a history of considerable curatorial neglect. Under Director Hartzog's administration, the Park Service acknowledged the scope of this deficiency and took corrective action, albeit with limited funds. An important reason for the relocation of SEAC's huge

10. George Fischer to Pete [Richard Faust], December 26 and 27, 1972, Memorandum in A643S folder, SEAC files.
11. Allan Marsh, e-mail to Cameron Binkley, April 7, 2004, National Park Service.
12. Sylvia Flowers, interview with Cameron Binkley, March 11, 2004, National Park Service. The validity of this story cannot be confirmed because documentary evidence is not available. Alan Marsh, who wrote Ocmulgee's administrative history (NPS, 1986), similarly uncovered no documents bearing upon the story, although he was aware of it. NPS Regional Archivist Sara Van Beck, who worked on a collections management plan for Ocmulgee, reported that documents were missing from Ocmulgee's files. Several current and former NPS archeologists acknowledged hearing the story, although some doubted the story to be true. SEAC's own records regarding the move were not conclusive either way.
The archeological collection was to take advantage of the efficiencies of a cooperative arrangement with FSU that might allow substantially better care in the absence of major new funding. Namely, curatorial contracts could capitalize upon inexpensive student labor (often donated through the VIP program) overseen by a university expert. Research was also facilitated by allowing students and FSU faculty ready access to these collections. It was a win-win situation. Still, Stoutamire found “visible progress” frustratingly slow because “a whole series of steps” had to be completed to solve any single issue. At the same time, FSU had to institute needed changes in the management of the collection without invalidating prior systems or creating new errors. Even simple issues could thus resist resolution. For example, to locate all the material cataloged under the control of SEAC it was first necessary to resolve incomplete and inaccurate loan files, produce a complete inventory of the remaining collections on hand, and organize catalog files so that complete lists of catalog numbers could be compiled and the specific material cataloged could be produced. Problems that the Park Service had ignored for years included the creation of a complete accession file, an item essential to the management of any museum or archeological collection. Moreover, in addition to new materials, Stoutamire estimated that approximately one million artifacts in SEAC’s collection had never been cataloged. This long-standing problem essentially made research on those items impossible.

Stoutamire did report progress in cataloging the collection. He instituted new procedures that required field crews to assist in the cataloging of materials as they were excavated. These procedures benefited the collection in that they produced more accurate and detailed records and allowed laboratory workers more time to address the backlog problem. By 1981, the year Stoutamire filed his last annual report, he and his assistants, and numerous student volunteers, had spent thousands of man hours addressing various NPS curation needs. One accomplishment was that Stoutamire was able to correct the accession files so that “the current accession records system has been update [sic] to reflect all archeological projects known to have been conducted in areas of the National Park Service, Southeast Region.” Nevertheless, it is obvious that the need to process current records was a constant limitation on the results that could be expected in correcting long-standing defi-

ciencies. For example, Stoutamire noted in the same report that over one hundred boxes of backlog material was threatened by loss of data while it awaited cataloging.\textsuperscript{16}

Considering the numerous issues connected with managing SEAC's archeological collections, especially overcoming backlog problems dating to relief-era excavations, the question could be asked, "why are these artifacts important?" By the mid-1980s, many professional archeologists had discredited the value of excavations conducted by the Civil Works Administration and the Works Progress Administration. Among other problems, they argued that these massive projects lacked adequate supervision for their inexperienced crews, controlled methods were not used, and documentation was left incomplete with many projects failing to post final reports. Nevertheless, an entire generation of archeologists cut their professional teeth on relief-era projects while the typologies, chronologies, and areal syntheses they developed provided a background for much modern interpretation and research which cannot now be revisited because the sites were either fully excavated at the time or later destroyed by subsequent development.

In 1985, an FSU anthropology graduate student, Judy Lynn Hellmich, completed a unique thesis in support of her FSU master's requirements that challenged this prevalent attitude. Hellmich argued that the rising cost of excavation, reduced funding, and the development of a "preservation ethic," had led many archeologists to re-assess the value of curated collections despite a strong academic prejudice toward original field excavations. She noted that many funding agencies had begun to ask for assessments of existing collections before making grants for additional excavation projects while more funding was becoming available for long-term curation of previously excavated materials.\textsuperscript{17}

To demonstrate how recently developed theories, analytical techniques, and technological innovations could derive additional information from old data sets, Hellmich chose to assess the integrity and research value of the relief-era excavations conducted at or near Ocmulgee National Monument and curated at SEAC. Her thesis, entitled "The Research Potential of C.W.A. and W.P.A. Archeological Collections from Bibb County, Georgia," was important in at least two regards. First, her work offered a concrete example of how synergistic and mutually beneficial was the maturing SEAC- FSU relationship. Second, her thesis offered an assessment of the curatorial state and research potential of a core segment of SEAC's collection as it stood in 1985. Hellmich attempted to evaluate that state by asking such questions as were the artifacts excavated using a systematic process? Are missing items representative or unique? Are support documents available and complete?\textsuperscript{18} After reviewing changes in the manner by which archeology extracts data from artifacts, Hellmich concluded that "the application of both theoretical and physical analysis techniques which have been instituted since the excavation of the C.W.A. and W.P.A., Bibb County, collections should allow for the extraction of a great deal of data from these collections and, in particular, add to our understanding of how man lived in the Bibb County, Georgia, area during the prehistoric and early historic periods."\textsuperscript{19}

Hellmich drew this conclusion even after determining that a great deal of cultural information that was once contained in the collection "has been lost due to careless curatorial practices and natural deterioration."\textsuperscript{20} It was not just neglect, however, as the Park Service itself had helped to scatter the collection by loaning out artifacts to universities, Ocmulgee, other museums, and often to individual scholars. While most transfers were properly noted in the accession files, roughly 10 percent were unaccounted for, and could not be recovered. Some of the artifacts were representative "type" items while some were unique. Some were museum quality items and not recorded on loan, but simply missing. While some of these might have been

\textsuperscript{16} James W. Stoutamire, "Annual Report: Curatorial Maintenance Program for the Southeast Archeological Center (Fiscal Year 1981)" (Tallahassee, Florida State University, 1981), 3, 24, in Richard R. Vernon files, SEAC.

\textsuperscript{17} Judy Hellmich, "The Research Potential of C.W.A. and W.P.A. Archeological Collections from Bibb County, Georgia" (Masters thesis, Florida State University, 1985), 2-4. Incidentally, Hellmich later pursued an NPS career, eventually becoming Chief of Interpretation at Grand Canyon National Park.


stolen, "it is suspected," she stated, "that missing artifacts from these sites may have been placed in type collections ... and that these collections were distributed to interested scholars and institutions without their being recorded. If this is the case, the integrity of many of the Macon Plateau Collections cannot be restored to any precise degree." Indeed, as noted above, when SEAC prepared to move to Tallahassee, it had deliberately sought to cleanse its collection to help deal with its inadequate space arrangements. In retrospect, Hellmich found such policy erroneous. She recommended that the Park Service conduct an inventory of all artifacts held at other institutions to determine what was in fact lost. Furthermore, she stated emphatically:

It is imperative that these collections undergo no further deterioration and that their integrity is no longer threatened by haphazard curation. Rather, these collections should be treated as valuable research materials deserving the same treatment that artifacts excavated using modern investigative and interpretive techniques receive.

Moss-Bennett and the Evolution of Salvage Archaeology

On June 24, 1973, Pete Faust, who had assumed the role of Acting Chief after John Griffin's resignation, put aside some long-standing reservations, and accepted the permanent position as Chief, Southeast Archeological Center. He would hold the job for over twenty years. Faust had first come to the center with its creation at Ocmulgee National Monument in October 1966 to assume the position of Chief, Archeological Research, which essentially meant that he managed salvage contracting for the River Basin Surveys. One of the projects that he held responsibility for was contracting for the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, a massive Panama Canal-sized construction project begun in 1972 by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers that sought to link the northward-flowing Tennessee River with the southward-flowing Tombigbee River - basically, a shortcut for commerce to the Gulf of Mexico.

The Corps traditionally relied upon the NPS Interagency Archeological Salvage Program to coordinate and manage its salvage needs and the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway project was no exception. Indeed, it was exactly this type of project for which Congress had passed the Reservoir Salvage Act of 1960. This act, and others passed in the 1960s, namely the National Historic Preservation Act and the National Environmental Policy Act, mandated construction agencies to conduct cultural resource mitigation along the route of the project, which would inundate large stretches of

23. Hellmich, "Research Potential of C.W.A. and W.P.A. Archeological Collections," 104. This viewpoint, valid in 1985, is even more valid today. In early 2005, for example, Sissel Schroeder published "Reclaiming New Deal-Era Archeology: Exploring the Legacy of William S. Webb and the Jonathan Creek Site." Schroeder cited several recently published articles based upon research in old collections that led to reinterpretations of previous excavations (see page 67, footnote 7). Schroeder also argued the merits of fresh field work and that conservation archeology sometimes went too far, but essentially concluded that "the ongoing Jonathan Creek research clearly demonstrates the potential of old collections to answer new questions and augment our understanding of ancient peoples. The Jonathan Creek site has a new kind of iconic status as an emblem of the benefits of archeological curation and the quality of New Deal-era archeology, underscoring how collections can be the foundation of past, present, and future knowledge." See Sissel Schroeder, "Reclaiming New Deal-Era Archeology: Exploring the Legacy of William S. Webb and the Jonathan Creek Site," CRM: The Journal of Heritage Stewardship, 2, no. 1 (Winter 2005): 53-71.
the Tombigbee River Valley and numerous archeological sites in Mississippi and Alabama.

The Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway project was controversial and opposed by numerous environmental and commercial interests. According to a history of the project by Jeffrey K. Stine, this opposition resulted in the Corps speeding up the project by working not only at the beginning of the proposed route as first planned, but at its middle and end as well. This strategy dramatically complicated efforts to oversee the needed salvage work, because the Park Service was geared to conduct archeology on a limited site-by-site basis. Indeed, it had only granted contracts for the southernmost portion of the waterway at a site known as the Gainesville Lock and Dam. According to Stine, “there was no real research or recovery plan at that stage, which typified federal CRM at the time.” As late as May 1974, Chief Faust was telling contractor Robert Thorne of the University of Mississippi that “by all means do not hesitate to let us know what research interests and proposals you may now have for the Tennessee-Tombigbee project.” In Stine’s view, it was impossible for SEAC to manage a project on the scale of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway without a more proactive approach. For better or worse, however, Faust did not have to resolve this predicament. In a few months, he was directed to reorganize SEAC’s functions and basic orientation to eliminate all external archeological projects, the very projects whose funding had previously been the mainstay of the center’s archeological program and which had been a major source of FSU’s interest in negotiating a cooperative agreement with SEAC.

In 1974, after years of debate and lobbying, Congress passed the Archeological and Historic Preservation Act (AHPA). AHPA is often referred to as “Moss-Bennett” after the legislation’s chief congressional sponsors, Sen. Frank Moss of Utah and Rep. Charles Bennett of Florida. Moss-Bennett specifically expanded provisions of the Reservoir Salvage Act. It required federal agencies to preserve historic and archeological objects and materials collected from archeological sites that would otherwise be lost or destroyed as a result of “any Federal construction project or federally licensed activity or program.” In other words, the act was not limited just to reservoirs. More importantly, Moss-Bennett allowed agencies to program up to one percent of project funds for archeological costs into their construction budgets. They could also transfer funds to the Park Service to have the work done, or contract it out themselves. Agencies could use project funds both to recover archeological data and to publish the results.

Moss-Bennett sought to ameliorate long-standing problems relating to salvage archeology. First, while Congress had made funds available under the Reservoir Salvage Act, the Park Service and the Smithsonian’s River Basin Surveys were left responsible for coordinating or conducting the resulting salvage work. In the years following World War II, the procedures developed by the Smithsonian, the Committee for the Recovery of Archaeological Remains, the Park Service, and the construction agencies worked well enough to rescue archeological data and artifacts that would otherwise be lost due to the construction of large reservoirs and dams. However, nothing compelled the construction agencies to cooperate. They did so largely as it pertained to the personalities involved and to maintain good relations with sister agencies. Second, although Congress had strengthened the legal basis for salvage archeology with the Reservoir Salvage Act, this legislation had not addressed the funding issue. Finally, the Reservoir Salvage Act failed to account for the many other government-funded construction projects, including road- and pipeline-building, soil conservation, and urban renewal, which also caused extensive damage to archeological sites. To solve these problems, Moss-Bennett mandated that federal agencies consider archeological resource values in any federally funded or licensed activity that threatened to harm an archeological site. It also held the agencies doing the work specifically responsible for the impact of their activity on archeological resources, but provided a means for them to mitigate damage by authorizing funds to be included in the actual construction costs of projects.

Moss-Bennett greatly expanded the scope of public archeology. Numerous agencies responded by eventually hiring their own archeologists or contracting the work to consulting firms instead of relying upon NPS services. In turn, heightened sensitivities about contract archeology brought change to the Park Service as well. In March 1974, Acting NPS Director Russell Dickenson authorized the Service to create the Interagency Archeological Services (IAS) branch, which thereby replaced the older salvage program. The philosophy behind this move was to insure that federal archeological contracting was conducted in a free and open market and with an eye towards the collection of data that helped to solve existing research problems. According to Victor A. Carbone, an IAS staffer, “the fledgling program went on the attack on a number of major fronts including archeology’s most sacred cows: territoriality, cronynism, and the research monopolies controlled by major regional institutions which had traditionally been the beneficiaries of sole-sourced government research contracts.” Initially, IAS was located within OAHP and its agenda paralleled the goals of Ernest Allen Connally, who was now Associate Director of Professional Services.

In July 1975, a staff meeting was held in Denver specifically to review the statutes, orders, and rules and regulations pertaining to IAS program operations.

According to NPS archeologist Thomas D. Thiessen, who attended the meeting, "there was shock and dismay that followed the Solicitor's remarks, because he told us that it was illegal to award contracts without competition, which was the norm in NPS archeological contracting at the time. It was clear after his talk that we (at least the IAS Division) were going to have to retool the contracting process both practically and philosophically." Indeed, to promote such retooling, NPS officials removed all external functions from the regions and archeological centers and set these up in new and consolidated IAS offices located in San Francisco, Denver, and Atlanta, with their chiefs directly under Rex Wilson, the Departmental Consulting Archeologist hand-picked by Connally for the job. The establishment of IAS separated the internal and external functions of NPS archeology. Unfortunately, as Director Hartzog had foreseen, it also made the external program easier to remove from the Service.

The decision to create IAS was painful as it resulted in staff cuts, resignations, personnel redeployments, and personnel reclassifications. For example, the San Francisco- and Denver-based offices were composed entirely of personnel transferred from other centers or regional staffs. The new Atlanta-based field office was established by the transfer of Wilfred Husted from MWAC and the hiring of Victor Carbone, Bennie Keel, Stephanie Rodeffer, Harry Scheele, and John Otto (all of whom, in compliance with Hartzog's and Connally's directive, held Ph.D.s). Connally and Wilson chose Keel to head up the office in June 1976. In doing so, Keel left a faculty position at Wright State University in Dayton, Ohio. SEAC escaped the brunt of these changes as Faust had conducted most of the center's salvage work through contracting. However, the effect on the Service's Midwest Archeological Center was particularly significant because many of its staff had come out of the Missouri Basin Survey. According to Thiessen, of twenty-four archeological positions then funded by salvage appropriations, sixteen were located at MWAC. These were transferred to the new Denver office in exchange for five newly created ONPS-funded positions at MWAC.

The IAS reorganization probably bred further resentment against Connally, both by archeologists and by regional directors resistive of direct program management by Washington within their areas. Pressure mounted, and effective April 1, 1976, Director Gary E. Everhardt returned line authority over the consolidated offices back to the regions, although he did insist that "there be no transfer of people or positions from the current field offices at this time." Everhardt also explicitly stated that "the Interagency Salvage Program staff and funds will be used only for those activities associated with the salvage program." These activities did not include, he further stated, "EIS [Environmental Impact Statement] review, cooperative or technical assistance activities, assistance to Indian tribes or the BIA [Bureau of Indian Affairs], or for any purpose funded from the ONPS [NPS operations] appropriation. The job should be the implementation of the Interagency Salvage program at full professional standard." It seems evident that a major reason the Park Service removed external archeology from SEAC, the other archeological centers, and the regions was to ensure appropriate use of funds in the newly expansive salvage contracting environment fostered by Moss-Bennett.

John Corbett, of course, had deliberately sought to develop a park-based archeology program on the back of an existing salvage effort, judiciously leveraging salvage-funded NPS archeological positions to provide park support. Thus, the impetus for a research unit at Occoneechee National Monument in the early 1960s was funding from the Georgia Department of Transportation provided to conduct salvage excavation in advance of a highway planned for construction through the park. Corbett had

31. Interagency Archeological Services Division, Staff Meeting Agenda in possession of author, July 21-25, 1975, National Park Service.
33. Rex L. Wilson, Departmental Consulting Archeologist, Memorandum to Interagency Archeological Services Division, April 28, 1975, MWAC files.
34. Bennie Keel, Comments to Cameron Binkley, August 11, 2005, National Park Service.
35. Donald Crusoe left SEAC to work for the IAS in Atlanta in early 1975, but this was apparently a career move and not a transfer of functions.
used this salvage "seed" money to start up SEAC and then scrambled to consolidate dedicated NPS resources to keep the nascent center in operation. In later years, the creation of a "market" for compliance archeology and the development of more rigorous accounting procedures made such strategies less feasible. In the Southeast, according to current SEAC Director John Ehrenhard, "the budget/finance people felt that there was hanky-panky going on between the various allotments of funds, and they wanted to stop that, and so made the external program a separate entity and moved it to Atlanta." Separating the external regional archeological assistance program from the now park-focused archeological centers facilitated auditing and ensured external funds were not going to pay for park research or other non-salvage uses.

In the 1980s, Congress itself was to become interested in Park Service accountability issues, especially collections management. It is sufficient here, however, to note that Moss-Bennett brought significant change to the way the Service conducted salvage archeology. Henceforth, the NPS archeological centers became focused entirely upon in-park work. External archeology was no longer an element of SEAC's function, a state that would prevail for another twenty years.

Meanwhile, Bennie Keel in Atlanta was grappling with the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway project, as was the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. In November 1975, the Corps hired its first archeologist, Jerry J. Nielsen, using authority and funding provided under Moss-Bennett. By assuming more control over the cultural resource management aspects of the Tennessee-Tombigbee project, the Corps probably hoped to appease some of its critics but the agency's attitudes were slow to change. Nielsen, faced with a mighty task, found it expedient to continue reliance upon the Park Service and established a Memorandum of Agreement. He and Keel, serving as joint coordinators, then abandoned the traditional salvage approach of site-by-site survey and excavation in lieu of a new methodology. Their "problem-oriented" approach involved selecting research proposals specifically designed to answer prevailing questions arising from holes in the cultural history of the Southeast. They also worked with the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation to create a single National Register District for the entire Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway, which avoided the need to nominate every individual archeological site to the register. The council approved their plan to manage the "Tombigbee-River Multi-Resource District" in December 1977. One measure of the success of the Nielsen-Keel approach was the use of the methodology for subsequent Corps and Bureau of Reclamation projects, including for the Richard B. Russell Dam later constructed on the Savannah River between Georgia and South Carolina.

The new methodology was not without some problems, however. As Stine noted, despite careful research proposals, many contract archeologists could not avoid the temptation to excavate found sites that, by the terms of their own research designs, should have been excluded. Many also failed to produce published research. A second major problem was the failure of Corps and NPS archeologists to include, at least initially, other preservation disciplines and to focus entirely upon prehistoric archeology. Of course, the waterway project threatened to destroy all cultural resources within its path, including old farmsteads and bridges, resources whose status and potential for mitigation when threatened by the significant impact of a federal program was also required to be considered by the new resource protection laws. Stine concluded that these other types of resources were only added to project plans after significant complaints by historic preservationists that Corps

38. Ehrenhard, Oral History Interview, 15.
41. An early IAS public outreach publication also resulted from this project. See, David S. Brose, Yesterday's River: The Archaeology of 10,000 Years Along the Tennessee-Tombigbee River (Cleveland: Cleveland Museum of Natural History, 1991).
42. Stine, "Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway," 22-25. This problem has long plagued public archeology. Later, Keel, Harry Scheele, and Victor Carbome provided guidance and technical oversight to the Illinois Department of Transportation for its I-270 project under a MOA to provide IAS, Atlanta, staff salaries and costs. The four-year-long project produced numerous professional reports and published journal and popular publications, including Charles J. Bareis and James W. Porter, ed, American Bottom Archaeology: A Summary of the FAI-270 Project Contribution to the Culture History of the Mississippi River Valley (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1984).
and IAS archaeologists "should have been subcontracting to historical experts for analysis and evaluation of architectural elements of their projects." Given the history of relations between Service archaeologists and preservationists, of course, Stine's findings were not unexpected.

**Doing Federal Archeology at a State University**

The Moss-Bennett Act had a major impact on the conduct of archeology in the United States. It certainly affected the relations between SEAC and Florida State University by changing the overall milieu in which archeologists conducted work for the federal government. The NPS-FSU cooperative agreement had given a privileged position to FSU faculty and students in obtaining archeological contracts. The Anthropology Department had thus expected to work with SEAC on various projects, including salvage investigations. Unfortunately, Moss-Bennett decreased the overall role of the Park Service in dispensing salvage contracts as agencies such as the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers took to the work themselves. Moreover, the Service's external programs continued to be buffeted by political change. In 1978, the Interagency Archeological Services division was pulled out of the Park Service after President Jimmy Carter authorized the creation of a new federal bureau called the Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service (HCRS). HCRS was still within the Interior Department, but NPS archeologists had little say in its decisions. According to former PSU Anthropology Department Chair J. Anthony Paredes, Florida State experienced a significant decline in its "fieldwork" contracts with the Park Service after these changes.

Now all NPS projects were within parks.

NPS contracting policy vis-à-vis Florida State shifted in other ways as well. Originally, SEAC issued large contracts directly to the university under the auspices of Hale Smith, who then assigned a faculty member as project director or principal investigator. That faculty member would then hire students under the contract. At about the same time that SEAC lost control over salvage contracting, Smith's health went into serious decline and the university curtailed his responsibilities. Because Smith could no longer do this work, SEAC cooperated with FSU to create a full-time position within the Anthropology Department funded through soft money from SEAC. The position was established to take over the curatorial work formerly done by Donald Crusoe and was filled by Thomas Padgett under a contract issued to run SEAC's curatorial program. Padgett was a Research Associate in the department, but essentially served as SEAC's collections manager or curator. Then, in 1976, the university hired James Stoutamire, a PhD-holding archeologist, who was tasked to run the university's NPS projects. While Padgett required teaching faculty oversight, Stoutamire did not. Stoutamire's position freed FSU faculty from the chore of splitting their time between NPS field and/or curatorial contracts and teaching classes. The new position also provided more flexibility for FSU to be involved in field projects not scheduled for the summertime.

In 1977, the Department of Anthropology lost its founder, Hale G. Smith, after a prolonged period of waning health. Although Smith had sought to forestall the department's decline by bringing SEAC to FSU, other issues remained. Soon after Smith's death, the university's Graduate Policy Council took a hard look at the anthropology program. One of the options it seriously considered was terminating the program. In April 1978, the council rejected this draconian measure, but issued a memorandum addressing several major problem areas and advising on necessary reforms. Several were relevant to SEAC. Its first recommended reform, in fact, was that "coordination between the Department of Anthropology and the Park Service in the training, supervision and financing of graduate students be improved by the institution of regular and frequent meetings between representatives of the two agencies." The council also advised the university to make a "strong effort" to provide the department with "the physical plant and equipment that is sorely needed." Of course, in 1972 the department had surrendered a large per-

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44. Paredes, Oral History Interview, 18.
46. Unknown, "The Development of the SEAC - History and Collections" (Tallahassee: Southeast Archeological Center, National Park Service, 1982), 5, in possession of author.
centage of space it controlled to SEAC, which impaired its own operations.

Following the Graduate Policy Council’s memorandum and major institutional and archeological “market” changes resulting from Moss-Bennett, (including NPS loss of IAS functions), the Anthropology Department decided the time was right to renegotiate the SEAC-FSU accord. Chief Faust agreed. He worked to coordinate a strategy with the department to convince the university to provide more space for the center in a manner that would concurrently free up more space for the department. The problem was that the university considered the space in Bellamy Hall provided by the Anthropology Department to the Park Service as part of the department’s own overall allotment even though the department could not utilize the space while SEAC occupied it. To gain more space for itself, therefore, the department lobbied the university to provide SEAC with 1224 additional square feet, space in the university’s “Montgomery Gym” or elsewhere.49 The proposal meant center staff might end up separated from the “collegiality” of sharing offices in Bellamy Hall with their academic colleagues, but it would allow SEAC to achieve greater centralization in one spot on campus. Both SEAC and the department would receive net gains in space. With the pending expiration of the lease for lab and office space looming, Faust drafted a letter, sent by Southeast Regional Director Joe Brown in late July 1978 to FSU President Bernard F. Sliger, requesting the parties to renegotiate the NPS-FSU agreement.50

The NPS letter to President Sliger noted the benefits of the relationship to the Park Service, including “the development and application of new theory, techniques and procedures to problems of cultural resources management, in areas of the National Park System; in addition, our archeological collections, some of the largest in the Southeast, have been receiving under contract with the university the maintenance and preservation which they require.” Brown also stated NPS belief that Florida State had benefited from the relationship via faculty and student contract work or direct employment at SEAC and by the placement of graduates within the Park Service and other federal agencies. In order for the General Services Administration (GSA), which was responsible for NPS lease negotiations, to approach the university, Brown requested an affirmative response that adequate space was available on campus to meet expanding NPS needs.51 This assurance made, Brown requested GSA to negotiate and obtain additional space to meet SEAC’s needs. He stated that the Park Service wanted to consolidate SEAC’s activities in a central location, instead of continuing the ineffective arrangement of maintaining four separate sites on campus. A centralized facility for SEAC “would not only improve administration but facilitate the direction of the archeological program.”52

The Park Service and Florida State signed the new accord in late 1978. It dropped cooperation in IAS activities, but retained “salvage” work for which SEAC was still responsible within park areas. Two new features were also added - a provision for cooperation in the conduct of anthropological studies relating to Native American populations in the Southeast and a provision for cooperation in underwater archeology. The latter provision appeared without explanation even as it had disappeared from the original accord prior to its signing. Another significant change was in duration of the accord itself. The new agreement was for five years, instead of fifteen, as would be subsequent revisions. Moreover, the new accord reflected concern with

48. Elston E. Roady, Chairman, Graduate Policy Council, Memorandum to Bruce T. Grindal, Chairman, Anthropology, et al. April 7, 1978, in “AB027: Space for Administrative Use, Office and File Storage File (1),” SEAC files. This memorandum addresses mostly internal deficiencies in the Anthropology Department’s program, offering recommendations to strengthen its academics in lieu of termination. The existence of SEAC on campus quite likely was an important factor in persuading the Council not to recommend program termination. If so, then Hale Smith’s strategy to bring SEAC to FSU was a wise one indeed.

49. This figure was derived by granting SEAC additional leased space, an increase of 824 square feet plus 400 square feet to replace a proposed elimination of SEAC office space belonging to department in Bellamy Hall.


the rapid state of change, either within the Service or within the archeological profession. It now required annual sub-agreements with SEAC to flesh out implementation of the five-year agreement. SEAC later adopted the same practice on an FSU-wide basis and for other institutions.

In preparing to renegotiate the FSU contract with SEAC that June, James Stoutamire and Anthropology Department Chair Bruce Grindal lobbied Dean Robert Johnson over their concerns with a major issue linked to the new NPS accord - growth in the FSU contract archeology program. Under Stoutamire, in 1977, the effort had dramatically increased in funding and required more space. SEAC, of course, had also continued to expand since 1972. The department was providing considerable storage and laboratory space for both efforts and was feeling the pinch. The Graduate Policy Council, of course, had just advised the university two months prior to provide more space for the department. Grindal and Stoutamire also explained how the department was seeking “center” status for Stoutamire’s contracting effort. They called this organization the Southeast Conservation Archeology Center (SCAC). The SCAC proposal, they argued, was in line with the council’s recommendations. If authorized, SCAC was to provide training for students in collections management, computer analysis and data storage, materials preservation, and cultural resource management. Stoutamire and Grindal also emphasized how SCAC could provide internship opportunities with the Park Service on campus and throughout the region as well as in the newly created HCRS. In fact, SCAC’s stated intent meshed well with the Park Service’s own goal to

53. National Park Service, Memorandum of Agreement between the National Park Service and Florida State University, 1978, 6, SEAC files.
create a cooperative education program related to SEAC. In retrospect, if the Stoutamire-Grindal proposal had been successfully implemented, it would have gone a long way toward addressing the laments of later SEAC staffers about the department’s failure to create an applied archeology training program to take advantage of the opportunities provided by having SEAC on campus. Here, in 1978, the department set out a plan to create just such a program.

In their proposal to the dean, Stoutamire and Grindal allowed for various possible ways in which more space could be achieved for both SEAC and the department. After SEAC Chief Faust advised them of his “pessimistic outlook” for NPS support of any new construction, they determined the best alternative was for the university to work with the Park Service, through GSA. Additional NPS funding might be available for increased leased-space requirements and even renovation costs if pay-back was made over a long-term basis through a lease. They explained that GSA regulations and formulae for office space for federal employees mandated specific square-foot allotments. It was a given that the cramped conditions of SEAC’s offices on campus did not meet GSA standards. Stoutamire and Grindal estimated that both SEAC and SCAC, if co-located, could get by with a minimum of 13,000 square feet at a cost of $400,000 at $35.00 per square foot for office space and $25.00 per square foot for lab space. They urged the university to consider new construction or major renovation to be paid back through a long-term NPS lease. Later, Robert Johnson, the Dean of Graduate Studies and Research, did agree to supply renovation funds, if these were amortized through a new leasing arrangement.

The university cleared SCAC for listing as a “Type II-B Center” in August 1978. Organizationally, SCAC was a stand-alone entity, directed by Stoutamire, who reported to the university, not the Anthropology Department. Stoutamire funded SCAC primarily through the NPS-FSU cooperative agreement and focused upon curating SEAC’s archeological collections, conducting research on underreported components of those collections, and related field research. However, SCAC could also do projects for other agencies, including the military and the states, the type of projects made possible by the Moss-Bennett legislation. There was sufficient funding, in fact, not only for Stoutamire, but one full-time assistant, Chad Braley, with additional assistance allowing SCAC to field up to eighteen crew members during the peak summer season (the average was less, with twelve members planned for the fall semester in 1980). Eventually, Stoutamire ran several non-NPS archeological projects, receiving funding to do so from such clients as the Colonial Dames, the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Veteran’s Administration, and even commercial oil companies.

The department encouraged this effort, in part, to compensate for declining activity in NPS salvage work.

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56. Chair Anthropology Department (Edwin A. Cook), Memorandum to University Space Committee, October 4, 1978. Note attached to 1978 SEAC-FSU cooperative agreement, SEAC files.
In January 1980, despite the Anthropology Department's success in creating SCAC, and the negotiation of a new SEAC-FSU accord, Chief Faust felt compelled to characterize the department's overall program as gradually deteriorating. According to Faust, a new chair was installed in 1978, but he had "achieved only limited success" in rejuvenating the anthropology program's curriculum, faculty attitudes, and graduate student recruitment, partially because the non-archaeological faculty were reluctant to admit "that the strength of the department is in archeology, even though 80% of the graduate student population are specializing in archeology." Faust noted hopeful areas as well. These included the department's intent to hire an archeologist specializing in Southeastern prehistory, the creation of SCAC, and his optimism that SEAC and FSU could solve their mutual space problem. However, Faust remained cautious in assessing the prospects for the latter, noting how he had turned back $11,000 in funding to hire temporary NPS employees in 1979 for want of space to house them.59 And, unfortunately, things were about to get even worse.

Stoutamire's SCAC initiative had problematic aspects and the Park Service soon became concerned with two main issues. First, SEAC worried that Stoutamire's salary, paid by NPS funds, was being used to subsidize FSU efforts to outbid private operations or the state of Florida in obtaining non-NPS archeological contracts. Second, SEAC did not want other agencies to subsidize Stoutamire's position or SCAC's overall workload to such an extent that it diverted attention from NPS work. SEAC suspected that Stoutamire was spreading himself so thin that he was less able to provide adequate supervision to the FSU students who were doing NPS work.60

Florida State eventually agreed that Stoutamire's work conflicted with the Anthropology Department's responsibilities to oversee its NPS contracts. And no one, according to former department Chair Paredes, wanted "to kill the goose that laid the golden egg," especially the large curatorial contracts issued by SEAC.61 However, because of these "economic considerations," SEAC felt compelled to cancel its curatorial contracts with the department in August 1981.62 The move was intended to head off a serious conflict of interest or a collision with NPS policy. With the collapse of NPS funding, Stoutamire began looking for a new job, soon finding one with a state agency. It is difficult to assess whether this outcome was inevitable, but it is not likely that the Park Service took such action with any joy.

After 1981, spurred by the situation with Stoutamire, SEAC began to hire students directly instead of through its cooperative arrangement with the Anthropology Department. Although university overhead fees were below the norm at 20 percent, the charge was an important reason that forced a "restructuring back into an in-house directorship."63 By hiring students directly, instead of through a university contract, SEAC could simply avoid paying an overhead charge. Nevertheless, under the new arrangement, SEAC still had the burden of supervising the curatorial work. Staff member Ellen Ehrenhard managed the student curators in-house for a period but eventually the center returned to the department for support, probably to comply with Office of Personnel Management rules. Rochelle Marrinan stepped up as the faculty point person in charge of the department's curatorial contracts with the Park Service. The department remained interested in receiving NPS curatorial contracts even after SEAC began to hire FSU students directly.64

Regardless of how the center's student employees were classified, many continued on with NPS careers. For example, NPS archeologists Bridgett Beers, David Brewer, Chuck Lawson, Daniel Lenihan, Steve Kidd, Margo Schwadron, Lee

59. Chief Richard D. Faust, Southeast Archeological Center, Memorandum to Associate Regional Director, Planning and Assistance, SER, January 31, 1980, National Park Service, in "A8027 Space for Administrative Use Office & Storage File (1)," SEAC files.
60. Paredes, Oral History Interview, 15-16.
61. Paredes, Oral History Interview, 16.
64. Unknown, "Development of the SEAC: History and Collections," 6; and Paredes, Oral History Interview, 16, 19.
Terzis, Tim Thomson, Richard Vernon, Kenneth Wild, Robert Wilson, and Emily Yates, among others, started out as FSU students who worked as SEAC lab and field technicians. Others, like Russell Skowronek and Ellen Ehrenhard, went into academia or museum management.

Despite ready access to FSU students, SEAC itself experienced some problems in working with them. The main problem was the students' lack of grounding in applied archaeology, a subject not taught in the Anthropology Department's curriculum. According to George Fischer, the large-scale nature of archeological surveys conducted by SEAC, for example, the survey of the Natchez Trace Parkway, which is approximately 700 feet wide and 400 miles long, mandated the use of techniques not generally applied in academic archaeology. SEAC thus had to train its FSU students on the job in techniques for large-scale survey because these were not taught in the department. On the other hand, the University of South Florida did develop a track in cultural resource management, and SEAC hired some of its students in the 1970s, but staff did not feel these were any better prepared than the students hired from FSU. "My only thought at the time," Fischer concluded, "was that it would be so much more simple for us to be producing the students here than there. His view was the same regarding museum management, where SEAC was also hiring many students who had no formal academic training in the subject. The collapse of SCAC, of course, probably dampened department enthusiasm for further effort in this field.

At any rate, Rochelle Marrinan continued to handle the task of administering large curatorial contracts with SEAC, hiring students, setting up the work parameters, and overseeing the project and accounts, but it was an onerous chore for a faculty member. Because of this workload and probably to reduce its own role supervising student workers, SEAC again cooperated with the department to create an FSU staff position whose sole function was to support NPS curatorial contracts with the university, essentially reprising the position once held by Thomas Padgett. The person hired for this position was Steve Hale. Hale's salary was paid using NPS funds. Hale taught at one of the branch FSU campuses in Panama City, but on his own time. He did the nuts-and-bolts curation for SEAC while Marrinan retained principal investigator responsibility and intellectual oversight of Hale's work.

The Anthropology Department's hopes for obtaining numerous large salvage contracts through its cooperative agreement with SEAC never materialized, but SEAC did commission several sizeable field contracts for work at park sites. Initially, these NPS contracts were modest, amounting to only $54,626 in 1973. However, these contracts gradually rose until they totaled $136,868 in 1978. Examples of specific contracts between SEAC and the department included a survey project at Gulf Islands National Seashore ($12,895) in 1973, excavations at Fort Matanzas ($4,000) in 1975, and excavations at Ocmulgee National Monument ($13,064) in 1977. SEAC did issue several sizeable field-related contracts between 1978 and 1979 (totaling $121,851) and a single $30,000 excavation contract for Naval Live Oaks area of Gulf Islands National Seashore in 1981. These contracts continued. Paredes himself did an ethnohistorical contract for SEAC in 1994. To this day, SEAC continues to employ FSU staff and students for work on various types of archeological contracts, although SEAC draws from a much larger talent pool.

65. Fischer, Oral History Interview, 24.
66. Paredes, Oral History Interview, 16.
67. Chair Anthropology Department (Edwin A. Cook), Memorandum to University Space Committee, October 4, 1978. Note attached to 1978 SEAC-FSU cooperative agreement, SEAC files.
pool than just the Anthropology Department or even the university.69

The bulk of work that SEAC contracted to Florida State was curatorial and backlog cataloging. In the ten-year period between 1972 and 1981, SEAC funded a total of $348,113.00 to the Anthropology Department for collections maintenance plus several thousand in additional funds for special projects to preserve site-specific artifact collections. Contracts for collections analysis constituted most of the rest of the funds expended for campus-based work during this period, running approximately at $61,000. Many were to complete work on WPA-era collections. There were some novelties, however. Paredes received a $5,000 contract for an ethnohistory study in 1974 that detailed the Creek background to the battle that took place at Horseshoe Bend National Military Park. Delving into ethnography was novel for the Park Service at the time and perhaps offers some indication of how the university environment was stimulating SEAC. Another innovative study funded by SEAC in this period was Benita Howell’s folklife study at Big South Fork National River and Recreation Area. In comparison to the collections contracts, approximately $185,000 was spent in total for the period on park-related fieldwork.70 By the late 1980s, the cumulative overhead reportedly paid to the university for all projects totaled some one million dollars.71

From the department’s perspective, curatorial projects were faculty-accessible. Faculty had learned from their contracting experience that such work had practical limits for academic staffs tied to teaching schedules. Like many university anthropology departments, Florida State could not function effectively in a cultural resource management environment.72 As private archeological consulting firms entered into the contract/compliance market after the passage of Moss-Bennett, most universities simply exited the business. Again, the failure of the FSU Anthropology Department to succeed in the contracting game, both because of its inherent dynamics and because of specific NPS concerns, probably helped shunt the department away from a greater public archeology orientation, at least in the long-term. Obviously, if the department had succeeded with involving itself in contract-oriented archeology, faculty ties and interest in teaching such coursework would have been strengthened.

By July of 1980, the university had agreed to support the efforts of the Park Service and the Anthropology Department to secure for SEAC a greater amount of consolidated space on the FSU campus. On July 8, 1980 (amended on January 6, 1982), Florida State offered to lease to the Park Service 4,990 net usable square feet on campus in a consolidated location.73 GSA recommended that the Park Service accept the FSU offer to lease available space on the ground floor of the Industrial Arts Building for a term of ten years.74 Upon word of the university’s offer, Paredes, as Acting Chairman, drafted a memorandum to the College of Arts and Sciences. He noted some inconveniences of the proposal but asserted that these would be outweighed by the opportunity “to alleviate severe and ever-growing space problems.” Paredes was also eager that the university understand that the department had provided this space to SEAC in 1972, creating thereby a longer-term space shortage problem for itself.75 For SEAC, all seemed well, and Acting Regional Director Neal G. Guse Jr. submitted Standard Form 81, Request for Space, to GSA in February 1981. This document outlined for GSA of how space to be leased from the university “will satisfy our principal program requirements.”76 The NPS-FSU negotiations begun

71. Paredes, Oral History Interview, 21.
72. Paredes, Oral History Interview, 14-19, passim.
73. Dean Robert M. Johnson, Graduate Studies and Research, Memorandum to G. M. Heath, Contracting Officer, GSA, May 6, 1982, in “A8027 Space for Administrative Use Office and Storage File (1),” SEAC files.
74. M.E. Poole, Memorandum to Joe Brown, Regional Director, September 3, 1980, in “A8027 Space for Administrative Use Office and Storage File (1),” SEAC files.
75. J. Anthony Paredes, Memorandum to Ralph Yerger, Associate Dean, July 16, 1980, in “A8027 Space for Administrative Use Office and Storage File (1),” SEAC files.
76. Neal G. Guse Jr., Acting Regional Director, Memorandum to Director, Space Management Division, GSA, February 25, 1981, in “A8027 Space for Administrative Use Office and Storage File (1),” SEAC files.
in 1978 to secure a new consolidated location on campus for SEAC had succeeded - almost.

Unexpectedly, in the spring of 1982, the university reversed course. On May 6, 1982, Dean Robert Johnson wrote GSA Contracting Officer G. M. Heath to withdraw Florida State University's offer to lease additional space to the Park Service. He acknowledged the considerable negotiations that had taken place in advance of the offer, and claimed the university had entered these “in good faith.” Nevertheless, he went on, conditions had changed and so had the university’s priorities. “Perhaps the prominent factor in our reconsideration,” he stated, “is the deteriorating economy at both the national and state level. Future appropriations from both the federal and state are uncertain, with projected forecast painting a very gloomy and uncertain financial future.” Basically, because of declining state aid, Johnson claimed that “the space originally proposed for renovation must now play a major role in the internal campus development.” He suggested GSA look for lease space off-campus for SEAC and specifically mentioned a nearby light industrial park then under construction named “Innovation Park.” In closing, Johnson affirmed FSU’s intent to maintain SEAC’s current lease of the Montgomery Gym. He also added, however, that “I see no future possibility of additional on-campus space.” Needless to say, without the provision of additional space for SEAC, it was unlikely that the Academic Policy Council’s advice to increase available space for the FSU anthropology program was going to be followed. The Southeast Region’s chief contracting officer succinctly stated the obvious in a memo to Chief Faust, “after months of negotiation this must be viewed as a significant disappointment.” In making this decision, the university stepped on both the Park Service and its own Anthropology Department.

Soon after Florida State withdrew its offer, U.S. Senator Paula Hawkins of Florida contacted the Southeast Regional Office on behalf of Malcolm B. Johnson, editor of the Tallahassee Democrat, who also represented the Leon County Research and Development Authority. The authority was developing the Innovation Park complex and Johnson had made several previous contacts with Chief Faust regarding potential NPS interest in relocating SEAC off-campus. Faust had politely but repeatedly rebuffed these overtures, insisting upon the Service’s desire to maintain its operations on the FSU campus. Obviously, the well-connected Johnson was hoping to capitalize upon Florida State’s suddenly withdrawn offer. In his letter to Sen. Hawkins, Johnson put his own twist on why the university had cancelled that offer: “The needs of the university are such,” he stated, “that they cannot continue to lease prime space in the heart of the campus to this organization.” Regional Director Robert Baker responded to Sen. Hawkins by saying that “we consider the Center to be adequately housed for the present time.” He offered, however, that “should future space needs arise that cannot be provided for on campus, those needs will be directed to the General Services Administration, which may, in turn, consider directing a solicitation

77. Dean Robert M. Johnson, Graduate Studies and Research, Memorandum to G. M. Heath, Contracting Officer, GSA, May 6, 1982, in “A8027 Space for Administrative Use Office and Storage File (1),” SEAC files.
78. Chief, Contracting and Property Management Division, SERO, Memorandum to Chief, SEAC, June 28, 1982 in “A8027 Space for Administrative Use Office and Storage File (2),” SEAC files.
79. The overriding concern for the Park Service was to associate SEAC with a university where relatively inexpensive space and professional collections management assistance could be obtained. This requirement could potentially have been met at another university. Indeed, in February 1980, Dr. F. Wayne King, Director of the Florida State Museum, which was an arm of the University of Florida in Gainesville (independent of that university’s anthropology department), visited NPS Chief Anthropologist Douglas Scovell to discuss the matter of the location of SEAC and to request consideration that the center be relocated to the state museum. The Park Service evaluated this proposal seriously along side NPS negotiations to increase SEAC’s space on the FSU campus. After Florida State made its offer to consolidate SEAC in more expansive quarters, the Park Service turned down the State Museum’s offer. The sticking point, which the State Museum readily acknowledged, was that institution’s inability to meet SEAC’s current and growing space requirements. See Chief, Southeast Archeological Center, Memorandum to Associate Regional Director, Planning and Assistance, SER, January 31, 1980; Chief Anthropologist, Memorandum to Associate Director, Management and Operations (Meeting with Director, Florida State Museum), March 3, 1980; Chief, Southeast Archeological Center, Memorandum to Associate Regional Director, Planning and Assistance, SER (Meetings with University of Florida Officials), June 9, 1980, and William R. Maples, Chairman, Florida State Museum, Letter to Richard D. Faust, Chief, August 12, 1980, all in “A8027 Space for Administrative Use Office and Storage File (1),” SEAC files.
80. Whether he had anything to do with it is unknown.
to the Leon County Research and Development Authority and its Innovation Park.”

Possibly, insufficient funding was the sole cause of Florida State’s decision to withdraw its lease offer. But internal campus politics probably played a role. There is no information that the termination of NPS contracts with SCAC was at issue. It would not have changed the calculations of the Anthropology Department, which was banking upon gaining more space by helping SEAC relocate. What the decision more clearly shows was the limited clout the department held with the university. The department had failed to secure a doctoral program under Hale Smith, although other programs at Florida State had. It did not matter, according to Paredes, that the department actually taught more students than the more prestigious Philosophy Department, which had a doctoral program. Prestige in a university matters. Lacking clout, the department had a tougher time convincing university administrators to recognize that while it appeared to have a considerable amount of space, a large percentage of that allocation was actually shared with SEAC. Indeed, Paredes claimed that his program was never able to convince the university of the value that SEAC brought to the FSU campus. While the SEAC-FSU agreement generated some revenue, FSU administrators noticed an essential difference between NPS archeological contracts and funds obtained from other agencies, for example, the National Science Foundation. The latter in particular brought greater prestige while other agencies’ awards brought higher overhead than the NPS arrangement. Thus, while the department benefited from SEAC contract work, the university apparently found applied archeology insufficiently prestigious while it could obtain higher rents from other organizations. The fact that the department could not escape its own space needs while SEAC remained on campus ensured that friction on this issue would continue to hamper relations.

In light of the foregoing discussion, the Anthropology Department’s failure to develop a public archeology degree track after the establishment of the SEAC-FSU partnership is more understandable. Center personnel continued to encourage their faculty peers to move in this direction. The department remained interested as late as 1987 when Paredes offered a fifteen year projection that anticipated how expected congressional appropriations would increase both the department’s and SEAC’s joint space requirements and related contract work. He believed that this joint activity “will complement the planned Ph.D. program with a strong emphasis in cultural resources management.” Nevertheless, the appeal of this argument had declined, given the SCAC experience and the university’s attitude toward its NPS partnership. Under founder Hale Smith, the department had had a strong historical and public archeology orientation focused upon Southeastern prehistory. After his death, this orientation gradually shifted toward a more anthropological outlook less focused upon archeology per se and more focused upon the academics required to sustain a doctoral effort. Today, under Chair Dean Falk, the department has major interests in biological anthropology, while its major archeological projects are in Meso-America, Eastern Europe, and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Despite this realignment, George Fischer managed to sustain some faculty interest in applied archeology through his teaching of underwater archeology. He hoped the program would thereby produce better prepared students. His teaching did generate useful student research reports for the Park Service with such titles as “Historical Geography of the French Ribault Fleet, 1565, off St.

82 Robert M. Baker, Regional Director, Letter to Honorable Paula Hawkins, United States Senator, October 4, 1982, in “A8015, Space for Administrative Use Pre-1992 File (1).” SEAC files. Baker’s response to Sen. Hawkins failed to define “adequately housed;” of course. SEAC had needed more space since it arrived on campus and needed it at least as much as the Anthropology Department. But SEAC’s expensive move to Tallahassee was still a recent memory and Baker probably dimly viewed funding a new move to a higher rent facility, even if he had sufficient funds, which was unlikely.
83 Similarly, there is no information about whether the Florida State Museum’s interest in SEAC had a bearing on the FSU decision to withdraw its offer. Possibly, if the university had learned about the NPS decision against relocating to Gainesville, it might have pushed a cash-conscious FSU administration to renegotiate on its offer, knowing that SEAC had nowhere else to go for low-cost accommodations.
85 Paredes, Oral History Interview, 20-21.
86 J. Anthony Paredes, Chairman, Memorandum to R. Bruce Bickley, Associate Dean, April 6, 1987, in “A8015: Space for Administrative Use, Pre-1992” folder (1), SEAC files.
Augustine,” “Cinnamon Bay and the Santa Monica,” “Historical Geography of HMS Fowey,” and “Seventeenth-Century Spanish Colonial Shipping in the Dry Tortugas.” The latter two were published. Field research reports by students included such titles as: “Magnetometer Survey for the Relocation of Shipwrecks off the Eastern Tip of Perdido Key, Gulf Islands,” “Survey of Early Man Sites off the Coast of Naval Live Oaks at Gulf Islands,” and “Underwater Survey off Castillo de San Marcos.” 87 After Fischer retired in 1988, he devoted even more time to promoting underwater archeology by continuing to teach on a courtesy appointment and by working to improve the FSU Academic Diving Program.

The fact that FSU students conducted NPS research sometimes brought into relief differences in philosophy and purpose that separated SEAC and the Anthropology Department. As faculty interest in applied archeology declined, some conflict on this front was perhaps inevitable. A dispute did erupt between faculty in the 1980s over whether student theses written as reports for SEAC could be used to fulfill FSU master’s degree requirements. 88 The dispute was essentially about whether work commissioned by the government to help it fulfill its legal responsibility in saving imperiled archeological data fulfilled the intellectual criteria of academic archeology’s research-driven methodologies. Philosophical reservations aside, a respectable number of FSU students completed theses or academic papers based upon SEAC’s archeological collections, which was certainly a boon for public archeology. It also legitimated prospective student advertisements by the university associating itself with the Park Service. However, because of the dispute over whether work done for the agency counted in earning a degree, subsequent NPS-FSU cooperative agreements included specific language to ensure that this was possible.

SEAC was not without its boosters in the department. J. Anthony Paredes, for example, supported the Park Service presence at the university until he retired in 1999. After the failed attempt to re-house SEAC on campus, Paredes lobbied to gain greater FSU appreciation of the benefits brought to

it by the Park Service. At one point, he even conducted a study that determined that Florida State ranked number three in the nation in placing graduates with master’s degrees into paid non-academic positions. Only two anthropology programs were more successful - the University of Kentucky and the University of Arizona. Paredes felt that the SEAC-FSU partnership was the main reason for this success, measured both by the number of FSU students able to work at SEAC and by the many FSU graduates with SEAC experience who went on to work in other federal and state agencies. Moreover, although the department did not have a formal program in underwater archeology during this period, FSU was recognized as a major source of training for underwater archeologists, largely due to George Fischer’s efforts. Paredes later even established a department goal to create a center for underwater archeology. Later still, Fischer and Paredes, among others, convinced the department to hire a tenure-track underwater archeologist, Michael Faught, in 1997.

SEAC’s current long-time Chief of Investigation and Evaluation, George Smith, also taught courses in the department from the 1990s and encouraged it to develop a public archeology component. Others who have taught courses at FSU include Bennie Keel, David Anderson, and Pete Faust. Faust, Keel, and Smith also directed numerous individual studies for anthropology students and served both formally and informally as theses advisors in the Departments of Anthropology and History.

However, by the time this study began, no SEAC staff were engaged in teaching at the university, another sign of the department’s continued lack of interest in promoting the development of a program in applied archeology. Despite the current low ebb in faculty sentiment toward public archeology, however, Smith, for one, has continued to see great potential in the relationship with Florida State. In 2003, for example, he was working with the university’s Associate Vice-President for Research to establish a heritage studies program, which would be international and interdisciplinary and involve the law school, the Departments of Anthropology, Urban Developing and Planning, Information Technology, and Museum Studies, among others. Students would be able to gain certificates relating to cultural resource management in whatever career field they chose. Whatever the hopeful outcome of this proactive venture, both Smith and Fischer clearly felt the department had missed an opportunity over the years, given the proximity of SEAC, by failing to sponsor an applied

89. Paredes, Oral History Interview, 13. The study referenced by Paredes has not come to light, but Paredes’s claim is reasonable.
91. Bennie Keel, Draft review comments, August 11, 2005, in possession of author.
92. SEAC archeologist Brinnin Carter is currently listed as an affiliated anthropologist with the department. Perhaps another indication of the state of relations between the FSU Anthropology Department and the National Park Service in 2004 was the department’s lack of interest in this study. For the record, three current members of the department who have had exposure to federal archeology were contacted and invited to answer questions or be interviewed. All declined. Dean Falk, the department’s current chairperson and holder of the Hale G. Smith Chair, is a biological anthropologist who joined FSU in 2001. Falk stated that she was too new to the department to answer questions about the NPS-FSU relationship.
archeology program. The Park Service, of course, is not without blame on that count, but the situation explains why the center eventually widened the scope of its relations beyond the Anthropology Department. Students are now hired from other FSU departments, for example, the Department of Geography, and beyond the university through additional cooperative agreements.

There are historical reasons for the Department of Anthropology’s failure to move in the direction of applied archeology seemingly in the face of the opportunity presented by the NPS presence on campus. SCAC’s failure was a main reason, but pressure upon the department to improve its reputation with the university drove it in the direction of a greater academic emphasis. Moreover, simple staff predilections also helped determine the department’s character, and these gradually changed over the years from Hale Smith’s time. There is, however, yet another factor - SEAC’s withdrawal from involvement in underwater archeology, which like SCAC, was a fertile area for cooperation. At least to the beginning of this study, the faculty had sustained an interest in underwater archeology. By the time that interest blossomed, however, SEAC itself could no longer participate for reasons discussed extensively below. Unfortunately, neither SCAC, nor an FSU applied archeology program, nor even SEAC’s own underwater archeology effort, survived the conundrums of bureaucratic life.

There also remained the nagging issue of space. Both the Park Service and the Anthropology Department were unsatisfied with arrangements resulting from SEAC’s relocation to the FSU campus. Both had suffered a space deficit and probably some mutual resentment. There was, after all, the memory of how the department’s own collections had been shunted off to Alligator Point for remote storage, as well as the persistent inconvenience. Moreover, the agreement required the department to share lab space with SEAC, a requirement that hampered faculty and student research and probably also muted enthusiasm for further collaboration. While everyone understood the problem and there was consistent mutual support to alleviate it, far too many years passed before real progress was finally made, as detailed in the chapter on Innovation Park. The point here is simply that there was plenty of time for frustration to brew despite good intentions.

Finally, the National Park Service has also shifted its own philosophical orientation, helping to widen the philosophical gap with the Department of Anthropology. While federal archeology has never been research-driven, relief, salvage, and early park archeology was at least excavation-oriented. Now, within the Park Service the definition of “public archeology” has come to mean “management archeology.” As SEAC Director John Ehrenhard stated:

[W]e have had some philosophical differences of opinion with the Department over what it is to be an archeologist anymore. It’s not going out and digging a hole in the ground, a nice square hole, and collecting the artifacts. Archeology is much more involved in the public sector now and knowing cultural resource management law, archeology resource protection law. When you get a degree in archeology now, the chances of you actually being out and digging in the field for a profession are remote, unless you continue to stay in the academic environment.

Moreover, according to Ehrenhard, public archeology is also about maintaining good government-to-government relations with Native Americans as mandated by the 1990 Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act. Archeology is “not just academic textbook kind of learning, but far more involved.” Obviously, universities rarely deal with these types of issues that have become more salient to the practice of archeology within federal service, although that does not excuse them from providing relevant education to their students.

94. J. Anthony Paredes retired as professor emeritus from the Department of Anthropology in 1999. During his career, he was a major supporter of the NPS presence on the FSU campus. His absence could only further contribute to the department’s long-term move away from public archeology. Paredes was also a strong proponent of the importance of “public anthropology.” From 1998 to 2006, he served in the position of Regional Ethnographer for the Southeast Region of the National Park Service.
95. Ehrenhard, Oral History Interview, 30.
The most fundamental philosophical divide between SEAC and the FSU Anthropology Department may also be the most difficult to gauge. As SEAC’s Smith explained:

There’s still a schism out there in the profession between those that are in the academic community and those that are not. It used to be called salvage archeology, contract archeology. As I talk about it, it’s the archeology of a lesser god. It’s one of these things where it was just considered something you did if you couldn’t go on to get your Ph.D. Well, that’s all changed now because some of the finest archeology in the country, and a lot of the methodology we use, has been developed outside the academy, because of how we have to do our job.96

Despite these various difficulties, SEAC gained by its association with the FSU Anthropology Department. Staff obtained access to the university’s research facilities and faculty expertise, both of which contributed to better collections curation, and enjoyed occasional teaching opportunities. SEAC also employed numerous FSU students. If these were hired without sufficient academic preparation for public archeology, they left their SEAC employment better off, which was part of the benefit both the university and Park Service hoped to achieve and which the department still touts to prospective FSU applicants today. Training them in the skills of public archeology was a small price for SEAC to pay. In no other way could the Park Service have acquired as able a pool of talent willing to work for low wages or even no wages. Certainly, if funding had even been available to contract out the work, the benefits would in no way compare. Student workers were motivated to succeed not just by a paycheck but also by a desire to promote their academic and future employment credentials, and if the range of papers produced is any indication, by their own inherent curiosity and, one can hope, by their concern for the NPS mission. The success of this aspect of the arrangement has been a consistent and perhaps the most important virtue of the SEAC-FSU cooperative arrangement. Despite its cramped workspace, SEAC flourished in a university environment and its collections were better managed. The decision to move SEAC out of Macon and to Florida State was historically sound; the minimum expectations were met even if the greatest potential was not fulfilled.

In the end, SEAC and the Anthropology Department settled into a useful and cordial working relationship, but one that has also suffered the stress of major ups and downs. Differences in approach and professional orientation drove the parties apart over time, but significant common interests have remained, including perhaps in the one area of potential cooperation not yet considered - underwater archeology. That subject is discussed later in this chapter. As regards the overall NPS-FSU relationship, however, two main points can be derived. First, the Park Service benefited from the SEAC-FSU cooperative agreement and the separatist strategy to locate SEAC on a university campus, although SEAC’s proximity to the university was not the sole factor determining the ease with which faculty and students have been able to participate in NPS work. Second, drift in the relations between SEAC and the department appears a factor of professional, bureaucratic, and philosophical predilections over which the Park Service has had some, but not exclusive influence. Understandably, changing national law and contracting rules, like those relating to SCAC, impaired NPS-FSU relations. On other occasions, the university failed to support the spirit of the NPS-FSU cooperative agreement, which helped drive the Anthropology Program further away from the needs of SEAC.

**Disposition and Curation of Archeological Collections: Part II**

In November 1982, the Southeast Archeological Center prepared a draft policy and scope statement for managing its archeological collections. The document addressed many routine items, such as accessioning, cataloging, and storage standards. The document’s overall purpose was to establish the scope and nature of the center as the main repository for archeological research materials and artifacts from national parks in the Southeast Region. However, the draft policy and scope statement also raised an indirect issue - the development of an overarching regionwide curatorial policy. Chief Faust sought to initiate the development of such a policy. He wanted regional officials to consider what should be the “appro-

96 Smith, Oral History Interview, 8.
patriate repository for archeological research collections that have been derived from units in the Southeast Region.” “Service wide,” he argued, “it is the position of most archeologists and many curators that archeological research collections, that is the artifacts and supporting documentary materials that have resulted from archeological investigations, should be kept intact as a collection in so far as possible, and that they should be stored in a centralized or regional repository.” To some extent, the creation of SEAC and its custody of a significant percentage of Ocmulgee National Monument’s archeological collections represented a de facto policy acknowledging the center as that designated “central repository.” However, as Faust noted, “no specific policy covering the center as the Region’s archeological repository has ever been formulated.” The problem with not having a policy was that some of the region’s archeological material was scattered among various parks, some parks wanted their own costly curatorial facilities, care was uneven, and conflicts with parks continued to arise periodically.\(^{97}\) SEAC would benefit, of course, from being designated the region’s official repository, but Faust’s argument had merit. The Hellmich thesis, previously discussed, soon strengthened his argument by confirming the research value of older archeological collections and the importance of maintaining their integrity, especially through centralized curation. Still, some parks have held a different and often no less valid perspective, so establishing SEAC as the repository for all archeological artifacts in the Southeast has been a tough goal to achieve. Faust’s initiative languished.

SEAC has had more complicated relations with Ocmulgee than most other Southeast Region parks. Problems have probably stemmed largely from continued confusion in curatorial, management, and jurisdiction issues induced by the decision to transfer most of Ocmulgee’s archeological collections to the center. According to Ocmulgee and regional officials, it took years just to sort out the accession records, because the park had limited staff and SEAC did not focus upon the issue.\(^ {98}\)

Eventually, the preparation of a draft Collections Management Plan (CMP) for Ocmulgee in the late 1980s brought out some long-standing tensions in the park’s relations with SEAC.

On March 15, 1989, a meeting was held at Ocmulgee to address some of the management concerns of the park regarding its archeological collections. SEAC Chief Pete Faust, Regional Curator Dale Durham, and Deputy Associate Regional Director for Cultural Resources Paul Hartwig attended the meeting along with Ocmulgee Superintendent Mark J. Corey. The park was concerned about the relationship between the Regional Office, SEAC, and itself regarding the management and accountability of the archeological collections. After years of perceived inactivity, Supt. Corey was eager to see some progress in completing the backlog cataloging of his park’s archeological collections and had used the CMP to push for improvement in the situation. There was probably, as there still is, lingering suspicion that SEAC’s slow rate of accomplishment in cataloging the collection had less to do with a lack of funds than with SEAC’s need to justify its mission by keeping that collection in Tallahassee. If Ocmulgee’s collection was completely updated, then the park could reasonably hope to see it returned. After all, that promise was made when SEAC relocated to Tallahassee originally, causing some degree of local consternation. At any rate, Corey objected to some provisions of the CMP. During and after the meeting, the Regional Office sought to clarify the role and function of the various NPS parties with an interest in managing Ocmulgee’s collections and perhaps to improve relations between the park and SEAC. In the end, however, the Regional Office sided with SEAC’s interpretation regarding management authority. In a follow-up memo, Deputy Associate Regional Director Hartwig made clear that “procedures for accomplishing specific tasks are appropriate in the plan to ensure that NPS curatorial standards will be met.” Furthermore, according to Hartwig, the draft plan was designed “to address the collection management needs of the collection held in the park only.”\(^ {99}\)


99. Paul Hartwig, Deputy Associate Regional Director for Cultural Resources, Memorandum to Superintendent, Ocmulgee National Monument (Disposition of Ocmulgee Archeological Collections), March 31, 1989, in Robert C. Wilson files, SEAC.
The park's position was difficult - to address Ocmulgee's concerns, Hartwig's memo first laid out the roles and responsibilities of the various parties who help manage the region's museum resources. While park superintendents are considered the "accountable officers for all museum collections including archeological artifacts in or from their parks," this authority is not decisive. It is true that all artifacts from Ocmulgee located at SEAC are considered "on loan." In practice, however, the great percentage of Ocmulgee's collection had been on loan to SEAC for many years. While the park is theoretically responsible for its collections, no matter under whose custody they are held, in fact, "the Center Chief in consultation with the Regional Curator, makes the final decision regarding the artifacts return." Although the Regional Director could override any such decision, as a practical matter, it was not likely. Thus, real authority over park archeological collections rested with the Center Chief. The park did not go away completely empty-handed, however. SEAC agreed to prepare an Archeological Overview and Assessment (a document intended to aid resource management, interpretation, and collection management). Park-identified concerns regarding the draft CMP were also to be noted in the final CMP and "the respective role of both the park and SEAC in managing the park collections at OCMU and SEAC will be discussed in the plan." One final issue was that Ocmulgee would continue to store a considerable number of WPA-era collections while SEAC determined what to do with them. The park was directed to maintain the collection in inactive storage. These materials "were not to be opened or used by the park staff."

Bureaucratically, this arrangement was to the benefit of SEAC. SEAC continued to maintain its day-to-day control over Ocmulgee's vast archeological collection, which some have argued, is a major justification for SEAC's own purpose for being. Turf-fighting aside, there were good reasons for SEAC to continue maintaining this collection. First, it could not be as well managed at Ocmulgee without a considerable upgrade in that park's resources, or without moving SEAC back to Macon. Such a scenario has remained unlikely.

100. Hartwig, Memorandum to Superintendent (Disposition of Ocmulgee Archeological Collections), March 31, 1989.
because Tallahassee offers a better environment for SEAC, given nearby access to FSU and its interested students, resources not available in Macon. Returning SEAC to Ocmulgee might also resurrect old problems developed as a result of having the archeological center located at a park. Meanwhile, SEAC has become more involved in maintaining the collections of other parks in recent years. Easy access to the collections also helps SEAC archeologists (and visiting researchers) to do their work by providing reference and comparative material for research or compliance documentation needs. The synergism of central curation is important, as Judy Hellmich’s thesis pointed out.

To ensure that all understood the relationship between SEAC, the Regional Curator, and parks regarding authority over archeological collections and museum holdings in the Southeast Region, Acting Regional Director Carroll W. (Jack) Ogle issued a memorandum in December 1993. In that memo, he applied the same standards and procedures as were emphasized in the 1989 consultations with Ocmulgee to all parks in the region, essentially adapting the 1989 Hartwig memo to Supt. Corey.101

In May 1994, SEAC, the Regional Curator, and Ocmulgee developed a further refinement of their specific agreement in which Ocmulgee created its own accession records and the park and SEAC agreed that Ocmulgee would be responsible for some park-related collections while WPA-era material was to continue solely under the jurisdiction of SEAC. Nevertheless, documentation relating to the collections was still scattered between the two facilities even after this agreement, while approximately 2.4 million artifacts remained “on loan” to SEAC for analysis, study, cataloging, and storage.102

Archeology and the Drive for Accountability

Beginning in the early 1980s, Congress became generally concerned with accountability issues in the management of the federal government. Legislation resulting from this concern inspired broad changes in federal policy that eventually facilitated a greater disparity in the relations between the Southeast Archeological Center and Florida State University while also increasing funds available to improve NPS management of its archeological collections. In 1982, Congress passed a major piece of legislation - the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA).103 FMFIA was intended to reduce waste and inefficiency and to strengthen managerial control over federal financial and auditing systems. In compliance with FMFIA, the Inspector General of the Interior Department conducted a department-wide audit in 1985. The audit resulted in a confidential report focused upon cultural objects within NPS museum and archeological collections. The report, entitled “Audit of Museum Collection Management, National Park Service,” evaluated the adequacy of NPS’s accounting controls, security procedures, and storage facilities for museum property, as well as procedures for the disposition of surplus museum items. The report concluded “a substantial portion of the museum property in the parks visited was vulnerable to theft and misappropriation because of inadequate accounting controls.” Among other problems, many national parks lacked essential fire and intruder alarm systems to protect their collections while many contained objects that were not properly stored or protected in accordance with NPS requirements.104

Regarding archeological collections specifically, the Inspector General (IG) determined that “NPS needs to improve controls over archeological collections. Most archeological and archival collections have not been accessioned or cataloged

104. Acting Assistant Inspector General for Auditing, Memorandum to Assistant Secretary, Fish and Wildlife and Parks, November 22, 1985, accompanying “Audit of Museum Collection Management, National Park Service” (Washington, DC: Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of the Interior, November 1985). Note, the IG’s report was based upon a survey of eight parks and two regional offices, assumed to be sufficient to represent the national park system overall. The report did not include a specific evaluation of SEAC, although it did specifically evaluate the state of NPS archeological curation.
upon receipt. As a result, NPS cannot be assured that the collections are intact or complete.\textsuperscript{105} The IG further determined that “NPS needs to have better control over archeological collections to ensure that all objects and related documentation are returned to the NPS” after completion of a researcher’s project or when the items are temporarily loaned out. In the parks surveyed, thousands of items turned up missing. The IG attributed these losses to improper accounting controls and security, deterioration due to improper storage and handling, and erroneous cataloging.\textsuperscript{105}

On January 6, 1987, \textit{Washington Post} writers Jack Anderson and Joseph Spear published a column on the IG report after having obtained a copy from \textit{Post} reporter Tyler Clements. Their account of that report included several technical errors but it served the useful purpose of helping to raise questions during congressional hearings taking place at the time. One example of problems NPS museums had was the state of object cataloging. Of twenty-two million NPS museum objects, only three million or 14 percent were cataloged. Chief Curator Ann Hitchcock, quoted in the column, agreed with the IG’s assessment and explained how the Park Service intended to submit a proposal to Congress with estimated costs to address the problem.\textsuperscript{106} Cataloging, whether by hand or electronically, is the key curatorial function required to maintain associational and locational information pertaining to artifacts and their records. It is necessarily laborious and time-consuming but absolutely essential.

Without effective curation, there is almost no point to doing archeology. Fifty years after the first WPA shovel sifted the earth at Ocmulgee Old Fields, Congress took the Park Service to task for failing a key mission: archeological curation.

Since 1985, the IG has conducted additional audits while the General Accounting Office and the National Park Service have independently conducted a series of internal “management control reviews” upon the Park Archeology Program. These determined that the Park Service, along with several other department bureaus, suffered what was called a “material weakness” in the area of curating its museum and archeological collections. This determination constituted a critical deficiency for the Park Service whose core mission includes the preservation of historic and prehistoric objects. In 1987, the Park Service did submit to Congress a plan to improve the management of its museum and archeological collections. Estimates of both the size of NPS museum collections, the number of items uncataloged, and the cost to account for them fully varies tremendously depending on the year assessed, the scope of one’s definition (for example, including collections held in non-federal repositories), and the fact that additional resources are always being added to the system (with new deficiencies as well). Nevertheless, in 1987 Chief Curator Hitchcock estimated that it would take thirty years at then current funding levels to correct a backlog of 22.6 million objects. To speed the process to correct the deficiency by 2000, she requested over $23 million.\textsuperscript{107} In 1988, Congress appropriated $2.763 million, the first of several appropriations launched to begin a major backlog-cataloging effort. In 1990, Congress provided an additional $1.6 million to help address preservation and security issues associated with museum objects and archeological artifacts.\textsuperscript{108} That same year, the Park Service published new rules in the \textit{Federal Register} outlining higher professional standards for the curation of archeological collections and associated documentation.\textsuperscript{109} By 2003, over $41 million had been spent to catalog over 43 million objects, spec-

\textsuperscript{105} Inspector General, “Audit of Museum Collection Management, National Park Service” (Washington, DC: Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of the Interior, November 1985), 28. The Park Service was not, of course, unaware of significant deficiencies in its accountability of archeological collections. Director Russell Dickerson set out as a policy goal in 1980 to improve agency care of its collections and to improve visitor access to them. “We are one of the world’s largest museums,” he told a reporter, “but we never took the time over the years to find out what we had.” Unfortunately, without funding, little progress was made under the Dickerson directorship. See Myron Struck, “Park Service Opens Old Vistas,” \textit{Washington Post}, December 28, 1984, A15.


\textsuperscript{108} Ann Hitchcock, Chief Curator, e-mail to Cameron Binkley, March 2, 2005.

\textsuperscript{109} “Curation of Federally-Owned and Administered Archeological Collections,” 36 CFR 79, \textit{Federal Register} 55 (September 12, 1990), 37616.
imens, and archival documents with over $32 million spent on correcting preservation and security problems. A portion of these funds was eventually used to relocate SEAC in 1995, which, like many other underfunded NPS units, has long had to cope with major curation issues.

Among the findings of these management control reviews was that archeological objects are "Personal Property" and must be controlled by the NPS curatorial program. Similarly, the Park Service concluded that archeological sites are "Real Property,” making them also subject to control through a program similar to those used for managing NPS buildings. One of the issues helping to drive the "material weakness” determination for archeology was the significant difference in the way archeologists and museum curators approach the management of collections. Even though oversight of SEAC’s collections was improved by contracting out the care to FSU’s Anthropology Department, archeological management is loose in terms of accountability of property. Archeologists are primarily concerned to maintain correct archeological provenance (i.e., cataloging) and less concerned with the strict physical accountability of items. An associated problem was that SEAC, other NPS archeological centers, and numerous parks had all deliberately placed significant archeological collections in the hands of universities across the country. SEAC even promoted this "outsourcing" of its collections when it prepared to move to Florida State. Ultimately, it loaned out a significant percentage of its collections to universities, totaling several hundred thousand items from several million held. As late as 1994, just prior to SEAC’s relocation to an off-campus site, it had some four hundred square feet of collections still housed at eighteen universities.

There were benefits to the policy of outsourcing collections in terms of curatorial cost savings (free storage), the promotion of scholarly research into those collections, and perhaps cooperative relations. However, remote storage and reliance on university curation was problematic. Obviously, in this system of management that part of the collection on loan was not under the control of

110. Hitchcock, e-mail to Cameron Binkley, March 2, 2005.
111. Administrative Officer, Southeast Archeological Center, Memorandum to Budget Officer, Southeast Region, June 20, 1994, in “A8015: Space for Administrative Use, Pre-1992” folder (1), SEAC files.
government officials. Some universities, such as Harvard's Peabody Museum, also proved reluctant to return government collections when they were recalled, which served only to further highlight the problematic nature of this management scheme. Technically, SEAC's own in-house collections were not under its authority either. They were under the formal jurisdiction of the Department of Anthropology, although SEAC staff had immediate access to the collections and frequent interaction with faculty curators involved with their care. Nevertheless, for SEAC to meet the terms of the various management reviews, it would need additional storage space under its own authority. This situation eventually spurred NPS authorities to approve funding to move SEAC off-campus.

Despite ongoing inventories and evaluations to account for NPS museum and archeological property, senior NPS archeologist Calvin Cummings complained in 1996 that the Park Service "has only inventoried and evaluated less than 10 percent of the Archeological Sites on NPS property." Servicewide, the reviews suggested that NPS archeological objects, sites, data, and infrastructure all remained "At Risk." After ten years of attention, Cummings concluded "until improved policies, procedures, and controls are implemented, significant risk of loss or damage of irreplaceable artwork and artifacts remains high."\(^{113}\)

While Congress was growing concerned with the federal government's general oversight and accountability, it took up an equally compelling issue that also greatly affected the work of museums nationwide. In 1990, after years of patient lobbying by Native American groups and their supporters, Congress passed the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (104 Stat. 3048). NAGPRA, as it is known, fundamentally transformed the manner by which public archeology is conducted in the United States. The act made it much more difficult to excavate Indian graves and/or to remove associated human and ceremonial remains, although provisions of the law still make this possible under some circumstances. NAGPRA also mandated that any public or private museum receiving federal funding was required to consult with appropriate Native American groups and return or "repatriate" to their lineal descendants or to the closest culturally affiliated tribe any existing artifacts determined to be Indian remains, funerary or sacred objects, or objects of cultural patrimony.\(^{114}\) To carry out this mandate, museums had to survey their holdings to account for and report on these items, which had been widely collected since the nineteenth century. This requirement was a significant new burden upon the managers of NPS museums and especially those responsible for archeological collections and obviously fed into the major policy shift leading the federal government to tighten its control over these collections.

So, by the end of the 1980s, congressional interest in government accountability and a growing sensitivity to Native American issues were focusing senior-level NPS attention upon some long-standing curatorial problems. At the same time, there was pressure for change from another direction: a major NPS reorganization of the mid-1980s. The reorganization is discussed more thoroughly below, but one of its results was that the Park Service conducted an "Operations Evaluation" upon Southeast Region management. The subsequent report included a review of SEAC's cultural resource management program and offered a number of recommendations. While the center had the "common problem" of backlogged work projects, the Operations Evaluation was generally upbeat. It rated SEAC at standard in most areas, such as Section 106 compliance work, cooperation with parks, and programming efforts. It noted that SEAC had "an effective program for archeological resources management, protection and preservation." Another point of praise concerned the Cultural Sites Inventory (CSI). The Park Service was then formulating a computer model for the CSI. According to the Operations Evaluation, this model was "designed and implemented at SEAC and is recognized Servicewide as an outstanding contribution to archeological data management."\(^{115}\)

\(^{112}\) Allen Bohnert, Discussion with Cameron Binkley, January 30, 2004, National Park Service.

\(^{113}\) Cal Cummings, Memorandum to Dan Lienhan, March 18, 1996, in "Archeology Centers: Admin. History and Reorganizations" folder, Michele Aubry files, Archeology and Ethnography Program, National Center for Cultural Resources, Washington, DC.

\(^{114}\) "Objects of cultural patrimony" means historical, traditional, or cultural items having cultural importance to a native group independent of any individual member.
The Operations Evaluation did critically assess two key areas. The first area concerned the center’s relations with the Submerged Cultural Resources Unit and the management of underwater archeology. That subject is detailed in the next section. The second area concerned SEAC’s curatorial and collections management. The Operations Evaluation noted, not surprisingly, the obvious backlog in collections cataloging. FSU staff were under contract by SEAC to reduce that backlog, but a secondary problem arose when parks contacted the center seeking collections information. Often, SEAC could not assist them because SEAC’s backlog activity absorbed so much effort while the center also lacked up-to-date computerized catalog records. The Operations Evaluation noted SEAC’s efforts to address the backlog, to keep the accession records current, and to document new collections as they were received, but the center had a huge backlog and also lacked a formal Collection Management Plan (CMP). “A Collection Management Plan was needed,” the Operations Evaluation asserted, “to guide and direct the processing and treatment of the collections.” While Chief Faust had earlier developed a Scope of Collection Statement, Regional Curator Dale Durham had deferred development of a CMP for SEAC. A likely reason was that it raised the sensitive issue of whether to designate SEAC as the formal repository for all artifact collections in the Southeast Region.

The Operations Evaluation also reported that while Regional Curator Durham visited the center two or three times per year to examine operations and to assess basic needs, his time was spent mostly assisting FSU staff to understand and implement NPS curatorial policy. While this was important, other basic problems relating to inadequate storage, security, and the need to account for collection materials as Personal Property were not being addressed. The Operations Evaluation strongly recommended that the Chief Curator of the National Park Service, Ann Hitchcock, and Durham visit the center to advise on the steps necessary to comput- erize SEAC’s collections and to help formulate a CMP. “This is particularly important,” it noted, “since a project to improve collections accountability at SEAC will be funded from the Cultural Resources Preservation Program.”

Chief Faust recognized the need for a full-time in-house curator to coordinate the center’s curatorial efforts and sought to create such a position. The Regional Office approved his request in 1986 but provided no funding. Then, in late September 1986, in direct response to the Operations Evaluation, Chief Curator Hitchcock visited the center in conjunction with a national team assembled to create SEAC’s first CMP. In her trip report, Hitchcock focused upon funding and how important it was for the center to employ its own full-time curator. A curator, she stated, “should personally direct all work in the collections areas to ensure consistency in management and adherence to NPS standards.” Hitchcock noted that NPS standards clearly required a full-time curator for a collection of SEAC’s size and that regional authorities had not been forthcoming in providing funding. “A clearly laid out collections management program,” she further noted, “under the direction of a permanent full-time curator, should result in more efficient use of existing staff time and resources.” Hitchcock also criticized how funding for collection management had dropped over the preceding two years and was in 1986 half of what it had been in 1976. “Considering that collections management is a major function of the center, Hitchcock stated, “and the Center has a large backlog of work (cataloging and storage reorganization) to be done, funding is in urgent need of increase.”

Chief Curator Hitchcock’s trip report was transmitted to SEAC via a memorandum to the Southeast Regional Director from Associate Director Jerry Rogers who further emphasized the point that the center had to have a curator. According to Rogers:

118. The CMP Team was composed of SER Regional Curator Durham, Pacific Northwest Regional Curator Kent Bush, Pacific Northwest Regional Archeologist Jim Thompson, and Mesa Verde Curator Allen Bohnert. They were at the Center September 21-25, 1986.
The Center has accomplished some good work through the curation contract with Florida State University, especially in recent cataloging efforts; however, the Center is in need of a permanent, full-time NPS curator. A curator would systematically address the storage and cataloging needs, coordinate the work of the contractor, implement a long-range collections management strategy, and provide continuity to the collections management program."

"We believe," he concluded, "that the Center is eager to improve its curation program. The Collections Management Plan will provide excellent guidance in this area."  

Despite this push, it was not until October 1988 that Southeast Regional authorities approved a plan by Chief Faust to create a section within SEAC for two museum specialists. Previously, only archeologists had staffed professional positions in SEAC, so this was an improvement. However, regional managers classified the positions as temporary, because of unstable funding drawn from "Congressional add-on, SERO Pkgs. 210 and 217 and cyclic preservation" sources.  

Finally, in 1990, SEAC received sufficient line-item money to allow Faust to hire a permanent curator, Allen Bohnert, who arrived from the Southwest Region where he had served as curator at Mesa Verde National Park. Bohnert had also worked on the team that had devised the center's first CMP,

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120. Jerry Rogers, Associate Director, Cultural Resources, Memorandum to Regional Director, Southeast Region, October 10, 1986, in "Southeast Archeological Center (SEAC)" folder, SEAC files.

121. Chief, Southeast Archeological Center, Memorandum to Deputy Associate Regional Director, Cultural Resources, SERO, October 7, 1988, in possession of author; and Deputy Associate Regional Director, Memorandum to Regional Director, Southeast Region, July 13, 1988, in "A8015: Space for Administrative Use, Pre-1992" folder (1), SEAC files.
and was thus familiar with its issues. Mesa Verde holds one of the largest archeological collections in the NPS system, so Bohnert’s selection as curator for SEAC was symbolic of renewed NPS commitment to improve management of SEAC’s archeological collections. It was also symbolic of the changing state of SEAC-FSU relations. The last SEAC curator was archeologist Donald Crusoe, who had transferred to IAS in 1975. By relying heavily upon curatorial contracts with Florida State, the Park Service had seen no need to re-staff Crusoe’s position.122 Then, in 1981, the situation that developed over the FSU Southeast Conservation Archeology Center led SEAC to move away from university contracting and to hire students directly to work on curation projects. That situation might have led SEAC to hire a museum specialist to oversee curation, but regional authorities in the mid-1980s chose to reduce staffing instead, so SEAC continued to rely upon FSU contracts.123 The demise of SCAC made this possible by ending any potential conflict between the Anthropology Department and NPS policy. Finally, national program office and congressional interest in museum accountability compelled the Southeast Region to increase curatorial funding for SEAC. Chief Faust assigned Bohnert to retool management of the center’s museum and archeological collections.

Bohnert immediately began to design an action plan to bring SEAC into compliance with a then recently revised special directive (Special Directive 80-1) governing NPS standards for preserving and protecting museum collections. The directive resulted from the “material weakness” problems. It was not SEAC’s first response to the 1985 IG audit. Faust had conducted an informal assessment of the center’s curatorial state in 1986 but at that time, no new funds were available to correct major deficiencies. In 1990, Faust notified the Anthropology Department of pending changes while Bohnert surveyed the status of SEAC’s compliance with NPS standards on a range of issues, including planning, security, fire protection, housekeeping, environment, and storage conditions.124 Among other tasks, Bohnert soon began returning archival documents and artifacts held by SEAC that were unrelated to its collections. For example, in 1990, he transferred to the Western Archeological and Conservation Center a set of artifacts and documents derived from George Fischer’s 1968 underwater archeological survey at Montezuma Well. According to Chief Faust, “this material was never appropriate to our collections,” but why it was still at SEAC after twenty-two years was not explained. Similarly, Bohnert also transferred artifacts and documents to Arkansas Post that were collected before the Southeast Region shifted authority over national parks in Arkansas to the Midwest Region. In a more serious undertaking, Bohnert also set out to retrieve “all human remains in official NPS collections from National Parks in the Southeast Region,” some of which were being curated under contract or permit by non-NPS repositories. NAGPRA now required systematic analysis and museum cataloging of all such remains.125

After 1990, SEAC became significantly less reliant upon Florida State to curate its collections, although it continued to rely upon FSU students to facilitate this work. Likewise, the NPS-FSU relationship continued to allow FSU faculty to participate in collections analysis and NAGPRA-related projects as academic schedules permitted. Nevertheless, the era of the center’s reliance upon faculty oversight of NPS collections had ended. Certainly, these changes further distanced relations between the center and FSU staff, but the law was clear: The Park Service had to improve its accountability and that entailed tighter supervision and a reduced role for the university.

In line with the new standards, SEAC began pushing Southeast Region parks for stricter accountability of their own museum property and archeological collections. In December 1993,

122. Instead, George Fischer, as Chief of Data Base and Programs, assumed the task of managing the curatorial contracts under which the curation by FSU faculty and students was actually done.
Acting Regional Director Carroll W. (Jack) Ogle issued a memorandum defining the respective roles of park superintendents, the Regional Curator, and the Chief of SEAC and spelling out the immediate need for all parks to file a “Loan of Specimens Form 10-127” with SEAC. This paperwork was important with regard to collections that parks had placed with “outside repositories,” mainly universities, and for which they had no loan or other types of agreements to establish accountability. Ogle designated SEAC as the party responsible for these collections and not the parks. He stated that “most of the archeological collections in outside repositories are from archeological investigations conducted in parks through SEAC. Therefore,” he concluded, “they should be managed by SEAC as part of their archeological collection holdings.” Ogle directed park superintendents to file the Loan of Specimens forms with SEAC, which would then establish secondary loan agreements with the non-NPS institutions having park-related archeological collections. This directive was part of SEAC’s ongoing effort to implement NAGPRA, but it also served to extend SEAC’s influence over park archeological holdings.

It took many years for the Interior Department to overcome the majority of its material weaknesses. Originally, the department was cited for 163 identified material weaknesses and 64 accounting system “non-conformances.” By the end of 1998, it could report that 147 of the material weaknesses and all of the accounting system problems had been satisfactorily corrected. The material weakness in curation, unfortunately, was not among those problems satisfactorily addressed. The Park Service specifically reported holding some 35 million archeological, ethnological, historical, biological, paleontological, and geological objects as well as 38 million manuscript and archival records. However, only 54 percent of the objects and 32 percent of the records were cataloged and available for public use. Despite new funding, the magnitude of the problem was proving greater than the resources dedicated to meet it.

In 2002, a GAO study determined that the department’s Indian Arts and Crafts Board, Minerals Management Service, National Business Center, U.S. Geological Survey, and Office of Trust Fund Management had passed the 80 percent milestone for museum objects cataloged, which finally allowed the department to declare “the Departmentwide material weakness in museum property accountability is resolved.” Nevertheless, at the bureau level, those agencies with the department’s vast bulk of museum and archeological collections, namely, the Bureau of Land Management (BLM), the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), the National Park Service (NPS), and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA), still needed to be monitored and their progress reported with regard to the completion of museum object cataloging in their respective agencies. In other words, the issue of soundly managing the Service’s museum and archeological collections remained both a significant concern and a significant deficiency both for the department and the National Park Service.

In 2004, SEAC’s collections held over eight million artifacts. Combined with nearly 700,000 related archival records, the figure was closer to nine million items requiring accountability. Only 39.36 percent of this collection had been cataloged, meaning that some 5,439,000 items in SEAC’s archeological artifact and archival holdings were improperly recorded. Until this process is fully completed, archeologists will not be able to access the potential knowledge available within these collections. Since the founding of SEAC in 1966, NPS archeologists have made great strides to correct deficiencies in the curation of the collection. Certainly, as Chief Curator Ann Hitchcock stated in early 2005, “SEAC has been very proactive and conscientious in addressing the backlog and storage facility issues that it has had.”

126. Acting Regional Director Carroll W. (Jack) Ogle, Memorandum to Superintendents, Southeast Region, December 30, 1993, in Robert Wilson files, SEAC.
theless, at current funding, it will take many years of further applied archeological effort to complete the project of cataloging SEAC's vast collection.

**Origins of Federal Underwater Archeology**

George Fischer did not directly participate in the Big Dig at Ocqueteau National Monument, the event that gave birth to SEAC. Nevertheless, the Park Service hired Fischer late in 1962 because he had submitted an application just as several vacancies opened up in the Southwest Region after staff there transferred to work on the excavation at Ocqueteau. After a brief stint at Montezuma Castle in Arizona, he, too, found himself at Ocqueteau for a couple of years, where he served as park archeologist. Then, in 1966, Fischer accepted a position on the Washington staff of the Division of Archeology under OAH. It was the same slot just vacated by Pete Faust, who had been selected in October 1966 to join SEAC as Chief of Archeological Research. Fischer came on board in November and served there for six years. Fischer was involved in numerous issues, but was especially interested in stimulating NPS interest in the emerging field of underwater archeology.

By the 1960s, underwater breathing technology had made significant advances through the development of the "self-contained underwater breathing apparatus," that is SCUBA. SCUBA-diving equipment freed divers from the necessity of being attached to vessel-based compressors using long umbilical-like hoses. More importantly, this equipment brought down the relative cost of diving, making it more accessible to recreational enthusiasts, university- and museum-associated researchers, and to scavengers of various sorts. The arrival of successful shipwreck salvaging by Mel Fisher and others revealed jurisdictional and legal concerns affecting the management of cultural resources that begged resolution. Gradually, concern arose about the numerous cultural heritage sites on submerged public lands. The effort to develop an institutional capability to manage such resources within the Park Service began one day in 1968 when Ernest Connally walked into John Corbett's office and asked, "What are you doing in terms of underwater archeology?"

Corbett had thought about the issue but had taken no action. Fischer was keen to get involved and so Corbett asked him to conduct a background study on the needs and potential of the Park Service in underwater archeology. Fischer conducted the study with a young archeologist-diver named Marion Riggs who was on the staff of Walnut Canyon National Monument (Arizona). Their report, published in March 1969, reviewed Service responsibilities, capabilities, and potential projects in underwater archeology, and identified significant non-NPS institutions with underwater archeological programs. It laid out the basic arguments for developing an NPS program in underwater archeology.

The first thing that was necessary was for Fischer to become a certified diver. After completing diver training, he sought out others in the Park Service with experience in diving or an interest in underwater archeology. That is why Calvin Cummings and Marion Riggs joined Fischer for the first national NPS underwater archeology project - an exploration of Montezuma Well in Arizona. The well, actually a large "cenote" or limestone sink hole some fifty feet deep with evidence of prehistoric occupation, was administered by Montezuma Castle National Monument, where Fischer had once worked. Presumably, the site was small enough to be safe for a training dive.

The dive took place in October 1968. The crew encountered some problems. First, as Fischer admits, they had no research design and the dive,

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132. Fischer, Oral History Interview, 2-4; Biographical data sheets for Richard Faust and George Fischer, courtesy of George R. Fischer, in possession of the author.
133. Fischer, Oral History Interview, 4-5. Individual parks conducted very limited underwater archeological investigations before this time, namely, at Fort Caroline in Florida in 1952 when archeologist Charles Fairbanks looked for the remains of the Fort, and in 1964 when Point Reyes National Seashore conducted a cursory magnetometer survey. See George R. Fischer, "The History and Nature of Underwater Archeology in the National Park Service," in Daniel J. Lenihan, ed., *Underwater Archeology in the National Park Service* (Santa Fe: National Park Service, 1974), 3-8.
134. Fischer, Oral History Interview, 4-5.
deemed a “survey,” produced only marginal archaeological information about the site. Second, the location turned out to have more environmental complications than expected. The bottom of the cenote was mud, not a hard sandy surface as a previous report had claimed. As Fischer and Cummings descended on a line from a small boat in the middle of the pool, they suddenly reached the bottom, which was not solid, and experienced the disturbing phenomenon of being engulfed by a swirling gelatinous mass of sediment. They kicked frantically to escape, stirring up further sediments that occluded visibility for the duration of the project. Nevertheless, some artifacts were obtained from the dive, several photographs proved useful as publicity devices, and Fischer acquired some experience to offer in applying for research funding.138

Shortly thereafter, Fischer obtained funding to conduct an archeological survey of submerged wreck sites at Fort Jefferson National Monument (now Dry Tortugas National Park). Zorro Bradley, who had also obtained diver credentials, joined the project, which was sponsored by Mendel Peterson, a senior Smithsonian archeologist. Fischer had met Peterson while participating in a previous Smithsonian wreck investigation in Florida in 1968 and apparently had persuaded him to support a nascent NPS underwater archeology program. The three conducted an initial site visit at Fort Jefferson in April 1969. In December 1970, Fischer organized a second trip to prepare for a full-scale operation, which followed in 1971. Some two dozen people participated in the Fort Jefferson survey. According to Fischer, it was the largest underwater archeological project in North America for a time.139 Fischer managed this project from Washington. Immediately after SEAC moved to Tallahassee in the summer of 1972, Fischer joined the staff there and the next NPS underwater archeology project was administered by SEAC.

The primary authority for the Park Service to conduct underwater archeology is the Antiquities Act of 1906 and the Historic Sites Act of 1935. Later acts, such as the Moss-Bennett legislation of 1974, supplemented this authority. However, the area of federal jurisdiction concerning submerged lands was then, and still is, quite complex. For example, in 1969, various acts generally gave states authority over offshore lands to three miles out but the Outer Continental Shelf Act of 1953 reserved control over submerged lands beyond that boundary to the federal government and the Secretary of the Interior. However, there were two important issues. First federal authority was not being enforced as treasure hunters and commercial salvagers freely invaded and salvaged wrecks under rules governing commercial salvage in international waters. Second, in some cases, federal authority overlapped with state authority. According to Fischer and Riggs, federal jurisdiction occurred whenever Spanish lands ceded by treaty to the United States were involved. All Spanish property and sunken vessels, whether under federal or state control, thus belonged to the federal government. Moreover, because the federal government never relinquishes authority over a sunken U.S. vessel, any federal vessel found in U.S. waters was presumably under the jurisdiction of the Interior Department.140 Years of jurisdictional conflict ensued until the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987 specifically entrusted states with authority to manage shipwrecks in their jurisdictional boundaries, although they must do so in accordance with standards maintained by the Secretary of the Interior as delegated to the National Park Service. Most important, the act established government ownership over historic shipwrecks in state waters and declared that such shipwrecks are not subject to the law of finds and admirality courts.

In 1969, the General Services Administration was responsible for all sunken naval vessels and administered commercial salvage applications. When GSA issued a salvage application, it also notified the National Park Service, in accordance with an inter-agency memorandum of understanding. The Park Service would offer its advice upon the historic significance of the specific applications. No other government agency appeared to recognize the applicability of the Antiquities Act to submerged resources. Were federal jurisdiction to be established in the areas where the law seemed to apply,
as Fischer and Riggs argued, the Park Service would suddenly find itself responsible for enforcing the Antiquities Act across several hundred thousand square miles of ocean. Obviously, underwater archaeology involved complex legal issues. Fischer and Riggs recommended a thorough legal review, and thereafter the immediate publication of NPS policies relating to underwater archaeology so that all interested parties would be aware of NPS responsibilities.¹⁴¹

About the same time that Fischer was beginning to think about underwater archaeology, two amateur treasure hunters, Jesse Pursell and Sam Corbino, made a significant archeological find while working under a GSA salvage contract. In issuing the contract, GSA invoked the Antiquities Act because of its MOU with the Park Service and because the site, De Soto National Wildlife Refuge, was administered by the Fish and Wildlife Service (then the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife). The treasure hunters had apparently located what they believed was a steamship lost on the Missouri River in April 1865 that reportedly included an unsalvaged cargo of gold coins, mercury, and whiskey. The steamship was named the Bertrand. Initial auger soil tests conducted in 1968 indicated that site excavation would be productive. According to the Antiquities Act, such excavation would have to avoid damaging the vessel and any historic objects associated with it.¹⁴²

Early on, the Park Service claimed that underwater archaeology was involved in the Bertrand excavation.¹⁴³ Although techniques for locating lost vessels (e.g., correlating historic written records

¹⁴². "De Soto National Wildlife Refuge, was administered by the Fish and Wildlife Service (then the Bureau of Sport Fisheries and Wildlife). The treasure hunters had apparently located what they believed was a steamship lost on the Missouri River in April 1865 that reportedly included an unsalvaged cargo of gold coins, mercury, and whiskey. The steamship was named the Bertrand. Initial auger soil tests conducted in 1968 indicated that site excavation would be productive. According to the Antiquities Act, such excavation would have to avoid damaging the vessel and any historic objects associated with it."
¹⁴³. "Although techniques for locating lost vessels (e.g., correlating historic written records..."
with geographic data) may have been used by those looking for the Bertrand, it was in fact found entirely on dry land beneath a corn field in an area near the Missouri River, which had shifted its course after a flood in the 1870s. By late 1968, sufficient excavation of the Bertrand confirmed that it was a remarkable find. Well-preserved items of all types were discovered: assorted tools, textiles, foodstuffs, champagne, kitchenware, and eight hundred unbroken bottles of "Dr. Hostetter’s Celebrated Stomach Bitters" (an alcohol-based cure-all). These materials were found in their original packing crates with manufacturer and consignee information clearly indicating various relationships. It was a veritable "slice of life" of Missouri River commerce, circa 1865, as the Division of Archeology reported in 1969.144

As the extent of this excavation became apparent, the Park Service began to grapple with the complexities of overseeing a multi-agency project involving treasure hunters and estimated artifact counts exceeding five hundred thousand items. By April 1969, it had tightened its control over excavation procedures and cargo removal by negotiating an amended contract.145 Greater control also brought greater burdens, however, and the Midwest Archeological Center (MWAC) was soon overwhelmed both by the staff required to process the vast amount of material being excavated and the costs. In the summer of 1969, MWAC essentially shut down its salvage contracting operations to divert all Bureau of Reclamation transfer funds to the care and preservation of items excavated from the Bertrand. This mandate came directly from Congress. The project drew close attention from Washington and Fischer, already developing a prospectus on underwater archeology, was tasked to assist the excavation. He soon found himself in Omaha, Nebraska.146

The Bertrand excavation was something of a sensation and was widely covered in the media.147 From a professional perspective, it seemed to demonstrate the potential of underwater archeology. Even though the Bertrand was found on land and excavated using standard archeological techniques, it was a vessel originally sunk beneath the Missouri River and therefore held implications for underwater archeology. For example, instead of digging in old trash heaps and recovering broken pottery or glass, archeologists working on the Bertrand found whole articles that were new when they were lost plus a wealth of exact data to establish archeological provenience. Much of this information was widely applicable in archeology. The excavation


146. National Park Service, "Review and Analysis of Archeology Program, Fiscal Year 1970," (Washington, DC: Division of Archeology, Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation, 1970), 22; Fischer, Oral History Interview, 5-9; Moore, Letters to Cameron Binkley, March 29 and May 15, 2003. The MWAC was created by a transfer of material and personnel from the Smithsonian Institution’s Missouri Basin Program in 1969. It was probably not as well prepared for the sudden emergency of managing the Bertrand as it might otherwise have been.

also spurred innovation in the development of conservation techniques. The large number of duplicate items allowed a baseline that gave an opportunity to test differing preservation strategies, which could be compared over time to assess preferred treatments. Refinements in the process of stabilizing waterlogged wooden structures (polyethylene glycol replacement) were also advanced due to the exigencies of the Bertrand project.148

The Bertrand excavation also helped invigorate Fischer's effort to develop an underwater program. He cited the Bertrand in discussing underwater archaeology to foster Florida State University's interest in SEAC. Fischer's lobbying on behalf of underwater archaeology and the transfer of SEAC to FSU were important factors in the successful negotiation of the cooperative agreement. At least, some faculty of the Anthropology Department were intrigued by the possibilities.149 The department's founder, Hale Smith, in particular, was interested in underwater archaeology. By the early 1960s, he had obtained diving equipment and conducted some informal investigations.150 Once SEAC was located at Florida State, it was largely through Fischer's auspices that the university became involved and remained involved in underwater archeology. Both he and Florida's State Archeologist Wilburn A. "Sonny" Cockrell began to teach the first courses in underwater archeology at the university. Fischer taught his course on an annual basis through 1997.151

149. Paredes, Oral History Interview, 8-9.
151. Fischer, "The History of Underwater Archaeology at Florida State University," page three.
The first underwater archeology project conducted by SEAC took place during the summer of 1973. The project was a survey of shipwreck sites at Gulf Islands National Seashore near Pensacola, Florida. It involved Florida State from the start through the auspices of the SEAC-FSU cooperative agreement. The following year, Cockrell also began working on a contract for Fischer to continue work on the underwater survey Fischer had initiated at Fort Jefferson in the Dry Tortugas. Additional minimally funded NPS projects utilized FSU students on field school-type exercises that provided the Park Service with its first assessments of the research potential and inventories of submerged cultural resources at several coastal parks in the Southeast. In addition to Gulf Islands and Fort Jefferson, Fischer conducted field school survey projects at Biscayne National Park, Canaveral National Seashore, Fort Matanzas National Monument, Castillo de San Marcos National Monument, and Fort Frederick National Monument, among others.

In 1972, SEAC announced that it had located and identified the Nuestra Senora de Rosario (1622), a vessel of the 1622 Spanish "plate" fleet, a shipwreck site located in Dry Tortugas National Park. Because the Nuestra Senora de Rosario was a treasure ship, its discovery drew a lot of attention, but the Park Service decided not to excavate it. Fischer's own words best describe how since the creation of SEAC, a new type of ethic had taken a hold among NPS archeologists:

> Some disappointment was voiced when we let it be known that there was no present intention to excavate, and probably will not be within our lifetime, if ever. Even if we could afford the luxury of concentrating on one site and excavating it completely, it is doubtful that we would consider that to be a judicious use of our resources. Complete excavation of individual sites is neither necessary or desirable from our particular point of view. Selective testing is expected to provide what information we need on the site, and would also provide a representative collection of material for study and exhibit. Obtaining the complete collection would be uneconomical for our purposes. Perhaps at some point in the future this site and others on Service land will be completely excavated. In the meantime they are protected for the best current utilization and may be available at some time when with more sophisticated techniques and a greatly diminished wreck population elsewhere it will be of far greater value."

No doubt, Fischer's perspective was encouraged by his exposure to submerged archeology, especially regarding the *Bertrand*. Indeed, the contingencies and expenses of the *Bertrand* excavation had had a major impact upon Service archeological circles in general. Although he could not date its origins, former SEAC Chief Pete Faust clearly explained his own conservative philosophy on excavation by explicit reference to underwater archeology:

> I think that part of my problems were with - well, with some of the historic and the underwater materials. If we had a closed context, like a shipwreck or something like that - my question was, "How many spikes do we need to retain and spend money for on preservation, stabilization and preservation?" Or "How many of the same size cannon ball do we need?" What are they going to prove? We can count them, describe them, whatever, but we do not have to take them into perpetual care when they're not going to provide any significant data. They're repetitive.

Then, as today, managerial and budgetary issues were not ancillary to public archeology - they were fundamental concerns. Knowledge gained had to be weighed against the long-term costs of artifact treatment, maintenance, and permanent storage as well as the possibility of robbing future archeologists of the opportunity for further research. Long-standing problems resulting from the massive WPA-era excavations no doubt share some credit, but SEAC's exposure to underwater archeology was an important determinant helping move it toward the professional orientation of conservation archeology. This philosophy was ascendant even before SEAC lost its salvage operations in 1973. In actual practice, of course, the thoroughgoing and complete excavation mentality of salvage work was always more of an ideal than a reality. There was never time or money enough to save every site.

152. Fischer, "The History of Underwater Archaeology at Florida State University," page three.
155. Faust, Oral History Interview, 19.
threatened by a major construction project, which is what drove public archeology more than anything toward a research-problem orientation. And that philosophy is what helped to fuel the rebellion against Connally and OAH. Unfortunately, a research-oriented approach to public archeology has never proven feasible, the foremost reason perhaps being that there is rarely a good connection matching a threatened site to existing research needs. And one never knows what any excavation might unexpectedly bring to light. The best preservation treatment for most artifacts, therefore, is to keep them in the ground if that option is at all possible. This emergent orientation within federal archeology eventually provided the common ground upon which the professions of cultural resources management could meet.

SEAC and the Search for HMS Fowey

If minor controversy accompanied Fischer's involvement with the Nuestra Senora de Rosario, it was something to which he was to become accustomed. In October 1978, a sport diver named Gerald Klein filed an in rem complaint in Admiralty Court for title to the wreck of a sunken and long-abandoned vessel, HMS Fowey, located in the waters of the Legare Anchorage in or near Biscayne National Park. With title, commonly granted under then existing admiralty law, Klein could legally salvage the site, paying a percentage to the state of Florida, which had up to then encouraged the practice to generate revenue. Klein mistakenly believed the wreck was a gold-laden Spanish galleon. It was not, but his claim led to a precedent-setting court battle that would help define and clarify the standards and merits of federal and state protection of submerged cultural artifacts - a golden outcome, even if no gold was ever found. State officials familiar with the case notified the Park Service because general coordinates provided to the court indicated proximity to Biscayne National Park. Indeed, in 1975, George Fischer had noted the site in that park's first submerged archeological resources survey, although there was limited information about it, including its precise location. The Park Service quickly intervened as defendant claiming title. 156

Legal suits over salvage rights to Spanish gold were common in Florida during this time. Such disputes were between not only salvors and the Park Service, but also involved jurisdictional collisions between the state and the federal government regarding which held authority over the management of historic shipwrecks. Indeed, as suggested above, the state of Florida actually sanctioned treasure-salvage operations in order to claim a percentage of the value gained by the salver, making the boundary of a park hugely important. 157 Concern over this issue may have been another reason that Florida's state government initially resisted the creation of an NPS underwater archeological effort in Tallahassee.

In 1978, SEAC renewed its accord with Florida State University, specifically indicating mutual intent to cooperate in the area of underwater archeology. In 1979, an NPS study on the history of preservation in the National Park Service, called for the creation of a "small professional cadre under the supervision of a qualified underwater archeologist" that would be based at a university. SEAC, however, did not have input into the report, which seemed oddly uninformed about SEAC's own efforts to create just such a capacity in conjunction with Florida State. Fischer complained to Calvin Cummings, "this document was astounding in stating the exact opposite of reality." 158 Soon after, Fischer drafted a formal prospectus on underwater archeology, noting the exceptional resources available for the creation of an expanded or fully staffed NPS underwater archeology capability at SEAC. 159 Fischer explained how his own expertise, equipment, and funding had initially been transferred from Washington with an explicit sanction to

156. Russell K. Skowronek, "Archeological Testing and Evaluation of the Legare Anchorage Shipwreck Site: Biscayne National Park, Summer 1982" (Tallahassee: Southeast Archeological Center, National Park Service, 1984), 48, 52. Today, the state of Florida has stricter permitting requirements for commercial salvors, including that salvors hire maritime archeologists and provide archeological surveys for wreck sites from which they seek treasure. Nevertheless, Florida still encourages commercial treasure-hunting, as clearly indicated on the state's archeological web site. When salvors abide by state regulations and enter into a salvage contract with the state, they can salvage up to 80 percent of an historic wreck by granting the state of Florida a "cut" of any recovered material. See http://dhr.dos.state.fl.us/archaeology/underwater/faq.cfm Some of the jurisdictional disputes were resolved by the Shipwreck Salvage Act of 1987, but many were not. The lack of comprehensive legislation to govern the protection of historic shipwrecks and other submerged culture sites remains a considerable concern to the heritage community.

157. Daniel Lenihan, Adventures of America's Most Elite Underwater Archeology Team (New York: New Market Press, 2002), 48, 52. Today, the state of Florida has stricter permitting requirements for commercial salvors, including that salvors hire maritime archeologists and provide archeological surveys for wreck sites from which they seek treasure. Nevertheless, Florida still encourages commercial treasure-hunting, as clearly indicated on the state's archeological web site. When salvors abide by state regulations and enter into a salvage contract with the state, they can salvage up to 80 percent of an historic wreck by granting the state of Florida a "cut" of any recovered material. See http://dhr.dos.state.fl.us/archaeology/underwater/faq.cfm Some of the jurisdictional disputes were resolved by the Shipwreck Salvage Act of 1987, but many were not. The lack of comprehensive legislation to govern the protection of historic shipwrecks and other submerged culture sites remains a considerable concern to the heritage community.

conducted underwater archaeological investigations. He spelled out how SEAC could cooperate with Florida State University, the Florida Bureau of Historic Sites and Properties, the Florida Institute of Oceanography, and the Florida Council of Archaeologists, among others as needed on various potential projects. In fact, he had already worked with several of these organizations on underwater archaeological projects. Florida State's own expanding resources were available at little expense to the Park Service through the cooperative agreement. The university had already dabbled in underwater archeology through the efforts of such early faculty practitioners as Hale Smith, Stanley Olsen and Charles Fairbanks. According to Fischer, FSU resources included a university-wide academic diving program, facilities and equipment of the FSU Marine Laboratory, and a base of anthropology students available for employment or assistance through field school-type work. Because of the relationships between SEAC, the university academic diving program, and the Anthropology Department, Fischer concluded, "that a standing and fully equipped diving team is in existence which includes expertise in underwater archeology." This team, he further stated, "can be used to execute projects in underwater archeology for the Service with no further training or preparation and minimal logistical problems."  

Fischer made a strong case. If the National Park Service was to develop an underwater archeology program, there were few better places in the nation to do so than in Tallahassee in cooperation with the numerous organizations in Florida already involved in that enterprise. It is important to emphasize that the Park Service already had a formal commitment to develop underwater archeology in conjunction with Florida State University. Unfortunately, Fischer's proposal languished for over four years. As noted above, underwater archeology was at the center of some very volatile issues, the kind that inevitably brought complications and perhaps bureaucratic resistance. In the meantime, Fischer and SEAC continued to accrue credentials in underwater archeology. In 1984, Fischer revised his prospectus on underwater archeology and it was released amidst a major "realignment" of NPS functions. It is unclear how high up the chain of command either of these proposals went, or who, beyond the Southeast Region, would have paid them any attention. By 1979, a new cadre of well-placed supporters of NPS underwater archeology was beginning to cohere around Daniel Lenihan, a former graduate student of Fischer in the FSU anthropology program.  

Lenihan first joined the National Park Service as a park ranger/archeologist to participate on a shipwreck survey of Gulf Islands National Seashore organized by Fischer in 1973. He had come to Florida State in 1970 to study archeology and espoused a convert's enthusiasm for preservation. However, as Lenihan attested in his book, *Adventures of America's Most Elite Underwater Archeology Team*, he "decided to stop being a school teacher and go to graduate school in anthropology at Florida State not because of a scholarly lust for knowledge or commitment to protection of archeological sites." Instead, he said, "it was because I thought I might eventually find a job in which someone will actually pay me to dive a lot to look for old treasures underwater." Lenihan was apparently a good amateur diver looking to turn pro and this motivation may explain in some degree the subsequent course of underwater archeology within the Park Service. Under Fischer, but especially over many years under Lenihan's direction, NPS underwater archeology was safe with no reported major life-threatening incidents. That

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160. Fischer has consistently made this point, although no document, other than those he authored, has turned up to validate it. However, his documents are NPS documents, underwater archeology was an important issue in negotiations with FSU, and Director Hartzog did support expanding NPS capabilities in underwater archeology. See Ernest Allen Connolly, Chief, Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation, Memorandum to Deputy Director, Operations (Approved and signed by George B. Hartzog), January 26, 1971, in A6435 folder, SEAC files. While Fischer had some approval for his efforts in underwater archeology, actual support was another matter. Considering the generally poor relations between Fischer and the other staff archeologists in Washington, who had resisted Connolly's effort to integrate archeology into OAHP, this lack of support is not surprising.


162. Paredes, Oral History Interview, 23.


important contribution should be noted even if archeology came second in Lenihan’s work. Stressing diving and diving safety, Lenihan honed a set of safety protocols while practicing the extremely dangerous art of cave diving in Florida in the 1960s. Acknowledging Lenihan’s diving expertise, Fischer gave him the mission of whipping his own underwater archeological team into shape for the work at Gulf Islands. The diving safety procedures Lenihan developed at SEAC became a model used by other professional divers both inside and outside the Park Service.

In 1974, Fischer, Lenihan, and Calvin Cummings, who was now Chief of the Division of Archeology at the Southwest Cultural Resource Center in Santa Fe, New Mexico, and a few others co-authored a concept paper edited by Lenihan proposing the creation of a national underwater archeological center. The paper was titled “Underwater Archeology in the National Park Service: A Model for the Management of Submerged Cultural Resources.” The paper sought to publicize the legal mandates and need for underwater archeology in the Park Service and to argue for a national capacity in excess of the then limited capabilities that had emerged chiefly at SEAC but also in Santa Fe. The report discussed how “an actual comprehensive in-park underwater archeological program was formulated and authorized in 1969.” The Park Service’s responsibility was growing in the area of underwater archeology, the report concluded, but its capability to mount effective underwater archeological investigations was too limited. Neither SEAC nor the Southwest Archaeological Center possessed the capacity to accomplish what was necessary without borrowing personnel from other regions. The solution was for the Park Service to create an underwater research center composed of teams of underwater archeologists. A Servicewide center could consolidate “fragmentary capabilities into a streamlined, efficient professional support team” that could operate at the request of a particular region nationwide. At the time, none of the authors of this report foresaw how their early proposal would touch off a long-lasting feud within the National Park Service that unnecessarily tainted the worthiness of underwater archeology.

The Lenihan, Fischer, Cummings, et al., proposal went nowhere initially. In 1975, however, Cummings succeeded in convincing the Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation, and the Soil Conservation Service to fund an NPS study to analyze the effects of reservoir inundation on archeological sites. The National Reservoir Inundation Study (NRIS) was a five-year project that involved something of an archeological survey of selected inundated sites to determine the impact of that inundation on artifacts made of clay, stone, metal, or wood. After the completion of the NRIS, Cummings hoped to keep the personnel and equipment to forge the nucleus of an underwater archeology capability, perhaps as proposed in the 1974 prospectus. He hired Lenihan to run the study. Cummings’s model in this regard was John Corbett, of course, who had sought to use salvage funding to help forge a corps of park archeologists.

The NRIS was an important development in the history of federal archeology. Despite some good and recognized work by classically trained American archeologists excavating submerged sites in the Mediterranean, neither Fischer, nor Cummings, nor even Florida’s own first state archeologist Sonny Cockrell were up to that time able to convince their agencies to fund an ongoing capacity to conduct underwater archeological work in the United States. Fischer, of course, had succeeded in acquiring funding for several specific projects but had not been able to develop support for a sustained capability. After the NRIS was brought to a conclusion, Cummings managed to keep the project going. In the spring of 1980, the small group of divers was formally declared a permanent standing unit of the Southwest Cultural Resource Center. The organization was given a name - the Submerged Cultural Resources Unit (SCRU). Set up in Santa Fe, New Mexico, SCRU offered its services to any NPS park or region or even to outside agencies with project funding. As it happened, SCRU’s first undertaking was a minor

165. Lenihan, Adventures, 38. NPS sources concur.
168. Lenihan, Adventures, 55-56.
169. Lenihan, Adventures, 46-47.
170. Lenihan, Adventures, 10.
role in support of SEAC and Florida State University.

In 1980, not long after the creation of SCRU, the U.S. Southern District Court of Florida issued a preliminary injunction in favor of the Park Service over title to the disputed shipwreck in Biscayne National Park. The federal judge ordered the claimants to cease all wrecking operations and to convey to NPS custody all materials removed from the site, which by then they had already partially destroyed using explosives. The claimants persisted to argue, however, that the Park Service was a competing salvager and the case dragged on. The initial ruling considerably favored the Park Service, but the court nevertheless strongly advised the Service to locate the site of the wreck. Acting under the Solicitor’s advice, SEAC began to conduct preliminary investigations both to strengthen the case for NPS ownership and for reasons having to do with public relations. According to George Fischer, senior regional managers became concerned about embarrassing headlines then appearing in The Miami Herald and similar South Floridian news-
papers, which were running articles with headlines like “National Park Service Has Wreck, Can’t Find It.” The salvager was not compelled to provide the government with his own location data. Court documents only specified it as within three thousand yards of a coordinate on the Triumph Reef within the Legare Anchorage. Fischer’s original but cursory survey had not precisely identified the site’s location. Thus, to demonstrate its stewardship, the Park Service funded an operation to locate and evaluate the wreck. SEAC then became involved in a “heated debate” with officials in the Southeast Regional Office over the best means to accomplish this task. It took a week before the Regional Directorate agreed to authorize the center’s use of a thousand-dollar-per-day Del Norte positioning system in lieu of an older and less expensive system less likely to find the wreck. SEAC then paid the salary and expenses of Larry Murphy from the Southwest Region whose help was requested to man the system while Daniel Lenihan elected to participate as a volunteer (paid by his own account) to gain some experience in using the new technology.\textsuperscript{172}

Lenihan may also have helped Fischer overcome Regional Office resistance to using the new system, which was more expensive than older techniques. Lenihan claims the support network he had developed while leading the NRIS proved useful in this regard. At any rate, Everglades National Park Superintendent John M. Morehead, a diving enthusiast and friend of Lenihan, supported SEAC.\textsuperscript{173} After agreeing to Fischer’s recommendations, the Southeast Regional Director set a two-week limit for Fischer, who was the project director, to find the wreck, which created some pressure for SEAC to succeed. Fischer admits that he probably would have resigned had the disputed wreck not been located after all of the uproar, but the advanced positioning system worked as intended and the site was located.\textsuperscript{174}

A photomosaic and associated artifact chart of the site was produced by Gregg Stanton, FSU Research Diving Coordinator, along with other FSU volunteers. The Florida Department of Transportation and the FSU Florida Resources and Environmental Analysis Center also participated in producing this work.\textsuperscript{175}

Although SEAC had located the wreck site, the vessel still needed positive identification. To accomplish this task, SEAC marshaled further aid from Florida State.\textsuperscript{176} Material compiled by FSU student Richard Johnson helped narrow the timeframe and cast doubt upon the Spanish character of the wreck. In 1981, FSU student Russell K. Skowronek conducted historical research in Great Britain and Canada that pointed to the possibility of the wreck being H.M.S. Fowey, a British man-of-war lost in 1748 after becoming stuck on a reef while escorting a captured Spanish merchantman to Charleston.\textsuperscript{177} In 1983, Fischer led an FSU archeological field school conducted at the site, now tentatively believed to be H.M.S. Fowey. SEAC archeologists and FSU students mapped the hull remains and artifacts scattered upon the sea floor. With


\textsuperscript{173} Lenihan, Adventures, 94-97, 102.

\textsuperscript{174} In his account of the finding of H.M.S. Fowey, Lenihan claims the court ordered the Park Service to prove its stewardship by locating the wreck within a three-week time frame. The Park Service had been challenged, according to Lenihan, in Old west style, to "slap leather." Lenihan, Adventures, 93-94. Fischer claims a two-week time limit was imposed by the Southeast Regional Director, not the court, to limit survey costs. See Fischer, H.M.S. Fowey - Redux, April 22, 2002. A memorandum by Attorney-Advisor James R. Mills to the Regional Solicitor, detailing the court’s order (U.S. District for the Southern District of Florida) to impose a preliminary injunction on Gerald Klein on January 10, 1980, as requested by the Park Service, does not mention any court-imposed timeframe while setting forth other specific orders. See Fischer and Johnson, “Biscayne National Park: Underwater Archeological Survey,” Appendix A: James R. Mills, etc., Memorandum to Regional Solicitor, January 11, 1980.

\textsuperscript{175} Fischer and Johnson, “Biscayne National Park: Underwater Archeological Survey,” see acknowledgements.


Through these means, George Fischer, FSU students Richard Johnson and Russell Skowronek, and other NPS partners developed sufficient information to identify conclusively that the wreck known as BISC-UW-20 was not a Spanish galleon, as the salvager had believed, but almost certainly was HMS Fowey. A series of reports on the wreck site followed as a result of the SEAC-FSU collaboration, and in 1987, Fischer, Johnson, Skowronek, and Richard Vernon published a definitive article in the peer-reviewed Journal of Nautical Archaeology and Underwater Explorations.\textsuperscript{179} No less than the issue of jurisdiction, this impressive research helped convince the court of the NPS claim for stewardship when the case went to trial in 1983. Fischer served as the government’s sole expert witness. Court documents specifically report Fischer’s name, an unusual testimony to his effectiveness as a witness. In fact, the HMS Fowey case,


**Klein versus Unidentified Wreck of Abandoned Sailing Vessel** (568 F. Supp. 1562) Southern District, Florida, 1983, was precedent-setting and has been cited in several additional rulings. According to Michael W. Reed, an attorney with the U.S. Department of Justice, Environment and Natural Resources, who was involved with several court cases relating to shipwreck litigation, Fischer’s testimony established the fact that the removal of artifacts by individuals without proper understanding of scientific methods from underwater cultural sites resulted in the loss of their true value. The Klein case essentially overturned a previously long accepted legal bias that sunken property was “in peril.” The court ruled that the Park Service owned all wrecks embedded within Biscayne National Park and that these were not “abandoned” or subject to the traditional law of finds. The Klein case was thus settled in favor of the government on July 28, 1983. It became a key instrument that later helped secure passage of the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987. This act sought to ameliorate some of the jurisdictional issues involved in the HMS *Fowey* case while strengthening protection of submerged cultural resources. Needless to say, the entire episode pointed out the importance to NPS management of having sound staff expertise as well as a good understanding of what resources were beneath a park’s waters, especially in Florida with its high

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182. The Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987, Public Law No: 100-298 (43 U.S.C. 39, Sections 2101-2106), asserts U.S. title or ownership rights to all abandoned vessels and archeological resources “embedded” within the submerged lands of a state or tribe. The act then assigns states and tribes jurisdiction over historical shipwrecks in their waters, but mandates that they follow Secretary of the Interior guidelines in the treatment of cultural resources. The U.S. government also asserts title to all abandoned vessels, whether embedded or not, that are listed or eligible to be listed in the National Register of Historic Places. The act substantially weakened the ability of salvors to claim ownership under the law of finds in an admiralty court. The act was also later amended by the National Historic Preservation Policy Act of 1989 to assert the U.S. title to shipwrecks and archeological resources embedded in or lying on the seabed in the “Exclusive Economic Zone.” In 1990, the National Park Service issued the necessary guidelines for states and tribes to follow.
level of treasure-hunting activity. And, it confirmed the fertile intellectual possibilities of SEAC’s university-based operations.

To add one final twist to this case history, after the field school project, Biscayne National Park Superintendent James A. Sanders decided to raise a second of the nine-pounder cannons located at the HMS Fowey site. He conducted this activity completely without archeological controls or supervision. In fact, the cannon was raised against the explicit advice of SEAC archeologists and its recovery only became known to SEAC after the Archeological Research Laboratory of the Florida Bureau of Archeology mistakenly informed the center about the cannon, which the park had sent to it for electrolysis, a technique to preserve metal long-exposed to salt water. George Fischer had told the superintendent, fearful that the cannon might be stolen, “not to worry about it.” Salvager Klein himself had attempted to raise the cannon but was unable because it was too heavy and broke from its strap. Moving the cannon was dangerous, unnecessary, and expensive. “Nobody’s going to pilfer a 4,000-pound block of iron,” Fischer told Sanders. “It just is not practical.” Sanders, however, organized a few divers from Biscayne and Everglades National Parks and raised the cannon in October 1983. Fischer disputed the propriety of the superintendent’s action, creating more management headaches related to HMS Fowey.

The HMS Fowey case thus helps to illustrate not only how the SEAC-FSU cooperative agreement was fulfilling its initial promise, but also why some might have found it problematic to support SEAC’s underwater archeology program. In the early 1980s, underwater archeology was a relatively minor aspect of SEAC’s overall prospectus, but it was a high-profile activity, and it could be a bureaucratic nuisance. Fischer became embroiled in disputes with park superintendents and regional office managers, some of whom likely thought that because they could dive, they knew as much about archeological resource management as those at SEAC. However, logistical arrangements and safety were always at the forefront of administrative concern whenever an underwater archeological project was

184. Fischer, Oral History Interview, 46-47.
(or is) proposed. Underwater archeology was (and is) clearly more expensive than terrestrial archeology. A glance at the equipment list and logistical requirements for any underwater archeological proposal testifies to this truth. In the earliest years, Fischer did have trouble gaining substantial Washington office support to expand SEAC's nascent efforts in underwater archeology, quite possibly because of his association with John Corbett and Zorro Bradley and the archeologists' dispute with Ernest Allen Connally. Fischer's reliance upon the cooperative NPS arrangement with Florida State was not just desirable, it was essential. Another significant hurdle to overcome was simply achieving a basic scholarly and bureaucratic appreciation of underwater archeology's potential.

Nevertheless, by the mid-1980s, SEAC seemed poised to move forward with the development of a more mature underwater archeological program. Some timely and spectacular finds in the Mediterranean were helping illustrate how shipwrecks opened discrete and penetrating windows into cultural history. As serious papers began to be written, the wide gap between the "pith-helmet archaeologists and the swimsuiters decreased."185 Treasure hunters, seeking potentially huge rewards by finding and retrieving lost Spanish gold, began to be countered by reputable investigators armed with substantial research grants. At SEAC, Fischer oversaw numerous studies designed to meet the cultural resource management needs of national parks in the Southeast Region, including several relating to submerged park resources.186 He also proved to be effective in marshaling the cooperative involvement of other organizations. In the case of HMS Fowey specifically, the 1983 investigation utilized the services of an FSU Anthropology Department field school, FSU's Marine Lab, and the university-wide Academic Diving Program, which greatly reduced the expense to the government as it was intended by the SEAC-FSU cooperative agreement. Contributing to these trends, the creation of SCRUS in the Southwest suggested an improving environment for federal underwater archeology despite various management headaches. Indeed, the emergence of a parallel program of underwater archeology in the Southwest seemed to indicate nascent bureaucratic recognition of the field's unique importance for

NPS resource management. Unfortunately, the existence of two separate efforts also positioned NPS underwater archeology for high-level scrutiny and potential consolidation under certain circumstances.

"Realignment" and Underwater Archeology in the Southeast

In 1983, under the administration of President Ronald Reagan, the National Park Service undertook a major "realignment" or reorganization of its management operations. The realignment focused upon three important activities within the Park Service where program and staff cuts appeared possible: the Denver Service Center (DSC), Harpers Ferry Center, and the three archeological centers. The main goal of this effort was to reduce "FTEs," that is, full-time equivalents or staff positions to increase efficiency and reduce costs. During the reorganization, the archeological centers were never seriously considered for elimination. In fact, to reduce the cost of providing archeological services to the DSC, which oversees all major construction programs in the Park Service, a proposal was pushed to create a new archeological center to serve the compliance needs of the National Capital Region, the Northeast Region, and the Mid-Atlantic Region. This proposal would have resulted in the elimination of DSC's direct oversight of its archeological support function in these regions. DSC head Deny Galvin supported this measure because his experience in using the services of MWAC and SEAC had demonstrated that they had sufficient capacity and project supervision capability to respond in a timely manner to DSC's schedule, thus protecting DSC's obligation rate for project funding. The center was never created, however, because the three regional directors would not agree to share power or to allow a center under the authority of another region to manage resources in their own region. However, considerable discussion regarding the archeological centers did take place at this time and Director Russell E. Dickenson established a special task force to evaluate their role and function.

The report of the Regional Office Organization Task Force reviewing the archeological centers, the Denver Service Center, and Harpers Ferry Center was drafted by Howard Chapman, Regional Director of the Western Regional Office, after receiving input from the appointed task force members. The methodology of the task force was to solicit the views of NPS archeologists, review the structure and the various personnel costs of the centers, and meet to hash out the issues in a two-day conference held April 21-22, 1983. A wide variety of opinions were expressed on many issues, but there were some fundamental conclusions. Task force members agreed that the archeological centers were extensions of their respective regional offices because continuing year-to-year workload and management concerns obviated general centralization. Chapman himself found no logic to the geographic alignment of the centers but acknowledged it would take "strong direction from top management" to alter the current state, especially given considerable resistance among the center chiefs to changing the status quo. The task force also acknowledged and affirmed the affiliation of the centers with various universities. The August body of regional and associate directors, center managers, and archeologists, concluded that this affiliation was an important part of the development of these centers and that the costs incurred were more than balanced by the gains. The task


188. Chief Anthropologist (Douglas H. Scox), Memorandum to Associate Director, Cultural Resources, et al., May 1, 1984, in "Archeology Centers Realignment Studies 1983" folder, Michele Aubry files, Archeology and Ethnography Program, National Center for Cultural Resources, Washington, DC. In lieu of a tri-regional archeological center a decision was made to "regionalize" DSC's operations by splitting them among the regions, but Galvin vigorously objected for the reasons noted in the text. He prevailed and DSC retained control of the limited archeological center, which is still based at Silver Spring, Maryland, and which supports all three regions.


190. See Howard H. Chapman, Memorandum to the Director, National Park Service, July 20, 1983, in "Archeology Centers: Admin. History and Reorganizations" folder, Michele Aubry files, Archeology and Ethnography Program, National Center for Cultural Resources, Washington, DC. Task Force members consisted of: Donald R. Field (PNWRO), Marie Rust (WASO), J. L. Dunning (MWRO), Daniel K. Kuehn (PNWRO), Jack Neechels (SWRO), Ken Raithe (NPS), Dwight Rettie (WASO), and Denis P. Galvin (DSC).
force accepted the remote location of the centers due to the "valid concept" of maintaining an academic association, although some members stressed the need for a strong management relationship to ensure that the centers properly supported regional management needs.

According to Chapman, the task force also dwelt upon the "notable tendency on the part of the archeologists to want to retain their identity as the major emphasis of the centers." In a summary of the view of the NPS archeological community provided by Chapman to the Director, two schools of thought were noted. In one school, archeologists were described as accepting interdisciplinary integration, especially regarding the possible establishment of a Northeast Cultural Resource Center because of its "heavy historical orientation." In the main school, however, the archeologists were described as the "keep archeology separate" group, whose adherents argued that archeology "loses strength and visibility when attached to 'historic preservation' and 'cultural resource management,'" that is, it loses its "anthropological character." While Chapman did "not believe this is appropriate to today's needs in the broad range of cultural resource needs," task force members came to no consensus on the issue of merging the archeological centers with their respective cultural resource divisions. The agreement on the value of academic affiliation helped mitigate the issue of combining the centers into larger entities despite Chapman's insistence that management consider the centers as focal points with functions beyond archeology. Other acknowledged complications involved in merging staffs included the basic cost, the logistics of maintaining collections, and the need to keep architectural historians, for example, close to regional offices so that they could interact with engineers.191

While there were practical limits to what actions could be taken, archeological exceptionalism, or the inclination of NPS archeologists to maintain a separate identity, virtually invited the task force, in Chapman's words, "to look more closely at what we expect from the cultural resource centers." Quite explicitly, he spelled out his thinking behind a major point that was to affect SEAC severely:

There are some activities carried out in various centers that have applications in a broad range of areas on a Servicewide basis. These activities could very well be located at one central location where this professional capability is available for Servicewide assignments. Those activities that are a full time load to be carried out in a specific region would then be truly considered as an extension of the Regional Director's staff. However, when a cultural resource program is one that is needed by many regions but only one team or operating unit can handle the program whether it is needed in Guam, Isle Royale or Everglades, then the personnel that make up this unit could best be assigned to one central location. The underwater cultural resource team would be such an entity.

"Logic would argue," Chapman concluded, "that much of what is in the various archeological centers could be centralized."192

It is not clear what criteria the task force on realignment used to determine those activities or programs suitable for centralization. In fact, Chapman's remarks contradicted not only some of his own comments, but comments of other task force members, few of whom found merit in a broad centralization of archeological functions within the Park Service. No such broad restructuring did take place. One member, Daniel R. Kuehn, Pacific Northwest Regional Office, stated his opinion that "since it was not possible to assess the workload of any of the centers in the short time the task force had, my recommendation is to leave them alone." The most often mentioned specialization that could be centralized was curation. However, any action on this account was likely to increase spending, not reduce it, and was left unresolved. Underwater archeology, an activity that might be centralized without significant capital expenditure, was singled out but only by Chapman and, curiously, by Jack Nechels, Associate Regional Director, Southwest Region. None of the other seven task force members specifically discussed consolidating underwater archeology in their task

191. Chapman, Memorandum to the Director, National Park Service, July 20, 1983, and attached anonymous memorandum entitled "Interviews - Summary of Responses, Existing, Archeological Centers (SEAC, VAC, MWAC, SWAC, Cummings, Logan)," in "Archeology Centers: Admin. History and Reorganizations" folder, Michele Aubry files, Archeology and Ethnography Program, National Center for Cultural Resources, Washington, DC.

192. Chapman, Memorandum to the Director, National Park Service, July 20, 1983.
force comments and no one recommended one program over another. Chapman's remarks suggest a bias toward SCRU, but he, too, did not indicate a preference. Still, Chapman and Nechels offered up an unexamined assumption that underwater archeology was ripe for consolidation. No arguments were offered to explain this view. It might well have been argued that underwater archeology was increasingly needed, as with terrestrial archeology, at the regional level to provide local managers with essential regional expertise and capability.

At any rate, Deny Galvin of the DSC strongly backed the archeological center model and made no recommendations about underwater archeology other than to stress that "if a region or a park contains sufficient program activity to justify a continuous program year after year...the services are probably best delivered at the park or regional level." Task force member Marie Rust did "discourage the development of similar programs in an area of specialization unless the need is great," but also explicitly encouraged "some 'specialty areas' in the centers," which, she said, "creates the balance of providing service and maintaining a creative atmosphere." As far as the archeologists themselves were concerned, they offered no consensus on specialization and no recorded remarks on underwater archeology.

Chapman's summary of the findings of the realignment task force acknowledged that it was a "limited depth review." As far as consolidating underwater archeology was concerned, his summary offered more opinion than fact. He advanced an assumption that conducting underwater archeology was a skill best performed by a single centralized NPS team and that it was not an inherently regional function. That idea was debatable. Again, for some regions, it may well have been an inherent function, like many other archeological responsibilities. In the Southeast Region, as SEAC's work on HMS Fowey made clear, there was a need for a regional underwater archeological program or at least the maintenance of some specialized expertise on historic shipwrecks. Logically, a management study or cost-benefit analysis of NPS underwater archeology was in order. Such key analysis could have provided sound guidance on the future development of underwater archeology within the Park Service. Unfortunately, no such analysis was conducted.

Although there was no specific evaluation of underwater archeology, Chief Anthropologist Douglas H. Scovill released a general report in December 1983 that articulated several points for use in consolidating park cultural resource functions. He spelled out the central assumption of consolidation, "that enlarging organizational units, expanding their area of service and increasing the number of park units served will result in operational efficiencies due to economies of scale." Such efficiencies were presumed to come from fewer administrative and highly graded professionals, sharing of equipment and support staff, more effective use of space, etc. However, Scovill countered this assumption with the notion that consolidation could also create "dis-economies of scale," which included "increased staff time devoted to coordinating with an increased number of park and regional units, more work time devoted to administrative and managerial type tasks, increased interpersonal complexities of larger staffs, the inefficiencies of more complex decision making and conflict resolution processes." 193

Scovill also noted the concerns of regional directors worried that centralization would, in fact, negatively affect existing abilities to identify park needs, to provide equity of service to parks, and to provide parks timely service or emergency responses. The regional directors, after all, were the ones responsible for the preservation of cultural resources within their regions. He, too, noted the efficiencies derived by having the archeological centers closely associated with a major university, an issue that was to help prevent the merger of SEAC with a proposed SERO cultural resource management center. 194 Because consolidation could as easily damage as improve cultural resource management, Scovill stressed that "consolidation of the park CRM function will require thoughtful consideration and should be based upon careful analysis and evaluation to determine if the operational efficiencies expected will occur." In other words, would consol-

idating services cost more or less to provide the same level of service or would that service simply be lost?  

Again, despite this informed commentary, no considered evaluation was done regarding the centralization of underwater archeology and whether its consolidation would increase the cost or reduce the service then being provided at the regional level. Perhaps the realignment task force simply needed a sacrificial lamb to appease the cost-cutting gods. Perhaps Chapman was convinced by Nechels that SCRU was all the Park Service needed in terms of underwater archeology. What is certain is that Chapman highlighted the desirability of consolidating underwater archeology up front in his memorandum to the director. Afterwards, the only real decision was which regional program to terminate, the one operated by the SWCRC or the one operated by SEAC?

George Fischer’s well-reasoned prospectus on the merits of continuing and expanding the program in underwater archeology at SEAC, released in early 1984, may have had no bearing on the decision to consolidate underwater archeology, which was probably made in the fall of 1983. By that point, word on the matter had leaked out. Rep. Don Fuqua’s office briefly investigated the issue that month to raise concerns in a letter received from Zorro Bradley “protesting the removal of underwater archeology from Florida to Santa Fe.” Congressional staffer Don Allen wanted to know what was going on and what could be done about it. He was especially concerned whether it meant the termination of NPS underwater archeology in Florida and how this would affect Florida State University. When Allen contacted SEAC, Fischer explained the ongoing NPS realignment without adding fuel to the fire, which he could easily have done. Instead, as Fischer admitted to Faust, “considering the timing, it is unfortunate, since the battles seem to be won and the way things are going the war will win itself.” He was right.

On February 17, 1984, Director Dickenson issued a memorandum directing SEAC to phase out its underwater archeological capability by September 30, 1984, and thereafter to acquire similar research services from SCRU on a refundable basis. The director’s decision to terminate underwater archeology at SEAC was made on the advice of the realignment committee which, without serious evaluation, simply reported the assumption that SEAC’s “submerged cultural resource capability unnecessarily duplicates the Servicewide capabilities of the submerged cultural resources unit stationed in the Southwest Region.” Faust received a copy of the director’s memorandum from the Southeast Regional Director. Although national consolidation of the archeological centers was off the table, he had expected that a management review would be directed to determine the feasibility of merging SEAC with the Southeast Cultural Resource Preservation Center (SECRPC), then based at the Chattahoochee River National Recreation Area in Atlanta. However, as he told colleagues Fischer and John W. Walker, the decision to terminate SEAC’s underwater archeological efforts “comes as a surprise.” Faust consulted Scovill on the matter and reported being told “it is a firm decision based upon Task Force recommendations.” As discussed above, task force records give no indication that the issue of consolidating NPS underwater archeology was discussed by anyone other than Chapman and the Southwest Region’s Nechels.

In retirement, former SEAC Chief Faust said that there was a high level of personal rivalry among the underwater archeologists. Any underwater project that combined professionals from other regions always ended with “a day or two days of listening to all the complaints about what happened or what went on. Those guys were never happy.

197. National Park Service Director, Memorandum to Regional Director, Southeast Region, February 17, 1984, in “Southeast Archeological Center (SEAC)” folder, SEAC files; and Chief Southeast Archeological Center (Richard D. Faust), Memorandum to Associate Regional Director, Operations, SERO, April 23, 1984, in “Southeast Archeological Center (SEAC)” folder, SEAC files.
198. Note attached to National Park Service Director, Memorandum to Regional Director, Southeast Region, February 17, 1984, in “Southeast Archeological Center (SEAC)” folder, SEAC files.
199. Pete Faust, Note to George Fischer and John W. Walker, et al., March 28, 1984, in “Southeast Archeological Center (SEAC)” folder, SEAC files.
200. Several informants to this study addressed this topic informally or off-the-record.
camper, for some reason.” In his discussions with Chief Anthropologist Scovill, Faust admits that the idea of consolidating underwater archaeology at SEAC was broached, but rejected. “SEAC’s performance was found wanting on the basis of a number of criteria,” he stated, in his 2003 interview. “The chief archeologist and I talked about it, about where it needed to and how it needed to go. We had an option to bring essentially what ended up at Santa Fe to the Center, and we discussed it a long time and both decided that it probably was not the best idea.”\textsuperscript{201} Be that as it may, a formal management review was called for to achieve consensus and to evaluate the objective merits of terminating SEAC’s underwater archeological capability, precisely to help avoid the type of problems that afterward developed.

On April 8, 1984, Chief Faust recommended compliance with the directive in two linked stages - a phase-out stage eliminating SEAC’s underwater capability and a phase-in stage in which an interregional agreement would be forged with clear responsibilities divided between the Southeast and Southwest Regions so that effective management of the Southeast Region’s submerged resources could be maintained. Faust listed several recommendations, but especially noted that the director had required SEAC to phase out its capability only, “and we should pay close attention to the authority and responsibility which should be retained by Southeast Region in order to ensure quality control and program responsiveness.” In this memorandum, Faust also noted the importance of maintaining the contributions of “outside academic interests such as have been secured from Florida State University” and recommended that a new cooperative agreement be developed to account for the fact that program execution was being transferred to the Southwest Region.\textsuperscript{202} No such protocol ever followed. In May 1984, Southeast Associate Regional Director Carroll W. (Jack) Ogle informed Bennie Keel, who was then Assistant Director for Archeology, “that the Submerged Resources unit has been phased out.”\textsuperscript{203}

Unexpectedly, Fischer’s former student, Daniel Lenihan, and peer Calvin Cummings had become rivals promoting underwater archeology within the Park Service. After getting his start at SEAC with Fischer, Lenihan had developed a coterie of high-level supporters first through his work with Calvin Cummings and the National Reservoir Inundation Study and later as head of SCRU. Besides Cummings, his supporters included Everglades Superintendent John M. Morehead, Southwest Regional Directors John E. Cook and Robert I. Kerr, and others with strong ties to the Southwest. Cummings in particular, as Robert Utley once remarked, was an unusually aggressive Chief Regional Archeologist.\textsuperscript{204} Naturally, Cummings supported SCRU to promote SWCRC. Zorro Bradley, from his post in Alaska, saw this development as confirmation of a conspiracy theory he

\textsuperscript{201} Faust, Oral History Interview, 25-26.
\textsuperscript{202} Chief, Southeast Archeological Center (Faust), Memorandum to Associate Regional Director, Operations, SERO, April 23, 1984.
\textsuperscript{204} Sellars and Webb, \textit{An Interview with Robert M. Utley}, 87.
had developed centered upon SWCRC and NPS archeology. Whether or not that was true, it is curious that the only time cultural resource functions were ever fully integrated in the National Park Service was in the SWCRC. Full integration of cultural resource functions was a goal of many in the Park Service, including, of course, Connally and Utley. As OAHP experienced, such consolidations required the backing of regional managers. SWCRC had such backing, which made it an influential entity in the Park Service during the 1980s. Ironically, the one time NPS archeologists were integrated in a truly multidisciplinary organization, it led to the creation of SCRU, perhaps the most extreme example of archeological separateness in the Park Service.

Despite Scovill’s own explicit advice about consolidations, no serious evaluation was conducted to compare the relative merits of the underwater archeology programs of SWCRC and SEAC. As further evidence that the decision was poorly informed, the same memorandum from Director Russell to Southeast Regional Director Robert Baker instructing him to terminate underwater archeology at SEAC is also the memorandum that directed the initiation of a formal internal management study to determine the merits of combining the operations of SEAC and SECPRC. The study that followed carefully analyzed the cost factors involved in consolidating the two operations by moving SEAC to Atlanta. It is a curious juxtaposition.

Incidentally, Regional Director Baker favored efforts to consolidate archeological functions. “There was a lot of thought that Baker wanted to do away with the Center,” Faust remembered. “He was,” as Faust recalled, “way out in front of everybody else, but he was way out past where most of the other regions were coming from.” Baker may have taken a cue from the Southwest Region and its unique combined cultural resources center. Despite evidence that SEAC was doing a credible job, and despite the realignment committee’s general recommendation to leave the archeological centers alone, Baker deliberately continued to challenge the need for an independent archeological center in the Southeast Region. His argument was that communications would be better if SEAC was based in Atlanta. Baker took the opportunity presented by the general NPS realignment to push for regional consolidation. His willingness to give up SEAC’s underwater archeological capability, seemingly without a fight, is more logical in light of this intent.

As it turned out, however, the internal study on consolidating SEAC and SECPRC once again critically attested to the numerous cost efficiencies associated with university affiliation. The report favorably noted how government costs were reduced through the SEAC-FSU cooperative agreement because of university-subsidized office space, storage space, and utilities; low contract overhead; and almost no-charge use of Anthropology Department equipment. The study also cited the important force-multiplying benefits to SEAC of being easily able to obtain qualified anthropology students to conduct or assist with NPS-sponsored work and the general productivity gains from having immediate access to such intellectual resources as the university library and various faculty experts. The first year charge for moving SEAC to Atlanta was estimated to be nearly a million dollars for the slight gain of being nearer the Regional Office and its non-aracheological cultural resource professionals. Strikingly, it stated, “at current lease rates, SEAC could remain at FSU for 84 years for the estimated cost of new construction and renovation necessary to house SEAC activities at CHAT.” The study even predicted an increase in grade for the senior chief of the proposed consoli-

206. SWCRC was itself deeply impacted by a major realignment in the 1990s that merged the Southwest and Intermountain Regions.
207. National Park Service Director, Memorandum to Regional Director, Southeast Region, February 17, 1984, in “Southeast Archeological Center (SEAC)” folder, SEAC files. The Director’s memorandum mirrors the recommendations of the realignment task force, which specified cutting SEAC’s underwater archeology program and formally analyzing the efficiencies of combining SEAC with SECPRC.
208. Faust, Oral History Interview, 31-32. Travel considerations posed another argument for consolidating SEAC in Atlanta— it would be closer to the massive Hartsfield International Airport. Studies done by SEAC, however, showed that Tallahassee was the closest location to the majority of large acreage parks. Regardless, Tallahassee, the capital of Florida, possessed a not inconsequential airport. With security precautions put into place after the September 11, 2001, terrorists attacks, the Tallahassee airport’s smaller size probably represented a bonus for SEAC, given the long security screening lines often encountered by travelers at Hartsfield.
dated center, which it did not consider desirable. The study recommended no consolidation of SEAC and SECRPC. As far as SEAC was concerned, the study merely recommended more frequent consultations between the SEAC chief and the Associate Regional Director, increased use of computerized office equipment, the transfer of a single archeologist to SEAC, and a return to contracting with Florida State to provide curatorial services. The last point was intended to reduce NPS staffing costs.\footnote{209} The determination of a Servicewide material deficiency in curation, of course, outdated the last and most important of these recommendations by 1990. Although he had hoped to consolidate SEAC with SECRPC, Regional Director Baker accepted the recommendations of this formal evaluation. SEAC remained secure in Tallahassee.\footnote{210} On January 11, 1985, Paul B. Hartwig assumed the duties of Deputy Associate Regional Director for Cultural Resources.\footnote{211} Hartwig continued some Baker-like efforts to consolidate functions, but proved to be a consistent advocate for SEAC.\footnote{212} After his arrival, SEAC no longer reported to Deputy Regional Director Carroll W. (Jack) Ogle.\footnote{213}

To summarize, a thorough and well-considered review of SEAC’s and SECRPC’s operations between 1984 and 1985, mandated by Director Dickenson himself, led NPS management to decide against consolidating these operations. At the same time, no study was conducted to evaluate the merits of consolidating the underwater archeology programs of SEAC and SWCRC. Hence, many important questions were never seriously addressed, among them:

- What were the repercussions, near- and long-term, of abrogating the SEAC-FSU cooperative agreement, forged with an explicit understanding that underwater archeology would be an important element of the SEAC-FSU relationship?
- How did George Fischer’s prospectus on underwater archeology at SEAC, which listed obvious efficiencies and advantages for the Park Service through studies jointly conducted with Florida State, compare to SCRU’s program or prospectus?
- How did SEAC’s and Florida State’s then ongoing work with HMS Fowey compare to SCRU’s achievements in terms of cost and academic performance?
- What benefits and/or efficiencies could have been obtained by transferring SCRU to SEAC, whether it remained in Tallahassee or was relocated to Atlanta?
- Was underwater archeology more appropriately located within regional cultural resource management centers, concentrated at a national level, or divided between them?
- Can a national resource management unit effectively and equitably meet the needs of all regions while under the authority of a single regional director?

Although no official review of these questions was conducted, most of the answers have become apparent with time, as further discussed below. As far as this study can determine, underwater archeology at SEAC was terminated for political and not policy-relevant or efficiency reasons. Of the two programs, SWCRC’s appears to have had better connections and stronger regional support.

\footnote{210} At least one other report, a national task force review of the organizational structure of the National Park Service recommended in 1987 that the Service “retain the center in Tallahassee pending the completion of the proposed operations evaluation of all the archeological centers.” The only concern of this report was further consideration of the option to combine SEAC with SECRPC in Atlanta, although it also noted that SEAC was too “top heavy with five GS-13s on the staff.” See National Park Service, Organizational Structure of the National Park Service: Task Force Report (Washington, DC: National Park Service, June 1987), 54. The high costs of moving SEAC pointed out in the 1985 Internal Management Review and the 1987 return of SECRPC to the Southeast Regional Office ended further efforts to merge the two entities, at least for several years (see footnote 212).
\footnote{212} For example, as Associate Director for Cultural Resources in 1994, Paul Hartwig drafted a report (discussed later) proposing the consolidation of all NPS cultural resource centers into three or four mega centers located in major U.S. cities, one being Atlanta.
\footnote{213} Ehrenhard, Oral History Interview, 2.
Consequences of the "Realignment"

The termination of underwater archeology at SEAC left a legacy of bitter feelings. In 1988, after the phase-out of underwater archeology at SEAC, George Fischer retired. "I got out early for good behavior," he later said. Without stretching the analogy too far, Fischer had attempted to do for underwater archeology in the National Park Service what Pinky Harrington had previously accomplished for historical archeology. Harrington is credited with significantly advancing the sub-discipline of historical archeology, a field especially useful for the Park Service. Fischer, like Harrington, sought to build institutional interest within the Park Service for a promising area of archeology that lacked crucial support in its early years. The small group of early enthusiasts who supported underwater archeology in the Park Service also included John Corbett, Zorro Bradley, and Calvin Cummings, but George Fischer stands out as the central figure of the story until SEAC's program was cancelled. Before Fischer, the Park Service had no capability in underwater archeology and very limited knowledge of its submerged cultural resources. As demonstrated by the case of HMS Fowey, after Fischer, the Park Service had sufficient knowledge to begin to understand, manage, and defend these resources. Through Fischer and SEAC, and the NPS-FSU cooperative agreement, the Park Service made significant inroads in underwater archeology and laid a foundation for later accomplishments.

As regards SEAC in general, the termination of underwater archeology was a critical juncture that in a short time began to complicate its ability to manage the region's archeological resources. Immediately, SEAC had difficulty implementing the director's order to phase out underwater archeology. On the one hand, it was a fairly simple task. Chief Faust counseled the Associate Regional Director that there was little to transfer to SCRU because so much of SEAC's program was based upon the SEAC-FSU cooperative agreement by which the university provided much of the equipment and logistical support as well as approximately 40 percent of the required man hours through uncompensated student labor. Moreover, while George Fischer provided project oversight, it was only one of the responsibilities of his position, which was not to be transferred to SCRU. On the other hand, the directive was not clear about its scope. Faust interpreted the directive to mean that SEAC was "to phase out capability only, and we should pay close attention to the authority and responsibility which should be retained by Southeast Region in order to ensure quality control and program responsiveness." Southeast Region parks were behind in drafting approved cultural resource management plans and it was difficult to project how many underwater investigations would be needed, but SEAC had identified approximately ten projects that might eventually have high priority (seventeen were identified in 1986). With no projects planned for fiscal year 1985, Faust urged regional authorities to use the interval "to structure an inter-regional agreement with the Southwest Regional Office in order to define the role, function and responsibilities of the two regions." He offered the following division of responsibilities:

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<tr>
<th>Activity</th>
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<th>SWRO</th>
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<td>Program coordination</td>
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<td>Establishment of priorities</td>
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<td>Preparation of cost estimates</td>
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<td>Approval of cost estimates</td>
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<td>Preparation of research plans</td>
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<td>Project accounting</td>
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<td>Report approval</td>
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<td>Preservation of artifacts; cataloging</td>
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<td>X</td>
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<tr>
<td>Artifact and information curation</td>
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"In substance," Faust wrote, "I am recommending that the Southeast Region should attempt to maintain program coordination and control in order to ensure responsiveness to regional cultural resource management requirements." He was also worried that the type of cost effectiveness and

216. Chief, Southeast Archaeological Center (Faust), Memorandum to Associate Regional Director, Operations, SERO, April 23, 1984.
quality enhancements gained through academic participation through the NPS cooperative agreement with Florida State would be lost if the Park Service failed to work out supplemental arrangements following the transfer of project execution to the Southwest Region.\(^{217}\) He did succeed in getting the Regional Office to help arrange a meeting with Southwest Region officials to work out his functional concerns related to programming, planning, executing, and administering projects and their results. Again, Faust emphasized the need to make clear to the SWR that SEAC should remain responsible for underwater archeology in the Southeast Region. The only issue he felt open was whether SEAC could contract needed underwater research, if SCR\(U\)'s workload prevented it from completing Southeast Region projects in a timely manner, a real concern given SCR\(U\)'s mandate to operate Servicewide and for other agencies. Faust's key concern, however, was that SCR\(U\) was under the line authority of SWR.\(^{218}\) Former Chief Historian Robert Utley shared Faust's concern. In a contemporaneous interview, Utley said that historic bi-regional cooperation between regional directors with regard to the sharing of archeological services represented "an untenable situation." He disparaged any claim that MW\(A\)C or the Western Archeological and Conservation Center adequately met the needs of any other region than the one that had authority over them.\(^{219}\) To assure that the Southeast Region would be able to continue to manage its submerged resources it was critical that good coordination and cooperation with SWR be maintained. Similarly, flexibility in implementing the director's order was needed, as with external contracting, to ensure timely program execution.

Despite efforts to work out an equitable arrangement with officials from the Southwest Region, little progress was made. In July 1984, Associate Director Jerry Rogers circulated a draft Special Directive within the Park Service. Instead of addressing SER concerns, however, the draft policy sought to codify SCR\(U\) as "the sole unit authorized to provide professional support services to park managers throughout the Service."\(^{220}\) The many problems inherent in the Special Directive could not be better explained than by the responding memorandum of the Acting Southeast Regional Director, Carroll W. (Jack) Ogle, in which he stated:

1. If the Submerged Cultural Resources Unit is the sole authorized unit to provide assistance, existing regional resource expertise and formulation procedures will not have an effective input into this segment of cultural resources management.

2. Because the Unit is under the line authority of the Regional Director, Southwest Region, questions arise as to how individual regional directors can exercise their line authority in operational matters. This could become critical in situations where the resources are National Register nominated or eligible and involved the authority, responsibility and coordination of the NHPA compliance process.

3. If the Unit is to be solely responsible for project formulation and action plans, once again the question of regional line authority and staff involvement presents itself.

4. If the Unit and WASO have direct responsibility for program formulation, the ability for individual regions to prepare and execute total cultural resource management programs will be impaired. The concept of a submerged cultural resource program separate from a regional cultural program is questionable.

5. We do not think it realistic to expect a small unit such as the Submerged Cultural Resource Unit to totally formulate and execute on a Servicewide basis such a program, and

\(^{217}\) Chief, Southeast Archeological Center (Faust), Memorandum to Associate Regional Director, Operations, SERO, April 23, 1984.

\(^{218}\) Chief, Southeast Archeological Center (Faust), Memorandum to Deputy Regional Director, SERO, June 14, 1984, in "Southeast Archeological Center (SEAC)" folder, SEAC files.

\(^{219}\) Sellars and Webb. An Interview with Robert M. Utley, 88. Not all would agree, however. MW\(A\)C archeologist Thomas D. Thiessen noted to the author that considerable work was done by MW\(A\)C in the Rocky Mountain Region between 1974 and 1995 even while it reported directly to the Midwest Regional Office. MW\(A\)C had separate research divisions for each region.

\(^{220}\) Associate Director Cultural Resources (Jerry L. Rogers), Memorandum to Directorate and Field Directorate, July 6, 1984, in "Southeast Archeological Center (SEAC)" folder, SEAC files.
moreover, do it on a first-come, first-served basis.

Ogle again reminded Rogers about the “understanding” that the Southeast Region was not to phase out its responsibility for managing the region’s submerged cultural resources and that the Park Service would benefit overall if SCRU’s role was confined to project execution only, making other assistance available upon a discretionary basis as needed by a region. “Program formulation,” he stated, “should remain a regional responsibility with underwater projects being annually considered within a total program matrix.” To set priorities for SCRU, he requested an annual meeting with other regional directors or a working committee.221

No such meeting had taken place by the time, a year later, that Acting Director Mary Lou Grier sought to base-fund SCRU, a position strongly supported by Southwest Regional Director Kerr and Everglades Superintendent John M. Morehead. However, others in the Southeast Region, increasingly frustrated by the apparent refusal of Washington or the SWR to cooperate in addressing the submerged cultural resource management process, disagreed. Review comments made in the margin of a short paper explaining SCRU’s budgetary status, which was attached to the Acting Director’s memo, suggest that at least one SER official was worried that SCRU would become fully base-funded (and perhaps autonomous in its ability to set its own priorities). If advance planning were done, the commenter suggested, “project funding could possibly be the best approach.” Finally, by 1986, an operations evaluation confirmed the validity of SER concerns. Stemming from this evaluation, Regional Director Baker forwarded a draft task directive to Associate Director Rogers outlining a series of steps to be taken by the Southeast and Southwest Regions respectively to coordinate the identification, planning, prioritization, and execution of submerged cultural resource projects.

The task directive was “based upon our decision that the investigation of submerged cultural resources will continue to be an integral part of this region’s cultural resource management programs.” Baker recommended that Rogers coordinate the implementation of the procedures.223

In December 1986, Chief Historian Edwin C. Bearss wrote unexpectedly to Regional Director Baker to protest “a turf battle between personnel in the Southeast Archeological Center and the Submerged Cultural Resources Unit.” Bearss had recently been in contact with Buck Island Reef National Monument Superintendent Thomas A. Bradley who had complained that he and the superintendent at Biscayne were trying to arrange for SCRU to conduct underwater archeological work in their parks “but this has raised hackles at SEAC.” Bearss went on to praise SCRU highly for its “impressive credentials” and “can do’ drive.” As it happened, SEAC had reviewed Buck Island Reef’s resource management plan and in a lengthy assessment made in June 1986 had found several faults in the document. SEAC noted that statements made in the plan, such as “archeological remains are so limited that visitors do not notice them,” undermined the hope the park had for obtaining funds for further research. SEAC’s review also included remarks about the park’s single known shipwreck and strongly recommended pursuit of historical research to determine the vessel’s possible identity prior to archeological investigations, which SEAC thought should come only after this footwork. Moreover, SEAC explained that “no historical suggestions exist to our knowledge that the area is likely to yield major shipwreck resources,” a notion SEAC thought supported by the park’s high number of sport divers who had apparently failed to uncover any such evidence. However, SEAC concluded that compliance with NPS mandates required an eventual underwater archeological survey once an appropriate historical research base was developed. In that regard, SEAC evaluated SCRU’s more expensive recommended magnetometer survey method.

221. Acting Regional Director Southeast Region (Carroll W. (Jack) Ogle), Memorandum to Associate Director Cultural Resources WASO, August 6, 1984, in “Southeast Archeological Center (SEAC)” folder, SEAC files.

222. See two-page summary entitled “Servicewide Submerged Cultural Resource Program” (May 3, 1985) attached to Acting Director (Mary Lou Grier), Memorandum to Regional Directors, May 17, 1985, in “Southeast Archeological Center (SEAC)” folder, SEAC files.

223. Regional Director Southeast Region (Robert Baker), Memorandum to Associate Director, Cultural Resources, WASO, August 13, 1986, in “Southeast Archeological Center (SEAC)” folder, SEAC files. Emphasis added.

224. Chief Historian (Edwin C. Bearss), Memorandum to Bob Baker, Regional Director, Southeast Region, December 3, 1986, in “Southeast Archeological Center (SEAC)” folder, SEAC files.
(microwave positioning) and recommended a technologically "less sophisticated and more practical [LORAN] approach." These were reasonable professional comments of the type that would be expected from resource professionals. They indicated that urgent underwater resource management work was not necessary at the park.

In January 1987, Chief Faust wrote the Regional Office about discussions he had had with Supt. Bradley. He explained how SEAC had detailed to the superintendent the "procedural problems" arising out of the realignment. Faust defended SEAC's review of Buck Island's management plan.

"I do not believe," he wrote, "that this position nor the Draft Task Directive... should be viewed as a turf battle between SEAC and the Submerged Cultural Resources Unit." That task directive had been forwarded to Washington six months before. Faust also discussed the Bearss memorandum with Chief Anthropologist Scovill, who promised to start reviewing the draft task directive. Acting Regional Director Frank A. Catroppa then wrote Associate Director Rogers about Bearss's letter.

"After a thorough review," he explained, "we believe that what we are encountering is frustration resulting from unresolved procedural questions, and that no turf battle, as such, exists." Catroppa went on to say the "discontinuation decision" had generated confusion at the field level and that the best way to ameliorate the negative consequences was to clarify the appropriate procedures needed to manage underwater activities. "We look forward to your staff's comments on our recommendations," he concluded, "and to an early implementation of appropriate directives." He thanked the Chief Historian for his comments and "review of the capabilities of the Submerged Cultural Resources Unit."227

Supt. Bradley was unhappy that SEAC had passed unfavorably upon his desire to conduct the underwater project favored by SCRU. Although the Southeast Region was forced to cede its capability to conduct underwater operations to SCRU, it fought to maintain its authority over the basic resource management process. As a result, there arose two distinct and competing sources of NPS authority providing Southeast Region parks with archaeological management advice for submerged cultural resources.

This predicament may also have exacerbated a tendency of large parks to seek to exercise authority over cultural resources without respect for established procedures requiring SEAC's participation. For example, Chief Faust recalled an effort by the Natchez Trace Parkway to gain control of funds available for archaeological purposes instead of allowing it to go to SEAC. In the context of discussing underwater archeology, he recalled how regional managers had to press constantly upon superintendents that:

You have one instrumentality for archeology: that's SEAC. Use it. You don't need to budget. You don't need to do anything. You need to give them information so they can budget. They'll get the money, then they'll handle the archeology, either in staff or through contract.228

Generally, however, Faust found that most regional directors and superintendents supported SEAC's role in the management process.229 Underwater archeology, both before and after its termination at SEAC, presented the biggest concerns.

Confusion about responsibilities regarding underwater resource management in the Southeast Region continued. In the early 1990s, Associate Southeast Regional Director Paul Hartwig and SEAC Chief Faust met in Santa Fe with SCRU and Southwest Regional officials at a meeting chaired by Chief Anthropologist Douglas Scovill to hammer out an understanding to obviate problems developing as a result of SCRU's involvement in underwater archeological work first relating to HMS Fowey at Biscayne and later at Dry Tortugas.

225. Chief, Southeast Archeological Center (Richard D. Faust), Memorandum to Superintendent, Buck Island Reef and Christiansted NHS, June 25, 1986, in "Southeast Archeological Center (SEAC)" folder, SEAC files.

226. Chief, Southeast Archeological Center (Richard D. Faust), Memorandum to Associate Regional Director, Operations, SERO, January 9, 1987, in "Southeast Archeological Center (SEAC)" folder, SEAC files.

227. Acting Regional Director, Southeast Region (Frank A. Catroppa), Memorandum to Associate Director, Cultural Resources, WASO, January 20, 1987, in "Southeast Archeological Center (SEAC)" folder, SEAC files.

228. Faust, Oral History Interview, 22. This policy was later changed. Director Roger Kennedy authorized parks to contract independently with NPS archeological centers, other agencies or qualified institutions, and private contractors for park archeological needs.

229. Faust, Oral History Interview, 22-23.
National Park. According to Faust, their “objective was to get SCRU to follow SER compliance process when working in SER parks.” They wanted SEAC and the Southeast Regional Office to be fully included in the consultation and review process and were entirely opposed to SCRU’s efforts “to remove underwater investigations from the process SER was using, particularly the establishment of priorities and the submission of annual funding requests.” SCRU agreed to consultations, although its view was that parks had the responsibility to consult SEAC and the region on their operations. Relations between the Southeast Region and SCRU marginally improved after this meeting.²³⁰

Whether or not SCRU has provided the same level of underwater archeological services to the Southeast Region as SEAC might have, per Chief Anthropologist Scovill’s dictum on consolidation, is impossible to know. SCRU provided Southeast parks with some archeological services, but this support appears to have declined over time. Moreover, should the NPS underwater unit again do work in the Southeast in the future, its interaction with SEAC and regional officials will again become an issue. The consolidation of underwater archeology in Santa Fe not only terminated that capability at SEAC, but it abrogated an important aspect of the NPS agreement with Florida State University. The 1978 cooperative agreement specifically called for NPS-FSU cooperation in underwater archeology as a component of the SEAC-FSU relationship. Moreover, interviews and the documentary record clearly show that FSU interest in underwater archeology remained high and even increased after the capability was abolished at SEAC. The department became involved in State Archeologist Sonny Cockrell’s Warm Mineral Springs project, for example. Moreover, faculty long-range plans of the late 1980s and early 1990s called for:

the establishment of an Institute of Underwater Archaeology which would enable the department to make a unique contribution among SUS [state university system] programs in anthropology through specialized training in underwater archaeology, for which FSU has some existing important resources, e.g., marine lab, academic diving program, Warm Springs Archaeological Research Project, and center for study of sea level changes.²³¹

Moreover, George Fischer remained active in underwater archeology after his retirement. He became a founding member of the Advisory Council on Underwater Archaeology and for years taught underwater archeology for the FSU Anthropology Department. He, J. Anthony Paredes, and others, continued to push for a PhD track in underwater archeology.²³² In 1997, their efforts led the university to hire Michael K. Faught to direct its Program in Underwater Archaeology. Faught developed a certificate program that allowed FSU students to do extra work to earn a credential in underwater archeology.²³³

Despite the recommendation by Chief Faust and other Southeast Region officials for SCRU to develop a protocol to ensure continued Park Service cooperation with Florida State, this never happened. Indeed, when Hurricane Andrew uncovered elements of HMS Fowey in 1993, SCRU chose not to draw upon the site-specific experience of George Fischer or the diving facilities of Florida State through the NPS-FSU cooperative agreement to help it survey the shipwreck and do any hurricane-related mitigation work. Instead, SCRU worked with the Department of Anthropology of

231. J. Anthony Paredes, Memorandum to B. Bickley, no date [ca. 1991], in “8015: Space for Administrative Use Pre-1992 (file 2)”, SEAC files. In this memorandum, entitled “Long-range Plans,” the Department sought by 2000 to develop a PhD program, expand its teaching faculty, maintain the NPS-FSU relationship in CRM to provide student training, obtain additional departmental space by encouraging the university to lease additional low-cost space to SEAC, and develop a major underwater archeology center. Failing these goals, the department recommended merging or abolishing the Anthropology Department altogether, if that is any indication of the seriousness with which at one time the department viewed its relations with the Park Service and the importance of underwater archeology. Bruce Grindal also discussed the department’s long-term goal to create a Program in Underwater Archaeology in a July 1991 memorandum to key FSU authorities. See, Bruce Grindal, Memorandum to Lawrence G. Abele, Dean, College of Arts and Sciences, et al., July 2, 1991, in “AB8015: Space for Administrative Use Pre-1992 (file 3)”, SEAC files.
the University of Maryland, which had no comparable experience. After SCRU failed to reference previous SEAC and FSU reports relating to HMS Fowey in new project funding proposals, the FSU Anthropology Department voiced concerns to NPS management. In the twenty years since the underwater archeology program was terminated at SEAC, the Santa Fe-based NPS underwater archeological unit never once participated in a cooperative arrangement with Florida State to do underwater archeology despite that university's burgeoning capacity in the field and significant experience with submerged archeology in Florida.

In the short run, the collapse of underwater archeology at SEAC did some harm to the university. As John Ehrenhard noted, being able to participate in NPS underwater archeology through SEAC, either as a student intern or employee, was an attractive aspect of the Anthropology Department's academic...
program in archeology. The example of Daniel Lenihan illustrates that point. In the long run, George Fischer’s work with the university helped to replace that lost opportunity and FSU became known as a good place for students who were interested in this field. However, the university’s access to underwater archeology through the Park Service was effectively terminated the NPS consolidation. The failure of the Park Service to continue to cooperate with Florida State University in underwater archeology undercut one of the pillars of the SEAC-FSU relationship. It is another key reason why the FSU Anthropology Department gradually continued to move away from public archeology and therefore NPS interests. Underwater archeology was an activity in which the university and the Park Service continued to share a strong mutual interest, and which afforded the Service one of the best opportunities to influence the department’s philosophical direction. As Anthropology Department professor emeritus J. Anthony Paredes remarked, had the National Park Service developed its FSU underwater archeology connection, SEAC might have turned out quite differently.

234. Eventually, SCRU received funding to conduct underwater archeological work to mitigate the effects of Hurricane Andrew upon HMS Fowey, but no NPS research reports have been published. A freelance writer with no NPS association did publish an article about SCRU’s work on HMS Fowey. See Eric Adams, “Hurricane Uncovers 18th-Century Wreck,” Naval History, vol. 10, no. 5 (September/October, 1996): 32-35. Adams’s article created a scandal, however, because allegations of plagiarism were made. Both George R. Fischer and Russell K. Skowronek, an Assistant Professor of Anthropology at Santa Clara University and a former FSU student who had worked with SEAC on HMS Fowey, wrote protest letters regarding the article. Skowronek stated “when I finished reading it, the impression that I came away with was that John Seidel [University of Maryland] and Larry Murphy [SCRU] had made the first map of the wreck site and researched the vessel’s background in the four years since Hurricane Andrew. Your readers will be interested to learn that this is far from true.” After listing various examples of the author’s failure to cite previous work properly, Skowronek called the article “an abomination.” See Russell K. Skowronek, Naval History, vol. 11, no. 1 (January/February 1997): 14, and George R. Fischer, Naval History, vol. 11, no. 3 (May/June 1997): 3.

235. Ehrenhard, Oral History Interview, 16.
236. Paredes, Oral History Interview, 23.

In November 1987, the General Services Administration, on behalf of the National Park Service, notified Florida State University of its intent to renew SEAC’s ten-year lease for the office space it used in the Montgomery Gym on the FSU campus. GSA invoked a special clause in the lease allowing the government to execute a one-time renewal for a ten-year period at the same rental rate. It gave 180 days notice, also in accordance with the lease terms. Clearly, the lease had been written in a manner sympathetic to SEAC’s special relationship with Florida State. After withdrawing its offer to rehouse the center in the old industrial arts facility, the university had stood by that lease. On this occasion, however, FSU officials indicated to SEAC that they would not renew it. NPS officials then became concerned over their ability to continue to house SEAC at the Montgomery Gym location. Discussions ensued.

On May 19, 1988, a few days before the lease’s expiration, the university’s legal counsel, Patricia A. Draper, advised GSA that the university would continue to lease the gym property to the Park Service but only for one more year at the current rental rate. At the end of that period the Park Service would have to negotiate a new rate. Although Draper stated that the university valued the presence of the Park Service on its campus, “circumstances do not permit the continuation of terms so unfavorable to the university.” GSA officials consulted with FSU contracting officials and advised them to discuss the situation and the terms of the contract with university officials, which GSA asserted fully allowed the Park Service to renew its lease at the same rate. Still, the Park Service indicated it was amenable to discussing the rate, if FSU signed a one-year extension at the current rate. In fact, that rate remained unchanged until SEAC moved off campus. By that time the leasing agreement certainly represented a bargain for the government, at least in terms of simple square feet per dollar. The episode marked yet another crisis in SEAC’s long-running quest to obtain and maintain adequate facilities. Whatever the other benefits of the SEAC-FSU cooperative agreement, it was around this time that NPS officials probably began to realize that they could not maintain SEAC indefinitely on the FSU campus. SEAC’s housing arrangements were inadequate, the rents were going up, and the university was ever less enthusiastic about subsidizing SEAC’s presence.

Still Not Enough Space

After renewing the Montgomery Gym lease, Pete Faust began to consider retiring. He had spent over twenty years near or at the helm of SEAC. However, the one important issue that had plagued much of his NPS career still nagged to be resolved. That issue, of course, was the persistent problem of SEAC’s inadequate housing. The Park Service knew the university wanted to and would eventually raise

1. M. E. Poole, Contracting Officer, GSA, Lease Renewal Notice to Florida State University, Contracts and Grants, November 16, 1987, in “A8015: Space for Administrative Use, Pre-1992” folder (2).
the rent for the dingy basement level offices in the Montgomery Gymnasium, which Faust described as "cramped" and "pitiful." Nevertheless, Chief Faust sensed that he could end his career on a high note. He decided to delay his retirement. "One of the things that I had pretty much committed to do," he said, "was to get the space problem solved." As an incentive, Southeast Regional Director Robert Baker authorized a one-grade directed promotion to persuade Faust to continue on as Chief of SEAC.6

In the years following the 1978 renegotiation of the SEAC-FSU cooperative agreement, neither the Park Service nor the Anthropology Department had succeeded in convincing the University Space Committee to alleviate their mutual problem despite much effort and their continued growth. Still, in June of 1987, as they prepared to renew the Montgomery Gym lease, both Chief Faust and Chairman Paredes still held out long-term hope, in Paredes's words, that the university would relocate their organizations to a new facility "that will make for greater accessibility between the Center and the Department than currently exists." Indeed, as he argued to FSU Vice President Robert Johnson, "We in the Anthropology Department have found the present arrangement most accommodating and very conducive to meeting the intellectual objectives which were the incentive for relocation of the Center to Florida State University."7 Paredes, of course, was counting on obtaining more space in any relocation. Neither SEAC nor the Anthropology Department had ever been satisfied with the situation that resulted from SEAC's move to Tallahassee and the prolonged failure to address the space problem.

The Regional Office supported SEAC's effort to find more accommodating arrangements because it expected to have increased funds for future leasing and because it was committed to housing SEAC in Florida. The basic story seems to be this: In 1985, an internal management review concluded that moving SEAC to Atlanta was too costly.8 Meanwhile, the Montgomery Gym lease, while inadequate operationally, was a bargain. Through the NPS-FSU cooperative agreement, the department also provided free of charge 4365 square feet in six rooms of Bellamy Hall that the Park Service estimated in 1990 to be worth a minimum of $40,000 in annual lease value. That space also provided access to expensive archeological equipment owned by the university but available freely to SEAC, including x-ray facilities and thin sectioning equipment. Finally, the department also made available another 1160 square feet in the Bellamy building at no cost to NPS for lab and administrative use. The Park Service understood that this arrangement benefited the government.9 Indeed, it is hard to imagine how less expensive arrangements could have been made. For political as well as cost reasons, southeastern NPS archeology was seemingly entrenched in Florida where the Service was motivated to solve SEAC's long-term housing needs. Fortunately, a major 1985 Interior Department audit, and subsequent reports, pointing out failings in the management of museum and archeological collections, eventually galvanized Congress to increase funding for NPS archeological needs. By 1987, there were strong indications that more federal funding would soon be available to help improve the management and storage conditions of SEAC's archeological collections. Moreover, further congressional mandates enacted under NAGPRA also increased NPS focus upon curatorial issues. Nevertheless, the Park Service was interested in maintaining the cost-efficiencies represented in its cooperative arrangements with Florida State University. As the Service prepared to spend more to update SEAC's housing arrangements, it had every incentive to work with the university to do so on campus. Past-practice had clearly advantaged the government, and NPS officials had obvious reason to expect similar future cost-efficiencies. Maintaining SEAC on campus was the clear preference of the Service.

Ultimately, however, the fundamental question of the NPS-FSU relationship was whether or not the

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university was able or willing to provide more space. As SEAC’s FTE authorization had gradually grown to meet compliance and park-related
research needs over the years, the cramped and dis-
jointed administrative environment in which staff
operated was impeding work. The 1988 lease-flap
had notified NPS officials that the cost of housing
SEAC on campus was going to rise, but no one
assumed that necessarily meant booting SEAC off
campus. On the other hand, SEAC’s on-campus
housing situation was becoming quite complex.

One new problem was that any new lease would
have to meet then current federal standards for
office space set by the General Services Admin-
istration, and the Montgomery Gymnasium
undoubtedly failed. Similarly, the laboratory and
collections storage space provided to SEAC
without charge from the Anthropology Department
was increasingly out of compliance with NPS cura-
torial standards, despite many improvements in
collections management made with the
department’s help. Bellamy Hall, for example, was
afflicted with an insect infestation in 1987 brought
on by other occupants of the building that SEAC
had no control over and whose activities were too
close to the collections. More fundamentally,
however, SEAC needed a considerable increase in
space (4,000 square feet) to meet congressional
concerns and an NPS directive to concentrate more
of its archeological collections at the center. As
Faust described the initiative to department Chair
Paredes: “it is intended to place the Service in a
position to accomplish curatorial “housekeeping”
at standard and to facilitate research and cataloging
activities undertaken by the Department and by
Center staff.” In essence, SEAC wanted to store
many more artifacts on campus after years of strug-
gling already with inadequate space needs. A final
problem related to the contracting relationship
between SEAC and the department. An important
reason for co-locating the organizations was so that

10. Richard D. Faust, Chief, SEAC, Letter to Dr. J. Anthony Paredes, Chairman, Department of Anthropology, April 10, 1987, in
"A8015: Space for Administrative Use, Pre-1992" folder (1), SEAC files.
(1), SEAC files.
they could share lab space and so the department could curate SEAC's collections, which through the cooperative agreement were technically administered under a non-leased arrangement. This arrangement allowed the university to charge for overhead, a major incentive for it to host SEAC on campus. If the two organizations were not co-located, this arrangement would not work. Moreover, revised curatorial practices were beginning to mandate federal control over museum and archeological collections (deemed "personal property," or to meet NAGPRA requirements). By the end of the 1980s, the bottom line was that the Park Service was going to have to pay more to house SEAC while the complexity of administering the on-campus situation was creating tremendous headaches.

Despite complex and at times problematic NPS-FSU relations, the cooperative accord appeared to offer the best bet for the least expensive arrangement. In September 1988, Deputy Associate Regional Director Paul Hartwig conferred with Chief Faust. The Regional Office had agreed to ask GSA to approach Florida State University with a request to provide SEAC with approximately 9,000 square feet. However, in clear recognition of SEAC's increasingly uncomfortable on-campus situation, Hartwig acknowledged a new NPS mindset regarding the relationship with FSU: "If they are unable to provide that space on campus, GSA will be instructed to seek a suitable location off campus for the entire SEAC operation. This will include curatorial as well as the other SEAC administrative functions, all functions will move to the new building." 13

Planning for an increase in space became a project that would consume much more of Chief Faust's time than expected, however. He characterized the situation as "nightmare." The Park Service, he asserted, had difficulty working with GSA because of its inability to provide sustained assistance. 14 Frustrated FSU officials also investigated slow progress regarding the NPS proposal to acquire more space after months of inaction in September 1989, and determined that the GSA official assigned to help the Park Service acquire more space had a "greater priority" on another project. 15 Repeatedly, after Faust began to work with GSA, the main person handling the NPS proposal would leave the position, forcing him to begin the process anew. Finally, GSA assigned Susan Alexander, a GSA Realty Specialist, to work with the Park Service to obtain the necessary space for SEAC. She made a concerted effort to help SEAC through the process of obtaining more appropriate facilities. She also seemed to understand the goal of allowing the Service to maintain important linkages to the university, which was often difficult because of GSA contracting rules. 16

Initially, NPS and FSU officials discussed relocating both the center and the department to a new "science building" then under construction on campus. After GSA submitted the NPS space increase proposal, the university did commit to moving the Anthropology Department from Bellamy Hall. However, whether by design or happenstance, this decision would also eliminate SEAC's non-leased space, perhaps the only way for the university to address the department's longstanding plea for its own expansion. The decision had two effects: it ensured an increased cost to relocate SEAC and it greatly reduced the purpose for SEAC to be located on campus. Regardless, in April 1989, Florida State formally notified GSA that it could not supply the space requested by the Park Service on campus because it did not have adequate facilities at the time to house SEAC's expansion. The Park Service had no alternative but to consider off-campus housing for SEAC, at least as an interim measure. 17

13 Deputy Associate Regional Director, Cultural Resources, to Chief, Southeast Archeological Center, September 19, 1988, in "A8015: Space for Administrative Use, Pre-1992" folder (1), SEAC files.
14 Faust, Oral History Interview, 34-35.
16 Faust, Oral History Interview, 35-36.
17 A. Fred Creighton Jr., Chief [GSA], Letter to Frank Catroppa, Associate Regional Director, April 19, 1989; Frank Catroppa, Associate Regional Director, Letter to A. Fred Creighton Jr., Chief [GSA], [December 13, 1989?]; and J. A. Paredes, Letter to Bruce Bickley, Associate Dean, October 24, 1988, both in "A8015: Space for Administrative Use, Pre-1992" folder (1), SEAC files.

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SEAC investigated the use of surplus space already controlled by GSA in the City Center Building in downtown Tallahassee. Its sole virtue was immediate availability. Allen Bohnert and Robert Wilson inspected the site in November 1990. This option, however, would have resulted in even further splitting the number of SEAC work sites, complicating management. In rejecting the City Center site, Chief Faust complained to the Regional Office that the options presented by GSA would not accommodate SEAC’s twenty-four FTEs, positions required to run the region’s archeological management program. Moreover, SEAC’s collections were still stored in half the space needed and under the authority of FSU. “If space problems are not resolved in a timely manner,” he reported to the regional office on November 28, 1990, “the Center will be unable to meet its FY91 goals related to completing the laboratory phases for field investigations, participate fully in the congressionally mandated backlog cataloging program, or comply with standards for the cultural sites inventory and for curation operations.”

As SEAC considered near-term solutions for its space needs, the University of South Florida (USF) made an unexpected proposal to the National Park Service. USF had learned about SEAC’s housing situation. It was interested in hosting the center itself. On February 20, 1991, Chief Faust responded on behalf of the regional office to inquiries made by Roger T. Grange, Chairman of USF’s Department of Anthropology. Faust detailed SEAC’s space needs and began a dialogue with Grange, who provided details on USF’s University Tech Center, which he said, could adequately house SEAC’s needs on its Tampa, Florida, campus. The Park Service did not seriously consider USF’s offer, unlike an offer made by the Florida State Museum several years before. Years of cohabitation with one anthropology department and a dawning recognition that many benefits of the NPS-FSU cooperative agreement could be maintained by housing SEAC in proximity to the FSU campus, if not on it, perhaps deterred further interest.

After evaluating the City Center site, the Park Service made a key decision - it decided to move all center operations off campus. Chief Faust explained the move to department Chair Grindal in July as an interim solution because “we are in desperate need of additional space now.” Faust laid out SEAC’s projected long-term space requirements and estimated that SEAC would need nearly 15,000 square feet within ten years. He expressed hope to Grindal that “our long-term needs (year 2000) hopefully can be met by space in the yet to be constructed Biology Unit 2 building” on the FSU campus. In turn, Grindal proposed a similar short/long term plan to the university. Whatever SEAC did in the near term, he argued to FSU officials that “the ideal future site for Anthropology and the consolidated operations of the Southeast Archeological Center would be in the planned Biology Unit II Building.”

On August 11, 1991, Susan Alexander posted an advertisement in the Tallahassee Democrat soliciting private bids for the lease of approximately 10,500 square feet within an area whose boundaries were determined by proximity to Florida State University. From then on, as Faust recounted, “the problem was just finally getting something that was decent. We’d get started, and we’d look at all kinds of structures and be shown old grocery stores, and we constructed a fairly strict criteria of what was acceptable, from a security standpoint and others.” These criteria had to be strict to allow SEAC to implement required changes in curatorial practice, as discussed above, relating to the Auditor General’s “material deficiency” findings regarding NPS museum and archeological collections management. SEAC’s new curator, Allen Bohnert, assisted in the design of the new facility by acquiring specifications for curatorial spaces that helped make planning decisions regarding the func-

18. Chief, Southeast Archeological Center, Memorandum to Associate Regional Director, Administration, SERO, November 28, 1990; and Chief, Database Branch, SEAC, Memorandum to Chief, Southeast Archeological Center, November 6, 1990; both in “A8015: Space for Administrative Use, Pre-1992” folder (1), SEAC files.
20. Richard D. Faust, Chief, Letter to Dr. Bruce Grindal, Chair, July 1, 1991; and Bruce Grindal, Chair, Memorandum to Lawrence G. Abele, Dean, College of Arts and Sciences, et al, July 2, 1991; both in “A8015: Space for Administrative Use, Pre-1992” folder (1), SEAC files.
22. Faust, Oral History Interview, 67-68.
In April 1992, GSA notified the Park Service that it had received a number of potential offers and had conducted initial market surveys to evaluate costs in Tallahassee for new construction or existing space of 10,455 net usable square feet. Based upon the surveys and rates quoted by potential lessors, GSA had determined the likely cost of annual rent to house SEAC to be approximately $147,000.00. This was a considerable leap from the per annum cost of $3,298.00 to house SEAC on the FSU campus (plus overhead relating to the collections). Relatively speaking, the government would go from paying $4.25 to $14.00 per square foot. Of course, the Park Service had negotiated that good rate in 1974. SEAC had also never obtained satisfactory housing arrangements on campus. By these standards, the large increase in annual rent, though considerable, was long overdue. Apparently, for reasons relating to vague concerns over the 1992 presidential race and a change of administration, GSA delayed action until April 1993. It then notified the Park Service that it was prepared to move forward with a formal solicitation for offers to provide SEAC 11,431 net usable square feet, the amount having been revised upward during the year. GSA estimated that up to 300 days would be required to complete the process “if we receive all requested information in a timely manner, and maintain a high level of coordination.” It was an optimistic assessment for GSA did not issue the solicitation until November.

By early 1994, the Park Service had considered several proposals submitted to GSA for various properties. It made a final decision to work in conjunction with Florida State University to construct a new facility in a residential industrial park located nearby but off campus just south of downtown Tallahassee. It was, in fact, a facility in the same complex that SEAC had rejected a decade earlier precisely because it was an off-campus site - Innovation Park. Now, however, with funding available and acute space needs impossible to meet in a timely fashion on campus, the FSU-affiliated research park seemed an ideal selection. Tenants in the park were required to meet certain specifications, including engagement in research, education, testing, analysis, design, prototype development, or pilot scale manufacturing. Park authorities expected its tenants to be involved in basic research, technology development, consulting, training, or governmental liaisons. They also had to have logical ties to the programs of nearby FSU or Florida A&M University. While the park was planned primarily for businesses interested in

24. By 1994, space needs were so acute that 1080 square feet of self-storage space was being rented for equipment storage at an additional per annum rate of $4,852.00.
25. William F. Norman, Section Chief, Space Management and Acquisition [GSA], Letter to Mr. Larry Downing, Chief, Contracting & Property [NPS], April 10, 1992, in "AB015: Space for Administrative Use, Pre-1992" folder (1), SEAC files.
26. William F. Norman, Section Chief, Space Management and Acquisition [GSA], Letter to Mr. Frank A. Catroppa, Associate Regional Director, Administration [NPS], April 1, 1993, in "AB015: Space for Administrative Use, Pre-1992" folder (1), SEAC files.
working in close to Tallahassee’s two major universities, SEAC easily met this criterion.

The designated NPS facility within Innovation Park also easily met many of SEAC’s own most important criteria. These included a sufficient amount of single occupancy space, needed for enhanced security of the center’s records on sensitive archeological site location data (legally protected from disclosure) and for the security and preservation requirements of the collections themselves; first floor contiguous space for efficient handling and load-bearing requirements; and a loading dock sufficient to handle the occasional thousand-pound cannon tube. The building, under construction, was scheduled to be completed in 1995. The Park Service agreed to occupy the facility for five years, given initial long-range plans of returning to shared accommodations with the Department of Anthropology. At some point after SEAC moved to Innovation Park, however, those plans quietly died. With the department’s drift away from public archeology and SEAC’s acute space needs finally met in a consolidated location, the benefits of co-location failed to balance against the required effort and cost for yet another move. Once adequately housed, the expectation soon became that NPS tenancy was permanent. Thus, the Service signed a thirty-year lease, automatically renewed every ten years unless SEAC chose to move.

Florida State University was satisfied with the federal lease payments for SEAC’s occupancy at the Innovation Park site, which served as a payback for its construction cost. The Park Service was also pleased because its new building was designed with the center’s needs in mind. Builders laid out the facility’s offices and square footage according to specific GSA formulae for how much space needed to be allotted for various positions, grades, and functions, as well as for SEAC’s special archeological activities. Meanwhile, while SEAC was no longer co-located with the Anthropology Department, nothing prevented the parties from continuing to pursue mutually beneficial cooper-

ative activities. The cooperative agreement was still in effect.

It had taken over twenty years, but the Park Service was finally able to place SEAC and its archeological collections in their first fully suitable quarters. Archeologists had struggled with this basic problem since the work-relief projects of the 1930s. While there was space to house the collections at Ocmluge National Monument, they were poorly curated there. After John Griffin engineered the move to the FSU campus, curatorial contracts greatly improved collections care, but from inception there was insufficient space available on campus to base an effective NPS archeological operation, which because of increasing legal and administrative mandates, was a problem that gradually grew worst until it became acute. While many NPS archeologists lamented the loss of daily contact with FSU faculty and students, the move was not of primary importance in hiring students, who have continued to work at SEAC, or in the drifting relations between the center and Anthropology Department. Most SEAC archeologists appreciated how important it was to secure suitable accommodations for the center. In the end, it can be said that the critical issue of how and where to house NPS southeastern archeological collections and operations was finally and effectively solved under the administration of Chief Faust. Once the design phase of the process was well underway, and there was a clear agreement between GSA and the Park Service, Faust finally decided “happy day,” and put in for retirement, effective April 30, 1994. In fact, he had another incentive, a federal buy-out offer made as the result of yet another major Park Service reorganization.

A Further Realignment

One argument the General Services Administration had used to justify delays in its process to rehouse SEAC was uncertainty in federal policy regarding the change over of presidential administrations. In the 1992 election, presidential candidate Bill Clinton defeated sitting President George Bush. Clinton’s running mate, Albert Gore, was a pro-

28. Chief, SEAC, Memorandum to Deputy Associate Regional Director, Cultural Resources, SERO, January 24, 1992, in “A8015: Space for Administrative Use, Pre-1992” folder (1), SEAC files.
29. Faust, Oral History Interview, 36. After John Ehrenhard assumed responsibility for SEAC, GSA Realty Specialist Susan Alexander transferred. Center frustration with the GSA process then renewed. Nevertheless, GSA, the Park Service, and the university appear to have resolved the main relocation issues around the time of Faust’s retirement or soon thereafter.
ponent of reducing the size of the federal government, including the Park Service. Thus, in 1993, NPS managers faced the prospect of yet another major reorganization. This management shake-up was reminiscent of earlier administrative upheavals, especially the 1983 “realignment,” though it was more extensive, and some might argue disruptive. Likewise, it had some similarity to the NPS reorganization that followed passage of the National Historic Preservation Act and the creation of the Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation. President Clinton initiated the reorganization by direct orders to the National Park Service, then under the administration of Roger Kennedy. The reorganization was an element of Vice-president Gore’s National Performance Review (later called the National Partnership for Reinventing Government) and it was billed as a program to decrease costs and increase federal government efficiency. In effect, however, the effort boiled down to a strong thrust to push staff expertise to the field and to -reduce FTEs by up to 25 percent. Tom Collier, Chief of Staff for the Secretary of Interior, assured Director Kennedy that a persuasive reorganization plan that improved efficiency would prevent major staff cuts. According to Kennedy, NPS effectiveness during the reorganization even led to some FTE gains for the Park Service as cuts were made in other agencies. Senior Department of Interior officials attempted to assure a nervous agency that no absolute cuts were to be imposed, that resource protection was to benefit, and that while decentralization was expected some offices or programs would withstand decentralization and even grow. The announced goal was “not FTE reductions,” but to reposition the National Park Service for the challenges of the 1990’s and beyond by making it (a) a more efficient organization, (b) focused on the increasing demands of ecosystem management, cultural context, and partnership-building, with (c) resources and authority placed in locations near the places where services are most effectively and efficiently delivered.  

Having undertaken major reorganizations before as head of the Ford Foundation and the Smithsonian's Museum of American History, Kennedy objected to "the lazy man's way" of reorganizing or simply trimming leaves from the stem, as he described it, which amounted to shrinking everything by some percentage. Instead, he sought a more purposeful reformation. His aim was to increase the ability of the Park Service to be more resilient so that it could survive as an entity in a changing world. He saw the Park Service as a system with parks not like zoos or isolated enclaves, but as parts of regions and communities. Thus, he emphasized increased professionalism, outreach, and integration of parks in their communities as places where people came not only for recreation but to learn. In fact, Kennedy's two fundamental tenets were simply his belief "in the Park System as a functioning part of society that has a redemptive role in that society," and his conviction in "the Service as a group of professionals." His credo was that resource protection begins with visitor services and work outside the park. You can't protect the place if nobody cares about your protecting it. And in order to get people to care about your protecting it, you really have to go and participate in the larger community. That's what you ought to do anyway because the function of the parks is to teach the population how to live in nature and with history. That's what the parks are for, not to be primitive isolates or funeral monuments.  

It is tempting to suggest that this management philosophy helps explain how and why SEAC survived the impending reorganization intact and, unlike the 1983 realignment, actually prospered from it. However, a succession of official memorandums consistently report that FTE reduction was a major, if not the major, driving force behind the reorganization as it was actually implemented.
the funding of the archeological centers. Several regional directors sought a study to resolve their concerns. Associate Director for Cultural Resources Jerry Rogers noted that the Park Service had already studied the centers, especially during the 1983 realignment. He attempted to restrain this compulsion. Conceding the point, however, he objected to any "prolonged study" and recommended a "task force approach." If there was to be a new study, it should be based upon regional recommendations and not those of "WASO."36

Whatever the regional directors' concerns, NPS archeologists were themselves hoping the new Clinton Administration would dole out more funds for archeology. Under the administrations of President's Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, NPS archeology had sustained fifteen years of annual budget/staff reductions. As Calvin Cummings noted "the cumulative result of these constant reductions is an existing Minimal Program which [sic] already fails to meet legal and regulatory mandates and which cannot maintain an appropriate level of Professionalism."37 In December 1993, the new Director attended a meeting in Denver and made a request to the archeologists for their ideas about the future of archeology in the National Park Service. They responded enthusiastically with a memorandum that provided an authoritative statement on the status of NPS archeology at the beginning of 1994. The national park system had grown from 287 parks covering thirty one million acres in 1975 to 367 parks with over eighty million acres in 1993. This rapidly increased park acreage had changed the focus of NPS archeology to concentrate on limited area surveys and site-specific compliance needed to accommodate legal mandates. Driven largely by funding for development projects, this program had failed to produce sufficient synthetic research for educational or scientific purposes, essential requirements for maintaining a credible research program. As a result, the memorandum concluded, "the NPS is losing rapidly its scientific leadership and its professional credibility."38

To address these failings, NPS archeologists made several recommendations to Director Kennedy, including:

- Increase both base and project funding for the Systemwide Archeological Inventory Program "to effective levels" to enable a credible research program.

- Provide strong management support at all levels for NPS archeologists to participate in various professional activities, such as presenting papers, serving as officers in professional societies, or on committees that promote park archeology.

- Provide strong management support for NPS archeologists to prepare and publish the results of NPS archeological research in professional publications.

- Encourage the development of links between NPS archeologists and interpreters and between archeologists and rangers, especially law enforcement.39

Only one SEAC archeologist, David Brewer, attended this meeting, probably because Chief Faust was wrapping up SEAC's plans to move to Innovation Park and preparing to retire. However, SEAC embraced these recommendations. Moreover, if the ultimate outcome is any indication, these concerns were also taken seriously by Southeast Regional managers. Most importantly,

36. Michelle Aubry [?], CR Staff Meeting Notes, July 14, 1992, in "Archeology Centers - Administrative History & Reorganizations," Michele Aubry files, Archeology and Ethnography Program, National Center for Cultural Resources, Washington, DC; Regarding funding, Roland Bowers, Deputy Associate Director for Cultural Resources, noted that the NPS archeological centers were ranked third in NPS budget determinations behind regions and parks.
37. Cal Cummings, Memorandum to Dan Lenihan, March 18, 1996, in "Archeology Centers: Admin. History and Reorganizations" folder, Michele Aubry files, Archeology and Ethnography Program, National Center for Cultural Resources, Washington, DC; Cummings remarks were delivered originally at a meeting in Denver to discuss the future of the NPS archeological centers on March 28, 1993.
38. NPS Archeologists in Attendance at the December 14-15 1993 Meeting in Denver, Memorandum to the Director, January 13, 1994, in "Archeological Centers-Streamlining 1994" folder, Michele Aubry files, Archeology and Ethnography Program, National Center for Cultural Resources, Washington, DC.
former Southeast Regional Director Robert Baker was asked by James Coleman, who had just arrived as the new Southeast Regional Director and who was helping coordinate planning efforts for the reorganization, to evaluate "how the 'archeological centers' might be restructured and reduced to support our overall FTE goals." Baker may have been tapped for this task because of his long tenure as Southeast Regional Director or because of his previous efforts to reorganize Southeast Region cultural resources, namely his push to merge SEAC with the SECRPC in the mid-1980s. Incidentally, Baker was soon able to return to Atlanta to resume his former post as Southeast Regional Director after Coleman retired in 1994. Before his own retirement in the summer of 1996, Baker attempted to implement Kennedy's reorganization plans in the Southeast Region.

In the meantime, Baker sounded out the NPS archeological community. Working with NPS center chiefs, regional archeologists, and others, Baker solicited archeological reorganization proposals and received three distinct designs prior to a meeting scheduled in March. These proposals came from the Southeast Region (Associate Regional Director, Paul Hartwig), the Midwest Region (Douglas Scott, Thomas Thiessen, and F.A. Calabrese), and the Pacific Northwest Region (Stephanie Toothman, Chief, Cultural Resources Division, and Jim Thomson, Chief Archeologist).

Hartwig proposed to consolidate cultural resource functions in three or more centers in Massachusetts, Georgia, and California. The proposal greatly reduced the size of regional office staff and claimed to reduce FTEs and costs. It acknowledged the virtue of organizing cultural resource centers along ecological lines, but claimed that there were far too few FTEs in the Park Service to accommodate all of the "ecosystem management zones" wanted by Director Kennedy. That was probably true. Grouping cultural professions into three broad regions would at least provide some cultural affinity.

40. Bob Baker, Memorandum to Kate Stevenson, March 8, 1994, in "Archeological Centers-Streamlining 1994" folder, Michele Aubry files, Archeology and Ethnography Program, National Center for Cultural Resources, Washington, DC.
for professionals while creating an interdisciplinary environment, especially since Hartwig proposed to take in the external and contracting functions. In this scheme, the North Atlantic Preservation Center, for example, would serve as the core for the Northeast area while the various cultural resource divisions of the Southeast Regional Office, including SEAC in Tallahassee, could be merged in Atlanta and used to support a wider region covering "the Old South." Regarding the Southeast Region specifically, Hartwig's proposal probably made some sense given its similarity to Baker's old proposal to merge SEAC with the SECRPC in Atlanta a decade before. There were three essential problems with the proposal, however. First, a problem that plagued many reorganizations is the absence of sufficient funding to carry out the plan's details. Hartwig's proposal entailed the already known high cost of moving SEAC to Atlanta, a considerable drawback despite any long-term savings from FTE reductions. It also said nothing about cultural professionals in the Midwest Region, who presumably were also to move to Atlanta. Second, the centers were to be multi-regional and would therefore have to report to Washington to avoid the recurrent complications that result from sharing resources between regions when the authority for the resource is controlled by one regional director and not another. Baker may have liked this plan, but the proposal likely met resistance from other regional directors. Finally, Hartwig's proposal undercut Kennedy's concurrent aim for reorganizing - increasing professionalism in the Service. If the Park Service moved SEAC to Atlanta, the SEAC-FSU relationship would be entirely scrapped. And, of course, the proposal went against the separatist tradition in attempting to merge archeology with other resource professions.  

The Southeast Region's proposal had failings, but so did the proposal offered by the Pacific Northwest Region, whose chief virtue was to point out shortcomings in the SER proposal. The Pacific Northwest Region objected to the "mega" service centers-idea because it did not "represent logical research and resource management units in terms of cultural, natural, and political ties," and because the costs of travel from San Francisco to the Pacific Northwest, for example, would exceed any benefits in savings in reduced overhead by eliminating the park-focused program in Seattle. The Pacific Northwest instead recommended utilizing the existing groups, whether in regional offices or centers, to build out a network of smaller satellite service offices scaled to the needs of local parks. The proposal failed to articulate this model, however, or to explain the funding aspects for the smaller offices. It also did not clarify the reporting relationships.  

The final proposal, from the Midwest Region, offered the clearest strategy for reorganization. Apparently, it or its authors' views informed the Director's decision to issue a draft Task Directive directing a formal study to reorganize NPS archaeology. This directive took as a given that "there already is a consensus that centers offer a nexus of support to accomplish archeological research." Instead of focusing upon reorganizing the centers, it sought to focus upon the archeological program functions of the Washington office and how those could be better organized. The Midwest plan included precise FTE reduction projections and

42. Chief Cultural Resources Division and Regional Archeologist Pacific Northwest Region, Memorandum to Regional Directors of Pacific Northwest and Rocky Mountain Regions, March 6, 1994, in "Archaeological Centers-Streamlining 1994" folder, Michele Aubry files, Archeology and Ethnography Program, National Center for Cultural Resources, Washington, DC.
cost savings. More importantly, however, it adopted several ideas from the 1987 Organizational Structure Task Force that comprehensively reviewed the role and functions of NPS structures. The Midwest Region thus offered up the archeological center as a model. Quoting from the task force report, the authors noted that the "centers are a viable and efficient way to accomplish the Service's archeological programs, and recommended continuance of the existing centers plus the establishment of two additional ones for Regions not served by archeological centers." Of critical importance, the Midwest Region pointed out an essential virtue of how the centers function effectively within the NPS institutional environment; that is, they report to officials who are "hierarchically above park superintendents." When combined with the "pool" or center concept, the Service had provided its archeologists not only opportunities for professional collaboration and economies of scale, but it allowed them to achieve "a strong voice in advocating the interest of its archeological resources." The Midwest proposal then offered several recommendations formerly made by the 1987 task force. For example, the Park Service should establish a center to serve the needs of all parks in the northeastern United States. It should also combine the archeological functions of the Western and Southwestern centers while devoting the Western Archeological and Conservation Center responsibilities primarily to curation. Finally, it argued that both the Midwest and Southeast Archeological Centers should extend their current capabilities across a greater number of states.  

Regarding SEAC specifically, the Midwest Region recommended adding the state of Louisiana to SEAC/Southeast Region's portfolio, continuing to use SEAC as a curation facility, and retaining the SER Regional Archeologist at SEAC but separating the research responsibility function from the center's chief function to clarify the reporting relationships. Curiously, one additional proposal was also made - to "move underwater archeological research team to SEAC to provide more logical and economical location for activities."

What is striking about this proposal, in the context of the struggle over underwater archeology between the Southwest and Southeast Regions, is that it came from archeologists in the Midwest Region who presumably had no vested interest in assigning SCRU to one place or the other. This proposal was taken seriously. At some point, Chief Anthropologist Douglas H. Scovill discussed the idea of moving SCRU to SEAC with center Chief Faust, apparently just before he retired. Faust turned away the suggestion. He found the offer to acquire SCRU from Santa Fe one of the "ironies" of the reorganization, but his response to Scovill was basically "not interested." Later, he recounted his reasoning: SCRU "looks like it's doing a good job from there."  

The Midwest approach for archeological reorganization was progressive, informed by the findings of older reorganization studies, and made a concerted effort both to defend archeological interests within the Park Service and to promote them. However, Associate Director Jerry Rogers tabled the Task Directive by advising Director Kennedy that its approach competed with an existing review of the Archeological External Assistance and National Register Programs. Moreover, the Restructuring Plan called for a working group to study the cultural resource centers, which was to cover all cultural resource professions, and several regional directors had already issued a memorandum volunteering to take charge of a re-evaluation of the cultural resource centers, presumably to ensure their say in how these were restructured.  

Basically, Rogers sided with the regional directors who sought to study archeology in the overall context of reorga-
nizing NPS cultural resource centers. The Midwest Region had made a strong separatist push on behalf of archeology, but was turned aside. Nevertheless, several of its proposals eventually filtered through the reorganization process, including the incorporation of Louisiana parks into the Southeast Region.

In the meantime, Rocky Mountain Regional Director Baker reviewed the various archeological reform proposals and organized a meeting with NPS archeologists in early March 1994. Afterwards, he drafted a report for Washington that raised serious concerns about the restructuring’s impact upon NPS archeology. One concern of the NPS archeological community was outsourcing. Most agreed that some archeology could be effectively conducted using contracts and/or cooperative agreements with academic organizations and museums. The Park Service, after all, had been doing such cooperative work for decades. For small projects, however, it was deemed more expensive to administer them than to do them in-house, a requirement that mandated a minimum capability. Another related concern was the need to maintain highly graded archeologists to ensure qualified oversight of contract activity. Moreover, Baker reported that with outsourcing “there will be a reduction in ability to utilize archeological volunteer and avocational Archeological Societies” because contractors would not be able to use these resources for insurance and cost reasons and because students would be less willing to donate their time to private companies. Finally, Baker discussed the proposed ecologically oriented administrative boundary adjustments. These, he wrote, might promote more efficient center archeology, but “it was opinioned that traditional territorial issues focusing on regional and park boundaries [would] continue to be a barrier.”

Many of Baker’s concerns relating to contracting would be revisited during the outsourcing initiative of the George W. Bush Administration.

If the streamlining and FTE reduction took place as outlined in the planning stage, Baker predicted a general slowdown “in compliance, research, NAGPRA support, and technical assistance to parks.” This slowdown would have the effect of forcing the Denver Service Center and parks to plan further ahead for their needs. Baker’s “ultimate concern was the potential diminishment of the Service’s stature and leadership role in archeology and historic preservation” if the restructuring failed to account for recent strides made to improve the management of NPS archeological resources. For example, the Park Service had recently committed itself to the Systemwide Archeological Inventory Program and the Professionalization Program adopted to help address the “material weakness” determinations of various management control reviews.50

In organizing an NPS conference to address streamlining and FTE reductions in NPS archeology, Baker had warned the participants to “be prepared to identify the most essential functions - the most important things the program does for the parks - and make some well-thought-out, if difficult, decisions.” With a 25 percent FTE reduction imposed as planned, the overall NPS “actual archeological FTE” of 151.4 was to be reduced to 114.96. Of this percentage, SEAC faced a staff loss of 7.35 FTEs from its 1994 Fiscal Year FTE ceiling of 31.65. Undoubtedly, this prospect was not quite the outcome hoped for by the archeologists who had attended the December 1993 meeting with Director Kennedy.

Another issue that undermined both archeological and regional support for Kennedy’s 1994 “Restructuring Plan” was its stated goal to create a “National Program Center for Cultural Resource Man-

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49. Bob Baker, Memorandum to Kate Stevenson, March 8, 1994, in “Archeological Centers - Streamlining 1994” folder, Michele Aubry files, Archeology and Ethnography Program, National Center for Cultural Resources, Washington, DC.


51. Regional Director Rocky Mountain Region (Bob Baker), Memorandum to Regional Directors, et al, March 7, 1994, in “Archeological Centers - Streamlining 1994” folder, Michele Aubry files, Archeology and Ethnography Program, National Center for Cultural Resources, Washington, DC.

52. Bob Baker, Memorandum to Kate Stevenson, March 8, 1994, in “Archeological Centers - Streamlining 1994” folder, Michele Aubry files, Archeology and Ethnography Program, National Center for Cultural Resources, Washington, DC; the five archeological cultural centers facing a 25 percent FTE reduction were: Midwest Archeological Center, North Atlantic Cultural Resource Center, Southeast Archeological Center, Southwest Cultural Resource Center, and Western Archeological and Conservation Center.
agement.” The national center was to be cobbled together from the then existing NPS Washington office divisions of curation, anthropology, park historic architecture, and history. The problem was that the new Washington center, reminiscent of the Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation, was to exert direct line authority over field cultural resource centers, an anathema to the regional directors as well as many archeologists. Washington soon backed off this proposal and the centers remained under local control, supposedly as an “interim measure,” but one that became permanent.53

Despite this accommodation, three regional directors wrote to Deputy Director Denis Galvin in October 1994. Although local control was to be maintained, they were still concerned to know “What the future roles, goals, functions and interrelationships of ‘Cultural Preservation Centers’ [including the archeological centers] should be in the context of a restructured and reengineered National Park Service.”54

The regional directors focused upon the efficiencies and diseconomies of national program consolidation and how “to empower those at the ‘doer’ level to re-engineer how the NPS achieves its mission.” Their views were reminiscent of Chief Anthropologist Scovill’s formula for consolidating the archeological centers a decade before. What, for example, was to be the role of the centers in ensuring NPS professionalism? Which specialties and services should be provided at the field level, which were inherent center functions, which could be contracted or gained through cooperative relationships? What were the most effective reporting relationships? The regional directors sought a more inclusive involvement of the parties impacted by the reorganization while agreeing that “that the future of the centers merits serious study.” By seeking a fuller analysis of the role of the cultural resource centers in the management of the National Park Service, the regional directors were acting to ensure that the cultural resource centers continued to provide “leadership and technological support for historic and archeological preservation.”55 Perhaps they also hoped to mitigate the impact of the restructuring process on the diffusion of their own authority and to slow down the process of change.

In retirement, Kennedy has been generous in his assessment of those who worked with him during the reorganization for their willingness to cooperate in making the most out of the situation the Park Service found itself in during the Clinton Administration.56 His reform efforts, however, explicitly sought to reduce the power of the Regional Directorate; quite likely, there was considerable resistance. Kennedy may have seen a National Program Center for cultural resources as a way to weaken regional office power. If so, it neither succeeded in that effort nor presented a fundamental transition in NPS cultural resource management: the National Program Center did not capture strong influence over the regional cultural resource centers. And the strong advocacy by them of their needs did much to dissuade the director from radical action. MWAC and its regional office advocates can be thanked for that. On the other hand, Kennedy’s restructuring effort presented a framework under which at least some of the centers


accrued even more power, which whether intended or not, is what happened with SEAC.57

During the reorganization of the mid-1990s, the Regional Directorate had no choice but to reduce the number of regional offices and the size of their staffs. Under Director Kennedy ten NPS Regional Directorates were consolidated into seven. Those that survived did so, at least in part, by falling back upon on an old strategy. In 1996, archeologist Calvin Cummings, a veteran of several reorganizations himself, described this phenomenon and how it related to archeology: “In the 1960’s, 1970’s, and 1980’s each of the Regional Directors with responsibility for one of the Archeological Centers would consider the Center a “Field Area” when political and budget considerations favored the field areas. Then, when central offices were favored, the Regional Directors would consider the Center as part of the Regional Office.”58 Late in 1994, the Park Service returned Robert Baker to the Southeast Region just in time for him to begin to implement some of the changes posed by Kennedy’s reorganization. Baker faced the political reality of a prevailing strong prejudice against regional offices and was required to reduce the size of his own in the Southeast. Fortunately, Baker was also aware of the virtues, or at least the strengths, of the archeological centers because his experience in attempting to merge SEAC with SECPRC in the 1980s and because he had just served as the lead for Kennedy’s early evaluations of NPS archeology.

“Out-House” Archeology Returns

On Wednesday, December 6, 1995, the Southeast Archeological Center formally opened its doors at its new off-campus digs in the Robert Merrill Johnson Building at Innovation Park. A dedication ceremony was held on that date with several dignitaries from the Southeast Regional Office in attendance. The Johnson building was the third building constructed at the park’s Don Fuqua Research Complex. The 39,000 square foot Johnson Building is owned by the Leon County Research and Development Authority, which leases the facility to Florida State University Research Foundation, Inc. The foundation, a non-profit, was created in 1993 to promote the research and training activities of FSU faculty, staff, and students through contracts, grants, and the development of commercially feasible products of their work. Don Fuqua was a local congressman. Robert Johnson was a former dean of the university. In fact, he was the same Dean Johnson who helped negotiate SEAC’s cooperative agreement in the late 1960s and early 1970s. The Park Service did not occupy the entire facility, only about 11,431 square feet, all of it located on the ground floor to accommodate an archeological collection that had grown to over six million artifacts by 1995 as well as a staff of approximately forty employees and students. Along with the Park Service, space was set aside in the facility for the Center for Ocean Atmospheric Prediction Studies, an interdisciplinary research group focused upon climate studies. Space was also set aside for NOAA’s International Climate Research Institute and the Florida State University Research Foundation, Inc. offices.59

Although Pete Faust had thought of extending his leadership of SEAC long enough to spend at least a single day in the new offices, he retired under the buy-out program on April 30, 1994. Chief Faust presided over the completion and planning for the first and the initiation and planning for the second of SEAC’s two major relocations. He guided the archeological center for twenty-three years while grappling with the political and technical complexities of curating a vast archeological collection (whose disposition is still not yet fully resolved), negotiated increasingly tight regulations governing archeological resources management, and maintained cordial relations between the Park Service and Florida State University even despite the changing up-and-down nature of those relations. NPS management also asked him to shepherd the center through numerous minor and major bureaucratic reorganizations. In retrospect, SEAC survived more or less intact, although the collapse of the university’s Southeast Conservation Archaeo-

57. Ironically, the Southwest Cultural Resource Center was disrupted by the reorganization when its functions were split between Santa Fe and Denver to accommodate the merger of the Southwest and Rocky Mountain Regions into the new Intermountain Regional Office headquartered in Denver. The Southeast Region benefited by the reorganization, for example, it acquired jurisdiction over National Park Resources in Louisiana.
THE DEDICATION CEREMONY
AT
THE DON FUQUA RESEARCH COMPLEX
OF
THE ROBERT MERRILL JOHNSON BUILDING

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1995 10:30 A.M.

FIGURE 51. Flyer announcing opening ceremonies for the Robert M. Johnson Building at Innovation Park in Tallahassee, Florida. The building was named after the graduate studies dean whose support had helped forge an alliance between the Park Service and Florida State University in 1972. NPS photograph, December 6, 1995; SEAC files

ology Center followed by the demise of SEAC’s own underwater archeological effort were debilitating events. Perhaps Faust’s own statement offers the best illumination upon his management of SEAC. “I liked a clean program,” he explained, “that emphasized what needed to be done in the parks, because we had a helluva lot to do in terms of writing resource management plans, even knowing, trying to get a handle on what the resources were in a park archeologically.” Under Faust SEAC sought “to assist in writing resource management plans that were directed toward what the park manager needed and identified new information that had to be done, whether it related to archaeology or otherwise.”

Doing what was required, if not more, was a hallmark of the Faust administration of SEAC. While some have faulted his “beneath the radar approach,” Faust should be credited with helping to develop SEAC from a handful of archeologists in 1972, the availability of whose expertise was often unrecognized by parks, into the formidable technical resource upon which Southeast Region managers were heavily reliant by 1994 for archeological expertise. Under Faust, SEAC conducted numerous projects that helped ensure resource protection even if its contribution to archeological scholarship was problematic. Again, Faust’s own words are most valuable: “I believe our most significant contribution was the location and evaluation of archeological sites and the provision of that information to management and protection; our major product was information and the major customer park management. We were less successful in serving another customer, the archeological community. The extreme slowness with which we produced final reports of investigations was the source of much frustration and tension.”

In the place of Pete Faust, the Park Service chose John Ehrenhard to succeed him as chief, effective from May 1, 1994. Ehrenhard, sensitive to his responsibilities under the Native American Graves Protection Act or NAGPRA, suggested to Regional Office superiors that the title “chief” was an ethnographically problematic term in the context of historic Anglo-American Indian relations. He thus requested a new title. This request was eventually granted and so Ehrenhard officially became “Director, Southeast Archeological Center.”

60. Faust, Oral History Interview, 31.
In 1978, IAS briefly left the Service when President Jimmy Carter created the Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service (HCRS). After President Ronald Reagan abolished HCRS three years later, IAS and several other external cultural resource programs returned to the Park Service. In the Southeast Region, these operations were again set up in the Atlanta regional office.

During the 1980s, the Atlanta IAS division became responsible for some important projects. One of these was to develop into a far-reaching effort that eventually became quite significant to SEAC. This project involved NPS participation in the massive Richard B. Russell Cultural Resource Mitigation Program, an effort by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Savannah District) to mitigate the loss of cultural resource stemming from Corps plans to inundate some 52,000 acres of land along a twenty-eight mile stretch of the Savannah River resulting from construction of the Richard B. Russell Dam. Named after the former Georgia Senator, the dam was set to impact several counties along the river in both Georgia and South Carolina after it began operation in 1984. Prior to that date, the National Historic Preservation Act, the Archaeological and Historic Preservation Act, Executive Order 11593, among others, established requirements for the Corps to cooperate with various local, state, and federal agencies to preserve the cultural resources of the areas to be affected by the dam. The Park Service was a principal source of archeological expertise and the Corps sought its aid. Thus, with Corps funding, IAS began to plot out an effort to survey the impacted area. Some 730 historic and prehistoric sites were located and evaluated, although only about thirty of these were ultimately selected for serious archeological excavation. In conjunction with the two states’ historic preservation offices, the Corps, and others, IAS wrote and awarded contracts and oversaw the field and laboratory work on these sites by various hired contractors and IAS archeologists such as David Anderson. The projects undertaken in this program spanned some twenty years. Experts drafted numerous technical archeological reports that together form a corpus known as the Russell...

62. "Chief" is the term colonial Americans applied to the apparent leaders of native Indian tribes. It is probably derived from European comparisons of aboriginal groups to Scottish clans, which were headed by a clan "chief." Its use is ethnographically appropriate as a title of distinction within Anglo-American culture, but the term's potential to inadvertently offend some Native Americans cannot be excluded.
63. Ehrenhard, Oral History Interview, 5-6.
64. Paul Winegar, Conversation with Cameron Binkley, December 23, 2004, National Park Service.

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papers. Archeological reports, of course, are not easily digestible to even educated lay audiences. Inherent in the project was the goal of more broadly distributing the new understanding of the peoples who had lived along the Savannah River in the past to those who inhabit the region today.65

By the early 1990s, the IAS division was considering how to bring the fruits of this vast undertaking to a popular audience. This desire resulted in a major study entitled *Beneath these Waters: Archeological and Historical Studies of 11,500 Years Along the Savannah River* that was published under IAS auspices in 1993 and written by Sharyn Kane and Richard Keeton, a husband and wife professional writing team. John H. Jameson Jr., an IAS archeologist, oversaw their work, which was a major outreach effort. If the value of the impressive summary of twenty years of archeological work can be judged by the joint authors of its Foreword, Georgia Governor Zell Miller and South Carolina Governor Carroll A. Campbell Jr., it was a successful undertaking. At any rate, this is the type of work that IAS was conducting and Ehrenhard was managing in Atlanta at the time of the major NPS restructuring under Director Roger Kennedy.

With his appointment as head of SEAC, Ehrenhard became responsible for completing the center’s move from the FSU campus to the new Innovation Park facility. He set up his office in the crowded basement of the Montgomery Gym. Chief Faust, of course, had overseen and completed the principal negotiations related to the move. Ehrenhard’s assumption of command of the archeological center created a conundrum, however. The first issue related to the terms of Faust’s own retirement. When Faust exercised his option under the terms of the congressionally authorized buy-out program, he received, like other recipients, approximately $25,000. It also meant that with his retirement, Faust’s official billet or position was afterwards abolished to reduce staff size and long-term government expenses.66 SEAC still required a manager, of course, and Ehrenhard had earned favor with officials in the regional office as head of IAS division. He was a ranking archeologist in the NPS, with considerable experience in the Southeast, and had previously worked for SEAC. That is why Associate Director Hartwig chose to place Ehrenhard in charge of SEAC. Of course, during a reduction in force or RIF, government managers must accommodate the resulting circumstances to the best of their abilities and resources. By placing Ehrenhard in charge of SEAC, a new center head could be put in place when there was no authority to fund it. The reason was simply that Ehrenhard’s salary was to be paid from IAS sources. In fact, Ehrenhard had to remain in charge of the IAS division as well as SEAC, which meant he had to travel frequently between Tallahassee and Atlanta, an expense the government had to pay, and official travel Ehrenhard had to undertake. This practice endured for over a year and was expected to continue for as long as Ehrenhard served as the head of both groups of archeologists.67 Meanwhile, the national NPS restructuring process was moving along.

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66. Val Knight, Comptroller, Southeast Regional, Discussion with Cameron Binkley, February 1, 2005, National Park Service.
Regional Director Baker was laying plans to break up the Southeast Regional Office, briefly to be known as the “Southeast Field Area,” into three quasi-ecologically based subdivisions or “clusters.” The archeologists feared that IAS division might also be broken up. As Ehrenhard recalled, “all the regions were going to have clusters, and the external program was going to pretty much be disbanded, and each of the archaeologists that worked there would have probably just been assigned to a cluster.” The idea of posting staff closer to the field and employing an ecological model was Kennedy’s exact prescription, and Regional Director Baker was relatively enthusiastic in implementing his general plans, so this threat was probably real. Some time after Paul Hartwig assigned Ehrenhard to replace Faust as SEAC head, the two began to see an opportunity within the crisis. Hartwig polled the IAS staff in Atlanta about their preferences in relocating to Tallahassee. All but one, archeologist Harry Scheele, were willing to move. Hartwig felt that a good case could be made for incorporating IAS into SEAC, which was more central to the proposed “Gulf Coast Cluster” than Atlanta. The notion of moving IAS personnel to SEAC made sense in the context of the NPS reorganization, especially because it reduced the staffing of the Southeast Regional Office. If IAS could be moved to SEAC, it would aid Baker in providing lower Regional Office FTE numbers to Washington, might preempt any scattering of IAS functions among the forthcoming clusters, and would centralize IAS at SEAC where Ehrenhard, who remained IAS division chief, was now based. The maneuver was an elegant solution that solved several management issues simultaneously. After Baker signed off on the move, IAS staff began orienting themselves to working with SEAC. John Jameson Jr., for example, who was doing archeological outreach, began to create a website for SEAC while still working in Atlanta. In late 1995, he and other IAS staff, archeologists David Anderson and Michael Russo and publications editor Virginia Horak, followed their chief to SEAC. Scheele remained in Atlanta and served as a liaison between SEAC and the regional contracting office until he retired. Some have jokingly named this exercise “the other mid-night move,” in reference to the alleged late-night transfer of archeological collections from Ocmulgee to the FSU campus supposedly conducted to reduce security or publicity concerns. The transfer in 1995 of IAS division to Tallahassee, however, was definitely conducted under the light of day.

Consolidating IAS with the existing NPS archeological functions at SEAC allowed Ehrenhard to remain in charge of both without the need to staff another position. The decision was also in line with Director Kennedy’s ambition to reduce the size and scope of regional office operations thereby “returning power to the people on the ground,” as he later said. This overriding incentive and perhaps higher standards of accountability rendered moot any debate about the merits of pouring together into one organization funds for both park and external archeological operations, which had once been a source of concern for NPS managers. Regional Comptroller Val Knight did not find this an issue, given that today most NPS division chiefs must work with and account for funds derived from various accounts. Still, after nearly twenty years, perhaps no one remembered. Regardless, the salvage-era program used by John Corbett to build up a park-based archeological program, one whose major achievements was the Ocmulgee Big Dig project that helped to birth SEAC, was finally returned to it. The fusion of SEAC and IAS allowed Director Ehrenhard to chart a significantly new course for archeological resource management at the center that was beyond what was possible under Chief Faust. Indeed, once again “out-house” archeology was available to help SEAC leverage its potential and to move in new directions.

Amazingly, despite initial management interest in once again “consolidating” the archeological centers during the massive Kennedy reorgan-

68. Ehrenhard, Oral History Interview, 6.
69. Hartwig, Discussion with Cameron Binkley, January 27, 2005.
71. Curiously, documentation to substantiate (or refute) either event has not turned up. It is believed that SERO records for the early 1990s were lost during the relocation of the regional headquarters to the Atlanta Federal Center from the nearby Russell Building or because of the Kennedy reorganization. One Regional Director also order the SERO CR library to be dismantled for space reasons while other records were water damaged during storage in a basement location.
72. Kennedy, Oral History Interview by Janet A. McDonnell, 32.
73. Knight, Discussion with Cameron Binkley, February 1, 2005.
zation, all of them survived intact. Recall, there had even been talk of bringing the centers under the authority of Washington, but as the reorganization proceeded, multiplied in complexity, and provoked institutional stress, this interest waned. For SEAC specifically, the reorganization provided substantial new capabilities in the arena of external programs, cooperative relationships, and its outreach program. SEAC grew stronger under the reorganization precisely because its separation from the Southeast Regional Office made it a convenient place to shift resources to accommodate or at least negotiate the political winds then blowing from Washington. NPS archeologists in the Southeast Region thus retained their separate professional identity and avoided whatever potential there was for staff diffusion to parks or clusters or simply FTE reductions. Ehrenhard did have to cut loose at least one archeologist, Kenneth Wild, who was implanted at Virgin Islands National Park. Wild’s extensive work and travel to the difficult-to-reach site argued for his permanent deployment there, a decision that became effective during this period.

There was only one brief complication from the merger of IAS division and SEAC. In August 1996, newly appointed Southeast Regional Director Jerry Belson threatened to undo the symmetry of Hartwig’s decision to combine the “in-house” and “out-house” archeology programs. As a result of the ongoing Kennedy reorganization, Hartwig was chosen to become superintendent of the newly created Gulf Coast Cluster. He expected to keep his responsibility for SEAC because, as he stated in a memorandum to Chief Archeologist Frank McManamon, the “Restructuring Plan calls for the Archeological Centers to report to the SSO [System Support Office] in which they are physically located.” Belson, however, violated this protocol and decided to place line authority for SEAC under Assistant Field [Regional] Director Marie Bostic, who was a recreation planner in charge of external programs. She was also in charge of IAS funding.

74. Paul Hartwig, e-mail to Frank McManamon, August 15, 1996, in “Southeast Archeological Center (SEAC)” folder, Archeology and Ethnography Program files, National Center for Cultural Resources, Washington DC. The “NPS Restructuring Plan” (Washington, DC: National Park Service, 1994), 24, directed, “as an interim measure, the Service’s existing cultural preservation centers…will remain in their current locations, but will be combined organizationally with and will report to the System Support Office established for the respective cluster where each center currently exists.” Many regions, however, did not fully implement measures directed by the plan before it was abandoned.
Belson intended to present this change, part of his plan for the ongoing Kennedy reorganization, to the National Leadership Council of the Park Service, but never consulted either Hartwig or Ehrenhard. The archeological community saw the move as an attempt to undermine archeological resource management. Instead of having authority over the funding of five IAS archeologists, Bostic would be responsible for thirty-six, the vast majority of whom were dedicated to park resource management and did not do external archeological assistance work. Concerns were expressed that funds would be diverted away from archeology. Chief Archeologist Frank McManamon appealed for help to Associate Director for Cultural Resources Kate Stevenson. In a formal memorandum, he stated the most tangible threat:

There is a reasonable fear that the partnership activity might be split from SEAC and incorporated into the other NR activities supervised by Cecil McKeithen [sic], who already is supervised by Bostic. We have supported the incorporation of the partnership archeology into SEAC as a means to strengthen and diversify both the park archeology and the partnership archeology in the SE. Taking the partnership archeology out of SEAC would not be productive or efficient.  

Associate Director Stevenson discussed the matter with Belson personally. Belson claimed his decision was only temporary, to end by December, and that SEAC would then be placed under then Assistant Field Director Kirk Cordell, who had extensive cultural resource management experience. Gracefully backing out of his misstep, Belson kept his word, and SEAC encountered no further repercussions.

Pete Faust characterized the center’s escape from the travails of the Kennedy reorganization as “lucky.” In truth, concurrent national concern focused upon improving collections management helped shield the center and its relocation to Innovation Park from serious manipulation in the mid-1990s. Of course, as discussed in Chapter V, Service archeologists had long encouraged that concern. Moreover, Regional Director Baker, who failed in his effort to consolidate SEAC into one cultural resources division in Atlanta, later found the center’s remote location a benefit and allowed SEAC to reacquire “out-house” archeology. Once that decision was made, the NPS cultural resources power structure acted to prevent its repeal. Such organizational effectiveness was not random. From the “Big Dig” in 1961 through SEAC’s relocation to Innovation Park, NPS archeology had waged a consistent effort to build a better archeological resources management program in the Southeast Region. By 1996, an exceptionalist orientation, university affiliation, and the center concept had together produced an organizational model with demonstrated competencies, economies, and flexibilities.

New Directions and Outreach

An immediate issue for the new staff arriving at SEAC from Atlanta in late 1995 was where to put them. GSA and SEAC had made meticulous plans to lay out the Innovation Park facility to accommodate the center’s staffing, curatorial, and laboratory work needs, but no one had anticipated the merger of SEAC and IAS. Compared to the on-campus space-squeeze, however, this problem was minor. Eventually, the center’s new director, John Ehrenhard, negotiated space in adjacent offices of the Johnson Building and SEAC overflowed into these areas. The use of compact storage for library and collections and the relative availability of space at Innovation Park has considerably eased the space

75. Frank McManamon, Memorandum to Kate Stevenson, August 19, 1996, in “Southeast Archeological Center (SEAC)” folder, Archeology Program files, National Center for Cultural Resources.
76. Frank McManamon, Electronic mail to John Ehrenhard, et al, August 29, 1996, in “Southeast Archeological Center (SEAC)” folder, Archeology Program files, National Center for Cultural Resources.
77. Faust, Oral History Interview, 36
78. Note, Senior Archeologist Craig W. Davis conducted a “mini-operations evaluation” on selected components of SEAC’s archeological program in March 1994 to follow up on an earlier evaluation. (See National Park Service, “SER - Operations Evaluation - 1985,” in “WASO Archeology Program” files, National Center for Cultural Resource Management.) The intent was to determine SEAC’s progress in addressing recommendations made nine years prior. In summary, Davis concluded: “there has been considerable improvement since 1986 in many operational areas of the Southeast Archeological Center. …the majority of the work done at the center in 1986 and since has been excellent and this review is meant only to identify areas that need improvement.” Davis’s biggest concern was SEAC’s need to complete National Register Nominations. See, Craig W. Davis, Senior Archeologist, Memorandum to Chief Archeologist, November 2, 1994, in “Southeast Archeological Center (SEAC)” folder, Archeology Program files, National Center for Cultural Resources. The methodology employed for this review was cursory but national NPS archeological program managers apparently held no substantial management concerns at the end of Chief Richard Faust’s administration of SEAC.
problem that SEAC had when located on the FSU campus.

After SEAC completed its move to Innovation Park, and settled in, it continued to address the major responsibilities that it had had for forty years - park compliance needs, park research, and collections curation. One signature project that had already involved both the center and IAS staff related to Virgin Islands National Park. The Department of Interior controlled a small island, Water Island, located in the harbor of St. Thomas. In the 1980s, the federal government began to consider transferring the island to the territorial government after years of neglectful management of its cultural resources, according to a 1988 NPS historic resource study.79 As the prospect of a transfer became more likely, Interior increased its attention and tasked the Southeast Region’s IAS group, still in Atlanta, to conduct a preliminary evaluation of Water Island’s archeological resources. In 1992, IAS Chief Ehrenhard funded two SEAC archeologists, David Anderson and Kenneth Wild, the latter with especial knowledge of Caribbean archeology and Virgin Islands National Park, to conduct an archeological investigation of Water Island.80 Later, after the merger of the IAS division and SEAC, federal authorities decided to transfer the property to the territorial government. The department then supported a major series of archeological investigations by the center to comply with Section 106 requirements and to provide the territorial government with long-term preservation recommendations. Many SEAC staff thus participated in archeological work on Water Island as either IAS or center employees, or both. The Water Island project serves to illustrate the logic behind the wedding of IAS and SEAC. In 2003, the center published The Archeology and History of Water Island, U.S. Virgin Islands, an accessible public outreach-style publication based upon these investigations.81

![Figure 55: SEAC staff and crew sift dirt for artifacts at one of many archeological sites tested during SEAC’s major 1998 field investigations at Water Island. The property was being transferred from federal ownership to the government of the U.S. Virgin Islands. NPS photograph, 1998; SEAC files.](image)

Another major project begun under Chief Faust was completed under Ehrenhard, the Southeast Regionwide Archeological Survey Plan. The plan was developed by Senior NPS archeologist Bennie C. Keel, former Consulting Archeologist for the Interior Department, and SEAC staff archeologists John E. Cornelison Jr. and David M. Brewer.82 It responded to a Management Control Review of the NPS archeological program in 1991, which had identified as a critical material weakness the Service’s baseline knowledge of its archeological resources.83 In response, NPS program managers developed a Systemwide Archeological Inventory Program “to conduct systematic, scientific research to locate, evaluate, and document archeological resources on National Park System lands.”84 Of


80. They published the results of their study in Ken S. Wild and David G. Anderson, An Archeological Inventory and Assessment of Cultural Resources on Water Island, U.S. Virgin Islands (Interagency Archeological Services Division, Atlanta, and Southeast Archeological Center, Tallahassee, 1992).


82. See David M. Brewer, John E. Cornelison Jr., and Bennie C. Keel, Regionwide Archeological Survey Plan (Tallahassee, Florida: National Park Service, 1996). This project also drew upon the support and work of dozens of past and then current colleagues.

83. Comments to the author from Thomas D. Thiessen, July 31, 2005, National Park Service.
course, SEAC and earlier NPS archeologists had conducted archeological projects, including various surveys on a limited basis through the years. Program managers were concerned, however, about significant shortfalls and holes in the fabric of archeological knowledge resulting from a non-systematic approach to archeological resource management. Congress had spelled out strong imperatives through such important legislation as the National Historic Preservation Act, which mandated federal land managers to maintain comprehensive inventories of the cultural properties under their authority. Ultimately, the only way to meet this concern was by establishing a systematic and prioritized approach systemwide. The probable reason that such an approach did not develop until the 1990s was simply a persistent lack of funding. Insufficient funding was to continue, but at least the Park Service was beginning to think more strategically about how to spend the meager funding it had to manage park archeological resources.

The trio working on the regionwide survey had to contend methodologically with the confusion then being spawned by the NPS reorganization under Director Roger Kennedy. For example, they had to devise paperwork to reflect intended cluster groups that were never effectively established and while coping with uncertainty about which parks were to remain within the region. The timing of the reorganization alongside the regionwide survey was unfortunate because it was to provide important long-term guidance. Nevertheless, the final plan represented an important assessment and step forward in the management of Southeast Region archeological resources in 1996. Brewer, Cornelison, and Keel reviewed park resource management plans to help devise park inventory (site location), identification (site testing), and evaluation (recommendations for National Register eligibility) needs. They evaluated existing park project statements to determine compatibility with the regionwide survey and looked over extensive previous park archeological projects, including a


85. For example, the Regional Archeological Survey pointed out major deficiencies in the archeological data needs of De Soto National Memorial near Sarasota, Florida. These deficiencies were subsequently addressed by Margo Schwadron, Archeological Investigations of De Soto National Memorial (SEAC Technical Reports No. 8, 2002).
review of each of the 1,150 projects accessioned by SEAC over the previous twenty-eight years. This effort was necessary to prioritize future project spending and to maximize the attainment of long-term goals. The team created project statements for parks that needed these and mapped out the appropriate archeological survey techniques for each park based upon its particular environmental characteristics and past archeology. Their final document also provided an excellent overview of the state of archeological knowledge of aboriginal culture in the Southeast along with primary transregional park themes focused upon European colonization, the American Revolution, the Civil War, and important early American life ways relating to slavery, plantation agriculture, and the maritime history of the Southeast.86

The Regional Archeological Survey allowed SEAC to perform more effectively its traditional work of resource management, but the center's merger with IAS division was also beginning to allow it to move in new directions. Those directions stemmed directly from IAS division's involvement in three main areas: archeological site stabilization, interagency assistance, and educational outreach. Director Ehrenhard characterized the reintegration of IAS and SEAC as an "evolutionary kind of change."87 In actuality, the external assistance program, and its funding, cultivated a wider scope and vision for what SEAC could do.

In facilitating its mandate to provide assistance to other agencies, the IAS program cultivated a number of partnerships. One of these focused upon archeological site stabilization, a technical subfield of archeology. Site stabilization concerns the use and development of techniques to prevent and repair damage to archeological resources threatened by natural or cultural processes, such as erosion. Ehrenhard, through his role as Chief of IAS division in Atlanta, became extensively involved with the center for Archaeological Research at the University of Mississippi. Founded by Robert Thorne in 1970s, the center for Archaeological Research conducted contract archeology using funds from a number of public agencies, originally for salvage work relating to the construction of the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway. It was similar to the Southeast Conservation Archaeology Center, but more successful. Thorne, who was also a professor of anthropology, became an authority in the field of site stabilization and developed a project called the National Clearinghouse for Archaeological Site Stabilization in conjunction with Bennie Keel, who was the Department of Interior's Departmental Consulting Archeologist (DCA), and Bennett Graham, who managed the Cultural Resources Program of the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA). When Keel stepped down as DCA and the TVA reduced its participation, Ehrenhard assumed the DCA's role through a cooperative agreement between the National Clearinghouse and the Park Service. The purpose of this cooperation was "to allow the National Clearinghouse to develop and maintain a site stabilization bibliography, to help develop and present workshops on site stabilization, and to provide expertise in the development of archaeological site stabilization projects."88 The clearinghouse was, according to Thorne, "a central location at which to seek information as well as to foster interactions among governmental agencies, professionals, and the private sector."89

Ehrenhard and Thorne co-authored a series of publications based upon their work and evaluations of several threatened archeological sites. One of their earliest efforts was in support of Cumberland Island National Seashore. In 1996, numerous of the park's archeological sites were threatened by "cutbank" erosion along the western shoreline, which was suffering from wind- and boat-generated waves, natural tidal flows, and problems caused by dredging of the inland waterway. Ehrenhard and Thorne noticed, however, that at certain points along the shoreline of the island naturally deposited oyster shell "rakes," that is small raised causeways, were actually restoring or generating new shoreline. They thus devised an

87. Ehrenhard, Oral History Interview, 27. After the IAS division merged with SEAC, it was renamed "Technical Assistance and Partnerships" or TAPS.
experiment to protect the cultural sites threatened with erosion by creating similar artificial berms using biodegradable burlap bags filled with oyster shell. In June 1990, Ehrenhard and Thorne constructed an experimental shell rake at the park using this low tech/low cost technology. They also kept labor costs minimal via the cooperative agreement with the University of Mississippi and the use of local NPS staff. By June 1992, it was nearly impossible to tell where the original burlap bags were located. These had dissolved, their shell naturally dispersed to form a low barrier behind which sediments accumulated. The shell rakes created new shoreline and plants were colonizing the area. The only minor problem was the occasional misappropriation of shell bags by fishermen using them for stepping stones. Ehrenhard and Thorne reported their findings of this innovative approach in 1993.90 Another example of their early work includes a 1991 report making site stabilization recommendations for Olympic and North Cascades National Parks, San Juan Island National Historical Park, and Coulee Dam National Recreation Area.91 In 1993 and 1994, they provided a series of erosion control recommendations to help stabilize shoreline archeological sites near Hurlburt Field and Eglin Air Force Base at Fort Walton, Florida.92

After SEAC absorbed the IAS division, Ehrenhard and others at SEAC continued to pursue site stabilization projects often in conjunction with the University of Mississippi through the NPS cooperative agreement.93 Under the agreement’s auspices in 1996, for example, SEAC conducted a range of archeological projects for Warren Air Force Base in Wyoming, soliciting help from the Midwest Archeological Center.94 Between 1996 and 1997, SEAC assisted the U.S. Army at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, to help restore and preserve military gravestones.95 In 2000, again working in conjunction with Robert Thorne, SEAC provided beachfront erosion control and “in situ” conservation assistance to the Yurok and Wyioet tribes and the Humboldt Lagoons State Park in Humboldt County, California. Similarly, that same year, Ehrenhard and Thorne prepared archeological conservation recommendations to Gateway National Recreation Area to mitigate shoreline erosion problems imperiling the Cove House site.96 In 2003, through the NPS-University of Mississippi agreement and SEAC’s outreach component, the center was able to assist the Georgia Department of Transportation (GDOT) to stabilize and preserve Battery Hamilton, a Union gun emplacement used during the Civil War siege of Fort Pulaski, but not actually a part of Fort Pulaski National Monument. GDOT agreed to ensure the preservation of the battery site to help offset losses incurred by the widening of a highway running through the monument. Ehrenhard and Thorne worked with GDOT and its consultant, Chad O. Braley, to provide a preservation and stabilization plan.97 A final example of SEAC’s productive involvement in archeological site stabilization and its cooperative agreement with the University of Mississippi involved Point Reyes National Seashore. The park’s superintendent requested SEAC’s aid in 2003 to assess erosional damage to archeological sites at the seashore and to develop a mitigation and stabilization program. As a result, Ehrenhard and Thorne

93. Mark Lynott at the Midwestern Archeological Center was also involved in some of these preservation projects, as were various people at SEAC besides John Ehrenhard.
94. A number of citations for this project can be found at http://www.ct.nps.gov/seac/famcamp.htm (accessed April 7, 2005).
developed an in-situ conservation strategy for a number of threatened sites.\(^8\)

The cooperative agreement between the Center for Archaeological Research at the University of Mississippi and SEAC produced a substantial body of research, techniques, and practical assistance for land managers in national parks, military reservations, and on other federal lands, including at state-owned sites and those managed by Native Americans. Recently, Robert Thorne retired. Similarly, Director Ehrenhard was at the time of this writing, planning his own retirement. If there is any complaint about the center’s site stabilization efforts, it is the failure by the Park Service to institutionalize site stabilization and so to provide long-term care for important NPS archeological sites. After DCA Bennie Keel developed the original partnership with Thorne’s National Clearinghouse, NPS involvement shifted to John Ehrenhard and the IAS Division, largely on the strength of the personal relations and professional interests of Keel, Ehrenhard, and Thorne. Even a cursory review of the literature on site stabilization reveals that technical proficiency in the arts and science of archeology is a mandatory requirement for the development of competent long-term preservation of archeological sites. Unfortunately, according to Thorne, “the Service views proactive site preservation as something that a maintenance staff can handle until they get into trouble or make some destructive mistake in judgment. Unfortunately, maintenance folks don’t understand the intricacies of the preservation of some kinds of archeological materials.”\(^9\)

Robert Thorne believes that John Ehrenhard and Bennie Keel have “set the stage” for the development of a transregional archeological site stabilization and conservation program at SEAC. As he noted, “John and his folks have already established an excellent electronic library of available reports and articles, and have established a reputation for producing excellent work.” This is not to impugn any similar efforts undertaken elsewhere, such as by the Western Archeological and Conservation Center, but efforts in the Southwest have not apparently migrated across the “adobe wall,” while neither Thorne nor Ehrenhard significantly involved themselves in that region.\(^10\) Apparently, as former Chief Historian Robert Utley might agree, this particular manifestation of archeological separatism has persisted into the 21st Century.\(^11\)

The historic Park Service inter-regional conflict over underwater archeology suggests concern over any decision to concentrate, on a nation-wide basis, specialized cultural resource functions in one region. Instead, it might be more appropriate for regions to maintain a staffing requirement for at least one or two archeologists who have some specialized expertise in site stabilization with national program goals and guidance set by Washington. Many have noted that academic archeologists are trained to excavate, not to manage, while public archeology has increasingly concerned itself with the long-term conservation of archeological sites. More than ever, archeological site stabilization and preservation expertise. In the 1990s, SEAC became a leader in this key field but archeological site stabilization is an issue that concerns both Park Service and federal archeology writ large.

An activity sometimes associated with archeological site preservation is “reconstruction.” The reconstruction of historic structures or archeological sites is a controversial area within the Park Service, for one reason, because reconstruction generally leads to the loss of whatever actual archeological or historic fabric still exists at a site. This fact is true whether or not the reconstruction eventually provides site visitors with a better understanding of history or misleads them into thinking that the reconstruction is actually the original, which is another concern. SEAC has made at least one notable contribution in the area, although primarily as an element of its outreach and education program rather than from a technical perspective, as was the case with site stabilization. In 2004,\(^8\)

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100. According to Robert Thorne, NPS personnel from the Southwest remained completely absent from any involvement with the National Clearinghouse for Archeological Site Stabilization. Robert M. Thorne, e-mail to Cameron Binkley, April 6, 2005, National Park Service.

101. Robert M. Utley identified the “adobe wall” divide within NPS archeology as one of the two principal manifestations of archeological separatism within the National Park Service. Sellars and Webb, An Interview with Robert M. Utley, 81.
SEAC’s John Jameson Jr. edited *The Reconstructed Past: Reconstructions in the Public Interpretation of Archaeology and History*. Published by AltaMira Press, the anthology of noted authorities provides a thoroughgoing discussion of the essential question facing many land managers around the world: that is, “to reconstruct or not to reconstruct?” In its forward, NPS Chief Historian Dwight T. Picaithley wrote that “this book goes a long way in presenting the landscape within which reconstructions exist.” For purposes of the current discussion, the book represents the latest in a line of educational and interpretive products developed by SEAC since its merger with IAS.

When Congress passed the Moss-Bennett Act in 1974, it intended to provide a means for funding archeological work relating to agency construction, but it also sought to promote greater understanding of archeology as well as interagency information exchange and assistance. Later, Section 10 (C) of the Archaeological Resources and Protection Act explicitly required federal land managers “to establish a program to increase public awareness of the significance of the archaeological resources located on public and Indian lands and the need to protect such resources.” These acts extended the legal authority of NPS archeologists to conduct public outreach and to work with outside agencies and partners to promote greater public appreciation of archeology. Before 1995, the Park Service had segregated this function in IAS, leaving SEAC to conduct park-related archeology. Once IAS functions were returned to SEAC, however, it assumed these other responsibilities. Today, according to Jameson, the center has the greatest variety of cultural resource management work of any federal office. SEAC does research, curation, NAGPRA, compliance investigations, contracts with universities, public education and outreach, and maintains a major effort to improve the quality of park interpretation related to archeological themes.

One of the outreach projects that IAS division was involved with prior to merging with SEAC was *Beneath these Waters: Archeological and Historical Studies of 11,500 Years Along the Savannah River*. This publication described cultural lifeways based upon archeological and historical knowledge of the area inundated by the massive Richard B. Russell Dam project. The 1993 project led to two long-term contracts (known in bureaucratise as “IDQs” for indefinite quantity contracts). One contract, as previously noted, was with the husband and wife writing team of Sharyn Kane and Richard Keeton, the authors of *Beneath these Waters*. The second contract was with a commercial artist named Martin Pate, who had provided artistic illustrations for the same work. SEAC inherited these relationships. Under the guidance of Director Ehrenhard and archeologist John Jameson Jr., the center continued to work with Kane and Keeton, Pate, and others to provide assistance to sister agencies in support of their own cultural resource management needs.

*Beneath these Waters* attracted the attention of the U.S. Army, which, as a large federal land manager, became interested in SEAC’s archeological assistance. In 1998, the U.S. Army Infantry Center at Fort Benning, Georgia, provided funding to produce a popular history based upon archeological and historical studies associated with the Fort Benning Military Reservation. The Army asked SEAC to administer the project mainly because of staff expertise stemming from IAS involvement in the Richard B. Russell Dam project. Using its IDQ contract, SEAC chose Kane and Keeton to author the outreach publication and

artist Martin Pate to provide illustrations. When the work was completed, SEAC designed a webpage and published associated brochures and posters. SEAC also sponsored a separate series of publications for Fort Benning that discussed the Battle of Monroe's Crossroads, a Civil War cavalry clash that took place on the reservation. These studies built upon one another. The first study was actually a technical archeological compliance report, which the Army commissioned SEAC to conduct in fulfillment of its legal responsibilities under Moss-Bennett. That complicity report then led to a briefing on the battle by MWAC archeologists Douglas D. Scott and William J. Hunt Jr., Cavalry Clash in the Sandhills: The Battle at Monroe's Crossroads, North Carolina, which was used to train military personnel. Scott had pioneered techniques for archeological investigation at battlefields with his work at Little Bighorn National Monument. Finally, the Army funded a third public outreach document based upon the technical study, Fiery Dawn: the Civil War Battle at Monroe's Crossroads, North Carolina. This publication was again written by the Kane and Keeton duo and illustrated by Martin Pate using their respective IDQs with SEAC. Since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, the military has shifted its attention away from resource stewardship and seems less likely to develop a significant in-house capability. Although there was discussion in 2004 of easing some resource protection regulations for the Department of Defense, military base managers cannot ignore legal requirements. It seems likely, therefore, that the Army will continue to draw upon outside expertise to help it comply with existing resource protection rules, and SEAC will remain a major candidate for providing that assistance. In 2004, for example, SEAC published A Soldier’s Place in History: Fort Polk, Louisiana, a public outreach document again authored by Kane and Keeton and based upon a technical overview of Fort Polk-related archeology by SEAC archeologist David Anderson. The Army seems aware that there is a public relations benefit to this type of work and that it can even potentially acquire militarily useful training material, such as the Cavalry Clash study.

Providing resource management assistance to sister agencies, like the Army, is a traditional activity of NPS archeology. However, Southeast Region parks have benefited from the synergies involved in such relationships. The work of Martin Pate has proven exceptional in this regard. Commissioned by the Park Service originally for a Corps of Engineers-backed dam project, Pate has now completed several dozen paintings for NPS parks. Many are for major thematic NPS initiatives, such as the Golden Crescent campaign, a partnership effort sponsored by the Southeast Regional Office that sought to promote the prehistoric and historic heritage of Coastal Georgia and Northeast Florida. Pate has also produced artwork for specific national parks, including Fort Pulaski, Jean Lafitte National Historical Park and Preserve, Cumberland Island National Seashore, and even Little Bighorn Battlefield National Monument. For Jean Lafitte, in particular, Pate completed a painting used to illustrate the African-American village of Fazendeville that existed on the site of the Battle of Chalmette between 1867 and 1964. The town was condemned, over the objections of residents, to help restore the “hallowed ground” of the Battle of New Orleans. In 1999, the park’s anthropologist began to collect data about the former residents of Fazendeville to provide interpreters with information to tell a more inclusive story about the site. Pate’s painting, use in an interpretive brochure, helps tell that story better. Indeed, Pate’s work for SEAC literally illustrates some major steps the center has taken in recent years to better communicate, interpret, and promote the public’s interest in archeology.

In 1997, with the work of IAS outreach as a driver, SEAC began a formal effort to improve public archeology’s ability to communicate its message. The effort was dubbed the Public Interpretation

106. See Sharyn Kane and Richard Keeton, A Soldier’s Place in History: Fort Polk, Louisiana (SEAC, 2004).
107. The Golden Crescent project was initiated by request of NPS Director Roger Kennedy and was canceled after he left office, apparently because it was not park-based and drew too much administrative effort while the Southeast Region was coping with Kennedy’s reorganization.
108. “A Cultural Memory: The Village,” NPS brochure about Fazendeville designed and produced by the Southeast Archeological Center (text by Allison H. Pena; painting by Martin Pate).
Initiative. From the beginning, SEAC knew that graphic artwork would be vital and sought help from artist Pate to meld accurate factual archaeological knowledge with interesting impressionistic illustrations of prehistoric and historic life. To do such work, Pate himself had to overcome some initial misgivings about working with NPS archaeologists. Having worked as a commercial artist, he was familiar with the difficulties of working with clients such as advertising agents and art directors. When Pate first began to work with the IAS and SEAC archaeologists, he feared they would overemphasize artifacts and technical details and interfere with the creative process. Later, he admitted that this concern had been groundless. SEAC’s archaeologists were interested in public outreach. By the 1990s, they knew, as Pate said, “if the purpose of a poster is to educate someone about a specific historical event or to point out to them the importance of a specific site, then an exciting, colorful, and well-executed image is one of the best ways to catch his or her interest.” From that point, you might get them to read the text.109

The problem SEAC was seeking to overcome with its public outreach and Public Interpretation Initiative is endemic within the profession of archaeology. By its nature, archaeology is less accessible to the lay person than is history. Works of history, no matter how obscure their topics or how theoretical their view-points, are nonetheless typically written as chronological narratives or stories. In this sense, at least, history is closer to literature than science and it has a more natural appeal to a broader audience. The same has not been true with archaeology, whose practitioners typically craft field notes, rough drawings, site maps, and dig photos into “dry” archaeological reports. Knowledge derived by studying the design, composition, geographic distribution, provenience, and age of artifacts is key to archaeology’s unique ability to interpret the past of human behavior, but it does not lend itself well to story telling, or interpretation, which is a key responsibility of the Park Service. Moreover, throughout the history of archaeology, especially in the arena of salvage work, the focus of most archaeologists was artifact recovery. But artifact rescue is only part of archeology’s mission. The rest involves data recovery, the integration of artifact data into a more general system of knowledge, and the transmission of that knowledge to the public on whose behalf the archeology was conducted.

In addition to eye-catching interpretive imagery, SEAC has explored several other avenues to promote the public’s understanding of archaeology. In 1997, Jameson edited a signature publication helping define SEAC’s emerging role as a champion of archaeological educators: Presenting Archaeology to the Public: Digging For Truths. This book, also published by AltaMira Press, has served as a text in several college courses on public archaeology and in SEAC’s own coursework. Its twelve or so authors cover a range of issues such as how to interpret “sites without sights” (that is, when a site’s archaeology is not apparent to the public), interpreting sites with competing explanatory theories, and how to involve the public as archaeological participant. It deals as well with themes that can spark controversy, such as how to interpret the archaeology of

Anglo-Native American battlefields or those that involve slavery. In a review of the book published in the British journal *Antiquity*, Kate Clark of the English Heritage Education Service agreed that few archeologists understand how to convey archeology to the public but that such understanding was key to maintaining the public's long-term support for it. Clark compared Jameson's anthology, which focused upon North American archeology, to a similar set of papers focused upon Asia and noted “that these issues are global ones” and the answer she drew from both cases was to teach the next generation. While characterizing the various interpretive methods described in *Presenting Archaeology* as “very worthy, if gently patronizing,” Clark felt they would indeed leave “the few members of the public who visit archeological sites marginally less baffled.”

In other words, for what it was worth, SEAC had made a useful, if imperfect, contribution to the public's interest in archeology.

And SEAC practiced what it preached. In conjunction with the Park Service’s national Mather and Albright Training Centers, SEAC sponsored an important NPS effort to provide cross-training for park archeologists in interpretation and park interpreters in archeology. SEAC’s efforts apparently prompted NPS training managers to adopt proficiency in archeological interpretation as an essential competency for all NPS archeologists. In conducting its courses and workshops at various national parks around the country, SEAC sought to teach staff not only how to more effectively understand and communicate park-related archeology, but how archeology can be used to promote park funding drives and to improve community interest in the park. As John Jameson stated, “Archeology is not just artifacts!” Archeology is a tool to get into unrecorded history while interpretive art and archeological interpretation help the Park Service to better and more accurately present archeological facts, both of which serve the public’s need for and interest in resource preservation.

By 2003, Jameson was characterizing SEAC’s Public Interpretation Initiative as “a long-term, interdisciplinary, and internationally focused program of academic symposia, training workshops, seminars, and publications with the goal of promoting educational archeology in both the private and public sectors.”

Direct public education has also been a major facet of SEAC’s Public Interpretation Initiative. For example, SEAC has worked with various states to promote state “Archaeology Days” and “Archaeology Weeks.” In 1996, through center auspices, the state of Louisiana sanctioned an “Archaeology Week” and even commissioned a poster by Martin Pate. SEAC has been a key promoter or sponsor of similar Archaeology Day events in other southeastern states, including Florida and South Carolina, and the territory of Puerto Rico.

Another twist on SEAC's direct outreach involves Fort Frederica National Monument. In 1994, a staff archeologist was inspired by attendance at a SEAC-sponsored outreach education seminar to develop a partnership between the park and the local Glynn County School System. Today, that partnership provides over 1,100 fourth-grade students per year a unique opportunity to participate in hands-on archeology at the monument. The park uses an old trench dug by archeologists of a past era. Those archeologists had used the trench to dispose of valueless replica artifacts, mostly pipe stems of which there are thousands. Because the trench held completely contextless artifacts, anyone could explore digging in the trench. The park thus allows children “to excavate” objects, which they then “process” and “clean.” Eventually, these artifacts are returned to the trench to be re-excavated by yet another class of fourth-graders. The course has become a part of the curriculum for all county fourth-graders and Fort Frederica provides an associated week-long teachers workshop. SEAC works with the park to maintain the artifacts (removing various items that would wear down, etc.). The park received the Freeman Tilden Award for this initiative in 1995 while the county received a grant from the National Parks Foundation so that a full-time teacher/coordinator could be hired and two classrooms set aside for the program.

In 1999, Fort Frederica and SEAC joined forces with the Georgia State Historic Preservation Office to expand the workshop into a

111. Jameson, Interview by Cameron Binkley, January 20, 2005.
career development opportunity for both NPS and Georgia state employees.  

Over the years SEAC staff have also involved themselves in teaching, especially at Florida State University under the auspices of the NPS-FSU cooperative agreement. Teaching, of course, is another variety of public outreach. Several SEAC staff members have taught at FSU or nearby campuses over the past twenty years or so, including David Anderson, Brinnen Carter, John Ehrenhard, Pete Faust, George Fischer, Bennie Keel, and George Smith.

One of SEAC’s biggest outreach campaigns in the last few years has concerned efforts to prevent archeological site destruction through looting and vandalism, criminal activity, environmental forces, or as a result of simple public ignorance about the importance of preserving heritage values. This mission has been a federal responsibility since Congress passed the Antiquities Act. Today, however, several additional laws entrust the National Park Service to protect archeological sites from looting. Not surprisingly, several SEAC staff have pursued this goal throughout their careers. According to Sherry Hutt, a judge of the Superior Court, Maricopa County, Arizona, and an expert on the Archaeological Resources Protection Act, Bennie Keel and George Smith have maintained for over twenty years “a vision that ARPA would become the vehicle to reach outside of the archeological community to engage resource managers, lawyers, and tribes in the protection of cultural resources. They educated future land managers, sponsored training, and drove others to write books and articles to heighten protection efforts.” Similarly, John Ehrenhard, while IAS chief in Atlanta, organized a special symposium on looting held during a 1990 Society for American Archaeology (SAA) meeting in Atlanta. Afterwards, he edited a publication based upon a number of presented papers entitled *Coping with Site Looting: Southeastern Perspectives: Essays in Archaeological Resource Protection.*

Spurred on by the success of that effort, the IAS division published a companion volume in 1993 highlighting site destruction in Georgia and the Carolinas caused by erosion, agriculture and forestry, and development, as well as looting and vandalism. At the end of that work, Ehrenhard opined that “it is not news that the average American doesn’t know much about the plight of archaeological resources.” Siting Harvey Shields, Ehrenhard stated that “resource protection is a

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product that must be sold to the general public as well as to those who make decisions” about archeological sites. “We must,” he added, “demonstrate to the public and the resource management community that protection of our collective heritage is something they need.” Not surprisingly, Ehrenhard, Keel, and Smith have continued to promote archeological outreach after coming to the center.

With this context in mind, SEAC has encouraged the reporting of Pulitzer Prize-winning Atlanta Journal and Constitution science writer Mike Toner. In the late 1990s, Toner sought SEAC’s advice and help for a project he was planning - a series of articles on the subject of archeological site looting. Toner took a global view and went around the world, but center aid was key in his reporting. After Toner’s articles were published in the Atlanta newspaper, SEAC secured its permission to republish his work in 2002 as a book, entitled The Past in Peril. Toner later earned the SAA’s journalism award for his efforts, which SEAC had nominated him for. Besides seeing service in the Park Service and in several university courses, The Past in Peril has aided SAA efforts to maintain an official Memorandum of Understanding with the government of Peru to prevent the trade in illegally exported Peruvian antiquities. The center has cooperated with the society in other ways as well, including supporting the establishment of the SAA’s Public Education Committee and its Curriculum Committee and helping to fund a “Teaching Archaeology in the 21st Century” workshop, beginning in 1999. In fact, on the basis of their workshop work, George Smith of SEAC and anthropologist K. Anne Pyburn of Indiana University co-authored a successful funding proposal to the National Science Foundation. Their proposal resulted in a five hundred thousand dollar grant designed to allow the SAA to launch a multi-year project called “M.A.T.R.I.X.: Making Teaching Archaeology Relevant in the 21st Century.” The project developed materials broadly relevant to many undergraduate curricula courses and made them available to archeology instructors. These were encouraged to draw upon the project’s teaching resources to promote basic principles of best practice archeology, including stewardship, social relevance, basic skills, values and ethics, real-world problem-solving, and so on, all of which had become key concerns for public archeology. Another contribution by SEAC to the SAA was a publication entitled Protecting the Past, originally published in 1991 by NPS IAS archeologists John Ehrenhard and George S. Smith, but later released on the internet by SEAC in support of the M.A.T.R.I.X project.

To further NPS efforts to promote archeological site preservation, the Southeast Archeological Center has pursued international cooperative agreements and symposia, contributed to or published its own outreach publications, and addressed the issue of site destruction, including, as mentioned, by teaching park staff and Justice Department officials about resource protection law. In early 2003, for example, SEAC archeologists George Smith and Guy Prentice lectured to a group of assistant U.S. attorneys in a course on the Archeological Resource Protection Act. Smith and Prentice tried to explain both the law and the importance of protecting the past, why the past is important, and why archeologists, prosecutors, law enforcement, and the public must work together. Most looting incidents are actually reported by park neighbors seeing someone at work with a metal detector, for example. Indeed, one of the benefits SEAC has accrued by staff and center involvement in national and international organizations, such as several past World Archeological Congresses, is that a “team” approach is key to preventing site destruction. As Smith explained, this notion transcends national boundaries and can be applied in any nation’s legal system even when actual laws protecting archeological resources are very different from those in the United States. In December 2002, SEAC signed a cooperative

118. Smith, Oral History Interview, 6.
121. See John E. Ehrenhard and George S. Smith, ed., Protecting the Past (Boca Raton: CRC Press, 1991). The royalties from the original work were also donated to the SAA in support of its public outreach efforts.
agreement with the Illicit Antiquities Research Center at Cambridge University because it recognized that there are many nations that have ancient archeological sites, some dating back thousands and even hundreds of thousands of years. According to Smith, "connecting into these wider audiences allows us to take advantage of people who have been doing this a lot longer than we have." 122

But SEAC has another important reason for international cooperation - simply put, looted artifacts are part of a major international criminal marketplace. Looting is neither a southeastern, nor a nationwide phenomenon, but an international one. Smith cited his personal experience working in Alaska where artifacts found on St. Lawrence Island in the Bering Sea ended up for sale at high prices in places like Japan. 123 Because the threats to archeological sites are broader than the Southeast Region, the National Park Service, and even the nation itself, SEAC must have a wide scope if it is to meet specific legal mandates such as ARPA or the goals set by Secretary of the Interior Manuel Lujan in his 1991 statement pronouncing a national strategy for federal archeology. That strategy named four essential goals that the federal archeology program should attempt to meet. They included preserving sites in situ, conserving archeological collections as well as their associated records, disseminating research results, and promoting public education and outreach. 124 All of the topics discussed in this and preceding sections fall comfortably within the scope of the Secretary’s goals. It is hard to imagine that any federal archeological effort anywhere has better or more efficiently met those goals than the Southeast Archeological Center.

John Ehrenhard has called the external program “a safety net for the Center” because it brought with it a lot of money, which helped to augment SEAC’s programs. At least as important, however, was simply the synergy. The IAS division involved SEAC in heritage education and public outreach, which were facets of the external program as it had developed in Atlanta. By combining the park functions with the external outreach function, as Chief Archeologist Frank McManamon realized, SEAC would be better able to take the work that was being done in the parks and get it out to the public. So, the external assistance program made it possible for SEAC to become more involved in heritage education and public outreach. Moreover, once this merger took place, SEAC was able to move beyond an interpretive role in educating the public about park archeological resources to educating the public about issues of preservation and resource protection. SEAC staff began to teach resource protection courses. And SEAC has become a major publisher of interpretive archeological information. Center staff are involved in both professional and NPS-supported publishing. In fact, according to Ehrenhard, by 2003 SEAC’s publication program was second to no other in the Interior Department. 125

Finally, in addition to the many cooperative activities so far discussed, SEAC has also provided important leadership in the Southeast Region in implementing the requirements of NAGPRA, that is, the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act. NAGPRA entitles federally recognized tribes to special considerations regarding culturally associated human remains or funerary objects and artifacts of cultural patrimony held in federal museums and archeological collections. The law is important in improving the federal government’s relations with native peoples and in attempting to redress some past grievances. Historically, of course, the federal government has not always fulfilled its legal responsibilities to American Indian tribes. For example, in the civil case Corbell vs. the Secretary of Interior, a federal court has recently ruled in favor of native groups who contend that the Interior Department has mishandled billions of dollars of trust account funds. Difficult relations also exist between native groups and academic anthropology. For example, several scholars have fought out their right to conduct research on the controversial “Kennewick Man,” the preserved remains of a Neolithic hunter found along the eroding banks of the Colombia River on government land controlled by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers near Kennewick, Washington. Ironcally, it was because the Corps of Engineers planned to allow the repatriation of Kennewick Man in accordance with NAGPRA that various

122. Smith, Oral History Interview, 4-5.
123. Smith, Oral History Interview, 5.
125. Ehrenhard, Oral History Interview, 27.
scholars filed suit under provisions of the Archeological Resources and Protection Act. The point here is that maintaining good relations with native groups is a difficult undertaking. The fact that SEAC is responsible for a huge assemblage of artifacts associated with prehistoric aboriginal cultures in the Southeast, its success in relating well to native groups is important to note: there are no major contentious historical cases involving the National Park Service in the Southeast Region to discuss. Instead, the concentration of NAGPRA compliance expertise at SEAC seems to be a significant source of aid to park superintendents who must manage a complicated and sensitive area involving what are essentially state-to-state relations between parks and federally recognized native groups.

NAGPRA mandates that tribes be allowed to repatriate human remains or artifacts of cultural patrimony held in federal museum or archeological collections. After the law took effect in 1990, it required federal agencies to inventory their museum and archeological collections to identify artifacts covered by the law and to allow tribal access. The process has taken many years to implement, but SEAC began work at an early date by hiring museum specialist Allen Bohnert the same year NAGPRA was signed into law. Bohnert immediately sought to grapple with how this legislation affected the center’s extensive holdings. SEAC curators Robert C. Wilson and Richard R. Vernon, among others, also participated in this work. Their accomplishments included the generation of park-by-park inventories of NAGPRA-related holdings, the recall of similar artifacts, especially Native American human remains that had previously been lent out to educational institutions or were still located at parks, and the creation of special procedures that allowed the center to physically separate NAGPRA-related human remains and artifacts from other holdings. After 1995, SEAC also made accommodations within its Innovation Park facility that provided tribal members a more respectful environment in which to inspect these items. As important as such changes were, a key aspect of SEAC’s work to implement NAGPRA was in communicating and disseminating information to interested tribes. To accomplish this task, the center exercised its cooperative agreement with Florida State University to involve FSU anthropologists and archeologists, including J. Anthony Paredes and Glen H. Doran, in helping SEAC sponsor an important series of conferences with tribes throughout the Southeast between 1994 and 1999. After these conferences, the Park Service produced comprehensive workshop reports, which were assembled and edited under the cooperative agreement by FSU professors and students. The NPS-FSU NAGPRA conferences allowed the Park Service an interactive opportunity to explain how the Service was implementing the law and to allow tribal members to ask questions and express their concerns directly.126

As a result of SEAC’s efforts, the center claims to have reacquired all NAGPRA human remains by 1999 and to have successfully repatriated several different collections to Native American tribes.127 During the workshops, tribal representatives offered various criticisms of the government and the manner in which the center was attempting to implement NAGPRA, as transcripts of the workshops included in the FSU-produced reports reveal. Nevertheless, Billy Cypress, representing the Seminole Tribe of Florida, perhaps expressed a common attitude about SEAC’s effort when he made the following opening statement:

I came here to tell you about our official policy or positions of the tribal government because all this is new to us. We deal with the government in all different areas. Right now we’re dealing with the National Park Service in the area of artifacts, but then we deal with the Bureau of Indian Affairs on health education. They all go through the same thing and sometimes you’re not consulted. . . . I do like to commend the National Park Service for getting us all together. Because the law says—even though they had to do it because the law says so, I still want to commend them anyway. They could have done it in any

126. See J. Anthony Paredes, ed., et al., “Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) Related Workshop,” report prepared for the National Park Service (contract CA-5890-4-9001/5) by the Department of Anthropology of Florida State University, December 1997; and Jennifer Ann Shannon and Glen H. Doran, eds., “Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA) Related Workshop,” report prepared for the National Park Service (contract CA-5890-4-9003/6) by the Department of Anthropology of Florida State University, November 2000; both in SEAC and SERO files.

number of ways; they could have just sent us a memo and forgot about it. But, I think they took pains to get us together and try to find the Southeastern Indian people that were here and that’s a difficult job because of the problems of different kinds of Indians that sometimes you have to deal with. But they did a pretty good job I thought in getting us all together. 128

In 1999, the Park Service continued efforts to improve relations with Native American groups as well as groups traditionally associated with parks by hiring J. Anthony Paredes to establish an ethnography program for the Southeast Region. The program was not set up at SEAC, however, but was located in the SER Cultural Resources Division. NPS Chief Ethnographer Murial “Mikki” Crespi had stressed the need to insure the program’s identity apart from archeology. 129

In summary, between 1995 and 2003, the Southeast Archeological Center conducted a successful program of cultural resource management that covered the full range of archeological activities, with the exception of underwater archeology. Its outreach, site stabilization, and cooperative efforts, including outreach to Native American Tribes for NAGPRA compliance, have made pioneering contributions to the field of public archeology. Indeed, the center’s high standards and professional cadre offered an outstanding example of why public opinion polls consistently rate the National Park Service as one of the most respected federal agencies.

The “Competitive Sourcing” Effort

In July 1999, the Southeast Archeological Center began a two-week-long remote sensing project at Shiloh National Miliary Park in western Tennessee that would evolve into one of the largest and potentially most significant excavations by the National Park Service in many years. The project actually involved a survey of several park

129. Note, while regional officials agreed with Crespi’s view, they refused to accept her program funding as she also insisted the position report to the National Park Service; J. Anthony Paredes, Discussion with Cameron Binkley, August 23, 2005, National Park Service; J. Anthony Paredes, Discussion with Cameron Binkley, August 19, 2005, National Park Service.
areas using various techniques, such as ground penetrating radar, GPS and total station mapping, metal detecting, and test excavations. The work documented a variety of Civil War sites, relief-era archeological excavation trenches dug in 1933 and 1934, and Mississippian mound constructions. The center sent a ten-person team, supported by several Florida State University students and volunteers, all led by project directors David G. Anderson and John E. Cornelison. Some of this work provided immediate information to park managers, including specific information to help plan the construction of a new visitor center as well as for interpretive purposes. It also helped SEAC determine the extent of an imminent threat to Mound A of Shiloh Mounds National Historic Landmark, a significant aboriginal cultural site within the park boundary threatened by erosion due to its precarious location adjacent to the shifting banks of the Tennessee River. With its encircling palisade, Mound A is an important example of Mississippian culture dating back some thousand years.

Subsequently, the center determined that in situ preservation was not feasible for Mound A. The Park Service, therefore, tasked SEAC to conduct a major excavation using a large crew of center archaeologists and volunteers, again including several FSU and other students under the direction of project leads David Anderson and John Cornelison. Shiloh National Military Park Superintendent Haywood S. Harrel had the option to contract out this work to private consulting firms. However, as he reported, “over the last 15 years, Shiloh Park has enjoyed a successful partnership with SEAC in regards to supporting both required Section 106 activities and the investigation of looting incidents involving violation of the Archaeological Resource Protection Act on Shiloh Battlefield.” As a result of SEAC’s past work, Harrel believed that “SEAC possessed considerable expertise in planning and executing complex field investigations on National Park lands. They also had solid working relationships with the leading academic experts in the disciplines needed for study of the period of prehistory represented by the preserved resources at the Shiloh Indian Mounds NHL site.” According to Harrel, “there was never any question who the park should partner with to carry out what was an unfortunate, but necessary, mitigation of the threatened ‘Mound A.”

The project unfolded over the course of three field seasons between 2001 and 2003. Several photographs from the Shiloh mounds excavations document the remainder of this section. The center believes its work has resulted in a number of significant discoveries, including new interpretations regarding the social meaning of the colored materials used in constructing the mound’s various levels. This work harkens back to the first federally sponsored “Big Digs” at the Shiloh Mounds complex, at Ocmulgee Old Fields near Macon, Georgia, and at similar Depression-era sites around the Southeast, as well as the later period of salvage archeology that gave birth both to SEAC and the Midwest Archeological Center (MWAC) in Lincoln, Nebraska. The project’s own website even compared the work to photographs of the preeminent early archeologist Frank H. H. Roberts Jr. conducting research atop Mound A in 1934. Certainly, the multi-season excavation was as large and significant as any similar field project conducted by the Park Service in recent times. In some degree, therefore, it represents an unbroken continuum. This review of the history of the Southeast Archeological Center and federal archeology in the Southeast has hopefully suggested the strong if not inherent vitality of the archeological research center idea wherein archeological practitioners combine many years of park-based resource experience with the efficiencies of university-partnerships as well as the enthusiasm of volunteer participants. Since the days of Pinky Harrington and the New Deal, NPS archeologists in the Southeast have innovated, persevered, and over the

130. Mound A was constructed atop a 168-foot-high cliff overlooking a bend in the Tennessee River, which exposed it to the river’s full force. “Hydrostatic pressure” was another natural threat, but the most important threat to the site came from construction of the Pickwick Dam downstream. The dam substantially altered the river’s hydrological conditions, causing severe fluctuations in water level. Moreover, the site is also subject to disturbance from the passage of huge coal barges. There was no feasible or cost-effective way to protect the site using “rip rap.” The Mound A excavation, conducted on the face of the mound nearest the river, was an unavoidable salvage operation. John Ehrenhard, Discussion with Cameron Binkley, April 26, 2005, National Park Service.


132. John Ehrenhard, Discussion with Cameron Binkley, April 26, 2005, National Park Service. Reports on this excavation are expected but were not available prior to the completion of this study.
FIGURE 61. Frank H.H. Roberts Jr., who conducted a major relief-era excavation of the mounds at Shiloh National Military Park for the National Park Service. NPS Photograph, no date; SEAC Neg-79-12

long-run upheld their responsibility to the public to preserve and interpret the region's key archeological sites. The center’s professional staff have amassed a reservoir of several hundred years worth of knowledge and archeological field experience. Their work has been without question a credit to the profession of archeology, the National Park Service, and the public's interest.

Meanwhile, while the center was involved in these activities, a new law went into effect - the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act of 1998 (FAIR Act). In December 2000, NPS Associate Director for Administration Susan Masica ordered the initiation of an inventory of NPS occupations subject to competition with the private sector as required by the FAIR Act.133 The act requires executive branch agencies to periodically report to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) a list of activities performed by federal employees that are not considered inherently governmental functions by the head of that agency. The creation of such a list is preparatory to having federal positions compete with private sector contractors. After the list is compiled, the government can select various positions or entire organizations to subject to what in bureaucratic parlance is known as an “A-76” or “competitive sourcing” review, a process based upon OMB Circular A-76. The NPS official most directly responsible for both of these activities was Donna Kalvels, the FAIR Act and A-76 Coordinator.

When the administration of George W. Bush assumed office in January 2001, it developed a “Competitive Sourcing Initiative” to promote the outsourcing of federal jobs. On January 20, 2002, Assistant Secretary for Policy, Management and Budget P. Lynn Scarlett issued a memorandum to all senior departmental executive service officials,

133. Anonymous, “The Competitive Sourcing Initiative at the Midwest Archeologist Center, Lincoln, NE,” (Lincoln: Midwest Archeologist Center, December 18, 2003), 3, entry for December 2, 1999 [note, the entry should read December 2, 2000, an editorial error of the anonymous compiler]. Several citations within this section are based upon this MWAC document, which is essentially a chronology of the A-76 review process compiled by an anonymous author at the Midwest Archeological Center and in possession of the author. The chronology, subsequently cited as MWAC A-76 Chronology, is based primarily upon e-mail and phone records of various MWAC personnel involved in the A-76 study. Many statements in the chronology are supported by published press accounts of the highly controversial and much criticized attempt to outsource NPS archeology. See also 112 STAT. 2382 (Public Law 105-270; October 19, 1998).
basically the heads of bureaus and offices, defining her “leadership perspective on competitive sourcing” and citing the president’s enthusiasm for “management reform.” In her memorandum Scarlett discussed the creation of the “Center for Competitive Sourcing Excellence,” which she tasked Department managers to work with “to identify specific functions to be competed in fiscal years 2002 and 2003.” Scarlett pledged that “we will continue to explore approaches to successfully pursue viable competitive sourcing alternatives that comply with the spirit of traditional methodology (OMB Circular A-76).”

Asked to compile a list of NPS positions subject to potential elimination through outsourcing, Kalvels used payroll records to find locations where there were large concentrations of employees within a single job series. Initially, at least, no investigation of the nature or activities of these positions was conducted nor was much effort made to determine whether their functions could be deemed “inherently governmental.” The selection of NPS archeological positions as “commercial” seems to have been made from this 2000 FAIR Act inventory. According to Deputy Midwest Regional Director Dave Given in late November 2001, the Park Service assigned its Associate Regional Directors for Administration to meet and generate recommendations for A-76 outsourcing studies. They recommended NPS archeology for such a review. These officials generally had no direct responsibility for professional activities relating to resource management, a core function of the Park Service. Had a more representative body of officials met, some problems later encountered in the A-76 process might have been averted. In January 2002, MWAC Manager Mark Lynott attended an A-76 meeting in Denver. Kalvels told him that NPS archeology was specifically chosen by OMB as one of the first areas to be studied for outsourcing. On April 15, 2002, NPS Director Fran Mainella sent an all employee bulletin advising employees of the forthcoming plan to study the outsourcing of up to 1,800 NPS positions. On July 30, 2002, Lynott received an e-mail from Chris Bernthal, Associate Regional Director for Administration, Midwest Region, advising him of the decision to include MWAC and SEAC among the “pilot” A-76 studies. This message also reported that the reason NPS archeology was selected for the outsourcing study was “because OMB and DOI don’t like us doing work for other agencies,” that is, the type of legally prescribed interagency archeological assistance traditionally conducted by the Park Service since the earliest days of federal archeology.

On August 5, 2002, Donna Kalvels informed NPS managers that Interior and senior NPS officials had decided that initial “Competitive Sourcing Studies will begin by September 1, 2002.” She wrote that “OMB and DOI have been very specific to date regarding some of the areas they feel we should study. The first three areas noted below were selected because they have been on the ‘radar screen’ for study by OMB and DOI as well as recommended by our consultants during their first analysis of NPS in 2000.” NPS archeology appeared specifically on that list, a strong indication that it was chosen by Interior officials and OMB, which was directing the overall Bush Administration outsourcing initiative. Shortly thereafter, the department notified Congress of its intent to


136. According to SEAC Director Ehrenhard, the outsourcing study may have been approved for SEAC because someone confused the presence of some 65 employees or so on SEAC’s listing on the FAIR Act inventory as being equivalent to 65 FTEs. There could conceivably be eight individuals working part-time for SEAC who together equal one FTE. In 2004, SEAC was authorized 45 FTEs. John E. Ehrenhard, Conversation with Cameron Binkley, February 23, 2004, National Park Service.


139. MWAC A-76 Chronology, 5 (July 30, 2002). According to Director John Ehrenhard, OMB officials strongly disagreed with the interagency work conducted by NPS archeological centers, especially NPS work commissioned by military bases. Ehrenhard, Oral History Interview, 19-20.
FIGURE 62. Metal-detecting at Shiloh National Military Park. L-r: volunteer metal-detector, SEAC archeologist/FSU student Tyler Cremeens, SEAC archeologist Tammy Cooper (with GPS pack), and SEAC archeologist Emily Yates (kneeling) conducting an archeological survey of a field at Shiloh. NPS photograph by John Cornelison, July 24, 1999. SEAC ACC. 1410

conduct a formal outsourcing study upon the Southeast Archeological Center in accordance with the process outlined by OMB Circular A-76. Two primary private consulting firms were chosen to conduct the study that was intended to compare the functions and costs of work performed by SEAC with those potentially available commercially. The firms were CH2M Hill, Inc., and Delta Solutions and Strategies, Inc.

A digression here is necessary to explain the A-76 process to provide a sense of how it was to affect the center and its mission. An A-76 study involves four phases. In the first phase, a preliminary evaluation is made to test the suitability of conducting a full-scale outsourcing study on the targeted governmental organization. A number of criteria are typically assessed, including the centrality of the unit's work to the mission of its parent organization, and managers of the organization proposed for outsourcing are consulted. In the second phase, an outside party, generally a private contractor, conducts a full-scale analysis of the nature of the work actually performed by the organization. This phase seeks to define what work functions can ultimately be competed and potentially performed by the private sector and what work is considered inherently governmental, either because of legal or organizational mission reasons. Supervisors, law enforcement personnel, and contracting officers, for example, are usually considered inherently governmental. The report this phase generates is called the Primary Work Statement or PWS.

Once the PWS is approved, usually after exhaustive interviewing of staff and analysis of organizational work requirements, a third phase begins. The third phase seeks to generate a newly constituted or model organizational structure that separates the inherently governmental positions from those that can potentially be outsourced. Across that line, the distinction must be clear. The inherently government positions are then grouped together in the so-called “Residual Organization” or RO while the potentially commercial positions are grouped together in the so-called “Most Efficient Organization” or MEO. The creation of the MEO, with its clear distinction from the functions of positions within the RO, makes possible the comparison of work performed by the government’s MEO with

140. MWAC A-76 Chronology, 5 (August 5, 2002).

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that available commercially. In the fourth phase, the work requirements performed by the government’s MEO are placed in a bid format and a competition is administered in which both private contractors and the MEO are allowed to compete. The intent of this process is to allow a comparison to evaluate the cost-efficiency of public and private sector work providers. However, A-76 rules do require a private contractor to outperform the government’s MEO by at least 10 percent to qualify for a winning bid. Regardless of whether government employees or a private contractor wins the competition, the work will continue to be managed by the residual group of inherently governmental supervisors and contract officers. The entire effort requires considerable time, and key managers of the organization must devote hundreds of man-hours to assist the contractor conducting the outsourcing study, which in the case of SEAC, took about a year to complete. An A-76 study constitutes an expensive and major intervention into the work of a government organization and for that reason should be carefully considered beforehand by senior managers.

One of the issues that apparently made NPS archeological centers unsuited for an A-76 study relates to their funding mechanism. Under the terms of an A-76 review, the resulting MEO, especially if it is made up of contract employees, must be maintained for five years following the review. Much of the workload of an archeological center is based upon project or “soft” funds that are determined on an annual basis and that fluctuate by project. That is, in a given year various projects will be funded for various parks that require various archeological skills. Sorting these out between the RO and MEO was one problem. But a critical issue was that the projects and their funding levels change from year to year for many tasks. The situation is unlike, for example, lawn maintenance, a function with predictable and fixed long-term costs. The MEO, however, must be funded for five years and private contractors would require upfront funding, not an uncertain prospect of future payments years down the line. In mid-January 2003, Jerre Brumbelow, Southeast Region Chief of Contracting informed SEAC and MWAC officials that the Park Service could not certify the availability of funds to operate the MEO for five years.141 Throughout the course of
the two A-76 archeological studies, no solution to this problem was found. Although the A-76 management study is densely suffused with bureaucratise, it is necessary to excerpt a key section here:

...inasmuch as the SFAC is funded in a hybrid manner, the challenge of funding needs to be addressed. Specifically, SEAC currently contracts much of its workload in a fee-for-service basis or with cooperative agreements to selected agencies. The possibility for contracting, even if by a hypothetical contractor for the purposes of a streamlined comparison has demonstrated the challenges of this funding methodology. If the core function of the SEAC were to be outsourced, the level of contracting for this function would need to considered carefully. If the contract were to be awarded for the baseline value of the workload being performed, it would be necessary to continue to seek reimbursement sources to attain this funding level. If the contract were to be awarded for the full value of the workload currently being performed, it would be necessary to continue to seek reimbursement sources to attain this funding level. If the contract were to be awarded for the baseline value of the workload being performed, there would be considerable potential workload over and above the baseload funding that would result in a contract modification. Furthermore if the SEAC is successful with a government (in-house) win of the streamlined competition, and proposes the residual organization and most efficient organization to support it, this winning combination will require additional baseload funding to sustain this proposed organization. 142

Certain conclusions can be made about this statement. First, although it is somewhat subtly noted, the fact is that the archeological centers were already in competition with the private sector when the A-76 studies began. “Fee-for-service” and “cooperative agreements to selected agencies” mean that parks and other agencies were already “choosing” who did their work for them. Prior to 1995, park superintendents were steered toward SEAC for their archeological resource management needs as a preference of regional authorities, but after the NPS reorganization under Roger Kennedy that sought a dramatic decentralization of NPS functions, superintendents were authorized to utilize archeological centers, cooperative agreements, or private contractors to meet their needs. Moreover, the Moss-Bennett Act of 1974 already empowered independent federal agencies to manage and/or contract for archeological services. Thus, when parks or outside agencies chose to contract work with the NPS archeological centers, and not private contractors, it was presumably due to their perception that the Park Service offered a competitive advantage. By example, Shiloh Superintendent Haywood S. Harrel could have hired a private contractor to excavate the threatened Shiloh Mounds National Historic Landmark, but chose SEAC because he believed the center offered the best value and expertise. Given that SEAC and MWAC were already in competition for their work

and that their funding mechanism did not allow for a large outlay required for a five-year MEO arrangement, the decision by senior officials to proceed with both studies seems questionable. What cost efficiencies could be further obtained by organizations already effectively competing with industry?

Indeed, private consultants hired by the Park Service for the MWAC study, and various mid-level authorities, pointed out early in the A-76 process that funding an archeological MEO would be difficult. According to a chronology of the outsourcing process prepared by MWAC, Delta Solutions consultants Geary Younkin and Mike Peregrin agreed that...the Center [MWAC] should not be subjected to CSI [Competitive Sourcing Initiative]. In a meeting on February 3, 2003, these consultants even reported their concerns to Don Nelson, an aide to U.S. Senator Ben Nelson. They told Nelson that MWAC was not a good candidate for an A-76 study because it was already competing with private enterprise as a “business-based operation.” They informed the congressional staffer that normally agencies conducted both a functional analysis to determine which operations were commercial and a cost analysis to determine if reasonable savings could be obtained before initiating an expensive and full-scale A-76 study. There exists no evidence that such pre-assessments were made with regard to NPS archeology.

Second, the statement above clearly points out the administrative challenge of funding SEAC as an MEO. Project funds are available on an annual basis only to do much of the work that the MEO requires upfront for all five years. Where would the funding come from? If the MEO was funded from non-project or “base” funds, amounting to about one-third the annual overall operating cost, any change in the contract to do project work above the base level would require major intervention by a contracting officer. These interventions would essentially be continuous. The prospect of managing the center in this way would likely reduce its efficiency considerably. The final point made by the A-76 consultants was what if SEAC won the competition and reorganized according to the A-76 procedure? In that case, it would still require additional base funding because the center was not fully funded to begin with. The discrepancy at both archeological centers between base and project funds was roughly the difference of some $800,000 of base funds versus some two million needed for an MEO. The A-76 process required SEAC to agree that it would reorganize to be more competitive and to compare with private industry. After the study’s completion, SEAC would have to reorganize, unless it did not receive additional base funding, in which case the center would have no choice but to continue operations as before the study. NPS and Interior official never resolved the issue of how to fund the MEO.

Another problem that should have factored into any decision to study SEAC for outsourcing was the fact that the center has been heavily involved in partnership activities for most of its existence. NPS archeology was an early federal leader in the drive to partner with universities and other non-profit organizations to share resources and reduce costs in conducting the public’s business. That so many of SEAC’s operations involved considerable numbers of students and volunteers, none of whom would be available if the work was contracted out, should have offered early and clear evidence that the center was not suited for a full-scale A-76 review.

On February 7, 2003, Acting Midwest Regional Director David Given reported directly to NPS Assistant Director Randy Jones that the Delta Solutions contractors had advised the Park Service that

143. Yet another funding problem was that many project funds are not allocated to the centers until well after the fiscal year begins.
144. MWAC A-76 Chronology, 6-7 (February 3-4, 2003).
145. According to SEAC Director John Ehrenhard, no functional analysis was performed prior to the decision to conduct an A-76 study on SEAC and no one at SEAC was consulted regarding that decision. John E. Ehrenhard, Conversation with Cameron Binkley, February 23, 2004, National Park Service. See also, MWAC A-76 Chronology, 6-7 (February 3-4, 2003).
146. Prior to initiating the SEAC outsourcing study, NPS Director Fran Mainella sent a message to all senior NPS managers urging them to utilize contracts but also partnerships to meet Service needs. The memo also targeted 15 percent of the FAIR Act Inventory for “direct conversion” or an outsourcing competition by the end of fiscal year 2003. Fran Mainella, Director, Memorandum to Regional Directors, Associate Directors, et al, November 28, 2001, National Park Service. Apparently, there was no consideration of how privatizing some functions might affect the partnership activities of others.
continuing the A-76 studies on both MWAC and SEAC was a mistake and that if the Park Service had prepared properly for such a study it would not have chosen its archaeological centers. On February 20, 2003, Associate Director for Administration, Business Practices and Workforce Development Dick Ring responded with a simple and terse “All five pilot studies are to continue.” A few days later, Helen Bradwell-Lynch, who was appointed in July 2002 to head the Center for Competitive Sourcing Excellence, rejected a similar request to consider cooperative agreements toward direct conversion outsourcing. Had Interior accepted that request it might have significantly reduced the scope of the A-76 review of NPS archaeology. Both MWAC’s and SEAC’s cooperative agreements could have merited numerous FTE equivalents.

Meanwhile, Interior’s outsourcing effort, particularly as it related to NPS archaeology, was shaping up to be a significant story. On January 26, 2003, that story broke nationwide. Los Angeles Times reporter Julie Cart published a stinging report about the scheme to privatize Park Service jobs. Cart’s story about the A-76 process in the Park Service was widely distributed and reprinted in dozens of major and minor newspapers and on websites across the nation. The tenor of follow-up press reports was equally negative. Basically, Cart reported that Interior Secretary Gale Norton had identified about 70 percent of full-time NPS jobs as potential candidates for replacement by private-sector employees (11,807 of 16,470 full-time positions). These were the positions that had been included on the 2002 FAIR Act Inventory. The positions ranged from maintenance and secretarial jobs to archeologists and biologists. Cart cited administration officials as saying that “the injection of free market-style competition would bring out the best in employees.” Interior officials reportedly stressed that the number of jobs outsourced would be a much smaller percentage, while law-enforcement personnel, managers, and most park rangers would keep their jobs. Cart cited Deputy Assistant Interior Secretary for Performance and Management Scott J. Cameron who said that only 4 percent of current workers would actually lose their jobs and they would have a chance (through the A-76 process) to argue the merits of their work. According to Cameron, “competition makes for a much more exciting Lakers game than if only one team were on the court.” Nevertheless, Cart’s article expressed the deep concern of administration critics that Interior planned to outsource the entire corps of NPS scientists, an act that “could undermine protection of the nation’s vast inventory of archeological and paleontological sites within parks and hand over the care of forests, seashores and wildlife to private firms not steeped in the Park Service culture of resource protection.” She quoted some well-known and respected authorities, including former Park Service Director Roger Kennedy. “The public understands,” Kennedy stated, “that parks are not parking lots - they are places that require a high degree of professional skill to manage. Not just anyone can do it.” Jeff Ruch, Executive Director of the non-profit Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility made a more serious charge - that the outsourcing of career professionals was an attempt to create “a pliant and controllable science staff.” “Our concern,” Ruch said, “is that a biologist who works for the park will be replaced by a private consulting firm, which, in order to get its contract renewed, will tell the park what it wants to hear.” Similarly, Randy Erwin of the National Federation of Federal Employees claimed he was “outraged” and that “it’s a travesty to turn the Park Service into a profit-making center.” George Washington University Professor of American studies James Oliver Horton, a former NPS consultant, added that NPS employees had “the kind of camaraderie that comes

147. MWAC A-76 Chronology, 7 (February 11, 2003).
148. MWAC A-76 Chronology, 7 (February 20, 2003).
149. The Interior Department’s decision to disallow cooperative agreements as counting toward reaching Department goals for outsourcing positions listed on the FAIR Act Inventory was reported to MWAC Manager Mark Lynott from Chris Bernthal, Associate Regional Director for Administration, Midwest Regional Office, February 25, 2003. MWAC A-76 Chronology, 7 (February 25, 2003).
150. After much discussion, one limit to the A-76 review was made for museum specialists at the request of Interior Department official Debra Sonderman, who wrote to Angela B. Styles, Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy, OMB. Given the “material weakness” determinations and property accountability issues regarding Interior museum and archeological collections, NPS Chief Curator Ann Hitchcock was successful in convincing OMB that museum specialists perform work that is “inherently governmental.” MWAC A-76 Chronology, 3 (September 17, 2001), 6 (January 21, 2003).
from people who consider they are doing the Lord’s work, preserving what we have come to know as America’s treasures. To say to those people who have stuck it out, ‘Now you are going to be cut,’ seems to me a real slap in the face. And a real slap in the face to Americans who want these places preserved.”

NPS Director Mainella responded quickly to the *Los Angeles Times* article. On January 28, 2003, she posted an all employee memorandum registering her “distress” and setting out her view on the matter. Mainella pointed out that the Park Service had no plans to outsource 70 percent of its jobs. However, she acknowledged the service had in fact listed roughly 70 percent of its positions on the 2002 FAIR Act Inventory as being commercial and thus eligible for A-76 outsourcing studies or for direct conversion. (The article had claimed 11,807; Mainella stated it as 11,524).

Supporters of NPS archaeology pressed their case with Congress. Rep. Doug Bereuter, a Republican from Lincoln, Nebraska, wrote Secretary Norton with concerns about the A-76 study of the Midwest Archeological Center, which was in his district. Later reported by Guy Gugliotta in the *Washington Post*, Bereuter wanted “to find out how the centers came to be targeted.” He “demanded that the Interior Department produce the ‘feasibility study’ or ‘assessment’ that led the Park Service to its decision.”

On April 22, 2003, on behalf of Secretary Norton, Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Cameron responded to Congressman Bereuter’s inquiry about how and why the NPS archeological functions were identified and selected for outsourcing review. Cameron explained that the archeological centers were chosen because they had appeared on the initial FAIR Act Inventory as the fourth most commercial NPS activity behind maintenance, administrative support, and architecture/engineering. He told Congressman Bereuter that “I agree with your point that in choosing functions for competitive sourcing studies it is valuable for the decision-maker to be aware of the mission and history of the function in question. That is why our bureaus, including NPS, are given almost complete discretion in making these decisions.”

Director Mainella, in a brief discussion with the author, stated that she did not make the decision. Director Mainella did suggest that the reason the archeological centers were chosen for the outsourcing review was because they were large and discrete entities and already noticeably involved in a significant amount of contract activity. This explanation is consistent with comments by other officials about the decision. It also resonates with past management interest in reorganizing NPS archeology, whose separate centers have historically tended to draw attention.

At any rate, Assistant Secretary Cameron explained to Congressman Bereuter that two private consulting firms actually made the recommendation to go ahead with the archeological outsourcing studies. The firms were Star Mountain, Inc. and CH2M Hill, Inc. The Star Mountain/CH2M HILL combination thereafter competed among three GSA Schedule contractors to perform the very work they had just recommended to be done. They were successful in being selected to perform the five pilot studies, which again involved NPS maintenance, architecture/engineering, and the two archeological centers, the cost for the latter being $412,766 or over $200,000 per center. Cameron also replied to one final concern of Congressman Bereuter - that a CH2M Hill subcontractor had allegedly been asked by someone in the Administration to refrain from answering congressional staff questions. “We are unaware,” Cameron stated.

152. Caru, “70% of Jobs in Park Service Marked ripe for Privatizing.”
153. Fran Mainella, Director, Memorandum to all employees, January 28, 2003, National Park Service, in possession of author.
157. Director Fran Mainella, Discussion with Cameron Binkley, February 17, 2004, Atlanta, Georgia, Southeast Regional Office, National Park Service.
158. Mainella, Discussion with Cameron Binkley, February 17, 2004.
159. Cameron, Letter to Honorable Doug Bereuter, May 30, 2003. It may seem like a conflict of interest that CH2M HILL was chosen both times, but both contracts were competitively bid and the practice of choosing the same contractor that recommended the A-76 study to do the study is allowed by GSA contracting regulations.
of any specific instructions to any contractor employee not to answer questions from Members of Congress or their staffs."\textsuperscript{160}

In late May 2003, concurrent with growing congressional interest in the A-76 review of NPS archaeology, Donna Kalvels informed the heads of the two centers to limit their A-76 reviews to seasonal and temporary employees only. On May 29, 2003, OMB also issued a revised A-76 circular, probably incidental to the pilot NPS studies, but officials in both the Midwest and the Southwest Regions seized the opportunity the new rules allowed and began to plan to convert the MWAC and SEAC studies from full cost comparison reviews to a "streamlined competition."\textsuperscript{161}

On June 26, 2003, Rep. Nick J. Rahall II of West Virginia, rose to offer legislation to stop administration plans to outsource Park Service employees' jobs. According to Rahall, "the Administration's privatization scheme is so vast, so unwarranted and so clumsy that it threatens to undermine both the National Park Service and the resources it was created to protect." Rahall noted that many of the jobs that would be lost belonged to minorities. He said that the Park Service could not demonstrate how "you can build a workforce of dedicated professionals, with the experience, institutional memory and expertise of the National Park Service for less money." He accused the Park Service of spending five million dollars on private consultants, money taken from the funds needed for the operation and maintenance of the parks while "not a single study has been produced demonstrating even a nickel in savings."\textsuperscript{162}

On June 29, 2003, Jerry L. Rogers published a passionate attack on the effort to outsource NPS jobs in the Santa Fe \textit{New Mexican}. Rogers was President of the New Mexico Heritage Alliance and a retired NPS Associate Director with considerable cultural resource management experience. Regarding the FAIR Act, he wrote:

\begin{quote}
Administrators have taken a grossly simplistic approach to the act's encouragement to outsource jobs that are not "inherently governmental." If a job title such as "archaeologist" can be found in the commercial world, it has been put up for grabs. Private firms contract with federal agencies to do archaeology, drug companies employ biologists, and some historians write and publish their own work, so three professions central to the National Park Service mission have been placed at risk. The service now employs barely enough such professionals even to oversee private contractors working in those fields.
\end{quote}

National parks, Rogers's continued, were supposed to remain "unimpaired forever," but "need help from archaeologists, biologists and historians specifically trained in preservation of the resources." "The come-and-go nature of contract work," he argued, "is not amenable to the dedicated lifetime it takes to accumulate this expertise." In no other area than archaeology and history, Rogers noted, was NPS responsibility "as inherently governmental." Nevertheless, Rogers did not deny that some benefits might stem from the A-76 process. However,

\begin{quote}
Through-the-looking-glass logic, the government has concluded that high-level people with little understanding of natural and cultural resources are inherently governmental, while specialists needed to preserve the resources and provide preservation leadership are not. This is what happens when some abstract-thinking Office of Management and Budget bureaucrat applies the language of law with a broad brush to entire departments rather than carefully and specifically to the statutory missions of individual bureaus.
\end{quote}

Rogers basically concluded that no benefit would be forthcoming from the A-76 process in the Park Service until senior officials "trouble themselves actually to think about what they are doing."\textsuperscript{163}

In July 2003, considerable media attention focused upon the attempt to outsource NPS jobs. Among them, the \textit{Washington Post} claimed that "the Bush administration is considering privatizing archaeological oversight of hundreds of national parks and landmarks and firing the National Park Service

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161. MWAC A-76 Chronology, 9 (May 27, 2003 and May 29, 2003). Congress has been concerned by the cost and time imposed on the government by the A-76 initiative. One point of the revised guidelines was likely to speed up the A-76 process.
\end{flushright}
archaeologists who for decades have been charged with protecting their historic value and cultural heritage.” Guy Gugliotta quoted Donna Kalvels as saying that “budget people complain that they are taking work from the private sector” because the centers provide services to other federal agencies. MWAC archeologist Douglas Scott, who just after receiving the Interior Department’s highest honor, the Distinguished Service Award, said “two weeks later our outsourcing study begins and they’re asking, ‘Are you really necessary?’” Gugliotta also wondered about “why the centers were chosen in the first place” to be studied for outsourcing. He quoted SEAC’s Director Ehrenhard as saying that the centers “have been so underfunded and so understaffed for so long, that we’ve had to learn to be efficient. This whole idea is almost laughable, and it’s an insult.” Congressman Bereuter concluded that the decision was driven by quotas and was “very arbitrary.” “On a job-by-job basis,” he said, “there are firms that could do this work, but you’re not going to have the institutional history, archives and resources. This will destroy centers of expertise that can never be reassembled.” Ehrenhard further cautioned about the loss of the “watchdog function.” “We do what’s in the best interests of the public,” he said, “which is not always in the best interests of some developer.”

Congressman Bereuter, unhappy that Secretary Norton had failed to provide sufficient explanation with regard to how the A-76 decision for NPS archeology was made, introduced an amendment to the House Department of the Interior appropriation bill for fiscal year 2004, along with his colleague Allen Boyd Jr. of Florida. The two sought to prohibit the Park Service from spending any funds to implement the outsourcing of the NPS archeological centers. Bereuter labeled the process “stupid.” On July 17, the amendment passed on a vote of 362 to 57. Bereuter began making arrangements for similar legislation to be introduced in the Senate. Donna Kalvels responded that center managers now had authority to move to streamlined A-76 competitions and that if they did their studies would probably finish prior to any legislation’s passage into law. The lopsided vote signaled strong congressional disapproval of efforts to outsource NPS archeological jobs.

On July 24, 2003, the Senate Subcommittee on National Parks called a hearing “to conduct oversight of the competitive sourcing effort within the National Park Service.” Committee Chairman Craig Thomas of Wyoming chaired the hearing. In his statements, Thomas said that while he supported outsourcing efforts, “we have to recognize the peculiarities and the uniqueness of the Park Service.” He further noted that OMB had recently revised the A-76 Circular, causing a great deal of attention to be focused upon the Park Service. The revised A-76 Circular, made public in December 2002, had eliminated a long-standing rule that previously defined as inherently governmental all functions involving “the regulation of the use of space, oceans, navigable rivers, and other natural resources” and newly presumed the commercial nature of all federal positions unless an agency could show otherwise. Thomas also specifically noted the House vote to prohibit the outsourcing of NPS archeological centers, clearly indicating that it was a major focus of the committee’s concern.

During the hearings, none of the witnesses called to testify on behalf of the A-76 initiative even mentioned “archeology” in their prepared remarks. Officials called to testify included Angela B. Styles, the Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy, Office of Management and Budget, and the Bush Administration’s point person for its outsourcing initiative. NPS Director Fran Mainella testified alongside Styles. Two pro-outsourcing experts also testified, Sam Kleinman, Vice President for Resource Analysis, Center for Naval Analysis, Inc., and Geoffrey Segal, Director of Privatization and Government Reform Policy at the Reason Foundation. Opponents of the Bush Administration’s plans to outsource NPS jobs also testified. These were J.W. (Bill) Wade, on behalf of the Campaign to Protect America’s Lands and a Coalition of Con-

166. Senate Subcommittee on National Parks of the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, “Competitive Sourcing Effort within the National Park Service” (Hearing before the U.S. Senate, 108th Congress, 1st Session, July 24, 2003), 1.
cerned NPS Retirees, and Scot McElveen, on behalf of the Association of National Park Rangers and the Association of National Park Maintenance Employees.

The testimony by Kleinman and Segal largely focused upon the reported efficiencies of outsourcing Defense Department jobs. Wade and McElveen spoke in passionate defense of NPS employees. Wade, in particular remarked that because of competitive sourcing and similar attacks on the purpose of the Park Service, “morale is the lowest that any of us have seen in up to 50 years.” “What is at risk,” he warned, “is reducing a once proud, highly productive workforce in an agency with immense public respect and admiration into a run-of-the-mill government bureaucracy.” The hearing’s most critical exchange, however, was among Mainella, Styles, and New Mexico Senator Jeff Bingaman, known as an advocate for national parks.

Sen. Bingaman began by recounting the New Mexican article by retired NPS Associate Director Jerry Rogers. Bingaman cited Rogers’s statement critical of the “Through the Looking Glass logic” whereby “high level people with little understanding of natural and cultural resources are inherently governmental while specialists needed to preserve the resources and provide preservation leadership are not.” “I guess what seems to me to be right,” he concluded, “is that there are people who make a career decision to devote themselves to the expertise that is needed by the National Park Service in archaeology, in biology, in some particular area, and they hire on to do that, and now they’re being told, you know, your jobs are going to be competed. That causes a morale problem.” In response, Director Mainella explained that “we were asked to through [sic] the President’s management agenda, to look at different areas.” “We’re not looking,” she continued, “at the archeologists that are in the parks. We are looking at the archeologists that are in the centers that also do a lot of projects in different areas.” As previously noted, a primary reason for concentrating archeologists in centers is that most parks lack funds to hire an archeologist. In 2003, for example, there were only four NPS park-based archeologists in the Southeast Region and only three in the Midwest Region. Centers concentrate talent and maximize efficiency to provide archeological expertise to multiple parks. In further response to Sen. Bingaman, Administrator Styles remarked:

These are archeologists in a building in downtown Lincoln, Nebraska who actually [sic] went to their web site yesterday and looked at, [sic] they’re managing a data base, they are using, running a library with 2,800 documents. They are acquiring and maintaining global positioning equipment, they are writing newsletters. This is not an inherently governmental archeological function. … They will have an opportunity to compete, and it is not to rid ourselves of all the archeologists. I think in order to manage the archeological contract you do need people that understand that, but that doesn’t mean that you necessarily are providing the taxpayer the best value at the lowest cost if

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167. Kleinman’s testimony focused upon Defense Department outsourcing efforts, specifically discussing aircraft maintenance and other activities of limited relevance to the Park Service. Critics frequently claimed that the Bush Administration’s main experience in outsourcing jobs was Defense-related. Kleinman did not discuss resource management. The lack of cultural resource management expertise in the military, forty years after passage of the NHPA, suggests that comparing the relative virtues of outsourcing Interior Department jobs by Defense Department experience is an inappropriate methodology. Segal did offer some discussion of outsourcing efforts in other types of park systems, noting examples in Alaska and in Canada, but he also focused upon DoD-related successes while similarly failing to discuss cultural resources management activity.

168. Senate Subcommittee on National Parks, “Competitive Sourcing Effort within the National Park Service,” 37. Others who supplied statements to the Committee included: Colleen M. Kelley, National President, National Treasury Employees Union, who said the quota-driven privatization effort was unfair to federal employees; Boby L. Harrage Sr., National President, American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO, who criticized OMB’s refusal “to supply any research or analysis to justify the privatization quota, despite a report requirement in the FY 2003 Omnibus Appropriations Bill”; and Craig D. Oney, Vice President for Government Affairs, National Parks and Conservation Association, who made a range of comments opposed to the initiative. The Society for American Archaeology also supplied a statement in which it noted its concern for future resource stewardship in the parks, that few parks had their own archeologists, and that NPS already outsourced much of its archeological work, both to private companies and through cooperative agreements with universities. The A-76 process, it explained, would completely eliminate university involvement and training opportunities for students.

169. Senate Subcommittee on National Parks, “Competitive Sourcing Effort within the National Park Service,” 20.
170. No records have been found to indicate if Interior Department officials planned to expand the limited number of park-based archeologists, especially in the event that those based at MWAC or SEAC were outsourced.
you have archaeologists running a data base or running global positioning equipment. 171

As the hearing was taking place, another congressman, Henry Waxman, was preparing a report entitled Politics and Science in the Bush Administration to be released in early August. In his report, Waxman was to accuse the Bush Administration of so interfering with U.S. science that it was threatening to erode public trust in both science and the government. 172 The attempt to outsource archaeological positions in the Park Service may have been emblematic of a larger debate. Finally, however, on July 31, 2003, the prominent science journal Nature published an editorial entitled “Dangers of Privatization: The Bush Administration’s Drive to Contract Out Services is a Threat to Science.” The journal went on to discuss the “gloom” at SEAC and MWAC as archeologists there contemplated what some then thought were the “final days” of NPS archeology. It suggested that the privatization effort was not about improving efficiency but gutting the ability of NPS archeologists (or their perceived ability) to delay mining, logging or road-building. It cited the private consultants who had told the Park Service that it was inappropriate to conduct A-76 studies on organizations, like the centers, whose funds were already “competitively secured.” It noted accusations that Interior officials had asked its contractors not to talk to Congress. It mentioned the Nebraska congressman who labeled Interior’s A-76 process as the “bean-counter doing something senseless” approach. And it even quoted an OMB official as saying that they considered archeologists no different than “laundry workers.” Nature worried that OMB’s zeal to outsource NPS positions could devastate other agencies as well, such as the National Institutes of Health and the Environmental Protection Agency. It called upon Congress “to expose the Bush Administration’s privatization plans to tough scrutiny.” 173

On August 11, 2003, a notice was posted on InsideNPS, the internal information website of the National Park Service. The header of the notice announced the completion of the streamlined A-76 review of SEAC. It succinctly stated: “SEAC Employees Are Cost Effective.” In the notice,

171. Senate Subcommittee on National Parks, “Competitive Sourcing Effort within the National Park Service,” 21.
Director Mainella commended the center’s staff for demonstrating “their outstanding value to the American people.” The Southeast Region’s Chief of Contracting, Jerre Brumbelow, added:

The study showed that in this instance using private contractors would cost nearly twice as much as doing the work with our in-house staff. It proves that our employees who are dedicated to the mission of the Service, can provide more resource protection for the parks than if we contracted it out. Our professionals are able to provide archeological service to national park sites in the southeast region, provide skilled archeological expertise to other federal agencies and conserve thousands of artifacts now in storage at the center more efficiently than an outside source.174

Meanwhile, the A-76 study at MWAC, which had been delayed, continued on under direct order of Assistant Secretary Scarlett.175 The MWAC study could have been cancelled in light of the SEAC study’s results, but senior managers misinterpreted its findings and wanted to pursue the MWAC study to extract cost savings. The misunderstanding resulted because the Southeast Region had removed fourteen vacant positions from SEAC’s organizational chart during the A-76 review.176 In October 2003, however, this A-76 study was also terminated, because Congressman Bereuter was making further progress with his amendment to prevent the department from spending funds to contract out NPS archeological jobs. According to MWAC, “in the week leading up to this decision, he had worked to have the Amendment introduced in the House version of the DOI appropriation bill.


174. Paul Winegar, “SEAC Employees Are Cost Effective,” InsideNPS, August 11 2003, internal website of the National Park Service, copy of notice in possession of author. SEAC’s work was not actually placed for public bid against competing contractors. To make the determination of cost-efficiency, as allowed by streamlined A-76 rules, the Park Service used published price lists and historical data. In fact, information to support the study was obtained from Southeast Region parks who, on occasion, have in fact contracted their archeological needs to private firms, again suggesting the inappropriateness of conducting an A-76 study on an archeological center already in competition for its work.

175. MWAC A-76 Chronology, 11 (September 15, 2003).

176. These fourteen positions, while neither funded nor filled, roughly amounted to $850,000 in salaries. Because the positions were merely scratched from SEAC’s organizational chart, their elimination did not bring about any extra savings.

177. MWAC A-76 Chronology, 11 (October 27, 2003); A similar account is reported in Nadia Khatchadourian, “Competitive Sourcing: A Study in Selective Reasoning,” The Land Line: Get the Dirt on America’s Lands, October 31, 2003, an electronically distributed newsletter published by the Campaign to Protect America’s Lands, in possession of the author.
On November 12, 2003, Director Mainella announced her success in making some changes for the better.178 "I have requested and received approval," she said in an all-employee memorandum, "to classify fee collectors and park guides as "core to the mission." More significant for resource professionals, Mainella added that "the NPS will further improve the competitive review process by exercising the full flexibility embodied in the May 2003 revision to OMB circular A-76." This flexibility would allow the Park Service "to conduct preliminary planning reviews." Afterward, she explained, "the NPS Director will determine if a fully advertised study is needed" to compare benefits with the private sector.179

In May 2004, OMB released a study entitled "Competitive Sourcing," which reported results of the initiative for the past year. On page 14 of the study, OMB explained how streamlined competitions result in savings even when the government proves itself more successful than private business.180 Later, however, Congress asked the General Accounting Office (GAO) to initiate a series of independent studies on Bush Administration outsourcing efforts. In June 2003, the GAO found that A-76 "competitions took longer than initially projected, costs and resources required for competitions were underestimated, selecting and grouping functions to compete was problematic, and determining and maintaining reliable estimates of savings was difficult."181 In February 2004, GAO reported that OMB was not meeting its goal to improve government performance and efficiency. "To date," the report concluded, "OMB's competitive sourcing guidance to federal agencies has focused more on targets and milestones for conducting competitions than on the outcomes the competitions are designed to produce: savings, innovation, and performance improvements."182

179. Director Fran Mainella, Memorandum to All Employees, November 12, 2003, National Park Service.
180. Office of Management and Budget, "Competitive Sourcing: Report on Competitive Sourcing Results Fiscal Year 2003" (Washington, DC: Executive Office of the President, 2004), 14. Citing SEAC specifically, OMB stated, "NPS expects implementation of the MEO to trim $850,000 per year in personnel costs, saving NPS $4.2 million over five years." See also footnote 176 above.
Chapter Six: The Future of Service Archeology in the Southeast

The Southeast Archeological Center is an artifact, as it were, of a period of pronounced archeological exceptionalism within the National Park Service. That legacy largely explains the significant processes and decisions that have influenced the center’s evolution and its development. What is important, however, is that the center concept has demonstrated over time significant efficiencies both as a management tool and as a vehicle for effective resource stewardship and partnership. Historically speaking, the Southeast Archeological Center has met the needs of the Service, the public it serves, and the profession of archeology.

Chief NPS Archeologist John M. Corbett was the principal supporter of archeological centers within the National Park Service. He and Region One archeologist John W. Griffin hatched the idea to create SEAC after several NPS archeologists conducted excavations at Ocmulgee National Monument near Macon, Georgia, between 1961 and 1962. Congress created the monument in 1936 after significant archeological activity at the site during the Great Depression. The later excavations, funded by the Georgia Department of Transportation, were known affectionately as the “Big Dig” in reference to the earlier digs. Unfortunately, this work was required because the Park Service approved the construction of a highway through the park. Any potential archeological information or artifacts in the path of the roadway would be destroyed without a new “salvage” project. The notion to found an archeological “center” at Ocmulgee came naturally as Corbett pulled together a crew of NPS archeologists from different locations to do a major park-based excavation.

After all, the Park Service had constructed the monument’s museum and visitor building originally as an archeological research center and repository for the millions of artifacts produced during the 1930s. Many of these artifacts were still not fully analyzed or cataloged and were suffering less than ideal curation at the isolated southern site. By leveraging external funds, shifting some positions, and staffing an existing facility, Corbett and Griffin succeeded in their effort to improve the Service’s ability to conduct park-based archeology. The organization they set up at Ocmulgee could support an entire region while also allowing for better curation of the Ocmulgee collection. They knew then what long proved true, that there was never to be sufficient funding to provide staff archeologists to most parks that needed them. To serve parks across the region, therefore, they had to pool resources. Thus, professional concerns, the opportunities provided by historic NPS involvement in salvage archeology, and the need to maximize scant resources, drove SEAC’s creation.

With the approval of senior NPS leadership, Corbett and Griffin later sought to further extend NPS archeological capabilities in the Southeast Region by establishing a significant partnership with a major educational institution then involved in public archeology, Florida State University. Originally, their goal was to improve the management and use of Ocmulgee’s significant archeological collections in situ, but eventually they chose to relocate SEAC entirely, as well as its collections. This decision brought significant synergies, faculty expertise, and much student participation to the center’s archeological activities, all of which con-
continued to promote efficiency, professionalism, and the public benefits of federal archeology. However, it also created friction. First, the staff of Ocmulgee and Macon locals were reluctant to see a treasured artifact collection moved to distant Florida. Second, the decision to move to Florida ranked Office of Archeology and Preservation Director Ernest Allen Connally, playing into the historic rivalry between historic preservationists and archeologists within the Park Service. While separatism has generally worked in favor of the quality and effectiveness of NPS archeology, in this case there were negative repercussions. As one apparent result, John Griffin resigned while Connally “retired” the Chief Archeologist himself for resisting his initiatives. Washington staff archeologist George R. Fischer also resisted Connally while at the same time promoting the creation of an NPS underwater archeological capability that he thought would be well suited to SEAC if relocated to Florida. Fischer’s promotion of underwater archeology to FSU faculty and staff and Griffin’s personal friendship with FSU Anthropology Department Chairman Hale G. Smith were the principal factors behind the university interest in partnering with the Park Service. With the help of native Floridian and Assistant Secretary of Interior Nathaniel P. Reed, Connally was overruled. In 1972, SEAC thus relocated. However, without strong Washington office support the effort to crystallize an NPS underwater archeological capability in Florida languished. That same year widespread regional and archeological disaffection with OAH, inspired Director George Hartzog to return authority for the NPS archeological centers to the field where they remained functionally independent from park superintendents but under regional oversight. This arrangement, which the center supported, has tended to help keep NPS archeology both independent, by accruing crucial regional support, and effective, by keeping archeology above the park level. However, for that same reason, a refusal to share power, no multi-regional northeast center ever materialized, while historic complaints about sharing centralized archeological functions across administrative boundaries were not limited to underwater archeology.

During the 1970s, SEAC made important strides in improving the curation of its considerable and growing archeological collection through the assistance of FSU faculty and students and under the direction of center Chief Richard D. Faust. A critical shortage of space, however, plagued the center’s operations on campus and was the subject of discussion and negotiation with FSU officials for many years. Meanwhile, in 1974, Congress passed the Moss-Bennett Act which significantly opened up archeological contracting opportunities. Moss-Bennett required any federal construction project or federally licensed activity or program to conduct archeological salvage in advance of a project that threatened to destroy an historically significant site. It also authorized those agencies to spend up to 1 percent of a project’s budget upon the activity. Ironically, Moss-Bennett helped heighten concerns about the financial management of contract archeology. In 1975, NPS officials removed the Interagency Archeological Salvage Program (IASP) from the control of regional directors and archeological centers to prevent irregularities. Both SEAC and the Midwest Archeological Center (MWAC) had deep roots in salvage archeology, but following Moss-Bennett both became entirely park-focused. A more important result for SEAC, however, was that the FSU Anthropology Department established a Southeast Conservation Archeology Center (SCAC) to better avail the university of contract opportunities. SCAC was intended to operate by contracting year round, an activity normally difficult for teaching professors. This development was at first highly encouraging for SEAC. It moved the Anthropology Department decisively in the direction of a cultural resource management program. Unfortunately, because NPS funded SCAC’s director to carry out curation contracts for SEAC, a conflict of interest gradually came into being and the Park Service ended its support for the initiative, which the department later terminated.

Despite the demise of SCAC, cooperative activity between SEAC and the university began to flourish in the area of underwater archeology. In the early 1980s, both George Fischer and the Park Service gained considerable publicity by becoming involved in litigation and archeological activity relating to a sunken wreck in Biscayne National Park. Capitalizing upon SEAC’s FSU partnership, Fischer testified in court on the government’s behalf while FSU students, staff, and the diving resources of the university and the state of Florida, as well as those of the Park Service, were brought to bear to find, survey, document, and identify the vessel, understood to be HMS _Fowey_, to help adju-
dicate the issue of proper legal ownership. The
court’s decision to favor the Park Service was pre-
cedent-setting and helped build a case for passage
of the Abandoned Shipwreck Act of 1987. By 1984,
the NPS-FSU partnership had completed a
thorough, professional, well-documented body of
work, including a peer-reviewed journal article on
the wreck, as well as management recommenda-
tions for treatment and care of the site, all of which
was completed, as far as can be determined, in the
most professional and efficient manner possible by
maximal partnership participation.

In the midst of an NPS reorganization in 1984, the
Park Service directed SEAC to cease its underwater
archaeological operations so that these could be cen-
tralized in Santa Fe, New Mexico, in an
organization run by a former FSU student and
SEAC employee, Daniel Lenihan, who reported to
the Southwest Regional Director. No management
study was conducted to justify this decision, which
by all accounts was made because George Fischer
had fallen out of favor in some circles while Daniel
Lenihan had fallen into favor in others. This
decision ended all NPS cooperative activity in
underwater archeology with Florida State Uni-
versity even after the university emerged as a leader
in the field and while Lenihan’s group lacked any
comparable partnership. The failure of the Park
Service to cooperate with the university in under-
water archeology also ended SEAC’s second
opportunity to promote the development of a
major cultural resource management program
within the FSU Anthropology Department.
Moreover, despite repeated efforts by Southeast
Region officials, Lenihan’s organization also failed
to cooperate with SEAC in co-management of the
Southeast Region’s underwater archeological
resources, preferring to make its own decisions,
which led to long-term confusion and conflict over
the management of those resources that has not
fully abated.

The collapse of underwater archeology at SEAC
and the problematical management of the region’s
submerged resources since 1984 is perhaps an
extreme example of archeological separatism.
There is a strong case to be made that underwater
archeology is a regional cultural management
function, that it should be supported through an
archaeological center or otherwise directed at the
regional level, and in future NPS “realignments” or
“consolidations” that notion might be considered.
At least it can be said that in 1984 the best place for
the Park Service to consolidate underwater arche-
ology was near the center of such activity, such as in
Florida, and not in New Mexico. In Florida court
battles over lost Spanish galleons abounded,
aboriginal artifacts could be found on its sub-
merged coastal plains, extreme diving enthusiasts,
like Daniel Lenihan himself, routinely explored
Florida’s deep inland springs and underwater caves
helping to create a culture supportive of locally
based professional activity even as it increased the
need for better resource management. Indeed, in
Florida, the Park Service managed its largest sub-
merged holdings, putting an NPS underwater
archeology capability nearest the resources, the
most interested partners, and a complex of facilities
best poised to allow it to achieve the greatest syn-
ergies and efficiencies and to do the most good.

After the collapse of underwater archeology at
SEAC and the termination of SCAC, pressure
increased on both SEAC and the FSU Anthro-
polgy Department to resolve each’s long-running
insufficiencies in terms of space. The first problem
was that SEAC’s collections and staff continued to
grow. The second problem was increasing legal and
regulatory requirements that outpaced the center’s
facilities on campus. In 1985, Interior’s Inspector
General reported that a “material weakness”
existed in the management of NPS and Interior
Department museum and archeological collections.
Then in January 1987, columnist Jack Anderson
published a column critical of how the Park Service
was managing those resources and this promoted
further congressional scrutiny. Congress eventually
authorized new funding to address the problem.
Finally, in 1990, Congress enacted the Native
American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act,
which imposed significant new requirements on
federal authorities responsible for museum and
archeological collections. SEAC’s curation of its
huge and still important archeological collection,
though greatly improved since relocation to Florida
State, became a more urgent issue and regional
authorities supported a serious drive to resolve
some of these concerns. After considering various
options, the Park Service decided to move SEAC off
campus while trying to maintain the best aspects of
the cooperative NPS-FSU agreement by keeping
SEAC close to the university. A site, Innovation
Park, was eventually selected near downtown Tallah-
hassee. SEAC formally opened its doors at the FSU-affiliated light industrial complex on December 6, 1995.

Simultaneous with efforts to relocate the center, another major reorganization of the National Park Service began. Concerned with the size of central offices, Director Roger G. Kennedy consolidated ten regional NPS directorates into seven. In the Southeast, Regional Director Robert Baker relocated the IAS Division in Atlanta to SEAC in Tallahassee. The merger of these organizations reduced the size of the Southeast Regional office by increasing the size - and scope - of SEAC. After nearly twenty years, external contracting, the “out-house” part of public archeology, returned to the center. Under the guidance of a new director, John E. Ehrenhard, and through synergies created by the merger, the center became significantly involved in intra-agency support, public awareness and education campaigns, issues related to the public interpretation of archeology, and site stabilization. It embarked upon a significant publishing campaign. Such activity greatly raised the center’s profile. In fact, SEAC’s reputation for excellent work led Shiloh National Military Park to hire the center to conduct a major mitigation at Mound A of Shiloh Mounds National Historic Landmark within the park. Mound A is part of an ancient Mississippian cultural site on the banks of the Tennessee River threatened by imminent loss due to severe erosion. This multi-season excavation, which involved significant numbers of FSU students mobilized through SEAC’s long-standing partnership activity, turned out to be one of the biggest federal digs of modern times, and was clearly resonant with the historic role that the Park Service has played in managing archeological resources in the Southeast since the Great Depression.

In late 2002, senior federal officials ordered an outsourcing review of the Southeast Archeological Center as part of a larger effort to privatize federal positions under President George W. Bush’s five-part Management Agenda. Both SEAC and its sister center in the Midwest Region came under scrutiny because of their organizational status, their high concentration of archeologists, and their work for other federal agencies, such as the military. The decision to conduct the bureaucratically labeled “A-76” or “competitive sourcing review” of NPS jobs, especially those at the archeological centers, provoked considerable publicity in the media and drew the attention of interest groups. Once the
studies began, the contractors hired to conduct them informed NPS officials that the archeological centers were not sound candidates for an A-76 review. Nevertheless, officials ordered the studies to continue. As a result, congressmen from both major political parties became concerned. The A-76 studies led to congressional inquiries, hearings, and proposed legislation specifically designed to prevent the government from funding the outsourcing of NPS archeological jobs. Congressman Doug Bereuter labeled the government’s process “stupid” and “arbitrary” and challenged senior officials from the department, the agency, and the Office of Management and Budget to explain adequately the basis for their decision-making. Finally, in August 2003, the Park Service announced that SEAC had demonstrated its efficiency over private contractors and by a wide margin.

The concentration of a single professional discipline - archeology - at SEAC may again attract the attention of high officials seeking greater administrative efficiencies. NPS archeologists will no doubt find it keenly important to communicate to future managers how the efficiency of an archeological center varies from having a cadre of highly experienced staff at a central location precisely because there are too few to staff at individual parks. Even if that were possible, these staff would still tend to be diffused, disconnected, and difficult to deploy on a regional basis to conduct the type of work done by a center. Moreover, in the unlikely event that funding is ever made available to staff every park with the number of archeologists that each needed, such an arrangement could not likely generate anywhere near an equivalent level of partnership activity as possible through a centralized archeological center. Modern efforts to facilitate federal-university collaborations, such as through the network of “Cooperative Ecosystem Study Units” or CESUs, are adaptive to park-based archeology. They cannot compare, however, to the synergies achieved by SEAC and the FSU Anthropology Department, especially during the height of their fully collaborative efforts in the 1970s and 1980s. Indeed, SEAC also participates in CESU activity.\(^1\) Although this study has revealed some of the limitations of a close partnership association, SEAC adapted organizationally to changing times and policies, retained the key efficiencies of the NPS-FSU accord, and expanded a set of more limited collaborative activities across a broader spectrum of partners in the 1990s. It is unlikely that any individual park in the national park system could achieve a similar nexus.

Today, the Southeast Archeological Center not only fulfills its central, historic, and legally mandated role as the Southeast Region’s key authority on matters of applied archeology, but it adds value to those roles, as is clearly evident through its efforts to link archeology and interpretation. More than ever, SEAC has much to offer the region’s parks, decision-makers, and external partners and clients. It is likely, especially given the flow of world events, that outside agencies, perhaps especially the military, will continue to seek (and fund) the center’s expertise in helping them to meet their own cultural resource responsibilities, at least as long as Congress deems it fit that they should. This may be as it should be for the military’s core mission is far removed from resource stewardship while that is the very reason that the Park Service exists. Moreover, having repeatedly experienced trial by fire, NPS archeologists can take comfort in knowing that their centers are more likely to prevail in future “reallocations,” “consolidations,” or “competitive sourcing” reviews than to wither. Finally, though it has provoked reactive attitudes, there is little historical evidence that the separate stance of archeology within the Park Service, as illustrated by this study of the Southeast Archeological Center, has detracted from the ability of the Service to deliver on its core mission. Rather, it has done much to make that achievement possible. Certainly, the major caveats relating to underwater archeology and early frictions between archeologists and historic preservationists deserve careful note. Former Chief Historian Robert M. Utley was a participant in some of those struggles and an aide to Ernest Connally as he fought them. The author is indebted to his informative insight. Nevertheless, the overall findings here are conclusive that those who sought to “keep archeology separate” have well served the National Park Service and the goals of resource stewardship.

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\(^1\) In fact, the South Florida-Caribbean CESU coordinator for the Park Service was initially based at SEAC.

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Appendix A: Chronology of Major Events at the Southeast Archeological Center

1892  Casa Grande, Arizona, becomes first archeological site to receive federal protection.

1906  Congress passes Antiquities Act, first national preservation law - largely in recognition of need to protect archeological sites - and establishes Mesa Verde National Park in Colorado.

December 1933  Civil Works Administration (CWA) grants funds for relief archeology to be conducted on ancient aboriginal sites located near Macon, Georgia, under Arthur R. Kelly of Smithsonian Institution.

April 1934  Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) assumes responsibility for relief archeology. Later, work is commissioned under Works Progress Administration (WPA) and Public Works Administration (PWA), with much labor supplied by the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC). Excavations near Macon receive national attention and become some of the largest ever conducted in the history of American archeology. Archeologists later affectionately refer to these as the "Big Dig."

December 1936  Upon completion of NPS study, Ocmulgee National Monument is established in Macon. Ocmulgee NM visitor/museum center is planned as an artifact repository and archeological "research center."

1938  Arthur Kelly accepts position as "Chief, Archeological Sites Division" in Washington, DC, under reorganized Branch of Historic Sites, a position supervised by Chief Historian Ronald F. Lee.

1937-1942  Under NPS and relief-era administration, archeology work continues at Ocmulgee while NPS develops the monument. With onset of WW II, relief-era archeology comes to an end. Processing and reporting of many Macon-area artifact collections are left incomplete.

April 1945  Committee for the Recovery of Archaeological Remains (CRAR) is formed to continue work of government-sponsored relief in a new era of massive water reclamation projects that threaten to destroy vast numbers of archeological sites. CRAR lobbies effectively for more than two decades to obtain funds to conduct "salvage" archeology in advance of Bureau of Reclamation and Corps of Engineers projects.

Summer 1945  NPS establishes Interagency Archeological Salvage Program (IASP) under authority of Historic Sites Act of 1935 and in cooperation with Smithsonian Institution. Involvement in relief-era archeology predisposes NPS for administration of salvage archeological projects funded by other federal agencies engaged in large-scale terrain modification activities such as reservoir, gas pipeline, and highway construction.

1946  Foremost program of IASP, massive River Basin Surveys (RBS) begins: focus of effort soon becomes Missouri Basin Project (MBP). Much of this work is contracted to partner universities. MBP at Lincoln, Nebraska, will eventually transform into the NPS Midwest Archeological Center (MWAC) in 1969.

1948  NPS archeology remains under Branch of Historic Sites but salvage archeology is transferred from Chief Historian to NPS archeologist John M. Corbett.

1950  John Corbett is appointed to head NPS archeology (park and salvage) but continues to report to Chief Historian. Corbett is soon called to duty in Korean War; his position is held temporarily by archeologist John Cotter.

1954  Southwest Archeological Center (SWAC) is established; later becomes the Western Archeological and Conservation Center.


1958  John Corbett becomes first Chief Archeologist of NPS as head of Division of Archeology. He reports, as does Chief Historian, to head of Division of Interpretation. Corbett seeks to expand park-based archeology by "leveraging" salvage work.

John W. Griffin hired as Regional Archeologist for Region One.
June 27, 1960
Congress passes Reservoir Salvage Act, legitimating informal practices developed by NPS and Smithsonian archeologists in league with construction agencies. Latter are now required to facilitate salvage archeology and not provide for it as a courtesy.

September 8, 1961
NPS Director Conrad L. Wirth succumbs to political pressure and authorizes construction of an interstate highway through Ocmulgee National Monument.

1961-1962
A temporary "research unit" is set up at Ocmulgee NM to conduct archeological investigations in advance of planned roadway construction through the park; funding is supplied by Georgia DOT.

1963
National Academy of Sciences completes The Robbins Report, which strongly supports creation of research laboratories or centers within NPS. It advocates NPS to create such research centers "whenever possible outside the limits of a park in some instances supported, administered and used jointly with other agencies or organizations."

October 25, 1966
SEAC created as a "field dependency" of Division of Archeology. Griffin is appointed Chief, but John "Jack" W. Walker is appointed Acting Chief until Griffin completes academic training and arrives in June 1967.

1967
NPS Director George B. Hartzog Jr. creates Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation (OAH) and appoints Ernest Allen Connally as Director. Connally seeks to create a "European-style monuments agency" within NPS. He is dogged by conflict with archeologists throughout his tenure.

October 1967
Director Hartzog expresses specific interest in management, archives, and collections of Ocmulgee NM.

Early 1968
NPS begins to determine Department of Interior and NPS responsibilities and potential for development of an NPS underwater archeology program. Reports find significant potential for expansion of archeological studies on NPS lands; few institutions possess sufficient capacity to undertake such investigations. OAH supports archeologists George R. Fischer and Marion Riggs in obtaining diving training.

September 4, 1968
Director Hartzog directs Connally to "initiate steps promptly to relate Ocmulgee National Monument to an appropriate University as a research station for the University. Steps should also be taken to relate Ocmulgee (SEAC) to the University with a Research Center on the University campus." In same memo, he directs SEAC to assume administrative authority over Ocmulgee NM itself.

Mid-September 1968
Corbett initiates discussions with University of Georgia officials on transfer of Ocmulgee NM to Division of Archeology and establishment of a research center.

Sept.-Oct. 1968
First underwater archeological investigations by Fischer, Riggs, and Calvin R. Cummings at Montezuma Well (a unit of Montezuma Castle National Monument in Arizona), mark beginning of efforts to forge a national NPS underwater archeological capability.

October 1, 1968
SEAC assumes authority over Ocmulgee NM, which is removed from Region One and placed beneath OAH, effectively relieving park Superintendent C. Fred Bohannon of command. Connally, Corbett, Fischer, and UGA officials discuss "potential research relations with the Center at Ocmulgee."

1968-1969
SEAC focuses upon salvage work and limited progress is made on implementing research proposals for park areas. Work toward long-range program is limited by manpower, program restrictions, and communication problems. Little is done to address Ocmulgee and Lamar backlog or to evaluate material from the "Big Dig."

April 1969
George Fischer presents research on underwater archeology of Montezuma Well; he and NPS archeologist Zorro Bradley hold discussions with Florida State University. Similarly, Griffin consults with FSU Anthropology Chair Hale G. Smith about possible relocation of SEAC to FSU. Griffin and Smith are long-time colleagues and friends.

July 1, 1969
MWAC is created from MBP project and made third "field dependency" of Division of Archeology within OAH.

September 20, 1969
Former Ocmulgee Superintendent Bohannon transfers upon request to Director Hartzog; Kennesaw Mountain NM assumes administration of Ocmulgee NM in August 1969 while SEAC remains responsible for park interpretation. Management Assistant W. Pingree Crawford arrives in December 1969 and is promoted to superintendent in March 1971, restoring independent management to the monument.

October 1969
Griffin and Corbett hold discussions with FSU and University of Georgia on relocation of SEAC.
December 1969
FSU President Stanley Marshall writes Director Hartzog expressing formal interest in pursuing the relocation of SEAC to FSU. He says space will be available in the Dept. of Anthropology and that a MOA similar to that negotiated between NPS and the University of Arizona is acceptable.

January 20, 1970
Griffin formally proposes SEAC relocate to FSU. He believes “the basic collections under curatorial care [should be] retained at Ocmealge as the Ocmealge Research Station of SEAC.”

February 23, 1970
Griffin writes FSU Dean of Graduate Studies Robert M. Johnson to encourage him to meet with reluctant OAHP Chief Connally to “express to him our mutual interests.”

March 1970
Fischer and Griffin hold talks with FSU; Fischer discusses joint efforts in underwater archaeology with Florida Department of Archives and History. FSU reviews draft cooperative agreement. FSU’s General Counsel suggests that separate space and cooperative agreements be negotiated. Griffin tells Corbett that “the space agreement would take more time, but I hope that it, too, will be pursued aggressively.”

January 26, 1971
Connally writes Director Hartzog saying “at the current and predictable level of activity I see no justification for the establishment of an archeological center in Florida and recommend that no commitment be made favoring such establishment.”

February 1971
OAHP Chief Connally counsels Chief Archeologist John Corbett to retire, frictions between the two over the role of archeology within OAHP and the Chaco Canyon Research Center have caused much stress. John Griffin accepts Executive Directorship of St. Augustine Historical Society. He tells his wife that he fears Connally plans to reassign him for promoting SEAC’s move to FSU. Richard D. Faust becomes Acting Chief, SEAC.

May 1971
Charles R. McGimsey III, Director, Arkansas Archeological Survey campaigns for “a coordinated nationwide program of problem-oriented archeology.” He advocates creation of an Office of Archeology and Anthropology set up parallel to OAHP. He wants “a series of bold administrative steps which will indicate to all that the Park Service can assume its rightful position as the principal federal agency responsible for the Nation’s archeological resources.” McGimsey strongly supports research centers, seeing them as regional resources apart from their research function in that they allow accumulation of data and collections that no other organization provides as well as regional information nodes or clearing houses between various federal agencies and the archeological community.

August 1971
Corbett reassigned as Special Aistant to Connally, but Hartzog refuses to allow him to be Dept. Consulting Arch. for fear the position might be removed from NPS. Corbett soon retires. Corbett’s staff archeologists, Bradley and Fischer, having supported Corbett against Connally, soon return to the field: Bradley heads to Alaska, Fischer eventually joins SEAC after its move to Tallahassee.

September 1971
Assistant Interior Secretary Nathaniel P. Reed intervenes in decision to move SEAC. Interior Secretary Rogers C. B. Morton authorizes NPS-FSU negotiations, although these cannot duplicate the underwater research facilities of Florida State’s Division of Archives, History, and Records Management.

December 16, 1971
Connally reaches agreement with Claude Cox, Chief of the Creek Nation, to allow a contingent of Creek Indians to establish a trading post in the basement of Ocmealge NM in space occupied by SEAC.

January 1972
SEAC Acting Chief Faust complains about FSU foot-dragging in negotiations over the minimum space requirements necessary for SEAC. Faust clashes with Bradley and Fischer on “their view that the most important thing was to agree to move to F.S.U. and to work out the details later.” FSU is evasive in making any commitments (possibly due to internal divisions).

January 19, 1972
Connally informs Director Hartzog that “negotiations for a satisfactory arrangement with the University of Georgia were fruitless. Florida State has a stronger, more prestigious Department of Anthropology and has offered adequate space at a reasonable rate.” He credits Assistant Secretary Reed for making the move to Tallahassee possible.

By early 1972
Amidst NPS reorganization and pressure from field managers opposed to OAHP, Director Hartzog returns line authority over archeological centers to regional directors and pulls many of Connally’s historians, marking the end of efforts to create a mini-monuments-style agency within the Park Service. Connally, who abandoned academia for his OAHP job, accepts defeat with aplomb and rises in rank.

January 31, 1972
Charles H. Fairbanks, University of Florida, expresses belated interest in hosting SEAC. NPS is surprised by the interest as SEAC is a few days away from signing a formal MOU with FSU.
April 12, 1972  SEAC signs cooperative agreement with FSU. After relocating, SEAC will work closely with FSU’s Anthropology Department for many years despite problems relating to insufficient space that hamper each's operations.

December 31, 1972  President Nixon fires Director Hartzog for eliminating Bebe Rebozo’s docking privileges at Biscayne NP. Under Hartzog the Park Service made important strides in resource management but the collapse of OAHP was a disappointment.

1972-1984  After the arrival of Fischer, SEAC begins to develop an NPS underwater archeological capability. The NPS-FSU cooperative agreement provides SEAC with access to FSU students, FSU and Florida state facilities, and FSU’s academic diving program.

January 1973  SEAC transfers bulk of the Ocmulgee archeological collections to the FSU campus and begins to contract with FSU Anthropology Department for curatorial maintenance. Quickly mythologized as the “Midnight Move,” this transfer is long lamented by Ocmulgee staff and some Macon citizens.

1973  George Fischer hires Daniel Lenihan, a diving enthusiast and one of his FSU graduate students, as a park ranger/archeologist to participate on a shipwreck survey of Gulf Islands National Seashore.

1974  Congress passes the Archeological and Historic Preservation Act (Moss-Bennett) requiring federal agencies to fund recovery or protection of archeological or historical resources subject to adverse impact as a result of any construction project (reservoir, road-building, or otherwise) planned by such agency or its licensee. Up to 1 percent of project costs are to be included for salvage archeology, which overnight creates a contracting market for private consulting firms.

1975  NPS managers remove IASP from control of regional directors and archeological centers due to auditing concerns. SEAC becomes entirely park-focused.

1975  Fischer conducts a submerged archeological resources survey for Biscayne NP, locating twenty-two wrecks, one of which will later be identified as HMS Fowey, an eighteenth-century British warship.

1975  Southwest Region archeologist Calvin Cummings secures external agency funding to study the affects of reservoir inundation on archeological sites. The National Reservoir Inundation Study (NRIS) begins and lasts five years. Cummings hires Daniel Lenihan to run the study.

Late 1977  Macon-area businessman John Holley launches unsuccessful campaign to force NPS to return SEAC’s artifact collection to Macon.

Late 1977  James Stoutamire files annual fiscal year report on FSU curation of SEAC’s artifact collection noting many improvements, as well as serious past problems, regarding their care at Ocmulgee NM.

1978-1981  Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service (HCRS) is created; IASP and other external programs are removed from NPS. Paul B. Hartwig, who is to play important role in SEAC’s history, enters NPS from HCRS when the short-lived agency is abolished.

August 1978  FSU clears creation of the Southeast Conservation Archaeology Center (SCAC). SCAC’s purpose is to conduct archeological contracting, NPS curational maintenance, and serve as a vehicle for promoting public archeology at the university.

October 1978  Sport diver Gerald Klein files for title in Admiralty Court to the wreck of a sunken and abandoned vessel located in the waters of Legare Anchorage in Biscayne NP. Klein mistakenly believes the wreck a gold-laden Spanish galleon. NPS quickly intervenes as defendant claiming title.

Late 1978  SEAC and FSU renew cooperative accord, which includes new provisions relating to Native American populations and cooperation in underwater archeology while de-emphasizing salvage contracting.

February 1980  SEAC seriously considers an offer by Florida State Museum, an arm of the University of Florida in Gainesville, to relocate to its facilities. After FSU offers SEAC more expansive quarters, NPS turns down the offer by the museum, perhaps prematurely. The sticking point, however, is that the museum is also unable to meet SEACs growing space requirements.

Spring 1980  NRIS study ends and Southwest Cultural Resource Center declares the creation of the Submerged Cultural Resources Unit led by Daniel Lenihan. The unit is nicknamed “SCRU.”

June-July 1980  Injunction is issued granting NPS temporary custody of wreck site sought by Klein after Fischer testifies as sole government witness; SEAC conducts research to pinpoint wreck location, makes a preliminary survey, and demonstrates NPS stewardship to court.
July 8, 1980  FSU offers to lease to the Park Service 4,990 net usable square feet on campus in a consolidated location. Extensive negotiations follow.

Late 1981  Stoutamire files final FSU curatorial report. Complications over Stoutamire's extensive contracting activities with non-NPS parties and the creation of SCAC have raised conflict of interest issues. SCAC is soon dissolved while Stoutamire moves on. NPS-FSU cooperation peaks, when in August SEAC is forced to cancel its curation contracts with FSU, although these are later restored.

May 6, 1982  Citing lean times, Dean Robert Johnson withdraws FSU's previous offer to lease additional space on campus to allow expanded NPS operations.

September 16, 1982  U.S. Senator Paula Hawkins contacts Southeast Region Officials on behalf of the Leon County Research and Development Authority. The Authority is developing "Innovation Park," a residential industrial complex near FSU, and wants to host SEAC, given that "the needs of the university are such that they cannot continue to lease prime space in the heart of the campus to [SEAC]."

1983  President Ronald Reagan directs the Park Service to reorganize. Consolidation of the archeological centers is considered but rejected by April 1983. Supporters of former SEAC employee Daniel Lienihan argue the need to consolidate underwater archeology in Santa Fe, New Mexico, although no management study is conducted to make that case.


Early 1984  SEAC releases a prospectus on its underwater archeological efforts and joint activities with FSU and the state of Florida.

1980-1984  SEAC archeologists and FSU students working under George Fischer conduct and publish important body of research, including a peer-reviewed article, using a variety of archeological and historical techniques to identify and document HMS Fowey. Despite SCAC's collapse, NPS-FSU cooperation in underwater archeology holds great promise.

February 17, 1984  NPS Director Russell Dickenson directs SEAC to phase out its underwater archeological capability by September 30, 1984 and thereafter to acquire similar research services from SCRU in Santa Fe, New Mexico, under authority of the Southwest Regional Director. NPS conducts no management study to justify or evaluate either the merits or the impact of this decision. Simultaneously, Dickenson directs initiation of a management study to determine the merits and costs of combining SEAC's operations with the Southeast Cultural Resource and Preservation Center (SECRPC) and moving SEAC to Atlanta.

April 1, 1984  John E. Ehrenhard is promoted to be division chief of the Interagency Archeological Services (IAS) Division stationed in Atlanta.

April 23, 1984  Chief Faust urges the Southeast Region "to maintain program coordination and control in order to ensure responsiveness to regional cultural resource management requirements" regarding underwater archeology. His concern is cost effectiveness, decline in quality, and loss to NPS of the advantages of the NPS-FSU cooperative agreement after phasing out SEAC's underwater archeological capability.

July 1984  Associate Director Jerry L. Rogers circulates draft Special Directive. The Directive codifies SCRU as "the sole unit authorized to provide professional support services to park managers throughout the Service." In August, Acting Southeast Regional Director Carroll W. (Jack) Ogle responds with numerous concerns that SCRU's expansive mandate will impair resource management in the Southeast and throughout the Service. Discussions continue without a clear result.

January 11, 1985  Paul Hartwig appointed Deputy Associate Regional Director for Cultural Resources, Southeast Regional Office.

1985  FSU anthropology graduate student Judy Lynn Hellmich completes masters thesis. Her thesis argues that the rising cost of excavation, reduced funding, and the development of the "preservation ethic" have led many archeologists to re-evaluate the value of curated collections despite a strong academic prejudice toward original field excavations. Her findings offer positive evidence of the value of SEAC's collections for continuing research, the importance of maintaining that collection's integrity, and the merits of the NPS-FSU partnership of which her thesis is a significant fruit.
1985
Inspector General of the Interior Department conducts Department-wide audit and determines that "a substantial portion of the museum property in the parks visited was vulnerable to theft and misappropriation because of inadequate accounting controls."

1985
Internal management study ordered by Director Dickenson concludes. After carefully analyzing cost factors, it concludes that consolidating SECRPC and SEAC in Atlanta is prohibitively expensive.

December 3, 1986
Chief Historian Edwin C. Bearss writes to Southeast Regional Director protesting "a turf battle between personnel in the Southeast Archeological Center and the Submerged Cultural Resources Unit." Bearss writes to support SCRU, but his letter reveals that Southeast Region archeological program management has been compromised by the consolidation of underwater archeology. Superintendents now have two sources for underwater archeological advice.

January 6, 1987
Writer Jack Anderson publishes a column on the IG report that attracts congressional interest in the state NPS management of its museum and archeological collections. The backlog in cataloging is singled out. NPS begins to submit funding proposals to address the problem that numerous reports label a "material weakness." Chief Curator Ann Hitchcock estimates that it will take thirty years at then current funding levels to correct a backlog of 22.6 million objects, a good portion of which belong to SEAC.

1988
George Fischer retires from NPS, but increases his teaching on underwater archeology at FSU, which helps it become well known in this area.

Congress approves new funding to promote resolution of Interior's "material weakness" designation for museum curation. SEAC requests funds to hire two museum specialists, which brings Mesa Verde curator Allen Bohmert to SEAC in 1990.

May 19, 1988
FSU attempts to raise SEAC's rental rates despite terms of an existing agreement. Discord is smoothed over but NPS realizes its continued presence on-campus may not be sustainable. Southeast Regional Director Robert Baker asks Chief Faust not to retire until he negotiates a satisfactory resolution to SEAC's housing crunch with FSU.

September 19, 1988
Deputy Associate Regional Director Hartwig, Southeast Region, advises Chief Faust that if FSU is unable to provide space on campus, then "GSA will be instructed to seek a suitable location off campus for the entire SEAC operation. This will include curatorial as well as the other SEAC administrative functions; all functions will move to the new building."

March 15, 1989
Meeting held at Ocmulgee to address management issues in relations between park and SEAC. Park concerns include the nature of relations between the Regional Office, SEAC, and itself regarding the management and accountability of its archeological collections. It is eager to see progress in completing the backlog cataloging and return of the collections. Regional authorities side with SEAC's interpretation of management authority.

April 1989
Following much NPS-FSU consultation, FSU notifies GSA that it cannot supply the necessary space to expand SEAC on campus because of inadequate facilities. SEAC must consider off-campus space.

September 1989
After a year of inaction by GSA, Susan Alexander, a diligent GSA Realty Specialist, assumes responsibility for helping SEAC solve its space needs.

1990
The Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act becomes law. NAGPRA requires much stricter federal supervision of archeological collections and helps bring new funds to NPS curation.

1991
Interior Secretary Manuel Lujan pronounces a national strategy for federal archeology. He names four essential goals for federal archeology: preserving sites in situ, conserving archeological collections and their associated records, disseminating research results, and promoting public education and outreach.

July 1, 1991
Chief Faust informs FSU Anthropology Chair Bruce Grindal that "we are in desperate need of additional space now." He expresses that "our long term needs (year 2000) hopefully can be met by space in the yet to be constructed Biology Unit 2 building" on the FSU campus. However, the memo means that SEAC intends to withdraw all operations off campus.

July 2, 1991
FSU's Anthropology Department proposes long-range plans to establish an Institute of Underwater Archaeology to promote specialized training and research in submerged resources management.

August 11, 1991
GSA posts an advertisement in the Tallahassee Democrat soliciting private bids for the lease of approximately 10,500 square feet within an area whose boundaries were determined by proximity to FSU.
Some regional directors raise concerns about archeological centers. Associate Director for Cultural Resources Jerry Rogers explains past NPS studies on centers, especially during the 1983 realignment but concedes to a new one.

President Bill Clinton directs the Park Service to reorganize. Under Vice President Al Gore, the “Reinventing Government” initiative seeks to improve results and performance, but is generally translated to mean FTE cuts of up to 25 percent.

Director Roger G. Kennedy solicits ideas on the future of NPS archeology while he plans NPS reorganization. NPS archeologists note that NPS archeology is driven by development decisions while the park system had so greatly expanded that inadequate archeological staff could only focus upon area surveys and site-specific compliance. Scientific and interpretive objectives are not being met and “the NPS is losing rapidly its scientific leadership and its professional credibility.”

Meetings are held to remedy long-standing problems in relations between SEAC, Southeast Regional Office, and SCRU. Frictions increase as SCRU conducts work on HMS Fowey and at Dry Tortugas National Park.

Meanwhile freelance writer Eric Adams publishes an article about SCRU’s work on HMS Fowey in Naval History that unaccountably obfuscates and plagiarizes prior work done by SEAC and FSU researchers.

Director Kennedy tasks Western Regional Director Baker, recently transferred from the Southeast Region, to evaluate “how the ‘archeological centers’ might be restructured and reduced to support our overall FTE goals” during reorganization. Baker considers various regional proposals and advises the Director to exercise restraint. Other regional directors follow suit and Director Kennedy heeds their advice.

The most influential proposal Baker reviews is by the Midwest Regional Office (MRO). Quoting from a 1987 NPS report, MRO argues that the “centers are a viable and efficient way to accomplish the Service’s archeological programs.” MRO points out how the centers function effectively because they report to officials who are “hierarchically above park superintendents.” The center concept provides economies of scale while allowing NPS archeologists to achieve “a strong voice in advocating the interest of its archeological resources.” MRO recommends expanding SEAC and the Midwest Archeological Center (MWAC) and creating a northeast region center. Finally, MRO advises NPS to “move underwater archeological research team to SEAC to provide more logical and economical location for activities.” Chief Anthropologist Scovill discusses the idea with Chief Faust as he prepares to retire, but no action is taken.

Even as the future of the archeological centers is debated, NPS decides to relocate SEAC to Innovation Park. The facility’s design matches contemporary standards for NPS collections curation and SEAC’s general space needs. SEAC loses the collegiality of a campus environment but working conditions improve and FSU student and faculty participation in the Center’s activities continues.

With agreement on relocating SEAC to Innovation Park, Chief Faust retires after serving as the Center’s chief for over twenty years. He is incentivized by a federal buy-out offer resulting from the NPS reorganization.

Associate Southeast Regional Director Paul Hartwig appoints John Ehrenhard to succeed Faust as head of SEAC. Ehrenhard is laterally re-assigned because the federal buyout program has eliminated funding for Faust’s position. Ehrenhard retains his responsibility as head of the IAS Division based in Atlanta.

Southeast Regional Director Baker, just returned from a lateral assignment as Western Regional Director, plans to reorganize the Southeast Regional Office, as directed by Roger Kennedy, into three quasi-ecologically based sub-divisions or “clusters.” Archeologists fear that IAS division may be broken up, but Baker agrees to let it relocate to SEAC. Several initiatives of IAS division are thereafter integrated into the work of SEAC, including archeological site stabilization, public outreach, anti-looting education, interagency archeological and technical assistance, and efforts to better integrate archeology with interpretation.

SEAC formally opens its doors at its new off-campus digs in the Robert Merrill Johnson Building at Innovation Park.

Southeast Regionwide Archeological Survey Plan is developed by NPS archeologists Bennie C. Keel, John E. Cornelison Jr., and David M. Brewer.
1997-2004

Michael K. Faught, an experienced underwater archeologist, directs FSU Program in Underwater Archaeology. Despite the forced termination of underwater archeology at SEAC in 1984, FSU continues to increase its involvement in the field. However, between 1984-2004, the Santa Fe-based underwater archeology unit fails to exercise the NPS-FSU cooperative agreement, even to conduct research in Florida, thus the Park Service abandons an important partnership opportunity.

1998

Congress enacts the Federal Activities Inventory Reform Act (FAIR Act), which requires agencies to report to the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) all federal jobs considered to be commercial.

2000

Donna Kalvels, the NPS FAIR Act and A-76 Coordinator (a title derived from OMB's A-76 Circular that defines "competitive sourcing" regulations), compiles a list of NPS positions subject to potential elimination through outsourcing. Reportedly, her methodology is to use payroll records to find locations with large concentrations of employees within a single job series.

Late Fall, 2000

NPS Director Robert Stanton recognizes SEAC as a national leader in public archeology and outreach by presenting it with the Cultural Resources 2000 Award.

2001-2003

SEAC conducts three fullscale summer field excavations, a modern "Big Dig," to mitigate the impending threat of river-caused erosion to Mound A at Shiloh Mounds National Historic Landmark within Shiloh National Military Park. Numerous students and volunteers participate.

November 2001

NPS Associate Regional Directors for Administration meet and generate recommendations for A-76 outsourcing studies and include archeology.

January 9-10, 2002

Donna Kalvels reportedly informs MWAC staff that OMB has chosen NPS archeology specifically to study for outsourcing.

January 20, 2002

Assistant Secretary for Policy, Management and Budget P. Lynn Scarlett announces a major "competitive sourcing initiative" and tasks senior Interior officials "to identify specific functions to be competed in fiscal years 2002 and 2003." She pledges to "comply with the spirit of traditional methodology" of OMB Circular A-76. The memo also discusses managers' "performance evaluation."

April 15, 2002

NPS Director Fran Mainella sends an all-employee bulletin announcing a forthcoming plan to study the outsourcing of up to 1,800 NPS positions.

July 17, 2002

SEAC Director Ehrenhard notifies center employees of Interior Department intent to conduct a "competitive sourcing review," i.e., an outsourcing study, on SEAC. Later that month, Ehrenhard holds a follow-up meeting with center staff, also attended by Chief SER Contracting Officer Jerre Brumbelow, in which he assures worried employees that SEAC has superior qualifications to prevail.

September 1, 2002

Initial NPS outsourcing studies begin for SEAC. MWAC, also slated for study, is able to delay the start of its review. Private firms hired to conduct the A-76 studies are CH2M Hill, Inc. and Delta Solutions and Strategies, Inc.

Mid-January 2003

Jerre Brumbelow, Southeast Region Chief of Contracting, informs SEAC and MWAC officials that NPS cannot certify the availability of funds for them to operate as "Most Efficient Organizations" or MEOs as required by A-76 rules. This determination results from the fact that the centers are largely "project-funded." If they loose their competitions to private firms, therefore, NPS will not have sufficient funding to hire those firms.

January 26, 2003

Los Angeles Times publishes a widely circulated account of efforts to privatize NPS jobs. Former NPS Director Kennedy is quoted saying "that parks are not parking lots - they are places that require a high degree of professional skill to manage. Not just anyone can do it."

February 7, 2003

Acting Midwest Regional Director David Given informs NPS Assistant Director Randy Jones that Delta Solutions contractors had advised him that continuing the A-76 studies on both MWAC and SEAC is a mistake and that if the Park Service had prepared properly for such a study it would not have chosen its archeological centers.

February 20, 2003

Associate Director for Administration, Business Practices and Workforce Development Dick Ring informs Midwest Regional officials that "all five pilot [A-76] studies are to continue." A few days later, Interior's Center for Competitive Sourcing Excellence rejects NPS requests to consider cooperative agreements toward direct conversion outsourcing. Senior NPS and Interior officials now know that continuing these A-76 studies will likely undermine NPS efforts to promote partnership activity.
April 22, 2003  Deputy Assistant Secretary Scott Cameron responds to Rep. Doug Bereuter, a Republican from Lincoln, Nebraska, about how and why NPS archeology was chosen for A-76 studies. Cameron cites the FAIR Act Inventory and says the Park Service made the decision.


June 29, 2003  Jerry Rogers, former NPS Associate Director for Cultural Resources, writes editorial in the New Mexican. Referring to the FAIR Act, he asserts that “administrators have taken a grossly simplistic approach to the act’s encouragement to outsource jobs that are not ‘inherently governmental.’” He adds, “this is what happens when some abstract-thinking Office of Management and Budget bureaucrat applies the language of law with a broad brush to entire departments rather than carefully and specifically to the statutory missions of individual bureaus.”

July 15, 2003  The Washington Post writes that “the Bush administration is considering privatizing archaeological oversight of hundreds of national parks and landmarks and firing the National Park Service archaeologists who for decades have been charged with protecting their historic value and cultural heritage.” The Post cites Kalvels who says that “budget people complain that they are taking work from the private sector” because the centers provide services to other federal agencies. SEAC head Ehrenhard is quoted saying the centers “have been so underfunded and so understaffed for so long, that we’ve had to learn to be efficient. This whole idea is almost laughable, and it’s an insult.” Congressman Bereuter calls the decision “very arbitrary.”

July 17, 2003  The House votes 362 to 57 to support an amendment to Interior’s Appropriation bill, by Congressmen Bereuter and Allen Boyd Jr. of Florida, prohibiting NPS from spending funds to implement the outsourcing of NPS archeological centers. Bereuter labels the NPS process “stupid.”

July 24, 2003  Senate Subcommittee on National Parks holds hearing “to conduct oversight of the competitive sourcing effort within the National Park Service.” Sen. Jeff Bingaman asks Director Mainella about Jerry Rogers’s June 29 editorial. Angela B. Styles, Administrator for Federal Procurement Policy, Office of Management and Budget, defends A-76 decision on NPS archeology by noting she had reviewed MWAC’s web site to determine that they “are using, running a library with 2,800 documents. They are acquiring and maintaining global positioning equipment, they are writing newsletters. This is not an inherently governmental archeological function.”

July 31, 2003  Prominent journal Nature claims that “the Bush Administration’s drive to contract out services is a threat to science.” It suggests that the effort to privatize NPS archeology is designed to gut the Park Service’s ability to delay mining, logging or road-building, and quotes an OMB official as saying that they consider archaeologists no different than “laundry workers.”

August 8, 2003  SEAC is notified that its services have been determined more competitive than those of private contractors; thus center operations will not be outsourced.

August 11, 2003  Notice is posted to InsideNPS, an internal NPS information web site. Its header reads: “SEAC Employees Are Cost Effective.” In the notice, Director Mainella commended the center’s staff for demonstrating “their outstanding value to the American people” by successfully completing the A-76 study. Several weeks later, due to persistent efforts by Congressman Bereuter, NPS cancels the A-76 review of MWAC.

November 12, 2003  Director Mainella announces changes in NPS A-76 policy. “I have requested and received approval,” she says in an all-employee memo, “to classify fee collectors and park guides as “core to the mission.” She adds that NPS will improve the A-76 process by exercising full flexibility and by allowing NPS “to conduct preliminary planning reviews.”

February 2004  GAO reports that OMB is not meeting its goal to improve government performance and efficiency. “To date,” it states, “OMB’s competitive sourcing guidance to federal agencies has focused more on targets and milestones for conducting competitions than on the outcomes the competitions are designed to produce: savings, innovation, and performance improvements.”

May 2004  Associate Southeast Regional Director Hartwig reports that no underwater archeological activity is being conducted by the Park Service in Southeast Region parks.
Appendix B: Primary Legislative Authorities for NPS Archeology

- Antiquities Act (1906) and regulations at 43 CFR 3 (16 U.S.C. 431, 431a, 432, 433; P.L. 59-209 (June 8, 1906)):

  The Antiquities Act is the first and foremost national preservation legislation. It authorizes presidential proclamations to declare historic landmarks, historic and prehistoric structures, and other objects of historic or scientific interest that are situated upon federally controlled or owned lands, to be national monuments. This may include reservation of land, limited to the smallest area compatible with the proper care and management of the objects to be protected. It authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to accept privately owned land as necessary for care and management of objects of historic or scientific interest. One amendment provides that only Congress may authorize any further extension or establishment of national monuments in Wyoming (a result of political backlash after establishment of Jackson Hole National Monument in 1943). The Antiquities Act allows qualified institutions to examine or excavate archeological sites and to gather objects of antiquity on federal lands by permit. These activities must be undertaken for the benefit of reputable museums, universities, colleges or other recognized scientific or educational institutions, with a goal of increasing the knowledge of such objects. Objects collected must be preserved in public museums. The Antiquities Act makes illegal the appropriation, excavation, injury, or destruction of a historic or prehistoric ruin or monument, or an object of antiquity, situated on federally owned or controlled lands without permission, and subjects violators to fine and/or prison.


  The Act, known as the Organic Act, establishes the National Park Service and directs it to manage national parks and monuments (and other nationally significant areas) and "to conserve the scenery and the natural and historic objects and the wild life therein and to provide for the enjoyment of the same in such manner and by such means as will leave them unimpaired for the enjoyment of future generations."


  The Act declares as national policy federal interest in preserving for public use historic sites, buildings, and objects of antiquity. The Act authorizes the programs known as the Historic American Buildings Survey, the Historic American Engineering Record, and the National Historic Landmarks Survey. It authorizes the National Park Service to restore, reconstruct, rehabilitate, preserve, and maintain historic or prehistoric sites, buildings, objects, and properties of national historical or archeological significance and to establish and maintain museums in connection therewith. It also authorizes cooperative agreements with other parties to preserve and manage historic properties.


  The Act authorizes the National Park Service to accept donations or bequests of museum properties, purchase them from donated funds, exchange, transfer, convey or destroy them, and receive and grant museum loans.
Reservoir Salvage Act (1960) P. L. 86-532 (June 27, 1960):

Required construction agencies to conduct archeological salvage in advance of the inundation of reservoirs and authorized expenditures to do so, although it did not provide for long-term curation and was limited in scope to federal reclamation activities. Superceded by the Moss-Bennett Act in 1974.


The NHPA is the cornerstone of national efforts to protect historically and culturally significant properties. It mandated the creation and maintenance of a National Register of Historic Places, and provided for the designation of State Historic Preservation Officers (SHPOs) and State Historic Preservation Programs to conduct comprehensive statewide surveys of historic properties important in U.S. history, architecture, archeology, engineering, and culture. The act also provided matching funds to the states and the National Trust for Historic Preservation to preserve historic properties and promote historic preservation. In addition, Section 106 of the act requires that prior to funding or licensing any undertaking, all federal agencies must "take into account" the effect of such undertaking on the integrity of any district, site, building, structure, or object listed or eligible to be listed in the National Register. The effect of the law was broad and far-reaching and required a major shift in the federal government's attitude toward the management of historic resources.


The Act, known as NEPA, requires federal agencies to integrate environmental values into their decision-making processes by considering the environmental impacts of their proposed actions and reasonable alternatives to those actions. NEPA requires federal agencies to prepare detailed Environmental Impact Statements (EIS). The Environmental Protection Agency reviews and comments on EISs prepared by other federal agencies, maintains a national filing system for all EISs, and assures that its own actions comply with the Act.


Directs federal agencies to provide leadership in preserving, restoring and maintaining the historic and cultural environment of the United States by (1) stewarding cultural properties under their control for the benefit of future generations, by (2) taking measures necessary to insure that their policies, plans and programs protect, restore, and maintain federally owned sites, structures, and objects of historical, architectural or archaeological significance for the inspiration and benefit of the public, and by (3) consulting with the Advisory Council on Historic Preservation to assure that federal plans and programs contribute to the preservation and enhancement of non-federally owned sites, structures and objects of historical, architectural or archaeological significance.


The Act, known as Moss-Bennett after its congressional sponsors Sen. Frank Moss of Utah and Rep. Charles Bennett of Florida, is based upon the Reservoir Salvage Act (1960), which it significantly amends (P. L. 86-532; June 27, 1960). Moss-Bennett authorizes federal agencies to expend funds to investigate archeological resources threatened by construction activities sponsored by the agency. Essentially, Moss-Bennett expands the type of projects eligible to include any federally funded activity (i.e., not just dam construction) and provides a legislative mechanism to fund necessary archeological
reviews on an ongoing basis, addressing major deficiencies in how River Basin salvage projects were previously funded. Moss-Bennett also emphasizes public education and participation, interagency information exchange, and consideration of long-term artifact curation needs.

- **Archaeological Resources Protection Act (1979) as amended and regulations at 43 CFR 7 and 36 CFR 79 (16 U.S.C. 470aa-470mm, P.L. 96-95 (October 31, 1979)):**

  The Act, known as ARPA, is an historic preservation statute specifically designed to prevent looting and destruction of archaeological resources. Like the Antiquities Act, ARPA provides for the imposition of both criminal and civil penalties against violators of the Act while providing a permitting process to authorize the recovery of certain artifacts consistent with the standards and requirements of the Federal Archeology Program. ARPA stands as congressional recognition of increased threats to the nation's archeological resources and strengthens the intent of the Antiquities Act by increasing penalties for violators, tying penalties to the scale of the perpetrator's damage, and outlawing the trafficking in archeological resources whose excavation is banned by the Act. Section 10 (C) also requires federal land managers "to establish a program to increase public awareness of the significance of the archeological resources located on public and Indian lands and the need to protect such resources."


  Authority for this Act, known as FMFIA, is drawn from the Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950 (31 U.S.C. 3512), which the Act amends. FMFIA requires agencies to conduct an ongoing review process of agency management and accounting control systems and to report annually on the adequacy of these systems. FMFIA embodies the intent of Congress that agencies establish and maintain sound management control systems as a primary means of providing greater accountability, effectiveness and efficiency in achieving program goals and objectives and in preventing fraud, waste, and mismanagement. Under this and associated laws¹ the Park Service is required to account for and adequately maintain its museum and archeological collections.


  The Abandoned Shipwreck Act overrides Admiralty Court law and asserts federal title to three categories of abandoned shipwrecks: abandoned shipwrecks embedded in a State's submerged lands; abandoned shipwrecks embedded in coraline formations protected by a State on its submerged lands; and abandoned shipwrecks located on a State's submerged lands and included in or determined eligible for inclusion in the National Register of Historic Places. Upon asserting title, the federal government transfers title to the majority of those shipwrecks to the respective states to manage. Federal title is retained to shipwrecks located in or on public lands while Indian tribes hold title to shipwrecks located in or on Indian lands. The Act directs the National Park Service to prepare guidelines to assist state and federal agencies in developing legislation and regulations to carry out their responsibilities under the Act. These guidelines are intended to maximize the enhancement of cultural resources; foster a partnership among sport divers, fishermen, archeologists, salvors, and other interests to manage federal and state shipwreck resources; facilitate access and utilization by recreational interests; and recognize the interests of individuals and groups engaged in shipwreck discovery and salvage.

1. The Government Management Reform Act (GMRA), the Chief Financial Officers (CFO) Act, and the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) reinforce the need for effective management controls. These Acts also call for the development of program performance indicators to monitor management's success in reaching program goals and desired outcomes. Department managers are to establish environments where management controls are understood, encouraged, practiced, and implemented.

The Act, known as NAGPRA, outlaws the excavation of Indian graves and/or the removal of associated human and ceremonial remains. NAGPRA also mandates that any museum, public or private, receiving federal funds is required to return or "repatriate" to their lineal descendents or closest culturally affiliated tribe any existing artifacts determined to be Indian remains, funerary or sacred objects, or objects of cultural patrimony (that is, historical, traditional, or cultural items having cultural importance to a native group independent of any individual member).
Appendix C: Major SEAC Cooperative Agreements, Effective January 1, 2005

April 12, 1972

Memorandum of Agreement: Florida State University

FSU Assistance in arranging space for SEAC to locate near the FSU campus and provides faculty affiliation for qualified SEAC personnel; Allows joint access to each party's facilities, including archeological collections, libraries, and labs, while promoting mutual opportunities for publication; Provides joint access to archeological materials loaned temporarily to the other from outside parties; Allows exchange of qualified personnel, subject to funding availability and pertinent regulations, for specific research or educational projects; Promotes studies leading to educational programs in such fields as interpretation, environmental studies, conservation and recreation, other studies furthering cooperative research goals, and graduate research relating to the Southeast Region; Allows specific contracts between the parties for archeological surveys, salvage, excavation and stabilization of NPS sites.

Significant modifications: The signed 1972 accord did not specify cooperation in underwater archeology although the first drafts by SEAC Chief John Griffin did specify this feature. NPS and FSU did not actually sign the first accord until SEAC was under the direction of Richard D. Faust. Faust was not a strong supporter of NPS underwater archeology in 1978, the accord was modified to include underwater investigations specifically, but these were again removed in subsequent renewals because of the decision to consolidate underwater archeology in Santa Fe, NM, by 1987. References to the Interagency Archeological Salvage Program (IASP) also disappeared in the 1978 accord, a result of the removal of IASP from NPS with the creation of HCRS. A related change was the institution of five-year renewal periods instead of the fifteen agreed to in the original accord. A final change in 1978 added cooperation in anthropological studies relating to Native Americans. Modern updates reference NPS commitment to the Innovation Park location, cooperation in technology development, especially geographic information systems, and archeological collections management. A specific provision was also added to protect students such that the results of cooperative studies may be used as theses or dissertations in partial fulfillment of FSU-granted degrees. This modification appeared after one FSU faculty member refused to approve a thesis conducted using NPS archeological collections. The parties signed the most current agreement on May 4, 2000.

April 5, 1995

Memorandum of Understanding for Professional and Technical Assistance in Managing Cultural Resources: 24th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and Fort Stewart, Georgia

Support for Fort Stewart's participation in the U.S. Army's Legacy Resources Management Program, subject to availability of funding (transferable from DoD to NPS), including cultural resources management, program development, public education and awareness, and specific management planning activities. Allows access of SEAC to Fort Stewart as appropriate in support of agreement and requires documentation of any exchange of resources.

Undated, ca. 1995

Memorandum of Understanding for Professional and Technical Assistance in Managing Cultural Resources: Joint Readiness Training Center and Fort Polk, Louisiana

Support for Fort Polk's participation in the U.S. Army's Legacy Resources Management Program, subject to availability of funding (transferable from DoD to NPS), including cultural resources management and program development, public education and awareness, and specific management planning activities. Allows access of SEAC to Fort Polk as appropriate in support of agreement and requires documentation of any exchange of resources.

July 6, 1998

Memorandum of Agreement: Florida Agricultural and Mechanical University, Tallahassee

Allows consultation, archival analysis, sharing of research facilities, including university libraries and special collections, access to NPS archeological collections, training opportunities for FAMU staff and students, and other cooperative opportunities, such as publication, relating to archeology, collections management, and ethnography. Agreement helps expose ethnic minorities to possible career opportunities in archeology and CRM work and promotes appreciation and understanding on minority history and cultural heritage.

National Park Service 209
April 19, 2000  Memorandum of Understanding to Promote Cooperation: Department of Archaeology, University of Umeå, Sweden, and National Heritage Board, Archaeological Excavations Department, Stockholm, Sweden

International cooperation in applied archaeology, research, teaching, and professional development through exchanges of information, exchanges of scholars and students, and participation in seminars, workshops, conferences.

September 11, 2002  General Agreement: South Carolina Department of Natural Resources Heritage Trust Program

Agreement to provide archeological assistance by either party on request, subject to availability of resources, for professional, technical, and material assistance of CRM and planning, including CR inventory, evaluation, registration, documentation, NHR nomination, and treatment; Consultations on technical preservation issues affecting a variety of prehistoric or historic structures or sites and associated curatorial issues; Funds such assistance as possible; Allows mutual access to the lands/facilities as appropriate in support of agreement; and requires documentation of any exchange of resources.

December 12, 2002  Memorandum of Understanding to Promote Cooperation: The McDonald Institute for Archaeological Research, University of Cambridge

International cooperation in applied archaeology, research, education and professional development, with special emphasis on resource protection relating to looting of archeological sites and the trade in illicit artifacts.

Undated, ca.2003  Understanding to Promote Cooperation and Information Exchange: NSW Heritage Office, Parramatta, New South Wales, Australia

International cooperation in applied archaeology, research, teaching, and professional development through exchanges of information, exchanges of scholars and students, and participation in seminars, workshops, conferences.

August 20, 2003  Understanding to Promote Cooperation and Information Exchange: Flinders University of South Australia and National Parks and Wildlife Service, Adelaide, South Australia, Australia

International cooperation in applied archaeology, research, teaching, and professional development through exchanges of information, exchanges of scholars and students, and participation in seminars, workshops, conferences.

November 4, 2003  General Agreement: Florida Atlantic University

Allows cooperation in program planning and research, technology development, demonstration, and publication relating to archeology, history, museum collections, ecology and environment, as well as identification, evaluation, and monitoring of areas of significant natural and cultural value relating to Department of the Interior and National Park Service units in the Southeast. Allows specific procurement contracts to accomplish these goals, SEAC access to university facilities subject to specific procurement contracts, university access to SEAC resources subject to availability and shipping charges, and cooperation between university faculty and students and SEAC staff, including faculty privileges for qualified NPS employees, and cooperative thesis/dissertation work by students in partial fulfillment of university degree requirements. The agreement is modeled upon the FSU accord.
Appendix D: Summaries of Oral History Interviews and Biographical Sketches

John E. Ehrenhard, Director, Southeast Archeological Center (1994-2006)

Biography: Ehrenhard spent his childhood overseas, in Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Pakistan following his father who worked as an engineering consultant for various hydroelectric and irrigation projects. Excavations for these projects brought Ehrenhard into frequent contact with archeology from about the age of six. In 1964, while studying engineering at the University of Nebraska, Ehrenhard changed his engineering major to archeology. After completing his master's degree in that subject, he found employment with the recently formed Midwest Archeological Center in Lincoln, Nebraska. He started with the National Park Service in 1971 as a wage grade one employee and worked his way up to Chief of the Interagency Archeological Services (IAS) division in Atlanta, Georgia, in 1984. In 1994, Ehrenhard was appointed Director of the Southeast Archeological Center in Tallahassee, Florida.

Interview summary: Ehrenhard discusses the early history of salvage archeology, relations between the National Park Service and the Smithsonian Institution, the origins of the three NPS archeological centers, archeological collections management, and the laws and regulations pertaining to SEAC's work. He also comments upon NPS underwater archeology and the importance of the early NPS relationship with Florida State University. On the latter topic, Ehrenhard discusses how that relationship was impacted by changing philosophical and/or institutional directions. Ehrenhard also discusses the work of IAS Division and how he became director of SEAC during the major NPS reorganization under Director Roger Kennedy in the mid-1990s. He explains how SEAC significantly altered its direction as a result of that merger, discusses modern center emphases upon publication, public outreach, the establishment of partnership agreements beyond the NPS-FSU accord, and development of the Regionwide Archeological Survey Plan. Ehrenhard further details how the technology of remote sensing, such as aerial photography (an aid to large-scale surveying) and military-derived radar devices (that can penetrate both underwater and underground), has affected SEAC's operations.

Throughout his interview, Ehrenhard offers extensive commentary upon the then ongoing "A-76" or outsourcing review of SEAC. He details the potential losses that would result from the significant privatization of archeological cultural resources management within the Park Service, why private corporations are by their nature ill-suited for the work done by SEAC, and the importance of documenting the center's history via the current study in the case that the Park Service did in fact outsource its archeological work. [May 28, 2003 interview]

Richard "Pete" D. Faust, Chief, Southeast Archeological Center (1973-1994)

Biography: Faust earned both bachelors and masters degrees in anthropology. Instead of pursuing a PhD, however, he took a position with the Park Service, about 1961, at Mound City Group in Ohio and worked there doing both routine docent work and excavation. In January 1965, he took a position working for Chief Archaeologist John Corbett in Washington, DC. Corbett later assigned him to be SEAC's first Chief, Archeological Research, on October 25, 1966. After the resignation of Center Chief John W. Griffin in June 1971, Faust assumed Acting Chief responsibilities until appointed Chief, Southeast Archeological Center, on June 24, 1973. He served in that position until his retirement in April 1994.

Interview summary: Faust discusses the role played by first Chief Archeologist John M. Corbett in building a park-based archeological program through historical NPS involvement in salvage archeology. He further discusses the role played by Corbett and Region One Chief Archeologist John
W. Griffin in the creation of SEAC at Ocmulgee National Monument near Macon, Georgia, as well as their involvement in relocating SEAC to Florida State University. He discusses various other persons important in the center’s early history, including Ernest Allen Connally, Chief of the Office of Archeology and Historic Preservation, his own supervisor, Paul Hartwig, fellow NPS archeologists C. Fred Bohannon, Donald Crusoe, George R. Fischer, Lee Hanson, and John W. Walker, as well as Hale G. Smith, founder of FSU’s Anthropology Department. He describes problems relating to SEAC’s location at Ocmulgee, its relations with the monument from 1966 to 1972, and SEAC-Ocmulgee relations after the move to the FSU campus. He discusses opposition by the University of Georgia to the FSU move and frequent NPS-FSU negotiations over on-campus space. In some detail, Faust also describes activities and operations of underwater archeology at SEAC, especially regarding shipwreck archeology and its litigation. He focuses upon problems in relations between SEAC, the Southeast Regional Office, and the Submerged Cultural Resources Unit (Santa Fe, New Mexico) subsequent to the termination of the center’s in-house underwater archeological capability.

During his interview, Faust discusses various other issues related to cultural resources management, including contracting or “external” archeology, creation of the Heritage Conservation and Recreation Service, archeological legislation related to the Park Service, and collections and museum management, including SEAC’s scope, preservation techniques, and the costs of perpetual care. He also discusses his efforts to relocate SEAC to FSU’s Innovation Park site, the role of the General Services Administration in that regard, and the concurrent NPS reorganization under Director Roger Kennedy. He makes passing comments on the effort to outsource NPS archeology under Director Fran Mainella. [May 29, 2003 interview.]

George R. Fischer, retired NPS archeologist (1959–1988)

Biography: Fischer was born near Tule Lake, California, where he took an interest in local Modoc Indian history. Later, this interest, as well as fire-fighting work for the Forest Service, led him to study anthropology while attending Stanford University. Fischer joined the Park Service at Mesa Verde NP during the 1959 summer season. After completing his graduate degree, Fischer accepted a full-time position at Montezuma Castle NM, Arizona, where he occupied a vacancy left by park staff hired to work the “Big Dig” at Ocmulgee NM. Fischer himself advanced to a position there in 1964 and then, as SEAC was created, advanced again to a staff position with Chief Archeologist John Corbett in Washington, DC, a position left vacant by Pete Faust who was moving to SEAC. While working for Corbett, Fischer initiated efforts to create a national NPS underwater archeological capability. His efforts were influential in aiding the move of SEAC to Florida State University in 1972 at which time he transferred to the center. Fischer held a variety of responsibilities while at SEAC, but is most well known for his work relating to the sunken wreck, HMS Fowey. After retiring from the Park Service in 1988, he taught FSU underwater archeological courses and became a major force in the respected FSU academic diving program.

Interview summary: Fischer discusses the origins and his involvement in creating an NPS underwater archeological capability, both in Washington and at SEAC. He discusses various underwater archeological projects, including at Montezuma Well NM, Fort Jefferson (Dry Tortugas), Biscayne National Park (especially relating to HMS Fowey), as well as his involvement in overseeing excavations of the Steamboat Bertrand near Omaha, Nebraska. Fischer discusses the politics of relocating SEAC and an associated NPS underwater archeological effort at Florida State University, the university competition for SEAC, various changes in line authority within archeology, and relations with external organizations, such as the Florida Bureau of Archaeological Research. He details the role of FSU students in SEAC’s work, his concerns about the academic direction of FSU’s Anthropology Department, and the impact of SEAC’s move to Innovation Park on those relations. He also discusses NPS cultural resource management planning, archeological surveys, and the archeological funding process. Finally, Fischer details early SEAC successes in educating park staff about enforcement of the Archeological Resources Protection Act. Conversely, he recounts examples of how public involvement has affected NPS policy.

In his interview, Fischer also discusses various NPS Washington staff figures, including Director George B. Hartzog Jr., preservationist Ernest Allen Connally, and archeologists John Corbett and Zorro Bradley. He comments extensively upon SEAC Chief John Griffin and notes others key to early NPS archeology, such as Mendel Peterson, Smithsonian Institution, Arthur R. Kelly, University of Georgia, and Hale G. Smith, Florida State. [May 28, 2003 interview.]
Patricia C. Griffin, anthropologist, social worker, and author

Biography: Griffin is the widow of John W. Griffin, the first Chief of SEAC (1966-1971), to whom she was married for 48 years. She is also the author of *Mullet on the Beach: The Minorcans of Florida, 1768-1788* and is president of the St. Augustine Historical Society. After her husband's passing, Patricia Griffin edited and published two well-received syntheses of his research, *Fifty Years of Southeastern Archaeology* and *Archaeology of the Everglades*, the latter a comprehensive overview about what is known of the region's ancient culture based upon research Griffin originally conducted for the National Park Service. Patricia Griffin herself was born in the Central Valley of California into a frontier family. She received a undergraduate scholarship to attend the University of California, Berkeley. Upon graduation in 1943, she received additional scholarships allowing her to study social work at the University of Chicago. It was there that she met John Griffin, who was a student in the archeology program. They were married in 1945 after the end of World War II. In 1988, Griffin received her own doctoral degree in anthropology. As an independent scholar, she remains active on historical and conservation issues relating to Florida.

Interview summary: In her interview, Griffin discusses her life with John Griffin, his background and training, and provides social commentary upon many archeologists who were prominent in American, Southeastern and especially Floridian archeology during the Twentieth Century. She relates the relationship between John Griffin and his various mentors, including Jean C. "Pinky" Harington and John M. Corbett, his NPS supervisors, and describes her husband's early influence in helping to establish the profession of archeology in Florida. For example, when he was only twenty or twenty-one years old, John Griffin developed the first statewide archeological plan for Florida, becoming in 1946, Florida's first paid state archeologist. Griffin also extensively discusses her husband's long relationship with Hale G. Smith, who founded the Department of Anthropology at Florida State University, relates the establishment of SEAC at Ocmulgee NM as a result of the corroboration between Corbett and Griffin, and describes the social and cultural life around Macon, Georgia, in the 1960s. She also addresses the Griffin's relations with NPS archeologist Zorro Bradley and senior NPS officials Ernest Allen Connally.

During her interview, Griffin provides commentary upon the cultural anthropology of the profession of archeology, including aspects relating to alcoholism, a topic upon which she has lectured. Although her husband was a "tea-toddler," alcohol abuse played a role in the lives of many early Southeastern archeologists. Other topics addressed by Griffin include the Southeastern Archaeological Conference, the life and work of Arthur R. Kelly, general problems in the field of archeology, notably curation, and SEAC's relations with the state of Florida. [September 9, 2003 interview.]

J. Anthony "Tony" Paredes, Professor of Anthropology, Florida State University (emeritus); Chief of Anthropology and Indian Affairs, NPS Southeast Region (1999-2006)

Biography: Paredes first became interested in anthropology through a boyhood love of Indian lore, which led him to acquire a PhD from the University of New Mexico. After completing his doctoral work in 1969, Paredes accepted a tenure-track position with the Anthropology Department of Florida State University. He chaired that department on numerous occasions and was significantly involved in relations with SEAC while it was located upon FSU campus.

Interview summary: Paredes discusses the background and relationship of NPS archeologist John W. Griffin and FSU Anthropology Department founder Hale G. Smith. He both details the origins of that department as a result of Smith's relationship with Raymond Bellamy and the interest of the Park Service in relocating SEAC to the university as a result of the Griffin-Smith relationship. He discusses several other important figures connected to the university and Floridian anthropology, including Stanley J. Olsen, the father of zooarchaeology and Florida archeologist George Percy. This discussion helps to place in historical context, figures and issues of the department that had bearing upon NPS-FSU relations. Thus, Paredes conveys how failed department efforts to develop a doctoral program, faculty concerns regarding laboratory and curatorial space, as well as philosophical objections to "salvage" archeology, at first impeded cooperation while faculty interest in underwater archeology, the prestige of NPS-association, and especially curatorial contracts were ultimately successful motivators for such cooperation. He also details examples of how FSU student exposure to Park Service activity benefited both and how NPS archeologist George R. Fischer was a catalyst for involving the university in scholarly diving activities. Paredes provides context on issues regarding
underwater archeology in Florida in the 1970s, including jurisdictional disputes, NPS cooperation with the state of Florida, and NPS management concerns. He further notes how various NPS policy changes impacted relations between SEAC and the department and how, on the other hand, national legislation, namely the Moss-Bennett Act of 1974, transformed the nature of university-based archeological contracting. He thus discusses NPS concerns over potential conflicts of interest regarding FSU Research Associate James Stoutamire who was involved in creating an FSU center for applied archeology and administering NPS curatorial contracts. Related thereto, Paredes discusses Thomas J. Padgett, who preceded Stoutamire, and Steve Hale, who followed him, both again administering NPS curatorial contracts. Paredes also notes and compares differences between research- and compliance-driven archeology, citing examples of how these differences affected SEAC-department relations as well as university administration attitudes both to the National Park Service and to its own Department of Anthropology. [March 11, 2004 interview.]

George S. Smith, Chief, Investigation and Evaluation Division, SEAC (1988-present)

**Biography:** Smith received a bachelor's in anthropology from the University of South Florida in 1971, a master's degree in anthropology from the University of Alaska in 1978, and an honorary doctorate from the University of South Florida in 2000. He began his career with the National Park Service in 1972, starting as a museum technician with the Cooperative Park Studies Unit at the University of Alaska, where he was a graduate student. Between 1978 and 1986, he served as the director of field research for the University of Alaska Museum, then returned to the Park Service to work in the Archeological Assistance Division [subsequently, the Archeology and Ethnology Division] in Washington, DC. Two and one half years later, he accepted his present position.

**Interview summary:** Smith begins by recounting the history of NPS archeology, the preeminence of Jean C. “Pinky” Harrington, and the NPS tradition of providing external archeological assistance to other agencies. Smith explains how outreach efforts are mandated by the such laws as the Archeological Resources Protection Act, discusses SEAC cooperation with foreign research centers (which helps the center combat the illicit trade in U.S. antiquities), and points out various SEAC efforts to educate U.S. attorneys, law enforcement officials, and NPS staff about U.S. resource protection law. Smith also refers to various SEAC outreach publications relating to resource protection or training and teaching in techniques of public archeology. He discusses how the goals and requirements of resource stewardship have increasingly diverged from the interests of academia and how SEAC has tried in recent years to renew scholarly interest in CRM-related archeology both in its relations with Florida State and across a broader spectrum. In so doing, Smith defines the nature and practice of public archeology (in government, university, and private practice), discusses the NPS role in helping to create the Society for Professional Archeologists and the Register of Professional Archeologists (which promotes professional accountability), and articulates issues relating to “grey” literature. After defining the nature of public archeology, Smith discusses the long-term impact of George W. Bush Administration efforts to restructure NPS archeology. He notes how a base of structural conditions, especially funding, make effective resource stewardship by private companies nearly impossible and how resource stewardship will decline under private care. However, he also conveys reasons that make SEAC inherently competitive, including various synergies that allow staff to involve themselves in professional activities, sometimes on their own, that benefit the Park Service, including issues relating to archeological resource protection. Smith also discusses his own professional activity in deploying archeology as a vehicle to help societies see their common heritage, thus serving as an instrument of peace and security. Additional issues discussed in the interview include the philosophy of conservation treatment, the decommissioning of dams, and underwater archeology. [May 30, 2003 interview.]

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Appendix F: Selected Masters Theses Completed in the Department of Anthropology at Florida State University by FSU Students Involving Significant Use of NPS Field Research and Collections, 1973-2004

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<th>Year</th>
<th>Thesis Title</th>
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<td>1974</td>
<td>The W.P.A. Glynn County project: a ceramic analysis</td>
<td>Marsha A Chance</td>
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<td>An analysis of post houses site 1844, Macon, Georgia</td>
<td>A. Wayne Prokopetz.</td>
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<td>1975</td>
<td>Stubbs Mound in Central Georgia prehistory</td>
<td>John Mark Williams</td>
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<td>1977</td>
<td>Development of Lamar period ceramics in Central Georgia</td>
<td>Christopher Everett Hamilton</td>
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<td>1978</td>
<td>The prehistory of the Virgin Islands: from excavations at Cinnamon Bay, St. John</td>
<td>Jay B. Haviser Jr.</td>
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<td>1980</td>
<td>Development of a research design to assess significance at Shiloh Indian Mounds, Shiloh National Military Park, Tennessee</td>
<td>Lindsay Christine M. Beditz</td>
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<td>1982</td>
<td>Trade patterns of eighteenth century frontier New Spain: the 1733 Flota and St. Augustine(^a)</td>
<td>Russell K. Skowronek</td>
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<td>1982</td>
<td>The Castillo de San Marcos: a cross cultural test of the determinants of artifact patterning</td>
<td>Maurice W. Williams</td>
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<td>1983</td>
<td>The spatial distribution of Glades period archeological sites within the Big Cypress National Preserve, Florida</td>
<td>William Paul Athens</td>
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<td>1983</td>
<td>A regional research design for the prehistoric archaeological resources of Escambia and Santa Rosa Counties, Florida(^b)</td>
<td>Bruce John Piatek</td>
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<td>1983</td>
<td>An evaluation of contemporary digital filtering techniques applied to magnetometer data from archaeological sites: southeastern examples</td>
<td>Randy Vincent Bellomo</td>
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<td>1985</td>
<td>The research potential of C.W.A. and W.P.A. archeological collections from Bibb County, Georgia</td>
<td>Judy Lynn Heilich</td>
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<td>1991</td>
<td>An archeological and ethnichistorical overview and assessment of Mosquito Lagoon at Canaveral National Seashore, Florida</td>
<td>David M. Brewer</td>
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<td>1996</td>
<td>Chemical analysis of clay and prehistoric pottery from St. John, U.S. Virgin islands, using PIXE and X-ray diffraction analyses</td>
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<td>1997</td>
<td>An archeological investigation of shell ridges at Shaw's Point (8MA7), De Soto National Memorial, Bradenton, Florida</td>
<td>Margo Schwadron</td>
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<td>2004</td>
<td>Archaeological examination of electromagnetic features: an example from the French dwelling site. A late eighteenth century plantation site in Natchez, Adams County, Mississippi</td>
<td>Charles Francis Lawson</td>
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\(^a\) Skowronek's thesis was not based upon NPS collections, however, he used knowledge from his thesis to advance significantly NPS research interests regarding the site known as HMS Fowey, as shown in the current study.

\(^b\) NPS related.

1. Chart compiled with input from Cameron Binkley, Pamela Jones, Bennie Keel, J. Anthony Paredes, George S. Smith, Richard R. Vernon, and was cross-checked against an older list compiled by George R. Fischer.
Notes: There were 123 FSU anthropology masters theses and doctoral dissertations (mainly the former) listed in the FSU Strozier Library electronic catalogue between 1973 and 2004. Of these, seventeen can be clearly associated with the collections or research of the National Park Service. Theses not clearly associated with the Park Service were excluded from this list. Probably, many students would have selected other topics for the theses on this list had SEAC’s collections not been near at hand to the FSU campus. This chart does not include theses or dissertations completed in other FSU departments such as Christina E. Miller’s 2004 doctoral dissertation *Slavery and Its Aftermath: The Archeological and Historical Record at Magnolia Plantation*, Department of History, Florida State University that was partially based on SEAC excavations at Cane River Creole NHP or by students from other universities, of which there are significant examples, such as Nicholas Honerkamp’s MA thesis entitled “The Material Culture of Fort Frederica - The Thomas Hird Lot” (University of Florida, 1975), which was later expanded into a dissertation entitled “Frontier Processes in Eighteenth Century Colonial Georgia: An Archeological Approach” (University of Florida, 1980). The chart also does not reflect a significant number of less formal research papers and a few published articles completed by FSU students and based upon NPS collections. Nor does it include faculty publications based on research funded through SEAC, for example, J. Anthony Paredes and Kenneth J. Plante. “A Reexamination of Creek Indian Population Trends: 1738-1832.” *American Indian Culture and Research Journal* (1982) 6(4): 3-28.

For many years the Department of Anthropology maintained a non-thesis option - many students who worked for or were undoubtedly benefited by SEAC and/or its collections were not required to complete a thesis to graduate. In rough terms, had the Park Service contracted for similar work as completed by these students, each listed title would have equated to one to two years work at the GS-7 or GS-9 pay grade level.

In 2005, five degree projects making substantial use of NPS collections were in progress: M. Hardy, Salt River Bay National Historical Park and Ecological Preserve (PhD, FSU), S. Kidd, Water Island (MS, FSU), A. Kowel, Charles Pinckney National Historic Site (PhD, FSU), C. Lydick, Shiloh National Military Park (MA, FSU), and H. Mustonen, Cumberland Island National Seashore (MA, Michigan State University).
Appendix G: SEAC Fact Sheets

Fact Sheet A: Administration, Inventory & Evaluation, and Collections & Information Management

History of the Center

The Southeast Archeological Center (the Center or SEAC), established in 1966, was originally housed on the ground floor of the Ocmulgee National Monument Visitor Center. In 1972, the Center moved to the main campus of Florida State University (FSU) in Tallahassee where it occupied 5,200 square feet next to the Department of Anthropology. The Center has maintained close association with the Department by sharing space, personnel, expertise, and equipment. In October 1995, the Center moved to new and expanded quarters in FSU's Innovation Park. In 1995, the Center was merged with the Interagency Archeological Services (IAS) Division, then based in Atlanta. Today, all Center offices are located at Innovation Park, an extension of the Florida State University campus. The Center continues its historical support functions as well as a wide variety of technical assistance and partnership projects both within and outside NPS.

For nearly forty years, the Center has been responsible for archeological research, collections, and database management for all park units located in the Southeast Regional Office of the National Park Service (NPS). A primary mission of the Center is to facilitate long-term protection and use of archeological resources and information from the parks of the Southeast. As a support operation, the Center helps parks fulfill the requirements of various federal laws, regulations, policies, and guidelines.

Organization

The Center is organized into four sections: Administration; Inventory and Evaluation (I&E), Archeological Collections and Information Management (ACIM); and Technical Assistance and Partnerships (TAP). The Center's staff comprises twenty-six permanent full-time employees and a varying number of part-time student appointments. Together, the permanent professional employees have nearly 300 years of archeological and CRM experience.

Services

The Center assists the parks in fulfilling their archeological responsibilities by providing a variety of services through the I&E and the ACIM sections.

I&E provides the following services:

1. Reviews park actions to assess potential impacts to their archeological resources and develops recommendations to mitigate adverse impacts.
2. Undertakes archeological clearances pursuant to section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act.
3. Prepares research designs and cost estimates, analyzing artifacts, preparing reports, and cataloging the collections from subsequent projects.
4. Undertakes archeological projects for park management needs.
5. Provides technical assistance for planning, site stabilization, public education, interpretation, and protection.
6. Prepares National Register nominations and state site forms, and updates the Cultural Sites Inventory (CSI).
7. Disseminates information to parks, State Historic Preservation Offices (SHPO), and the professional community.
8. Prepares databases for archeological reports and collections.
11. Assists parks with developing public education programs.
12. Works with law enforcement agents and U.S. attorneys on ARPA cases.
13. Prepares overviews and assessments of park cultural resources.
14. Surveys park areas as part of the Systemwide Archeological Inventory Program.

ACIM provides the following services:

1. Manages park museum collections (conservation, preservation, storage, and security).
2. Maintains accession and cataloging information for parks.
3. Manages the backlog cataloging program for park archeological collections.
4. Maintains the park and regional portion of the Servicewide ANCS (Automated National Catalog System), CSI databases, and Archeological Sites Information Management System (ASMIS) databases.
5. Provides summaries and inventories and coordinates cultural affiliation studies and consultations with Native American tribes for parks in compliance with the Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation Act (NAGPRA).
6. Provides Geographic Information System (GIS) archeological theme layers and other computer mapping data for parks.

Facilities

In 13,652 square feet of space, the Innovation Park facility houses administrative and staff offices; ADP; archives; a library/conference room; artifact processing and analyses laboratories; collection storage; and drafting, report preparation, and storage areas.

Research Resources

1. Libraries: These include the Center’s library, the state of Florida library, the Strozier Library (FSU), and the Florida A&M University library. The Center has interlibrary loan privileges with the above.
2. Cooperative Agreements are in place with FSU, the University of Georgia, the University of Florida, the University of South Carolina, and the Georgia Trust for Historic Preservation to conduct special analyses and other activities.
3. Center Archives contain records of investigations from all parks in the Southeast Regional Office.
4. Collections: Over six million objects and archival documents comprise the Center’s collection.
5. Data Bases at the Center are available electronically and include ANCS, CRBIB (Cultural Resources Bibliography), CSI, LCS (List of Classified Structures), and NADB (National Archeological Database).
6. Maps: Hundreds of USGS quadrangle and other project maps have been generated by investigations.

Equipment

1. Vehicles and field equipment are available to conduct investigations.
2. State-of-the-art surveying equipment makes mapping accurate and efficient through the use of data recorders and computer assisted drafting (CAD).
3. Personal computers (PCs) and special software permit rapid data processing and report preparation; high-speed PCs facilitate CAD, GIS, and collections management work.
Track Record

Since 1991, the Center has reviewed over 500 "Assessment of Actions Having an Effect on Cultural Resources" (XXX) forms. No further archeological work was recommended on approximately 60 percent of projects reviewed. Of the remaining approximately 40 percent, archeological survey, testing, and/or monitoring was recommended. In no cases, after a recommendation of no additional work or after field testing was conducted with negative results, was an archeological site discovered during construction. In the few exceptions where projects were undertaken by private consultants or archeologists from other agencies, the Center reviewed their qualifications, research designs, and reports to assure that professional, NPS, and Center standards were met. With over 200 projects conducted since 1990, only twice have SHPOs requested minor additional work. Center projects are recognized as cost effective, timely, and of the highest quality throughout the NPS.

Fact Sheet B: Technical Assistance and Partnerships

Legislative Authority

The Technical Assistance and Partnerships (TAP) interagency assistance program was established in 1975 to better meet the Secretary of the Interior's increased responsibilities under the Archeological and Historical Preservation act of 1974 (Public Law 93-291) which amended the Reservoir Salvage Act of 1960. The latter act provided for the recovery of archeological data to be damaged or destroyed by the construction of dams and other water control structures. The 1974 amendment provides for the recovery, protection, and preservation of cultural resources data to be adversely affected not only by dam construction but by all federally financed or licensed activities that will affect significant cultural resources.

Funding Sources

Two sources of funding are provided by Public Law 93-291. In federally financed undertakings, the law permits the use of up to one percent of the total amount authorized for the project to be used for the recovery, protection, and preservation, of significant data. In those instances where a federal license or permit is involved, funds are appropriated to the Secretary of the Interior for data recovery. The law further provides that in federally financed projects that will adversely affect significant cultural resources, the funding agency may conduct the data recovery program or it may request that the Secretary of the Interior undertake the program. In the latter instance, the agency must transfer to the Secretary funds sufficient to complete the program or the one percent maximum, whichever is lower.

Technical Assistance Functions

Many federal agencies have developed their own cultural resources programs with staffs of one or more archeologists and historians. Under normal circumstances, these agencies are able to fulfill their Public Law 93-291 responsibilities with this in-house capability. Other agencies, such as the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA), have no cultural resources staffs and are thus unable to adequately undertake and administer cultural resource projects in-house. In such situations, these agencies may obtain assistance from the Secretary of the Interior through an agreement providing for the funding of the actual data recovery program and the technical and administrative costs required to develop and administer the program.

The Secretary of the Interior also has responsibilities to assist other federal agencies in compliance with Executive Order 11593 (Protection and Enhancement of the Cultural Environment). Such assistance ranges from consultation via a telephone call through the conducting of cultural resources surveys and evaluations to direct assistance in fulfilling an agency's compliance responsibilities with the Advisory

The Secretary of the Interior's cultural resources responsibilities are fulfilled through professional staffs in the regional offices of the National Park Service. TAP is responsible for programs in Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, Puerto Rico, South Carolina, Tennessee, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. In coordination with other regional offices, TAP has also supervised projects in California, Washington, Arizona, Texas, Wyoming, Pennsylvania, and New York. Cultural resources investigations are conducted via contracts with qualified firms and institutions. Procurement is competitive in compliance with the Federal Acquisition Regulation, and contract awards are made on the basis of the best technical proposal obtained through negotiation. Contracts are firm fixed price.

When an agency requests cultural resources assistance, a memorandum of agreement is usually developed between the agency and the Southeast Archeological Center. This agreement defines the roles of the two parties and the terms of TAP's participation. This participation is on a cost reimbursable basis. Reimbursement for noncontractual services is on an actual cost basis plus a maximum of 20 percent of the total actual costs as administrative overhead. These technical services include the preparation of scopes of work for cultural resources investigations, compliance documents and mitigation plans, monitoring of field projects contracted by other agencies, and procurement costs prior to the award of a contract. Actual costs for these services includes salaries, travel, supplies, etc. Reimbursement for contractual services include the cost of the contract plus a maximum of 20 percent of that cost for administrative overhead. Salaries, travel and other costs involved in the administration of the contract are drawn from the administrative overhead. Assistance is provided as staffing and workload permit.

Partnerships

National and Regional Cooperative Agreements

TAP maintains a wide variety of cooperative relationships, with federal and state agencies, ranging in scope from regulatory compliance assistance, archeological site stabilization, CRM planning, and public education and outreach. The Division has been designated by the Washington office of NPS as the nationwide point of contact for cooperative agreements with bureaus and installations in the Department of Defense, the General Services Administration, and other federal and state agencies. A cooperative agreement with the University of Mississippi has established the National Clearinghouse on Archeological Stabilization, with numerous protection/stabilization projects carried out in national parks and military installations throughout the United States. A cooperative agreement with the University of South Carolina has helped TAP to carry out archeological studies, planning overviews, and public outreach projects in the Southeast.

Education and Outreach

Another major area of interagency technical assistance has involved public interpretation, education, and outreach, where Center personnel provide unique expertise within NPS. TAP is an active participant in an interagency effort to conduct historic overviews, write popular histories, and develop regionally specific teacher lesson plans in South Carolina and Georgia. The Division currently administers indefinite quantity contracts for the writing and editing of popular histories, posters, public education plans, brochures, and producing original interpretive art work. Working with state agencies, TAP has assisted and produced public education posters in Louisiana, Tennessee, South Carolina, North Carolina, Georgia, Florida, and the Lower Mississippi Delta. Examples of other assistance projects include contracting to build a public interpretation/stabilization exhibit at Warren AFB, Wyoming, and, working with GSA, U.S. Geological Survey, and the U.S. Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit, the design of permanent museum displays in the San Francisco Bay area, California.
TAP's Public Interpretation Initiative program helps to accomplish federal mandates for the preservation of archeological sites and historic sites, emphasizing public education and participation as well as interagency information exchange. The Initiative also helps to accomplish Section 110 of the Archeological Resources Protection Act (ARPA) that requires each federal land manager to "establish a program to increase public awareness of the significance of the archeological resources located on public lands and Indian lands and the need to protect such resources." With the NPS’ Mather and Albright training centers, TAP coordinates interdisciplinary training courses and workshops designed to provide the "basic tools" necessary for program managers, interpreters, educators, and archeologists in developing effective presentations at the park or site level that meet federal standards and agency missions.

Other Cooperative Efforts

TAP and the Southeast Archeological Center carry out internally or administer contracts for various archeological and historical studies, site stabilization projects, and public education projects. Funding for these efforts has been supplied through reimbursable accounts established with GSA (California, Arizona, and Texas); the U.S. Army (Fort Bragg, NC; Fort Benning, GA; Fort Polk, LA; Fort Stewart, GA; and elsewhere); and the U.S. Air Force (Warren AFB, WY; Eglin AFB, FL; and elsewhere).
Selected Bibliography

A major primary source for this study are several oral history interviews, additional author interviews with NPS staff, retirees, and outside professionals, and numerous written communications with a variety of correspondents. These sources are cited in this study's footnotes, its introduction (see methodology), and Appendix D. Many interviewees also provided the author access to their personal papers. Transcripts of the formal oral history interviews conducted for this study have been placed on permanent file with the Harpers Ferry Center Library. They are also available at the Southeast Archeological Center and from the National Center for Cultural Resources Management in Washington, DC.

Written primary and secondary source records were obtained from the following sources, listed alphabetically:

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- Florida State University, Pepper Library Special Collections (Anthropology Department Records and FSU photograph files), Tallahassee, Florida
- Georgia State University, William Russell Pullen Library, Atlanta, Georgia
- Harpers Ferry Center Library (NPS history collection files and library), Harpers Ferry, West Virginia
- Harpers Ferry Center Historic Photograph Collection, Silver Spring, Maryland
- National Center for Cultural Resource Management, Division of Archeology and Ethnology (archaeological and staff files), Washington, DC
- National Center for Cultural Resource Management, National Register, History and Education Division (historical and staff files), Washington, DC
- Ocmealte National Park (park library records), Macon, Georgia
- Southeast Archeological Center (archival files, official administrative files, staff files, and staff library), Tallahassee, Florida
- Southeast Regional Office (files and CRM library), Atlanta, Georgia
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As the nation's principal conservation agency, the Department of the Interior has responsibility for most of our nationally owned public lands and natural resources. This includes fostering sound use of our land and water resources; protecting our fish, wildlife, and biological diversity; preserving the environmental and cultural values of our national parks and historical places; and providing for the enjoyment of life through outdoor recreation. The department assesses our energy and mineral resources and works to ensure that their development is in the best interests of all our people by encouraging stewardship and citizen participation in their care. The department also has a major responsibility for American Indian reservation communities and for people who live in island territories under U.S. administration.

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