KENNESAW MOUNTAIN
NATIONAL BATTLEFIELD PARK
HISTORIC RESOURCE STUDY

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR • NATIONAL PARK SERVICE • SOUTHEAST REGION
KENNESAW MOUNTAIN
NATIONAL BATTLEFIELD PARK

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March 1995

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Foreword

We are pleased to make available this historic resource study, part of our ongoing effort to provide comprehensive documentation for the historic structures and landscapes of National Park Service units in the Southeast Region. Following a field survey of park resources and extensive research, the project team updated the park’s List of Classified Structures, developed historic contexts, and prepared new National Register of Historic Places documentation, which is included as an appendix to this volume. Many individuals and institutions contributed to the successful completion of this work. We would particularly like to thank Park Superintendent John Cissell, Park Historian Dennis Kelly, and Park Ranger Retha Stephens for their help at every stage of the project. Thanks are also due to Historical Landscape Architect Brian Morris, who prepared three of the maps included in the study. We hope that this study will prove valuable to park management and others in understanding and interpreting the historical significance of the park’s cultural resources.

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March 1995
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INTRODUCTION

DESCRIPTION OF KENNESAW MOUNTAIN NATIONAL BATTLEFIELD PARK

Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park (the Park) contains the site of some of the fiercest fighting of the Civil War’s Atlanta Campaign. The Battle of Kolb’s Farm on June 22, 1864, and the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain on June 27, 1864, failed to stem the advancing Union Army and represent the last major engagements before the Confederates’ retreat across the Chattahoochee River. The 2,884-acre park interprets the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain through museum exhibits, a slide presentation, and a self-guiding auto tour of the battlefield. The park is located in Cobb County, Georgia, three miles west of Marietta and twenty-three miles northwest of Atlanta (see figure 1). It is irregularly shaped, measuring nearly seven miles north to south and, at its widest point, only two miles east to west. Two state routes, Dallas and Burnt Hickory Roads, intersect the park, dividing it into three sections. Big and Little Kennesaw Mountains dominate the northern section, with the remainder containing ridges and rolling hills characteristic of the Georgia Piedmont region.

The patchwork of open fields and wooded areas that characterized this agricultural area in 1864 is now decidedly more wooded, because most agricultural production has ceased, and many fields have been released to forest succession. Many infantry and artillery positions that were once situated in clearings with commanding views of the landscape now stand in the midst of mature, second-growth trees. The open fields maintained by the National Park Service (NPS), located predominantly at the north end of the park, approximate the location of earlier fields, but are smaller and less rectilinear. Post–Civil War agricultural practices, in which sloping fields were leveled and terraced to minimize erosion, are still evident. In areas that represent some of the most significant action of the battle, efforts have been made to rehabilitate and maintain the historic appearance.

\[1\]
Figure 1. Location of Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park
of the landscape. The NPS maintains approximately half of the open field below Cheatham Hill, which Federal forces ascended in their doomed assault.

In recent years, the small farms that surrounded the park have been replaced by residential and commercial development, reflecting the continued growth of Cobb County and the northern suburbs of Atlanta. Within the bounds of the park, three “islands” of private property exist. These densely settled areas, located at the north, central, and south ends of the park, contain large single-family homes constructed within the last twenty years. This recent development has contributed to increased traffic in the park and increased recreational use of park facilities.

The park was established through the efforts of private individuals, memorial associations, and a series of congressional acts. Federal legislation in 1917 authorized a national battlefield site at Kennesaw. In 1935, following nine unsuccessful attempts, Federal legislation established the Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park “for the benefit and inspiration of the people.” The park contains one of the largest surviving collections of Federal and Confederate field fortifications, or earthworks, totaling approximately eleven miles. The Confederates’ carefully prepared line, extending from the top of Big Kennesaw to Powder Springs Road, illustrates the tactical defensive strategy, frequently employed in the later stages of the war. These positions are situated along ridges and hills and include structures ranging from infantry lines to more sophisticated artillery positions. Early efforts to commemorate the battle and the establishment of the Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park contributed to the preservation of the earthworks and other historic resources within the park boundary.

Big and Little Kennesaw, Cheatham Hill, Pigeon Hill, and the Kolb house represent four historic sites within the park currently interpreted by the NPS. Ten monuments and markers have been erected throughout the park, marking the locations of particular units or significant events in the battle. Sixteen miles of park trails and two-lane drives provide access to these areas, and small parking lots accommodate motorists. The Visitor Center is located south of Stilesboro Road at the foot of Big Kennesaw and contains a small museum and theater (photograph 1).

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2In 1935, Civil Works Administration laborers under the guidance of the NPS engaged in an effort to rehabilitate overgrown and abandoned agricultural fields and establish meadows in the Cheatham Hill vicinity; see Michael Capps, Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park: An Administrative History (Atlanta: National Park Service, Southeast Regional Office, 1994), 15-16. In addition, the NPS assigns Special Use Permits to local agricultural concerns that raise hay in the open fields.


Photograph 1. Visitor Center

**SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF HISTORIC RESOURCE STUDY**

The Historic Resource Study (HRS) identifies and evaluates, using National Register criteria, the historic properties within the park. The study establishes and documents historic contexts associated with the park and evaluates the extent to which the surviving historic resources represent those contexts. The completed HRS will serve as a tool for future site planning, resource management, and the continuing development of interpretive programs at the park.

Although much has been written concerning the battle, there has not been a comprehensive examination of the park’s historic resources, notably the earthworks, within historic contexts. The battlefield was listed in the National Register of Historic Places on October 15, 1966. The earthworks are documented in the Historical Base Map of 1938, Emmet Nichols’s Historic Ground Cover Map of 1980 and Index of Artillery Positions, surveyed from 1977 to 1978, and most recently by park Historian Dennis Kelly in a battlefield-scale troop movement map produced in 1993. The 1994 administrative history addresses the creation of the park, the history of the park’s interpretive programs, and the construction of park

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5Supporting documentation was accepted by the National Register on February 24, 1976.
facilities.\textsuperscript{6} This HRS and associated survey documentation will provide park management with information on historic structures, an interpretive framework for the park, and updated National Register documentation.

For the purpose of updating the National Register nomination, the Kennesaw Mountain battlefield is classified as a National Register historic district, following the guidelines established in National Register Bulletins 16 and 40.\textsuperscript{7} The district boundary matches the boundary of the Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park, finalized in 1947 (see Historical Base Map, Appendix D).\textsuperscript{8} Most of the battlefield and nearly all of the areas where significant action occurred are included within this boundary. Areas associated with the battle that lie beyond the park boundary maintain little or no historic integrity and are not eligible for listing in the National Register or are outside the jurisdiction of the NPS, especially roadways, railroads, or private property holdings.

Several islands of residentially developed land are located within the park’s perimeter boundary. These islands are excluded from the park’s legal boundary and create a complex National Register boundary. Typically, nonhistoric or incompatibly developed areas located within continuous National Register boundaries would be included in a boundary, but labeled as noncontributing elements or intrusions. For national parks, the legislated park boundary will usually serve as the National Register boundary delineating the park as a district, as an individual property, or a group of multiple properties. At Kennesaw, the developed islands are privately owned post–World War II residential subdivisions that no longer maintain historic structural or landscape integrity. The NPS will not pursue acquisition of these islands and has no jurisdiction over these properties.

Two other types of properties of potential historic significance to the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain or local history but excluded from the proposed National Register boundary are transportation corridors and adjacent private property. The widening of Powder Springs Road in 1985-86 significantly altered the historic appearance, location, feeling, and setting associated with this resource, making it ineligible for National Register listing. Other important roads within the park, particularly Burnt Hickory, Dallas, and Stilesboro Roads, played pivotal roles in the battle and maintain most elements of historic integrity. Any alteration to these

\textsuperscript{6}Capps, passim, 5-56.


\textsuperscript{8}Capps, 8-14.
roads would affect adjacent park property and require use of park right-of-way or easements. Thus, these roads are included in the National Register nomination. The CSX railroad corridor is also significant to the history of the battle; however, private ownership of this resource deters the NPS from nominating it. The NPS recognizes the historic significance of this resource and others in the immediate vicinity of the park and will encourage state, local, and private efforts to ensure their preservation.

**SUMMARY OF IDENTIFICATION AND EVALUATION METHODS**

**Survey Methodology**

The goals of the historic resource survey of the park are to 1) update the List of Classified Structures (LCS) database for the park for use by park management; 2) prepare a Historic Resource Study for the park; 3) update National Register documentation for the park; 4) assemble a comprehensive survey of structures consisting of completed Georgia State Historic Preservation Office (SHPO) survey forms, when applicable, and a photographic record for each structure built prior to 1950 and considered eligible for listing in the National Register. This documentation will be used in complying with Sections 106 and 110 of the Historic Preservation Act of 1966.

Initially, the survey team examined building files, maintenance records, historic research compiled by the park staff, and maps located at the park headquarters. The field survey of the park yielded information on the present condition of the historic resources. Additionally, the team reviewed archival materials at the Southeast Regional Office of the National Park Service. Research with primary and secondary sources was conducted at the park library and the Atlanta Historical Society to obtain information relating to the historic appearance of the landscape and the development of the park. The Cobb County Public Library and the Illinois State Historical Library supplied information on commemorative activity. The survey team relied heavily on unpublished studies of the park compiled by independent researchers and park staff.

The earthwork field survey methodology differed from standard LCS procedure because it did not attempt to record all the earthen structural features known to exist within the park boundaries. The previous LCS included all earthwork structures and features as one LCS entry. Although park staff field verified battery and gun positions within the park, none of the field information was entered onto the LCS. The survey team determined that the earthworks should be grouped in smaller units: for example, a cohesive infantry line could delineate one unit; individual features within lines, such as batteries or redoubts, would be treated separately; and earthworks, both entire lines and individual features, also would constitute a single LCS entry and would be identified by their topographic location or their importance.
to specific battle events. This would accomplish two purposes: it would provide for a more accurate description of the condition and treatment of these resources for inclusion in management documents, and it would allow management to limit the scope of Section 106 reviews to specific cultural resources.

Because the park possesses so many earthwork features, a complete survey of all earthworks could not be accomplished within the scope of this study. Instead, a sample, consisting of six features, was surveyed and recorded on LCS forms. Park management suggested that earthworks at Cheatham Hill, Pigeon Hill, and Little Kennesaw be evaluated. The survey team also investigated Strahl’s Fort and the Federal twenty-four-gun emplacement, two isolated features that provide a contrast to earthworks located adjacent to trails or within walking distance of parking facilities. The remaining earthworks, approximately eight to ten miles, are grouped as one LCS entry. These earthworks were not field verified. The team relied on several maps available at the park to record their length and location.9

**Determination of Historic Contexts**

This study evaluates the historic integrity and assesses the eligibility of the Park’s historic resources within two historic contexts identified by the survey team. These contexts correspond to historic themes identified by the National Park Service and the Georgia State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO). The thematic framework of the NPS is outlined in *History and Prehistory in the National Park System and the National Landmark Program*. In addition to general historical themes like “Military” and “Public Works,” the Georgia SHPO has identified twelve distinctive “aspects” of Georgia history. These aspects are currently undeveloped but should be considered when assembling state and local context studies.

The following two historic contexts have been developed for the current study: 1) The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain and the Atlanta Campaign, May-September 1864 (chapter 2); and 2) Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park: The Commemoration of American Battlefields and National Park Development, 1887-1942 (chapter 3).

The first context, “The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain and the Atlanta Campaign, May-September 1864,” relates to the NPS subthemes “War in the West” and “Political and Diplomatic Scene” of Theme VI, “The Civil War.” The context also relates to one aspect of Georgia history, “Major Theater for the Civil War.” Chapter 2 examines the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain as one in a series of clashes

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*Despite the desire to create separate entries for infantry lines and individual earthwork features, accurate mapping that would verify commands and the identity of the field fortifications is not available. Preliminary mapping which illustrated the location of existing earthworks was unreliable for this level of detail because it lacked field verification and thus was not used by the survey team.*
during Sherman’s Atlanta Campaign, which began with Sherman’s march from Chattanooga in May 1864 and ended with the capture of Atlanta in September of that year. The context discusses the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain and Sherman’s successful execution of the Atlanta Campaign within military and political parameters. The context describes the battles fought at Kennesaw and discusses how military strategy and tactics, developed through the course of the Civil War, were employed at Kennesaw Mountain.

The second context, “Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park: The Commemoration of American Battlefields and National Park Development, 1887-1942,” relates to the NPS facets “Battlefield Preservation” and “The National Park Service and the New Deal” of the subtheme “The Federal Government Enters the Movement, 1884-1949” of Theme XXXIII, “Historic Preservation.” National battlefield commemoration stemmed from efforts by veterans’ groups to honor both the men who fought and died during the Civil War and the places where they fought. Following these efforts, the Federal government sought protection of these sites through the development of national and state parks. Chapter 3 examines the commemoration of Civil War battlefields, beginning with the efforts of veterans at the close of the Civil War and culminating with the establishment and subsequent development of national battlefield parks by the National Park Service. The narrative traces the activities of private commemorative associations at Kennesaw from the 1880s through the 1910s, the administration of the battlefield by the War Department from 1928 to 1933, its establishment as a national battlefield park in 1935, and its development by the National Park Service from 1933 to 1942.

Historic resources within the Park represent three periods of significance. The period of the Atlanta Campaign, May to September 1864, is primarily represented by the Kolb house, earthworks, and roads constructed prior to the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain. The second significant period, 1887 to 1917, represents commemoration of the Kennesaw Mountain battlefield by private individuals and associations. This period began with reunions by military units that fought at the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain and is represented by numerous monuments and markers erected on the battlefield as memorials to individuals and units. The third period witnessed the management and subsequent development of the battlefield by the Federal government from 1917 to 1942. This period included the administration and development of the battlefield by the War Department and the National Park Service. Few historically significant structures remain that demonstrate the importance of early park development planned by the NPS and performed by the

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10 The Georgia and Texas Monuments, erected in 1964, are managed as cultural resources but are not eligible for the National Register because they do not possess the exceptional significance required of properties that have achieved significance within the last fifty years.
Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) from 1938 to 1942. However, those extant structures are reminders of the park’s development history.

**The Setting of the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain**

During the middle of the nineteenth century, small farms surrounded Kennesaw, reflecting typical antebellum land-use patterns of the Georgia Piedmont. These farms consisted of fifty to 150 acres. The rocky soil supported sturdy crops, such as grains, and some farms contained orchards. Dwellings were generally small, one-story, frame or log structures. Farm complexes contained yards and several outbuildings, including barns and smokehouses. Dirt roads and smaller dirt lanes meandered throughout the area.

In June 1864, Confederate and Union forces transformed this landscape into a line of battle more than eight miles long. The lines ran east to west for a short distance from a point east of Big Kennesaw and then curved around the west face of the mountain and ran south to a point beyond the Powder Springs Road. The Confederates, who chose the site, had more time to construct their field fortifications than did the advancing Union army. The substantial nature of these works reflects their importance in the Confederates’ defensive strategy. Placed along high ground, these earthworks consisted of essentially a single infantry line punctuated with artillery positions at key points. In some areas, notably Cheatham Hill, secondary lines were erected for support, and artillery pieces were sited on the crests of Big and Little Kennesaw. The Federal forces constructed defenses composed of a series of overlapping lines supported with artillery emplacements, rather than a continuous line. Both sides had rifle pits for skirmishers in advance of their main entrenchments. Vast numbers of trees were cut to clear paths of fire and to construct the earthworks. The forested ridges provided material for head logs, revetments, and obstacles that slowed the enemy advance. The hilltops were thinned or cleared to provide artillery with a wider field of fire.

Among the many miles of earthworks are several features that are sophisticated examples of earthwork technology. The Federal twenty-four-gun emplacement and the Confederate fieldworks at Little Kennesaw Mountain, Pigeon Hill, Cheatham Hill, and Strahl’s Fort typify earthen fortifications employed throughout the Atlanta Campaign (see Appendix B). The historic integrity of these fieldworks provides a visible link with the events that necessitated their creation (photographs 2 and 3).

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12Nichols, “Historic Ground Cover — June 1864.”
Photograph 2. Fort McBride, Little Kennesaw Mountain

Photograph 3. Earthworks, Cheatham Hill
Through the process of natural succession, stands of pine replaced the hardwoods that the Confederates removed along the Kennesaw ridge in 1864, and for approximately one hundred years following the battle, much of the surrounding low area was intensely cultivated. In the decades following the battle, farmers terraced their fields and expanded them as agricultural technology improved, leading to the destruction of some earthworks. Other fortifications pass through wooded areas that were open during the battle. Most of the earthworks within the park bounds remain intact, with nearly the entire Confederate line and fragments of the Federal line preserved. Wood elements of earthworks, such as head logs and revetments, have long since disappeared. Surviving earthworks are defined by an earthen parapet, rear and sometimes front ditches, and in the case of some gun emplacements, embrasures. In most areas, trees have taken root in the earthworks, creating holes in the parapet walls as the dead trunks and root systems rot away. In a few places, grasses and other benign undergrowth cover the earthworks.

Although land-use patterns have changed over time, many of the components that convey the historic significance of the battle’s setting remain intact. Within park bounds, the contours of the land and the locations of streams have been left largely unaltered. Six of the nine roads that pass within the park—Stilesboro, Gilbert, Old John Ward, Dallas, Burnt Hickory, and Powder Springs Roads—existed prior to the battle and, though improved, most still follow the course of their historic roadbeds. Smaller, unpaved roads that date to the middle of the nineteenth century, such as the Marietta-Cassville and Old Mill Roads, can still be found within the park, but have been considerably altered. The Western & Atlantic Railroad, now the CSX Railroad, follows its original path along the park’s northern boundary. Nearly twenty buildings, including dwellings, churches, and mills, existed within the present park boundary in 1864. Only the Kolb house, which has been rehabilitated to represent its historic exterior appearance, survives.

**HISTORICAL BASE MAP DISCUSSION**

The Historical Base Map (HBM) depicts the existing historic and nonhistoric resources of the park including buildings, monuments, markers, earthworks, sites, and roads. The map graphically distinguishes contributing from noncontributing historic resources as defined by National Register criteria.

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13This assessment is based on a reconnaissance-level survey of earthworks at various locations throughout the park. Emmet A. Nichols’s “Historic Ground Cover — June 1864,” is the most complete study of earthworks at Kennesaw. It features measured drawings of artillery positions but only maps infantry lines and provides no methodology.
The location and configuration of the existing resources were drawn primarily from a USGS topographic sheet and a set of infrared aerial photographs of the park. The surviving sections of the Confederate and Union earthworks are drawn directly from Emmet Nichols's map of the 1864 battlefield. No effort has been undertaken to systematically field verify the exact location and configuration of the surviving earthworks as indicated on Nichols's map. Maps on file at the park and regional office provide documentation of the construction or alteration of resources during the period following the battle. The types of maps reviewed and cross-referenced with the narrative documentation of the park's development include the master plans and project-specific plans including preconstruction, construction, and as-built drawings.

NPS documented the 1864 battlefield by producing four historical base or troop movement maps. The four maps represent the accumulation of information gained from extensive research of the primary and secondary narrative, graphic, and photographic documentation related to the battle. The historical base map (1939) and the troop movement map (1993) each have accompanying narrative descriptions of the sources and methods used in their production. All four maps generally include the same subject matter and exhibit only minor differences in the location or configuration of the features they depict. Although no effort has been made in this investigation to revisit the primary source material to verify the accuracy of the three maps, Kelly's 1993 troop movement map is presumed the most authoritative because it is soundly based on archival and field verification, it identifies and includes previously unknown documentation, and the methods of its compilation are clearly described. Consequently, the troop movement map has served as the primary source of information for this investigation concerning the location and


17B. C. Yates, "Annotations for Kennesaw Culture Map," (Kennesaw Mountain, Ga.: Kennesaw Mountain NBP, 1939); Memorandum, Dennis Kelly to Chief, Cultural Resources Planning, Southeast Region, NPS, May 6, 1993. Nichols's, "Historic Ground Cover — June 1864" map has no accompanying narrative description of its sources or methods of compilation.
configuration of the earthworks, structures, roads, and vegetation patterns of the 1864 battlefield.

Park historian Dennis Kelly compiled the troop movement map and acknowledges varying levels of confidence in the accuracy of the map’s depiction of all areas of the battlefield. The map’s depiction of the battlefield in the vicinity of Cheatham Hill is the most reliable because it reflects a high degree of correlation and agreement among the relatively greater number of maps that were drawn of the area near the time of the battle. The map’s depiction of the southern portion of the battlefield, particularly near the Kolb house, is less reliable because of a higher level of discrepancy among the source material. The agreement and correlation among the sources covering the other portions of the battlefield contribute to the confidence in the map’s accurate depiction of the remainder of the battlefield.18

The scope and detail of the troop movement map’s depiction of the 1864 battlefield are limited by the source material. Because of these limitations, the troop movement map depicts only the broad-scale land use and settlement patterns of the 1864 landscape. Examples include the mosaic of open fields and woodland, roadways, and the location of the individual farmsteads, churches, and schools that existed at the time of the battle. Smaller-scaled characteristics and features of the 1864 battlefield that are not illustrated on the troop movement map include the types of vegetation of the agricultural fields, woodlots, and orchards; the woodland clearing associated with the construction of the field fortifications and observation stations; and the structures and features associated with the individual farmsteads of the battlefield (e.g., supporting domestic and agricultural buildings, fences, orchards, gardens, etc.).

Despite the varying levels of confidence in the accuracy of the troop movement map’s depiction of the entire battlefield and the limits to the scope and detail of its depiction of the setting of the battle, it represents the most thoroughly documented representation of the 1864 battlefield and illustrates the conduct and tactics of the battle within the context of its physical setting.

18Kelly, Memorandum to Chief, Cultural Resources Planning, 2.
CHAPTER 1

THE BATTLE OF KENNESAW MOUNTAIN
AND ITS PLACE IN THE CIVIL WAR

The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain (June 27, 1864) was one of a number of Civil War clashes between Federal and Confederate forces in northwest Georgia in the spring and summer of 1864. Kennesaw Mountain was a physical barrier standing between a large Federal force commanded by Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman and Atlanta, an important Confederate railroad and manufacturing center. The war was in its fourth year, and the November 1864 presidential election would soon provide a referendum on Abraham Lincoln’s war leadership. Lincoln’s reelection depended heavily on the progress of Sherman’s army in Georgia and Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant’s in Virginia. Although it was not a critical turning point in the war, the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain played an important role in a complicated national drama of bitter military combat and politics played out in the summer of 1864. Additionally, the battle illustrated the decided advantage the tactical defensive had over the tactical offensive in the later stages of the war. This chapter places the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain within the broader context of the Civil War.

In the decade prior to the outbreak of war, sectional divisions over the extension of slavery, a protective tariff, and internal improvements racked the United States. The Democrat party split over the issue of slavery, and four candidates contested the 1860 presidential election. Illinois Republican Abraham Lincoln was elected president by carrying the northern states. Believing the Republican Party hostile to southern interests, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas seceded from the Union before Lincoln’s inauguration and established the Confederate States of America. Upon assuming office on March 4, 1861, Lincoln decided to assert the Federal government’s sovereignty by resupplying the besieged U.S. army garrisons at Fort Sumter in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina, and Fort Pickens in Pensacola Harbor, Florida. The Confederate government ordered an attack on Fort Sumter, signalling its intention to fight for
its independence. Following the surrender of Fort Sumter on April 13, 1861, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas joined the Confederacy.19

At the outbreak of hostilities, the North enjoyed significant advantages in population and economic resources. The North, with twenty-two million white citizens to the South’s six million, had a far larger pool of potential combatants. The Confederacy’s 3,500,000 slaves supported southern armies with their labor, but did not carry arms. The North possessed 90 percent of the nation’s manufacturing capability, forcing the South to quickly develop factories and import armaments from abroad. The North also had a more highly developed railroad network, with two and one-half times more trackage than the Confederate states. Railroads proved crucial in supplying and moving the large armies that fought the Civil War. The South did possess some advantages. Federal troops moving from one area to another would have to move in a wide arc around the front, while the Confederacy could shift forces more quickly along shorter, interior lines. The Confederates, for example, frequently shifted troops between the Shenandoah Valley and Eastern Virginia as the need arose. Additionally, many of the most talented active and inactive U.S. army officers were southerners who rallied to the Confederacy when the war began.20

The South’s military problem was in a sense simple: it had to keep the war going until the North acquiesced in Southern independence. Southern strategy was defensive and consisted largely of maintaining its territorial integrity. Wanting to maintain independence rather than conquer territory, the Confederacy invaded northern states on only a few occasions. The South relied heavily on the prospect of foreign recognition of the Confederacy and Northern dissatisfaction with the human and material cost of a long war. The North, by contrast, had to wage an aggressive war to subdue the rebellious states and restore the Union. A strategic problem for the South was the question of whether to scatter its forces to defend every inch of territory or to concentrate to protect the areas of greatest strategic importance.

In the Spring of 1861, few on either side envisioned a long war. Many scoffed at U.S. General-in-Chief Winfield Scott’s strategy of envelopment, which implied a protracted conflict. Scott advised reliance on a Federal naval blockade of southern ports and control of the Mississippi River to gradually deprive the agricultural South of foreign supplies and markets for its cotton. Envelopment was Federal policy


from the start and received increasing emphasis as naive hopes for a quick capture of the Confederate capital at Richmond, Virginia, were dashed. As the war progressed, northern advantages in manpower, industrial might, naval force, and organization increasingly turned the tide against the South.

The natural barrier of the Appalachian Mountains dictated a division of hostilities between eastern and western theaters. Military activity in the eastern theater focused on limited areas of Virginia: the area between Washington, D.C., and Fredericksburg; around Richmond; and the Shenandoah Valley. The western theater, by contrast, was immense, stretching from the Alleghenies to the first tier of states west of the Mississippi. Important western theater battles occurred in Arkansas, Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia. Although public attention often focused on the major battles in Virginia, the struggle for control of the rivers and railroads in the West was of immense importance to the war's outcome.

As president of a republic in war time, Lincoln had as many political concerns as strategic ones. Lincoln had to employ considerable political skill to maintain popular support for the war, in the face of often disastrous defeats for Federal armies and mounting casualties. Only seven years old in 1861, the Republican Party was an uneasy coalition of often competing interests that Lincoln had to unify. Outside the party, Democrat office holders and powerful newspaper editors such as Horace Greeley of the New York Tribune frequently criticized the administration. Lincoln's political stock rose and fell with the fortunes of Federal armies in the field. Whenever the Federal military effort appeared to stagnate, opposition to the administration's conduct of the war increased. In the South, Confederate victories fed false hopes that Great Britain and France would recognize the Confederacy and that the North would give up the struggle.

Lincoln faced opposition inside and outside the Republican Party. To hold his party's factions together, Lincoln appointed several Republican rivals to his cabinet. Lincoln tolerated considerable dissension and even disloyalty in the cabinet, but outmaneuvered his opponents in the end. Northern Democrats varied in their commitment to the war effort. Some "War Democrats" joined the Republican Party, while others supported a war for the Union but vigorously opposed emancipation. In 1862, "Peace Democrats," who urged an immediate armistice and a negotiated settlement of sectional differences, became a significant force. Many Peace Democrats mistakenly believed that the South would rejoin the Union if slavery were guaranteed; others were covert supporters of southern independence.²¹

The first two years of war brought stalemate in Virginia, but Federal armies made important gains in the West. In February 1862, a joint army-navy expedition

²¹McPherson, 506.
led by Brig. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant and Flag-Officer Andrew H. Foote took Fort Henry on the Tennessee River and Fort Donelson on the Cumberland River, providing two water routes of invasion into Tennessee. Federal control of the Cumberland forced the Confederates to abandon Nashville, an important rail junction and manufacturing city, on February 23, 1862. Northern armies prepared to advance on the Confederate supply center at Corinth, Mississippi. The bloody Battle of Shiloh, Tennessee (April 6-7, 1862), temporarily checked the Federal advance. The 23,000 casualties of Shiloh, including more than 3,000 killed, destroyed any remaining illusions of a short and painless war. Federal forces captured New Orleans in late April 1862, and by June, only the Confederate fortress at Vicksburg, Mississippi, prevented total Northern control of the Mississippi River. In the east, Federal armies were bloodily repulsed by the Confederates at First Manassas (July 21, 1861), the Seven Days’ Battles (June 25-July 1, 1862), and Second Manassas (August 28-30, 1862). Lack of Federal military success, particularly in Virginia, increased criticism of the administration and strengthened the position of the Democrat Party going into the 1862 elections.

During 1862, the Republican Party moved rapidly to adopt emancipation as a war policy. Lincoln awaited favorable military news to strike at slavery in the South. At the Battle of Antietam in western Maryland (September 17, 1862), the Army of the Potomac under Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan turned back a Confederate army of invasion commanded by Gen. Robert E. Lee. Within days, Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, freeing slaves in those areas of the South still engaged in rebellion as of January 1, 1863. Lincoln aimed to undermine Southern resistance and encourage blacks to rally to the Federal effort. Many Northern Democrats charged that the proclamation changed the war’s purpose from preservation of the union to the elevation of black slaves to equality with whites. Democrats made significant gains in the Fall 1862 elections, but the Republicans’ control of the national government remained solid.

In the first half of 1863, antiwar agitation grew, fueled by Federal defeats in Virginia at Fredericksburg (December 13, 1862) and Chancellorsville (April 3-May 6, 1863). Emancipation and the slow progress of the war remained the major political issues, but the Federal Conscription Act of March 1863 and Lincoln’s wartime suspension of civil liberties added to the opposition. The United States’ first military draft provoked riots in several cities. The worst rioting occurred in New York City, where 105 died in July 1863 before Federal troops restored order. Lincoln on several occasions ordered the arrest of suspected southern sympathizers.

\[22\text{McPherson, 339-45, 395-413, 418, 464-71, 528-33.}\]

\[23\text{McPherson, 557-61.}\]
In defiance of Federal court decisions, many were held without charge and denied the writ of habeas corpus.\textsuperscript{24}

On the western front in late 1862 and 1863, the Confederates attempted to retake Tennessee, while the Federals sought to capture Vicksburg. The advance of the Confederate Army of Tennessee under Gen. Braxton Bragg into Middle Tennessee was repulsed at the Battle of Stones River (December 31, 1862-January 2, 1863) by Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, commander of the Federal Army of the Cumberland. Rosecrans pushed the Confederates out of Middle Tennessee during June and July, and captured Chattanooga in September. Rosecrans’s pursuit of Bragg’s army was thwarted at the Battle of Chickamauga (September 19-20, 1863) in northwest Georgia. Rosecrans retreated to Chattanooga, where the Federal forces remained bottled up until November. Under Grant’s leadership, they broke the Confederate stranglehold on the city with victories at Lookout Mountain (November 24, 1863) and Missionary Ridge (November 25, 1863).

The long Federal siege of Vicksburg had ended on July 4, 1863, when Grant, commanding the Army of the Tennessee, occupied the city. The loss of Vicksburg and of Port Hudson on July 9, the last remaining Southern strongholds on the Mississippi, was a serious blow to the Confederacy. With Vicksburg’s fall, Texas, Arkansas, and most of Louisiana were cut off from the rest of the Confederacy. Troops, provisions, and fresh horses from the Trans-Mississippi region were no longer available to the main southern armies. Along with the capture of Chattanooga and the defeat of Lee’s second invasion of the North at the Battle of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (July 1-3, 1863), the fall of Vicksburg lifted Northern morale and strengthened the Republican Party in 1863’s state and local elections. Republicans interpreted their election successes as an endorsement of the administration’s policies, particularly emancipation.\textsuperscript{25}

The presidential election year of 1864 brought the greatest test of Lincoln’s leadership and northern commitment to the war. Federal control of the Mississippi and an ever tighter blockade put severe strains on the Confederacy. Confederate hopes for foreign recognition had dwindled following the failure of Lee’s invasions in 1862 and 1863. However, northern casualties had been very high, and important areas of the South remained untouched by war. Repeated Federal campaigns had failed to capture Richmond. Atlanta, a critical railroad center, also remained in southern hands. In March 1864, Lincoln promoted Grant to the rank of lieutenant general and placed him in command of all Federal armies. Grant moved east to personally supervise the operations of the Army of the Potomac and put Maj. Gen.

\textsuperscript{24}McPherson, 288-89, 610-11.

\textsuperscript{25}McPherson, 591-97, 600, 666, 687-88.
William T. Sherman in charge of all western armies. Grant ordered simultaneous advances by the Army of the Potomac on Richmond and by three combined western armies under Sherman’s personal command into Georgia. The Confederacy aimed to hold off the northern armies until after the November election, in hopes that Lincoln would be defeated by a Democrat sympathetic to southern independence. The future of the administration and, hence, the war effort depended largely on the success of Grant and Sherman.\(^{26}\)

Aware that the large, well-equipped northern armies could tolerate casualties far more readily than the Confederate armies, Grant waged a war of attrition in Virginia. Where previous Federal commanders had retreated after being bloodied by Lee’s army, Grant accepted his losses and relentlessly advanced. In May and June 1864, the Army of the Potomac fought bloody battles at the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, North Anna, and Cold Harbor. After absorbing 65,000 casualties on these fields alone, Federal troops found themselves in mid-June bogged down in trench warfare on the outskirts of Petersburg. Protected by breastworks, Lee’s smaller army was able to repel repeated Federal assaults.\(^{27}\)

In Georgia, Sherman moved south from the Chattanooga area in early May with 100,000 men of the Armies of the Cumberland, the Tennessee, and the Ohio. Opposing him were approximately 65,000 men of the Confederate Army of Tennessee, now commanded by Gen. Joseph E. Johnston.\(^{28}\) Sherman’s objectives were to defeat Johnston’s army and destroy the Confederacy’s war resources. A considerable portion of those resources were in Atlanta, 125 miles southeast of Chattanooga. The intervening terrain offered the Confederates numerous strong defensive positions on ridges and mountains, including Kennesaw Mountain, 23 miles northwest of Atlanta. Atlanta was a crucial transportation hub, an administrative center for the Confederate Army, and an important manufacturing city that produced ammunition, railroad rails, uniforms, and other war matériel. Additionally, Atlanta was at the center of a belt of Confederate manufacturing communities, stretching from Augusta, Georgia, to central Alabama. If Atlanta fell,


\(^{27}\)McPherson, 742.

\(^{28}\)Johnston had closer to 50,000 troops at the beginning of the campaign, but Lieutenant General Leonidas Polk’s Army of Mississippi joined Johnston in mid-May 1864 (Thomas L. Connelly, *Autumn of Glory: The Army of Tennessee, 1862-1865* [Baton Rouge: University of Louisiana Press, 1971], 332).
these cities and the rich agricultural heartland of Georgia would lie open to northern attack.  

Sherman conducted a campaign of maneuver in north Georgia, often using a portion of his superior force to hold the southern army in place, while deploying his remaining troops in turning maneuvers. In late May, the Confederates repulsed two Federal attempts to penetrate their lines. By late June 1864, Sherman had advanced to within 25 miles of Atlanta without fighting a major battle. The Confederate army was entrenched along an eight-mile line, anchored by Kennesaw Mountain. By 1864, both sides recognized the advantage of fighting from the protection of entrenchments. Armed with accurate rifle-muskets, an entrenched army could concentrate a devastating fire on an attacking force from relative safety. Commanding officers were slow to modify standard tactics, which emphasized frontal assaults by infantry. Futile assaults on entrenched positions were ordered on many fields before officers adapted to the new realities. Sherman preferred to advance by outflanking the enemy when he could. In a departure from his customary approach, Sherman on June 27 attempted a frontal assault on entrenched Confederate forces in the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain. The attack was easily repulsed, at the cost of more than 3,000 Federal casualties, compared to less than 1,000 for the southern army.  

The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain is described in detail in chapter 2 below.

In addition to emphasizing the advantages of an entrenched defensive position, the Confederate victory at Kennesaw briefly boosted southern morale. Soon, however, Sherman resumed his flanking tactics, and Johnston was forced to retreat. Johnston withdrew across the Chattahoochee River on July 9, 1864, to a line a few miles outside of Atlanta. Impatient with Johnston’s lack of aggressiveness, the Confederate government on July 17 gave newly promoted Gen. John B. Hood command of the Army of Tennessee. Hood quickly took the offensive. A series of battles in late July failed to compel Sherman to retreat but did check his advance. By early August, the northern armies had settled in for a siege of Atlanta.

With the two main Federal armies seemingly bogged down within sight of their primary objectives, pessimism gripped the North. Antiwar sentiment mounted, exacerbated by 90,000 northern casualties in three months and a July 18, 1864, call

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29Connelly, 369-71; Richard M. McMurry, “The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain and the Georgia Campaign of 1864” (Master’s thesis, Emory University, 1964), 3-5.


for 500,000 additional Federal soldiers. The Democrats, anticipating victory, nominated Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan in Chicago on August 31.\textsuperscript{32} The party's platform branded the war a failure and called for an immediate ceasefire without any concessions from the South. McClellan accepted the nomination but backed away from the platform, insisting that southern reentry into the Union precede an armistice.\textsuperscript{33}

On September 2, 1864, Atlanta fell, providing a huge boost to Northern morale and a corresponding letdown for the South. Coupled with Rear Adm. David G. Farragut's August 5 victory at Mobile Bay and Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan's successes in Virginia's Shenandoah Valley in September and October, the capture of Atlanta deprived the Democrats of their war failure issue. The Republicans fully exploited the implications of the Democrats' peace platform and made repeated accusations of disloyalty. Democrats tried to emphasize opposition to emancipation but made little headway. Believing that a final military victory was at hand, northern voters gave the Republicans an overwhelming victory in November. McClellan carried only Kentucky, Delaware, and New Jersey, and the Republicans won a three-fourths majority in the Congress.\textsuperscript{34}

Vindicated at the polls, Lincoln and the Republican Party pursued the war to a successful conclusion. Sherman's army marched through Georgia and South Carolina, confiscating or destroying anything of value to the Confederacy. Richmond fell in early April 1865; Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox Court House on April 9; and all remaining Confederate forces, including those west of the Mississippi, had surrendered by June 23.\textsuperscript{35} The war was over, and the country turned its attention to problems of reconciliation and reconstruction.

The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain was one component of the larger 1864 Atlanta campaign. Although the battle was a Confederate victory, it did not prevent the fall of Atlanta. The capture of Atlanta's important rail lines and manufacturing capacity was a severe blow to the Confederacy and opened the Lower South to further depredations by Sherman's armies. The timing of Atlanta's fall was a key to Lincoln's reelection, which helped ensure victory on the North's terms of

\textsuperscript{32} McClellan had been a general without a command after being removed by Lincoln from command of the Army of the Potomac in November 1862 (McPherson, 562).

\textsuperscript{33} McPherson, 758; Stephen W. Sears, George B. McClellan: The Young Napoleon (New York: Ticknor & Fields, 1988), 369-76.

\textsuperscript{34} McPherson, 773-75, 788-91, 805-6.

unconditional surrender. Had the Confederates been able to follow up their
defensive victory at Kennesaw Mountain with other triumphs, the fall of Atlanta
might have been postponed or even prevented. That, in turn, would have greatly
complicated Lincoln’s reelection bid.

At the level of battlefield tactics, the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain
demonstrated again the near futility of frontal assaults on entrenched positions.
Only after repeated experience and casualties did officers fully learn that rifle-
muskets and field entrenchments had irrevocably changed the nature of infantry
combat. The surviving earthworks at Kennesaw Mountain are a sobering reminder
of the frightful casualties that forged that experience. The battlefield and its
memorials are a testament to the valor of the men who fought there.

36 The charge of 15,000 Confederate soldiers on the Federal position at Cemetery Ridge on the
last day of the Battle of Gettysburg (July 3, 1863) and the Federal army’s suicidal assaults on Marye’s
Heights at the Battle of Fredericksburg (December 13, 1862) were two of the most costly lessons the
war provided in this area.
CHAPTER 2

KENNESAW MOUNTAIN AND
THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN, MAY-SEPTEMBER 1864

From May to September 1864, Federal and Confederate forces fought across north Georgia from Dalton to Atlanta, which was abandoned by the Confederates on September 1. Occasional fierce battles punctuated almost daily skirmishing and maneuvering for position. Collectively, this activity is known as the Atlanta Campaign. The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain, June 27, 1864, occurred near the middle of the campaign. The importance of the battle in the Civil War is described in the previous chapter. This chapter will explore the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain and the Atlanta Campaign, focusing on the remaining Park resources.37

STRATEGIC SITUATION IN THE SPRING OF 1864

When Ulysses S. Grant assumed command of all Federal armies in March 1864, he ordered a coordinated offensive to destroy Confederate resistance and end the war. The major efforts focused on eastern Virginia and northwest Georgia, while smaller Federal forces moved toward Richmond from south of the James River, up the

37The best introduction to the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain and the Atlanta campaign is Kennesaw Mountain and the Atlanta Campaign by Dennis Kelly, the park’s historian. Albert Castel’s recently published work, Decision in the West: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864, is a masterful analysis of the campaign. Other important sources are The Army of Tennessee: A Military History by Stanley F. Horn, Autumn of Glory: The Army of Tennessee, 1862-1865 by Thomas L. Connelly, War So Terrible: Sherman and Atlanta by James L. McDonough and James P. Jones, and two Ph.D. dissertations done at Emory University: “The Atlanta Campaign, December 23, 1863, to July 18, 1864” by Richard M. McMurry and “The Atlanta Campaign, July 18-September 2, 1864” by Errol M. Clauss. McMurry’s biography of Hood, John Bell Hood and the War for Southern Independence, is also useful. Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American is a provocative study of Sherman’s strategic thinking by the British historian B. H. Liddell-Hart. Sherman, Johnston, and Hood all published memoirs after the war’s end. Sherman’s work is Memoirs of W. T. Sherman, Johnston’s is Narrative of Military Operations, and Hood’s Advance and Retreat.
Shenandoah Valley, and toward Texas and the Indian Territory by way of the Red River and Southwest Arkansas. Grant accompanied Maj. Gen. George G. Meade and the Army of the Potomac in Virginia and aimed to finally defeat Gen. Robert E. Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia. Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman commanded three Federal armies concentrated near Chattanooga, Tennessee. Grant ordered Sherman to “move against [Confederate Gen. Joseph] Johnston’s army, to break it up, and to get into the interior of the enemy’s country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources.”38 If Confederate resistance persisted, Grant contemplated combining his army with Sherman’s forces in the Lower South.

The war-making capacity of the Confederacy, which remained formidable after three years of combat, was a major target for Sherman. In the spring of 1864, the Federals controlled the Mississippi River, and the Confederates had been expelled from most of Tennessee and much of Mississippi. Still, the heartland of the Confederacy, stretching from Alabama through Georgia to the Carolinas, was virtually untouched by the war. Atlanta, 125 miles southeast of Chattanooga, was an important Confederate rail junction, a significant manufacturing city, and the center of a belt of important manufacturing communities extending from Augusta, Georgia, to Selma, Alabama. Four railroads met at Atlanta, linking the southern Atlantic seaboard states with the western Confederacy (see figure 2). The Western & Atlantic ran northwest to Chattanooga and was the axis along which the Atlanta Campaign was fought. The Georgia Railroad ran east to Augusta, where it connected with lines to Charleston, Raleigh, and Richmond. The Macon & Western ran southeast, with connections to Savannah. Just south of Atlanta at East Point, the Atlanta & West Point, which extended west into Alabama, diverged from the Macon line. Atlanta’s factories produced iron, armor plate, railroad rails, ammunition, pistols, uniforms, flour, and meat. Confederate government offices in Atlanta included the Quartermaster, Commissary Department, the Signal Corps, and the Railroad Transportation Office.39

Sherman had substantial resources to accomplish his mission. He commanded 100,000 soldiers at Chattanooga, divided among Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland with 60,000 troops, Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson’s Army of the Tennessee, 25,000 strong, and Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield’s 13,000-man Army of the Ohio. Opposing the Federal force was the Army of Tennessee under Gen. Joseph Johnston at Dalton, Georgia. Johnston received reinforcements

38 McPherson, 722.

Figure 2. The Atlanta Campaign

in May that brought his strength up to about 65,000. Johnston’s army had three
infantry corps, commanded by Lt. Gens. Leonidas Polk, William Hardee, and John
Bell Hood. Both sides depended for supplies on the single-track Western &
Atlantic Railroad. Sherman’s rail supply line extended north to Chattanooga and
Nashville, while Johnston’s ran south to Atlanta. The movements of both
commanders were influenced by the need to safeguard the supply lines behind the
armies. The numerous mountains and ridges of north Georgia offered the
Confederates strong natural defensive positions. Additionally, the advancing
Federals would have to cross three rivers, the Oostanaula, the Etowah, and the
Chattahoochee. South of Atlanta, the mountains ended, and the Confederates would
have fewer natural lines of defense.40

The Confederate Army of Tennessee that Johnston took over in late December
1863 was handicapped by disension among its top officers and poor overall morale.
The army had only one clear victory, Chickamauga, to its credit, and the Federals
had routed the army, then commanded by Gen. Braxton Bragg, at the Battle of
Missionary Ridge (November 25, 1863). Confederate President Jefferson Davis was
skeptical of Johnston’s abilities and gave him command of the army with reluctance.
Personal animosity and a fundamental disagreement over strategy marred Johnston’s
relationship with Davis. Davis repeatedly urged Johnston to take the offensive
against Sherman, while Johnston felt his inferior numbers dictated a defensive-
offensive strategy. Johnston believed he could attack only after he had won some
defensive victories over the advancing Federals. Johnston made his position more
difficult by failing to fully communicate his intentions to Confederate authorities in
Richmond. Additionally, Johnston’s three corps commanders—Polk, Hardee, and
Hood—mistrusted him. Johnston did much to restore the army’s morale, but its
command problems were never satisfactorily resolved.41

By contrast, Sherman and Grant had cooperated closely while both fought in the
Western theater and enjoyed each other’s confidence. Grant gave Sherman broad
strategic objectives and relied on him to devise tactics to accomplish them.
Sherman was an energetic commander who realized early that a Northern victory
would require not just battlefield successes but destruction of the Confederates’
ability to make war. Sherman targeted the South’s economic and military resources
equally.

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41Connelly, 288-93, 313.
CIVIL WAR TACTICS

When the Atlanta campaign opened, tactical considerations were radically altered from the early days of the war. At the war's beginning, officers emphasized the tactical offensive, in which assaulting troops advanced in lines, firing volleys on command. As the enemy line was approached, troops would run the last several yards and break the line with a bayonet charge. These linear tactics dated to seventeenth-century European wars. They had been successful in the Mexican War (1846-1848) and were stressed at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Changes in weaponry during the war decreased the effectiveness of linear tactics. Rifle-muskets of superior range and accuracy, used only by elite units of the old regular army, were in general use on both sides by 1863. The combination of rifle-muskets and the nearly universal use of field entrenchments by late 1863 greatly compromised the effectiveness of the tactical offensive.42

Rifle-muskets had an effective range of 300 to 400 yards, four times greater than the range of the smoothbore muskets used early in the war. By 1863, attacking troops could no longer expect to advance to within a few dozen yards of the enemy, fire a volley, and make a double-time charge while defenders were reloading. Defenders could devastate the ranks of attacking troops well before they were close enough to form for a bayonet charge. When defenders were protected by field entrenchments, their advantage was magnified. By 1864, whenever troops halted near the enemy, they quickly entrenched to have some protection against attack. The Confederates, fighting a largely defensive war, often constructed elaborate systems of trenches, laid out in advance by field engineers to exploit advantages of terrain. Engineers distinguished between the topographic crest and the military crest of a hill. The military crest was often a position slightly downslope of the topographic crest. From the military crest, defenders had a clear field of fire over the ground in front of them without exposing their silhouettes to enemy fire.43

Entrenchments on both sides followed the same pattern. Trenches were dug, and the earth from them piled up to form a protective parapet, also known as breastworks. Troops could dig a three-foot-deep rifle pit with an earthen parapet in about an hour. In more permanent positions, trenches might be deeper, and log retaining walls, known as revetments, were used to back the earthen parapets (photograph 4). A tree trunk, known as a head-log and held in place by skid logs, was placed atop the parapet. Riflemen stood in the trench or on a firing step and fired through the narrow gap between the head-log and parapet. Other troops would

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42McPherson, 472-73.

43McPherson, 473-75.
Meanwhile be reloading in the trench, waiting to take their turn on the firing line. When time permitted, various obstacles were placed in front of the breastworks to slow an attacking force. A front ditch was sometimes dug directly in front of the parapet. Out beyond the parapet, trees and brush were felled, and their branches interlaced to form obstacles known as abatis. Skirmishers from the attacking force would clear a path, under fire, through the abatis. Infantrymen often dug their own trenches, but Sherman's army increasingly employed freed slaves to dig them, while the Confederates often used gangs of slaves to prepare fall-back lines of defense out of range of Federal artillery.  

By late 1863, the tactical defensive possessed a clear advantage. An entrenched position, defended by troops with rifle-muskets, was extremely difficult to overrun. Officers, however, were slow to recognize the altered tactical realities and often had few alternatives to a frontal assault. Many commanders looked for ways to envelop the enemy's flank, but the opposing general was unlikely to leave his flanks

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unprotected. Officers on both sides repeatedly ordered frontal assaults on entrenched lines, frequently with disastrous results. In some encounters, attacking forces suffered ten times the casualties of defenders. In the Atlanta campaign, Sherman chose repeatedly to outflank the Confederates’ entrenched positions, rarely ordering frontal attacks. Sherman’s three to two advantage in numbers allowed him to use part of his force to keep the Confederate army in place while other units were sent on turning maneuvers.45

THE ATLANTA CAMPAIGN

When Sherman’s forces moved out from Chattanooga on May 7, 1864, the Confederates held a strong defensive line around Dalton, Georgia. Sherman ordered Thomas and Schofield to threaten an attack against the main body of Confederates, while McPherson made a wide move to the right in the direction of Resaca, fifteen miles south of Dalton (see figure 2). McPherson nearly got in Johnston’s rear, but was deterred by a small force holding Resaca. This delay gave Johnston enough time to retire from Dalton to a hastily prepared position around Resaca. The two armies fought at Resaca May 13-15, while Sherman tried another flanking move, sending a division of McPherson’s army to cross the Oostanaula River and get behind the Confederates’ left. When Johnston learned of the successful river crossing, he ordered a retreat, first to Adairsville and then on to Cassville.46

Johnston planned an attack on the Federals for May 19, when he suspected that they would be strung out on two parallel roads between Adairsville and Cassville. General Hood declined to press the attack when he detected a potential threat to his rear, and the opportunity was lost. After a council of war on the night of May 19, Johnston ordered another pullback across the Etowah River to Allatoona Pass. Sherman bypassed this position and swung his forces west away from the railroad and toward the town of Dallas. Johnston moved his army west to counter this new threat. Federal attacks at New Hope Church (May 25) and Pickett’s Mill (May 27) were repulsed by the Confederates, and Sherman began to move to his left back toward the railroad to the east. Believing that Sherman’s right might be undermanned, Johnston ordered an attack at Dallas on May 28. Here the Federals had the advantage of fighting from trenches, and they decisively turned back the assault.47

45Connelly, 432; McPherson, 472-77.

46Connelly, 341-45; Kelly, 13-14; Sherman, 496-504.

47Kelly, 15-16; Connelly, 346-56; Sherman, 504-7, 512-15.
Following these battles, a period of heavy skirmishing and maneuvering for position lasted well into June. Heavy rainfall impeded the movements of both armies. In the first week of June, Johnston’s army took up a position along a ten-mile line approximately 30 miles northwest of Atlanta. The line ran from northeast to southwest, with Brushy Mountain on the right, Pine Mountain in the center, and Lost Mountain on the left. On June 14, a Federal artillery shell killed Confederate General Polk on Pine Mountain. Johnston appointed Maj. Gen. William W. Loring temporary commander of Polk’s army corps. Lt. Gen. A. P. Stewart assumed permanent command of the corps in the first week of July. After additional fighting near Gilgal Church on June 15 and Lost Mountain on June 16, the Confederates on the night of June 18-19 fell back southeast to a prepared line anchored by Kennesaw Mountain, a few miles north of Marietta.  

The Kennesaw Mountain Line

Two peaks, Big and Little Kennesaw, dominate the battlefield of Kennesaw Mountain. Extending to the south of Little Kennesaw is a spur known as Pigeon Hill. Together they form a two-mile-long ridge referred to as Kennesaw Mountain. Confederate forces chose Kennesaw Mountain as the fulcrum of their line of defense, in part because of the military advantages offered by its dominance over the surrounding countryside and its steep and forested northern and western slopes that faced the advancing Federal forces. Rising 700 feet above the surrounding area, Kennesaw Mountain was described by Sherman as “the key to the whole county.”

Seizing this military opportunity, Johnston’s chief engineer, Lt. Col. S. W. Pressman, carefully laid out the Confederate line of defense at Kennesaw Mountain. Pressman enhanced the topographically strong defensive position of Kennesaw Mountain with the construction of a nearly continuous six-mile-long line of field fortifications. The Confederate earthworks formed a convex line that began northeast of Big Kennesaw Mountain and continued west for a short distance, crossed the Western and Atlantic Railroad, an important supply link to Atlanta, and then turned southward and wrapped around the western face of Big and Little Kennesaw, just below their crests. The line continued to the south, taking advantage of exposed boulders and rugged terrain, and crossed three roads leading into Marietta from the west (Burnt Hickory, Dallas, and Powder Springs)

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48Kelly, 21-23; Connelly, 357-58, 421.

49Pigeon Hill is a twentieth-century name; at the time of the battle, this feature was called the Kennesaw Spur.

50Sherman, 530.
terminating south of Powder Springs Road. Johnston arrayed the three corps of his army, with Hood’s on the right of the line, Loring’s in the center, and Hardee’s on the left.

The Confederates partially cleared the crests of Big and Little Kennesaw Mountain of timber to accommodate artillery emplacements and observation stations. A network of trenches for infantry and earthen forts (redoubts) for artillery support lined the slopes of the ridge. Earthen parapets protected the infantry trenches. Immediately beyond the parapets were front ditches and abatis, and farther in advance were rifle pits for skirmishers, who observed the enemy and gave advance warning of an attack.\textsuperscript{51}

As was his habit, Sherman ordered the bulk of his arriving troops to dig in close to the enemy line while he probed both flanks of the Confederate position. In contrast to the Confederate earthworks, the Federal fortifications consisted of a series of short overlapping lines rather than a nearly continuous line. Located in opposition to the already established Confederate line, the Federal fortifications were constructed in the low lying area below Kennesaw Mountain (photograph 5). The Federal line stretched from an area north of the railroad south to below Powder Springs Road.

\textbf{Photograph 5. View from a Union artillery position toward Little Kennesaw Mountain (left) and Pigeon Hill (right) (U.S. Signal Corps photograph, National Archives)}

\textsuperscript{51}Kelly, 24; Connelly, 357; McMurry, “The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain,” 35.
McPherson positioned his Army of the Tennessee on the left, Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland held the middle, and Schofield’s Army of the Ohio was on the right. On June 20, a Federal cavalry sortie across Noonday Creek east of the railroad on the Confederate right flank was checked by three brigades of southern cavalry. Simultaneously, Sherman ordered Schofield’s Army of the Ohio to continue trying to envelop Johnston’s left flank by moving to the south. Johnston learned that the Federals were pressing Hardee’s corps on the Confederate left and threatening to seize the Powder Springs Road, an important route to the Chattahoochee. To counter this southward shift of Federal forces, Johnston ordered Hood to remove his corps from the right and march it behind the Confederate lines to reinforce and extend the left on the night of June 21. Loring’s corps shifted to the right, joining Confederate cavalry in manning the positions abandoned by Hood’s troops.52

Cobb County in 1864

The Union and Confederate forces entering Cobb County disrupted a lightly settled agricultural community composed largely of white farmer-landowners. Settlement in the area grew after the 1829 discovery of gold in the north Georgia mountains, near Dahlonega, and encouraged the Georgia legislature to establish Cobb County in 1832. The 1836-1838 removal of the Cherokees from Georgia west to the Indian Territory (present-day Oklahoma) allowed for the expansion of the county’s white settlement. Enterprising land owners bought land lots, consisting of 160 acres, and gold lots, with forty acres. The majority of the county was distributed in gold lots, although gold discoveries proved insignificant and short-lived. In 1838, the state legislature guaranteed the bonds for the Western & Atlantic Railroad, established by Joseph E. Brown. This rail line, which connected Atlanta and Chattanooga, was completed in 1850 and contributed to Marietta’s growth as a summer resort community. At the same time, some industrial activity, particularly in the city of Roswell, Georgia, identified Cobb County as a promising textile manufacturing center.53 Despite this modest town development, most Cobb residents lived in the rural countryside and operated small farms among the rolling hills, woods, and lowlands.54

The county population in 1860 consisted of 10,000 whites and 4,000 blacks. Nineteenth-century small farms surrounding Kennesaw Mountain reflected typical

52 Kelly, 24-26; Connelly, 358-59.
53 Roswell was later made a part of Fulton County.
54 Scott, 19-21.
antebellum land use patterns of the Upland Section of the Georgia Piedmont. The rolling geography and rocky soil prevented the establishment of large-scale plantations and also limited the need for a large slave work force. The typical Cobb County farmstead comprised 50 to 150 acres. Subsistence farming characterized antebellum Cobb County, with timber sales providing needed cash for some farmers.55

One family, the Hardages, settled early in Cobb County, along the Burnt Hickory Road, south of Little Kennesaw. The family originally lived in a log cabin, but over the course of twenty years it moved to several larger residences. In 1853, George W. Hardage built a sawmill on Noyes Creek, paying eighteen dollars an acre for the land. When the Union army invaded Cobb County in June 1864, Mrs. Hardage and her two youngest children fled to Stone Mountain. Some family members remained until the fighting around Kennesaw Mountain intensified, when they also sought refuge at Stone Mountain.56

The Kennesaw Mountain troop movement maps illustrate the broad scale land use and settlement patterns that characterized the setting of the battle in June 1864.57 Overall, the map shows the influence of the natural landforms upon land use patterns and the siting of Confederate and Federal earthworks. Settlement and agricultural land use, evidenced by the presence of structures, roadways, and open fields, are shown concentrated in the flatter, low-lying areas of the battlefield. In contrast, the slopes and ridges remain unimproved and uniformly forested. The depiction of homesites, open fields, orchards, a school, churches, and a mill suggests the diversity of land uses and spatial patterns in the area below the ridges at the time of the battle. The circulation network exhibits a hierarchy of major and minor roads. The major thoroughfares travel mainly east-west, crossing the prevailing north-south ridge at its lowest points. A network of minor local roads is concentrated in the low-lying areas, presumably to provide access to the individual farmsteads and agricultural fields. Although the rocky slopes and crests of Kennesaw Mountain were of little agricultural or settlement value, they gave the Confederates a strong defensive position and visual command of the countryside. The timber on the slopes and ridges provided both cover and material for the

55Thomas A. Scott, "Cobb County, Georgia, 1880-1900: A Socioeconomic Study of an Upper Piedmont County" (Ph.D. diss., University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 1978), 5.


construction and reinforcement of the Confederate earthworks or was cleared in areas to provide views and fields of fire toward the enemy.

The Union forces established their positions in flat, low-lying areas valued for agriculture and settlement, but tactically weak because of their exposure to the Confederate positions. However, as Kelly's map illustrates, the Union forces constructed the majority of their earthworks under the protective cover of woodland except on the southern portion of the battlefield. Here, the Union forces were forced to construct their field fortifications in open fields. The exposed nature of the terrain between the Federal and Confederate positions would pose a serious problem for any contemplated Federal advance.

The Battle of Kolb's Farm

On June 22, Schofield's troops and Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker's XX Corps of the Army of the Cumberland began to advance east toward Marietta along the Powder Springs Road on the Confederate left. By early afternoon, Federal skirmishers had clashed with advance elements of Hood's corps, and the northerners hastily prepared dirt and fence-rail breastworks. Hood's orders were merely to check the Federal advance, but without consulting Johnston, Hood ordered a late-afternoon attack by two of his three divisions, led by Maj. Gens. Thomas C. Hindman and Carter L. Stevenson. The ensuing engagement is known as the Battle of Kolb's Farm.58

In this battle, the Confederates advanced westward athwart Powder Springs Road, pushing back Federal skirmishers. Hindman's division was arrayed north of the road, while Stevenson's advanced slantwise across it. Dense underbrush and swampy ground impeded the advance in places. When the advance neared the main Federal lines, it disintegrated. Aided by forty artillery pieces, many sighted to deliver devastating enfilade fire down a ravine, Federal infantry repulsed the advance. The brief battle cost Johnston approximately 1,000 casualties compared to 350 for the Federals. The battle checked Sherman's maneuvering toward the south and influenced his decision to attempt a penetration of the Confederate line at Kennesaw.59

The field of the Battle of Kolb's Farm lies partially within the southern boundary of the park and partially on private property. The rehabilitated four-room log house of Peter Kolb, built in the 1830s, stands on the south side of Powder Springs Road within the park. Peter Valentine Kolb settled early in Cobb County from South Carolina, likely between 1832 and 1838. Shortly thereafter, Kolb built a rectangular log house composed of square-hewn oak logs with lime and mud


chinking. Kolb operated a largely self-sufficient farm, with ten slaves and approximately 600 acres of land. A blacksmith shop, north of Powder Springs Road, and numerous farm outbuildings occupied the site. The family cemetery lay west of the house. When the Federals approached the farm along Powder Springs Road, the Kolb family fled to Madison, Georgia. Union General Hooker used the house as his field headquarters until the Union armies left Kennesaw. The Kolbs did not occupy the house again until the 1880s, and during this lapse the house was damaged and several outbuildings were lost.\(^6^0\) At the time of the battle, the area north of Powder Springs Road across from the house was mostly open pasture and cropland surrounded by swampy woods, lying within the floodplain of John Ward Creek. The main Federal lines were west of the Kolb house.

**The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain**

Thwarted in his attempt to maneuver beyond the Confederate left flank at Kolb’s Farm, Sherman considered his options. Elements of his army were now within 20 miles of Atlanta. To the rear of Johnston’s Kennesaw line, only one natural obstacle, the Chattahoochee River, protected the city. Nearly constant skirmishing and numerous medium-sized battles had marked the campaign, but neither army had suffered major losses. The rain had finally stopped and the roads were drying, facilitating army movements. Sherman felt that he could not prudently extend his lines farther to his right away from his railroad supply line. Believing that Johnston might have stretched his lines dangerously thin in extending his left, Sherman decided to attack the entrenched Confederates, “a thing carefully avoided up to that time.”\(^6^1\) Sherman later justified his decision on the grounds that troops lost their edge if kept out of combat for too long and his fear that his flanking tactics were becoming too predictable. Sherman may simply have grown impatient with the slow pace of his advance.\(^6^2\)

Sherman reasoned that an assault on the physically imposing center of the Confederate line would be unexpected and ordered a two-pronged attack for the morning of June 27. McPherson’s Army of the Tennessee and Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland would attempt to penetrate the Confederate line at points selected by each army’s commander. McPherson directed Maj. Gen. John A. Logan’s XV Corps to attack at the junction of Little Kennesaw and Pigeon Hill. That portion of the Confederate line was defended by W. H. T. Walker’s division of Hardee’s

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\(^{61}\)Sherman, 530.

\(^{62}\)Castel, 320-21; Liddell-Hart, 266-67; Kelly, 31.
corps and Samuel G. French’s division of Loring’s corps. The second, larger Federal effort would occur about one mile south. General Thomas chose Brig. Gen. John A. Newton’s Second Division of the IV Corps and Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis’s Second Division of the XIV Corps to make the attack. The objective was a low ridge defended by the divisions of Maj. Gens. Patrick R. Cleburne and Benjamin F. Cheatham of Hardee’s corps (see figure 3). Other portions of the Federal force would feign an attack on the right and left flanks to prevent Johnston from reinforcing his center. As in many Civil War battles, only a fraction, approximately 20 percent, of the available Federal force was committed to the June 27 assault. The remaining troops were held in reserve to follow up any successes.63 Most of the Federal troops involved were Midwesterners, with the great majority coming from Illinois, Ohio, and Indiana.

After a fifteen-minute artillery barrage on the morning of the 27th, Federal troops facing Big Kennesaw and Pigeon Hill moved forward from their works at 8:15 A.M. The diversion at Big Kennesaw Mountain and Bell’s Ferry Road on the Confederate right was easily repulsed. At Pigeon Hill, 5,500 Federals in three brigades64 moved toward the Confederate lines through dense underbrush and abatis on both sides of the Burnt Hickory Road to confront the heavily fortified Confederate line. The western crest of Pigeon Hill was lined with earthworks, some built atop vertical rock faces, and provided the Confederates with a commanding view of Federal movements below. At the junction of Little Kennesaw and Pigeon Hill is a steep gorge, where the northerners struggled through dense underbrush. Part of this attack’s front was within range of Confederate batteries on Little Kennesaw, which supported the defenders. A few Federals came within yards of the breastworks but could not breach the Confederate line. The attack collapsed within two hours.65

On Thomas’s front south of Dallas Road, 9,000 Federals in Newton’s and Davis’s divisions formed in open fields behind the Federal lines. Their 9:00 A.M. assault was nearly an hour late. Thomas and his subordinates chose to assail this area because there the Federal lines were closest to the Confederate position. This shorter distance lessened the time that the attacking Federals would be exposed to Confederate fire. Additionally, a bend in the Confederate line created a potentially

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64The brigades were commanded by Brig. Gen. Giles A. Smith, Brig. Gen. A. J. Lightburn, and Col. Charles Walcutt.

65Kelly, 32-36; Castel, 307-11.
Figure 3. The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain

vulnerable salient soon to become known as "The Dead Angle." The Confederate defenders on this portion of the front enjoyed a carefully prepared position. The unusually deep trenches followed the contour of the ridge and were equipped with firing platforms and traverses to provide protection from enfilade fire. One flaw in the position was the siting of the salient on the topographic rather than the military crest of the ridge. Artillery positions, concealed by brush, provided flanking fire from each side of the salient. The right flank was covered by Mebane's Tennessee Battery, a two-gun emplacement within a square redoubt (photograph 6). In places, abatis were supplemented by sharpened pine stakes set four inches apart and by chevaux-de-frise, criss-crossed logs bristling with pointed stakes. The ground to be covered by the Federals was partly occupied by a field, but was rough and rocky in places, with thin forest and dense underbrush impeding the formation of ranks. A small creek lay between the lines of the two armies.

Photograph 6. Redoubt occupied by Mebane's Tennessee Battery

Salients tend to draw focussed, attacking fire while fanning out less effective defensive fire. Salients also limit the field of fire for flanking artillery.
Newton's three brigades attacked a westward-facing section of the Confederate line just north of the salient. The Confederate trenches in this area were protected by especially heavy abatis and a deep front ditch. The brigades of Brig. Gen. Charles Harker on the right and Brig. Gen. George D. Wagner on the left made the initial assault. To increase the chances of a breakthrough, the attack was in dense columns with individual regiments lined up one behind the other. When the Federals emerged from the last stand of light trees, the Confederates opened a devastating fire. Infantry fire was supplemented by shell and canister from Confederate artillery batteries. Both Federal brigades were easily repulsed, and only a few attackers penetrated the abatis to the foot of the Confederate breastworks. Harker, the only general to go into this battle mounted, was killed trying to rally his men for a renewed attack. Newton then ordered Brig. Gen. Nathan Kimball's brigade, deployed on Wagner's left, to advance. A handful of Kimball's men reached the parapet, where they were killed or captured.

Just south of Newton's attack, two brigades of Davis's division led by Cols. Daniel McCook and John G. Mitchell assaulted the Dead Angle. McCook's four regiments, formed in line of battle, ran across an open field toward the salient, hitting the toe in successive waves. Mitchell's regiments, similarly aligned, advanced and then wheeled to their left to attack the salient's southern flank. As soon as the Federals entered the wheat field in front of the Confederate position, they came under infantry fire. The defensive fire became intense as the assault force neared the breastworks. The Confederate battery south of the Dead Angle suddenly caught Mitchell's men in deadly enfilade fire. Some of the Federals reached the Confederate trenches and briefly fought hand-to-hand before being killed or captured. Colonel McCook was mortally wounded on the parapet near the toe of the salient. His successor, Col. William Dilworth of the 85th Illinois regiment, fell within five minutes of assuming brigade command.67

The placement of the Confederate salient on the highest part of the hill, rather than the military crest, prevented even greater Federal casualties. Approximately twenty-five yards below the salient, the hill drops off steeply before regaining its gentle slope to the valley floor. The Federals, repulsed and unable to return to their own works without incurring additional losses, fell back to the shelter provided by this depression. There, they rapidly dug trenches, using tin cups and bayonets, and improving the works at night with entrenching tools brought up from the rear. A second Federal line was constructed and, later, an attempt was made to tunnel under the Confederate works and destroy them with explosives (photograph 7). Several cease-fires were observed in order to retrieve wounded and bury the dead that lay

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strewn between the two lines following the morning assault. The stand-off ended five days later when Johnston’s forces withdrew from the Kennesaw line. The ridge on this portion of the battlefield was named Cheatham Hill, in honor of the successful defense by Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham’s troops.  

Sherman was reluctant to acknowledge the failure of his attempt to break the Confederate lines. He queried Thomas about renewing the attack on the afternoon of June 27. When Thomas responded that “one or two more such assaults would use up this army,” Sherman abandoned the idea. Federal casualties for the morning’s assault were estimated at 3,000. Protected by their breastworks, the Confederates lost less than 1,000. Many of these were skirmishers overrun in advance positions; troops manning the main Confederate line suffered minimal losses. The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain demonstrated again the overwhelming advantage possessed by motivated defenders in entrenched positions, particularly where the topography also favored the defenders.

Schofield’s demonstration on the far right of the Federal position provided Sherman’s only gain of the day. In that sector, northern infantry established a position on the Austell Road, and cavalry detachments advanced south to within five

69Kelly, 36-39; Castel, 307-16.
69Kelly, 41.
69McPherson, 749-50; Castel, 320.
miles of the Chattahoochee. In the days following the battle, Sherman ordered McPherson to reinforce Schofield on the far right. Johnston was once again in danger of being outflanked, and he ordered a withdrawal from the Kennesaw line on the night of July 2. The Confederate army took up a new position around Smyrna Station, four miles southeast of Marietta. In the end, the Confederates' defensive victory at Kennesaw Mountain had little impact, because it only delayed, but did not halt, Sherman's advance.  

Sherman continued to probe the Confederate left, and on the night of July 4 Johnston ordered another retreat, this time to a prepared line of defenses on the north bank of the Chattahoochee. The Chattahoochee runs from the northeast to the southwest in this area, and Johnston believed Sherman would again attempt to get around his left flank. Sherman encouraged this belief by sending a decoy cavalry detachment to the southwest to ostentatiously scout river crossings. Johnston responded by dispatching the bulk of his cavalry to guard the downstream crossings. Sherman meanwhile ordered Brig. Gen. Kenner Garrard's cavalry and Schofield's infantry to cross upstream (northeast) of Johnston's line. The Federals captured the town of Roswell, destroying the cloth mills there, and crossed the river at several upstream fords on July 8 and 9. With numerous Federals across the river and threatening to get between him and Atlanta, Johnston ordered the abandonment of his river line. On the night of July 9, the Confederates withdrew to the outer defenses of Atlanta, on the south bank of Peachtree Creek and less than five miles from the city's center.  

Johnston's continued withdrawals caused increasing concern in the Confederate capital. On July 16, Jefferson Davis wired Johnston, asking for his plan of operations. Johnston's reply that his plan "must depend on that of the enemy" failed to reassure Davis. On July 17, Davis relieved Johnston of command of the Army of Tennessee and put Lt. Gen. John Bell Hood in his place. General Cheatham assumed temporary command of Hood's old army corps, which was assigned to Lt. Gen. Stephen D. Lee on July 27. Just thirty-three, Hood had a reputation for aggressiveness as a brigade and division commander, but lacked experience in commanding an army. A leg lost at Chickamauga and a mangled left arm limited Hood's ability to ride a horse and personally supervise combat operations. The change of commanders did not end dissension among the officers of the Army of Tennessee. Many officers considered Hood a reckless gambler, and

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71Kelly, 41-42, 45.
72Kelly, 45; Connelly, 392-98.
General Hardee’s dissatisfaction at being passed over probably affected his performance in the subsequent battles for Atlanta.\textsuperscript{73}

**The Fall of Atlanta**

When all of his forces had crossed the Chattahoochee, Sherman advanced on Atlanta in a wheeling movement. Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland served as the pivot, moving on the city from the north, while Schofield’s Army of the Ohio and McPherson’s Army of the Tennessee swung around to the east. On July 19, McPherson was in Decatur, six miles east of Atlanta, marching slowly west along the Georgia Railroad, tearing up track along the way. Schofield was near Decatur advancing on a road parallel to the railroad, and Thomas was beginning to cross Peachtree Creek on a six-mile front. Hoping to capitalize on the division of the Federal forces, Hood ordered Cheatham’s corps and Georgia militia under Maj. Gen. G. W. Smith to hold Schofield and McPherson in place while Stewart and Hardee surprised Thomas astride Peachtree Creek. The attack, scheduled to begin at 1:00 P.M. on July 20, fell victim to delay and confusion. Hood remained at his headquarters in Atlanta after issuing his orders, and Hardee and Cheatham were unable to coordinate their assaults. When the attack began, Thomas had virtually all of his troops on the south bank of the creek and held off the disorganized Confederates in the Battle of Peachtree Creek.\textsuperscript{74}

Undaunted, Hood ordered an attack on McPherson’s army for the 22nd. Hardee’s corps was sent on a fifteen-mile night march to get in position on McPherson’s left flank and rear. With simultaneous attacks by Cheatham’s corps from the west and Hardee’s from the south and east, Hood hoped to roll up McPherson’s left. The Confederates nearly succeeded in winning the Battle of Atlanta, despite rushed preparations and inadequate coordination. Hardee was hampered by densely wooded terrain and poor reconnaissance and was unable to get all of his divisions engaged until late in the afternoon. Hood inexplicably delayed the attack on Cheatham’s front until two hours after Hardee’s began. General McPherson was killed in the battle, but the Federal lines held after some early wavering.\textsuperscript{75}

Sherman was determined to capture the two rail lines—the Macon & Western and the Atlanta & West Point—still in Confederate hands. The Macon & Western ran south from Atlanta; at the town of East Point five miles away, the Atlanta &

\textsuperscript{73}Connelly, 430-32, 450-51; Foote, 472-73.

\textsuperscript{74}Connelly, 439-44; Kelly, 46.

\textsuperscript{75}Connelly, 444-50; Kelly, 48-50.
West Point branched from it. Sherman sent cavalry detachments southeast around his left flank to disrupt the Macon & Western deep in the Confederate rear. The Army of the Tennessee, now commanded by Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, was ordered on a broad movement counterclockwise around Atlanta to the right to seize the junction at East Point and tear up the Atlanta & West Point. Confederate cavalry turned aside the Federal cavalry raids, and Hood prepared a trap for Howard's advancing army. Stephen D. Lee's corps was to delay the Federals by taking a position along Lickskillet Road near Ezra Church, while Stewart's corps circled around to attack Howard's right flank. When Lee advanced on the morning of July 28, he found the Federals already entrenched. Without consulting Hood or waiting for Stewart to move up, Lee committed his divisions in a series of suicidal attacks. When Stewart arrived, his troops made additional futile charges. The Battle of Ezra Church was the most one-sided of the campaign. The Confederates suffered 5,000 casualties, almost ten times the Federal loss.  

Hood's three battles in a week's time cost the Confederates more than 12,000 casualties. Sherman had failed to cut the rail lines but showed no sign of retreating, and the Federals brought up heavy siege guns to bombard Atlanta. Jefferson Davis virtually ordered Hood to make no more attacks on entrenched Federal positions. Hood extended his entrenchments to cover the railroad from Atlanta to East Point. On August 10, Hood sent half his cavalry, about 4,000 men, on a raid deep in Sherman's rear to disrupt Federal supplies. The raid had negligible results, and the lack of cavalry hampered Hood's ability to track Sherman's movements around Atlanta. Throughout August, Federal artillery rained down on the city, while the North waited for favorable war news.  

Northern civilian morale was at a low ebb in August 1864. Grant at Petersburg and Sherman at Atlanta were engaged in trench warfare of unpredictable duration. Federal armies had absorbed staggering casualties in 1864 to achieve what appeared to be a stalemate. In late August, the Democrat Party nominated Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan for president on a platform that emphasized peace over restoration of the Union. Privately, President Lincoln predicted a Democratic victory in the fall. Absent a decisive victory for Federal arms, the election of McClellan on a peace platform was a strong possibility.  

Mindful that Lincoln's reelection effort depended on Federal victories and impatient with the slow progress of the siege, Sherman in late August abandoned his lines around Atlanta. On August 26, all three Federal armies began a giant

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76 Connelly, 452-55; Kelly, 51.
77 Connelly, 456-58.
78 McPherson, 766-72.
wheeling movement counterclockwise around Atlanta aimed at finally tearing up the Atlanta & West Point and Macon & Western tracks south of the city. With much of his cavalry off on a raid, Hood was slow to grasp the dimensions of this shift. On August 30, Hood learned that Howard’s Army of the Tennessee was approaching Jonesboro from the west, fifteen miles south of Atlanta. Hood sent Hardee’s and S. D. Lee’s corps to meet this threat. On August 31, the first day of the Battle of Jonesboro, a numerically superior Confederate force was unable to break the Federal lines. That night, Hood ordered Lee’s corps back to Atlanta. A late-afternoon Federal assault on September 1 nearly crushed Hardee’s corps, which retreated south to Lovejoy’s Station. Federal troops now controlled all the railroads into Atlanta, and Hood was compelled to abandon the city. In their hasty withdrawal, the Confederates accidentally destroyed their reserve ammunition train and numerous other supplies. Sherman wired Washington that “Atlanta is ours, and fairly won.”79

The capture of Atlanta, in conjunction with a successful Federal drive up the Shenandoah Valley in Virginia in September and October, dramatically boosted northern morale. Sherman’s success in Georgia was a major factor in Lincoln’s reelection in November 1864. In the South, the loss of Atlanta dealt a severe blow to Confederate morale and willingness to carry on an increasingly devastating war. After destroying Atlanta and expelling its citizens, Sherman in mid-November began his march to the sea, devastating a sixty-mile-wide corridor across Georgia and capturing Savannah in late December 1864.

**Kennesaw Mountain After the War**

After the armies left, families gradually returned to their farms and attempted to restore their livelihoods. The vast majority of the battlefield remained in private ownership from the conclusion of the battle in 1864 until 1933-1941, when the NPS initiated land acquisition to establish the battlefield park. The only portion of the battlefield set aside for commemoration prior to this was the 60-acre tract at Cheatham Hill purchased by Illinois veterans.

By 1880, changes in southern agricultural practices had affected the community and the countryside. Tenancy greatly increased among Cobb County farmers and throughout the South. Between 1880 and 1900, the use of tenants on Cobb County farms rose from 34 percent to 56 percent. Landowners carved up their tracts, which had averaged 112 acres per farm, to lots of 72 or fewer acres, to better accommodate the tenant farmer and to increase the number of farms available for tenancy. Improved acreage increased by 31 percent in these twenty years. The county population rose considerably—from 14,242 in 1860 to 24,664 in 1900.

79Kelly, 51-52; Connelly, 461-64.
Together, the increase in population density and the corresponding decrease in the size of the average farmstead resulted in substantial alteration of the landscape.\textsuperscript{80}

A map prepared in 1935 depicts the appearance of the battlefield at the close of the period of private ownership and before the period of NPS development and rehabilitation of the battlefield.\textsuperscript{81} A comparison of the 1935 map with the troop movement map of the 1864 landscape reveals substantial changes to the broad scale patterns of land use of the battlefield in the intervening seventy-one years of private ownership. The vegetation patterns depicted on the two maps are substantially different, reflecting the countywide trend toward denser and more extensive settlement and cultivation. Compared to the troop movement map of the 1864 battlefield, the 1935 landscape shows an increase in the number and size of cleared fields and a corresponding decline in the area of woodland. Entire woodlots of the 1864 landscape are shown under cultivation by 1935. Sections of the Federal earthworks under the cover of woodland in 1864 are exposed in open fields by 1935. The location and configuration of the extant earthworks in 1935 is similar to today's, suggesting that the obliteration of sections of the fortifications occurred prior to their acquisition by the NPS. While the 1935 map indicates that some of the structures depicted on the troop movement map remained, others had been removed. Both maps show an overall increase in the number of buildings on the battlefield by 1935. The 1935 circulation system also shows a similar increase in density and partial retention of elements dating to the period of the battle.

\textbf{SIGNIFICANCE}

Today Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park preserves the locations of and commemorates the major events associated with the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain. It is the only National Park Service property that commemorates the Atlanta Campaign. This campaign had important military and political significance in the final phases of the Civil War. The surviving elements of the battlefield setting, including the natural landforms, earthworks, structures, and roads, are tangible links to the Atlanta campaign. The role of the battle in the Atlanta Campaign, the grand strategy of the war, and Civil War battlefield tactics are represented by these resources.

The historic resources dating to the time of the battle have varying levels of significance. The entire eleven miles of earthworks are nationally significant under

\textsuperscript{80}Scott, 5-6, 22-26; Sarah B. G. Temple, The First Hundred Years: A Short History of Cobb County in Georgia, 6th ed. (Athens, Ga.: A. G. Publishers, 1989), 7.

\textsuperscript{81}National Park Service, "Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park (Proposed), Land Status Map," NPS Map Number NBP-KM-6005-2, 3 Sheets, (Kennesaw Mountain, Ga.: Kennesaw Mountain NBP, 1935).
National Register Criteria A, B, and D. The earthworks clearly indicate the areas of combat during the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain, a crucial engagement in the Atlanta Campaign, and were built at the orders of Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman and General Joseph E. Johnston. Although not nominated under Criterion D, the earthworks may also possess information potential. The Kolb house contributes to the national significance of the battlefield under Criterion A and is locally significant as an example of an early farm house under Criterion C. It is the only remaining park building that existed during the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain and is a rare example from an early period of Cobb County settlement. A significant military action, known as the Battle of Kolb's Farm, occurred near the house.

The Kolb cemetery, located adjacent to the Kolb house, contributes to the national significance of the battlefield and is locally significant under Criterion A because it represents burial customs among early settlers (photograph 8). The New Salem Church cemetery, which is associated with the ruins of New Salem Church, is also locally significant under Criterion A for nineteenth- and early twentieth-century burial practices. In addition, the New Salem Church site may possess archeological potential, because the church possibly served as a Confederate field hospital. The Kolb cemetery and possibly the New Salem Church cemetery are among the few remaining resources that existed during the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain.

Photograph 8. Kolb cemetery
Gilbert, Old John Ward, Stilesboro, Dallas, and Burnt Hickory Roads were all present at the time of the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain. Stilesboro, Dallas, and Burnt Hickory Roads contribute to the national significance of the battlefield under Criterion A, because they served as transportation corridors for the approaching armies. Gilbert and Old John Ward Roads are locally significant under Criterion A for their association with early Cobb County settlement.

Final determination of the significance of the existing vegetation awaits further field and archival research. Additional research is needed to evaluate whether the existing vegetation has the potential to increase our understanding of the role vegetation played in defining the setting of the battle and its influence on the conduct and strategies of the battle. Until this research is conducted the existing vegetation remains unevaluated and should be considered potentially significant for the information it may contribute to the recovery of the vegetation patterns of the 1864 battlefield.

**INTEGRITY OF HISTORIC RESOURCES**

Integrity is the ability of a property to convey its historic significance. The seven aspects of integrity are location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association. These are applied to each contributing property and measured against its level of significance and the criteria from which it derives its significance. For example, a property that is significant under Criterion A for its association with an event is not held to the same standard of integrity as one that derives its significance from Criterion C, as an example of art or architecture. For a property to contribute to the historic district, it must possess several, and usually most, of the aspects of integrity.

Overall, the earthworks possess a high degree of integrity despite the loss of historic fabric caused by development and erosion. Because of the great expansion of agriculture after the war and the sheer extent of the earthworks erected by Federal and Confederate forces, it is inevitable that some loss of historic fabric has occurred. Most of the Federal earthworks, erected in open, low-lying areas suitable for agriculture, have been destroyed. Quantitatively, the Confederate earthworks retain the best integrity. However, all the extant earthworks retain integrity of location, and most exhibit integrity of design, setting, materials, feeling, and association. In the best cases, a front and rear ditch and a well-defined parapet wall may be visible. Most of the earthworks are in stable condition, with grasses and other benign understory growth checking erosion. In limited areas, the integrity of the earthworks has been compromised, largely because of erosion or visitor impacts. For example, on Kennesaw Mountain and its spur, trails pass through the earthworks to provide access for visitors. In other areas, particularly among the artillery
positions located along the ridgelines, the protective foliage covering the works has been killed by visitors walking along the crest of the parapet walls.

The Kolb house and cemetery individually retain a high degree of integrity. The Kolb house exhibits a high degree of integrity of design, workmanship, and association. The NPS in 1963 rehabilitated the exterior to its 1830s appearance, removing later clapboard siding to reveal the original hewn logs. Most of the original 1830s historic fabric was retained in the rehabilitation (compare photographs 9 and 10). The interior, although adapted to serve as park quarters, still reflects the original Georgian plan. The Kolb cemetery, which contains eleven marked graves, retains integrity of design, materials, workmanship, and association. Both the house and the cemetery remain in their original location and clearly identify the historically significant site. The integrity of setting and feeling of the entire Kolb farmstead has been compromised by the loss of its associated farm acreage, vegetation patterns, and outbuildings, as well as by the development of Powder Springs Road into a five-lane arterial road.

New Salem cemetery, containing approximately twenty-four marked graves, has substantial integrity of location, design, setting, materials, feeling, and association. The church foundation ruins possess integrity of location and setting and mark the site of a building present at the time of the battle and possibly used as a Confederate field hospital.

Stilesboro, Dallas, and Burnt Hickory Roads retain their historic location and alignment. Although paved and widened, they maintain their nineteenth-century roadbeds. Where they pass through the battlefield, these roads possess considerable integrity of setting, feeling, and association, especially in relationship to the modern road systems that surround the park (photograph 11). These roads allow visitors to understand how troops reached their positions before and during the battle. Gilbert and Old John Ward Roads also retain a substantial degree of integrity.

Today the vegetation patterns within the park bear little resemblance to patterns extant at the time of the battle. A Vegetation Map, based on Kelly’s troop movement map, (see Appendix D) illustrates the degree of change that has occurred in the location, size, and configuration of the open fields and woodland since the time of the battle. Today the vegetation patterns of the battlefield fail to convey the important interrelationship of landform, settlement, land use, and vegetation in defining the character of the battlefield and their combined effect on the conduct and tactics of the battle. Alteration of the 1864 vegetation patterns occurred as the result of postbattle agricultural and settlement changes, as well as the lack of a comprehensive and sustained effort to preserve or restore the 1864 landscape by its successive owners and administrators. Despite the historical inaccuracy of the existing vegetation patterns, the historic integrity of the vegetation may be recover-
Photograph 9. Kolb house in 1961 prior to rehabilitation

Photograph 10. Kolb house in 1992
Photograph 11. Burnt Hickory Road, used by advancing Union troops during the battle.

The release of a large percentage of the battlefield to succession is a natural and potentially reversible alteration of this resource.

**Contributing Properties**

Earthworks (1864)
Kolb House (c. 1836)
Kolb Cemetery (1839-)
Stilesboro Road (c. 1840-1864)
Gilbert Road (c. 1840-1864)
Old John Ward Road (c. 1840-1864)
Dallas Road (c. 1840-1864)
Burnt Hickory Road (c. 1840-1864)
Big Kennesaw Antebellum Road (c. 1840-1864)
New Salem Church Site (c. 1840-1864)
Grave of the Unknown U.S. Soldier (1864; 1934)

**Noncontributing Properties**

Shiloh Church and School Site
Hardage House Site
Cass House Site
Ballenger House Site
Tierce House Site

There are no standing structures on these sites and their potential eligibility has not been evaluated through archeological investigation (only Ballenger has been surveyed). The park has placed interpretive signs at these locations, and as sites they provide continuity to the historic landscape.

Marietta-Cassville Road
Powder Springs Road

Both of these roads have been altered and do not meet integrity requirements. Powder Springs Road is currently five lanes of asphalt with curb and gutter in some places and has been straightened. The Marietta-Cassville Road, within and outside of the park, has been fragmented and no longer maintains integrity of setting, feeling, or association.

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CHAPTER 3

KENNESAW MOUNTAIN NATIONAL
BATTLEFIELD PARK: THE COMMEMORATION OF
AMERICAN BATTLEFIELDS AND NATIONAL
PARK DEVELOPMENT, 1887-1942

The nucleus of today’s Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park was a sixty-
acre tract at Cheatham Hill acquired and preserved through the efforts of Union
veterans. The history of the park’s development properly begins with the broader
theme of Civil War memorial activity. An examination of privately sponsored
memorial activity at Kennesaw Mountain follows and leads into the history of
Federal involvement at Kennesaw. The War Department administered the park
from 1928 to 1933. National Park Service administration began in 1933 and
included development work performed by Civilian Conservation Corps Camp 431,
located in the park from 1938 to 1942.

EARLY BATTLEFIELD COMMEMORATION: CIVIL WAR
MEMORIAL ACTIVITY AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF
KENNESAW MOUNTAIN BATTLEFIELD PARK, 1887-1933

The Civil War was a watershed event in American history and a signal event in the
lives of all who participated in it. Of the 2.75 million Americans who saw action
in the war, 621,000 died and 470,000 were wounded. Efforts to memorialize the
fallen and recognize and aid veterans and their survivors began even before combat
ceased. The creation of the first Civil War national military parks in the 1890s was
preceded by twenty-five years of private and state memorial efforts. Commemorative efforts began in the mid-1860s with the formation of local
memorial associations in the South, the creation of Union soldiers’ cemeteries at
Gettysburg and Antietam, the preservation of land at Gettysburg, the establishment
of national cemeteries by the Federal government, and the creation of veterans’
groups, mostly in the North. In the early postwar years, commemoration took
different forms in the North and the South. In the 1880s and 1890s, as the veteran
population aged, commemorative activity expanded, and contact between ex-
Confederates and ex-Federals increased. Blue-gray reunions, often held on the
battlefields, became common. The interaction at reunions, a spirit of sectional
reconciliation and commemoration of the sacrifice of both sides, and an increased
appreciation of the nation’s past all contributed to the successful movement to
establish national battlefield parks.

In the South, independent, local memorial associations sprang up rapidly during
and after the war. Many originated in women’s wartime groups organized to do
hospital and relief work. The new groups often took the name of Ladies’ Memorial
Associations (LMAs), but men provided crucial, especially financial, support. The
proper burial of the Confederate dead was the immediate concern of the LMAs, and
the individual groups established many cemeteries across the South. Most
cemeteries were located in towns, although a few were established at battle sites.
After the cemeteries were laid out, the LMAs turned their attention to memorials.
In the first twenty years after the war, these memorials, which typically took the
form of stone obelisks, were commonly erected in cemeteries.\textsuperscript{83} In 1900, local
southern memorial associations affiliated with an umbrella group, the Confederated
Southern Memorial Association (CSMA). The CSMA assisted local LMAs and
raised funds for a Jefferson Davis monument in Richmond, unveiled in 1907.\textsuperscript{84}

The Confederate Cemetery at Marietta, Georgia, is a typical result of memorial
activity in the postwar South. The cemetery received its first interments during the
war and was officially dedicated in 1866. Catherine Winn of the Ladies’ Aid
Society and Mary Green of the Georgia Memorial Association spearheaded the
establishment of the cemetery. The Georgia legislature appropriated $3,500 in 1866
to allow the collection of remains from all the north Georgia battlefields for
reinterment at the Marietta cemetery. The cemetery contains 3,000 graves, and its
Confederate Monument was unveiled July 7, 1908.\textsuperscript{85}

The Union possessed greater resources than the Confederacy for establishing
military cemeteries, which were initially created through state and local action. The

\textsuperscript{83} A representative early Confederate monument is the obelisk in Atlanta’s Oakland Cemetery,
unveiled April 26, 1874 (Ralph W. Widener, Jr., Confederate Monuments: Enduring Symbols of the
South and the War Between the States [Washington, D.C.: Ralph W. Widener, Jr., 1982], 42).

\textsuperscript{84} Gaines M. Foster, Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat, the Lost Cause, and the Emergence of
the New South, 1865 to 1913 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 36-41, 158; History of the
Confederated Memorial Associations of the South (New Orleans: Confederated Southern Memorial
Association, 1904), 32.

\textsuperscript{85} History of the Confederated Memorial Associations of the South, 140-43; Widener, 67.
State of Pennsylvania acted immediately in 1863 to lay out a cemetery at Gettysburg. By the time of President Lincoln’s famous address dedicating the Gettysburg cemetery on November 19, 1863, landscape gardener William Saunders had laid out a circular burial ground with space for a monument at the center. Arlington National Cemetery was also established during the war, on Mrs. Robert E. Lee’s confiscated estate just across the Potomac from Washington. Congress soon authorized a system of national cemeteries, at Civil War battlefields and elsewhere, in legislation enacted on February 22, 1867. The Federal government accepted responsibility for the cemeteries at the Gettysburg and Antietam battlefields in the 1870s. Ultimately, twenty-six national cemeteries were established at or near Civil War battlefields. The Federal role in creating and maintaining Civil War battlefield cemeteries prefigured the creation of national military parks some twenty years later.86

A cemetery for Union dead was established in Marietta in 1866 on land donated by Henry G. Cole, a Marietta citizen who had opposed secession. Cole’s initial proposal for a cemetery for the fallen of both sides was rejected, and on July 31, 1866, he conveyed twenty acres to the Federal government for a national cemetery. By 1870, the remains of 9,973 Union soldiers had been transferred to Marietta National Cemetery. Remains came from the battlefields of north Georgia and from a short-lived national cemetery in Montgomery, Alabama.87

The formation of Civil War veterans’ groups closely followed the movement to establish cemeteries. Veterans’ organizations formed earlier in the North than in the South. The Grand Army of the Republic (GAR), which emerged as the largest and most influential of the many Union veterans’ groups, was organized in Springfield, Illinois, in 1866. Drawing its membership from all ranks of Union Civil War veterans, the GAR adopted a paramilitary structure. Local posts or camps were organized into statewide departments, which were presided over by a national commander-in-chief. Yearly national encampments brought together veterans from hundreds of posts scattered across the country. The GAR experienced an initial spurt of growth in the late 1860s, a period of decline in the 1870s, and a substantial rebirth in the 1880s, reaching a peak membership of 400,000 in 1890. In its mature phase, the GAR lobbied on issues important to veterans, established old soldiers’


homes, sponsored monuments and patriotic observances, and worked to create national battlefield parks. 88

Although by far the largest, the GAR was not the only Union veterans’ group. Several Federal army societies formed in the 1860s: the Society of the Army of the Tennessee in 1865, the Society of the Army of the Cumberland in 1868, and the Society of the Army of the Potomac in 1869. Other northern veterans’ groups restricted membership based on officer status or length of service. Among these were the Military Order of the Loyal Legion (founded 1865), the Union Veteran Legion (founded 1884), and the Union Veterans’ Union (founded 1886). Many individual companies and regiments also formed organizations. A primary focus of most unit organizations was socializing at annual reunions, but many erected battlefield monuments. Veterans’ groups also successfully lobbied state legislatures to appropriate funds for the erection of state monuments on numerous fields. 89

Pressing economic needs and the social and political upheavals of Reconstruction hampered the formation of comparable Confederate veterans’ groups. Additionally, any Reconstruction-era regional organization of ex-Confederates risked being charged with fomenting disloyalty. A few local benevolent societies with substantial Confederate veteran membership appeared in the 1860s. In May 1869 in New Orleans, prominent former Confederate officers formed the Southern Historical Society (SHS). In 1870, an Association of the Army of Northern Virginia (AANVA) was formed in Richmond, and an Association of the Army of Tennessee appeared in 1877. The SHS and AANVA focused on the erection of a monument to Robert E. Lee in Richmond. 90 In the 1880s, more Confederate army units held reunions, and some established permanent organizations. The organization of local veterans’ posts into statewide groups in Virginia, Tennessee, and Georgia in 1887-1888 preceded the formation of the United Confederate Veterans (UCV) in June 1889. Employing an organizational structure similar to the GAR’s, the UCV spread across the South in the 1890s, with membership reaching approximately 80,000 by 1903. 91

While in the North veterans usually led the way, in the South, women played a prominent role in commemorative activities. Several local groups calling


89Davies, 29-30, 36-37.

90More than 100,000 people participated in ceremonies marking the unveiling of the Lee Monument on May 29, 1890 (Foster, 100-101).

91Foster, 50-53, 91, 104-7.
themselves Daughters of the Confederacy sprang up in the 1890s, and the United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC) was founded in 1894 to coordinate activity across the South. UDC chapters raised funds for monuments, promoted observance of Confederate holidays (such as Confederate Memorial Day and Robert E. Lee's birthday), maintained Confederate museums, and promoted a southern interpretation of the Civil War, emphasizing states' rights. The UDC often cooperated with the UCV but maintained its independence from the veterans' group.92

The commemorative efforts of veterans' groups changed over time. In the early postwar period, various army societies urged the completion of statues and monuments honoring generals. Reunions were always an important commemorative activity and initially included only veterans who had fought on the same side. In the 1880s, the bitterness of excombatants began to diminish, and veterans focused on common wartime experiences. Contacts between former Confederates and former Federals steadily increased. National GAR encampments began to invite ex-Confederates to participate. Reciprocal visits of individual northern and southern veterans' posts began in the early 1880s, and more formal combined blue-gray reunions and joint ceremonies became increasingly common as the decade wore on. A blue-gray reunion at Gettysburg in 1882 was followed by others at Fredericksburg, Antietam, and Kennesaw Mountain. The emphasis was shifting from which side was "right" to an appreciation of the valor and sacrifice of the foe.93

The spirit of reconciliation manifested in the blue-gray reunions, coupled with veterans' growing interest in securing their place in history, helped advance the cause of Civil War national military parks. Veterans urged the Federal government to take over from states and army societies the responsibility of protecting battlefield sites and marking unit positions. As early as 1880, Congress appropriated funds to study and survey the Gettysburg battlefield. The GAR lobbied for a national military park at Gettysburg, the Society of the Army of the Cumberland pressed for one at the Chickamauga and Chattanooga battlefields, and the Society of the Army of the Tennessee wanted a park at Vicksburg. In 1890, Congress established the first Civil War national military park at Chickamauga and Chattanooga under War Department administration. In keeping with the growing spirit of national reconciliation, the legislation stipulated that all troop positions, Confederate and Federal, were to be marked. National military parks followed at

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92 Foster, 172-73; Davies, 41-42.

93 Davies, 226, 249; Paul H. Buck, The Road to Reunion 1865-1900 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1937), 257-58; Foster, 67-68.
Shiloh (1894), Gettysburg (1895), and Vicksburg (1899), along with a national battlefield site at Antietam (1890).  

**Memorial Efforts at Kennesaw Mountain**

Union veterans' groups led the initial efforts to preserve and commemorate the Kennesaw Mountain battlefields. In 1887, veterans held a blue-gray reunion at Kennesaw Mountain. After the war, veterans of the Third Brigade, Second Division, of the XIV Federal Army Corps, which made the assault on Cheatham Hill, formed the Colonel Dan McCook Brigade Association, named in honor of their fallen commander. The association, which held its first reunion in August 1900, resolved to purchase the land at Cheatham Hill where the brigade attacked and Colonel McCook was mortally wounded. In December 1899, Lansing J. Dawdy, a veteran of the 86th Illinois regiment, purchased a sixty-acre tract that included the Federal and Confederate trenches at Cheatham Hill (figure 4). In 1900, Dawdy conveyed this tract to Martin Kingman and John McGinnis, who acted on behalf of the Kennesaw Memorial Association, a nonprofit organization formally incorporated under Illinois law in April 1901.

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**Figure 4. Original 60-acre tract at Cheatham Hill purchased by Illinois veterans (NPS drawing NBS-KM-1051)**

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65Buck, 258.

66"Program, First Reunion of the Third Brigade, 2d Division, 14th Army Corps"; "Minutes of Business Meeting, Colonel Dan McCook Brigade Association, May 15, 1901"; Capps, 5.
The Kennesaw Memorial Association attempted to raise funds from Union veterans to erect a monument at Cheatham Hill. Contributions from veterans proved insufficient, and the association secured a $20,000 appropriation from the state of Illinois in June 1913. Illinois Governor Charles S. Deneen appointed three officers of the association, Dawdy, William A. Payton, and Dr. J. B. Shawgo, to a commission charged with carrying out the work of erecting a monument. The commission contracted with the McNeel Marble Company of Marietta to erect a large monument to Illinois troops at the site of the attack on Cheatham Hill.97 The $25,000 monument was unveiled on June 27, 1914, the fiftieth anniversary of the battle. A large number of veterans, Governor Edward Dunne of Illinois, and a contingent from the United Daughters of the Confederacy attended the ceremony. The 25-foot-high monument of Georgia marble features a square base and a tapering shaft. On the west side are seven-foot bronze figures of a Union soldier flanked by two robed allegorical figures (photograph 12). Several smaller battlefield markers were erected at Cheatham Hill in this period. These included separate memorials to Captain Neighbour, Captain Fellows, and Sergeant Coffee, a marker at the McCook Brigade’s jumping off point, and a stone arch marking the tunnel begun by Federal troops attempting to undermine the Confederate trenches.98

In the early years of the Kennesaw Memorial Association’s ownership of the tract, local citizens volunteered to care for the area.99 In 1922, the Association appointed the Reverend J. A. Jones resident caretaker of the site. His duties were to maintain the monuments and the immediately surrounding grounds “in a presentable condition at all times.” In return for his services he was allowed to “occupy the buildings of the place, cultivating such parts of the reservation that [would] not interfere with access to the monuments.”100 Jones resigned his position in 1926, and no caretaker was employed until after the tract’s transfer to the War Department.

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97McNeel Marble Company aggressively solicited memorial business from United Daughters of the Confederacy chapters and built many monuments across the South (Foster, 167-68).


There is no indication that the vegetation management of the tract, including the continuation of agricultural use by the caretaker, attempted to preserve or restore the 1864 landscape. Except for the erection of the monuments, the Kennesaw Memorial Association’s alteration of the site did not include the design or implementation of a commemorative landscape.

**Federal Government Commemorative Activity at Kennesaw Mountain**

The northern veterans who led the effort to erect a memorial at Kennesaw intended from the start that a national park be created at the battlefield. Unsuccessful congressional attempts in 1910 and 1912 to establish a national military park at
Kennesaw Mountain preceded enactment on February 8, 1917, of a law authorizing the Secretary of War to accept title to the sixty-acre tract at Cheatham Hill from the Kennesaw Memorial Association as a national battlefield site. Problems with the chain of title delayed the conveyance of the tract to the War Department until 1928.101

In April 1926, Federal legislation established a three-man commission to inspect Kennesaw Mountain and other Civil War battlefield sites in north Georgia. The legislation entrusted this commission, composed of an officer of the Army Corps of Engineers and one veteran each from the Union and Confederate armies, to determine whether a national military park, which would represent the Atlanta campaign, should be established. The commission considered Kennesaw Mountain the most suitable battlefield for designation as a national military park, based on its significance to the campaign, its intrinsic scenic value, and its accessibility.102

Concurrent with the commission's actions at Kennesaw, Congress passed legislation on June 11, 1926, that established a comprehensive system of battlefield classification, drafted by the War Department, which created standards for determining the appropriate level of commemoration. In the post–World War I period, private commemorative interests persuaded Congressmen to introduce numerous bills to establish national military parks, most associated with Civil War battlefields. Until 1926, Congress had appointed individual commissions to inspect and recommend preservation alternatives for many Civil War sites. In that year alone, the Committee on Military Affairs received twenty-eight bills requesting that Congress establish fourteen national military parks and appropriate six million dollars for the inspection of battlefield sites and the erection of markers and tablets.103

Prior to this national initiative, the Kennesaw Mountain battlefield survey commission recommended the establishment of Kennesaw Mountain National Military Park. Introduced in December 1926, the legislation to create a national military park at Kennesaw did not pass, and repeated congressional efforts over the next nine years to establish the park were unsuccessful. On June 10, 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order 6166, transferring War Department military and historical parks to the National Park Service. Among the properties transferred was the sixty-acre tract at Kennesaw Mountain, known as

101Capps, 6-7; Senate Bill S. 6391, 61st Congress, February 15, 1910; Senate Bill S. 7099, 62nd Congress, June 11, 1912; Public Law 44 Stat. 588, February 8, 1917.

102Capps, 6-7.

103Lee, 47.
Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Site, which still constituted the only property administered by the Federal government at the battlefield.\textsuperscript{104} The June 1926 legislation made the War Department responsible for surveying all of the nation’s battlefields. Using a classification system created by Lt. Col. C. A. Bach, Chief, Historical Section, Army War College, in 1925, the department, armed with survey data, would determine which sites should be considered for national military park status (Class I); those that would be designated by marking the lines of battle (Class IIa); and those that would receive only a monument or marker from the U. S. government (Class IIb). The War Department conducted the national survey between 1926 and 1932 and by 1929 had recommended the establishment of two Class I battlefields, nine Class IIa, and fifty Class IIb sites.\textsuperscript{105}

For the War Department, this classification system determined how large an area would be preserved and the extent of interpretive or commemorative efforts. Most battlefields, especially Revolutionary War sites, received Class IIb classifications, which recommended some type of monumentation to mark the battlefield site. Class IIa battlefields, like Kennesaw, required the acquisition and marking of the battle lines, clearly delineated at Kennesaw by the miles of earthworks constructed by Union and Confederate forces. This preservation tactic, popularly known as “the Antietam Plan,” preserved the smallest amount of land possible that enabled the War Department to interpret the battle’s primary action. The Antietam Plan assumed that the countryside adjacent to abandoned battlefields would remain rural without requiring War Department ownership and responsibility for the land.\textsuperscript{106}

The War Department accomplished very little at Kennesaw Mountain over the five years it actively administered the site. Because the site was never designated a national military park, no additional land acquisition occurred beyond the original sixty acres. Between 1928 and 1932, the superintendent of Marietta National Cemetery administered the battlefield, but few funds were available for improvement or maintenance at Kennesaw.

Despite plans for roads, better fencing, underbrush clearing near the monument and trenches, and partial reconstruction of the earthworks, the War Department accomplished very little work prior to the site’s transfer to the NPS.\textsuperscript{107} In 1932, the War Department appointed Benjamin Jones, son of the previous caretaker, the


\textsuperscript{105}Lee, 47-49.

\textsuperscript{106}Lee, 39-40.

\textsuperscript{107}Capps, 7-8.
resident caretaker of the Cheatham Hill tract. Like his father, Benjamin Jones was allowed to occupy buildings on the site and to cultivate "30 acres of the lowlands" in return for his services.\textsuperscript{108} Jones retained his position until the property was conveyed to the NPS in 1933. In 1932, the War Department constructed a three-quarter-mile entrance road from John Ward Road and erected a fence along a portion of the tract's boundary. The War Department's administration of the tract did not include a comprehensive attempt to restore or preserve the 1864 appearance of the tract or the implementation of a designed commemorative landscape.

The NPS approach to battlefield commemoration differed substantially from War Department policies. In general, the War Department made sporadic efforts to interpret or provide access to its battlefield sites, maintaining them largely for use as study aids for succeeding generations of military men. The National Park Service, established in 1916, was at first strongly oriented to the preservation of natural and wilderness areas. Nevertheless, as early as 1917 the question of consolidating all historical and military parks under National Park Service authority was debated.\textsuperscript{109} The background of the NPS, its evolving mission, and the development of Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park with Civilian Conservation Corps labor are treated below.

\section*{Expansion and Development: National Park Service Administration and the CCC, 1933-1942}

The national park system, well established in the west, experienced its greatest growth east of the Mississippi just before and during the Great Depression. Several factors contributed to this growth: the authorization of Great Smoky Mountains, Mammoth Cave, and Shenandoah National Parks in 1926; the establishment of Colonial National Monument and the reconstruction of Washington's birthplace in 1930; the construction of Skyline Drive begun in 1930-31; and finally, the 1933 transfer to NPS of all battlefields, national monuments, and historic sites administered by the War Department, the Department of Agriculture, and in Washington, D.C. These developments physically expanded the national park system and significantly enlarged NPS's agenda beyond conservation of natural areas.

The Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), established March 31, 1933, under the Federal Unemployment Relief Act, significantly facilitated the administration and expansion of historic and natural parks by the National Park Service (NPS). The

\textsuperscript{108} Letter from W. J. Calvert, Major, Q.M. Corps, Assistant, to Benjamin F. Jones, April 13, 1932. Quoted in Yates, 1941, p 11.

\textsuperscript{109} Albright, \textit{Origins of National Park Service Administration of Historic Sites}, 5.
period 1933 to 1942 witnessed a long-held conservation and preservation ethic toward public lands enacted on a national scale. The CCC also represented a challenging experiment in social reform, which spawned many subsequent New Deal programs. The national parks benefited extensively from CCC improvements, which included building roads and trails and providing historic interpretive programs, greatly increased public access. Reforestation, land reclamation, and landscaping enhanced the natural beauty of emerging national parks. In addition, many new state parks were developed, some adjacent to national parks, to provide recreation areas for the increasing numbers of park visitors.

The CCC represented a culmination of conservation philosophies, recreational needs, and an expanding Federal role in natural preservation. The program was heartily embraced by lawmakers and the public alike, because it responded quickly and practically to the greatest economic disaster the United States had yet experienced. Roosevelt conceived of an Advisory Council with representatives from the Departments of War, Labor, Agriculture, and Interior that would administer CCC camps and work. The Labor Department would initiate nationwide recruiting; the Army would condition and transport the enrollees and operate the camps; and the National Park Service and the Forest Service would create work programs and supervise work assignments.\textsuperscript{110}

NPS Director Horace M. Albright served on the Advisory Board and saw great potential for the CCC within the national park system, especially in long-ignored road- and trail-building projects. Albright quickly increased the technical staff of the NPS in preparation for the land conservation work and designed park development projects that the CCC would carry out. The NPS hired hundreds of landscape architects, historians, foresters, and engineers to design and supervise CCC operations.\textsuperscript{111} The propitious addition of the military and historic parks, sites, and national monuments in 1933 conveniently coincided with the newly created CCC.

The CCC served several purposes, but its primary significance lay in creating useful work for unemployed youths. In 1933, three years into the Depression, national unemployment figures for youths spiked to 25 percent, and 30 percent of those employed labored only part-time. Unemployment figures for the nation nearly equalled the youthful rate. In 1930, one year after the stock market crash, national unemployment rates reached 9 percent and continued to rise: to 16 percent in 1931, 24 percent in 1932, and to a zenith of more than 25 percent in 1933. Depressed economic conditions had plagued agricultural areas for nearly a decade, and careless husbandry combined with drought and pestilence slashed rural production capacity.

\textsuperscript{10}Paige, 10-11.

\textsuperscript{11}Albright, The Birth of the National Park Service, 289-90.
The cities, especially industrial bases, also witnessed deflated production and massive unemployment.\textsuperscript{112} Roosevelt introduced the Emergency Conservation Work Act to Congress within two months of his inauguration, and it was eagerly passed. Although hardly a panacea for unemployment, it foreshadowed the many New Deal economic and employment relief initiatives to follow.

The passage of the Federal Unemployment Relief Act (FURA) in March 1933 introduced a new role for the Federal government. Under this Act, Emergency Conservation Work (ECW), later known as the CCC, was created. Congress appropriated funds to the ECW Director, Robert Fechner, who in turn allocated funds to participating Federal agencies. All work performed by ECW labor would be performed on public lands and directed by Federal agencies. Between 1933 and 1935, Congress created numerous work relief programs under the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of June 1933. In contrast to the ECW, programs emanating from NIRA entitled states to Federal relief grants that would fund public works projects. Two popular relief agencies emerging from the NIRA, the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) and the Public Works Administration (PWA), allocated Federal funds to states and municipal governments, provided these agencies contributed matching funds. In 1935, the Works Progress Administration, which replaced the PWA, greatly expanded the type of public works performed with Federal and state funding. Early New Deal public works programs, like the PWA, concentrated solely on construction projects. New Deal programs after 1935 also provided relief to unemployed white-collar workers, professionals, and large numbers of unskilled women.\textsuperscript{113}

Initially, CCC enrollees were inducted from urban areas, where unemployment was highest, especially among the unskilled. Roosevelt envisioned the program operating on three levels: 1) as a direct relief program, through grants to states; 2) as a large-scale public works project and; 3) as a program to prevent mismanagement of land, specifically addressing soil erosion and forest conservation. The first three camps established in the east were in Shenandoah National Park and Colonial National Monument in May 1933, drawing enrollees from eastern seaboard cities where unemployment was the greatest.\textsuperscript{114} Camps were established first in national parks and later in state parks. The Army administered camps composed of approximately two hundred single men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-


\textsuperscript{113}Paige, Appendix A, Selected Draft Legislation, Legislation, and Executive Orders Affecting the Civilian Conservation Corps, 162-78; Shannon, 177-80, 191-93.

\textsuperscript{114}Paige, 7, 15.
five. Enrollees were paid $30 a month; $25 of their monthly salary was sent directly to their needy families.

The CCC program established a unique relationship among the Army, the National Park Service, and the United States Forest Service (USFS). NPS and USFS Advisory Council representatives immediately recognized that their agencies could not administer the camps. Therefore, the Army, with an established regimen and considerable personnel, maintained camp life. Early camps resembled Army field camps with canvas tents, reveille at 6:00 A.M., meals taken at the mess hall, communal bathing facilities, and limited freedom outside of the camp. Junior Army officers generally commanded the camps, and a military doctor often served several camps in a large geographical vicinity. Within a year, ready-to-assemble camp buildings replaced the tents, and the temporary nature of camps lessened, although these buildings were moveable. When camps were located in national parks, the NPS park superintendent planned and directed work for the enrollees. Park superintendents and state park directors could supplement their CCC labor pools with skilled craftsmen, identified as local experienced men (LEMs); World War I veterans, who generally did little manual labor because of their age; and, primarily in the west, Native Americans. Many regular CCC enrollees had little experience with manual labor or construction techniques, and LEMs proved valuable to the program. Age and marital status requirements did not apply to LEMs and World War I veterans, and some, if married, lived outside of camps.

CCC enrollments lasted six months and could be extended to a total of two years of service. The enlistment goal for the second enrollment period, from October 1933 to March 1934, was 300,000 enrollees, including 25,000 veterans and an equal number of LEMs. In 1935, the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act extended Emergency Conservation Work for two years to 1937, doubled its size to 600,000 men, and relaxed age requirements; enrollees could enlist at seventeen years and remain until age twenty-eight. By October 1933, the NPS operated 102 camps

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116 John A. Salmond, The CCC, 1933-1942: A New Deal Case Study (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1967), 34. John Paige refers to the LEMs as locally employed men, but Salmond's term better describes the role these men played in the CCC organization.

within national parks, and the number of camps in state natural and recreation areas nearly doubled the NPS operation.\textsuperscript{118}

In essence, two separate agendas existed, both administered by the National Park Service: the make-over of existing national parks—especially the newly acquired battlefields, historic sites, and national monuments—and the establishment or revitalization of state recreation and natural areas. For many years, conservationists and preservationists agreed that increased visitation to national parks threatened the integrity of these unique resources. Stephen T. Mather, the first director for the NPS, consistently urged the development of state parks with natural recreational areas that would act as buffers to the national parks.\textsuperscript{119} The CCC significantly enlarged state park systems and improved the condition of new and existing national parks.

Most CCC enrollees performed labor that improved national park infrastructures through road and trail construction, reforestation, and soil erosion control. The CCC program also greatly enlarged the professional staffs of the national parks. Landscape architects, foresters, and engineers designed and supervised work projects, within both state and national parks. Professional historians, supplemented by college students in the summers, created interpretive programs and engaged in numerous research projects. Conservation, preservation, historic interpretation, and landscape design and planning became key goals for NPS professional staffs. Eventually, funding for improvement projects in state and national parks required drafting master plans developed by NPS technical staffs.\textsuperscript{120} In addition, the administrative hierarchy of the NPS experienced growth and change. In 1933, the ECW Advisory Board created four regional offices that administered the state parks program. By 1936, Interior Secretary Harold L. Ickes announced that the NPS also would adopt a regional hierarchy to administer the ECW programs within the national parks.\textsuperscript{121}


\textsuperscript{119}In 1921, Mather sponsored a state park conference to encourage the development of state parks and to reduce the wear and tear on federal holdings (Newton, 533).

\textsuperscript{120}Paige, 45; Newton, 576, 578-80.

\textsuperscript{121}Paige, 21, 45-52; Newton, 540, 576.
The CCC program reached its largest enrollment in 1935, although funding from Congress continued until 1942. In 1935, Roosevelt began efforts to reduce the ECW program in order to convince Congress to permanently establish a conservation work program for the state and national parks. The NPS reduced its active camps from 446 to 340 in 1936 and converted some temporary technical positions to permanent NPS employment. In 1937, Roosevelt asked Congress to permanently establish the ECW program. Congress responded with a three-year funding package that formally changed the name of the ECW to the Civilian Conservation Corps and required camps to establish ten hours per week of general education or vocational training classes for enrollees. Another attempt in 1939 to establish a permanent CCC program failed. By 1940, the NPS had to reduce its supervisory personnel without drastically altering work projects. The agency created central service units within NPS regional offices to handle design and technical matters and abolished these positions in the individual camps. By 1941, the NPS discontinued many camps that could not maintain 165 men per camp, eliminating 135 camps between September and November 1941. When the United States entered World War II in December 1941, NPS abolished all but 89 camps, which directly related to the war effort. In 1942, Congress discontinued funding for the CCC program and it was informally abolished.\footnote{Paige, 21-36.}

**Creating a Park: Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park**

Legislation enacted on June 26, 1935, established the Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park under the authority of the NPS. The act authorized expansion of the park to include Big and Little Kennesaw Mountains and other significant sections of the battlefield. An appropriation of $100,000 was included for land acquisition and park development.\footnote{Public Law 49 Stat. 423, June 26, 1935.} Between 1933 and 1938, the NPS relied on labor and funding from the Civil Works Administration (CWA) and the Public Works Administration (PWA). These improvements occurred without the benefit of a master plan for overall park development and largely were concentrated at Cheatham Hill, which contained the sixty acres preserved by the Illinois veterans.

The early efforts of the CWA addressed the adverse effects of the preceding years of private agricultural use of the battlefield. The abandonment of agriculture following the battlefield's acquisition by the NPS resulted in increased rates of erosion and soil depletion. Corrective measures undertaken by the CWA included the construction of stone and earthen dams and terraces and the channelling of streams. Several of the abandoned fields were plowed, fertilized, and planted with...
legumes or grasses to expedite their recovery and stabilization. The planting of native and nonnative species of trees, shrubs, and ground covers augmented the recovery of other areas. By 1935, an extension of CWA projects administered by the NPS expanded their physical improvements to accommodate basic visitor access and service needs at the park. Future work plans included the construction of a custodian’s residence, a utility building, a water and sewer system, a north-south highway, an administration building, and a new road to Big Kennesaw.124

The CCC, which established a camp at Kennesaw Mountain on June 3, 1938, continued the work begun by the CWA. CCC Company 431 traveled from a disbanded camp at Rutledge, Georgia, and established itself just south of U.S. 41, near the northeast park boundary, at Marietta camp GA NP-4, also known as “Camp T. M. Brumby.” Composed largely of Georgia men, the camp comprised twenty-two prefabricated wood buildings bolted together and placed on concrete and brick pier foundations. The circular camp site had a central parade ground marked by cedars and was enclosed by a camp road that covered approximately sixty acres. Between 185 and 190 men occupied four barracks.125

The CCC provided the labor necessary to complete the transition from farmland to parkland. At Kennesaw, the CCC constructed roads, fought fires, demolished historic and nonhistoric housing within the park boundaries, implemented vegetation management projects, and guided interpretive tours.

The early work of the CCC was largely a continuation of the soil and water conservation programs initiated by the CWA. With the technical assistance of the Soil Conservation Service, the stabilization efforts of the CCC included the construction of dams and terracing, stream channelling and revegetation programs that checked erosion and expedited the recovery of the recently abandoned agricultural fields. Under the CCC the stabilization efforts were expanded to include two primary areas of the battlefield, Cheatham Hill and the area that had been under intensive agricultural use between Cheatham Hill and Old John Ward Roads. At the proposed headquarters area at the base of Kennesaw Mountain, new development was combined with stabilization work.126

At Cheatham Hill, the CCC accomplished the dual objective of site stabilization and accommodation of visitor needs. The corps constructed a small self-help visitor information kiosk and trails that avoided earthworks but circulated the visitors through the battlefield site. The earthworks, swept clean of vegetation under the

124Capps, 15-16.


126Capps, 17.
War Department administration, were covered with mulch and planted with a combination of native and nonnative species. In the vicinity of Cheatham Hill, CCC men planted approximately 25,000 seedlings supplied by the Great Smoky Mountains National Park.\(^{127}\)

For four years, the Kennesaw CCC spent most of its time on road work. The crew improved drainage ditches and shoulders, graded and planted the slopes and land adjacent to the road shoulders, and erected simple brick entrance signs with cast-iron plaques at the park boundaries along the public roads that traversed the park (photograph 13). U.S. Highway 41, located on the northern boundary of the park, provided the primary vehicular access to Big Kennesaw Mountain and the CCC camp. The State Highway Department agreed to aid the CCC efforts to improve the shoulders and ditches along U.S. 41 and provided some equipment. Two other roads within the Park, Burnt Hickory Road and Dallas Road, passed

Photograph 13. Park entrance sign on Burnt Hickory Road

\(^{127}\)Yates, "Superintendent Monthly Reports" (August 1939), RG 79, National Archives. The superintendent reports do not specify the species or location of seedlings that were planted, or whether the CCC laborers at Great Smokies also helped the Marietta camp to replant the seedlings.
directly through major areas of conflict associated with the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain and also received some shoulder and ditch improvements. The CCC opened a quarry in October 1939 and purchased a rock crusher to produce materials to grade the inadequate dirt roads traversing the park and eventually constructed a new road to Cheatham Hill.\footnote{B. C. Yates, “Superintendent Monthly Reports” (October 1939), Records of the National Park Service, RG 79, National Archives, copies of these reports, collected by park staff, are available at the Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park library; Neil McL. Conley, Jr., “Investigative Report” (15 November 1938), RG 79, National Archives.}

The result of these road improvements clearly established the boundaries of the park through vegetation and signs. Within the park, CCC road improvements are characterized by steep road cuts with grass cover fading into deep pine woods. Although local stone was available—the CCC operated a stone quarry on the side of Big Kennesaw for road construction—the corps used brick to build park structures and incorporated modern, functional design elements into these structures. The few structures built by the CCC at Kennesaw did not reflect traditional rustic park architecture.

Most of the CCC work at Kennesaw proceeded without an approved Master Plan. Between 1938 and 1942, the NPS Eastern Branch of Plans and Design developed several layouts for general park development intended as parts of the Master Plan. These plans incorporated NPS architectural design criteria—typically functional and devoid of rustic stylistic detail by the late 1930s—and standardized spatial relationships among visitor services, historic and scenic areas, and functional park management buildings. Typically, the NPS designed visitor service structures with easy access to roads; curvilinear park roads following the land’s natural contours provided access to historic and scenic areas; and park management structures such as employee residences and maintenance facilities were built behind vegetative screens or in remote areas. Although the Eastern Branch completed numerous drawings for headquarters development, employees' residences, interpretive exhibits, and internal park tour roads, the NPS did not accomplish comprehensive park development at Kennesaw before World War II evaporated the CCC labor force.

The Cheatham Hill road best represents the design philosophy embodied in NPS improvements at Kennesaw Mountain. Although access to the Illinois Monument and the Confederate and Union earthworks at the Cheatham Hill site existed from John Ward Road, this War Department road intruded upon the battlefield and significantly damaged earthworks. In November 1939, the NPS drafted road plans that snaked an access road south from Dallas Road among earthworks on the Confederate line and terminated in a parking area just north of the Illinois
Monument. This road, covered with a fine stone gravel, replaced a War Department road that approached Cheatham Hill from the northwest and cut across the open field the Federals crossed when they assaulted the Confederate salient. The new road passed several battery positions behind the Confederate forward earthworks and deposited the visitor at Mebane’s Redoubt (photograph 14 and figure 5). A foot trail directs the visitor to the Illinois Monument.

The CCC also helped improve the grounds within the park. Company 431 dug drainage ditches along U.S. 41 and planted trees. Structures not consistent with the battle period were razed. The CCC eliminated rock agricultural terraces in the vicinity of Burnt Hickory Road. To improve public relations and prevent erosional run-off that clogged Noses Creek and John Ward Creek, located within the park, the CCC filled ditches on adjacent farmers’ lands. Local residents, at first reluctant to accept the CCC camp, later praised its work, especially when the CCC worked to control forest fires that threatened private property.129

Photograph 14. Cheatham Hill Drive, looking south

129Herman Allen, interview by Retha Stephens and Lynn McFarland, 19 December 1984; “Superintendent Monthly Reports” (June 1939), RG 79, National Archives.
Figure 5. Route of Cheatham Hill Drive, following contours and avoiding earthworks (NPS drawing NBS-KM-8004)
Across the remainder of the battlefield, the CCC laborers engaged in vegetation management projects. The CCC laborers managed the recently abandoned agricultural fields in one of three ways: release of the fields to natural succession; resumption of agricultural use, including leasing the fields to local farmers; or revitalization of the depleted soil through the planting of woodland or meadow species.\textsuperscript{130} Documentation of the specific vegetation management projects undertaken by the CCC is poor. Nonetheless, the documentation is sufficient to establish that NPS decisions concerning the vegetation management were not designed or implemented on a park-wide scale, nor were the decisions to preserve or release individual fields consistently made with reference to their 1864 location or configuration or in reference to a comprehensive design for a commemorative landscape. Despite the NPS efforts to maintain some open fields and, in a limited number of cases, to restore or preserve the 1864 vegetation patterns, this early period of NPS park development witnessed the beginning of the widespread release and reforestation of a large percentage of the battlefield.\textsuperscript{131}

In October 1940, the CCC began laying concrete foundations for a group of maintenance buildings at the base of Big Kennesaw Mountain. The corps constructed three buildings: two brick garage facilities with storage rooms and a metal oil house. The corps completed the buildings in August 1941 and continued with other improvements including the construction of red brick and cast iron entrance signs at each intersection of park boundary and road. Each sign has a base slightly broader than its shaft and quoining at the ends, with a cast-iron plaque inscribed, "National Park Service/Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park/United States Department of the Interior." Before additional work drafted by the Eastern Branch prior to 1940 could be completed—replacing the park headquarters building, constructing a superintendent’s residence, and erecting another garage in the maintenance area—the CCC operations at Kennesaw Mountain ceased on March 10, 1942, and all remaining personnel were transferred to Fort Benning, Georgia.

**SIGNIFICANCE**

Two types of historic properties located within Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park are significant under Criteria A and represent commemorative

\textsuperscript{130}Capps, 17-21, 38-39.

\textsuperscript{131}The sequence of aerial photographs of the park spanning the period from the 1940s to today indicates that the release of the open fields to natural succession that began during the CCC era reached its peak during the 1940s and 1950s. Thereafter the configuration of the fields and woodlands on the battlefield appears to have generally stabilized. There has been no subsequent undertaking to recover the vegetation patterns of the 1864 landscape.
activity at the park. They meet Criterion Consideration F because of their age, associated tradition, and symbolic importance. The Illinois Monument and the associated markers at Cheatham Hill are significant at the state level because they represent the efforts of Illinois veteran organizations to commemorate the participants of the battle in the postwar period, between 1887 and 1917. The War Department continued this commemorative theme, but did not construct any monuments or enlarge the battlefield, and no structures are extant that relate to this period, 1917-1933. The NPS also continued a commemorative tradition at the battlefield by enlarging the park boundaries and providing improved automobile access to Cheatham Hill via Cheatham Hill Drive. Both the Illinois Monument and Cheatham Hill Drive are locally significant under Criterion C because they possess high artistic value and embody distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction. The eight brick entrance signs are locally significant under Criterion A because they represent the New Deal-era development of the park with CCC labor.

The vegetation management activities and the resulting vegetation patterns associated with the commemoration of the battlefield are not historically significant because of an absence of a demonstrated intent, or implementation on a parkwide scale of a plan designed to preserve/restore the 1864 landscape or to achieve a designed commemorative landscape.

INTEGRITY OF HISTORIC RESOURCES

The properties contributing to the historic district under the theme of commemoration and park development exhibit virtually all aspects of integrity: location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association. Although the McCook Brigade Marker is located approximately 200 feet northwest of its original location, it still retains integrity of setting, marking the approximate location where McCook’s brigade began its assault on Cheatham Hill (photograph 15).

It is important that those resources related to park development retain a high degree of integrity, especially in the areas of design, materials, setting, workmanship, and association. The CCC completed hundreds of construction projects in the national parks in the 1933-1942 period, mostly related to the development of park infrastructures. These projects were designed by NPS architects and landscape architects who subscribed to a well-defined design philosophy. As a result, certain stylistic features often define structures built during this era and reflect a park service design approach applied to buildings, structures, and landscapes. Because the CCC ended in 1942, Kennesaw was not comprehensively developed in accordance with an overall plan. Few of the buildings and structures planned in the 1930s for the park were erected; those that
were completed remain as isolated units and do not convey a coherent, recognizable design intent. Additionally, the maintenance area has been altered by the 1974 L-shaped connection between the existing buildings. Of the CCC-era work at Kennesaw, Cheatham Hill Drive represents the prevailing NPS design philosophy and retains sufficient integrity to be considered eligible for the National Register. The eight entrance signs are unaltered, remain in their original locations, and retain substantial integrity. 132

Photograph 15. McCook Brigade Marker

Contributing Properties
Illinois Monument (1914)
Union Tunnel Marker (ca. 1914)
McCook Brigade Marker (ca. 1914)
Coffey Marker (ca. 1914)
Fellows Marker (ca. 1914)
Cheatham Hill Drive (1939-1940)
Enterance Signs (eight) (1938-1942)

Noncontributing Properties
CCC Camp Site (1938-1942)
Maintenance Complex-Motor Repair Shop and Equipment Storage Garage (1940)

The CCC camp was dismantled shortly after the corps moved out. Nothing remains of the original buildings except some concrete foundations that lack architectural integrity. Originally, these foundations supported paneled walls bolted together that formed the camp buildings. The camp site is not considered contributing to this context because other examples of intact CCC architecture are extant within the NPS, and as foundations the camp buildings lack architectural integrity. The ruins represent only a small percentage of what was present at the camp. Currently, the site is defined by a grassed, mown clearing.

The maintenance complex consists of two 1939-1940 buildings joined by a recent corner addition, forming an ell-shaped plan that measures approximately 27 x 80 x 95 feet. Built by the Civilian Conservation Corps, they were known as the Motor Repair Shop and Equipment Storage Building. Separately, they consisted of a three-part building with two garage bays flanked by two toolrooms and another building with eight garage bays. Each building has a side-gabled roof, covered with asbestos shingles, red brick veneer, and an interior brick chimney. The buildings do not possess significant architectural merit and do not embody the materials and craftsmanship associated with other park-designed structures built during this period.

Mountain Road (1938-1942; 1950)

This road was graded, but not completed, by the CCC. The current road to the top of the mountain was completed by NPS in 1950; the road’s overlook was dedicated in 1964. Because the road was completed within the last fifty years, it is not a contributing feature.
Texas Monument (1964)
Georgia Monument (1964)
Neighbour Marker (circa 1914; replaced 1985)

Although these monuments do not contribute to the significance of the district based on their age, they will be managed by the park as cultural resources because of their commemorative purpose. The dedication ceremonies for the Georgia and Texas Monuments during the Civil War Centennial represented an ongoing tradition of commemoration at the Park (photograph 16).

Photograph 16. Dedication of Georgia Monument, August 16, 1963
CHAPTER 4

MANAGEMENT RECOMMENDATIONS

The Cultural Resources Planning Division offers the following management recommendations to help resource managers identify areas for further research, expand existing interpretive programs, and maintain records related to historic cultural resources. These management recommendations are a direct result of the program to update the List of Classified Structures (LCS) and to initiate the Cultural Landscape Inventory—Level I (CLI—Level I). Included are some preliminary recommendations for the management and treatment of cultural resources that may require additional funding and which should be incorporated into the Park’s Resource Management Plans (RMPs).

The park’s most significant resources, the Confederate and Federal earthworks, need to be systematically surveyed and mapped to accurately determine their length, condition, and location within the park. Geographical Positioning System (GPS) mapping is a technology being studied within the NPS as a method of recording park features. Utilizing GPS, the park could accurately record the locations of all of its extant resources, especially the earthworks, within a reasonable time. In addition, archeological investigations could accurately locate and describe fortifications not visible on the ground surface. This inventory and assessment should be included as a project statement in the park’s next RMP.

The park possesses a significant number of earthworks, many in excellent structural condition. The LCS team chose a limited number of earthwork features to survey and evaluate. The earthwork survey gathered information on condition and current interpretative efforts in order to provide some measure of resource assessment for use in the LCS inventory. However, this survey does not replace a comprehensive earthwork survey. The LCS survey team inventoried six features: Little Kennesaw, Pigeon Hill, Strahl’s Fort, the Twenty-four Gun Emplacement, the Cheatham Hill salient, and Granbury’s Brigade at Cheatham Hill. The remaining
earthworks are grouped into one LCS entry that broadly describes the resources, but does not specifically describe features, location, or condition.

For the most part, the earthworks at Kennesaw are excluded from interpretive programs. Some earthworks are located in heavily wooded areas away from established trails. This dense vegetative cover protects the resources from erosion, visitor traffic, and vandalism. However, many earthworks located adjacent to trails lack even minimal vegetative cover which typically protects them. In addition, these earthworks are not interpreted and visitors are unaware that they need protection. For example, the artillery positions on the crest of Big Kennesaw are subject to heavy visitation and frequent foot traffic. Without adequate vegetative cover, these earthworks suffer from severe erosion and loss of historic fabric. Although these earthworks will continue to sustain heavy use, signs that discourage walking on the earthworks and possibly interpretive text that illustrates the effects of erosion should be posted, especially in this high traffic area. The park should also consider incorporating some earthwork educational material in the visitor center exhibits. Some trail earthworks have been stabilized and are actively managed as cultural resources, such as those at Cheatham Hill, Pigeon Hill, and atop Little Kennesaw. Because earthworks are such a valuable resource, it is important that a comprehensive plan to stabilize and preserve the earthworks be pursued. The RMP should consider earthworks stabilization and preservation a top priority. Once a plan is established, proposed treatment methods should be evaluated through the Section 106 review process, properly implemented, and then monitored for results. Stabilization and interpretive efforts should not jeopardize the historic material of the earthworks.

Recreational use of the park is important to the surrounding urban community and will continue to influence park management responsibilities. However, vandalism and intensive recreational use of the park jeopardize interpretive programs and cultural resources and monopolize personnel. Cooperative efforts among the park and its immediate neighbors could facilitate closer monitoring of park use and possibly protect resources.

Protection of historic resources within and outside of the park’s boundaries is also an important management consideration. Because of its location in a rapidly urbanizing area, the park is continually threatened by development. Historic features, especially transportation corridors, like roads and railroads, and adjacent historic properties are not owned by the park, but decisions affecting their preservation or alteration will significantly influence the historic resources the park does manage. Incompatible development such as high density residential or commercial construction could threaten scenic vistas important to interpreting the battle’s significant events, and widening roads could introduce heavy and unsafe traffic within the park’s boundary. In light of these considerations, the park should
pursue alternatives to development within and adjacent to park boundaries through cooperation with state, local, and private interests and the State Historic Preservation Office. The park may want to pursue National Register nomination for adjacent historic properties also in cooperation with local or state preservation groups.

Currently, the park identifies several cultural sites significant to the battle landscape of 1864. Although most of these sites appear to have been historically verified by archival research, archeological investigations are needed. In particular, the Kolbe Farm landscape, the New Salem Church site, and several mid-nineteenth-century house sites could yield significant information relevant to military actions in the area. For example, local tradition suggests that the Confederates used the New Salem Church as a field hospital. An archeological investigation could test that hypothesis and contribute to interpretive exhibits at the site.

Although not addressed in this Historic Resource Study, at least sixty stone mounds are present within the park boundaries. A preliminary survey performed by the Southeast Archeological Center in 1992 following a vandalism incident proved inconclusive concerning the mounds’ cultural origin or function. The SEAC investigator recommended further archeological study. Until the cultural origin of these mounds is determined, park prosecution of vandals cannot proceed, and repeated vandalism could severely impair their integrity.

Further research and evaluation of the vegetation at KEMO is needed in order to understand the potential historical significance of this resource in the context of the battle action and as it defined the historic setting. A Cultural Landscape Report (CLR), is the primary landscape treatment document and could be the vehicle by which vegetation management alternatives for recapturing the historic setting are explored. An in-depth analysis of historical vegetation patterns would require overlaying the troop movement map (1993) with baseline data on existing park vegetation in order to evaluate whether the extant vegetation could yield information on historical agricultural field patterns since these fields have been released to natural succession. This process should consider the management of earthworks and the role vegetation plays in their current preservation and interpretation.

More archival research is needed to better interpret the role veterans’ groups, notably, the Colonel Dan McCook Brigade Association and Kennesaw Memorial Association, played in spearheading early preservation and commemoration efforts at the park. Because Georgia collections on these groups are thin, further research in Illinois, where these associations were organized, would be valuable for interpreting commemorative efforts at the park.

Finally, information pertaining to park maintenance and treatment methods of cultural resources was not readily available. Although some files are kept by the administrative staff and within maintenance, they do not provide a cohesive account of preservation treatments, routine maintenance, or cyclic maintenance for each
cultural resource. Building files or cultural resource files containing complete information regarding age, condition, alterations, and treatment should be compiled for each LCS property.
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APPENDIX A
CONTRIBUTING STRUCTURES LIST

Earthworks: The park contains approximately eleven miles of infantry trenches, batteries, forts, and gun positions, both earthen and stone, constructed by Federals and Confederates. These fortifications are located on high ground and on slopes of major topographical features and have helped define park boundaries. Currently, the park interprets approximately one-third of the earthworks. Some of these works have been stabilized with grass and tree removal, when feasible, and marked with signs that direct the visitor to stay off the works. The remaining earthworks are hidden from the visitor in wooded areas or are located adjacent to footpaths. Many of these fortifications are covered with understory growth consisting of briars, honeysuckle, and wild grasses, some large and small trees, mainly oak, pine, and dogwood, as well as years of forest debris, such as leaves and fallen limbs. See Appendix B for more complete descriptions of selected earthworks.

Kolb House: This is a one-and-one-half story, three bay, Georgian-plan log house, constructed circa 1836. Its construction is characterized by square hewn logs and square notching, concrete chinking, stone piers, and four brick and stone chimneys. The side-gabled roof is covered with wood shingles and possesses gable returns, a vergeboard, and weatherboard gable ends. The house has no front porch, a full-facade rear shed porch, and a shed porch on the west facade. The front entry is trabeated and appears to have been larger at one time, possibly an open breezeway. The exterior of the house was rehabilitated in 1963, and most of the existing oak logs were retained. However, soil cement chinking replaced original mud chinking and appears to have dried out the logs. Window openings, door openings, and porch configurations appear original. The front entry possesses a slate and concrete stoop that probably is not historically accurate. Because few records were extant regarding the historic condition of the house, park staff relied on information from similar houses in north Georgia and interviews of former occupants. The interior of the house consists of four rooms linked by a central hall with an open stair displaying a chamfered newel post. The interior walls had wood paneling, using both beaded-board and plank materials, at the time of the rehabilitation. Behind the paneling, the interior log walls had brick nogging and mud chinking; these were left in place. However, the paneling was removed and replaced with dry wall, both on the walls and the ceilings. The floors in the hall and in three of the four rooms are original with four-inch pine boards. All fireplaces, mantels, and stone or brick hearths were removed during the rehabilitation and the interior openings sealed to accommodate a modern heating system.

Kolb Cemetery: The cemetery is located east of the house and is the only extant landscape feature or secondary structure surviving from the original farmstead. The graveyard measures 48 x 50 feet and is enclosed by a raised
concrete foundation. There are eleven marked graves with marble headstones that date from 1839 to 1955. The oldest grave, that of Peter Valentine Kolb, consists of a small pillar on a square base in the center of the graveyard. The pillar is loosened from the base and could pose a safety hazard.

**Stilesboro Road:** This is a two-lane asphalt-covered state route located on the northern park boundary, south of the CSX Railroad (formerly the Western & Atlantic) Railroad. Approximately one-and-one-half miles of the road lie within the park. The road runs east and west. According to historical base maps and reports in *The War of the Rebellion: A Computation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies*, Federal troops and earthworks lay astride the Stilesboro Road. As the Federals prepared to initiate their mountain diversion, they moved across the road toward the entrenched Confederates.

**Gilbert Road:** This is a one-mile gravel road, one-and-one-half lanes wide, that is located between Stilesboro Road and Old Mountain Road and is oriented primarily north and south. Only 600 feet lie within the park boundary, and on this segment, the road turns east out of the park. An extension of this road continues south and is utilized by park maintenance staff.

**Old John Ward Road:** This is a 20- to 22-foot-wide packed gravel maintenance road, formerly known as John Ward Road. It begins at Dallas Road and proceeds south out of the park to intersect with New John Ward Road.

**Dallas Road:** This is a two-lane asphalt-covered state route that runs east and west for a distance of one-half mile within the park. The road is located in the southern part of the park and serves park visitors and Cobb County commuters. Dallas Road provides access to Cheatham Hill and facilitated troop movements. Several earthworks are located within the right-of-way of this road.

**Burnt Hickory Road:** This is a two-lane asphalt-covered state route that runs east and west and marks the north-south midpoint of the park. Several earthworks are located in the right-of-way of this road, including those on Pigeon Hill. Reports in the *Official Records* document troop movements along this road. Approximately two miles of this road lie within the park boundaries.

**Big Kennesaw Antebellum Road:** This is a steep, 10- to 15-foot-wide unpaved road that ascends the east face of Big Kennesaw Mountain and ends just below the crest. The road, which was used by the Confederate Army, is not maintained or interpreted by the park. Although trees have taken root in the roadbed, the road is still visible.

**New Salem Church Site:** This site consists of a stone foundation ruin, probably granite, and a cemetery of unidentified and largely unmarked graves. A church clearly existed on this site at the time of the battle because it appears on a manuscript map prepared by an unknown Confederate engineer in 1864. An oral history interview conducted in the 1940s described the church as a frame building
with board siding. The ruin, which lies west of an old roadbed, consists of two geometric outlines that formed the foundation. One is rectangular and the other is square-shaped, approximately twelve inches high. The twenty-four graves noted are clustered mostly to the south; some are marked by head and foot stones. No conclusive evidence concerning the age of the graves has been discovered. Local tradition has it that the church was used as a field hospital during the Atlanta campaign; the church’s location behind the Confederate lines near the scene of action at Pigeon Hill lends credence to the tradition.

**Illinois Monument:** This monument, erected in 1914, consists of a twenty-five foot battered marble shaft rising from an eight-foot-square base. The marble is inscribed on three sides, with the west elevation dominated by three bronze figures: a Union soldier flanked by two classical female figures. Situated on the crest of Cheatham Hill, the monument overlooks a small plaza and two flights of marble steps to the west. An eagle perched above the figures on the west elevation was damaged by lightning in 1984. In 1991, the eagle was restored atop the monument.

**Union Tunnel Marker:** This is a 5 x 3 foot marble arch marking the tunnel entrance Union troops excavated in an attempt to breach the Confederate works at Cheatham Hill. The inscribed keystone describes the tunnel’s purpose. It is located at the foot of the Illinois monument and is flanked by a dry-stack stone wall.

**McCook Brigade Marker:** This is a 24 x 24 x 15 inch rectangular granite marker located at the point where McCook’s Brigade began its assault, as described on the marker’s beveled face. Currently, the marker is located north of a foot path, on a wooded knoll, but was moved to this location from some point further south, circa 1935-39.

**C. H. Coffey Marker:** This marker is a 2 x 1 x 3 foot plain marble tablet indicating the place where C. H. Coffey was mortally wounded during the Federal assault on Cheatham Hill. It is located approximately 300 feet north of the salient at the crest of the hill.

**Fellows Marker:** This is a 1 x 2 x 2 foot rectangular white marker with a beveled face bearing the inscription: “Captain W.W. Fellows/Inspector General/3rd Brigade Second Division/ 14th A.C.” It is located on Cheatham Hill east of the Illinois Monument.

**Grave of the Unknown U. S. Soldier:** This is a 1 x 2 x 3 foot marble headstone inscribed: “Unknown/U. S. Soldier/June 27, 1864.” Civil Works Administration laborers discovered the grave, in 1934, while they cleared the surrounding area of vegetation and planted trees. Located southeast of the Cheatham Hill salient, the grave is enclosed by a split rail fence. It is the only known Civil War interment at the park.

**Cheatham Hill Drive:** This is a one-mile, two-lane narrow asphalt-covered road constructed in 1939-40 by the Civilian Conservation Corps. The road is
located adjacent to the Confederate earthworks, situated south of Dallas Road, and ends at a parking area just north of Mebane's Battery near the Cheatham Hill salient. The gently curving road largely follows natural contours and avoids impacting the earthworks. This road, the only one completed by the CCC in the park, provided much-needed visitor access to the area and helped retain the integrity of the earthworks.

**Eight Red Brick Entrance Signs:** Each sign has a cast-iron plaque inscribed, "National Park Service/Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park/United States Department of the Interior." Constructed between 1938 and 1942, the signs do not vary appreciably. Each measures 9 x 6 x 2 feet, has a slightly broader base than shaft and quoining at the ends, and possesses a concrete cap and foundation. All have metal plaques painted brown with white lettering. They are located at every point where an east-west state route intersects a park boundary except the western park boundary on Powder Springs Road.
APPENDIX B

DESCRIPTIONS OF SELECTED EARTHWORKS

The Federal twenty-four gun emplacement is located on a small, wooded rise south of Stilesboro Road and faces Little Kennesaw and Pigeon Hill. It accommodates four batteries, each containing six gun positions. The gun emplacements are spaced between eight and fourteen feet apart within each battery and consist of rear pits with a surrounding horseshoe-shaped, earthen parapet. The sides or wings of the parapets taper toward the ends and the cannon opening, an embrasure, exists at the apex. These emplacements measure between approximately fifteen and twenty-five feet across the front and between twenty and thirty feet along the wings. The northernmost battery resembles an infantry line with each emplacement set side by side, sharing common wings and a single linear parapet. The four batteries are approximately seventy-five to 150 feet apart.

The earthworks at Little Kennesaw include both Confederate infantry and artillery positions. The infantry line along the western crest of Big Kennesaw continues south across the declivity between Big and Little Kennesaw and along the northwest face of Little Kennesaw, below the crest. At the crest, the thick woods covering the mountainsides thin, allowing views of the battlefield and the surrounding area. The line consists of a continuous parapet, between two and four feet high, a rear ditch, and transverses placed intermittently along the line. Along the south and southwest faces, earthen parapets were either constructed atop rock outcroppings or abandoned when these outcroppings alone were sufficient. Loose rock was also used to construct defensive positions, including gun emplacements. Five artillery emplacements are located on the western crest, above the infantry lines. Three consist of single-gun emplacements with horseshoe-shaped parapets. The remaining two emplacements contained two and three guns each and are collectively known as Fort McBride, named for Lieutenant E. D. McBride, who was killed defending this position. A fourth, single-gun emplacement is located in the declivity between Big and Little Kennesaw, distinguished from the parapet of the infantry line by the embrasure and deepened rear pit.

The continuous earthen parapet of the Confederate infantry line at Little Kennesaw ends at the mountain’s steep southern slope. As Little Kennesaw merges with Pigeon Hill, the infantry line begins, running northeast to southwest just below the crest of Pigeon Hill. The line, which runs parallel to the Pigeon Hill Trail, is approximately 2,000 feet long and runs through thinly wooded areas with thick undergrowth in places. The line is constructed of loose rock and earth, forming a parapet between two and four feet high. Transverses and rifle pits, located on the right end of the line near the foot of Little Kennesaw, are similarly constructed. The parapet continues along the vertical rock faces of the western and northwestern slopes of the hill before terminating at Burnt Hickory Road, near the bottom of the hill. Four artillery positions are located on Pigeon Hill. Two, four-gun
emplacements, consisting of loose rock and earth parapets, are incorporated into the right and left ends of the infantry line. Two, single-gun emplacements constructed of loose rock and earth are located on the crest of the hill, with the Federal twenty-four gun emplacement within the field of fire.

The Confederate line resumes east of the Hardage House site, south of Burnt Hickory Road. Between Burnt Hickory and Dallas Roads, the earthen parapet, broken in places, straddles the Old Mill Road. South of Dallas Road, the earthworks follow the contour of a ridge known as Cheatham Hill, and contain some of the most elaborate earthworks constructed at Kennesaw. A forward earthen parapet lines the crest of the hill forming a salient. The parapet and transverses measure between three and five feet high. Two interior lines meander across the top of the hill, which is thinly wooded with no undergrowth, creating a labyrinth of trenches, transverses, dug-outs, and parapets that overlook a large, open field. The left flank of the salient was anchored by a two-battery artillery position. The right flank was protected by a square redoubt located in a clearing, south of the visitor parking area. The redoubt is shaped by four parapet walls, approximately sixty feet long and four feet high, that completely enclose the two-gun battery.

Repulsed by the Confederates at the salient, the Federals hastily constructed two lines in a declivity that protected them from Confederate fire. The forward line features a parapet that rises only one to two feet and the mouth of the tunnel where Federal troops attempted to tunnel beneath the Confederate lines and destroy them with explosives. The second Federal line contains a smaller parapet and lies at the edge of an old road bed.

As the Confederate infantry line continues south, across John Ward Creek, it forms a cluster of earthen parapets known as Strahl's Fort. Located on a wooded rise, Strahl's Fort is an eight-gun emplacement with an L-shaped parapet constructed along the rear and right flank. A C-shaped parapet covers the front of the fort, just below the crest of the hill. At the center of this arrangement is a C-shaped, four-gun emplacement, approximately thirty feet across with parapets measuring between three and six feet high. The front wall contains three embrasures with the fourth embrasure located on east or rear wall. The open, right flank of this emplacement is covered by a second, four-gun emplacement located approximately 250 feet to the south. This L-shaped emplacement consists of a two-gun, west-facing parapet and a second, two-gun parapet facing south, with three embrasures for a wider field of fire. An infantry trench lies south and west of this position, meandering along the sloping contours of the hill. This line features outstanding examples of parapets and transverses, some measuring between five and seven feet high.
United States Department of the Interior
National Park Service

NATIONAL REGISTER OF HISTORIC PLACES
REGISTRATION FORM

This form is for use in nominating or requesting determination of eligibility of properties and districts. See instructions in How to Complete the National Register of Historic Places Registration Form (National Register Bulletin 16a). Complete each item by marking "X" in the appropriate box or by entering the information requested. If any item does not apply to the property being documented, enter "N/A" for "not applicable." For functions, architectural classification, materials, and areas of significance, enter only categories and subcategories from the instructions. Place additional entries and narrative items on continuation sheets (NPS Form 10-900a). Use a typewriter, word processor, or computer, to complete all items.

1. Name of Property

historic name Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park

other names/site number

2. Location

street & number Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park (KEMO)

Kennesaw Mountain ridge roughly bounded by Old U.S. 41 on the north and Powder Springs Road on the south

not for publication ___

vicinity X

city or town Marietta

state Georgia code GA county Cobb code 067

zip code 30061

3. State/Federal Agency Certification

As the designated authority under the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966, as amended, I hereby certify that this ___ nomination ___ request for determination of eligibility meets the documentation standards for registering properties in the National Register of Historic Places and meets the procedural and professional requirements set forth in 36 CFR Part 60. In my opinion, the property ___ meets ___ does not meet the National Register Criteria. I recommend that this property be considered significant ___ nationally ___ statewide ___ locally. ( ___ See continuation sheet for additional comments.)

Signature of certifying official ___________________________ 3/14/95 Date

NATIONAL PARK SERVICE

State or Federal agency and bureau

In my opinion, the property ___ meets ___ does not meet the National Register criteria. ( ___ See continuation sheet for additional comments.)

Signature of commenting or other official ___________________________ Date

State or Federal agency and bureau
4. National Park Service Certification

I, hereby certify that this property is:

- entered in the National Register
- determined eligible for the National Register
- determined not eligible for the National Register
- removed from the National Register
- other (explain): additional documentation accepted

[Signature of Keeper] 3/3/95  Date of Action

5. Classification

Ownership of Property (Check as many boxes as apply) Category of Property (Check only one box)

- private
- public-local
- public-State X public-Federal

building(s) district

site

structure

object

Number of Resources within Property
(Do not include previously listed properties in the count)

Contributing Noncontributing

0 5 buildings
2 6 sites
7 2 structures
10 3 objects
12 16 Total

Number of contributing resources previously listed in the National Register 6

Name of related multiple property listing (Enter "N/A" if property is not part of a multiple property listing.) N/A
6. Function or Use

Historic Functions
(Enter categories from instructions)
- Defense: battle site, fortification
- Domestic: single dwelling
- Agriculture: agricultural field
- Recreation and Culture: monument/ marker

Current Functions
(Enter categories from instructions)
- Other: National Battlefield Park
- Recreation and Culture: monument/ marker, outdoor recreation
- Agriculture: agricultural field

7. Description

Architectural Classification
(Enter categories from instructions)
- Other: Civil War earthworks
- Early Republic: Federal
- Modern Movement: Modernistic

Materials
(Enter categories from instructions)
- Foundation: stone, concrete
- Walls: log, weatherboard, brick
- Roof: shingle, asphalt
- Other: earth, granite, marble

Narrative Description (Describe the historic and current condition of the property on one or more continuation sheets.)

8. Statement of Significance

Applicable National Register Criteria (Mark "x" in one or more boxes for the criteria qualifying the property for National Register listing)

- Property is associated with events that have made a significant contribution to the broad patterns of our history. [X] A
- Property is associated with the lives of persons significant in our past. [X] B
- Property embodies the distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction or represents the work of a master, or possesses high artistic values, or represents a significant and distinguishable entity whose components lack individual distinction. [X] C
- Property has yielded, or is likely to yield information important in prehistory or history. [ ] D
Criteria Considerations (Mark "X" in all the boxes that apply.)

- A owned by a religious institution or used for religious purposes.
- B removed from its original location.
- C a birthplace or a grave.
- D a cemetery.
- E a reconstructed building, object, or structure.
- X F a commemorative property.
- G less than 50 years of age or achieved significance within the past 50 years.

Areas of Significance (Enter categories from instructions)  Period of Significance

Military  May-September 1864

Other: Commemoration  1887-1942

Architecture

Significant Dates

1864
1887, 1914, 1928, 1933
 circa 1836

Significant Person (Complete if Criterion B is marked above)

Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman and George H. Thomas
and Gen. Joseph E. Johnston

Cultural Affiliation

Euro-American

Architect/Builder

Narrative Statement of Significance (Explain the significance of the property on one or more continuation sheets.)
9. Major Bibliographical References

(Cite the books, articles, and other sources used in preparing this form on one
or more continuation sheets.)

Previous documentation on file (NPS)
__ preliminary determination of individual listing (36 CFR 67) has been
requested.
X previously listed in the National Register
__ previously determined eligible by the National Register
designated a National Historic Landmark
__ recorded by Historic American Buildings Survey # GA-1171; GA-1178-E:
   GA-2169
__ recorded by Historic American Engineering Record # ______________________

Primary Location of Additional Data
__ State Historic Preservation Office
__ Other State agency
X Federal agency
__ Local government
__ University
__ Other

Name of repository: National Park Service, Southeast Regional Office:
Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park

10. Geographical Data

Acreage of Property 2.884

UTM References (Place additional UTM references on a continuation sheet)

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__ See continuation sheet.

Verbal Boundary Description (Describe the boundaries of the property on a
continuation sheet.)

Boundary Justification (Explain why the boundaries were selected on a
continuation sheet.)
11. Form Prepared By

name/title Robert W. Blythe, Historian; Maureen A. Carroll, Historian; Steven H. Moffson, Architectural Historian

organization National Park Service, Southeast Regional Office

date October 24, 1994

street & number 75 Spring Street, S.W. telephone (404) 331-5988

city or town Atlanta state GA zip code 30303

Additional Documentation

Submit the following items with the completed form:

Continuation Sheets

Maps
A USGS map (7.5 or 15 minute series) indicating the property’s location.
A sketch map for historic districts and properties having large acreage or numerous resources.

Photographs
Representative black and white photographs of the property.

Additional items (Check with the SHPO or FPO for any additional items)

Property Owner (Complete this item at the request of the SHPO or FPO.)

name National Park Service

street & number P.O. Box 37127 telephone

city or town Washington state DC zip code 20013-7127
Description of Historic Resources

Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park contains the site of some of the fiercest fighting of the Civil War’s Atlanta Campaign. The Battle of Kolb’s Farm on June 22, 1864, and the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain on June 27, 1864, failed to stem the advancing Union Army and represent the last major engagements before the Confederates’ retreat across the Chattahoochee River. The 2,884-acre park interprets the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain through museum exhibits, a slide presentation, and a self-guiding auto tour of the battlefield. The park is located in Cobb County, Georgia, three miles west of Marietta and twenty-three miles northwest of Atlanta. It is irregularly shaped, measuring nearly seven miles north to south and, at its widest point, only two miles east to west. Two state routes, Dallas and Burnt Hickory Roads, intersect the park, dividing it into three sections. Big and Little Kennesaw Mountains dominate the northern section, with the remainder containing ridges and rolling hills characteristic of the Georgia Piedmont region.

The patchwork of open fields and wooded areas that characterized this agricultural area in 1864 is now decidedly more wooded, because most agricultural production has ceased, and many fields have been released to forest succession. Many infantry and artillery positions that were once situated in clearings with commanding views of the landscape now stand in the midst of mature, second-growth trees. The open fields maintained by the National Park Service (NPS), located predominantly at the north end of the park, approximate the location of earlier fields, but are smaller and less rectilinear. Post-Civil War agricultural practices, in which sloping fields were leveled and terraced to minimize erosion, are still evident. In areas that represent some of the most significant action of the battle, efforts have been made to rehabilitate and maintain the historic appearance of the landscape. The NPS maintains approximately half of the open field below Cheatham Hill, which Federal forces ascended in their doomed assault.

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2In 1935, Civil Works Administration laborers under the guidance of the NPS engaged in an effort to rehabilitate overgrown and abandoned agricultural fields and establish meadows in the Cheatham Hill vicinity, see Michael Capps, Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park: An Administrative History (Atlanta: National Park Service, Southeast Region, Cultural Resources Planning Division, 1994), 16. In addition, the NPS assigns Special Use Permits to local agricultural concerns that raise hay in the open fields.

In recent years, the small farms that surrounded the park have been replaced by residential and commercial development, reflecting the continued growth of Cobb County and the northern suburbs of Atlanta. Within the bounds of the park, three "islands" of private property exist. These densely settled areas, located at the north, central, and south ends of the park, contain large single-family homes that were constructed within the last twenty years. This recent development has contributed to increased traffic in the park and increased recreational use of park facilities.

The park was established through the efforts of private individuals, memorial associations, and a series of congressional acts. Federal legislation in 1917 authorized a national battlefield site at Kennesaw. In 1935, following nine unsuccessful attempts, Federal legislation established the Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park "for the benefit and inspiration of the people. . . ." The park contains one of the largest surviving collections of Federal and Confederate field fortifications, or earthworks, totaling approximately eleven miles. The Confederates' carefully prepared line, extending from the top of Big Kennesaw to Powder Springs Road, illustrates the tactical defensive strategy, frequently employed by the close of 1863. These positions are situated along ridges and hills and include structures ranging from infantry lines to more sophisticated artillery positions. Early efforts to commemorate the battle and the establishment of the Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park contributed to the preservation of the earthworks and other historic resources within the park boundary.

Big and Little Kennesaw, Cheatham Hill, Pigeon Hill, and the Kolb House represent four historic sites within the park currently interpreted by the NPS. Ten monuments and markers have been erected throughout the park, marking the locations of particular units or significant events in the battle. Sixteen miles of trails and two-lane roads provide access to these areas, and small parking lots accommodate those touring the battlefield by car. The Visitor Center is located south of Stilesboro Road at the foot of Big Kennesaw and contains a small museum and theater.

**Landscape Features of Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park**

During the middle of the nineteenth century, small farms surrounded Kennesaw, reflecting typical antebellum land-use patterns of the Georgia Piedmont. These farms consisted of fifty to 150 acres.\(^4\) The rocky soil supported sturdy crops, such as grains, and some farms contained orchards. Dwellings were generally small, one-story, frame or log structures. Farm complexes contained yards and


\(^5\) Thomas A. Scott, "Cobb County, Georgia, 1880-1900: A Socioeconomic Study of an Upper Piedmont County" (Ph.D. diss., University of Tennessee, Knoxville, 1978), 5.
several outbuildings, including barns and smokehouses. Dirt roads and smaller dirt lanes meandered throughout the area.

In June 1864, Confederate and Union forces transformed this landscape into a line of battle more than eight miles long. The lines ran east to west for a short distance from a point east of Big Kennesaw and then curved around the west face of the mountain and ran south to a point beyond the Powder Springs Road. The Confederates, who chose the site, had more time to construct their field fortifications than did the advancing Union army. The substantial nature of these works reflects their importance in the Confederates' defensive strategy. Placed along high ground, these earthworks consisted of essentially a single infantry line punctuated with artillery positions at key points. In some areas, notably Cheatham Hill, secondary lines were erected for support, and artillery pieces were sited on the crests of Big and Little Kennesaw. The Federal forces constructed defenses composed of a series of overlapping lines supported with artillery emplacements, rather than a continuous line. Both sides had rifle pits for skirmishers in advance of their main entrenchments. Vast numbers of trees were cut to clear paths of fire and to construct the earthworks. The forested ridges provided material for head logs, revetments, and obstacles that slowed the enemy advance. The hilltops were thinned or cleared to provide artillery with a wider field of fire.

Stands of pine soon replaced the hardwoods that were removed along the Kennesaw ridge in 1864, and for approximately one hundred years following the battle, much of the surrounding area was intensely cultivated. In the decades following the battle, farmers terraced their fields and expanded them as agricultural technology improved, leading to the destruction of earthworks. Other fortifications pass through wooded areas that were open during the battle. Most of the earthworks within the park bounds remain intact, with nearly the entire Confederate line and fragments of the Federal line preserved. Wood elements, such as head logs and revetments, have long since disappeared. Currently, the earthworks are defined by an earthen parapet, rear and sometimes front ditches, and in the case of some gun emplacements, embrasures. In most areas, trees have taken root in the earthworks, creating holes in the parapet walls as the dead trunks and root systems rot away. In a few places, grasses and other benign undergrowth cover the earthworks.

Although land-use patterns have changed over time, many of the components that convey the historic significance of the landscape remain intact. Within park bounds, the contours of the land and the locations of streams have been left

"This assessment is based on a reconnaissance-level survey of earthworks at various locations throughout the park. Emmet A. Nichol's, "Historic Ground Cover — June 1864," is the most complete study of earthworks at Kennesaw. It features measured drawings of artillery positions roughly scaled depicting infantry lines. The author provided no text to describe his survey methodology or mapping technique and as a result, the "Historic Ground Cover" map is used cautiously."
largely unaltered. Six of the nine roads that pass within the park—Stilesboro, Gilbert, Old John Ward, Dallas, Burnt Hickory, and Powder Springs Roads—existed prior to the battle and, though improved, most still follow the course of their historic road beds. Smaller, unpaved roads that date to the middle of the nineteenth century, such as the Marietta-Cassville and Old Mill Roads, can still be found within the park, but have been considerably altered. The Western & Atlantic Railroad, now the CSX Railroad, follows its original path along the park’s northern boundary. Nearly twenty buildings, including dwellings, churches, and mills, existed within the present park boundary in 1864. Only the Kolb House, which has been rehabilitated to represent its historic exterior appearance, survives.

Descriptions of Selected Earthworks

Among the many miles of earthworks are several features that are sophisticated examples of earthwork technology. The Federal twenty-four-gun emplacement and the Confederate fieldworks at Little Kennesaw Mountain, Pigeon Hill, Cheatham Hill, and Strahl's Fort typify earthen fortifications employed throughout the Atlanta Campaign. The historic integrity of these fieldworks provides a visible link with the events that necessitated their creation.

The Federal twenty-four-gun emplacement is located on a small, wooded rise south of Stilesboro Road and faces Little Kennesaw and Pigeon Hill. It accommodates four batteries, each containing six gun positions. The gun emplacements are spaced between eight and fourteen feet apart within each battery and consist of rear pits with a surrounding horseshoe-shaped, earthen parapet. A cannon opening, or embrasure, is centered on the parapet wall, and the sides or wings of the parapets taper toward the ends. These emplacements measure between approximately fifteen and twenty-five feet across the front and between twenty and thirty feet along the wings. The northernmost battery resembles an infantry line with each emplacement set side by side, sharing common wings and a single linear parapet. The four batteries are approximately seventy-five to 150 feet apart.

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The continuous earthen parapet of the Confederate infantry line at Little Kennesaw ends at the mountain's steep southern slope. As Little Kennesaw merges with Pigeon Hill, the infantry line begins, running northeast to southwest just below the crest of Pigeon Hill. The line, which runs parallel to the Pigeon Hill Trail, is approximately 2,000 feet long and runs through thinly wooded areas with thick undergrowth in places. The line is constructed of loose rock and earth, forming a parapet between two and four feet high. Traverses and rifle pits, located on the right end of the line near the foot of Little Kennesaw, are similarly constructed. The parapet continues along the vertical rock faces of the western and northwestern slopes of the hill before terminating at Burnt Hickory Road, near the bottom of the hill. Four artillery positions are located on Pigeon Hill. Two, four-gun emplacements, consisting of loose rock and earth parapets, are incorporated into the right and left flanks of the infantry line. Two, single-gun emplacements constructed of loose rock and earth are located on the crest of the hill, with the Federal twenty-four-gun emplacement within the field of fire.

The Confederate line resumes east of the Hardage House site, south of Burnt Hickory Road. Between Burnt Hickory and Dallas Roads, the earthen parapet, broken in places, features a salient north of Noses (also known as Noyes) Creek.South of Dallas Road, the earthworks follow the contour of a ridge known as Cheatham Hill, and contain some of the most elaborate earthworks constructed at Kennesaw. A forward earthen parapet lines the crest of the hill forming a salient. The parapet and traverses measure between three and five feet high. Two interior lines meander across the top of the hill, which is thinly wooded with no undergrowth, creating a labyrinth of trenches, traverses, dug-outs, and parapets that overlook a large, open field. The left flank of the salient was anchored by a two-battery artillery position. The right flank was protected by a square redoubt located in a clearing, south of the visitor parking area. The redoubt is shaped by four parapet walls, approximately sixty feet long and four feet high, that enclose the two-gun battery.

Repulsed by the Confederates at the salient, the Federals hastily constructed two lines in a declivity that protected them from Confederate fire. The forward line features a parapet that rises only one to two feet and the mouth of the tunnel where Federal troops attempted to tunnel beneath the Confederate lines and destroy them with explosives. The second Federal line contains a smaller parapet and lies at the edge of an old road bed.

As the Confederate infantry line continues south, across John Ward Creek, it forms a cluster of earthen parapets known as Strahl’s Fort. Located on a wooded rise, Strahl’s Fort is an eight-gun emplacement with an L-shaped parapet constructed along the rear and right flank. A C-shaped parapet covers the
front of the fort, just below the crest of the hill. At the center of this arrangement is a C-shaped, four-gun emplacement, approximately thirty feet across with parapets measuring between three and six feet high. The front wall contains three embrasures with the fourth embrasure located on the east or rear wall. The open, right flank of this emplacement is covered by a second, four-gun emplacement located approximately 250 feet to the south. This L-shaped emplacement consists of a two-gun, west-facing parapet and a second, two-gun parapet facing south, with three embrasures for a wider field of fire. An infantry trench lies south and west of this position, meandering along the sloping contours of the hill. This line features outstanding examples of parapets and traverses, some measuring between five and seven feet high.

Descriptions of Contributing Properties

Earthworks: The park contains approximately eleven miles of infantry trenches, batteries, forts, and gun positions, both earthen and stone, constructed by Federals and Confederates. These fortifications are located on high ground and on slopes of major topographical features and have helped define park boundaries. Currently, the park interprets approximately one-third of the earthworks. Some of these works have been stabilized with grass and tree removal, when feasible, and marked with signs that direct the visitor to stay off the works. The remaining earthworks are hidden from the visitor in wooded areas or are located adjacent to footpaths. Many of these fortifications are covered with understory growth consisting of briars, honeysuckle, and wild grasses, some large and small trees, mainly oak, pine, and dogwood, as well as years of forest debris, such as leaves and fallen limbs. (IDLCs 12176, 90133, 90134, 90135, 90136, 90137, 90138; previously listed; structures)

Kolb House: This is a one-and-one-half story, three-bay, Georgian-plan log house, constructed circa 1836. Its construction is characterized by square hewn logs and square notching, concrete chinking, stone piers, and four brick and stone chimneys. The side-gabled roof is covered with wood shingles and possesses gable returns, a vergeboard, and weatherboard gable ends. The house has no front porch, a full-facade rear shed porch, and a shed porch on the west facade. The front entry is trabeated and appears to have been larger at one time, possibly an open breezeway. The exterior of the house was rehabilitated in 1963, and most of the existing oak logs were retained. However, soil cement chinking replaced original mud chinking and appears to have dried out the logs. Window openings, door openings, and porch configurations appear original. The front entry possesses a slate and concrete stoop that probably is not historically accurate. Because few records were extant regarding the historic condition of the house, park staff relied on information from similar houses in north Georgia and interviews of former occupants. The interior of the house consists of four rooms linked by a central hall with an open stair displaying a chamfered newel post. The interior walls had wood paneling, using both beaded-board and plank materials, at the time of the rehabilitation. Behind the paneling, the interior log walls had brick nogging and mud chinking; these were left in place. However, the paneling was removed and replaced with dry wall,
both on the walls and the ceilings. The floors in the hall and in three of the four rooms are original with four-inch pine boards. All fireplaces, mantels, and stone or brick hearths were removed during the rehabilitation and the interior openings sealed to accommodate a modern heating system. (IDLCS 12175; previously listed; building)

Kolb Cemetery: The cemetery is located east of the house and is the only extant landscape feature or secondary structure surviving from the original farmstead. The graveyard measures 48 x 50 feet and is enclosed by a raised concrete foundation. There are eleven marked graves with marble headstones that date from 1839 to 1955. The oldest grave, that of Peter Valentine Kolb, consists of a small pillar on a square base in the center of the graveyard. The pillar is loosened from the base and could pose a safety hazard. (IDLCS 90150; site)

Stilesboro Road: This is a two-lane asphalt-covered state route located on the northern park boundary, south of the CSX Railroad (formerly the Western & Atlantic Railroad). Approximately one-and-one-half miles of the road lie within the park. The road runs east and west. According to historical base maps and reports in The War of the Rebellion: A Computation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies, Federal troops and earthworks lay astride the Stilesboro Road. As the Federals prepared to initiate their mountain diversion, they moved across the road toward the entrenched Confederates. (IDLCS 90149; structure)

Gilbert Road: This is a one-mile gravel road, one-and-one-half lanes wide, that is located between Stilesboro Road and Old Mountain Road and is oriented primarily north and south. Only 600 feet lie within the park boundary, and on this segment, the road runs east out of the park. An extension of this road continues south and is utilized by park maintenance staff. (IDLCS 90147; structure)

Old John Ward Road: This is a 20- to 22-foot-wide packed gravel maintenance road, formerly known as John Ward Road. It begins at Dallas Road and proceeds south out of the park to intersect with New John Ward Road. (IDLCS 90146; structure)

Dallas Road: This is a two-lane asphalt-covered state route that runs east and west for a distance of one-half mile within the park. The road is located in the southern part of the park and serves park visitors and Cobb County commuters. Dallas Road provides access to Cheatham Hill and facilitated troop movements. Several earthworks are located within the right-of-way of this road. (IDLCS 90145; structure)

Burnt Hickory Road: This is a two-lane asphalt-covered state route that runs east and west and marks the north-south midpoint of the park. Several earthworks are located in the right-of-way of this road, including those on Pigeon Hill. Reports in the Official Records document troop movements along
this road. Approximately two miles of this road lie within the park boundaries. (IDLCS 90148; structure)

**Big Kennesaw Antebellum Road:** This steep, 10- to 15-foot-wide and approximately 1500-foot-long unpaved road ascends the east face of Big Kennesaw Mountain along the Confederate line of earthworks and is bisected by Mountain Road. The road, which was used by the Confederate Army, is not maintained or interpreted by the park and has deteriorated significantly near the crest of Big Kennesaw and toward the toe of the slope where it diminishes into erosional gullies. (IDLCS 90198; structure)

**New Salem Church Site:** This site consists of a stone foundation ruin, probably granite, and a cemetery of unidentified and largely unmarked graves. A church clearly existed on this site at the time of the battle because it appears on an 1864 manuscript map prepared by an unknown Confederate engineer. An oral history interview conducted in the 1940s described the church as a frame building with board siding. The ruin, which lies west of an abandoned roadbed, consists of two geometric outlines that formed the foundation. One is rectangular and the other is square-shaped, approximately twelve inches high. The twenty-four graves noted are clustered mostly south of the foundation ruins; some are marked by head and foot stones. No conclusive evidence concerning the age of the graves has been discovered. Local tradition has it that the church was used as a Confederate field hospital after the battle; the church’s location behind the Confederate lines near the scene of action at Pigeon Hill lends credence to the tradition. (site)

**Illinois Monument:** This monument, erected in 1914, consists of a twenty-five foot battered marble shaft rising from an eight-foot-square base. The marble is inscribed on three sides, with the west elevation dominated by three bronze figures: a Union soldier flanked by two classical female figures. Situated on the crest of Cheatham Hill, the monument overlooks a small plaza and two flights of marble steps to the west. An eagle perched above the figures on the west elevation was damaged by lightning in 1984. In 1991, the eagle was restored atop the monument. (IDLCS 12177; previously listed; object)

**Union Tunnel Marker:** This is a 5- x 3-foot marble arch marking the tunnel entrance Union troops excavated in an attempt to breach the Confederate works at Cheatham Hill. The marker was erected circa 1914 and features an inscribed keystone that describes the tunnel’s purpose. It is located at the foot of the Illinois monument and is flanked by a dry-stack stone wall. (IDLCS 90142; object)

**McCook Brigade Marker:** This is a 24- x 24- x 15-inch rectangular granite marker located at the point where McCook’s Brigade began its assault, as described on the marker’s beveled face. The marker, erected circa 1914, is currently located north of a foot path, on a wooded knoll, but was moved to this location from some point farther south, circa 1935-39. (IDLCS 90141; previously listed; object)
C. H. Coffey Marker: This marker, erected circa 1914, is a 2- x 1- x 3-foot marble tablet indicating the place where C. H. Coffey was mortally wounded during the Federal assault on Cheatham Hill. It is located approximately 300 feet north of the salient at the crest of the hill. (IDLCS 90139; object)

Fellows Marker: This is a 1- x 2- x 2-foot rectangular white marker with a beveled face bearing the inscription: "Captain W. W. Fellows/Inspector General/3rd Brigade Second Division/ 14th A.C." It was erected circa 1914 and is located on Cheatham Hill east of the Illinois Monument. (IDLCS 12178; previously listed; object)

Grave of the Unknown U. S. Soldier: This is a 1- x 2- x 3-foot marble headstone inscribed: "Unknown/U. S. Soldier/June 27, 1864." Civil Works Administration laborers discovered the grave, in 1934, while clearing the surrounding area of vegetation. Located southeast of the Cheatham Hill salient, the grave is enclosed by a split rail fence. It is the only known Civil War interment at the park. (IDLCS 12179; previously listed; object)

Cheatham Hill Drive: This is a one-mile, two-lane narrow asphalt-covered road constructed in 1939-40 by the Civilian Conservation Corps. The road is located adjacent to the Confederate earthworks, situated south of Dallas Road, and ends at a parking area just north of Mebane’s Battery near the Cheatham Hill salient. The gently curving road largely follows natural contours and avoids impacting the earthworks. This road, the only one completed by the CCC in the park, provided much-needed visitor access to the area and helped retain the integrity of the earthworks. (IDLCS 90156; structure)

Eight red brick entrance signs: Constructed by the CCC between 1938 and 1942, each sign bears a cast iron plaque inscribed, "National Park Service/Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park/United States Department of the Interior." Each measures 9 x 6 x 2 feet, has a slightly broader base than shaft and quoining at the ends, and possesses a concrete cap and foundation. All have metal plaques painted brown with white lettering. The signs are located at every point where an east-west state route intersects a park boundary except the western park boundary on Powder Springs Road. (IDLCS 91332 through 91339; objects)

Noncontributing Properties

Shiloh Church and School Site, no aboveground features, no archeological investigations
Hardage House Site, no aboveground features, no archeological investigations
Cass House Site, no aboveground features, no archeological investigations
Ballenger House Site, no aboveground features, no archeological investigations
Tierce House Site, no aboveground features, no archeological investigations
Marietta-Cassville Road, altered, lacks integrity
Powder Springs Road, altered, lacks integrity
Neighbour Marker, 1985, postdates period of significance (IDLCS 90140)
Georgia Monument, 1964, postdates period of significance (IDLCS 90144)
Texas Monument, 1964, postdates period of significance (IDLCS 90143)
CCC Camp Site, 1938-1942, lacks integrity
Maintenance Complex, 2 buildings, 1939-1940, not architecturally significant or representative of NPS design traditions, altered 1974
Visitor Center, 1964, postdates period of significance
Park Quarters, 2 buildings, 1965, postdates period of significance
Statement of Significance

This study evaluates the historic integrity and assesses the eligibility of the park’s historic resources within two historic contexts identified by the survey team. These contexts correspond to historic themes identified by the National Park Service and the Georgia State Historic Preservation Officer (SHPO). The thematic framework of the NPS is outlined in History and Prehistory in the National Park System and the National Landmark Program. In addition to general historical themes like "Military" and "Public Works," the Georgia SHPO has identified twelve distinctive "aspects" of Georgia history. These aspects are currently undeveloped but should be considered when assembling state and local context studies.

The following two historic contexts have been developed for this study:

A. The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain and the Atlanta Campaign, May-September 1864.


Context A, "The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain and the Atlanta Campaign, May-September 1864," relates to the NPS subthemes "War in the West" and "Political and Diplomatic Scene" of Theme VI, "The Civil War." Context A also relates to one aspect of Georgia history, "Major Theater for the Civil War." Context A examines the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain as one in a series of clashes during Sherman’s Atlanta Campaign, which began with Sherman’s march from Chattanooga in May 1864 and ended with the capture of Atlanta in September of that year. The context discusses military and political aspects of the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain and Sherman’s successful execution of the Atlanta Campaign. The context describes the battles fought at Kennesaw and discusses how military strategy and tactics, developed through the course of the Civil War, were employed at Kennesaw Mountain.

Context B, "Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park: The Commemoration of American Battlefields and National Park Development, 1887-1942," relates to the NPS facets "Battlefield Preservation" and "The National Park Service and the New Deal" of the subtheme "The Federal Government Enters the Movement, 1884-1949" of Theme XXXIII, "Historic Preservation." National battlefield commemoration stemmed from efforts by veterans groups to honor both the men that fought and died during the Civil War, and the places where they fought. Following these efforts, the Federal government sought protection of these sites through the development of national battlefield parks and national cemeteries. Context B examines the commemoration of Civil War battlefields, beginning with the efforts of veterans at the close of the Civil War and culminating with the establishment and subsequent development of national battlefield parks by the National Park Service. The narrative traces the activities of private commemorative associations at Kennesaw from the 1880s
through the 1910s, the administration of the battlefield by the War Department from 1928 to 1933, its establishment as a national battlefield park in 1935, and its development by the National Park Service from 1933 to 1942.

Historic resources within the Park represent three periods of significance. The period of the Atlanta Campaign, May to September 1864, is primarily represented by the Kolb House, earthworks, and roads constructed prior to the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain. The second significant period, representing commemoration of the Kennesaw Mountain battlefield by private individuals and associations, lasted from 1887 to 1917. This period began with reunions by military units that fought at the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain and is represented by numerous monuments and markers erected on the battlefield as memorials to individuals and units. The third period witnessed the management and subsequent development of the battlefield by the Federal government from 1917 to 1942. This period included the administration and development of the battlefield by the War Department and the National Park Service. Few historically significant structures remain that demonstrate the importance of early park development planned by the NPS and performed by the Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC) from 1938 to 1942.

A. The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain and the Atlanta Campaign, May-September 1864.

1. Context Narrative

From May to September 1864, Federal and Confederate forces fought across northwest Georgia from Dalton to Atlanta, which was abandoned by the Confederates on September 1. Occasional fierce battles punctuated almost daily skirmishing and maneuvering for position. Collectively, this activity is known as the Atlanta Campaign. The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain, June 27, 1864, occurred near the middle of the campaign. The importance of the battle in the Civil War is described below. This context will describe the Battle of

7The landscape of the battlefield park does not reflect one particular period but illustrates a process of continuous change by various owners and occupants: early-nineteenth-century settlers clearing fields; Union and Confederate armies constructing earthworks; post-Civil War farmers terracing fields; memorial associations erecting monuments; and the CCC constructing roads and planting trees. A Cultural Landscape Report, however, has not been undertaken to determine the historic appearance of the landscape in 1864.

8The Georgia and Texas monuments, erected in 1964, are managed as cultural resources but are not eligible for the National Register because they do not meet the standards established by the National Register for resources that have achieved significance within the last fifty years.
Kennesaw Mountain and the Atlanta Campaign, focusing on the remaining park resources. 9

The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain and its Place in the Civil War

The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain (June 27, 1864) was one of a number of Civil War clashes between Federal and Confederate forces in northwest Georgia in the spring and summer of 1864. Kennesaw Mountain was a physical barrier standing between a large Federal force commanded by Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman and Atlanta, an important Confederate railroad and manufacturing center. The war was in its fourth year, and the November 1864 presidential election would soon provide a referendum on Abraham Lincoln’s war leadership. Lincoln’s reelection depended heavily on the progress of Sherman’s army in Georgia and Lt. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant’s in Virginia. Although it was not a critical turning point in the war, the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain was an important act in a complicated national drama of bitter military combat and politics played out in the summer of 1864. Additionally, the battle illustrated the decided advantage the tactical defensive had over the tactical offensive in the later stages of the war.

In the decade prior to the outbreak of war, sectional divisions over the extension of slavery, a protective tariff, and internal improvements racked the United States. The Democrat party split over the issue of slavery, and four candidates contested the 1860 presidential election. Illinois Republican Abraham Lincoln was elected president by carrying the northern states. Believing the Republican Party hostile to southern interests, South Carolina, Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas seceded from the Union before Lincoln’s inauguration and established the Confederate States of America. Upon assuming office on March 4, 1861, Lincoln decided to assert the Federal government’s sovereignty by resupplying the besieged U.S. army garrisons at Fort Sumter in the harbor of Charleston, South Carolina, and Fort Pickens in Pensacola Harbor, Florida. The Confederate government ordered an

9 The best introduction to the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain and the Atlanta campaign is Kennesaw Mountain and the Atlanta Campaign by Dennis Kelly, the park’s historian. Albert Castel’s recently published work, Decision in the West: The Atlanta Campaign of 1864, is a masterful analysis of the campaign. Other important sources are The Army of Tennessee: A Military History by Stanley F. Horn; Autumn of Glory: The Army of Tennessee, 1862-1865 by Thomas L. Connelly; War So Terrible: Sherman and Atlanta by James L. McDonough and James P. Jones; and two Ph.D. dissertations done at Emory University: "The Atlanta Campaign, December 23, 1863, to July 18, 1864" by Richard M. McMurry and "The Atlanta Campaign, July 18-September 2, 1864" by Errol M. Clauss. McMurry’s biography of Hood, John Bell Hood and the War for Southern Independence, is also useful. Sherman: Soldier, Realist, American is a provocative study of Sherman’s strategic thinking by the British historian B. H. Liddell-Hart. Sherman, Johnston, and Hood all published memoirs after the war’s end. Sherman’s work is Memoirs of W. T. Sherman, Johnston’s is Narrative of Military Operations, and Hood’s Advance and Retreat.
attack on the Fort Sumter, signaling its intention to fight for its independence. Following the surrender of Fort Sumter on April 12, 1861, Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas joined the Confederacy.  

At the outbreak of hostilities, the North enjoyed significant advantages in population and economic resources. The North, with twenty-two million white citizens to the South’s six million, had a larger pool of potential combatants. The Confederacy’s 3,500,000 slaves supported southern armies with their labor, but did not carry arms. The North possessed 90 percent of the nation’s manufacturing capability, forcing the South to quickly develop factories and import armaments from abroad. The North also had a more highly developed railroad network, with two and one-half times more trackage than the Confederate states. Railroads proved crucial in supplying and moving the large armies that fought the Civil War. The South did possess some advantages. Federal troops moving from one area to another would have to move in a wide arc around the front, while the Confederacy could shift forces more quickly along shorter, interior lines. The Confederates, for example, frequently shifted troops between the Shenandoah Valley and Eastern Virginia as the need arose. Additionally, many of the most talented active and inactive U.S. army officers were southerners who rallied to the Confederacy when the war began.  

The South’s military problem was in a sense simple; it had to keep the war going until the North acquiesced in Southern independence. Southern strategy was defensive and consisted largely of maintaining its territorial integrity. Wanting to maintain independence rather than conquer territory, the Confederacy invaded northern states on only a few occasions. The South relied heavily on the prospect of foreign recognition of the Confederacy and Northern dissatisfaction with the human and material cost of a long war. The North, by contrast, had to wage an aggressive war to subdue the rebellious states and restore the Union. A strategic problem for the South was the question of whether to scatter its forces to defend every inch of territory or to concentrate to protect the areas of greatest strategic importance.  

In the Spring of 1861, few on either side envisioned a long war. Many scoffed at U.S. General-in-Chief Winfield Scott’s strategy of envelopment, which implied a protracted conflict. Scott advised reliance on a Federal naval blockade of southern ports and control of the Mississippi River to gradually deprive the agricultural South of foreign supplies and markets for its cotton. Envelopment was Federal policy from the start and received increasing emphasis as naive hopes for a quick capture of the Confederate capital at Richmond,  


Virginia, were dashed. As the war progressed, northern advantages in manpower, industrial might, naval force, and organization increasingly turned the tide against the South.

The natural barrier of the Appalachian Mountains dictated a division of hostilities between eastern and western theaters. Military activity in the eastern theater focused on limited areas of Virginia: the area between Washington, D.C., and Fredericksburg, around Richmond, and the Shenandoah Valley. The western theater, by contrast, was immense, stretching from the Alleghenies to the first tier of states west of the Mississippi. Important western theater battles occurred in Arkansas, Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, and Georgia. Although public attention often focused on the major battles in Virginia, the struggle for control of the rivers and railroads in the West was of immense importance to the war’s outcome.

As president of a republic in war time, Lincoln had as many political concerns as strategic ones. Lincoln had to employ considerable political skill to maintain popular support for the war, in the face of often disastrous defeats for Federal armies and mounting casualties. Only seven years old in 1861, the Republican Party was an uneasy coalition of often competing interests that Lincoln had to unify. Outside the party, Democrat office holders and powerful newspaper editors such as Horace Greeley of the New York Tribune frequently criticized the administration. Lincoln’s political stock rose and fell with the fortunes of Federal armies in the field. Whenever the Federal military effort appeared to stagnate, opposition to the administration’s conduct of the war increased. In the South, Confederate victories fed false hopes that Great Britain and France would recognize the Confederacy and that the North would give up the struggle.

Lincoln faced opposition inside and outside the Republican Party. To hold his party’s factions together, Lincoln appointed several Republican rivals to his cabinet. Lincoln tolerated considerable dissension and even disloyalty in the cabinet, but outmaneuvered his opponents in the end. Northern Democrats varied in their commitment to the war effort. Some "War Democrats" joined the Republican Party, while others supported a war for the Union but vigorously opposed emancipation. In 1862, "Peace Democrats," who urged an immediate armistice and a negotiated settlement of sectional differences, became a significant force. Many Peace Democrats mistakenly believed that the South would rejoin the Union if slavery were guaranteed; others were covert supporters of southern independence.12

The first two years of war brought stalemate in Virginia, but Federal armies made important gains in the West. In February 1862, a joint army-navy expedition led by Brig. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant and Flag-Officer Andrew H. Foote took Fort Henry on the Tennessee River and Fort Donelson on the Cumberland

12McPherson, 506.
River, providing two water routes of invasion into Tennessee. Federal control of the Cumberland forced the Confederates to abandon Nashville, an important rail junction and manufacturing city, on February 23, 1862. Northern armies prepared to advance on the Confederate supply center at Corinth, Mississippi. The bloody Battle of Shiloh, Tennessee (April 6-7, 1862), temporarily checked the Federal advance. The 23,000 casualties of Shiloh, including more than 3,000 killed, destroyed any remaining illusions of a short and painless war. Federal forces captured New Orleans in late April 1862, and by June, only the Confederate fortress at Vicksburg, Mississippi, prevented total Northern control of the Mississippi River. In the east, Federal armies were bloodily repulsed by the Confederates at First Manassas (July 21, 1861), the Seven Days' Battles (June 25-July 1, 1862), and Second Manassas (August 28-30, 1862). Lack of Federal military success, particularly in Virginia, increased criticism of the administration and strengthened the position of the Democrat Party going into the 1862 elections.

During 1862, the Republican Party moved rapidly to adopt emancipation as a war policy. Lincoln awaited favorable military news to strike at slavery in the South. At the Battle of Antietam in western Maryland (September 17, 1862), the Army of the Potomac under Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan turned back a Confederate army of invasion commanded by Gen. Robert E. Lee. Within days, Lincoln issued the Emancipation Proclamation, freeing slaves in those areas of the South still engaged in rebellion as of January 1, 1863. Lincoln aimed to undermine Southern resistance and encourage blacks to rally to the Federal effort. Many Northern Democrats charged that the proclamation changed the war's purpose from preservation of the union to the elevation of black slaves to equality with whites. Democrats made significant gains in the Fall 1862 elections, but the Republicans' control of the national government remained solid.

In the first half of 1863, antiwar agitation grew, fueled by Federal defeats in Virginia at Fredericksburg (December 13, 1862) and Chancellorsville (April 30-May 6, 1863). Emancipation and the slow progress of the war remained the major political issues, but the Federal Conscription Act of March 1863 and Lincoln's wartime suspension of civil liberties added to the opposition. The United States' first military draft provoked riots in several cities. The worst rioting occurred in New York City, where 105 died in July 1863 before Federal troops restored order. Lincoln on several occasions ordered the arrest of suspected southern sympathizers. In defiance of Federal court decisions, many were held without charge and denied the writ of habeas corpus.

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14McPherson, 557-61.
In the west in late 1862 and 1863, the Confederates attempted to retake Tennessee, while the Federals sought to capture Vicksburg. The advance of the Confederate Army of Tennessee under Gen. Braxton Bragg into Middle Tennessee was repulsed at the Battle of Stones River (December 31, 1862–January 2, 1863) by Maj. Gen. William S. Rosecrans, commander of the Federal Army of the Cumberland. Rosecrans pushed the Confederates out of Middle Tennessee during June and July, and captured Chattanooga in September. Rosecrans’s pursuit of Bragg’s army was thwarted at the Battle of Chickamauga (September 19–20, 1863) in northwest Georgia. Rosecrans retreated to Chattanooga, where the Federal forces remained bottled up until November. Under Grant’s leadership, they broke the Confederate stranglehold on the city with victories at Lookout Mountain (November 24, 1863) and Missionary Ridge (November 25, 1863).

The long Federal siege of Vicksburg had ended on July 4, 1863, when Grant, commanding the Army of the Tennessee, occupied the city. The loss of Vicksburg and of Port Hudson on July 9, the last remaining Southern strongholds on the Mississippi, was a serious blow to the Confederacy. With Vicksburg’s fall, Texas, Arkansas, and most of Louisiana were cut off from the rest of the Confederacy. Troops, provisions, and fresh horses from the Trans-Mississippi region were no longer available to the main southern armies. Along with the capture of Chattanooga and the defeat of Lee’s second invasion of the North at the Battle of Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (July 1–3, 1863), the fall of Vicksburg lifted Northern morale and strengthened the Republican Party in 1863’s state and local elections. Republicans interpreted their election successes as an endorsement of the administration’s policies, particularly emancipation.¹⁶

The presidential election year of 1864 brought the greatest test of Lincoln’s leadership and northern commitment to the war. Federal control of the Mississippi and an ever tighter blockade put severe strains on the Confederacy. Confederate hopes for foreign recognition had dwindled following the failure of Lee’s invasions in 1862 and 1863. However, northern casualties had been very high, and important areas of the South remained untouched by war. Repeated Federal campaigns had failed to capture Richmond. Hoping to hasten the war’s end, Lincoln in March 1864 promoted Grant to the rank of lieutenant general and placed him in command of all Federal armies.¹⁷

Strategic Situation in the Spring of 1864

Shortly after assuming overall command, Grant ordered a coordinated offensive designed to destroy Confederate resistance and end the war. The major efforts focused on eastern Virginia and north Georgia, while smaller Federal forces moved toward Richmond from south of the James River, up the Shenandoah Valley, and toward Texas and the Indian Territory by way of the Red River and Southwest Arkansas. Grant accompanied Maj. Gen. George G. Meade and the Army of the

¹⁶McPherson, 591–97, 600, 666, 687–88.

Potomac in Virginia, aiming to finally defeat Gen. Robert E. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia. Grant placed Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman in command of three Federal armies concentrated near Chattanooga, Tennessee. Grant ordered Sherman to "move against [Confederate Gen. Joseph] Johnston's army, to break it up, and to get into the interior of the enemy's country as far as you can, inflicting all the damage you can against their war resources." If Confederate resistance persisted, Grant contemplated combining his army with Sherman's forces in the Lower South. The Confederacy planned to hold off the northern armies until after the November election, in hopes that Lincoln would be defeated by a Democrat sympathetic to southern independence. The future of the administration and, hence, the war effort depended largely on the success of Grant and Sherman.

Aware that the large, well-equipped northern armies could tolerate casualties far more readily than the Confederate armies, Grant waged a war of attrition in Virginia. Where previous Federal commanders had retreated after being bloodied by Lee's army, Grant accepted his losses and relentlessly advanced. In May and June 1864, the Army of the Potomac fought bloody battles at the Wilderness, Spotsylvania, North Anna, and Cold Harbor. After absorbing 65,000 casualties on these fields alone, Federal troops found themselves in mid-June bogged down in trench warfare on the outskirts of Petersburg. Protected by breastworks, Lee's smaller army was able to repel repeated Federal assaults.

While Grant's objective was the destruction of Lee's army, Sherman focused on the war-making capacity of the Confederacy, which remained formidable after three years of combat. In the spring of 1864, the Federals controlled the Mississippi River, and the Confederates had been expelled from most of Tennessee and much of Mississippi. Still, the heartland of the Confederacy, stretching from Alabama through Georgia to the Carolinas, was virtually untouched by the war. Atlanta, 125 miles southeast of Chattanooga, was an important Confederate rail junction, a significant manufacturing city, and the center of a belt of important manufacturing communities extending from Augusta, Georgia, to Selma, Alabama. Four railroads met at Atlanta, linking the southern Atlantic seaboard states with the western Confederacy. The Western & Atlantic ran northwest to Chattanooga and was the axis along which the Atlanta Campaign was fought. The Georgia Railroad ran east to Augusta, where it connected with lines to Charleston, Raleigh, and Richmond. The Macon & Western ran southeast, with connections to Savannah. Just south of Atlanta at East Point, the Atlanta & West Point, which extended west into Alabama, diverged from the Macon line. Atlanta's factories produced iron, armor plate, railroad rails, ammunition, pistols, uniforms, flour, and meat. Confederate government

18McPherson, 722.

19McPherson, 742.
Sherman had substantial resources to accomplish his mission. He commanded 100,000 soldiers at Chattanooga, divided among Maj. Gen. George H. Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland with 60,000 troops, Maj. Gen. James B. McPherson’s Army of the Tennessee, 25,000 strong, and Maj. Gen. John M. Schofield’s 13,000-man Army of the Ohio. Opposing the Federal force was the Army of Tennessee under Gen. Joseph Johnston at Dalton, Georgia. Johnston received reinforcements in May that brought his strength up to about 65,000. Johnston’s army had three infantry corps, commanded by Lt. Gens. Leonidas Polk, William Hardee, and John Bell Hood. Both sides depended for supplies on the single-track Western & Atlantic Railroad. Sherman’s rail supply line extended north to Chattanooga and Nashville, while Johnston’s ran south to Atlanta. The movements of both commanders were influenced by the need to safeguard the supply lines behind the armies. The numerous mountains and ridges of north Georgia offered the Confederates strong natural defensive positions. Additionally, the advancing Federals would have to cross three rivers, the Oostanaula, the Etowah, and the Chattahoochee. South of Atlanta, the mountains ended, and the Confederates would have fewer natural lines of defense.

The Confederate Army of Tennessee, which Johnston had commanded only since late December 1863, was handicapped by dissension among its top officers and poor overall morale. The army could claim just one clear victory, Chickamauga, and the Federals had routed the army, then commanded by Gen. Braxton Bragg, at the Battle of Missionary Ridge (November 25, 1863). Confederate President Jefferson Davis doubted Johnston’s abilities and gave him command of the army with reluctance. Personal animosity and a fundamental disagreement over strategy marred Johnston’s relationship with Davis. Davis repeatedly urged Johnston to take the offensive against Sherman, while Johnston felt his inferior numbers dictated a defensive-offensive strategy. Johnston believed he could attack only after he had won some defensive victories over the advancing Federals. Johnston made his position more difficult by failing to fully communicate his intentions to Confederate authorities in Richmond. Additionally, Johnston’s three corps commanders, Polk, Hardee, and Hood, mistrusted him. Johnston did much to restore the army’s morale, but its command problems were never satisfactorily resolved.

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22Connelly, 288–93, 313.
By contrast, Sherman and Grant had cooperated closely while both fought in the Western theater and enjoyed each other’s confidence. Grant gave Sherman broad strategic objectives and relied on him to devise tactics to accomplish them. Sherman was an energetic commander who realized early that a Northern victory would require not just battlefield successes but destruction of the Confederates’ ability to make war. Sherman targeted the South’s economic and military resources equally.

Civil War Tactics
When the Atlanta campaign opened, tactical considerations were radically altered from the early days of the war. At the war’s beginning, officers emphasized the tactical offensive, in which assaulting troops advanced in lines, firing volleys on command. As the enemy line was approached, troops would run the last several yards and break the line with a bayonet charge. These linear tactics dated to seventeenth-century European wars. They had been successful in the Mexican War (1846-1848) and were stressed at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Changes in weaponry during the war decreased the effectiveness of linear tactics. Rifle-muskets of superior range and accuracy, used only by elite units of the old regular army, were in general use on both sides by 1863. The combination of rifle-muskets and the nearly universal use of field entrenchments by late 1863 greatly compromised the effectiveness of the tactical offensive.23

Rifle-muskets had an effective range of 300-400 yards, four times greater than the range of the smoothbore muskets used early in the war. By 1863, attacking troops could no longer expect to advance to within a few dozen yards of the enemy, fire a volley, and make a double-time charge while defenders were reloading. Defenders could devastate the ranks of attacking troops well before they were close enough to form for a bayonet charge. When defenders were protected by field entrenchments, their advantage was magnified. By 1864, whenever troops halted near the enemy, they quickly entrenched to have some protection against attack. The Confederates, fighting a largely defensive war, often constructed elaborate systems of trenches, laid out in advance by field engineers to exploit advantages of terrain. Engineers distinguished between the topographic crest and the military crest of a hill. The military crest was often a position slightly downslope of the topographic crest. From the military crest, defenders had a clear field of fire over the ground in front of them without exposing their silhouettes to enemy fire.24

Entrenchments on both sides followed the same pattern. Trenches were dug, and the earth from them piled up to form a protective parapet, also known as breastworks. Troops could dig a three-foot deep rifle pit with an earthen parapet in about an hour. In more permanent positions, trenches might be deeper, and log retaining walls, known as revetments, were used to back the

23McPherson, 472-73.
24McPherson, 473-75.
earthen parapets. A tree trunk, known as a head-log and held in position by
skid logs, was placed atop the parapet. Riflemen stood in the trench or on a
firing step and fired through the narrow gap between the head-log and parapet.
Other troops would meanwhile be reloading in the trench, waiting to take their
turn on the firing line. When time permitted, various obstacles were placed in
front of the breastworks to slow an attacking force. A front ditch was
sometimes dug directly in front of the parapet. Out beyond the parapet, trees
and brush were felled, and their branches interlaced to form obstacles known as
abatis. Skirmishers from the attacking force would clear a path, under fire,
through the abatis. Infantrymen often dug their own trenches, but Sherman’s
army increasingly employed freed slaves to dig them, while the Confederates
often used gangs of slaves to prepare fall-back lines of defense out of range of
federal artillery.  

By late 1863, the tactical defensive possessed a clear advantage. An
entrenched position, defended by troops with rifle-muskets, was extremely
difficult to overrun. Officers, however, were slow to recognize the altered
tactical realities and often had few alternatives to a frontal assault. Many
commanders looked for ways to envelop the enemy’s flank, but the opposing
general was unlikely to leave his flanks unprotected. Officers on both sides
repeatedly ordered frontal assaults on entrenched lines, frequently with
disastrous results. In some encounters, attacking forces suffered ten times
the casualties of defenders. In the Atlanta campaign, Sherman chose repeatedly
to outflank the Confederates’ entrenched positions, rarely ordering frontal
attacks. Sherman’s three to two advantage in numbers allowed him to use part
of his force to keep the Confederate army in place while other units were sent
on turning maneuvers.  

The Atlanta Campaign

When Sherman’s forces moved out from Chattanooga on May 7, 1864, the
Confederates held a strong defensive line around Dalton, Georgia. Sherman
ordered Thomas and Schofield to threaten an attack against the main body of
Confederates, while McPherson made a wide move to the right in the direction of
Resaca, fifteen miles south of Dalton. McPherson nearly got in Johnston’s
rear, but was deterred by a small force holding Resaca. This delay gave
Johnston enough time to retire from Dalton to a hastily prepared position
around Resaca. The two armies fought at Resaca May 13–15, while Sherman tried
another flanking move, sending a division of McPherson’s army to cross the
Oostanaula River and get behind the Confederates’ left. When Johnston learned of
the successful river crossing, he ordered a retreat, first to Adairsville
and then on to Cassville.  

25Castel, 228; William T. Sherman, Memoirs of General W. T. Sherman (New York:
26Connelly, 432; McPherson, 472-77.  
27Connelly, 341-45; Kelly, 13-14; Sherman, 496-504.
Johnston planned an attack on the Federals for May 19, when he suspected that they would be strung out on two parallel roads between Adairsville and Cassville. General Hood declined to press the attack when he detected a potential threat to his rear, and the opportunity was lost. After a council of war on the night of May 19, Johnston ordered another pullback across the Etowah River to Allatoona Pass. Sherman bypassed this position and swung his forces west away from the railroad and toward the town of Dallas. Johnston moved his army west to counter this new threat. Federal attacks at New Hope Church (May 25) and Pickett's Mill (May 27) were repulsed by the Confederates, and Sherman began to move to his left back toward the railroad to the east. Believing that Sherman's right might be undermanned, Johnston ordered an attack at Dallas on May 28. Here the Federals had the advantage of fighting from trenches, and they decisively turned back the assault.²⁸

Following these battles, a period of heavy skirmishing and maneuvering for position lasted well into June. Heavy rainfall impeded the movements of both armies. In the first week of June, Johnston's army took up a position along a ten-mile line approximately 30 miles northwest of Atlanta. The line ran from northeast to southwest, with Brushy Mountain on the right, Pine Mountain in the center, and Lost Mountain on the left. On June 14, a Federal artillery shell killed Confederate General Polk on Pine Mountain. Johnston appointed Maj. Gen. William W. Loring temporary commander of Polk's army corps. Lt. Gen. A. P. Stewart assumed permanent command of the corps in the first week of July. After additional fighting near Gilgal Church on June 15 and Lost Mountain on June 16, the Confederates on the night of June 18-19 fell back southeast to a prepared line anchored by Kennesaw Mountain, a few miles north of Marietta. This new line had been carefully laid out in advance by Johnston's chief engineer, Lt. Col. S. W. Presstman.²⁹

The Kennesaw Mountain Line
Colonel Presstman took a topographically strong defensive position at Kennesaw Mountain and enhanced it. Kennesaw Mountain is a two-mile-long ridge extending from Big Kennesaw on the northeast to Little Kennesaw on the southwest, with a spur now known as Pigeon Hill extending south from Little Kennesaw.³⁰ Rising nearly 700 feet above the surrounding landscape, Kennesaw Mountain was described by Sherman as "the key to the whole country."³¹ Johnston arrayed his army in a convex, six-mile-long line. The Confederate line extended east to protect the railroad and bent south along the Kennesaw Mountain ridge and beyond to cover the roads leading into Marietta from the west. Hood's corps

²⁸Kelly, 15-16; Connelly, 346-56; Sherman, 504-7, 512-15.
²⁹Kelly, 21-23; Connelly, 357-58, 421.
³⁰Pigeon Hill is a twentieth-century name; at the time of the battle, this feature was called the Kennesaw Spur.
³¹Sherman, 530.
held the right, Loring's the center, and Hardee's the left. The crests of Big and Little Kennesaw were cleared of timber to accommodate artillery emplacements and observation stations. A network of trenches for infantry and earthen forts, or redoubts, for supporting artillery lined the lower slopes of the ridge. Earthen parapets protected the infantry trenches. Immediately beyond the parapets were front ditches and abatis, and farther in advance were rifle pits for skirmishers, who observed the enemy and gave warning of an attack.\textsuperscript{12}

As was his habit, Sherman ordered the bulk of his troops to dig in close to the enemy line, while he probed both flanks of the Confederate position. McPherson positioned his Army of the Tennessee on the left, Thomas's Army of the Cumberland held the middle, and Schofield's Army of the Ohio was on the right. On June 20, a Federal cavalry sortie across Noonday Creek east of the railroad on the Confederate right flank was checked by three brigades of southern cavalry. Simultaneously, Sherman ordered Schofield's Army of the Ohio to continue trying to envelop Johnston's left flank by moving to the south. Johnston learned that the Federals were pressuring Hardee's corps on the Confederate left and threatening to seize the Powder Springs Road, an important route to the Chattahoochee. To counter this southward shift of Federal forces, Johnston ordered Hood to remove his corps from the right and march it behind the Confederate lines to reinforce and extend the left on the night of June 21. Loring's corps shifted to the right, joining Confederate cavalry in manning the positions abandoned by Hood's troops.\textsuperscript{13}

\textbf{Cobb County in 1864}

The Union and Confederate forces entering Cobb County disrupted a lightly settled agricultural community composed largely of white farmer-landowners. Settlement in the area grew after the 1829 discovery of gold in the north Georgia mountains, near Dahlonega, and encouraged the Georgia legislature to establish Cobb County in 1832. The 1836-1838 removal of the Cherokees from Georgia west to the Indian Territory (present-day Oklahoma) greatly expanded the county's white settlement. Enterprising land owners bought land lots, consisting of 160 acres, and gold lots, with forty acres. The majority of the county was distributed in gold lots, although gold discoveries proved insignificant and short-lived. In 1838, the state legislature guaranteed the bonds for the Western & Atlantic Railroad, established by Joseph E. Brown. This rail line, which connected Atlanta and Chattanooga, was completed in 1850 and contributed to Marietta's growth as a summer resort community. At the same time, some industrial activity, particularly in Roswell, Georgia, identified Cobb County as a promising textile manufacturing center.\textsuperscript{14} Despite this modest

\textsuperscript{12}Kelly, 24; Connelly, 357; McMurry, "The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain," 35.

\textsuperscript{13}Kelly, 24-26; Connelly, 358-59.

\textsuperscript{14}Roswell was later made a part of Fulton County.
town development, most Cobb residents lived in the rural countryside and operated small farms among the rolling hills, woods, and lowlands.35

The county population in 1860 consisted of 10,000 whites and 4,000 blacks. Most farms were small compared to other Georgia counties. The rolling geography and rocky soil prevented large plantations and also limited the need for a large slave workforce. Subsistence farming characterized antebellum Cobb County, with timber sales providing needed cash for some farmers. On the whole, these modestly prosperous people were self-sufficient. The Hardage family settled early in Cobb County, along the Burnt Hickory Road, south of Little Kennesaw. The family originally lived in a log cabin, but over the course of twenty years it moved to several larger residences. In 1853, George W. Hardage built a sawmill on Noyes Creek, paying eighteen dollars an acre for the land. When the Union army invaded Cobb County in June 1864, Mrs. Hardage and her two youngest children fled to Stone Mountain. Some family members remained until the fighting around Kennesaw Mountain intensified, when they also sought refuge at Stone Mountain.36

The Battle of Kolb’s Farm

On June 22, Schofield’s troops and Maj. Gen. Joseph Hooker’s XX Corps of the Army of the Cumberland began to advance east toward Marietta along the Powder Springs Road on the Confederate left. By early afternoon, Federal skirmishers had clashed with advance elements of Hood’s corps, and the northerners hastily prepared dirt and fence-rail breastworks. Hood’s orders were merely to check the Federal advance, but without consulting Johnston, Hood ordered a late-afternoon attack by two of his three divisions, led by Maj. Gens. Thomas C. Hindman and Carter L. Stevenson. The ensuing engagement is known as the Battle of Kolb’s Farm.37

In this battle, the Confederates advanced westward athwart Powder Springs Road, pushing back Federal skirmishers. Hindman’s division was arrayed north of the road, while Stevenson’s advanced slantwise across it. Dense underbrush and swampy ground impeded the advance in places. When the advance neared the main Federal lines, it disintegrated. Aided by forty artillery pieces, many sighted to deliver devastating enfilade fire down a ravine, Federal infantry repulsed the advance. The brief battle cost Johnston approximately 1,000 casualties compared to 350 for the Federals. The battle checked Sherman’s maneuvering

35Scott, 19-21.


toward the south and influenced his decision to attempt a penetration of the Confederate line at Kennesaw.\textsuperscript{38}

The field of the Battle of Kolb's Farm lies partially within the southern boundary of the park and partially on private property. The rehabilitated four-room log house of Peter Kolb, built in the 1830s, stands on the south side of Powder Springs Road within the park. Peter Valentine Kolb settled early in Cobb County from South Carolina, likely between 1832 and 1838. Shortly thereafter, Kolb built a rectangular log house composed of square hewn oak logs with lime and mud chinking. Kolb operated a self-sufficient farm, with ten slaves and approximately 600 acres of land. A blacksmith shop, north of Powder Springs Road, and numerous farm outbuildings occupied the site. The family cemetery lay west of the house. When the Federals approached the farm along Powder Springs Road, the Kolb family fled to Madison, Georgia. Union General Hooker used the house as his field headquarters until the Union armies left Kennesaw. The Kolbs did not occupy the house again until the 1880s, and during this lapse the house was damaged and several outbuildings were lost.\textsuperscript{39}

At the time of the battle, the area north of Powder Springs Road across from the house was mostly open pasture and cropland surrounded by swampy woods, lying within the floodplain of John Ward Creek. The main Federal lines were west of the Kolb house.

\textbf{The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain}

Thwarted in his attempt to maneuver beyond the Confederate left flank at Kolb's Farm, Sherman considered his options. His army was now within 20 miles of Atlanta. To the rear of Johnston's Kennesaw line, only one natural obstacle, the Chattahoochee River, protected the city. Nearly constant skirmishing and numerous medium-sized battles had marked the campaign, but neither army had suffered major losses. The rain had finally stopped and the roads were drying, facilitating army movements. Sherman felt that he could not prudently extend his lines farther to his right away from his railroad supply line. Believing that Johnston might have stretched his lines dangerously thin in extending his left, Sherman decided to attack the entrenched Confederates, "a thing carefully avoided up to that time."\textsuperscript{40} Sherman later justified his decision on the grounds that troops lost their edge if kept out of combat for too long and his fear that his flanking tactics were becoming too predictable. Sherman may simply have grown impatient with the slow pace of his advance.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{38}\textsuperscript{38}Castel, 294-95; Kelly, 26-28; McMurry, "The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain," 55-62.


\textsuperscript{40}\textsuperscript{40}Sherman, 530.

\textsuperscript{41}\textsuperscript{41}Castel, 320-21; Liddell-Hart, 266-67; Kelly, 31.
Sherman reasoned that an assault on the physically imposing center of the Confederate line would be unexpected and ordered a two-pronged attack for the morning of June 27. McPherson's Army of the Tennessee and Thomas's Army of the Cumberland would attempt to penetrate the Confederate line at points selected by each army's commander. McPherson directed Maj. Gen. John A. Logan's XV Corps to attack at the junction of Little Kennesaw and Pigeon Hill. That portion of the Confederate line was defended by W. H. T. Walker's division of Hardee's corps and Samuel G. French's division of Loring's corps. The second, larger Federal effort would occur about one mile south. General Thomas chose Brig. Gen. John A. Newton's Second Division of the IV Corps and Brig. Gen. Jefferson C. Davis's Second Division of the XIV Corps to make the attack. The objective was a low ridge defended by the divisions of Maj. Generals Patrick R. Cleburne and Benjamin F. Cheatham of Hardee's corps. Other portions of the Federal force would feign an attack on the right and left flanks to prevent Johnston from reinforcing his center. As in many Civil War battles, only a fraction, approximately 20 percent, of the Federal force was committed to the June 27 assault. The remaining troops were held in reserve to follow up any successes. Most of the Federal troops involved were Midwesterners, with the great majority coming from Illinois, Ohio, and Indiana.

After a fifteen-minute artillery barrage on the morning of the 27th, Federal troops facing Big Kennesaw and Pigeon Hill moved forward from their works at 8:15 A.M. The diversion at Big Kennesaw Mountain and Bell's Ferry Road on the Confederate right was easily repulsed. At Pigeon Hill, 5,500 Federals in three brigades moved toward the Confederate lines through dense underbrush and abatis on both sides of the Burnt Hickory Road only to confront the heavily fortified Confederate line. The western crest of Pigeon Hill was lined with earthworks, some built atop vertical rock faces, and provided the Confederates with a commanding view of Federal movements below. At the junction of Little Kennesaw and Pigeon Hill is a steep gorge, where the northerners struggled through dense underbrush. Part of this attack's front was within range of Confederate batteries on Little Kennesaw, which supported the defenders. A few Federals came within yards of the breastworks but could not breach the Confederate line. The attack collapsed within two hours.

On Thomas's front south of Dallas Road, 9,000 Federals in Newton's and Davis's divisions formed in open fields behind the Federal lines. Their 9:00 A.M. assault was nearly an hour late. Thomas and his subordinates chose to assail this area because there the Federal lines were closest to the Confederate position. This shorter distance lessened the time that the attacking Federals would be exposed to Confederate fire. Additionally, a bend in the Confederate


44Kelly, 32-36; Castel, 307-11.
line created a potentially vulnerable salient soon to become known as "The Dead Angle." The Confederate defenders on this portion of the front enjoyed a carefully prepared position. The unusually deep trenches followed the contour of the ridge and were equipped with firing platforms and traverses to provide protection from enfilade fire. One flaw in the position was the siting of the salient on the topographic rather than the military crest of the ridge. Artillery positions, concealed by brush, provided flanking fire from each side of the salient. The right flank was covered by Mebane's Tennessee Battery, a two-gun emplacement within a square redoubt. In places, abatis were supplemented by sharpened pine stakes set four inches apart and by chevaux-de-frise, criss-crossed logs bristling with pointed stakes. The ground to be covered by the Federals was partly occupied by a field, but was rough and rocky in places, with thin forest and dense underbrush impeding the formation of ranks. A small creek lay between the lines of the two armies.

Newton's three brigades attacked a westward-facing section of the Confederate line just north of the salient. The Confederate trenches in this area were protected by especially heavy abatis and a deep front ditch. The brigades of Brig. Gen. Charles Harker on the right and Brig. Gen. George D. Wagner on the left made the initial assault. To increase the chances of a breakthrough, the attack was in dense columns with individual regiments lined up one behind the other. When the Federals emerged from the last stand of light trees, the Confederates opened a devastating fire. Infantry fire was supplemented by shell and canister from Confederate artillery batteries. Both Federal brigades were easily repulsed, and only a few attackers penetrated the abatis to the foot of the Confederate breastworks. Harker, the only general to go into this battle mounted, was killed trying to rally his men for a renewed attack. Newton then ordered Brig. Gen. Nathan Kimball's brigade, deployed on Wagner's left, to advance. A handful of Kimball's men reached the parapet, where they were killed or captured.

Just south of Newton's attack, two brigades of Davis's division led byCols. Daniel McCook and John G. Mitchell assaulted the Dead Angle. McCook's four regiments, formed in line of battle, ran across an open field toward the salient, hitting the toe in successive waves. Mitchell's regiments, similarly aligned, advanced and then wheeled to their left to attack the salient's southern flank. As soon as the Federals entered the wheat field in front of the Confederate position, they came under infantry fire. The defensive fire became intense as the assault force neared the breastworks. The Confederate battery south of the Dead Angle suddenly caught Mitchell's men in deadly enfilade fire. Some of the Federals reached the Confederate trenches and briefly fought hand-to-hand before being killed or captured. Colonel McCook was mortally wounded on the parapet near the toe of the salient. His

Salients tend to draw focussed attacking fire while fanning out less effective defensive fire. Salients also limit the field of fire for flanking artillery.
successor, Col. William Dilworth of the 85th Illinois regiment, fell within five minutes of assuming brigade command.46

The placement of the Confederate salient on the highest part of the hill, rather than the military crest, prevented even greater Federal casualties. Approximately twenty-five yards below the salient, the hill drops off steeply before regaining its gentle slope to the valley floor. The Federals, repulsed and unable to return to their own works without incurring additional losses, fell back to the shelter provided by this depression. There, they rapidly dug trenches, using tin cups and bayonets, and improving the works at night with entrenching tools brought up from the rear. A second Federal line was constructed and, later, an attempt was made to tunnel under the Confederate works and destroy them with explosives. Several cease-fires were observed in order to retrieve wounded and bury the dead that lay strewn between the two lines following the morning assault. The stand-off ended five days later when Johnston’s forces withdrew from the Kennesaw line. The ridge on this portion of the battlefield was named Cheatham Hill, in honor of the successful defense by Maj. Gen. Benjamin F. Cheatham’s troops.47

Sherman was reluctant to acknowledge the failure of his attempt to break the Confederate lines. He queried Thomas about renewing the attack on the afternoon of June 27. When Thomas responded that “one or two more such assaults would use up this army,”48 Sherman abandoned the idea. Federal casualties for the morning’s assault were estimated at 3,000. Protected by their breastworks, the Confederates lost less than 1,000. Many of these were skirmishers overrun in advance positions; troops in the main Confederate line suffered minimal losses. The Battle of Kennesaw Mountain demonstrated again the overwhelming advantage possessed by motivated defenders in entrenched positions, particularly where the topography also favored the defenders.49

Schofield’s demonstration on the far right of the Federal position provided Sherman’s only gain of the day. In that sector, northern infantry established a position on the Austell Road, and cavalry detachments advanced south to within five miles of the Chattahoochee. In the days following the battle, Sherman ordered McPherson to reinforce Schofield on the far right. Johnston was once again in danger of being outflanked, and he ordered a withdrawal from the Kennesaw line on the night of July 2. The Confederate army took up a new position around Smyrna Station, four miles southeast of Marietta. Although it briefly boosted Southern morale, in the end, the Confederates’ defensive


47Kelly, 36-39; Castel, 307-16.

48Kelly, 41.

49McPherson, 749-50; Castel, 320.
victory at Kennesaw Mountain had little impact, because it only delayed, but did not halt, Sherman’s advance.\textsuperscript{30}

Sherman continued to probe the Confederate left, and on the night of July 4 Johnston ordered another retreat, this time to a prepared line of defenses on the north bank of the Chattahoochee. The Chattahoochee runs from the northeast to the southwest in this area, and Johnston believed Sherman would again attempt to get around his left flank. Sherman encouraged this belief by sending a decoy cavalry detachment to the southwest to ostentatiously scout river crossings. Johnston responded by dispatching the bulk of his cavalry to guard the downstream crossings. Sherman meanwhile ordered Brig. Gen. Kenner Garrard’s cavalry and Schofield’s infantry to cross upstream (northeast) of Johnston’s line. The Federals captured the town of Roswell, destroying its cloth mills, and crossed the river at several upstream fords on July 8 and 9. With numerous Federals across the river and threatening to get between him and Atlanta, Johnston ordered the abandonment of his river line. On the night of July 9, the Confederates withdrew to the outer defenses of Atlanta, on the south bank of Peachtree Creek and less than five miles from the city’s center.\textsuperscript{31}

Johnston’s continued withdrawals caused increasing concern in the Confederate capital. On July 16, Jefferson Davis wired Johnston, asking for his plan of operations. Johnston’s reply that his plan “must depend on that of the enemy” failed to reassure Davis. On July 17, Davis relieved Johnston of command of the Army of Tennessee and put Lt. Gen. John Bell Hood in his place. General Cheatham assumed temporary command of Hood’s old army corps, which was assigned to Lt. Gen. Stephen D. Lee on July 27. Just thirty-three, Hood had a reputation for aggressiveness as a brigade and division commander, but lacked experience in commanding an army. A leg lost at Chickamauga and a mangled left arm limited Hood’s ability to ride a horse and personally supervise combat operations. The change of commanders did not end dissension among the officers of the Army of Tennessee. Many officers considered Hood a reckless gambler, and General Hardee’s dissatisfaction at being passed over probably affected his performance in the subsequent battles for Atlanta.\textsuperscript{32}

The Fall of Atlanta
When all of his forces had crossed the Chattahoochee, Sherman advanced on Atlanta in a wheeling movement. Thomas’s Army of the Cumberland served as the pivot, moving on the city from the north, while Schofield’s Army of the Ohio and McPherson’s Army of the Tennessee swung around to the east. On July 19, McPherson was in Decatur, six miles east of Atlanta, marching slowly west along

\textsuperscript{30}Kelly, 41-42, 45.

\textsuperscript{31}Kelly, 45; Connelly, 392-98.

the Georgia Railroad, tearing up track along the way. Schofield was near Decatur advancing on a road parallel to the railroad, and Thomas was beginning to cross Peachtree Creek on a six-mile front. Hoping to capitalize on the division of the Federal forces, Hood ordered Cheatham’s corps and Georgia militia under Maj. Gen. G. W. Smith to hold Schofield and McPerson in place while Stewart and Hardee surprised Thomas astride Peachtree Creek. The attack, scheduled to begin at 1:00 P.M. on July 20, fell victim to delay and confusion. Hood remained at his headquarters in Atlanta after issuing his orders, and Hardee and Cheatham were unable to coordinate their assaults. When the attack began, Thomas had virtually all of his troops on the south bank of the creek and held off the disorganized Confederates in the Battle of Peachtree Creek.53

Undaunted, Hood ordered an attack on McPerson’s army for the 22nd. Hardee’s corps was sent on a fifteen-mile night march to get in position on McPerson’s left flank and rear. With simultaneous attacks by Cheatham’s corps from the west and Hardee’s from the south and east, Hood hoped to roll up McPerson’s left. The Confederates nearly succeeded in winning the Battle of Atlanta, despite rushed preparations and inadequate coordination. Hardee was hampered by densely wooded terrain and poor reconnaissance and was unable to get all of his divisions engaged until late in the afternoon. Hood inexplicably delayed the attack on Cheatham’s front until two hours after Hardee’s began. General McPerson was killed in the battle, but the Federal lines held after some early wavering.54

Sherman was determined to capture the two rail lines—the Macon & Western and the Atlanta & West Point—still in Confederate hands. The Macon & Western ran south from Atlanta; at the town of East Point five miles away, the Atlanta & West Point branched from it. Sherman sent cavalry detachments southeast around his left flank to disrupt the Macon & Western deep in the Confederate rear. The Army of the Tennessee, now commanded by Maj. Gen. Oliver O. Howard, was ordered on a broad movement counterclockwise around Atlanta to the right to seize the junction at East Point and tear up the Atlanta & West Point. Confederate cavalry turned aside the Federal cavalry raids, and Hood prepared a trap for Howard’s advancing army. Stephen D. Lee’s corps was to delay the Federals by taking a position along Lickskillet Road near Ezra Church, while Stewart’s corps circled around to attack Howard’s right flank. When Lee advanced on the morning of July 28, he found the Federals already entrenched. Without consulting Hood or waiting for Stewart to move up, Lee committed his divisions in a series of suicidal attacks. When Stewart arrived, his troops made additional futile charges. The Battle of Ezra Church was the most one-sided of the campaign. The Confederates suffered 5,000 casualties, almost ten times the Federal loss.55

53Connelly, 439-44; Kelly, 46.
54Connelly, 444-50; Kelly, 48-50.
55Connelly, 452-55; Kelly, 51.
Hood’s three battles in a week’s time cost the Confederates more than 12,000 casualties. Sherman had failed to cut the rail lines but showed no sign of retreating, and the Federals brought up heavy siege guns to bombard Atlanta. Jefferson Davis virtually ordered Hood to make no more attacks on entrenched Federal positions. Hood extended his entrenchments to cover the railroad from Atlanta to East Point. On August 10, Hood sent half his cavalry, about 4,000 men, on a raid deep in Sherman’s rear to disrupt Federal supplies. The raid had negligible results, and the lack of cavalry hampered Hood’s ability to track Sherman’s movements around Atlanta. Throughout August, Federal artillery rained down on the city, while the North waited for favorable war news.  

Northern civilian morale was at a low ebb in August 1864. Grant at Petersburg and Sherman at Atlanta were engaged in trench warfare of unpredictable duration. Federal armies had absorbed staggering casualties in 1864—90,000 in one three-month period—to achieve what appeared to be a stalemate. Lincoln’s July draft call for 500,000 more men added to the discontent. In late August, the Democrat Party nominated Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan for president on a platform that emphasized peace over restoration of the Union. Privately, President Lincoln predicted a Democratic victory in the fall. Absent a decisive victory for Federal arms, the election of McClellan on a peace platform was a strong possibility.

Mindful that Lincoln’s reelection effort depended on Federal victories and impatient with the slow progress of the siege, Sherman in late August abandoned his lines around Atlanta. On August 26, all three Federal armies began a giant wheeling movement counterclockwise around Atlanta aimed at finally tearing up the Atlanta & West Point and Macon & Western tracks south of the city. With much of his cavalry off on a raid, Hood was slow to grasp the dimensions of this shift. On August 30, Hood learned that Howard’s Army of the Tennessee was approaching Jonesboro from the west, fifteen miles south of Atlanta. Hood sent Hardee’s and S. D. Lee’s corps to meet this threat. On August 31, the first day of the Battle of Jonesboro, a numerically superior Confederate force was unable to break the Federal lines. That night, Hood ordered Lee’s corps back to Atlanta. A late-afternoon Federal assault on September 1 nearly crushed Hardee’s corps, which retreated south to Lovejoy’s Station. Federal troops now controlled all the railroads into Atlanta, and Hood was compelled to abandon the city. In their hasty withdrawal, the Confederates accidently destroyed their reserve ammunition train and numerous other supplies. Sherman wired Washington that “Atlanta is ours, and fairly won.”

The fall of Atlanta provided a huge boost to Northern morale and a corresponding letdown for the South. Combined with Rear Adm. David G.

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56Connelly, 456-58.

57McPherson, 766-72.

58Kelly, 51-52; Connelly, 461-64.
Parragut’s August 5 victory at Mobile Bay and Maj. Gen. Philip H. Sheridan’s successes in Virginia’s Shenandoah Valley in September and October, the capture of Atlanta deprived the Democrats of their war failure issue. The Republicans fully exploited the implications of the Democrats’ peace platform and made repeated accusations of disloyalty. Democrats tried to emphasize opposition to emancipation but made little headway. Believing that a final military victory was at hand, northern voters gave the Republicans an overwhelming electoral victory in November. McClellan carried only Kentucky, Delaware, and New Jersey, and the Republicans won a three-fourths majority in the Congress. Sherman’s success in Georgia was a major factor in Lincoln’s reelection.  

Vindicated at the polls, Lincoln and the Republican Party pursued the war to a successful conclusion. After destroying Atlanta and expelling its citizens, Sherman in mid-November began his march to the sea, devastating a sixty-mile-wide corridor across Georgia and capturing Savannah in late 1864. Richmond fell in early April 1865; Lee surrendered the Army of Northern Virginia at Appomattox Court House on April 9; and all remaining Confederate forces, including those west of the Mississippi, had surrendered by June 23. The war was over, and the country turned its attention to problems of reconciliation and reconstruction.

**Kennesaw Mountain After the War**

After the armies left, families gradually returned to their farms and attempted to restore their livelihoods. However, by 1880, changes in southern agricultural practices had affected the community and the countryside. Tenantry greatly increased among Cobb County farms and throughout the South. Between 1880 and 1900, the use of tenants on Cobb County farms rose from 34 percent to 56 percent. Landowners carved up their land tracts, that had averaged 12 acres per farm, to lots of seventy-two acres or less, to better accommodate the tenant farmer and to increase the number of farms available for tenantry. Improved acreage increased by 31 percent in these twenty years. The county population also rose considerably, from 14,242 in 1860 to 24,664 in 1900. Together, smaller farms and higher population density created a patchwork of cultivated fields, pastures, and orchards that replaced the woodlands and forests of the antebellum period.  

**Significance**

Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park is the only National Park Service property that commemorates the Atlanta Campaign. This campaign had important military and political significance in the final phases of the Civil War. The

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60McPherson, 846-50; Foote, 1021-22.

earthworks, landscape, some of the roads, and the Kolb House at Kennesaw are tangible links to the Atlanta Campaign. The role of the battle in the Atlanta campaign, the grand strategy of the war, battlefield tactics, and the life of the average soldier are represented by these resources.

The historic resources dating to the time of the battle have varying levels of significance. The entire eleven miles of earthworks are nationally significant under National Register Criteria A, B, and C. The earthworks clearly indicate the areas of combat during the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain, a crucial engagement in the Atlanta Campaign, and were built at the orders of Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman and General Joseph E. Johnston. Although not nominated under Criterion D, the earthworks may also possess information potential. The Kolb House contributes to the national significance of the battlefield under Criterion A and is locally significant as an example of an early farm house under Criterion C. It is the only remaining park building that existed during the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain and a rare example from an early period of Cobb County settlement. A significant military action, known as the Battle of Kolb’s Farm, occurred near the house.

The Kolb Cemetery, located adjacent to the Kolb House, contributes to the national significance of the battlefield and is locally significant under Criterion A because it represents burial customs among early settlers. The New Salem Church Cemetery, which is associated with the ruins of New Salem Church, is also locally significant under Criterion A for nineteenth- and early twentieth-century burial practices. Additionally, the New Salem Church site may possess archeological potential, because the church possibly served as a Confederate field hospital. The Kolb Cemetery and possibly the New Salem Church Cemetery are among the few remaining resources that existed during the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain.

Gilbert, Old John Ward, Stilesboro, Dallas, and Burnt Hickory Roads were all present at the time of the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain. Stilesboro, Dallas, and Burnt Hickory Roads contribute to the national significance of the battlefield under Criterion A, because they served as transportation corridors for the approaching armies. The antebellum road, which was used by the Confederates to haul artillery to Big Kennesaw’s summit, also contributes to the national significance. Gilbert and Old John Ward Roads are locally significant under Criterion A for their association with early Cobb County settlement.

2. Integrity/Criteria Considerations

Integrity is the ability of a property to convey its historic significance. The seven aspects of integrity are location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association. These are applied to each contributing property and measured against its level of significance and the criteria from which it derives its significance. For example, a property that is significant under Criterion A for its association with an event is not held to the same
standard of integrity as one that derives its significance from Criterion C, as an example of art or architecture. For a property to contribute to the historic district, it must possess several, and usually most, of the aspects of integrity.

The integrity of the earthworks varies from feature to feature. All earthworks retain integrity of location, and most exhibit integrity of design, setting, materials, feeling, and association. In the best cases, a front and rear ditch and a well-defined parapet wall may be visible. Most of the earthworks are in stable condition, with grasses and other benign understory growth checking erosion. In limited areas, the integrity of the earthworks has been compromised, largely because of erosion or visitor impacts. For example, on Kennesaw Mountain and its 'spur, trails pass through the earthworks to provide access for visitors. In other areas, particularly among the artillery positions located along the ridgelines, the protective foliage covering the works has been killed by visitors walking along the crest of the parapet walls. All earthworks within the bounds of the park retain integrity as archeological resources that are likely to yield further information.

The Kolb House exhibits a high degree of integrity of design, workmanship, and association. The NPS in 1963 rehabilitated the exterior to its 1830s appearance, removing later clapboard siding to reveal the original hewn logs. Most of the original 1830s historic fabric was retained in the rehabilitation. The interior, although adapted to serve as park quarters, still reflects the original Georgian plan. Integrity of setting and feeling have been compromised by the loss of surrounding farm acreage and outbuildings and the development of Powder Springs Road into a five-lane arterial road. However, the house remains in its original location and clearly identifies the historically significant site.

Kolb Cemetery, which contains eleven marked graves, retains integrity of location, design, materials, workmanship, and association. Integrity of setting and feeling are lessened slightly by the loss of farm outbuildings and heavy traffic on Powder Springs Road. New Salem Cemetery, containing approximately twenty-four marked graves, has substantial integrity of location, design, setting, materials, feeling, and association. The church foundation ruins possess integrity of location and setting and mark the site of a building present at the time of the battle and possibly used as a Confederate field hospital.

Stilesboro, Dallas, and Burnt Hickory Roads exhibit integrity of location and design. Although paved and widened, they maintain their nineteenth-century roadbeds. Where they pass through the battlefield, these roads possess considerable integrity of setting, feeling, and association, allowing visitors to understand how troops reached their positions before and during the battle. Gilbert and Old John Ward Roads also retain a substantial degree of integrity.

Several properties that contribute to the significance of the historic district under Context A also meet various Criteria Considerations. The Kolb and Old
Salem Church cemeteries meet Criteria Consideration D for their association with the Battle of the Kennesaw Mountain. The Kolb Cemetery is also significant for its association with the Kolb House, the only extant building in the district dating to the battle. The New Salem Church foundation ruins, adjacent to the New Salem Church Cemetery, meet Criteria Consideration A, based on their association with the battle. The Grave of the Unknown U.S. Soldier, the only known interment at the battlefield, meets Criterion Consideration C.

3. Contributing Properties under Context A

Earthworks (1864)
Kolb House (c. 1836)
Kolb Cemetery (1839-)
Stilesboro Road (c. 1840-1864)
Gilbert Road (c. 1840-1864)
Old John Ward Road (c. 1840-1864)
Dallas Road (c. 1840-1864)
Burnt Hickory Road (c. 1840-1864)
Big Kennesaw Antebellum Road (c. 1840-1864)
New Salem Church Site (c. 1840-1864)
Grave of the Unknown U.S. Soldier (1864; 1934)

4. Noncontributing Properties

Shiloh Church and School Site
Hardage House Site
Cass House Site
Ballenger House Site
Tierce House Site

All of these sites are vacant and have not been determined eligible by archeological investigations (only Ballenger has been surveyed.) 62 No standing structures remain, although the park has placed interpretive signs at these locations, and as sites they provide continuity to the historic landscape.

Marietta-Cassville Road
Powder Springs Road

Both of these roads have been altered and do not meet integrity requirements. Powder Springs Road is currently five lanes of asphalt with curb and gutter in some places and has been straightened. The Marietta-Cassville Road, within and outside of the park, has been fragmented and no longer maintains integrity of setting, feeling, or association.

B. Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park: The Commemoration of American Battlefields and National Park Development, 1887-1942

The nucleus of today's Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park was a sixty-acre tract at Cheatham Hill acquired and preserved through the efforts of Union veterans. The history of the park's development properly begins with the broader theme of Civil War memorial activity. An examination of privately sponsored memorial activity at Kennesaw Mountain follows and leads into the history of Federal involvement at Kennesaw. The War Department administered the park from 1928 to 1933. National Park Service administration began in 1933 and included development work performed by Civilian Conservation Corps Camp 431, located in the park from 1938 to 1942.

Early Battlefield Commemoration: Civil War Memorial Activity and the Establishment of Kennesaw Mountain Battlefield Park, 1887-1933

The Civil War was a watershed event in American history and a signal event in the lives of all who participated in it. Of the 2.75 million Americans who saw action in the war, 621,000 died and 470,000 were wounded. Efforts to memorialize the fallen and recognize and aid veterans and their survivors began even before combat ceased. The creation of the first Civil War national military parks in the 1890s was preceded by twenty-five years of private and state memorial efforts. Commemorative efforts began in the mid-1860s with the formation of local memorial associations in the South, the creation of Union soldiers’ cemeteries at Gettysburg and Antietam, the preservation of land at Gettysburg, the establishment of national cemeteries by the Federal government, and the creation of veterans’ groups, mostly in the North. In the early postwar years, commemoration took different forms in the North and the South. In the 1880s and 1890s, as the veteran population aged, commemorative activity expanded, and contact between ex-Confederates and ex-Federals increased. Blue-gray reunions, often held on the battlefields, became common. The interaction at reunions, a spirit of sectional reconciliation and commemoration of the sacrifice of both sides, and an increased appreciation of the nation's past all contributed to the successful movement to establish national battlefield parks.

In the South, independent, local memorial associations sprang up rapidly during and after the war. Many originated in women's wartime groups organized to do hospital and relief work. The new groups often took the name of Ladies' Memorial Associations (LMAs), but men provided crucial, especially financial, support. The proper burial of the Confederate dead was the immediate concern of the LMAs, and the individual groups established many cemeteries across the South. Most cemeteries were located in towns, although a few were established at battle sites. After the cemeteries were laid out, the LMAs turned their attention to memorials. In the first twenty years after the war, these memorials, which typically took the form of stone obelisks, were commonly
erected in cemeteries. In 1900, local southern memorial associations affiliated with an umbrella group, the Confederated Southern Memorial Association (CSMA). The CSMA assisted local LMAs and raised funds for a Jefferson Davis monument in Richmond, unveiled in 1907.

The Confederate Cemetery at Marietta, Georgia, is a typical result of memorial activity in the postwar South. The cemetery received its first interments during the war and was officially dedicated in 1866. Catherine Winn of the Ladies' Aid Society and Mary Green of the Georgia Memorial Association spearheaded the establishment of the cemetery. The Georgia legislature appropriated $3,500 in 1866 to allow the collection of remains from all the north Georgia battlefields for reinterment at the Marietta cemetery. The cemetery contains 3,000 graves, and its Confederate Monument was unveiled July 7, 1908.

The Union possessed greater resources than the Confederacy for establishing military cemeteries, which were initially created through state and local action. The State of Pennsylvania acted immediately in 1863 to lay out a cemetery at Gettysburg. By the time of President Lincoln's famous address dedicating the Gettysburg cemetery on November 19, 1863, landscape gardener William Saunders had laid out a circular burial ground with space for a monument at the center. Arlington National Cemetery was also established during the war, on Mrs. Robert E. Lee's confiscated estate just across the Potomac from Washington. Congress soon authorized a system of national cemeteries, at Civil War battlefields and elsewhere, in legislation enacted on February 22, 1867. The Federal government accepted responsibility for the cemeteries at the Gettysburg and Antietam battlefields in the 1870s.

Ultimately, twenty-six national cemeteries were established at or near Civil War battlefields. The Federal role in creating and maintaining Civil War

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63A representative early Confederate monument is the obelisk in Atlanta's Oakland Cemetery, unveiled April 26, 1874 (Ralph W. Widener, Jr., Confederate Monuments: Enduring Symbols of the South and the War Between the States [Washington, D.C.: Ralph W. Widener, Jr., 1982], 42).

64Gaines M. Foster, Ghosts of the Confederacy: Defeat, the Lost Cause, and the Emergence of the New South, 1865 to 1913 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 36-41, 158; History of the Confederate Memorial Associations of the South (New Orleans: Confederated Southern Memorial Association, 1904), 32.

65History of the Confederate Memorial Associations of the South, 140-43; Widener, 67.
battlefield cemeteries prefigured the creation of national military parks some twenty years later.66

A cemetery for Union dead was established in Marietta in 1866 on land donated by the Henry G. Cole, a Marietta citizen who had opposed secession. Cole's initial proposal for a cemetery for the fallen of both sides was rejected, and on July 31, 1866, he conveyed twenty acres to the Federal government for a national cemetery. By 1870, the remains of 9,973 Union soldiers had been transferred to Marietta National Cemetery. Remains came from the battlefields of north Georgia and from a short-lived national cemetery in Montgomery, Alabama.67

The formation of Civil War veterans' organizations closely followed the movement to establish cemeteries. These organizations formed earlier in the North than in the South. The Grand Army of the Republic (GAR), which emerged as the largest and most influential of the many Union veterans' groups, was organized in Springfield, Illinois, in 1866. Drawing its membership from all ranks of Union Civil War veterans, the GAR adopted a paramilitary structure. Local posts or camps were organized into statewide departments, which were presided over by a national commander-in-chief. Yearly national encampments brought together veterans from hundreds of posts scattered across the country. The GAR experienced an initial spurt of growth in the late 1860s, a period of decline in the 1870s, and a substantial rebirth in the 1880s, reaching a peak membership of 400,000 in 1890. In its mature phase, the GAR lobbied on issues important to veterans, established old soldiers' homes, sponsored monuments and patriotic observances, and worked to create national battlefield parks.46

Although by far the largest, the GAR was not the only Union veterans' group. Several Federal army societies formed in the 1860s: the Society of the Army of the Tennessee in 1865, the Society of the Army of the Cumberland in 1868, and the Society of the Army of the Potomac in 1869. Other northern veterans' groups restricted membership based on officer status or length of service. Among these were the Military Order of the Loyal Legion (founded 1865), the Union Veteran Legion (founded 1884), and the Union Veterans' Union (founded


1886). Many individual companies and regiments also formed organizations. A primary focus of most unit organizations was socializing at annual reunions, but many erected battlefield monuments. Veterans’ groups successfully lobbied state legislatures to appropriate funds for the erection of state monuments on numerous fields.\(^6\)

Pressing economic needs and the social and political upheavals of Reconstruction hampered the formation of comparable Confederate veterans’ groups. Additionally, any Reconstruction-era regional organization of ex-Confederates risked being charged with fomenting disloyalty. A few local benevolent societies with substantial Confederate veteran membership appeared in the 1860s. In May 1869 in New Orleans, prominent former Confederate officers formed the Southern Historical Society (SHS). In 1870, an Association of the Army of Northern Virginia (AANVA) was formed in Richmond, and an Association of the Army of Tennessee appeared in 1877. The SHS and AANVA focused on the erection of a monument to Robert E. Lee in Richmond.\(^7\) In the 1880s, more Confederate army units held reunions, and some established permanent organizations. The organization of local veterans’ posts into statewide groups in Virginia, Tennessee, and Georgia in 1887-1888 preceded the formation of the United Confederate Veterans (UCV) in June 1889. Employing an organizational structure similar to the GAR’s, the UCV spread across the South in the 1890s, with membership reaching approximately 80,000 by 1903.\(^7\)

While in the North veterans usually led the way, in the South, women played a prominent role in commemorative activities. Several local groups calling themselves Daughters of the Confederacy sprang up in the 1890s, and the United Daughters of the Confederacy (UDC) was founded in 1894 to coordinate activity across the South. UDC chapters raised funds for monuments, promoted observance of Confederate holidays (such as Confederate Memorial Day and Robert E. Lee’s birthday), maintained Confederate museums, and promoted a southern interpretation of the Civil War, emphasizing states’ rights. The UDC often cooperated with the UCV but maintained its independence from the veterans’ group.\(^7\)

The commemorative efforts of veterans’ groups changed over time. In the early postwar period, various army societies urged the completion of statues and monuments honoring generals. Reunions were always an important commemorative activity and initially included only veterans who had fought on the same side. In the 1880s, the bitterness of excombatants began to diminish, and veterans

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\(^6\)Davies, 29-30, 36-37.

\(^7\)More than 100,000 people participated in ceremonies marking the unveiling of the Lee Monument on May 29, 1890 (Foster, 100-101).

\(^7\)Foster, 50-53, 91, 104-7.

\(^7\)Foster, 172-73; Davies, 41-42.
focused on common wartime experiences. Contacts between former Confederates and former Federals steadily increased. National GAR encampments began to invite ex-Confederates to participate. Reciprocal visits of individual northern and southern veterans’ posts began in the early 1880s, and more formal combined blue-gray reunions and joint ceremonies became increasingly common as the decade wore on. A blue-gray reunion at Gettysburg in 1882 was followed by others at Fredericksburg, Antietam, and Kennesaw Mountain. The emphasis was shifting from which side was “right” to an appreciation of the valor and sacrifice of the foe. 73

The spirit of reconciliation manifested in the blue-gray reunions, coupled with veterans’ growing interest in securing their place in history, helped advance the cause of Civil War national military parks. Veterans urged the Federal government to take over from states and army societies the responsibility of protecting battlefield sites and marking unit positions. As early as 1880, Congress appropriated funds to study and survey the Gettysburg battlefield. The GAR lobbied for a national military park at Gettysburg, the Society of the Army of the Cumberland pressed for one at the Chickamauga and Chattanooga battlefields, and the Society of the Army of the Tennessee wanted a park at Vicksburg. In 1890, Congress established the first Civil War national military park at Chickamauga and Chattanooga under War Department administration. In keeping with the growing spirit of national reconciliation, the legislation stipulated that all troop positions, Confederate and Federal, were to be marked. National military parks followed at Shiloh (1894), Gettysburg (1895), and Vicksburg (1899), along with a national battlefield site at Antietam in 1890. 74

Memorial Efforts at Kennesaw Mountain
Union veterans’ groups led the initial efforts to preserve and commemorate the Kennesaw Mountain battlefields. In 1887, veterans held a blue-gray reunion at Kennesaw Mountain. 75 After the war, veterans of the Third Brigade, Second Division, of the XIV Federal Army Corps, which made the assault on Cheatham Hill, formed the Colonel Dan McCook Brigade Association, named in honor of their fallen commander. The association, which held its first reunion in August 1900, resolved to purchase the land at Cheatham Hill where the brigade attacked and Colonel McCook was mortally wounded. In December 1899, Lansing J. Dawdy, a veteran of the 86th Illinois regiment, purchased a sixty-acre tract that included the Federal and Confederate trenches at Cheatham Hill. In 1900, Dawdy conveyed this tract to Martin Kingman and John McGinnis, who acted on

73Davies, 226, 249; Paul H. Buck, The Road to Reunion 1865-1900 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1937), 257-58; Foster, 67-68.
74John C. Paige and Jerome A. Greene, Administrative History of Chickamauga and Chattanooga National Military Park (Denver: National Park Service, Denver Service Center, 1983), 9-10; Davies, 228; Lee, 31-35.
75Buck, 258.
behalf of the Kennesaw Memorial Association, a nonprofit organization formally incorporated under Illinois law in April 1901. ⁷⁶

The Kennesaw Memorial Association attempted to raise funds from Union veterans to erect a monument at Cheatham Hill. Contributions from veterans proved insufficient, and the association secured a $20,000 appropriation from the state of Illinois in June 1913. Illinois Governor Charles S. Deneen appointed three officers of the association, Dawdy, William A. Payton, and Dr. J. B. Shawgo, to a commission charged with carrying out the work of erecting a monument. The commission contracted with the McNeel Marble Company of Marietta to erect a large monument to Illinois troops at the site of the attack on Cheatham Hill. ⁷⁷ The $25,000 monument was unveiled on June 27, 1914, the fiftieth anniversary of the battle. A large number of veterans, Governor Edward Dunne of Illinois, and a contingent from the United Daughters of the Confederacy attended the ceremony. The 25-foot-high monument of Georgia marble features a square base and a tapering shaft. On the west side are seven-foot bronze figures of a Union soldier flanked by two robed allegorical figures. Several smaller battlefield markers were erected at Cheatham Hill in this period. These included separate memorials to Captain Neighbour, Captain Fellows, and Sergeant Coffee, a marker at the McCook Brigade's jumping off point, and a stone arch marking the tunnel begun by Federal troops attempting to undermine the Confederate trenches. ⁷⁸

**Federal Government Commemorative Activity at Kennesaw Mountain**

The northern veterans who led the effort to erect a memorial at Kennesaw intended from the start that a national park be created at the battlefield. Unsuccessful congressional attempts in 1910 and 1912 to establish a national military park at Kennesaw Mountain preceded enactment on February 8, 1917, of a law authorizing the Secretary of War to accept title to the sixty-acre tract at Cheatham Hill from the Kennesaw Memorial Association as a national battlefield site. Problems with the chain of title delayed the conveyance of the tract to

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⁷⁶"Program, First Reunion of the Third Brigade, 2d Division, 14th Army Corps"; "Minutes of Business Meeting, Colonel Dan McCook Brigade Association, May 15, 1901"; Capps, 5-6.

⁷⁷McNeel Marble Company aggressively solicited memorial business from United Daughters of the Confederacy chapters and built many monuments across the South (Foster, 167-68).

the War Department until 1928. In the interim, the Kennesaw Memorial Association hired the Reverend J. A. Jones as resident caretaker. 79

In April 1926, Federal legislation established a three-man commission to inspect Kennesaw Mountain and other Civil War battlefield sites in north Georgia. The legislation entrusted this commission, composed of an officer of the Army Corps of Engineers and one veteran each from the Union and Confederate armies, to determine whether a national military park, which would represent the Atlanta campaign, should be established. The commission considered Kennesaw Mountain the most suitable battlefield for designation as a national military park, based on its significance to the campaign, its intrinsic scenic value, and its accessibility. 80

Concurrent with the commission's actions at Kennesaw, Congress passed legislation on June 11, 1926, that established a comprehensive system of battlefield classification, drafted by the War Department, which created standards for determining the appropriate level of commemoration. In the post-World War I period, private commemorative interests persuaded Congressmen to introduce numerous bills to establish national military parks, most associated with Civil War battlefields. Until 1926, Congress had appointed individual commissions to inspect and recommend preservation alternatives for many Civil War sites. In that year alone, the Committee on Military Affairs received twenty-eight bills requesting that Congress establish fourteen national military parks and appropriate six million dollars for the inspection of battlefield sites and the erection of markers and tablets. 81

Prior to this national initiative, the Kennesaw Mountain battlefield survey commission recommended the establishment of Kennesaw Mountain National Military Park. Introduced in December 1926, the legislation to create a national military park at Kennesaw did not pass, and repeated congressional efforts over the next nine years to establish the park were unsuccessful. On June 10, 1933, President Franklin Roosevelt signed Executive Order 6166, transferring War Department military and historical parks to the National Park Service. Among the properties transferred was the sixty-acre tract at Kennesaw Mountain, known as Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Site, which still constituted the only property administered by the Federal government at the battlefield. 82

79Capps, 6-7; Senate Bill S. 6391, 61st Congress, February 15, 1910; Senate Bill S. 7099, 62nd Congress, June 11, 1912; Public Law 44 Stat. 588, February 8, 1917.

80Capps, 6-7.

81Lee, 47.

The June 1926 legislation made the War Department responsible for surveying all of the nation's battlefields. Using a classification system created by Lt. Col. C. A. Bach, Chief, Historical Section, Army War College, in 1925, the department, armed with survey data, would determine which sites should be considered for national military park status (Class I); those that would be designated by marking the lines of battle (Class IIa); and those that would receive only a monument or marker from the U. S. government (Class IIb). The War Department conducted the national survey between 1926 and 1932 and by 1929 had recommended the establishment of two Class I battlefields, nine Class IIa, and fifty Class IIb sites.\footnote{Lee, 47-49.}

For the War Department, this classification system determined how large of an area would be preserved and the extent of interpretive or commemorative efforts. Most battlefields, especially Revolutionary War sites, received Class IIb classifications, which recommended some type of monumentation to mark the battlefield site. Class IIa battlefields, like Kennesaw, required the acquisition and marking of the battle lines, clearly delineated at Kennesaw by the miles of earthworks constructed by Union and Confederate forces. This preservation tactic, popularly known as "the Antietam Plan," preserved the smallest amount of land possible that enabled the War Department to interpret the battle's primary action. The Antietam Plan assumed that the countryside adjacent to abandoned battlefields would remain rural without requiring War Department ownership and responsibility for the land.\footnote{Lee, 39-40.}

The War Department accomplished very little at Kennesaw Mountain over the five years it actively administered the site. Because the site was never designated a national military park, no additional land acquisition occurred beyond the original sixty acres. Between 1928 and 1932, the superintendent of Marietta National Cemetery administered the battlefield, but few funds were available for improvement or maintenance at Kennesaw. In 1932, a part-time caretaker established residence on a farm near the site and witnessed the construction of a three-quarter-mile entrance road from John Ward Road and the erection of some boundary fencing. Despite plans for better fencing, roads, underbrush clearing near the monument and trenches, and partial reconstruction of the earthworks, no other work was completed by the War Department prior to the site's transfer to the NPS.\footnote{Capps, 7-8.}

The NPS approach to battlefield commemoration differed substantially from War Department policies. In general, the War Department made sporadic efforts to interpret or provide access to its battlefield sites, maintaining them largely for use as study aids for succeeding generations of military men. The National Park Service, established in 1916, was at first strongly oriented to the
preservation of natural and wilderness areas. Nevertheless, as early as 1917 the question of consolidating all historical and military parks under National Park Service authority was debated. The background of the NPS, its evolving mission, and the development of Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park with Civilian Conservation Corps labor are treated below.

Expansion and Development: National Park Service Administration and the CCC, 1933-1942.

The national park system, well established in the west, experienced its greatest growth east of the Mississippi just before and during the Great Depression. Several factors contributed to this growth: the authorization of Great Smoky Mountains, Mammoth Cave, and Shenandoah National Parks in 1926; the establishment of Colonial National Monument and the reconstruction of Washington’s birthplace in 1930; the construction of Skyline Drive begun in 1930-31; and finally, the 1933 transfer to NPS of all battlefields, national monuments, and historic sites administered by the War Department, the Department of Agriculture, and in Washington, D.C. These developments physically expanded the national park system and significantly enlarged NPS’s agenda beyond conservation of natural areas.

The Civilian Conservation Corps (CCC), established March 31, 1933, under the Federal Unemployment Relief Act, significantly facilitated the administration and expansion of historic and natural parks by the National Park Service (NPS). The CCC also represented a challenging experiment in social reform, which spawned many subsequent New Deal programs. Through CCC projects, the 1933-1942 period saw a long-held conservation and preservation ethic toward public lands enacted on a national scale, and the national parks benefitted broadly. CCC improvements, which included building roads and trails and providing historic interpretive programs, greatly increased public access. Reforestation, land reclamation, and landscaping enhanced the natural beauty of emerging national parks. In addition, many new state parks were developed, some adjacent to national parks, to provide recreation areas for the increasing numbers of park visitors.

The CCC represented a culmination of conservation philosophies, recreational needs, and an expanding Federal role in natural preservation. The program was heartily embraced by lawmakers and the public alike, because it responded quickly and practically to the greatest economic disaster the United States had yet experienced. Roosevelt conceived of an Advisory Council with representatives from the Departments of War, Labor, Agriculture, and Interior that would administer CCC camps and work. The Labor Department would initiate nationwide recruiting; the Army would condition and transport the enrollees and

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5 Albright, Origins of National Park Service Administration of Historic Sites, 5.
operate the camps; and the National Park Service and the Forest Service would create work programs and supervise work assignments.\textsuperscript{87}

NPS Director Horace M. Albright served on the Advisory Board and saw great potential for the CCC within the national park system, especially in long-ignored road- and trail-building projects. Albright quickly increased the technical staff of the NPS in preparation for the land conservation work and designed park development projects that the CCC would carry out. The NPS hired hundreds of landscape architects, historians, foresters, and engineers to design and supervise CCC operations.\textsuperscript{88} The propitious addition of the military and historic parks, sites, and national monuments to the NPS in 1933 conveniently coincided with the newly created CCC.

The passage of the Federal Unemployment Relief Act (FURA) in March 1933 introduced a new role for the Federal government. Under this Act, Emergency Conservation Work (ECW), later known as the CCC, was created. Congress appropriated funds to the ECW Director, Robert Fechner, who in turn allocated funds to participating Federal agencies. All work performed by ECW labor would be performed on public lands and directed by Federal agencies. Between 1933 and 1935, Congress created numerous work relief programs under the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA) of June 1933. In contrast to the ECW, programs emanating from NIRA entitled states to Federal relief grants that would fund public works projects. Two popular relief agencies emerging from the NIRA, the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) and the Public Works Administration (PWA), allocated Federal funds to states and municipal governments, provided these agencies contributed matching funds. In 1935, the Works Progress Administration, which replaced the PWA, greatly expanded the type of public works performed with Federal and state funding. Early New Deal public works programs, like the PWA, concentrated solely on construction projects. New Deal programs after 1935 also provided relief to unemployed white-collar workers, professionals, and large numbers of unskilled women.\textsuperscript{89}

The CCC served several purposes, but its primary significance lay in creating useful work for unemployed youths. In 1933, three years into the Depression, national unemployment figures for youths spiked to 25 percent, and 30 percent of those employed labored only part-time. Unemployment figures for the nation nearly equaled the youthful rate. In 1930, one year after the stock market crash, national unemployment rates reached 9 percent and continued to rise: to 16 percent in 1931, 24 percent in 1932, and to a zenith of more than 25 percent in 1933. Depressed economic conditions had plagued agricultural areas for nearly a decade, and careless husbandry combined with drought and pestilence

\textsuperscript{87}Paige, 10-11.

\textsuperscript{88}Albright, The Birth of the National Park Service, 289-90.

\textsuperscript{89}Paige, Appendix A, Selected Draft Legislation, Legislation, and Executive Orders Affecting the Civilian Conservation Corps, 162-78; Shannon, 177-80, 191-93.
slashed rural production capacity. The cities, especially industrial bases, also witnessed deflated production and massive unemployment. Roosevelt introduced the Emergency Conservation Work Act to Congress within two months of his inauguration, and it was eagerly passed. Although hardly a panacea for unemployment, it foreshadowed the many New Deal economic and employment relief initiatives to follow.

Initially, CCC enrollees were inducted from urban areas, where unemployment was highest, especially among the unskilled. Roosevelt envisioned the program operating on three levels: 1) as a direct relief program, through grants to states; 2) as a large-scale public works project and; 3) as a program to prevent mismanagement of land, specifically addressing soil erosion and forest conservation. The first three camps established in the east were in Shenandoah National Park and Colonial National Monument in May 1933, drawing enrollees from eastern seaboard cities where unemployment was the greatest.91 Camps were established first in national parks and later in state parks. The Army administered camps composed of approximately two hundred single men between the ages of eighteen and twenty-five. Enrollees were paid $30 a month; $25 of their monthly salary was sent directly to their needy families.

The CCC program established a unique relationship among the Army, the National Park Service, and the United States Forest Service (USFS). NPS and USFS Advisory Council representatives immediately recognized that their agencies could not administer the camps. Therefore, the Army, with an established regimen and considerable personnel, maintained camp life. Early camps resembled Army field camps with canvas tents, reveille at 6:00 A.M., meals taken at the mess hall, communal bathing facilities, and limited freedom outside of the camp. Junior Army officers generally commanded the camps, and a military doctor often served several camps in a large geographical vicinity.92 Within a year, ready-to-assemble camp buildings replaced the tents, and the temporary nature of camps lessened, although these buildings were moveable. When camps were located in national parks, the NPS park superintendent planned and directed work for the enrollees. Park superintendents and state park directors could supplement their CCC labor pools with skilled craftsmen, identified as local experienced men (LEMs); World War I veterans, who generally

91Paige, 7, 15.
did little manual labor because of their age; and, primarily in the west, Native Americans. Many regular CCC enrollees had little experience with manual labor or construction techniques, and LEMs proved valuable to the program. Age and marital status requirements did not apply to LEMs and World War I veterans, and some, if married, lived outside of camps.

CCC enrollments lasted six months and could be extended for a total of two years service. Once the program was in place, Roosevelt authorized the second six-month enrollment period, from October 1933 to March 1934, and hoped to employ 300,000 regular enrollees, 25,000 veterans, and an equal number of LEMs. In 1935, the Emergency Relief Appropriation Act extended Emergency Conservation Work for two years to 1937, doubled its size to 600,000 men, and relaxed age requirements; enrollees could enlist at seventeen years and remain until age twenty-eight. By October 1933, the NPS operated 102 camps within national parks, and the number of camps in state natural and recreation areas nearly doubled the NPS operation.

Two separate agendas existed, both administered by the National Park Service: the make-over of existing national parks—especially the newly acquired battlefields, historic sites, and national monuments—and the establishment or revitalization of state recreation and natural areas. For many years, conservationists and preservationists agreed that increased visitation to national parks threatened the integrity of these unique resources. Stephen T. Mather, the first director for the NPS, consistently urged the development of state parks with natural recreational areas that would act as buffers to the national parks. The CCC significantly enlarged state park systems and improved the condition of new and existing national parks.

13 John A. Salmon, *The CCC, 1933-1942: A New Deal Case Study* (Durham, North Carolina: Duke University Press, 1967), 34. John Paige refers to the LEMs as locally employed men, but Salmon's term better describes the roles these men played in the CCC organization.

14 Paige, 9-15.


16 In 1921, Mather sponsored a state park conference to encourage the development of state parks and to reduce the wear and tear on federal holdings (Newton, 533).
Most CCC enrollees performed labor that improved national park infrastructures through road and trail construction, reforestation, and soil erosion control. The CCC program also greatly enlarged the professional staffs of the national parks. Landscape architects, foresters, and engineers designed and supervised CCC work projects, within both state and national parks. Professional historians, supplemented by college students in the summers, created interpretive programs and engaged in numerous research projects. Conservation, preservation, historic interpretation, and landscape planning and design became key goals for NPS professional staffs. Eventually, funding for improvement projects in state and national parks required drafting master plans developed by NPS technical staffs. In addition, the administrative hierarchy of the NPS experienced growth and change. In 1933, the ECW Advisory Board created four regional offices that administered the state parks program. By 1936, Interior Secretary L. Harold Ickes announced that the NPS also would adopt a regional hierarchy to administer the ECW programs within the national parks.

The CCC program reached its largest enrollment in 1935, although funding from Congress continued until 1942. In 1935, Roosevelt began efforts to reduce the ECW program in order to convince Congress to permanently establish a conservation work program for the state and national parks. The NPS reduced its active camps from 446 to 340 in 1936 and converted some temporary technical positions to permanent NPS employment. In 1937, Roosevelt asked Congress to permanently establish the ECW program. Congress responded with a three-year funding package that formally changed the name of the ECW to the Civilian Conservation Corps and required camps to establish ten hours per week of general education or vocational training classes for enrollees. Another attempt in 1939 to establish a permanent CCC program failed. By 1940, the NPS had to reduce its supervisory personnel without drastically altering work projects. The agency created central service units within NPS regional offices to handle design and technical matters and abolished these positions in the individual camps. By 1941, the NPS discontinued many camps that could not maintain 165 men per camp, eliminating 135 camps between September and November 1941. When the United States entered World War II in December 1941, NPS abolished all but 89 camps, which directly related to the war effort. In 1942, Congress discontinued funding for the CCC program, and it was informally abolished.

Creating a Park: Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park
Legislation enacted on June 26, 1935, established the Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park under the authority of the NPS. The act authorized expansion of the park to include Big and Little Kennesaw Mountains and other significant sections of the battlefield. An appropriation of $100,000 was

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7Paige, 45; Newton, 576, 578-80.

8Paige, 21, 45-52; Newton, 540, 576.

9Paige, 21-36.
included for land acquisition and park development. Between 1933 and 1938, the NPS relied on labor and funding from the Civil Works Administration (CWA). These improvements occurred without the benefit of a master plan for overall park development and largely were concentrated at Cheatham Hill, which contained the sixty acres preserved by the Illinois veterans.

Through CWA funding and labor, the NPS accomplished some reforestation and erosion control and initiated field and earthwork restoration projects. By 1935, the CWA had constructed a parking lot at Cheatham Hill, planted grass in key areas, and created a trail layout. Future work plans included the construction of a custodian’s residence, a utility building, a water and sewer system, a north-south highway, an administration building, and a new road to Big Kennesaw. These elements were essential to providing the most basic visitor services at the park.

The CCC, which established a camp at Kennesaw Mountain on June 3, 1938, continued the work begun by the CWA. The Marietta camp, GA NP-4, Company 431, also known as "Camp T. M. Brumby," traveled from a disbanded camp at Rutledge, Georgia, and established itself just south of U.S. 41, near the northeast park boundary. Composed largely of local Georgia men, the camp consisted of twenty-two prefabricated wood buildings bolted together and placed on concrete and brick pier foundations. The circular camp site had a central parade ground marked by cedars and was enclosed by a camp road. The site covered approximately sixty acres. Between 185 and 190 men occupied four barracks.

The CCC provided the labor necessary to complete the transition from farmland to parkland. The CCC at Kennesaw constructed and landscaped roads, fought fires, demolished historic and nonhistoric housing within the park boundaries, and guided interpretive tours. For four years, the Kennesaw CCC spent most of its time on road work. The crew improved drainage ditches and shoulders, landscaped the slopes and land adjacent to the road shoulders, and erected entrance signs at the park boundaries along the public roads that traversed the park. U.S. Highway 41, located on the northern boundary of the park, provided the primary vehicular access to Big Kennesaw Mountain and the CCC camp. The State Highway Department agreed to aid the CCC efforts to improve the shoulders and ditches along U.S. 41 and provided some equipment. Two other roads within the park, Burnt Hickory Road and Dallas Road, passed directly through major areas of conflict associated with the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain and also received some shoulder and ditch improvements. The CCC opened a quarry in October 1939 and purchased a rock crusher to produce materials to grade the

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101 Capps, 15-17.
inadequate dirt roads traversing the park and eventually constructed a new road to Cheatham Hill.\textsuperscript{103}

The result of these road improvements clearly established the boundaries of the park through vegetation and signs. Within the park, CCC road improvements are characterized by steep road cuts with grass cover fading into deep pine woods. Although local stone was available—the CCC operated a stone quarry on the side of Big Kennesaw for road construction—the corps used brick to build park structures and incorporated modern, functional design elements into these structures. The few structures built by the CCC at Kennesaw did not reflect traditional rustic park architecture.

Most of the CCC work at Kennesaw proceeded without an approved Master Plan. Between 1938 and 1942, the NPS Eastern Branch of Plans and Design developed several layouts for general park development intended as parts of the Master Plan. These plans incorporated NPS architectural design criteria—typically functional and devoid of rustic stylistic detail by the late 1930s—and standardized spacial relationships among visitor services, historic and scenic areas, and functional park management buildings. Typically, the NPS designed visitor service structures with easy access to roads; curvilinear park roads following the land’s natural contours provided access to historic and scenic areas; and park management structures such as employee residences and maintenance facilities were built behind vegetative screens or in remote areas. Although the Eastern Branch completed numerous drawings for headquarters development, employees’ residences, interpretive exhibits, and internal park tour roads, the NPS did not accomplish comprehensive park development at Kennesaw before World War II evaporated the CCC labor force.

The Cheatham Hill road best represents the landscape design philosophy embodied in NPS improvements at Kennesaw Mountain. Although access to the Illinois Monument and the Confederate and Union earthworks at the Cheatham Hill site existed from John Ward Road, this War Department road intruded upon the battlefield and significantly damaged earthworks. In November 1939, the NPS drafted road plans that snaked an access road south from Dallas Road among earthworks on the Confederate line and terminated in a parking area just north of the Illinois Monument. This road, covered with a fine stone gravel, replaced a War Department road that approached Cheatham Hill from the northwest and cut across the open field the Federals crossed when they assaulted the Confederate salient. The new road passed several battery positions behind the Confederate forward earthworks and deposited the visitor at Mebane’s Redoubt. A foot trail directs the visitor to the Illinois Monument.

\textsuperscript{103}B. C. Yates, "Superintendent Monthly Reports" (October 1939), Records of the National Park Service, RG 79, National Archives, copies of these reports, collected by park staff, are available at the Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park library; Neil Mcl. Conley, Jr., "Investigative Report" (15 November 1938), RG 79, National Archives.
The CCC completed other work at Cheatham Hill that enhanced the visitor's experience and attempted to preserve the historic integrity of the landscape. The earthworks, swept clean of vegetation under War Department administration, were planted with grass. The corps constructed trails that avoided earthworks but circulated the visitors through the battlefield site. At Cheatham Hill, the CCC planted approximately 25,000 seedlings supplied by the Great Smoky Mountains National Park and erected a small self-help visitor information kiosk. 104

The CCC also helped improve the grounds within the park. Company 431 dug drainage ditches along U.S. 41 and planted trees. Structures not consistent with the battle period were razed. The CCC eliminated rock agricultural terraces in the vicinity of Burnt Hickory Road and restored the fields to grassy meadows. To improve public relations and prevent erosional run-off that clogged Noses [sic] Creek and John Ward Creek, located within the park, the CCC filled ditches on adjacent farmers' lands. Local residents, at first reluctant to accept the CCC camp, later praised its work, especially when the CCC worked to control forest fires that threatened private property. 105

In October 1940, the CCC began laying concrete foundations for a group of maintenance buildings at the base of Big Kennesaw Mountain. The corps constructed three buildings: two brick garage facilities with storage rooms and a metal oil house. The corps completed the buildings in August 1941 and continued with other improvements including the construction of red brick and cast iron entrance signs at each intersection of park boundary and road. Each sign has a base slightly broader than its shaft and quoining at the ends, with a cast iron plaque inscribed "National Park Service/Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park/United States Department of the Interior." Before additional work drafted by the Eastern Branch prior to 1940 could be completed—replacing the park headquarters building, constructing a superintendent’s residence, and erecting another garage in the maintenance area to form a U-shaped court—the CCC operations at Kennesaw Mountain ceased on March 10, 1942, and all remaining personnel were transferred to Fort Benning, Georgia.

Significance
Two types of historic properties located within Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park are significant under Criteria A and represent commemorative activity at the park. The Illinois Monument and the associated markers at Cheatham Hill are significant at the state level because they represent the

104 Yates, "Superintendent Monthly Reports" (August 1939), RG 79, National Archives. The superintendent reports do not specify what type of seedlings were planted at Cheatham Hill, or whether the CCC laborers at Great Smokies also helped the Marietta camp to replant the seedlings.

105 Herman Allen, interview by Retha Stephens and Lynn McFarland, 19 December 1984; "Superintendent Monthly Reports" (June 1939), RG 79, National Archives. The Superintendent reports refer to Noses Creek, which is also known as Noyes Creek.
efforts of Illinois veteran organizations to commemorate the participants of the battle in the postwar period, between 1887 and 1917. The War Department continued this commemorative theme, but did not construct any monuments or enlarge the battlefield, and no historic resources are extant that relate to this period, 1917-1933. The NPS also continued a commemorative tradition at the battlefield by enlarging the park boundaries and significantly altering the postbattle landscape. Both the Illinois Monument and Cheatham Hill Drive are locally significant under Criterion C because they possess high artistic value and embody distinctive characteristics of a type, period, or method of construction. The eight brick entrance signs are locally significant under Criterion A because they represent the New Deal-era development of the park with CCC labor.

2. Integrity/Criteria Considerations

The properties contributing to the historic district under the theme of commemoration and park development exhibit virtually all aspects of integrity: location, design, setting, materials, workmanship, feeling, and association. Although the McCook Brigade Marker is located approximately 200 feet northwest of its original location, it still retains integrity of setting, marking the approximate location where McCook’s brigade began its assault on Cheatham Hill.

It is important that those resources related to park development retain a high degree of integrity, especially in the areas of design, materials, setting, workmanship, and association. The CCC completed hundreds of construction projects in the national parks in the 1933-1942 period, mostly related to the development of park infrastructures. These projects were designed by NPS architects and landscape architects who subscribed to a well-defined design philosophy. As a result, certain stylistic features often define structures built during this era and reflect a park service design approach applied to buildings, structures, and landscapes. Because the CCC ended in 1942, Kennesaw was not comprehensively developed in accordance with an overall plan. Few of the buildings and structures planned in the 1930s for the park were erected; those that were completed remain as isolated units and do not convey a coherent, recognizable design intent. Additionally, the maintenance area has been altered by the 1974 L-shaped connection between the existing buildings. Of the CCC-era work at Kennesaw, Cheatham Hill Drive represents the prevailing NPS design philosophy and retains sufficient integrity to be considered eligible for the National Register. The eight brick entrance signs are unaltered, remain in their original locations, and retain all aspects of integrity.

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Most of the properties that contribute to the significance of the historic district under Context B also meet Criteria Consideration F. Commemorative activities at Kennesaw Mountain began in the late nineteenth century with a blue-gray reunion. In the years that followed, numerous monuments and markers were erected on the battlefield that reflect the efforts of veterans groups to honor their fallen comrades and recognize the places where they fought. This associated tradition and its symbolic value has invested the commemorative resources at Kennesaw with their own historical significance.

3. Contributing Properties

Illinois Monument (1914)
Union Tunnel Marker (ca. 1914)
McCoy Brigade Marker (ca. 1914)
Coffey Marker (ca. 1914)
Fellows Marker (ca. 1914)
Cheatham Hill Drive (1939-1940)
Entrance Signs (eight) (1938-1942)

4. Noncontributing properties

CCC Camp Site (1938-1942)
Maintenance Complex, two buildings (1939-1940)

The CCC camp was dismantled shortly after the corps moved out. Nothing remains of the original buildings except some concrete foundations that lack architectural integrity. Originally, these foundations supported paneled walls bolted together that formed the camp buildings. The camp site is not considered contributing to this context because other examples of intact CCC architecture are extant within the NPS, and as foundations the camp buildings lack architectural integrity. As a cultural landscape the camp site does not possess integrity. The remaining ruins represent only a small percentage of buildings once present. Currently, the site is defined by a grassed, mown clearing. Vegetation during the CCC’s occupation consisted of formerly cultivated fields with primary growth pines and no parade ground vegetation.

The maintenance complex consists of two 1939-1940 buildings joined by a 1970s corner addition, forming an ell-shaped plan that measures approximately 27 x 80 x 95 feet. A planned third building that would have formed a U-shaped court was never constructed. Built by the Civilian Conservation Corps, the completed buildings were known as the Motor Repair Shop and Equipment Storage Building. Separately, they consisted of a three-part building with two garage bays flanked by two toolrooms and another building with eight garage bays. Each has a side-gabled roof covered with asbestos shingles, red brick veneer, and an interior brick chimney. Utilitarian in character, the buildings do not possess architectural merit and do not represent the prevailing NPS rustic design philosophy of the period. The maintenance buildings also do not form part of
any comprehensive plan of development for the park. The 1974 addition compromises the integrity of the original configuration of the two buildings.

Mountain Road (1938-1942; 1950)

This existing paved road was partially graded, but not completed, by the CCC. The current road to the top of the mountain was completed by NPS in 1950; the road’s overlook was dedicated in 1964. Because the road was completed within the last fifty years, it is not a contributing feature.

Texas Monument (1964)
Georgia Monument (1964)
Neighbour Marker (1914; replaced 1985)

Although these monuments do not contribute to the significance of the district based on their age, they will be managed by the park as cultural resources because of their commemorative purpose.
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Boundary Justification

The Kennesaw Mountain battlefield is classified as a National Register historic district, following the guidelines established in National Register Bulletins 16 and 40. The district boundary matches the boundary of the Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park, finalized in 1947. Most of the battlefield and nearly all of the areas where significant action occurred are included within this boundary. Most areas associated with the battle that lie beyond the park boundary maintain little or no historic integrity and are not eligible for listing in the National Register.

Several islands of residentially developed land are located within the park’s perimeter boundary. These islands are excluded from the park’s legal boundary and create a complex National Register boundary. Typically, nonhistoric or incompatibly developed areas located within continuous National Register boundaries would be included in a boundary but labeled as noncontributing elements or intrusions. For national parks, the legislated boundary will usually serve as the National Register boundary delineating the park as a district, an individual property or a group of multiple properties. At Kennesaw, the developed islands are privately owned modern residential subdivisions that no longer maintain historic structural or landscape integrity. The NPS will not pursue acquisition of these islands and has no jurisdiction over these properties.

Two other types of properties potentially historically significant to the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain or local history but excluded from the proposed National Register boundary are transportation corridors and adjacent private property. The widening of Powder Springs Road in 1985-86 significantly altered the historic appearance, location, feeling, and setting associated with this resource, making it ineligible for National Register listing. Other important roads within the park, particularly Burnt Hickory, Dallas, and Stilesboro Roads, played pivotal roles in the battle and maintain most elements of historic integrity. Any alterations to these roads would affect adjacent park property and require use of park right-of-way or easements. Thus, these roads are included in the National Register nomination. The CSX railroad corridor is also significant to the history of the battle; however, private ownership of this resource deters NPS from nominating it. The NPS recognizes


\[108\] Capps, 13-14.
the historic significance of this resource and others in the immediate vicinity of the park and will encourage state, local, and private efforts to ensure their preservation.

In addition, the CSX railroad corridor, which passes through the park between Old U.S. 41 and Stilesboro Road, creates a discontinuous element at the north end of the park. This approximately 110-acre area features earthworks and potential archeological resources associated with the Battle of Kennesaw Mountain. The area is not interpreted and not easily accessible to visitors; however, the significance of the resources in this area merits its listing in the National Register as a discontinuous element of the Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park.
Photographs

Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park
Cobb County, Georgia
Photos: Maureen Carroll and Steven Moffson
Location of Negatives: NPS, SERO

1. Single gun emplacement at Federal Twenty-four-Gun Emplacement, view from NW.

2. Fort McBride, Little Kennesaw Mountain, view from E.

3. Mebane’s Redoubt, Cheatham Hill, view from N.

4. Cheatham Hill, view from N. toward salient.

5. Strahl’s Fort, view from W.

6. Kolb House, view from NE.

7. Kolb House, view from S.

8. Kolb Cemetery, view from S.

9. New Salem Church Site, view from E.

10. Marietta-Cassville Road, view from S.

11. Illinois Monument (center) and Union Tunnel Marker (lower right), view from NW.

12. Illinois Monument, view from W.

13. McCook Brigade Marker, view from W.

14. Coffey Marker, view from E.

15. Maintenance Complex, Equipment Storage Building (left) and Motor Repair Shop (right), view from N.

16. Entrance Sign marking the park’s east boundary on the north side of Burnt Hickory Road, view from E.

17. Parade Ground, CCC Camp Site with Big (right) and Little (left) Kennesaw mountains in background, view from E.

18. Bath House ruins, CCC Camp Site, view from N.
19. Georgia Monument, view from N.
20. Fellows Marker, view from E.
21. Neighbour Marker, view from E.
22. Union Tunnel and Stone Wall, view from W.
23. Grave of Unknown U.S. Soldier, view from E.
24. Texas Monument, view from SE.
25. Pigeon Hill, view from E.
26. CSX Railroad Corridor N of Old U.S. 41, view from S.
27. Dallas Road, view from W.
28. Cheatham Hill Drive, view from N.
29. Big Kennesaw Mountain Antebellum Road, view from W.
30. Artillery Positions, Big Kennesaw Mountain, view from S.
31. Gilbert Road, view from S.
32. Stilesboro Road, view from W.
33. Burnt Hickory Road, view from E.
34. Powder Springs Road, view from NE.
35. Cheatham Hill Battery, view from S.
36. Old John Ward Road, view from N.
APPENDIX D
HISTORICAL BASE MAP AND VEGETATION MAP
**Legend**

**Property**
- NPS Ownership
- Private Ownership

**Buildings, Monuments, Markers**
- Contributing to N.R. Signif.
- Noncontributing to N.R. Signif.
- Maintenance Complex
- Nonhistoric (noncontributing to N.R. Signif.)

**Earthworks**
- Contributing to N.R. Signif.
- Confederate and Union Earthworks

**Roads and Signs**
- Historic
- Contributing to N.R. Signif.
- Noncontributing to N.R. Signif.

**Sites**
- Historic
- Contributing to N.R. Signif.
- Noncontributing to N.R. Signif.

The terms "historic" and "nonhistoric" denote properties that have and have not reached fifty years of age, respectively.

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**Historical Base Map**

Kennesaw Mountain National Battlefield Park
Cobb County, Georgia

United States Department of the Interior
National Park Service

Map Compiled by Office of Cultural Resources Planning
Southeast Regional Office, 1984

Drawing No. 352/80014