Chapter 6
A HEAP OF STONES
GEN. JEFFERSON C. DAVIS
April 15-17, 1873
The War Department reacted quickly to the tragedy of
April 11 and selected Col. Jefferson C. Davis to fill Canby's position
as commander of the Department of the Columbia. [1] It would take Davis considerable time to
reach the lava beds; for now the full burden of the war rested on
Gillem. He moved swiftly to punish the Modocs and to bring an end to the
four months of turmoil.
Gillem's resources appeared to be more than adequate
for the task of subduing about 60 Modoc warriors, even if they were
ensconced in a veritable Gibraltar. Either at hand or enroute were four
batteries of artillerymen (prepared to fight as infantry), five troops
of cavalry, five companies of infantry, and 70 Warm Springs Indians. To
support the troops, Gillem still had the two mountain howitzers and had
increased his artillery with the addition of four Coehorn mortars.
Wheaton, after the January battle, had seen the need
for mortars in order to get at trenches and caves within the Stronghold
that could not be reached by direct fire. Gillem had agreed when he had
assumed command in February, requesting the four mortars and 300 shells.
While Canby could see the value of mortars, he had reduced the
requisition for shells to 75. From what he knew of the Stronghold and
from his Civil War experience, hand grenades would also be valuable for
close range fighting. The depot at Benicia had no hand grenades and had
offered to send 150 time fuze shells instead. Canby had wired back that
the hand grenades should be sent for. On March 26 he had learned that
500 hand grenades had been acquired and were enroute to the lava beds.
However there is no hint that these grenades ever arrived or ever were
used in the fighting to come. [2]
Communications between Gillem's Camp and Hospital
Rock had also been improved in recent weeks. Although Gillem had not at
first thought much of Wheaton's plan to acquire boats for Tule Lake, he
had changed his mind and had put two or three on the lake by this time.
These could transport messengers and small amounts of supplies between
the two camps a mere five miles by water but almost fifty by
land. [3]
After the first battle for the Stronghold, Wheaton
had solicited from Green, Mason, and Bernard their ideas for the next
attack. Then deliberating on them, Wheaton had formulated his own plan
(see page 49). [4] Undoubtedly, all these
ideas were now available to Gillem as he prepared his plans for the
coming attack. In the end, his concepts almost duplicated Wheaton's
attack of January 17. Gillem recognized that the natural strength of the
Stronghold combined with the Modocs' determination would make a direct
assault too costly. He too would attack from both east and west,
surround the Modocs on the south, and drive them into surrender through
attrition. The major differences now were Gillem's far larger force and
the fact that he had both howitzers and mortars. Major Mason,
accompanied by the artillery section, would attack from the east; Major
Green, having the mortars, would attack from the west.
Mason's forces at this time consisted of Troops B and
G, and Companies B, C, and I, 21st Infantry. Seventy experienced Warm
Springs were already riding down from the Warm Springs Reservation and
would join him in time to take part in the attack. Second Lt. Edward S.
Chapin, 4th Artillery, took charge of the howitzer section. Mason's
total strength was in the neighborhood of 300 officers and men. [5] Green's command was somewhat larger. The
total number of officers and men in Troops F and K, Batteries A, E, K,
and M, and Companies E and G, 12th Infantry, was approximately 375. [6] About one-third of the regulars had
participated in the January 17 attack, and nearly all of these were
concentrated on the east side under Mason. Only Perry's Troop F of the
"oldtimers" was with Green's command on the west. The
demoralization they had undergone in January had largely disappeared.
However, in the next few days they were to demonstrate a certain caution
in tangling with the Modocs. By April 14, all was in readiness. Gillem's
orders rang loudly, "Tell your men to remember Gen. Canby, Sherwood and
the flag."
During the night of April 14-15, Mason's men moved
forward in the darkness and took their position on about the same line
that Bernard had occupied in January. The infantry companies were
closest to the lake, under Capt. George H. Burton; then the two cavalry
troops (dismounted); while the Warm Springs, also dismounted, composed
the left flank. Bernard commanded both the cavalry and the scouts. [7]
At two a.m. on the 15th, Green's Troops F and K
(dismounted) moved out from Gillem's camp and made their way quietly to
the far side of the (Hovey) peninsula. Sergeant Fitzgerald was there:
"We advanced in single file, each with carbine and sixty rounds of
ammunition; in his haversack, each carried fifteen hardtack and a small
piece of bacon." There was no fog to confuse the soldiers this time: "It
was a beautiful and balmy night; not a breath of air was stirring, nor
could the slightest sound . . . be heard." The silent march seemed
uncanny to the sergeant: "There was no moonlight; but a star-bespangled
sky afforded enough light to enable us to pick our footsteps over the
jagged rocks . . . We were cautioned not to make the slightest noise."
[8]
Then, according to Fitzgerald, a soldier stumbled and
accidentally fired his weapon. A Modoc sentry gave a cry of alarm, and
those in the Stronghold picked it up echoing the cry through the
mournful blackness. Gillem reported simply that both the east and west
forces "took their positions without loss." [9]
Green had appointed Capt. Marcus Miller, 4th
Artillery, in charge of the main force (Batteries E, K, and M, Companies
E and G, 12th Infantry). For the time being, Capt. Evan Thomas' Battery
A was to remain in reserve with the mortars, already packed on mules. At
eight a.m., Miller led his men toward the Stronghold, with Battery E at
the head of the column. About one-half mile out, Battery E deployed as
skirmishers, staying close to the shore. After passing the cavalry
troops, Miller deployed all his units into a skirmish line with
Companies E and G, 12th Infantry, on the left nearest the lake, then
Batteries K, M, and E on the right flank. As in the first battle,
progress was exceedingly slow as the troops dodged from one hump of lava
to the next, "a party remaining still and firing to cover the advancing
party." Battery E on the extreme right was the first to come under fire
from a few Modocs under cover behind rocks. There was one major
difference this time: this battle was not dependent on the light of one
day only. The troops were prepared to stay.
The first significant action occurred at 1:30 p.m.,
when Green's infantry and artillery "made a beautiful charge, driving
the Indians back several hundred yards, to a very strong position near
the crest of the lavabed." Gillem's descriptive word "driving" may have
implied too much. The Modocs withdrew skillfully from their outposts,
their intention being to resist from their main strongpoints. As they
withdrew, they continued to bother the soldiers with flanking fire. [10] The cavalry was able to observe this
action from the peninsula, "the infantry instead of pressing forward to
form a junction with Col. Mason's command. . . were compelled to turn
and face the Indians who were annoying them by persistent sniping on the
flank." Fitzgerald was of the opinion that the advance could be
characterized as "desultory fighting."
The forward movement carried the infantry companies
next to the lake, and commenced a drive on the high rocks far enough to
the right to allow Green to order Troops F and K into the line from
their holding position on the peninsula. The two troops occupied the
extreme left flank that dominated the northwestern end of the
Stronghold. It had been from here that the Modocs had pinned down
Green's men on the shore during the earlier attack. Fitzgerald got his
first good view of the Stronghold at this time: "When the natural
formation did not meet all the requirements . . . the Indians had
constructed artificial barriers of stone about four feet in height as
breastworks with loop-holes to shoot through." The troops charged these
positions, finding most of them abandoned, "but behind a barrier which
three or four of us reached at the same moment, a Modoc had the
termerity [sic] to remain until one of our party named [Pvt. Charles]
Johnson looked over it and received a bullet through the head, killing
him instantly." [11]
As dark dropped down over the lava beds, Green
ordered a halt, straightened the line, and suspended operations for the
night. The troops threw up hasty forts of loose rock, each large enough
to protect five or six men, many of which structures still stand.
Throughout the night the mortars continued to fire periodically into the
Indian defenses. Although Green's men had not yet made a serious effort
to unite their right flank with Mason's left, the day's operations had
been generally satisfactory, albeit slow-paced and undramatic.
On the east side, Mason's day was quite similar. His
troops, supported by artillery fire, began to move forward at daylight.
They made a rather feeble attempt to move by their left flank around the
Stronghold to the south, but found it "impossible to effect the junction
without weakening the line too much." A year later, Gillem bitterly
criticized Mason's actions on the 15th. The colonel complained that
Mason had said, "it was not part of my plan to expose my
men unnecessarily." Gillem also doubted that Mason had moved up as
close to the Stronghold as he had reported (400 yards) . "I have
examined the ground occupied," wrote Gillem, "and am convinced that the
distance was was nearer seven hundred than four." Had Mason been more
aggressive, thought the colonel, the Stronghold would have been
surrounded the first day. [12]
Both the howitzers and the mortars continued dropping
shells on the Stronghold during the second day of the fight, April 16.
The troops probed and tested the Modoc defenses. The Indians, shifting
their few men from place to place, effectively challenged the soldiers.
The best that Gillem could say was that progress was slow. He again
ordered Green to push out on his right flank. Again this effort failed.
This time, Mason reported from his side that Modocs were firing on one
of his flanks and from the rear and that this diversion was keeping him
well occupied. When Miller, who had been trying to maneuver past the
Modocs' trenches to the south, learned that Mason had been driven back,
he decided to break off the attempt. [13]
When it became apparent that the southern junction
could not be effected, Green crossed to Mason's command (undoubtedly by
boat) to confer on alternate plans. Repeating the January experience,
they decided to attack simultaneously at the northern end of the
Stronghold and unite their forces. Gillem could see little advantage to
this plan, except to deprive the Modocs of their water supply. Since
Green's cavalry already controlled some of the high ground in this area,
the maneuver succeeded after a fashion, although the Indians resisted
every step.
Gillem, summarizing the junction, said "During this
day the command advanced to within the immediate vicinity of the caves .
. . in some places so near as to render it necessary to fall back in
order not to interfere with the shelling." Sergeant Fitzgerald was not
that certain of the success: "We could make little headway; and, judging
from the distant report of firearms in that direction, the other command
was not having any better success in its efforts to reach us." He
recalled withdrawing a short distance at the end of the day: "we
straggled back, tired and hungry, through the rocks, harassed all the
time by galling fire, to very near the place we occupied the night
before, though a little closer to the Stronghold." Nevertheless, the
colonel's confident report, not Fitzgerald's skepticism, became the
official document. At any rate, the advance of the 16th seems to have
been effective, for "During the night of the 16th the firing [small
arms, mortars, and howitzers] was almost continuous, the Indians
endeavoring to pass through our lines in several places, evidently for
the purpose of procuring water." [14] One
hypothesis that may be made is that while the two forces had not
physically united, they were close enough to each other to dominate the
terrain and to effectively cover the ground between them with fire, thus
preventing the Indians from reaching the lake.
Gillem was not happy with Mason's efforts this day
either. Mason reported that he controlled "the Mesa which commanded the
'Medicine rock' and the whole eastern and southeastern side of
the Modoc Stronghold." Gillem later expressed doubt on the grounds that
such a position would have prohibited the Modocs' escape. However,
Gillem's memory failed him there. From the "mesa" that Mason controlled,
identified today by the line of fortifications thrown up by the
soldiers, he could indeed see across into that part of the Stronghold.
However, he would not have observed necessarily the withdrawal of the
Indians, for a deep ravine separated him from the Stronghold. One arm of
this ravine runs off toward the southeast (from the southeast corner of
the Stronghold), and at that point it is unusually deep and precipitous.
Under cover of darkness, an army could have slipped through it
undetected by soldiers behind their fortifications on the high ground
farther to the north. [15]
The Modocs harassed the soldiers during the night by
random firing and taunts "in very plain, if not classical English."
Although Gillem believed that the Modocs were trying to get water, which
they may have been, they had other reasons for their activity. They had
decided to abandon the Stronghold. During the night, the women,
children, and part of the men silently withdrew to the south, working
their way through the tortuous lava flow that went back as far south as
the mountains. Today this rugged feature, that caps itself at the lake's
edge with the Stronghold, is called the Schonchin Flow. A few
sharpshooters remained behind to create the impression that the area was
still strongly defended. Again, the mortars fired throughout the long
night.
April 17 was anti-climactic. Both Green and Mason
began moving forward, cautiously at first, then more rapidly as they
became aware that, despite a few snipers' bullets, the Indians had
abandoned the Stronghold. There was no improvement in Gillem's opinion
of Mason's men. The colonel advanced with Green's left on the 17th. He
could not find any of Mason's units as he moved forward. Angry, Gillem
"got upon the highest rock available, and ordered repeatedly 'Forward'
'Forward,'" until finally, Mason's Troop G under Captain Bernard came up
to join with Green in sweeping the area. [16]
The army had at least captured the impregnable
Stronghold. It was an empty success. The troops had failed utterly in
their prime mission to capture or destroy the Modocs. Yet, it was
a turning point in the war. The Modocs had been driven from the position
that head best offered them the chance of continued resistance. From now
on the campaign would be different. No longer would assault and siege be
the soldiers' lot. The war was about to become fluid, a campaign of
motion, of pursuit, and of still more disaster. The Modocs were yet to
demonstrate their best or, from the soldiers' point of view,
their worst.
The three-day battle was over. Now it was time to
count the cost. Asst. Surgeon McElderry's casualty list was much shorter
this time. Yet, it was long enough. The number of casualties was 23, of
whom six were killed and seventeen wounded; nearly all of them were from
Green's command. Mason's infantry suffered no casualties; one of the
wounds was accidentally selfinflicted (Pvt. Eugene O'Connor,
Battery M); only one officer was a casualty (1st Lt. Charles P. Eagan,
12th Infantry); and one of the wounded was a Warm Springs Indian. [17]
As in the earlier battles, the number of Modoc
casualties is difficult to determine. The Army and Navy Journal
reported that 16 "warriors" were killed and one Indian woman captured. A
student of the fight determined the bodies of three men and eight women
were found in the Stronghold. Lieutenant Boyle wrote that three bodies
were found and two old women and one elderly man were taken prisoner.
The soldiers lifted at least one scalp. An English artist, William
Simpson, on a world-wide tour for The Illustrated London News,
arrived at the lava beds shortly after the capture of the
Stronghold. While someone held the scalp out at arm's length, Simpson
drew the grisly object. He was told that Sgt. G. W. Lee, Troop K, had
removed it from the body of Scarfaced Charley. That was a mistake, for
Scarfaced Charley was still very much alive. Simpson also reported that
three prisoners were taken, but he increased Boyle's count of enemy
bodies to four. The artist decided that "the number of Indians killed
has never been clearly ascertained." Sergeant Fitzgerald witnessed
another gruesome sight, "the head of a Modoc severed from the trunk,
perhaps by some soldier, that was as black as the darkest native of the
Congo. Passing troopers generally saluted it with a vicious kick." [18]
Another alleged incident illustrated that savagery
knows no bounds amoung men of different shades. The soldiers came across
a very old Indian woman who begged for her life. The lieutenant asked,
"Is there anyone here who will put that old hag out of the way?" A
soldier stepped forward, "placed his carbine to her head and blew out
her brains." [19]
Simpson, who rendered a number of excellent drawings
of the Stronghold immediately after its capture, described it for his
English readers: "In the first hollow on the west of Captain Jack's
cave, the long ridge of rock on the right has been rent in two along its
whole length, and the Modocs could pass along it under perfect cover,
with embrasures or holes from which they could fire with safety." In the
hollow, or depression, itself "were the wickie-ups, or wigwams of twigs
and mats, where the woman and children lived." He visited the cave that
was identified as Captain Jack's: "Bones, some of them picked; others
with the pickings still left; horns of cattle; hoofs; skins, with the
hair on; hides and pieces of deer skin . . . Fish in a putrid state, and
fish bones, were in shelves of the rock; pieces of fat and dark,
questionable-looking lumps lay about which were said to be meat." As for
the cave itself, it "was simply a circular hole in the lava . . . It was
perfectly bomb-proof, and only a verticle fire could by chance drop a
shell into it. It was near the center of the stronghold, and had a
number of similar crater-like holes around." John Muir, who visited the
lava beds one year after the war, gave a similar description of the
cave: "It measures twenty-five or thirty feet in diameter at the
entrance, and extends but a short distance in a horizontal direction."
Even then, the bottom of Jack's cave was still covered with animal bones
from the Modocs' occupation. [20]
Among the bones, rags, and wickiups there was little
of the loot of war that appealed to the collector instinct among
soldiers. However there was one trophy that assumed importance in their
minds the "medicine flag." At three different high points in the
Stronghold the Modocs had erected these emblems, the guarantors of
victory. One in particular, standing on one of the highest rocks, had
long been visible to the soldiers, and to them it had become a symbol of
Modoc defiance, the enemy's regimental colors as it were.
The troops captured this medicine flag on the last
day of the fight. It was no star-spangled eagle embroidered on a field
of blazing color. Simpson, realizing its importance as a symbol, drew
and described it as consisting of a "mink's skin and hawk's feathers
with medicine bead." These were fastened to the end of a stick "about
four feet long, and is just as it was cut from the tree." He said that
the small white bead had been placed among the feathers, and the pole
"stood on a heap of stones during the fighting." After the battle, a
photographer took a picture of two soldiers standing on the "medicine
rock." This rock may still be identified today toward the northeastern
end of the Stronghold. It is quite possible that the medicine flag
fluttered from here during the battle. [21] Its capture and removal symbolized the
soldiers' success in taking the Stronghold. But that was all it
symbolized. The Modocs were still their own masters, somewhere in the
lava beds to the south.
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The low-lying area beyond the ranger is
the general site where the Thomas Patrol was so devastatingly attacked
by the Modocs. The hill to the right is the butte that was the object of
the patrol (today called Hardin Butte).
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